1. Introduction

1.1. This Assessment has been prepared by Operation Motion for the assistance of the Inquiry. The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of Karachi as a police officer responsible for Operation Motion.

2. Summary

2.1. Dates of Service in Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) and the Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15): MPSB: 199_ - Oct 200_; SO15: 200_ - present

2.2. Covert or sensitive posts: [Redacted]

2.3. Other covert agency staff deployed with (if any): [Redacted]

2.4. Information currently in the public domain regarding deployment and/or identity: None

AC Undercover Policing Public Inquiry Team
2.5. Official confirmation regarding deployment and/or identity: None

2.6. Age and current employment: Detective Sergeant, Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15), seconded to Operation Motion.

2.7. Risk of Karachi being exposed and profiled by activists or anti-UCO campaigners with the concomitant interference to his private and family life in event of identification of Karachi through information disclosed by the Inquiry is: HIGH.

2.8. Risk of a compromise of operational capability in event of identification of Karachi through information disclosed by the Inquiry is: HIGH.

2.11. Risk of physical or psychological harm to Karachi in event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is: LOW.

3. What this document is based on

3.1. Karachi has supplied all the information outlined in this Risk Assessment and has referred where necessary to the following documents:

- MPSB records,
- UCPI documents,
- Open source material.
4. Overview of the assessed individual

4.1. Karachi is [ ] years of age (DoB [xxx]) and is a serving Metropolitan Police officer. He joined the MPS on [xxx] 198[xxx] and he has an exemplary service record. [xxx]

4.2. On joining the MPS he was posted to a central London police station where he served for three years on uniform duties as a Constable before transferring to the CID on attachment as a Trainee Detective.

4.3. Between 198[xxx] and 199[xxx] Karachi spent four years in the CID including three postings to Area Major Incident Teams investigating offences resulting from the Poll Tax riot in 1990, Chinese organised crime (Triads) and a double murder enquiry.

4.4. Karachi returned to uniform duties in 199[xxx], the following year he successfully applied to join the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) and in [xxx] 199[xxx] was posted there as a Detective Constable. After an initial six months on 'P' Squad (Ports) he transferred to 'B' Squad (Irish) in [xxx] 199[xxx] and for three years worked on investigations and operations to develop and exploit intelligence to counter [xxx]. He received three Commendations for his work during this time.

4.5. [xxx]

4.6. In [xxx] 200[xxx] Karachi joined MPSB Protection ('A' Squad) as a Personal Protection Officer. Then in [xxx] 200[xxx], shortly before the merger of MPSB with the Anti-Terrorist Branch to form the Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15), he transferred to what was to become the SO15 National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit (NTFIU) as a financial investigator.

AC Undercover Policing Public Inquiry Team
During his time on the NTFIU he received two Commendations for his work on two significant counter-terrorism operations.

In 2015 Karachi was posted to SO15 International Operations and in December 2014 he was promoted to Detective Sergeant. Shortly after, in January 2015, he was one of two officers selected to take on responsibility for Operation Motion (henceforth referred to as Op Motion).

Op Motion is responsible for the risk management and provision of welfare and support to all former SDS officers, including those who served in an undercover role and those who worked in the 'Back Office' as Cover Officers, Supervisors or Managers. There are in excess of one hundred and fifty officers within the remit of Op Motion and this number is increasing because MPS officers who served as undercover officers on the NPOIU have recently also been brought within the remit of Op Motion.

One of the primary tasks undertaken by Karachi and his colleague (Jaipur) has been to identify, trace and locate and contact all officers as outlined above for the purpose of:

(i) Compiling a definitive list of all officers in scope of the Op Motion terms of reference,
(ii) To invite them to a meeting for the purposes of ascertaining sufficient information about their SDS role, particularly if they deployed as an undercover officer (UCO), to enable an assessment to be made of the current level of risk to them,
(iii) To discuss what security measures, if any, are required to mitigate the risk(s) identified,
(iv) To highlight any personal or health issues linked to their SDS role that requires intervention from Op Motion or the offer of assistance,
(v) Should the officer choose not to want to meet or engage, then at the very least they will be made aware of the existence Op Motion and the support that is available to them should they require it.
4.11. The process of contacting all SDS officers is not yet complete and at present has been put on hold while Karachi (and Jaipur) prepare reports and Risk Assessments for submission to the UCPI. Preparation of this material has required continued engagement and meetings with undercover officers.

