

Statement made on behalf of: The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

Witness: [REDACTED] [Gist: Cairo]

Statement No: 1 (version 3)

Exhibits Referred to: Cairo/160212/1-9

Date Statement Made: 20th July 2017

THE PITCHFORD INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING

Witness: [REDACTED] [Gist: Cairo]

Occupation: Police Officer

Address: c/o Directorate of Legal Services, 10 Lamb's Conduit Street, London, WC1N 3NR

I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true

Signed Cairo

Dated 20th July 2017


On 12th February 2016 and 30th June 2016, I made a statement of 70 paragraphs which read as follows:

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
"INTRODUCTION"

1. I am a senior manager within the MPS. I have in the past performed specialist roles within law enforcement agencies ['LEAs'].


2.



3.



4.



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[REDACTED]

5.

[REDACTED]

6.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

8.

[REDACTED]

9.

[REDACTED]

10.

[REDACTED]

11.

[REDACTED]

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[Gist of paragraphs 2-11: Redacted paragraphs detail Cairo's experience. Cairo has more than 20 years police experience. Cairo's physical appearance and voice have in the past been associated with an undercover name. Cairo has provided training to undercover officers and managers, facilitation and authorisation of undercover operations. Cairo has held a number of roles in covert policing, has investigated corruption, national and international crime and terrorism, including operations deploying undercover officers.]

12. This statement is divided into the following sections:

- (a) Confidentiality
- (b) Pressures on the protection of identity/methodology
- (c) The impact of actual or potential compromise of the covert identity of an undercover officer on individuals and their connections
- (d) The impact of actual or potential disclosure of covert methodology
- (e) The impact on the retention and recruitment of undercover operatives and other covert human intelligence sources.

CONFIDENTIALITY


13. Undercover operatives are and always have been volunteers. The police service provides little motivation by way of subsequent prospects of promotion if an officer becomes an undercover operative. It promises significant interference with both personal and family life, and the imposition of significant emotional and psychological burdens on those close to an officer. This is expressly recognised in material circulated by the College of Policing in connection with the recent

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
UCA (Undercover Advanced) selection process: *'Realistic Job Preview and Self Assessment Questionnaire'*, §1.5:

'Impact on Professional Life'

In becoming an undercover officer you should consider the implications this has on the other policing roles you can realistically maintain at the same time i.e. roles where you raise a high public profile within policing media (e.g. internet) or general media.



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[Gist of the redacted part of paragraph 13: Officers are advised that adopting an undercover role will have an impact on their relationships with colleagues.]

14. The primary motivation for police officers to become an undercover officer is the desire to perform a critical public service. Sufficient volunteers are essential to the continuing efficacy of undercover policing.
15. It is, and has been, the expectation of undercover operatives that their identity will be protected, both during their periods of deployment and subsequently. Effective identity protection represents the key protection for the operative, and for his or her family, from physical or psychological repercussion.
16. This has been the case since the early days of undercover policing and the beginning of the SDS. As part of the process of assessing and interviewing a prospective SDS field officer, more senior officers (at DCI or DI rank) would attend the home address of the candidate. Part of the purpose of this exercise was to provide reassurance, both to the officer and to their family, about the

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nature and ramifications of the role. The reassurance frequently extended to reinforcing the commitment of the MPS to safeguarding the true identity of the officer.

17. The absolute nature of this expectation was reflected in a document described in its covering memorandum as '*Proposed SDS Pre-Deployment Document*' and drawn up by N53 in February 2005. I exhibit the document and the covering memorandum as Cairo/160212/2.

