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## 1. Introduction

This report seeks to explain the workings of the 'Mosaic Effect' in respect of the exposure of former undercover officers (UCOs) i.e. how the incremental release of information can be used to identify them. The report focuses on a very specific group of officers, namely those who performed long term 'intelligence only' undercover deployments as part of the MPS Special Branch Special Demonstration Squad later known as the Special Duties Section (SDS) and latterly also those on the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU). Since 2001 allegations have gradually come into the public domain about the work of these covert units, which has led to a concerted effort by activists and others to expose former UCOs, reveal details of their deployments and in some cases their true identities. The report outlines the risks posed to former UCOs by the disclosure or potential disclosure of their cover and true identities and the impact of this on their lives.

## 2. Defining the 'Mosaic Effect' and aggravating factors:

The power of the 'Mosaic Effect' is that unrelated snippets of information from diverse sources can be collated over time and used to tentatively or positively identify UCOs. When assessing how to minimise the risk of a UCO being identified by this process there are several aggravating factors to consider: the sheer amount of information about the SDS and its modus operandi which is now in public domain; the unknown amount of information in the possession of activists and journalists which has not yet been made public; the potential for further revelations by other former SDS or NPOIU officers; and the development of the Internet as a research tool. Together these make it almost impossible to predict the outcome of the release of any information about an SDS or NPOIU UCO deployment.

### 2.1 Knowledge gaps:

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- The scope of the recollection of individual activists about associates in their groups cannot be known, but their recollections when shared with others can enable them to pinpoint a possible UCO in their group. The Internet has enabled activists to easily share and cross-reference information about suspected UCOs and this exercise has been aided by the volume of material that is now in the public domain about how the SDS operated. Evidence of the extent of the cooperation between activists from diverse groups is illustrated by the detailed profiles of





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suspected UCOs available online and the publication of a point by point checklist of a typical SDS or NPOIU UCO (see para. 2.2 - The Internet as a research tool).

- The personal details a UCO might have inadvertently revealed about themselves during their time in the field are not known, yet even the most trivial detail when placed alongside other information can years later help activists retrospectively identify them. This is compounded by the length and nature of SDS and NPOIU UCO deployments, which required the officers to form close friendships with activists in their respective groups and spend considerable time with them over the course of many months and years. Clearly it is unrealistic to expect the officers to recall everything they might have discussed.

(see para. 4.1 - Tracing John Barker).

- It is not known exactly how much information Peter Francis has disclosed to journalists such as Paul Lewis and Rob Evans, nor how much has been passed on to activists. However given the length of his posting on SDS and in MPSB it is certain that Francis has a wealth of knowledge to impart, including details of fellow Special Branch officers deployed as UCOs before him and with him. It is assessed that the volume of information published or broadcast to date by journalists working with Francis represents only a small proportion of what he has potentially disclosed (see para. 4.2 - Peter Francis)

### **2.2 The Internet as a research tool:**

The Internet has played a pivotal role as a research tool and a primary enabler of the 'Mosaic Effect.' During the time that the SDS was operating it was never envisaged that the unit would ever be subject to such intense public scrutiny. This has exposed the UCOs and their cover stories to unprecedented analysis, much of which has been facilitated by the Internet on websites, social media, forums and blogs.


These enable activists to compile information about suspected UCOs and compare details such as the "who, what, when and where" of meetings and protests and highlight common themes or inconsistencies. The consequence is that a single piece of seemingly trivial information, which prior to the Internet might only have been known to one individual activist, can now be shared online and may be recognised by another activist as highly significant. SDS or NPOIU UCO cover stories were never intended to withstand such minute examination.

The public inquiry will inevitably place a substantial volume of material regarding deployments and methodology squarely in the public domain. It is reasonable to expect that activists, journalists and other



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interested parties including potentially active criminals will make full use of this in an attempt to obtain the true identity of UCOs. There are a number of ways of narrowing down the identity of an intelligence source,



### 2.3 Undercover Research Group:

The activists and researchers working on identifying UCOs have established a website dedicated to the identification and exposure of UCOs - [undercoverresearch.net](http://undercoverresearch.net). The group describes their work as follows:

<http://undercoverresearch.net>

The Undercover Research Project aims to create a one-stop resource on political policing and undercover surveillance. This blog discusses the undermining of protest and dissent, to support others holding those responsible to account.