5. Current level of exposure

5.1. The current level of exposure of Karachi is LOW. There are no details about him in the public domain in respect of his work on MPSB or SO15 operations and no information linking him to Op Motion.

5.2. Karachi has never worked as an undercover officer.

5.3. 

5.4. However, when Karachi worked as a Personal Protection Officer (2001-2004) this was an overt role and there are archive photographs available open source of him at major events which were covered by the media when he was accompanying his Principal. There is information available in the public domain which confirms that MPSB officers were responsible for the protection roles in which Karachi was deployed.

5.5. The level of exposure of Karachi on social media is commensurate with an officer who has spent twenty years of his career in MPSB and SO15 and undertaken a number of sensitive roles, but has never been an undercover officer.
5.6. Therefore, Karachi has taken all reasonable precautions to minimise the risk of him being easily identified as a police officer who works in counter-terrorism and in the past, has worked with colleagues in partner agencies. His immediate family and friends are also mindful that alluding to his work openly could compromise his security.

6. Objective Assessment of Impact in the event of identification

6.1. I identify the following risk factors arising if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of Karachi as a police officer responsible for Op Motion.

(i) Karachi being exposed and profiled by activists or anti-UCO campaigners with the concomitant interference to his private and family life,
(ii) Compromise of operational capability,
(iii) [Redacted]
(iv) [Redacted]
(v) Risk of physical or psychological harm to Karachi.

6.2. Paragraph 6.1, points (i) to (v) in detail:

(i) Karachi being exposed and profiled by activists or anti-UCO campaigners with the concomitant interference to his private and family life:

6.3. It is assessed that were information to be disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of Karachi as a police officer responsible for Op Motion, then the risk of him being exposed and profiled by activists or anti-UCO campaigners with the concomitant interference to his private and family life would be HIGH.
6.4. Of significant concern is that once the name of Karachi is published in the context of the Public Inquiry and Op Motion, then the activists and researchers with a proven track record of profiling officers deemed to be of interest would research his name and link it to a photograph which would then be published with his profile.

6.5. As has been outlined, Karachi maintains a low public profile, however he does have an online footprint and it is assessed that it is likely to be within the capabilities of the activists, researchers or interested journalists to discover a photograph of him in due course.

6.6. Since the SDS closed in 2008 there is no current management structure to expose and therefore the next best thing for the activists and researchers would be to expose the de facto management which now exists for the SDS officers, namely the officers involved in running Op Motion.

6.7. This assessment has been made on the basis of the actions of activists and researchers seeking to identify undercover officers to date, who have analysed every snippet of information released into the public domain about any officer linked to the SDS, including managers, supervisors and senior officers who in reality had little or no day to day involvement with the unit.

6.8. Details of a number of these officers have been published online and an example is a post which can be found on the Undercover Research Group website (see Appendix A) and a linked article on another similar website Undercoverinfo (see Appendix B).

6.9. The article on the Undercover Research Group website was posted on 23 November 2015 and titled "The spycops supervisors"¹ and it names senior officers who are alleged to have held supervisory posts with responsibility for the SDS, NPOIU or a national remit in respect of covert or undercover policing or domestic extremism.

¹ http://undercoverresearch.net/2015/11/23/the-spycops-supervisors-who-remain-accountable/
6.10. The article concludes with an 'NB' comment that clearly illustrates the intentions of the group to expose and profile all officers involved in covert or undercover policing, regardless of whether they deployed as a UCO or not. It states: "As you can see the Undercover Research Group portal does not have profiles on all of these supervisors yet. Assistance to populating the Wiki would be warmly welcomed. Get in touch with us!"

6.11. The Undercover Research Group has also published detailed profiles of a number of officers that did not serve on the SDS, but who are perceived to have held significant posts linked to the unit in the past or to be involved in managing issues around the unit or undercover officers at present.