[REDACTED]

The context in which this document was produced included the then ongoing civil claims brought against the MPS by Officers A and B, two former SDS officers. The document proposed a series of undertakings on behalf of both the Commissioner of the MPS and each current and future deployed officer. The proposed undertakings included the following:

Undertakings by the Commissioner

2.1 *In consideration of the undertakings entered into by [REDACTED] which are set out below, The Commissioner undertakes on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service:*

2.1.1 *Not throughout [REDACTED]'s lifetime to disclose the fact that she/he served as a Special Duty Section undercover officer other than:*

- *For the purposes of properly performing its obligations under this agreement;*
- *In order to safeguard [REDACTED]'s security and welfare;*
- *With [REDACTED]'s consent; or*

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- *Under compulsion of law or statutory duty.*

2.1.3 To take all necessary steps to ensure 's continued operational and personal security, including the provision of welfare, advice and support, both during her/his police career and thereafter.

3. Undertakings by

3.1 In return for the assistance and undertakings to be provided by the Commissioner undertakes:

3.1.1 To take all reasonable and practicable steps to ensure that situations in which he/she could be identified as a former SDS officer are avoided;

...

3.1.3 Not to publish without the prior written authority of the Commissioner any information which related to security or intelligence matters and/or the work of the Special Duty Section of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch

3.1.6 Not to disclose details of his/her SDS operation without prior written authority from the Commissioner other than were necessary to meet the obligations contained in this Memorandum of Understanding

18. Whilst to the best of my belief this document was not actioned in the way described by N53 in the covering Memorandum, that is, I do not believe deployed or prospective SDS officers were asked to sign the Confidentiality Declaration and Memorandum of Understanding, it is my understanding that the document articulated the current and historic expectation within the SDS of the lifelong protection of the undercover officer's identity. This understanding finds support in (a) the fact that all SDS material relating to the identity of officers was

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security marked as at least SECRET and (b) the annual SDS reports, which repeatedly refer to the overarching obligations to ensure *'the safety and well being of undercover officers employed for this purpose'* and *'the security and integrity of the SDS operation.'*

19. Outside the SDS, policy guidelines and working practices for major crime investigations dated 1990 explain that:

'COURT PROCEEDINGS

...

Every effort must be made to obtain the agreement of the Crown Prosecution Service not to call the Undercover Officer as a witness but rely on other evidence.

Nothing should be said or done with intent to deceive the Court, or whereby the Court may be misled.

When it has been decided that an Undercover Officer is required to give evidence, he should always sign his statement in his assumed identity.

The Senior Investigating Officer should make every effort to retain the anonymity of the Officer throughout the trial.

Where the Officer has to give oral evidence, application should be made to the judge for the Officer's true identity to be written down and handed to the Judge, and that the Officer continues to use his assumed identity.

The Trial Judge should be asked to make an order that no sketches or photographs should be taken and nothing written which may reveal the true identity of the Officer.

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The Undercover Officer should be allowed to enter the Court building without being exposed to public attention, such as through a rear door, or through the cell area.

Arrangements should be made for the Undercover Officer to wait in a private area away from other witnesses, and the public. He should not be allowed to wait in corridors outside the Court Room. As soon as he has given evidence application should be made so that he can leave the Court as soon as possible.

...

PUBLICITY

All reference to the use of Undercover Operatives must be avoided. No matter how successful or sensational the case may be, Co-ordinators must ensure that in any Press release, TV interview, or internal document, no mention, or confirmation, of the use of Undercover Operatives is given. Likewise in any commendation report that an Undercover Operative might receive, he/she should be commended in terms of 'detective ability and dedication', rather than identifying his role as an Undercover Operative.'

I exhibit a document entitled 'Use of Undercover Police Officers in Major Crime Investigation: Policy Guidelines', April 1990 as Cairo/160212/3. I exhibit a document entitled 'Use of Undercover Police Officer in Major Crime Investigation: Working Practices', July 1990 as Cairo/160212/4.

20. The Terms and Conditions governing the action of CHIS in their role as a source of information provides an absolute assurance about the protection of the identity of the CHIS:

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8. Your identity will be protected. You in turn must not reveal your role to anybody without first discussing it with your handlers, this includes other officers, family or friends.

