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| Title: | N326 - Risk Assessment |
| Summary: | Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) |
| Relevant to: | UCPI |
| Author: | Kevin Shanahan |
| Peer Reviewer: | Mark Veljovic |
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PURPOSE;

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N326

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N326 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N326 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both his pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT;

26th May 2017

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR;

The author of this risk assessment is Kevin Shanahan

It has been peer reviewed by Mark Veljovic

THE PROCESS ADOPTED;

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report is documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS;

There are a number of limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

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1. REAL IDENTITY

Real name: **Name, date and place of birth**

Undercover pseudonym: Douglas EDWARDS, born 08/09/1945, commonly known as 'Doug'

From this point he is referred to as N326. The only exception is when quoting material in the public domain (section 6.1 etc. or where specifically commenting upon the pseudonym)

2. SUMMARY

N326 was deployed between 1968 and 1971. The initial deployment was into Independent Labour Party (ILP) & Tri-Continental (a left-wing, radical newspaper).

Exposure: Membership of (ILP) elevated his status allowing him to become Treasurer of Tri-Continental, this background facilitated access to other extremist, anarchist left-wing groups.

N326 current situation: Retired from MPS *on date*.

3. SUMMARY OF OFFICER'S LIFE PRE-DEPLOYMENT

3.1 Life before joining MPS

Born: *Date of birth* **Location:** *Place of birth*

Parents: *Details of parents* (both parents now deceased).

Siblings: Not on file.

Locations: Not on file.

Schools: Not on file.

Occupations: *Details of career prior to joining the MPS*

Other factors of note: None.

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment

N326 was aged **Age** and **Status** when he joined the MPS on **Date**

3.2 Police career history pre-UCO role

Details of education and training

Postings:

Details of postings no detail of any special role within Special Branch (SB).

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment

3.3 Recruitment to UCO role

He was recruited to SDS by *details of individuals who recruited N326 to the SDS, one of whom* was in a management role within (SB) He was informed that a new Unit at this point named Special Operations Squad, subsequently Special Demonstration Squad (SDS). He was considered a suitable candidate for the role. Their function was to monitor protest groups who were a major concern of the Government.

Psychometric testing: Not a consideration during this period of SDS history.

When posted to the SDS back office: Not subject of comment.

When deployed as a UCO: 1968 – 1971.

Formal or informal training for his role: No form of training or, formal induction.

Did he consider his back story sufficient: Confident that he set in place a cover to explain any prolonged absence.

What was his legend: Cover occupation as long distance lorry driver. *Details of cover occupation*

3.4 Assurances re future anonymity:

This section is limited given the comments of the Chairman as to whether it naturally falls into a risk assessment process.

Were assurances of lifelong anonymity provided? Is it relevant to risk: At time of his recruitment was informed by his senior management (Detective Chief Inspector & Detective Inspector) that the Unit he was seconded to was highly secret and was to be deployed as a result of ongoing large scale public disorder being a major concern of the Government at that time (late 1968).

4. UNDERCOVER DEPLOYMENT

4.1 Dates of deployment: N326 was deployed as a UCO from 1968 to 1971.

How does this compare with the usual 4-5 year posting:
Details of N326's deployment

4.2 Main group(s) infiltrated

Initial deployment into radical left-wing, and anarchist groups, at this period in time (1968-1971) many smaller groups were loosely affiliated coming together at major demonstrations.

4.3 Peripheral interactions

N326 was linked to, or occasionally reported upon, the following. That means he wasn't specifically targeted towards those groups, but he would have come into contact with people involved in them, or had information concerning those groups. It is not meant to be considered a comprehensive list;

Independent Labour Party (ILP), Tri-Continental a left-wing organisation that allied itself left-wing elements in Asia, Africa & Latin America. The organisation also published a newspaper. His connection with both groups facilitated access to other left-wing and anarchist groups involved in political demonstrations.

4.4 Covert identity adopted

Birth certificates of deceased child: N326 constructed his own identity *Details of pseudonym*

Cover occupation: Long distance Lorry Driver *Details of cover occupation*

N326 was allocated to what area: Primarily the Greater London area where organised demonstrations were likely to occur.

Discussion of other aspects of N326's covert identity.

4.5 Tasking

Team meetings: Not referred to within his file. Stated that briefings were weekly at a cover flat where he met with other field operatives.

4.6 Assimilation into the group: Established position of Treasurer within Tri-Continental is indicative of a high degree of assimilation.

