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| Title: | N333 - Risk Assessment |
| Summary: | Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) |
| Relevant to: | UCPI |
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| Peer Reviewer: | Brian Lockie |
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PURPOSE;

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N333.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N333 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N333 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both N333's pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

The initial DLS profile of N333 has been provided to the Risk Assessor.

DATE OF DOCUMENT: 02 – 05 – 2017

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR;

The author of this risk assessment is Graham Walker

It has been peer reviewed by Brian Lockie

THE PROCESS ADOPTED;

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been defined and been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS;

There are a number of limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer, and has been documented.

Documents used to compile this report are referenced as follows:

Document references

The documents reviewed but not considered relevant to the risk assessment are referenced as follows:

Document references

Other material generated from, or pertinent to, this risk assessment is referenced as follows:

Document references

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MPS DLS
OFFICIAL
LOG D5916

1. REAL IDENTITY

Real name

Pseudonym

From this point *this officer* is referred to as N333.

2. SUMMARY

Details of UCO deployment

N333 went on to provide protection duties. *Details of career*

Family composition

3. SUMMARY OF OFFICER'S LIFE PRE-DEPLOYMENT

3.1 Life before joining MPS

N333's date and place of birth, family composition, locations of upbringing, educational details and work pre-MPS.

Other factors of note: None

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment

3.2 Police career history pre-UCO role

Occupation before joining the MPS. Age and marital status at time of joining the MPS.

Completed Training School – *Date*

Postings – *'Details of postings*

Details and date of posting

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment

3.3 Recruitment to UCO role

Recruitment: N333 was selected by SB officers (not named) for SDS role.

Psychometric testing: None

SDS back office: Not deployed

When deployed as a UCO: *Years*

Formal or informal training for *the* role: N333 described the training as 'rudimentary'

Did N333 consider N333's back story sufficient: Yes

What was N333's legend: *Details*

3.4 Assurances re future anonymity

This section is limited given the comments of the Chairman as to whether it naturally falls into a risk assessment process.

N333 received no specific assurance or guarantee of anonymity by senior officer(s). N333 states that there was only an *'implied implication'* of future anonymity.

4. UNDERCOVER DEPLOYMENT

4.1 Dates of deployment

Details.

4.2 Main group infiltrated

Details

4.3 Peripheral interactions

N333 reported on **type of group**. That means N333 wasn't specifically targeted towards those groups, but N333 would have come into contact with people involved in them, or had information concerning those groups.

4.4 Covert identity adopted

Birth certificates of deceased child: No

N333's area of operation, details of any arrests, details of any behaviour that may raise risk

4.5 Tasking

Would attend weekly meetings at covert premises

4.6 Assimilation into the group

Discussion

4.7 Group size

Discussion

4.8 Geographical location(s) based

Discussion

4.9 Cover occupation

Discussion

4.10 Compromises or security concerns during N333's deployment

Discussion

4.11 Risk assessments during deployment

Discussion

4.12 Relationships entered into, or other behaviour that could heighten the risk

Discussion

4.13 Arrests

Discussion

4.14 Key associates

Discussion

4.15 Other Undercover officers who would be affected if a restriction order was not issued

Discussion

4.16 Withdrawal / exit strategy

Discussion

4.17 Return to regular policing

Details of career, including close protection duties

4.18 Commendations / Awards

Details of any Commendations / Awards

4.19 Support during deployment

Discussion

4.20 Whether N333 is a Core Participant at the Public Inquiry

N333 is not a core participant in the Inquiry.

5. CURRENT SITUATION WITH N333

5.1 Age & current marital status

N333 is **Age**

5.2 Current location

N333 resides in **Location** (address known to Operation Motion)

5.3 Family circumstances

Family composition

5.4 Subject to any formal investigation

Discussion

5.5 Current employment

Retired

5.6 Route to work

N/A

5.7 Role within the community

Not known

5.8 Their partner's employment

Retired

5.9 Children

Family composition

5.10 Internet profile

Discussion

5.11 Knowledge of their role amongst family and close friends

The **partner** of N333 knows of N333's role, N333's children are not aware of specifics.

5.12 Physical health

Discussion

Details of current medical condition

5.13 Psychological health

N333 states that N333 is suffering from stress as a result of contact for this Inquiry but not to the extent of requiring professional assistance or medication.

6. CURRENT LEVEL OF EXPOSURE

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any risk caused by self-disclosure or third party disclosure will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6)

Information currently in the public domain regarding deployment and identity is as follows:

6.1 Cover name

Discussion

6.2 True identity

Discussion, including some exposure in a different context

6.3 Where sourced: online - websites, forums, other social media, print media, TV

Discussion

6.4 Compromises / potential compromises subsequent to posting

Discussion

6.5 Details of pseudonym

Discussion

6.6 Official confirmation regarding deployment and / or identity

There has been no self-disclosure, no court order, no police revelation, and no official disclosure

6.7 Other deployments by the UCO

Discussion

7. INTERVIEW BETWEEN RISK ASSESSORS AND N333

The Risk Assessor met with N333 at *location* on Friday 7th April 2017. Notes were made at the time and subsequently a typed version was produced for ease of reference.