I exhibit these Terms and Conditions as Cairo/160212/5. [See correction to this paragraph at paragraph 71 below].

21. The Covert Human Intelligences Sources ['CHIS'] Code of Practice published on 10th December 2014, issued pursuant to section 71 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ['RIPA'] and replacing the 2002 and 2010 incarnations, reinforces the imperative of identity protection for all CHIS following deployment, providing:

'The ongoing security and welfare of the CHIS, after the cancellation of the authorisation, should also be considered at the outset. Also, consideration should be given to the management of any requirement to disclose information tending to reveal the existence or identity of a CHIS to, or in, court': §6.14

'The records kept by public authorities should be maintained in such a way as to preserve the confidentiality, or prevent disclosure of the identity of the CHIS, and the information provided by that CHIS': §7.6

22. The published part of the Authorised Professional Practice ['APP'] on Covert Policing: Undercover Policing, which is published and updated from time to time by the College of Policing, provides as follows:

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Protection of identity and methodology

The value of undercover policing as a tactic is essential. LEAs and the communities they serves [sic] should value this body of dedicated operatives who carry out this type of work.


The role of a UCO can be dangerous. UCOs carry out their role as volunteers in the expectation that their identity will be protected during their deployment and afterwards. LEAs, prosecuting authorities and the judiciary have a duty of care to these operatives.

23. It is possible that this Inquiry will conclude that certain methods deployed by undercover operatives have become morally and/or ethically unacceptable over the passage of time. It is a realistic concern that with the passage of time, and particularly given the extreme scrutiny to which the undercover tactic will be subject by virtue of the Inquiry, other aspects of covert methodology will be similarly reassessed. The rejection of a contemporaneously sanctioned tactic could never, in my view, justify the exposure of the true identity of an undercover officer.

24. The risk to undercover operatives does not disappear with time. This is because they may have been involved in numerous operations either before or since a specific deployment. Exposing the identity of an undercover officer, even long after a deployment has ended, may generate risk to them, to other individuals associated with the role they performed (including other undercover operatives and informants), and to the officer's family. My own history [REDACTED] means

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that I am cognisant of such issues. That history has impacted and continues to impact on both my personal and professional life. The protection of my identity is a consideration in every aspect of my life both within law enforcement and in my personal life.



[Gist of the second redaction in paragraph 24: The redacted part of the paragraph details the steps taken by UCOs to protect their identity.]

PRESSURES ON PROTECTION

- 25.** Extraordinary pressures are placed on the ability of LEAs, including the MPS, to maintain the protection of undercover operatives and the undercover tactic generally by (a) the advance of technology, (b) the desire of the criminal subjects of undercover operations to destroy the efficacy of the undercover tactic, (c) accidental contact, and (d) recent and ongoing publicity.

Information Technology

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26. The recent and ongoing advances in information technology, providing (for example) powerful search functions, social media, crowd sourcing, the aggregation of data on websites, and the ready availability of tools such as face recognition, render the protection of an operative's true identity extraordinarily challenging. This trend shows no sign of abating. I am aware that the Inquiry has been provided with a detailed briefing in respect of the 'mosaic' effect, and do not seek to repeat that analysis here. I do observe, though, that:

- a. Recruitment exercises seeking candidates for the UCA role underlined the potential difficulties faced by officers with a 'high social media presence', and in particular whether such a presence represented an insuperable bar to the ability to retain an undercover identity and, importantly, '*a risk to you and to those around you*': exhibit Cairo/160212/1 at §1.4.



- b. The partners, children, family or friends of an operative might through their own online profile inadvertently reveal both the officer's true identity and their own connection to the officer. Similar concerns arise in respect of former officers, who may not have appreciated the intense scrutiny that their subsequent online presence may attract.

27. The effect of these advances is an increased risk of exposure of identity. This increase is mirrored in the heightened concern amongst current undercover officers about the prospect of retaining identity protection.