The group uses the website to coordinate their investigations, publicise issues pertaining to undercover policing and publish profiles of persons they believe they have confirmed as UCOs (see Profiling a UCO deployment).

The group applied for but has been denied Core Participant status at the public inquiry, however, their application gives a useful insight into the group and its stated *raison d'être*, which is somewhat at odds with how it actually goes about exposing UCOs and publishing their undercover profiles, photographs and in some cases their true identities:

<https://www.ucpi.org.uk/hearings/>

First Preliminary Hearing: 7 October 2015:





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Transcript pages 94-99

Submissions by Ms Gerry (representing the Undercover Research Group)

Ms Gerry: Sir, one of the first things I was going to do was address you a little bit more about the Undercover Research Group, when and why it was formed, its make up and its purpose, but in brief summary, Mr (Donal) O'Driscoll is one of three core members, as it were, of the organisation which is essentially, as you will see, a research based organisation. There is Mr O'Driscoll and two others, Eveline Lubbers and Chris Mitchell, and these three together formed the Undercover Research Group, as a result of the revelations that came about in late 2012, early 2013, in relation to Mark Kennedy.

Sir, the purpose of the organisation was to facilitate the gathering of information that was coming forward in relation to suspected activities by undercover officers, and it was to provide and does provide support to people who either believe they may have been or are aware they were targeted by undercover police officers.

Lord Justice Pitchford: Was its purpose to out undercover policemen?

Ms Gerry: Sir, it is more, as I say, an assistance and support role. If I can say on my instructions, I have been told that in very many cases, what the organisation is able to do is actually reassure people there is no evidence that they were in fact targeted by undercover officers or to the degree they can, based on the information they have. For those that wish to be able to take matters further or to understand more as to why they may have been targeted and in what ways they were targeted, to help them through the research that they have managed to do, and the information they have managed to gather together.

Sir, in essence it is to gather information about undercover police officers and to support those who are affected or believe they may be affected by helping them to better understand what may have happened to them, and to provide what advice and assistance they can about whether or not there are any further actions that they may be able to take.

Sir, what I have been told is they have been consulted by hundreds of individuals, and they have managed to gather a lot of information from a wide variety and a number of campaigning organisations in the intervening couple of years, and, sir, they are an organisation that is very much trusted in this area and they have managed to foster relations with some individuals who are very reluctant in respect of coming forward with information.

Sir, in terms of the organisation itself on a sort of day to day basis, they have face to face meetings, the three core researchers, four times a year. At those meetings, they will decide issues to be focused on, what research to conduct and they have weekly Skype meetings. As you will have seen from the application, they publish papers in respect of the research they undertake, they have a blog and they also partake in public talks around the research they have done.

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Sir, in relation to how the organisation say that they will be of benefit and assistance to the Inquiry, it is submitted on their behalf that they do have a very detailed overview and a wide appreciation and understanding of the political and social justice campaigns and movements, and also the information that has come to them in regards to concerns about the use of undercover police officers infiltrating those groups and campaigns. In my submission, what the group would be able to do is assist the Inquiry on making representations in regards to the areas or issues that the Inquiry identify, that needs to be investigated as part of the Inquiry, and to hopefully help ensure that all relevant areas would be covered by the lists identified. They can also, it is submitted, provide assistance by way of cross-examination, obviously with the permission of you, Sir, and the Inquiry, on the basis that they will be able to draw upon their considerable knowledge in order to make connections, to be able to cross-refer evidence, and so to ensure that there is the fullest and rigorous cross-examination of witnesses with the considerable knowledge they have amassed to date.

Also, Sir, it is submitted that they would be able to help the Inquiry identify other possible witnesses or evidence, given their access to the community and the contacts that they do have. So, in short, Sir, if they were given core participatory status, they submit they would be able to provide helpful observations in terms of areas to be covered, ensure the questions are across both time and groups and hopefully help





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identify and also foster relations with additional witnesses.

