



FOIA consideration	FOIA exemptions may apply		
Protective Marking:	Confidential	FOIA publication (Y/N)	No
Title:	Briefing to Management board on Public Inquiry into undercover policing		
Summary:	Implications to MPS of the Pitchford Inquiry into undercover policing		
Branch / OCU:	Assistant Commissioner's Public Inquiry Team		
Date created:	07/10/2015	Review date:	07/10/2016
		Version:	1.0
Relevant to:	AC Hewitt		
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Authorising Officer:	DSU Neil Hutchison		
Quality Assurance:	DSU Neil Hutchison		
MOPI Group	Group 4 (Subset 10)	Retention period:	100 years Public Inquiry / TNA

Pitchford Inquiry Terms of Reference

- All undercover police operations by English and Welsh forces in England and Wales since 1968
- No other agencies operations covered in ToR
- Focus on SDS and NPOIU undercover ops in relation to political/justice campaigns. Will consider contribution of tactic, motivation for, scope and collateral impact of operations
- Will consider authorization and governance arrangements including awareness of HM Gov
- Will consider selection, training and management of UCs
- Will consider adequacy of legislation, policy and judicial regulation

Key points

- The Inquiry is expected to last three years, witness cross examination to commence late 2016
- There are 156 agreed Core participants and number may increase however most of these are grouped into areas where sharing legal representation. The Commissioner, NPCC and NCA and core participants. A number of serving and former officers have been granted separate core participant status due to their concerns re conflict of interest with the MPS
- Legal representation re ex-officers is unclear (potential conflicts of interest). A number of the officers who have been granted separate core participant status are seeking for the MPS to fund their legal representation
- CC Creedon has suggested that National Undercover working group (NUWG) operate as 'clearing house' for requests from Inquiry to non-MPS forces. He and ACC John Boucher applying to NPCC for resourcing to create a small NUWG team to facilitate requests.
- All MPS contact with Pitchford Inquiry to go via AC- Public Inquiry team and DLS who form the Police and Legal Team, all disclosure will be recorded on CT Holmes. Address queries to DSU Neil Hutchison.

Confidential



- MPS will have 14 days to respond to disclosure requests, Inquiry Chair has final decision on PII and redaction of material
- Info Management is major challenge, 83 different digital and paper based archives of potential relevance. AC-PIT will need to task owning units to conduct searches and provide full disclosure.
- Units owning material will need to provide full, prompt and unredacted disclosure to AC-PIT team. This will involve prompt handing over of copies of Secret and highly sensitive material. Receipt notes will be provided and material handled to GPMS standards.
- Destruction of or willfully withholding relevant material from the Inquiry is a criminal offence. Business groups are advised to not destroy any material which could be relevant.
- MPS need to evidence contribution of UC policing to preventing/detecting crime
- Risk of internal impact on confidence of officers to volunteer as UCOs or leaders to use the tactic
- Risk of undermining use of NCND policy with impact on wider covert policing/CHIS

Risk to Confidence

- Current public awareness very focused on sexual relations and police interference with legitimate left wing groups and justice campaigns. To a lesser extent; potential of miscarriages of justice, use of dead children's identities and 'blacklisting' of workers assessed as politically subversive by SB. This is reflected in the list of core participants
- Other issues of concern include;
 - Failure to reveal to courts undermining CJ system
 - Participation in crime
 - Failure to manage officers behaviour
 - Failure to manage officers welfare
 - Involvement in other states
 - Involvement of other agencies
 - Failure to implement legislation (RIPA)
 - Wider role of SB in relation to national security, monitoring of dissent/political groups and interference with democracy/free speech
 - Vulnerabilities in Information management preventing prompt and complete disclosure
 - Criticism of MPS lack of transparency if attempt to implement PII restrictions, NCND



MPS - UCPI
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