

Title:	N81 - Risk Assessment
Summary:	N81 - Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)
Relevant to:	UCPI
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Peer Reviewer:	Graham Walker
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PURPOSE;

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N81.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N81 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N81 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both N81's pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR;

The author of this risk assessment is David Reid.

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker.

THE PROCESS ADOPTED;

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has previously been set out.

The terms have also been previously defined.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS;

There are a number of limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer. These have been set out previously.

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MPS DLS
OFFICIAL
LOG D5842

1. REAL IDENTITY

Real name – *Name and date of birth*

Undercover pseudonym – *Name and date of birth*

Referred to as *codename*

Reference number – *number*

However, please note that more than one UC has a reference to *number*.

From this point wherever possible N81 is referred to as N81.

2. SUMMARY

Details of deployment

N81 features heavily in the report by Mark Ellison QC around the case of Stephen Lawrence.

N81 is in the public domain as 'N81'

3. SUMMARY OF OFFICER'S LIFE PRE-DEPLOYMENT

3.1 Life before joining MPS

Details of early life

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment

Further details of early life

3.2 Police career history pre-UCO role

N81 was allocated the warrant number *number*.

Details of police career

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

3.3 Recruitment to UCO role

Circumstances of recruitment

The selection process commenced in *date* with a series of interviews. N81 had psychometric testing with Dr. *Name*. *Dr Name* comments N81 had a "well balanced character and relaxed manner"

N81 had a home visit *Details of home visit*

N81 started working in the back office in *Date*. *Details of preparation for and date of deployment*

3.4 Assurances re future anonymity

This section is limited given the comments of the Chairman as to whether it naturally falls into a risk assessment process.

N81 became immersed in the culture, believing (rightly or otherwise) this posting was part of a specialised, highly secret team whose duties were of national importance. Full assurances were provided by **two nominals** when they did a home visit. They affirmed that N81 would have anonymity for the rest of N81's career. This, in his view, was an unqualified commitment.

It can be added that N81 would have been aware of similar lifetime anonymity being afforded to many UC's prior to N81's deployment, and this would be reinforced by the seniority of the officers making those assurances. The assimilation of the officer back into SB at the conclusion of their posting formed part of that process.

These assurances were later commented upon by N86, a DCI, in terms of the State affording the UC the appropriate level of protection. I note also the comments of Mark ELLISON QC around 'absolute confidentiality'. He states "*Officers who served in the MPS were, and are, owed an absolute duty of care by their employer, the MPS, to ensure that their identity is never disclosed by the organisation that asked them to carry out that covert activity*".

He continues "*In reporting our findings on the role of undercover policing in the Lawrence case, we have respected the absolute confidentiality that the MPS owes to its officers for life not to publicly identify any undercover role they played*".

4. UNDERCOVER DEPLOYMENT

4.1 Dates of deployment

N81 was deployed as a UCO from **dates**.

Details of deployment

4.2 Main group infiltrated

Details of deployment

4.3 Peripheral interactions

N81 was linked to, or occasionally reported upon, the following. That does not mean N81 was necessarily specifically targeted towards those groups, but N81 would have come into contact with people involved in them, or had information concerning those groups. I appreciate in N81's case precisely which group N81 was targeted against is contentious. It is not meant to be considered a comprehensive list, nor enter into the debate around the precise nature of N81's tasking in connection with the family of Stephen Lawrence;

Details of peripheral interactions

4.4 Covert identity adopted

Details of legend and undercover deployment

4.5 Tasking

The team meetings occurred twice weekly.

4.6 Assimilation into the group

Details of assimilation into group

4.7 Group size

Size of group

4.8 Geographical location(s) based

Locations

4.9 Cover occupation

Details of cover occupation

4.10 Compromises or security concerns during N81's deployment

Details of potential compromises

4.11 Risk assessments during deployment

A CHIS authorisation document dated **date** includes a risk assessment from DI **Name**. **The DI** states that thorough background preparation and attention to operational techniques and field craft remained the most effective riposte to suspicions. **The DI** assesses the chance of an attack on an exposed officer as being unlikely, although the groups do contain violent individuals.