Sir, touching upon what my learned friend Mr Stanage referred to as well this morning about the ability of the Inquiry to delve into more historic matters, you will see from the application from the Undercover Research Group that they have gathered information and have contact with those that are involved in some of the now defunct campaigning groups going back to the 1970s, and also obviously where people have now sadly died. Again, in my submission this is a group that would be able to assist the Inquiry with ensuring that as much information is provided to the Inquiry as possible in relation to more historic matters where there may be less currently available information.

On 23 October 2015, in response to the question from Lord Justice Pitchford at the 7 October hearing, the group published a lengthy treatise on their website to explain and justify their work under the title of "Investigating undercovers: How we work".

<http://undercoverresearch.net/2015/10/23/undercover-research-group-how-we-work/#more-1075>

Investigating undercovers: How we work:

At the recent hearing of the Pitchford Inquiry into Undercover Policing, the Judge asked the Undercover Research Group whether it 'was its purpose to out undercover policemen.' (\*1) It is a good question and the answer is more nuanced than a simple yes or no. In this post we aim to give you some insight into how we work and how we make our judgements.

To be clear, we do not have a list of unconfirmed undercovers through which we are steadily working in preparation to systematic exposure. What we have is a bunch of fears and concerns from individuals and groups, who we think have valid questions.

First and foremost, no exposure is done by a single person working away by themselves in isolation. It requires people to come together and share suspicions and work out whether those suspicions have any grounding. We are there to support that process. In some cases, those groups of people have found the definitive evidence themselves and gone public with it. In others, there is a lack of expertise and doubt over what they have assembled. It is in the latter case that a number of them have turned to us. We will help the group profile the individual, assemble the information they need and (possibly most importantly) ask the right questions to test if the suspicion is reasonable. Or it may be that they don't have enough and need to go back and assemble more information to give a clearer profile of the person.

Once they have a reasonable suspicion, we then start testing it ourselves, which again comes in two parts. The first is documenting and researching these stories, putting the narrative together in a way that draws out issues, identifying new leads from it and seeing where gaps need filling.

The second skill we bring is the deep dig, looking for the corroborating bits of information that may provide definitive answers or allow us to test the background story of the person concerned. It is a painstaking process that takes time because it requires a wide ranging understanding of issues and access to particular resources that are not commonly available.

None of this could take place without the work of the people affected. As recently pointed out by Emily Apple in The Canary, all undercovers to date, with the exception of whistleblower Peter Francis, have only been exposed by activists doing the work of investigation. This is people doing the difficult work of investigating a close friend, not an abstract bit of detective work. We at the URG are there to work alongside them, involved and supporting at the same time. We are only all too aware of how painful a process this can be for people as they slowly come to terms that an old friend with whom they shared so much of their lives was not who they said they were. Going in with the sole object of exposing someone is not a helpful mindset. We are here to alleviate fear and destructive uncertainty. If we can prove that a friend, lover or colleague is not an undercover or corporate spy then that is equally important to us.

If no definitive evidence is found, going public is the only way that those affected stand a chance of actually finding out the truth.





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At all times we are hampered by the police's position of neither confirm nor deny (NCND). In a fair amount of the cases we have been able to establish conclusive evidence that the investigated individual was indeed a police officer. But there are and will be more undercovers under investigation for whom this 'smoking gun', so to speak, is not there. In fact that final bit of doubt is keeping us from publishing further cases.

This is why the police policy of NCND is effectively justice denied.

Which leaves us with the very real problem of when we can advise a group whether they have sufficient evidence to go public. To deal with this dead-end situation we have developed our own 'internal metric', which comes in three parts:

- Do the activities of the individual under investigation meet the established pattern of trade craft associated with undercover police officers? This does not have to be 100%, but it has to be substantially met. Normally, but not always, this amounts to answering a set of 10-15 questions, which we also use to establish how well-founded a group's suspicion is in the first place, and what they need to find out.
- What was the exit-strategy for the undercover? In particular, has their disappearance from the activist scene been pretty much total and they are no longer in touch with anyone?
- Can we find them? The flip side of showing someone was an undercover is to show that he or she is a genuine person who has put an end to the activist period in his or her life. So we set out to do that, to see if we can track them down, prove their existence and locate where they are now so we can put the case to them. If we cannot find them at all, that is a strong indication that the person known as an activist does not really exist.

If we are satisfied that all three criteria are met, even though there may be residual doubt, then we believe the group has enough to go public on, and we will publish our own report and profile on the undercover in support of the group's case.