4.7 Group size: Not subject of comment.

4.8 Geographical location(s) based: Appears to centre on London,

4.9 Cover occupation: Long distance Lorry Driver.

4.10 Compromises or security concerns during his deployment: *Discussion*

4.11 Risk assessments during deployment: *Discussion*

4.12 Relationships entered into, or other behaviour that could heighten the risk: *Discussion*

4.13 Arrests: *Discussion*

4.14 Key associates: *Discussion*

4.15 Other Undercover officers who would be affected if a restriction order was not issued: *Discussion*

4.16 Withdrawal / exit strategy: N326 reports that his exit strategy consisted of him simply 'disappearing' and resuming police duties within (SB).

4.17 Return to regular policing: Toward the conclusion of his deployment (May 1971) an appraisal (dated January 1971) refers to N326's deployment in the following terms; "*He has been engaged in delicate enquiries and displayed a high degree of professional ability under unsavoury and at, times extremely testing conditions. His flexibility and keenness enabled him to remain effective for longer than most of his colleagues, which was possible only because of his facility for tempering his initiative with fine judgement*".

4.18 Commendations:

Discussion

4.19 Support during deployment: N326 states that he was not offered or, provided with support, it was in his words very 'ad hoc' and uncoordinated.

4.20 Whether N326 is a Core Participant at the Public Inquiry: N326 is not a core participant in the Inquiry.

5. CURRENT SITUATION WITH N326

5.1 Age & current marital status: N326 is aged years old and retired. *He is married.*

5.2 Current location: *Discussion*

5.3 Family circumstances: Married, has children . *Number and age of children*

5.4 Subject to any formal investigation: *Discussion*

5.5 Current employment: Retired.

5.6 Route to work: Not applicable.

5.7 Role within the community: *Discussion*

5.8 Their partner's employment: *Discussion.*

5.9 Children: *Number and age of children .*

5.10 Internet profile: *Discussion*

5.11 Knowledge of their role amongst family and close friends: Knowledge of his former role as an undercover operative is exclusive to his wife.

5.12 Physical health: *Discussion*

5.13 Psychological health: *Discussion*

6. CURRENT LEVEL OF EXPOSURE

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any risk caused by self-disclosure or third party disclosure will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6)

Information currently in the public domain regarding deployment and identity is as follows:

6.1 Cover name: Not in the public domain.

6.2 True identity: *whether or not the true identity is in the public domain*

6.3 Where sourced: online-websites, forums, other social media, print media, TV: *Details, if any*

6.4 Compromises / potential compromises subsequent to his posting: *Discussion*

6.5 Details of pseudonym

6.6. Official confirmation regarding deployment and/or identity: There has been no self-disclosure, no court order, no police revelation, and no official disclosure.

6.7 Other deployments by the UCO: *discussion*

7. INTERVIEW BETWEEN RISK ASSESSORS AND THE FORMER UCO

The risk assessor(s) met with N326 at *location* on 15/03/2017. The typed notes are included in document

8. CAUSAL LINK IN TERMS OF COMPLETING A MOSAIC / JIGSAW EFFECT

This section does not intend to prove the existence of the Mosaic effect, but looks at the likelihood of it applying in this case.

8.1 General impact

In general terms, a number of matters can be said.

Firstly, the risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as a former undercover operative. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' is required before the full picture is revealed.

Secondly, the risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify him or her, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

8.2 Specific impact: In the case of N326, his pseudonym is not in the public domain.

9. THREAT CONSIDERATIONS

9.1 Current terrorist threat level

The terrorist threat level is currently **severe**.

The risk assessors see this as a risk, but less in specific terms to N326 than those discussed elsewhere in this report.

10. RESEARCH CONDUCTED

10.1 Initial research on HOLMES and Relativity

The individuals and organizations that could be considered to present a risk have been identified from researching the HOLMES accounts for HERNE and PITCHFORD; accessing 'Relativity'; interviewing the officer; and considering other reports as highlighted in Appendices 'I' and 'J'

HOLMES and Relativity hold separate albeit overlapping documentation. All of the material on HOLMES has been used for the assessment, as recorded against their nominal profile. It is accepted there may well be material that is not shown within that profile, particularly generic documents, that could be argued to have relevance to risk. However, given the time scales that apply this is deemed a proportionate search.

Relativity contains a vast amount of material. To check all of the documents would be simply impossible within the time scales, even should fairly restricted search terms be used. As a result there is reliance upon the DLS profile that has been prepared. The risk assessors do have access to Relativity should further enquiries be required.