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Research Portals

28. The court will be aware of the activity of organisations such as the Undercover Research Group. -Members of these groups are committed to identifying undercover officers and/or publicising information about persons believed to have been undercover officers and/or developing and publicising methodology believed to be characteristic of undercover operatives.

29. It is abundantly clear that NCND represents a very significant barrier to the further 'outing' of persons as putative undercover officers. Thus, for example, the Undercover Research Group maintains a page entitled: '*Investigating undercovers: how we work.*' That page contains the following text:

At all times we are hampered by the police's position of neither confirm nor deny (NCND). In a fair amount of the cases we have been able to establish conclusive evidence that the investigated individual was indeed a police officer. But there are and will be more undercovers under investigation for whom this 'smoking gun', so to speak, is not there. In fact that final bit of doubt is keeping us from publishing further cases.

This is why the police policy of NCND is effectively justice denied.

Which leaves us with the very real problem of when we can advise a group whether they have sufficient evidence to go public. To deal with this dead-end

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situation we have developed our own 'internal metric', which comes in three parts:

- 1. Do the activities of the individual under investigation meet the established pattern of trade craft associated with undercover police officers? This does not have to be 100%, but it has to be substantially met. Normally, but not always, this amounts to answering a set of 10-15 questions, which we also use to establish how well-founded a group's suspicion is in the first place, and what they need to find out.*
- 2. What was the exit-strategy for the undercover? In particular, has their disappearance from the activist' scene been pretty much total and they are no longer in touch with anyone?*
- 3. Can we find them? The flip side of showing someone was an undercover is to show that he or she is a genuine person who has put an end to the activist period in his or her life. So we set out to do that, to see if we can track them down, prove their existence and locate where they are now so we can put the case to them. If we cannot find them at all, that is a strong indication that the person known as an activist does not really exist.*

If we are satisfied that all three criteria are met, even though there may be residual doubt, then we believe the group has enough to go public on, and we will publish our own report and profile on the undercover in support of the group's case.

This metric is flexible. Each case is to a degree unique, and we also recognise that undercovers do not always follow their tradecraft to the letter, so there will be times when adhering strictly to the conditions is not appropriate, particularly where there has been some degree of 'going native' or there are variations due to

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the nature of the background story / character that has been developed. We hope that our experience has given us sufficient judgement to be satisfied when a case falls into that sort of situation and to make the appropriate call.

We are very aware of the risk of getting it wrong and the need to act responsibly towards all parties. However, in a world with NCND in place and the refusal of the authorities to act responsibly towards those affected by intrusion from undercovers, the ability to get that guarantee is limited.

The police justify NCND on the grounds that it is needed to protect their officers, but that ignores totally the abuse caused in it is name. We firmly believe that NCND needs to be abandoned and that the police must properly acknowledge the invasion of privacy, personal lives and activist / political work carried out in their name. If the police will not answer, then going public is all that is left to us at this point. Furthermore, we believe that this use of undercover policing is not about stopping crime as the police claim, but is political policing pure and simple, either to uphold a political agenda and/or to suppress criticism of the police; that is simply not acceptable.

30. I observe that undercover officers may have acquitted themselves at all times in accordance with officially sanctioned conduct and may still have exposed themselves to very considerable risk in the process.

31. I am particularly concerned about the Group's expressed intention to track down officers in order to '*put the case to them.*'


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32. I further observe that the Undercover Research Group acknowledges the possibility that it may, in error, 'out' an undercover officer:

'If subsequent material comes to light that proves the individual was who they said they were, we will remove any article and replace it with an apology.'

Leaving aside the question of whether it is realistically possible to remove traces of such information from online resources, apology and removal is most unlikely to avoid the physical and/or psychological consequences to the 'outed' individual.