This metric is flexible. Each case is to a degree unique, and we also recognise that undercovers do not always follow their tradecraft to the letter, so there will be times when adhering strictly to the conditions is not appropriate, particularly where there has been some degree of 'going native' or there are variations due to the nature of the background story / character that has been developed. We hope that our experience has given us sufficient judgement to be satisfied when a case falls into that sort of situation and to make the appropriate call.

We are very aware of the risk of getting it wrong and the need to act responsibly towards all parties. However, in a world with NCND in place and the refusal of the authorities to act responsibly towards those affected by intrusion from undercovers, the ability to get that guarantee is limited.

The police justify NCND on the grounds that it is needed to protect their officers, but that ignores totally the abuse caused in it is name. We firmly believe that NCND needs to be abandoned and that the police must properly acknowledge the invasion of privacy, personal lives and activist / political work carried out in their name. If the police will not answer, then going public is all that is left to us at this point. (\*2) Furthermore, we believe that this use of undercover policing is not about stopping crime as the police claim, but is political policing pure and simple, either to uphold a political agenda and/or to suppress criticism of the police; that is simply not acceptable.

If subsequent material comes to light that proves the individual was who they said they were, we will remove any article and replace it with an apology. We will also place a statement on each such page pointing out the position of lack of 100% proof and our reasons for publishing.

Might be worth saying that investigating undercover officers is by far not the only thing we do. Check the Undercover Research portal to see the many other profiles on officers and units involved in political policing, their networks and subsequent careers.

(\*1): a transcript of the 7th October 2015 hearing is available at the Pitchford Inquiry website. See page 95 for the quote.





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(\*2) we refer to the 'Reynold's Defence in English & Welsh law, a case where the court has ruled that a newspaper can publish a story in the absence of absolute proof when there is a public cause – as a defence against libel. For more detail see Lawteacher.net and this article in The Guardian about limits to the Reynold's defence.

- Identifying a UCO:

[Gist: The information now available about SDS and NPOIU UCO deployments has been used by researchers to compile a checklist to identify possible UCOs and this is referred to in the previous Undercover Research Group article when they state:] "Normally, but not always, this amounts to answering a set of 10-15 questions, which we also use to establish how well-founded a group's suspicion is in the first place, and what they need to find out". On 2 November 2015 the group elaborated on this in a further post on their website titled "The Fifteen Questions we work with."

<http://undercoverresearch.net/2015/11/02/1178/>

The Fifteen Questions we work with:

As we noted in a recent blogpost on how we work, we have a list of questions that we have developed from close study of the undercovers exposed so far. If someone comes to us with a suspicion about someone in their group, we put these questions to them, to see whether their suspicions are well founded. If many boxes are ticked, there are strong grounds for further investigation.

Here we set out the questions we work with, putting them in context (thanks for people taking part in our meeting at the London Anarchist Bookfair for their input!). Some questions are specifically related to the undercover tradecraft. Others are things about what infiltrating officers get wrong, or what we've picked up from our own analyses.

1. Is their background missing?

Generally, the undercover has very little in the way of background story. They will often have a 'legend' – where they are from, why they left. Details will generally be quite sparse, and there is very little overlap between their previous world and their activist one. It is rare to meet friends (or see their photos) from their 'previous' life, even though they may be discussed or the suspect claims he goes to see them. Undercovers will also have a lack of presence in the public record, though this is not always obvious until one starts investigating them seriously.

Caveat: It is known that several undercovers did bring other people through – generally these are considered 'background artistes' used to help bolster an undercover's story. For example, Lynn Watson introduced several boyfriends to activist friends. Generally these other people have only appeared once or twice, and at times have been noted for their unusual or provocative behaviour.

2. Is their politics missing, underdeveloped or stereotyped?

Related to the first question, in most cases undercovers have had very little to say in relation to the politics of the movement they are infiltrating. Although they are indeed interested in listening to others (though some eschewed any interest in the name of cynicism), they contribute little on that score and generally avoid or head-off such discussions. Where they demonstrate interest, it is often superficial and the books and background material they have are standard, popular stuff showing little depth or breathe.





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Caveat: This can be applied to a lot of campaigners, but in some groups it is a reason for standing out.