The risk assessors have worked through examples to quantify the amount of material. The results of these searches are recorded and have been retained. Should it be felt that the risk assessors should have attempted to review more material in preparing the risk assessments these details can be provided.

10.2 Basic research on individuals (PNC / PND)

No research has been conducted.

10.3 Additional research

There has also been an assessment of material held: Not additional research has been conducted.

10.4 Open source research

Look at internet profile of N326, wife etc: *Discussion*

11. THE RISK CURRENTLY POSED BY THE GROUPS INFILTRATED

The groups infiltrated by N326 no longer exist in their original format. The risk assessor cannot identify any risks arising from former associates involved with the group during the period of deployment.

12. THE RISK FROM INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE GROUP

12.1 Associate causing N326 particular concern / perception of risk by the UCO: N326 states he cannot recall any person who he believes now (present day) would be a concern to him.

12.2 Associates with a propensity for violence: None.

12.3 Associates with research skills: None.

12.4 Associates with previous experience of harassing their targets: None recalled.

12.5 Geography of people of concern: Not applicable.

13. INDICATORS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK REQUIRING EXPERT ASSESSMENT

It must be stressed that the risk assessors do not have medical qualifications. However, the following can be stated as points of fact;

13.1 Perception by the UCO of the risk: Does not believe after such an extensive period of time that, he faces any risk other than being 'door stepped' by elements of the media. This for him is a major concern fearing the negative impact this would have upon his wife.

13.2 Counselling, medication, welfare, psychological referral etc: *Discussion*

14. ASSESSMENT OF RISK OF INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY AND PRIVATE LIFE

The risk assessors are aware of the comments of the Chairman of the Inquiry in relation to Article 8, and an individuals' right of respect for private and family life terms (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.10)

14.1 Perception of the risk: N326 believes the risks he would face would involve a degree of unwarranted media attention. He is concerned that 'door stepping' by journalists will create stress and anxiety to his household.

14.2 Nature and gravity of the risk: *Details of later career.* His major concern is being exposed in the wider media, which would cause a degree of personal discomfort and anxiety.

14.3 Media intrusion: Not known as a former police officer to any persons other than a small circle of close friends. His role in the police service was exclusively within Special Branch. During his career he took considerable measures to insure anonymity and discretion. Any media intrusion would be the cause of great anxiety to him. Any form of direct contact with the media would greatly distress both him, and his wife who are, enjoying their retirement.

14.4 Effect on friends and family: Impact would create stress and anxiety to his wife who has little direct knowledge of his career, other than whatever N326 chose to disclose, which owing to the sensitive nature of his previous role, is likely to be minimal.

15. MITIGATING THE RISK

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any alternative methods available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm or damage will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6).

He has subdivided that grouping (B.1) into "means other than a restriction order that may be available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm" (section B.1.7) and "whether those means would, without the restriction order, avoid the risk or the extent to which those means would, without the restriction order, reduce the risk" (section B.1.8)

15.1 Previous Risk Assessments and recommendations (if allowed access): *Discussion*

15.2 Security arrangements in place: *Discussion*

15.3 The anticipated result of revealing pseudonym only: Impact is likely to be minimal owing to the extensive passage of time after his deployment. It is difficult to gauge if any persons he reported upon would recall the pseudonym he employed.

The question of how official confirmation as opposed to unofficial publicity could increase the risk, albeit possibly marginally, is discussed in section 8.1.

15.4 Withholding, redacting, or gisting documents in the context of this UCO

In general terms, these would need to be considered on a 'document by document' basis, and falls outside of the scope of this risk assessment.

There is not a specific exemption to this principle in this case.

15.5 Using a cipher: Effective measure to ensure his participation in the Inquiry without creating any risk of disclosure of his identity.

15.6 Screening: Effective measure, however it is unlikely that he would be identified by any parties he reported upon during his undercover deployment.

15.7 Voice modulation: Effective measure, unlikely to make an impact in his participation with the Inquiry.

15.8 Prohibition around publication: Effective measure that would minimise the potential of media intrusion. This is the main cause of concern for N326, disclosure of true identity.

15.9 Receiving evidence in private: Effective measure, it is the view of the risk assessor that this measure would reassure N326 and meet his major concern of intrusion into his family and private life.