N333 was cooperative and answered, or appeared to try to answer, all questions put. N333 declined at this stage to provide the pseudonym N333 used, stating that N333 would seek advice about disclosure.

N333 subsequently provided the pseudonym used to Op Motion, which was passed to the Risk Assessor.

8. CAUSAL LINK IN TERMS OF COMPLETING A MOSAIC / JIGSAW EFFECT

This section does not intend to prove the existence of the Mosaic effect, but looks at the likelihood of it applying in this case.

8.1 General impact

In general terms, a number of matters can be said.

Firstly, the risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

Secondly, the risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify him or her, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

8.2 Specific impact

Whether or not N333's pseudonym is in the public domain.

9. THREAT CONSIDERATIONS

9.1 Current terrorist threat level

The general terrorist threat level for the UK is currently at *severe*.

This is relevant to all officers, but arguably in particular to those ex-SB officers whose details become public knowledge.

The risk assessor sees this as a risk, but arguably less in specific terms to N333 as N333 is now retired.

10. RESEARCH CONDUCTED

10.1 Initial research on HOLMES and Relativity:

Explanation of why no HOLMES and Relativity searches carried out

10.2 Basic research on individuals (PNC / PND):

No research has been conducted any individual in relation to the deployment of N333.

10.3 Additional research

There has also been an assessment of material held: Not applicable.

10.4 Open source research

The open source research undertaken has been focussed and conducted at a level of competence. It does not seek to assert that a more experienced and dedicated individual, group or state sponsor with extensive knowledge and access could not uncover more information.

N333's personal details are available on the internet to an informed searcher.

Discussion of whether or not it is possible to link 333's pseudonym and true identity.

11. THE RISK CURRENTLY POSED BY THE GROUPS INFILTRATED

Details of the group(s) infiltrated.

12. THE RISK FROM INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE GROUP

12.1 Associate(s) causing N333 particular concern / perception of risk by the UCO:

Discussion

12.2 Associates with a propensity for violence:

Discussion. N333 stated that the strategy of the group advocated the encouragement and instigation of others to commit violence, which was seen as necessary.

12.3 Associates with research skills:

Discussion

12.4 Associates with previous experience of harassing their targets:

Discussion

12.5 Geography of people of concern:

Not applicable.

13. INDICATORS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK REQUIRING EXPERT ASSESSMENT

It must be stressed that the risk assessors do not have medical qualifications. However, the following can be stated as points of fact;

13.1 Perception by the UCO of the risk.

N333 has a belief that disclosure of N333's role in SDS will leave N333 open to attempts to identify N333 by current **interested groups**, and such exposure will increase the risk of physical harm to N333 and N333's partner.

13.2 Counselling, medication, welfare, psychological referral etc.

Discussion

14. ASSESSMENT OF RISK OF INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY AND PRIVATE LIFE

The risk assessors are aware of the comments of the Chairman of the Inquiry in relation to Article 8, and an individuals' right of respect for private and family life terms (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.10)

14.1 Perception of the risk

N333 has the belief that involvement in the Inquiry would be disproportionate to N333's deployment.

Details of why N333 holds that belief.

14.2 Nature and gravity of the risk

The risk from N333's perspective would create unnecessary and unwarranted intrusion into N333's life. The disclosure of N333's **SDS deployment** would, in N333's view, expose N333's subsequent role(s). ***His name is linked to one subsequent role***, but with no link at all to his being a UCO.

14.3 Media intrusion

Details of some exposure of N333 in a different context. There is no association with the UCO role within the SDS or to N333's pseudonym. N333 feels that the media will provide a negative and tainted portrayal of N333's role within the SDS, and in fact generally the SDS as a unit.

14.4 Effect on friends and family

N333 has a concern that due to existing wider adverse media coverage of the SDS, the association will 'taint' N333 and undermine N333's credibility and standing, and that of N333's children, ***Details of N333's family.***

15. MITIGATING THE RISK

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any alternative methods available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm or damage will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6).

He has subdivided that grouping (B.1) into "means other than a restriction order that may be available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm" (section B.1.7) and "whether those means would, without the restriction order, avoid the risk or the extent to which those means would, without the restriction order, reduce the risk" (section B.1.8)

15.1 Previous Risk Assessments and recommendations (if allowed access)

Discussion

15.2 Security arrangements in place

Discussion

15.3 The anticipated result of revealing pseudonym only

Details of identity and whether or not there is a genuine divide between the true identity of N333 and the pseudonym. N333 did not use the identity of a deceased child therefore N333's pseudonym is entirely fictional.