3. Has anyone ever met their family?

Some undercovers never talk about their family, while some talk about them a lot. However opportunities to meet them never quite come off – there are always excuses. Undercovers can produce photos and other material indicating the existence of supposed family members, and talk about having close relationships with them. Others have spun stories about abusive relationships (and used these stories to build trust), but inconsistently talk about how they are going to see them. Sometimes family crises, such as a seriously ill father, are used as an excuse to go away for extended periods of time.

4. Does their job take them away for periods at a time?

It appears that many undercovers have jobs that require them to be away for extended periods of time, up to several weeks at a time. These jobs would also supply them with money, vehicles and excuses to put receipts 'through the books'. Depending on the nature of the job, most are reluctant to bring activists into contact with their employers. E.g., Lynn Watson was a care-worker, but when friends asked about working with her agency, she kept them at bay.

5. Did their home look un-lived in?

A common theme is how un-homely or not lived-in their houses were, though – again – not in every case. There would be materials around that indicated 'political activist', but they are the exception rather than the norm, looking more staged than anything. There would also be a lack of personal touch and possessions. The most noted case of this was Lynn Watson's house which had overdone Class War posters and little in the way of personal touch.

6. Did they have a vehicle?

Most undercovers had vehicles and showed willing to use them for the purposes of campaigning, including doing reconnaissances and actions. The vehicles would vary in type and model, and include vans. Sometimes the undercovers claimed the car came through their work.

7. Did they have above-average driving skills?

Something commented on a lot of undercovers is their above average driving skills, which is not unsurprising given Special Branch / police background.

8. Would you consider them someone who went out of their way to be helpful?

The charm, friendliness and general kindness of the undercovers is regularly noted upon. They come across as ready to go out of their way to help. In particular, they are happy to give lifts to and from campaigner's homes.

9. Did they have ready access to money and were they generous with it?

They are often ready to help people out with money, such as wave petrol costs or buy rounds of food or drink. Sometimes they will claim that expenses are already covered it in some way – through their work for instance. They are not necessarily flash, but seem to have ready access to cash. They show willing to be generous, and will be quick to buy the rounds.

10. Did they focus relationships on key people?

It is not uncommon for them to – after getting involved in a group – to 'make a beeline' for key people and become very close to them personally and in campaigning. This often leads to them being seen as 'second in command', etc.

11. Did they ever exhibit noticeable out-of-character behaviour?

A number of undercovers have been known to do something quite out of character that either disrupted an action and alerted police, or was distinctively away from the norm of the group. Examples are: inexplicable carelessness (Jim Boyling sabotaged a blockade during a Reclaim the Streets action by 'forgetting' to keep window closed, so that the car was easy to remove by the police), or doing things beyond the group's normal mode of behaviour (encouraging activities that put other members at risk, or take them into





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unplanned confrontations).

Related to this is spreading stories about more serious involvement in radical action elsewhere to give the impression they are 'up for it', though this would differ from how they normally present and actually behave in given situations.

**12. Have you spotted oddities?**

A number of things we have encountered in our research, that are worth noting if you encounter them:

- Have documents in other names (sometimes can be explained away; not all are without good reason).
- Organisational skills at odds with their persona.
- Not having the skills they claim, especially where it is within their alleged job (Mark Jenner, for instance claimed to be a professional joiner but was unable to fit a kitchen). Related to this is not knowing enough about something they claim to be into, particularly a football team.
- A focus on cleanliness and order that puts them at the far end of the activist spectrum, or at odds with it (e.g. Mark Kennedy getting his hair regularly styled in professional hairdressers).
- Characteristics that indicate some formal training (the way they do their boots).
- Reacting to surprise situations in ways that indicated some other training (at a noise outside Jenner dropping in the correct moves to react to a bomb explosion).
- Owning a very expensive bit of equipment that is somewhat out of characteristic for them or their milieu (top of the range phone, watch).
- Doing something that seems to be signalling to someone else.

**13. Have there been weird things around court cases or – lack of – police interest?**

Sometimes undercover officers have been dropped inexplicably from a legal case, or chose to have a different solicitor from everyone else. Or you may have experienced a noticeable lack of police interest during the period the undercover was part of your group, or people would not be arrested when it would be otherwise be expected. It is now known that the undercovers' handlers were turning a blind eye to illegal activities at occasions, and would go out of their way to keep the undercover from going to court.