33. Part of the ongoing work of the Group has involved the development of a page entitled '*The Fifteen Questions We Work With.*' The Questions refer extensively to the authors' understanding of undercover tradecraft,



[Gist of the redacted part of paragraph 33: and effectively represent a draft test for establishing whether an individual was or was not an undercover officer. It can reasonably be inferred that disclosure of undercover tradecraft, in the course of the Inquiry or otherwise, would be put to the same use.]

Criminals etc

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34. Regardless of accuracy, the activities of organisations such as the Undercover Research Group, unfortunately, also provide a wealth of open source material to criminals. Criminals, including terrorists and paedophiles, will go to still greater lengths to identify suspected undercover operatives, with a view ultimately to preventing the operatives securing intelligence or giving evidence. They have an obvious interest in the destruction of the utility of the tactic generally. Unlike the campaigning organisations, the criminal community is most unlikely to publish its activity.

35. Criminals may be well funded and will not be restricted to lawful methods to obtain information. Their methods have been known to include paying for research or paying corrupt employees to provide an operative's true identity and/or information about police covert methodology. I am aware that a large proportion of Integrity Testing activity using undercover officer or tasked witnesses undertaken by the MPS Directorate of Professionalism (DPS) concern some aspect of intelligence leakage by staff or corrupt approaches to staff to gain access to police intelligence/information. These corrupt taskings/approaches predominantly concern ascertaining personal information regarding an individual's criminality or details/progress of on-going investigations and occasionally about covert methods. An example of such a case was an occasion where a corrupt officer was recorded advising his son on his proposed drug dealing business, and advising him on how to avoid sales to undercover operatives.

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36. The following are examples of efforts made by criminals to secure information about undercover operatives and/or related information.

- a. A case in the late 1990s involving a member of CPS staff who smuggled a list of 33 informers from his offices whilst working on an investigation involving the Adams family, and was convicted of accessing information on behalf of criminals. I exhibit the BBC report of the case dated 7th March 2000:

Cairo/160212/7.

- b. An investigation into an officer working on an investigation into an organised network for leaking sensitive information to known criminals capable of identifying an undercover operative [REDACTED]

Criminal

proceedings were not pursued because naming the officer would have required a departure from NCND resulting in the confirmation of the identity of the undercover operative. The officer resigned from the MPS on [REDACTED]

Accidental contact

37. Such contact can and does occur in wholly unpredictable circumstances. For

example, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[Gist of the redacted part of paragraph 37: Redaction gives an example of an officer who met a person on a public course, against whom they had been deployed when undercover. The person had been convicted as a result of the operation. Example details the urgent action taken in response to the chance meeting."]

Publicity

38. The ramifications of the naming of Mark Kennedy, coupled with his national undercover officer number, and his confirmation as a deployed undercover officer in the Court of Appeal judgment in the case of *Barkshire* has led to an increased fear in the undercover world generally and amongst undercover operatives in particular of further exposures of undercover officers. Mark Kennedy had deployed such standard pieces of tradecraft [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in the creation of his legend [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

39. Undercover officers have historically been and continue to be aware of one another's true identity and of aspects of covert methodology. Undercover officers expect not only their employers but their fellow operatives to adhere to the strict policy of non-disclosure of a covert identity and of covert methodology. The National Code of Conduct for Undercover Operatives ['the Code'] contains a

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prohibition on revelation of an undercover role or deployment. The 2003 incarnation provided that undercover officers, as well as being bound by the Official Secrets Act, have an ongoing duty to maintain the confidentiality of undercover operations, investigations, methodology and capability. The current Code provides that:

[17] Undercover operatives must not reveal the fact of an undercover role or the detail of any undercover deployments without the express permission of their undercover covert operations manager.

...

[20] Undercover operatives are bound by the Official Secrets Act and have a duty not to disclose for publication by any means whatsoever, details of any operation or investigation. This includes any information as to methodology or infrastructure of undercover units.

40. An individual who 'self-discloses' presents a real risk not only to him or herself, but also to undercover operatives and other CHIS with whom the individual might have been connected. In my experience, undercover officers whose work has required them to work with groups or individuals who present a real risk do not engage in the process of self-disclosure.