16. CONCLUSIONS

16.1 General comments

N326 has no pseudonym in the public domain

The general risk from the International Labour Party is low, the group does not exist. However, extreme left-wing groups exist in other forms. It is unlikely after the substantial passage of time after his deployment that any person(s) infiltrated would recall him as an operative. ***Whether or not N326's pseudonym is linked to his real identity.***

The risk of attack from former associates (in any form) is considered as very Low (minimal), those referred to by N326 are either deceased or advanced in years and are unlikely to present a physical threat. Impact is negligible.

The risk of attack from people currently involved in extreme left-wing politics in respect of N326 is low and highly unlikely. The potential risk faced by N326 emanates from ***details of potential threat.***

The risk assessor cannot specify any individual or group of individuals likely to present any threat to N326. However, it must be assumed that his ***later*** role creates a generic threat to him should his true identity come into the public domain.

The risk assessors are not medical experts. There are no obvious and apparent indicators that should be followed up in terms of his psychological well-being.

Specific concerns; Raised anxiety should his true identity be disclosed. The impact of fear arising from media intrusion is to his mind considerable, the reality is likely to be less so. The risk is medium, the impact is moderate. The assessor considers that disclosure of his true identity would create for him and his immediate family, a high level of anxiety.

The likelihood of the real identity of N326 becoming known if he, appears at the Inquiry in pseudonym is low. **Details of pseudonym.** Owing to the passage of time between his deployment and anticipated involvement in the Inquiry any potential connection between his true identity and his pseudonym is remote. The passage of time since his deployment and changes to his physical appearance, are mitigating factors. Risk is low, the impact is negligible.

16.2 Assessment scores

N326 – Risk of physical attack if pseudonym officially confirmed

His deployment was of a sufficient period of time where it is highly unlikely that any persons who may recall him would be able to link his pseudonym to his true identity. The risk of physical attack is low (2), the impact is minor (2).

Therefore the overall assessment is low (4).

N326 – Risk of physical attack if real identity officially confirmed

The risk of physical attack increases if N326's true identity is disclosed. The risk assessor cannot identify any individuals like to seek any form of violent retribution upon N326. However, the risk from any unidentified individual knowing N326's former role as an undercover police officer cannot be excluded. Therefore I assess the risk if his true identity is disclosed as medium (3). The impact of his true identity being disclosed also increases to moderate (3).

Therefore the overall risk assessment is (9).

N326 - Risk of interference with family and private life if pseudonym officially confirmed

His deployment as an undercover operative was unremarkable and unlikely to generate sufficient interest in any party seeking to link him to his former undercover role. The risk of interference to his family and private life if his pseudonym is confirmed is low (2). Any impact arising from confirmation is minor (2)

Therefore the overall assessment is low (4).

N326 - Risk of interference with family and private life if real identity was officially confirmed

The risk of interference to N326's private and family life increases should his true identity be disclosed. The risk assessor is unable to identify any specific risk emanating for any individual or group of individuals. However, official confirmation of N326 as a former undercover operative within the SDS has the potential to generate media interest and or, attract a degree of unwarranted intrusion from other parties which will create distress to him and, more importantly, his wife.

N326 stated to the risk assessor that he specifically requested officers from **an operation** not to visit his home address (**he was required to provide information in relation to N16**) despite this request officers attended his home address and created a great deal of distress to his wife

N326 expressed his dissatisfaction and disappointment that his home life was, in his words disrupted by unthinking officers unable to accept that he is retired, and wishes to keep his former police role distant from his home life. N326 stated he was more than happy to cooperate with **an operation** and attend a police building rather than officers disturb him at home. To confirm this view N326, met with the risk assessor at **location** at his own expense as he felt this was a more comfortable environment for him, whilst addressing the concerns of his wife. Therefore I assess the risk as medium (3), the impact as moderate (3) as any interference will also impact upon his wife.

Therefore the overall assessment is (9).

Signature of author;

Date;

Signature of peer reviewer:

Date;

Appendix 'A' -Open Source Research Document

Appendix 'B'-DLS Profile N326

Appendix 'C'-Notes of Interview with N326

Appendix 'D'-Summary of HOLMES Material N326

Appendix 'E'-Threat Assessment;

APPENDIX 'A'

MPS DLS
OFFICIAL
LOG D5915

APPENDIX 'B'

MPS DL'S
OFFICIAL
LOG D5915

MPS DLS
OFFICIAL
LOG D5915

APPENDIX 'E'

MPS DLS
OFFICIAL
LOG D5915