Justification for finding above.

N333 has since been a personal protection officer. **Discussion of whether N333 has been recognised as a UCO.**

Most of N333's targets are likely to be deceased. The risk from exposure remains from those currently with similar outlooks, or those simply believing they should, both of which are not quantifiable.

Whether or not there is a link between N333's pseudonym and N333's real identity

If other factors were in place to further limit revelation or recognition of N333's true identity, the result of **confirming the pseudonym** is likely to be of little consequence to N333, but of potential reputational risk to the MPS if the pseudonym is confirmed.

The question of how official confirmation as opposed to unofficial publicity could increase the risk, albeit possibly marginally, is discussed in section 8.1.

15.4 Withholding, redacting, or gisting documents in the context of this UCO

In general terms, these would need to be considered on a 'document by document' basis, and falls outside of the scope of this risk assessment.

There is not a specific exemption to this principle in this case.

15.5 Using a cipher

This would only provide an increase to mitigate N333's own concerns if N333 were required to participate in the Inquiry.

15.6 Screening

This would provide a significant additional measure should N333, in particular if N333 were to be questioned with regard to N333's deployment, subsequent career after deployment with the SDS. This would also avoid recognition, as opposed to identification.

15.7 Voice modulation

Owing to the extensive passage of time between any appearance at the Inquiry and N333's SDS deployment this as a measure would be unnecessary.

15.8 Prohibition around publication

This measure has limitations if N333 is identified. The impact of publication would otherwise be to the detriment of the private and family life of N333.

15.9 Receiving evidence in private.

This would significantly mitigate the concerns of N333 if N333 were invited to participate in the Inquiry.

16. CONCLUSIONS

16.1 General comments

- ***Whether or not the pseudonym of N333 is considered 'intact'.***
- No specific group identified, but risks may be present from any individual who follow a specific or similar cause should N333's true identity become known. ***Details of career***
- The risk of attack from former associates (in any form) is considered as minimal. N333 cannot recall any individual believed likely to present a risk of physical harm.
- The risk of attack from ***current activists*** is assessed as minimal. It cannot exclude a threat from an unconnected individual knowing, or becoming aware of, N333's former role as an undercover operative.
- The risk assessors are not medical experts; however, there are no obvious or apparent indicators that should be followed up in terms of N333's psychological well-being.
- The prime concern of N333 is the potential increased risk of physical harm to N333 and ***partner*** should N333's true identity become known, with a secondary impact upon N333's private and family life.
- The likelihood of the real identity of N333 becoming known if not afforded the opportunity to provide evidence in pseudonym is high.
- N333 has stated that N333 would rather not provide live evidence to the Inquiry.
- If the Inquiry was minded that it was not appropriate to identify N333, then screens would be appropriate should N333 be required to give evidence in person.
- The deployment of N333 was ***some time*** ago, N333's prime concern is the fear of physical reprisals should N333's true identity become known, and secondary the potential negative impact on N333's family life and professional standing. N333 is prepared to cooperate with the Inquiry but fears involvement will have a negative impact on him.
- As in the case of other UCO's deployed in this period, there will be a need to monitor this advice should there be a significant delay in calling live evidence for any change in circumstance

16.2 Assessment scores

N333 – Risk of physical attack if pseudonym officially confirmed

In terms of risk of physical attack occurring if the pseudonym is officially confirmed, I assess the likelihood in this category as 'very low' (1)

I would consider the impact as 'moderate' (3). In reaching that conclusion I have considered N333's age and health.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 3.

N333 - Risk of interference with family and private life if pseudonym officially confirmed

In terms of risk of interference with or to family and private life occurring if the pseudonym is officially confirmed, I assess the likelihood in this category as 'very low' (1)

I would consider the impact as 'moderate' (3). In reaching that conclusion I have considered N333's age and health, coupled with the likely impact upon N333's partner.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 3.

N333 - Risk of physical attack if real identity was officially confirmed

The likelihood of interference with the family and personal life of N333 must logically be greater if N333's real identity is known than if only N333's pseudonym is known. Taking into account N333's deployment within the SDS, and subsequent roles I would assess this as 'medium' (3).

I would consider the impact as 'moderate' (3). In reaching that conclusion I have considered N333's age and health.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 9.

N333 - Risk of interference with family and private life if real identity was officially confirmed

The likelihood of interference with the family and personal life of N333 must logically be greater if N333's real identity is known than if only N333's pseudonym is known. Taking into account N333's deployment within the SDS and subsequent roles I would assess this as 'medium' (3).

I would consider the impact as 'moderate' (3). In reaching that conclusion I have considered N333's age and health, coupled with the likely impact upon **N333's partner**.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 9.

Signature of author;

Date; _____

Signature of moderator;

Date;