41. There is a real risk that if self-disclosing officers are publicly confirmed, subjects of undercover operations will force persons that they suspect of being undercover officers to self-disclose in order to test their identities.

IMPACT: operatives and families

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42. Measures available to control the risk flowing from a compromise of the true identity of any CHIS, including undercover operatives, extend to the provision of a completely fresh identity. Such a step is extraordinarily invasive to the individual and their family, as well as being very expensive, but may be the minimum intervention necessary to manage the article 2/article 3 threats faced by the persons concerned. I am aware of one individual who has had to become a protected person under section 82 Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 because of the extent of the threat to them personally as a result of exposure as an undercover officer. Lesser measures, such as the relocation of an officer (or other CHIS) and their family, are also available. Such measures are also incredibly disruptive to the individual's private and family life

[REDACTED]

. I am aware of another individual who had been ordered to move from his home address following the moving into premises within a short distance of his home of members of his target group.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]


[Gist of the second redaction in paragraph 42: Redacted passage gives further detail about the long term impact of relocation and further compromise risk on the individual and family involved.]

43. I am aware of specific intelligence in a number of cases following the conduct of an undercover operation to the effect that the subjects are attempting to locate the operatives in order to cause them injury or to kill them. In [REDACTED] [Gist: an English force], for example, a successful undercover operation was carried out by the [REDACTED] [Gist: local] Undercover Unit in [REDACTED] [Gist: recent years]. Threats to the life of the individual identified by the subject as the informant, in fact an undercover officer, continue to be made [REDACTED] [Gist: a number of] years after the subject's trial and imprisonment. This continues to cause real distress to the threatened officer. In no case has harm in fact ensued to the operative, a circumstance which I attribute directly to the successful protection of the operatives' true identities. I am aware that in all cases the threats have been directed against the pseudonym employed by the officer.

44.

[REDACTED]

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[Gist of paragraph 44: The redacted passage gives a further example of an undercover officer infiltrating an organised crime group. Following the suspect's arrest, the officer in his covert identity was made the subject of a contract to kill by the suspect. The suspect was eventually convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for drug offences.]

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45. In the wider CHIS world, I am aware of a number of cases involving threats to life and/or serious physical harm being caused to persons who either were or were suspected of being police informants.


IMPACT: disclosure of methodology

46. The architecture supporting the deployment of an undercover officer is complex.


It may involve the construction of an extremely robust legend to sustain the infiltration of a terrorist or criminal group. Similar points can be made of other CHIS. For example, it may be necessary [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [Gist: to take steps] [REDACTED] to avoid exposing an informant as the source of information about, for example, the location of a murder weapon. In all cases every care must be taken in carrying out an appropriate assessment to identify and manage the risks posed to those involved.

47.




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[Gist of paragraph 47: Some methods and tactics of securing information about groups or individuals to LEAs have been in use for decades. They require proportionate 'backstopping' to establish sufficient credibility with the subjects of the operation and require undercover operatives to be suitably equipped.]

48. As the Inquiry progresses, there is a real risk that sensitive methodology will be revealed and/or receive or apparently receive official confirmation. The more undercover methodology is scrutinised, dissected and discussed in a public forum, the more difficult it will be to continue using the methods and to keep operatives safe. I reiterate that the risk presented is very much greater in the present age of web enabled means of gathering, storing and disseminating information.

49. An example of the direct impact of the disclosure of covert methodology to the criminal community was provided in the course of an undercover operation which ran between June and November 2012. For a time, officers operated simultaneously but independently. The officers were equipped with surveillance equipment. 