6.12. Examples are the profiles of:

- Phil Gormley, currently Chief Constable of Scotland. In 2005-2006 he was head of MPSB for a short period and as such was the senior officer in charge of the SDS, albeit in reality he would have had minimal input to the running of the unit.

- Martin Hewitt, Assistant Commissioner, head of MPS Professionalism portfolio. He recently issued the apology on behalf of the MPS to the women who were engaged in sexual relationships with alleged SDS and NPOIU undercover officers and he has responsibility for Op Motion.

- Both profiles have photographs of the officers attached.

6.13. Another reason why the identity of Karachi would be of significant interest to activists and researchers such as the Undercover Research Group is that together with Jaipur, he is responsible for drafting the Risk Assessments and other reports which are being submitted to the Inquiry in support of applications for anonymity for the SDS officers. The anti-UCO campaigners want nothing less than the identification of all undercover officers and they will perceive that the work of Karachi (and Jaipur) is designed to obstruct and thwart their ambitions and the work of the UCPI.
6.14. It is conceivable that if the Inquiry does support anonymity applications for the majority of SDS officers then the activists will turn their attentions to Karachi (and Jaipur) and target them, if their identities are in the public domain. This is because of the officer’s involvement with Op Motion and because their names would be known, while the primary targets (the undercover officers) would remain out of reach.

6.15. The publication of a profile of Karachi accompanied by a photograph and details of his work as a police officer would be an intrusion into his private and family life. He is a private individual who has always exercised discretion in respect of his work and not disclosed details to anyone who does not need to know. Karachi maintains a low profile on social media as per current security advice; however, When taking on the Op Motion role, he never foresaw that his identity and details about his work might be placed in the public domain.

6.16. A further intrusion into the private life of Karachi is that it would have an adverse impact on his friendship with an SDS officer who deployed undercover, who he has known for over twenty years. Activists and the Undercover Research Group are actively trying to identify this UCO and details of his cover name and his photograph have been published online. If the identity of Karachi is revealed with his photograph and he is identified as one of the officers currently dealing with the SDS officers, this would severely restrict where he and his friend could socialise away from work because of the potential for a compromise of his friend’s identity if they were observed together.

6.17. Finally, there is a high public interest in the SDS and the UCPI; therefore it is assessed that if the identity of Karachi is revealed and he is identified as one of the officers currently working closely with the undercover officers, then he will be subject to press attention. He may be targeted by media sympathetic to the cause of ‘anti-UCO campaigners’ and because the UCPI is a newsworthy item, his details could also be reported by the broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, as well as on television, online news outlets and social media. The press has already shown its willingness to publish the names and photographs of undercover officers and so would have no qualms about doing the same to Karachi.
6.18. Given that Karachi would be of sufficient interest to the activists and anti-UCO campaigners for them to justify researching and publishing his profile and photograph, then there would be a potential compromise of operational capability. 

(ii) Compromise of operational capability:

6.19. It is assessed that were information to be disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of Karachi as a police officer responsible for Op Motion, then the risk of compromise to the operational capability of (Op Motion) would be HIGH.

6.20. The Op Motion role involves Karachi maintaining regular contact with former SDS officers either in person, by phone, or by email, or in many cases all three. A key factor underpinning the work of Op Motion is maintaining the trust and confidence of the SDS officers, which is achieved first and foremost by ensuring that their anonymity is maintained and their safety and security is not compromised. In respect of personal meetings it is of the utmost importance that these are carried out with discretion and that the SDS officers are comfortable meeting Karachi in public and private without a fear of compromise.

6.21. As has been outlined, if the identity of Karachi were to be revealed it is assessed that his personal details and in due course his photograph would be published online by activists and anti-UCO campaign groups and he would be identified as one of the officers currently dealing with the SDS officers. This would seriously jeopardise the ability of Karachi to operate effectively as an Op Motion officer for the following reasons.