4.12 Relationships entered into, or other behaviour that could heighten the risk

None.

4.13 Arrests

Details of any arrests

4.14 Key associates

Discussion

4.15 Other Undercover officers who would be affected if a restriction order was not issued

Discussion

4.16 Withdrawal / exit strategy

Details of withdrawal/exit strategy

4.17 Return to regular policing

Details of return to regular policing

4.18 Commendations

Details of any commendations

4.19 Support during deployment

On **date nominal** visited N81 at home. **N81 was informed that there would be post-operational psychological support**

4.20 Whether N81 is a Core Participant at the Public Inquiry

N81 is a core participant in the Inquiry.

5. CURRENT SITUATION WITH N81

5.1 Age & current marital status

N81 is **age**, and **details of marital status**.

5.2 Current location

Location

5.3 Family circumstances

As per section 5.1.

5.4 Subject to any formal investigation

N81 is not subject to any formal investigation.

5.5 Current employment

Details of current employment

5.6 Route to work

Route to work

5.7 Role within the community

Details of role (if any) within the community

5.8 Their partner's employment

Discussion

5.9 Children

Details of children (if any)

5.10 Internet profile

Details of internet profile

5.11 Knowledge of their role amongst family and close friends

Details

5.12 Physical health

N81 has been medically assessed so this is not covered here.

5.13 Psychological health

Details of N81's psychological health

6. CURRENT LEVEL OF EXPOSURE

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any risk caused by self-disclosure or third party disclosure will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6).

Details of whether or not the following are in the public domain

6.1 Cover name

Discussion

6.2 True identity

Discussion

6.3 Where sourced:

Discussion

6.4 Compromises / potential compromises subsequent to N81's posting

Discussion

6.5 Details of pseudonym

Discussion

6.6 Official confirmation regarding deployment and/or identity

There has been no self-disclosure, no court order, no police revelation, and no official disclosure. However the existence of N81 is acknowledged, and that N81 was a member of group/s which were later amongst those which sought to influence the Lawrence Campaign.

6.7 Other deployments by the UCO

Discussion

7. INTERVIEW BETWEEN RISK ASSESSORS AND THE FORMER UCO

The risk assessor met with N81 on 17th February 2017. The notes included at Appendix 'A'.

8. CAUSAL LINK IN TERMS OF COMPLETING A MOSAIC / JIGSAW EFFECT

This section does not intend to prove the existence of the Mosaic effect, but looks at the likelihood of it applying in this case.

8.1 General impact

In general terms, a number of matters can be said.

Firstly, the risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

Secondly, the risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify him or her, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

8.2 Specific impact

In the case of N81, N81's cipher ('N81') is already in the public domain. There is a clear desire by the Undercover Research Group (amongst others) for N81 to be identified.

9. THREAT CONSIDERATIONS

9.1 Current terrorist threat rating.

The terrorist threat level is currently severe.

That is relevant to all officers, but arguably in particular to those ex-SB and Counter Terrorist Command officers whose details become public knowledge.

10. RESEARCH CONDUCTED

10.1 Initial research on HOLMES and Relativity

The individuals and organizations that could be considered to present a risk have been identified from researching the HOLMES accounts for HERNE and PITCHFORD; accessing 'Relativity'; interviewing the officer; and considering other reports. The HOLMES research material and the initial DLS profile are recorded.

HOLMES and Relativity hold separate albeit overlapping documentation. All of the material on HOLMES has been used for the assessment, as recorded against their nominal profile. It is accepted there may well be material that is not shown within that profile, particularly generic documents, that could be argued to have relevance to risk. However, given the time scales that apply this is deemed a proportionate search.