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[REDACTED] On 7th November 2012, a series of arrests were made based on information provided by an officer. A second officer, 'Deano', remained deployed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On 26th November 2012, 'Deano' attended a particular premises posing (as he had done previously) as a user of heroin/crack cocaine in order to buy drugs. He was questioned by those present regarding his true identity and purpose. He was searched. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 'Deano' was severely beaten and seriously injured. He escaped by jumping out of a first floor window. There was some contemporaneous press reporting of the incident (see <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/4673226/Cop-flees-Reservoir-Dogs-gang.html>) and further reporting during the subsequent trial (<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2345574/Undercover-policeman-leapt-floor-window-hidden-camera-exposed-drugs-gang-scene-reminiscent-Reservoir-Dogs-film.html>). I produce these reports as Cairo/160212/8.

Backstopping

50. 'Backstopping' is a critical protective process undertaken in respect of all covert assets. Covert assets include undercover officers, as well as covert vehicles, equipment and premises. Whilst there are very extensive written procedures governing backstopping processes and very clear lines of authority, scrutiny and oversight, the MPS seeks to minimise the number of police officers and police

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staff who are engaged in these processes so as to minimise the potential for accidental or corrupt disclosure of the capabilities.

- 51.** So far as undercover officers are concerned, backstopping includes all measures taken to support the covert identity. Thus, the provision of [Gist: documents and premises]

[REDACTED]

- 52.** Failures in the backstopping process may risk or result in the exposure of an undercover operative and/or of the deployment of the undercover tactic generally.

- 53.**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

54.

[REDACTED]

55. I have provided some examples below of MPS backstopping and associated risk management capability.

[REDACTED]

56.

[REDACTED]

57.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

58.

[REDACTED]

59.

[REDACTED]


Property

60. The MPS relationship with property may be overt, discreet, or covert. There is no attempt to conceal either overtly held property (such as New Scotland Yard) or discreetly held property, although the MPS will not advertise its relationship with discreet property. Covert property is that held in connection with covert policing. Some covert property is occupied by undercover officers.


61.

[REDACTED]


OFFICIAL



62.



63.



OFFICIAL

64.

IMPACT: retention and recruitment

65. The risk of exposure, and in particular any actual or perceived increase in the risk of exposure, is likely in my opinion to impact negatively on the ability of LEAs to recruit and retain undercover operatives. I am aware that the HMIC in 2014 identified concerns about the declining ability of the police to attract candidates to undercover roles. Such a falling off was mirrored by the dropping demand for places both on National Undercover Training Assessment Centre ['NUTAC'] courses run by the MPS until 2014. I believe a total of ■ individuals were accepted on the College of Policing first UCA training course in 2015, not all of whom successfully completed the course.

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66. Should police officers lose faith in the ability of the service to protect their identity, it is likely to prove catastrophic to retention and to future recruitment.

67. In addition, the exposure of undercover officers, however that disclosure comes about and whether or not it is confirmed by the police or other LEA, carries a direct threat to the police ability to continue to recruit and retain informants.

[REDACTED] Undercover

officers, as I have previously mentioned, are typically deployed against a number of individuals or groups; the risk associated with the exposure of any one particular officer may be very extensive. More generally, members of the public may question how, if the police are unable to protect their own officers, they will be able to protect them should they provide information.

68. The further the pool of recruits as undercover officers is narrowed, the more limited the availability of the tactic. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Where an officer is deployed into a particularly small or particularly close group, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and particularly where the officer subsequently gives evidence, it may be unsafe and therefore impossible for that officer to be redeployed.

69. [REDACTED]

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70. It is my view that an actual or perceived increase in the risk of the exposure of the identity of undercover officers will have a negative impact on the ability of the MPS to recruit both undercover operatives and other CHIS.

71. On ____ July 2017, I made this amended statement. This was to make a correction to paragraph 20, which should read as follows:

“The Terms and Conditions governing the action of CHIS in their role as a source of information provides an assurance about the protection of the identity of the CHIS:

8. Your identity will be protected. You in turn must not reveal your role to anybody without first discussing it with your handlers, this includes other officers, family or friends.

I exhibit these Terms and Conditions as Cairo/160212/5.”