6.22. Karachi would no longer be able to carry out liaison meetings with SDS officers in public places because of the potential for a compromise of an undercover officer's identity. If the meeting was observed by any person with an interest in the UCPI they could make the assumption that the person Karachi was with was an SDS officer.
6.23. At present, the ability of Karachi to meet SDS officers discreetly and if necessary at short notice in a public place allows for considerable operational agility and flexibility. This would be severely curtailed if his identity were to be revealed.

6.24. As the UCPI progresses it is anticipated that Karachi (and Jaipur) will play a vital role in supporting the SDS officers through the process in a role similar to that of a Witness Liaison Officer. It is envisaged that this will entail accompanying officers to and from the venue covertly. If the identity of Karachi is revealed and he is identified as one of the officers currently dealing with the SDS officers, this would limit how he could be deployed in this role because of the potential for a compromise of an undercover officer’s identity if they were observed together.

6.25. All the undercover officers are experiencing a degree of anxiety associated with the fear that their identity will be exposed during the UCPI. Many of the officers suffer from a range of psychological issues and a small number have suffered nervous breakdowns. Often, Karachi (and Jaipur) are the only people that an SDS officer has been able to confide in and on these occasions they take on the mantle of de facto counsellors. If the identity of Karachi is revealed, this will erode the trust and confidence of the most psychologically vulnerable who will perceive that the work of Op Motion is being compromised. This could irreparably damage the delicate relationships that Karachi (and Jaipur) have established over the past year and potentially have an adverse impact on all the officers in scope of Op Motion.

6.26. The skills profile of Karachi which led to his selection to take on responsibility for Op Motion is one that only a very limited number of officers within the MPS possess:

(i) Extensive MPSB service,
(ii) Good understanding of the operation of the SDS,
(iii) Known to the majority of former SDS undercover officers still serving in the MPS,
(iv) Also known to many other ex/retirec SDS officers,
(v) Excellent working knowledge of many of the groups the SDS infiltrated,
6.27. This means that if Karachi is compromised in the eyes of the SDS officers, it would be difficult to find another similarly qualified officer to take on his work.
(v) Risk of physical or psychological harm to Karachi:

6.40. It is assessed that were information to be disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of Karachi as a police officer responsible for Op Motion, then the risk of physical or psychological harm to Karachi would be LOW.
6.41. There is a general threat to Karachi consequent to the current terrorist threat against police officers which, since January 2015, has been rated as 'Severe' (an attack is highly likely). Since this date, serving police officers including Karachi have received briefings about their security and have received advice about maintaining a low profile on social media and when off duty.

6.42. Karachi has worked in sensitive counter-terrorism roles within MPSB and SO15 for the past twenty years. He is well aware of the need to be discreet about his work in his private life to protect the security of him and his family. If his identity was exposed and he is identified as an SO15 officer with an extensive service in counter-terrorism, then it would arguably heighten the risk to him from extremists in general.

7. Measures in place to manage risk

7.1. The following security measures are currently in place to minimise risk faced by Karachi:

(i) Karachi manages his risk in consultation with Jaipur and taking into account the factors he considers when assessing the risk for the SDS officers he deals with,
(ii) Daily social media and open source monitoring to identify threats to SDS officers,
(iii) Operation Motion Contingency Plan in the event of an incident lodged in the 24/7 Reserve Room.

7.2. These measures are presently minimal and commensurate with the fact that at present, there is no information about Karachi in the public domain in connection with his work with the SDS officers under the auspices of Op Motion.

7.3. If the identity of Karachi was exposed, a review would be carried out of the risk to him and additional security considered as appropriate, however it is unlikely that the physical risk would justify some of the standard security measures that are offered to the SDS officers such as

AC Undercover Policing Public Inquiry Team
7.4. Furthermore if his identity is exposed, it is assessed that there is no practical action that could be taken to mitigate the resultant HIGH risk of being profiled and targeted by activists or anti-UCO campaigners, the HIGH risk of compromise to the operational capability of Op Motion, or the MEDIUM risk of compromise of a CHIS.
APPENDIX A

Undercover Research Group, 23 November 2015: "The spycops' supervisors who remain accountable"
UndercoverInfo 20 November 2015:
"The spycops and their supervisors who remain accountable"