Relativity contains a vast amount of material. To check all of the documents would be simply impossible within the time scales, even should fairly restricted search terms be used. As a result there is a reliance upon the DLS profile that has been prepared. The risk assessors do have access to Relativity should further enquiries be required.

The risk assessors have worked through examples to quantify the amount of material. The results of these searches are recorded and have been retained. Should it be felt that the risk assessors should have attempted to review more material in preparing the risk assessments these details can be provided.

10.2 Research on individuals

The second phase of the research has been a need to then research those individuals identified during the first phase to see what risk they currently present, as there is often a significant period of time between deployment and the present day.

A number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (which shows convictions), IIP (Metropolitan Police intelligence) and PND (nationwide intelligence).

However, it needs to be made clear that undercover officers commonly interacted with a large number of people during their deployments. As a result it is not possible to research thoroughly all of the subjects with whom they engaged. The risk assessors have therefore concentrated upon subjects with a known propensity for violence or for disrupting family life, or where the UCO has specific concerns, or where the UCO was particularly close to an individual, or where there is another specific reason to research that person. There is not a blanket intention to research everyone with whom the UCO came into contact, or upon whom N81 reported.

PND, IIP and PNC checks have been conducted upon the following **number of** individuals mentioned in section 4.14.

The main issue here is whether only researching that number reduces the quality of the assessment. In one sense it undoubtedly does because it cannot by definition be such a thorough process. However there is no intent to prove that the UCO would have reported upon a number of dangerous people during the deployment, some of whom will have criminal convictions. That much is clear from other papers. That situation however would be the same for many police officers who give evidence regularly during their service, often involving serious crime or organised criminality. Those officers would usually (albeit not always) do so in their own names. Therefore the critical distinction between the normal actions of a police officer and these matters is the perceived level of betrayal, given the personal nature of the interaction by the UCO. Hence the focus in this process upon those people the undercover officer was particularly close to.

In terms of PND checks I have asked the researcher to primarily look at the last 5 years. I am aware that this allows for the possibility of information being missed, but realistic search parameters need to be set to make the process feasible. I am primarily looking at recent offences or intelligence to assess the current

(rather than historical) risk. I appreciate there may be a need to look at other material in terms of assessing the overall proportionality of the operation, but that is not the aim of this document.

I have NOT included material in the section below that may form part of the research if I do not consider it can meaningfully contribute to the current risk assessment for N81. However, it should not be assumed that I have given significant weight to all of the information that is included. For example, my final conclusions take into consideration that convictions are likely to carry more weight than intelligence, as the veracity has been tested in a court of law. Recent material is likely to carry more weight than more historic material as it may give a better understanding of the current threat posed. The grading of intelligence is not included below but is a further consideration.

Some material is included simply to show that a person is still 'active' in a given sphere. It is not to suggest that the activity itself presents an issue or a threat.

Further details of research

List of individuals and outcome of research in respect of each

10.3 Open source research

I have assessed the information that is currently in the public domain re N81.

The detailed research is attached behind Appendix B, but there is mention of N81 (as 'N81') on a variety of sites. These include the UCPI.

N81 also features on;

Channel 4 website (an article in relation to the Ellison inquiry).

Daily Star website (also relating to the Ellison report).

Powerbase

The Derbyshire Police website re Op. Herne.

A government website reporting Theresa May MP's assertion in the House of Commons, accurate or otherwise, about N81 reporting back personal information concerning the Lawrence family.

Articles in The Guardian covering similar ground around the Ellison report.

IPCC website covering similar ground about the Ellison report

The Undercover research group, and a general article.

11. THE RISK CURRENTLY POSED BY THE GROUP(S) INFILTRATED

Details of group(s) and outcome of research

There are other groups in different spheres not directly linked to N81 who may well deem the activity of this UC as an invasion of privacy.

Given the significant media attention that the case of N81 is likely to attract, it would be reasonable to expect the potential for online harassment.

N81 is particularly exposed to 'anti-UCO' campaigners. The level of exposure already in the public domain makes N81 a potential target. That, when coupled with the high public interest, means it presents a significant risk.

12. THE RISK FROM INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE GROUP(S)

12.1 Associates causing N81 particular concern / perception of risk by the UCO

Details (if any)

12.2 Associates with a propensity for violence

Details (if any)

12.3 Associates with research skills

Details (if any)

12.4 Associates with previous experience of harassing their targets

Details (if any)

12.5 Geography of people of concern

Locations

13. INDICATORS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK REQUIRING EXPERT ASSESSMENT

It must be stressed that the risk assessors do not have medical qualifications. However, the following can be stated as points of fact;

13.1 Perception by the UCO of the risk.

Discussion of N81's perception of risk

13.2 Counselling, medication, welfare, psychological referral etc.

Details (if any)

14. ASSESSMENT OF RISK OF INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY AND PRIVATE LIFE

The risk assessors are aware of the comments of the Chairman of the Inquiry in relation to Article 8, and an individuals' right of respect for private and family life terms (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.10).

14.1 Perception of the risk

Discussion of N81's perception of risk

14.2 Nature and gravity of the risk

Discussion of nature and gravity of risk

14.3 Media intrusion

Discussion of the effect of any media intrusion

14.4 Effect on friends and family

Discussion of potential effect on any friends and family

15. MITIGATING THE RISK

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any alternative methods available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm or damage will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6).

He has subdivided that grouping (B.1) into "means other than a restriction order that may be available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm" (section B.1.7) and "whether those means would, without the restriction order, avoid the risk or the extent to which those means would, without the restriction order, reduce the risk" (section B.1.8).

15.1 Previous Risk Assessments and recommendations

Details of any previous risk assessments and recommendations

15.2 Security arrangements in place

Details of any security arrangements

15.3 The anticipated result of revealing pseudonym only

Discussion of results of revealing pseudonym

15.4 Withholding, redacting, or gisting documents in the context of this UCO

In general terms, these would need to be considered on a 'document by document' basis, and falls outside of the scope of this risk assessment.

There is not a specific exemption to this principle in this case.

15.5 Using a cipher

N81 is already known in the press as N81. This is discussed further below.

15.6 Screening

N81 does not think that screens would be sufficient to prevent N81's identification if N81's pseudonym was known. N81 assesses the people concerned with N81's identification as very resourceful, and N81 also assesses the desire for N81's identity to be known as very great.

I agree with N81's assessment in terms of the desire amongst some for N81's identity to be known. The value of screens depends upon how N81 is giving N81's evidence. If it is in N81's real name then I have no doubt that people wishing N81 harm would be able to identify N81. Screens may assist in slowing that process, but would not in my view stop it happening.

If N81 gave evidence in N81's pseudonym then screens would be of value, as they would prevent N81's current appearance becoming known, and that may well make N81's full identification harder. I again take the view that naming N81 in N81's pseudonym would eventually lead to N81's full identification. The justification for this is below. However I mention this in this section because the process of identifying N81 (if screens were deployed) would be slowed rather than prevented. My opinion around this issue is hardened by *matter*. I hold the view that naming him in his pseudonym irrespective of whether screens were used will result in his real identity becoming known.

If N81 is to give evidence as N81 then I think screens could be of high value. It would prevent people immediately linking 'N81' with N81's pseudonym.

However, I comment below on my view whether even giving evidence in N81's cipher is 'safe'.

15.7 Voice modulation

The same principle as outlined in 15.6 applies, with the value of voice modulation increasing as the level of revelation decreases. However, I comment below on my view whether even giving evidence in N81's cipher is 'safe'.

15.8 Prohibition around publication

'N81' is clearly in the public domain in N81 cipher from the Lawrence Inquiry 'Ellison' reports. N81 is concerned how this will progress, and clearly any publication of material will increase the speculation and 'pool resources' that could lead to N81 identification.

15.9 Receiving evidence in private.

Whilst I appreciate the competing interests involved in this decision, there can be no doubt that this would hugely assist when the issue is considered purely in terms of risk. Certainly N81 considers the 'notoriety' of N81's deployment means that this proposition would be seriously challenged.

16. CONCLUSIONS

16.1 General comments

N81 is insistent that N81 did not target the Lawrence family. N81 also takes the view that people have already decided that N81 did. The position is complex, and I do not comment further upon the actual issues that Mr. Ellison addressed in his reports.

In one sense in terms of risk assessment it makes little difference. The risk arises from the belief, irrespective of whether this stance has a basis in fact or is built upon a false assumption. N81 has been portrayed, and in N81's view will continue to be, as the police spy in the Lawrence camp. Indeed, that was the phrase used by Theresa May MP in the House of Commons on 6th March 2014. The validity of that assertion, as proposed by N43, is another matter. The risk is assessed on the basis that some people will accept that proposition, whether the reality of that basis is (or is not) valid.

Discussion

I have concluded below that revealing N81's pseudonym or N81's cipher would add to the risk N81 faces.

Discussion

N81 has, by N81's own admission, struggled with the media coverage around **these matters**, and the various reports into N81's conduct. N81 had previous assurances that N81's 'secret' role would remain just that. It is recognised by the risk assessors that what is in the public domain (in essence N81's cipher) may be considerably less than is actually known. I am not privy to knowing the totality of what may have been passed on by former UCO's, or indeed what may have been 'worked out' by others with an interest. I do not assume that the cipher is all that is known.

16.2 Assessment scores

(i) N81 – Risk of physical attack if pseudonym officially confirmed

I need to consider whether giving evidence in N81's pseudonym would be a safe method. My view is that it would be problematic. The section below explains why I believe that confirming N81's pseudonym or indeed giving significant details of N81's deployment could realistically reveal N81's real identity, and raise a significant risk of danger to N81. That is the case even if N81 gave evidence with screens.

As always, I am effectively dividing this process into two steps. The first is whether it is likely to be able to 'cross' the 'sterile corridor' from pseudonym to real identity. The second step for me to assess is whether N81 would be assaulted if N81's real identity was known.

The second step is covered in section 16.2 (ii) below, but suffice to say for the purpose of this section that I do consider there is a significant risk of N81 being assaulted if N81's real identity was known.

The key in this section is whether there is a realistic prospect of identifying N81 from N81's pseudonym. I think that the prospect of that happening is indeed feasible.

Discussion

If the physical appearance / photograph of N81 were revealed, even from the dates of N81's deployment, there is an obvious mechanism for identifying N81, by posting it on the internet.

Having come to the view that giving evidence in N81's pseudonym would still attract significant danger, I need to then consider whether giving evidence in a cipher in public, even with screens and voice modulation, would actually assist. I am not actually satisfied that this would be a safe proposition either.

My rationale is based upon a consideration of whether using the cipher whilst giving evidence in public does anything helpful. It seems to me that in the vast majority of cases (other theoretically than a few where the evidence given is very limited) giving evidence in a cipher rather than a pseudonym is unlikely to meaningfully assist at all. I am satisfied that the nature of the evidence provided by N81 would lead to the recognition of who was speaking, and therefore to N81's pseudonym. In other words it is my view that the evidence of N81 'in and of itself' would effectively reveal N81's pseudonym, and so the use of a cipher would NOT add an additional layer of security, as it can do in some historic cases where the evidence provided is largely peripheral.

Discussion

I therefore dismiss the idea of using a cipher as a possible mechanism for reducing risk in the context of public evidence.

As stated previously, all of the theoretical discussions above do not take into account the critical factor that a number of former UC's know perfectly well who N81 is. Those would include people such as *nominal*. What they have already passed on in terms of N81's real identity I cannot say.

I have considered the risk of physical attack to N81 if N81's pseudonym was revealed. On balance I assess the likelihood of an attack as 'low' (2), as it would be possible that the sterile corridor between pseudonym and real identity may be maintained, and I consider the risk of physical attack as lower than the risk of interference with family and private life. I have made clear my concern that maintaining this corridor may not be realistically feasible, but nonetheless I think it is a lower probability than if the real identity was revealed without that additional step being required.

I assess the impact if it did occur as 'serious' (4).

The overall score is therefore 8, but (as always) this overall score should be considered in the light of the comments under 'overall risk' in the generic documents referred to previously.

(ii) N81 – Risk of physical attack if real identity officially confirmed

The next question is whether N81 would be subject of physical attack if N81's real identity was confirmed.

I have considered the risk from the individuals and groups previously.

I have considered the risk to N81 if N81's real identity was revealed. I assess the likelihood of an attack as 'medium' (3), as it could reasonably be foreseen. I also take into account the comments of N81.

I assess the impact, if an attack did occur, as 'serious' (4). An attack could originate from a single individual or otherwise.

The overall score is therefore (conservatively) assessed as 12.

(iii) N81 - Risk of interference with family and private life if pseudonym officially confirmation

Overall, for all of the factors highlighted above, I have considered the risk to N81 if N81's pseudonym was revealed. I am not satisfied that the revelation of the pseudonym would definitely lead to the identification of N81's real identity, but I think there is a distinct prospect that it would.

I consider that the risk of interference with N81's family and private life to be greater than the risk of

physical assault. The 'scores' around probability in sections 16.b.(iii) and 16.b.(iv) are therefore higher than in 16.b.(1) and 16.b.(ii).

Discussion

I assess the likelihood of an attack as medium (3). I assess the impact, if an attack did occur, as serious (4).

The overall score is therefore assessed as 12.

(iv) N81 - Risk of interference with family and private life if real identity was officially confirmed

Clearly the risk of interference with family and private life if N81's real identity was confirmed must logically be higher than if only N81's pseudonym was revealed.

I do consider that it reaches the next threshold. I therefore consider that the likelihood of interference is high (4).

I have considered whether the probability in reality should be scored higher. I have borne in mind the potential for significant and ongoing media interest in the widest terms. I have borne in mind **N81's circumstances**. However, I have decided not to move to a 'very high' scoring. That decision is based upon a lack of specific intelligence.

I assess the impact, if an attack did occur, as serious (4).

I therefore assess the overall risk as 16.

Signature of author:

Dariusz K.

Date:

27/17

Signature of peer reviewer:

Date:

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N81

Supplementary - Appendix C

Subsequent to the submission of the risk assessment I have been provided with the following;

Material

Having read this group risk assessment I have decided it may assist the Inquiry in their restriction order considerations.

The document is recorded as Reference

I have not changed the risk assessment as a result of having access to the document. It does not change my conclusions.

It is submitted as an additional Appendix purely because it gives background and context to the current status of the

David Reid

Risk Assessor

15th June 2017

N81 – Supplement to version 2 - Appendix D

Subsequent to the submission of the risk assessment I have been provided with the following;

Material

Having read this group risk assessment I have decided it may assist the Inquiry in their restriction order considerations.

The document is recorded as Reference

I have not changed the risk assessment as a result of having access to the document. It does not change my conclusions.

It is submitted as an additional Appendix purely because it gives background and context to the current status of

David Reid

Risk Assessor

30th June 2017

N81 – Supplement to version 2 - Appendix E

Subsequent to the submission of the risk assessment concerning N81 I have been provided with Material

Having read this material I have decided it may assist the Inquiry in their restriction order considerations.

The document is recorded as Reference

I have not changed the risk assessment as a result of having access to the document. It does not change my conclusions.

It is submitted as an additional Appendix purely because it gives background and context to the current status of the

David Reid

Risk Assessor

4th July 2017