Caveat: The opposite might be true too: there are several strong examples of undercovers turning up in court using their false names to give evidence for instance – leading to overturned convictions eventually.

**14. Did he or she suddenly disappear and cut off all contact?**

This question is a section in itself as the 'exit strategy' is one of the most important aspects of the tradecraft when investigating a suspicion. In every case, undercovers have served a term of four to five years, then left relatively abruptly. It is quite telling how time and again two strategies are used, sometimes in combination: a) they go abroad, or b) act out and demonstrate a kind of mental breakdown, including actual tears. More importantly, they disappear completely, totally cutting off from their activist social life.

In several cases, not attending funerals or coming to other events related to people they were once very close to, gave rise to suspicions.

Sometimes, the situation has been more complicated, because the undercover continued to tangle up their personal life and their professional undercover one, which is called 'going native'. Mike Chitty, for instance, returned after supposedly having left for Canada to socialise with activist friends, while he continued his job in the protective service – a different section of Special Branch. Kennedy came back after he had left the police, and tried to use his activist contacts to set up shop as a corporate spy selling the information he gathered.





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15. Can you help up kill these myths?

We are aware from conversations that some people believe or have believed undercovers had a code of conduct, that there were things they would not do. We flag them up here to put an end to these myths:

- Commit illegal activities;
- Have sexual relationships with people they were targeting;
- Deny they are police when asked directly (some would even joke about it).

We now know that all of these things have been done regularly by undercover officers.

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This article is here to help those who have been targeted in the past to identify individuals who should be investigated further, and should not be seen as the most up-to-date understanding of undercover police tradecraft.

Profiles of undercovers mentioned in this article can be found here (active link on website). Some details taken from undercovers yet to be publicly exposed.

This article complemented an earlier piece titled "Checklist of how to identify a UCO" published on the Undercover Research website on 5 August 2015 which was part of a broader article titled "Getting ready for Pitchford."

<http://undercoverresearch.net/2015/08/05/getting-ready-for-pitchford/#more-887>

Checklist of how to identify a UCO:

From our investigations of the undercover officers exposed to date, we have been able to identify key aspects of their trade-craft, particularly the Special Demonstration Squad and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit which we list here.

If we have a key bit of advice to give, then it that the first thing you do is write down what you know (and don't know) of the person, and what are the basis of your suspicions. It is a surprisingly effective technique for testing the substance of your concerns. Use the Tradecraft and Exit Strategy below as a first check list to see if and how the suspicions overlap with this basic framework.

Next, make a time line chronicling his or her whereabouts, presence, behaviour and activities – checking for (in)consistencies as well as periods of absence like we did for Mark Kennedy (Always make sure not to include hearsay or stories that go around, keep track of who are your sources).

Tradecraft

Key aspects of tradecraft used by undercover officers exposed for infiltrating activist groups:

- Jobs that would take them away for considerable periods
- Sparsely furnished house, often devoid of much in the way of personal stuff. Can sometimes be very focused on cleanliness and order
- Never having family or people from their previous lives around, plus a background story that writes them out of their lives. This includes going to places close to family with partners, but somehow never ending up meeting them, especially if they use the excuse of ill family members as an excuse for being away
- Have a car or van and be ready to use it to give people lifts to demonstrations or their homes, transport essentials for an action or volunteer for recces. Above average driving skills.





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Ready access to cash and quick to buy rounds.

- Poor politics, or avoidance of discussing stuff to any depth.
- Claims of activities that do not match up with day to day experience of them. (Claim to be a handyman, but failing to fit a kitchen; claim to be a supporter but failing to know specifics about the team).
- Quick to get close to key organisers (but again, not necessarily so).
- A lack of public record for the individual before or after they are on the scene
- Provoke acts that disrupt actions or their planning, alert police or are otherwise out of the norm – whether socially or politically. For example: inexplicable carelessness (sabotaging of the car blockade during a Reclaim the Streets action by 'forgetting' to keep window closed so that the car was easy to remove); or doing things beyond the group's normal mode of behaviour (encouraging activities that put other members at risk, or take them into unplanned confrontations).

#### Exit Strategy

There is a key set of techniques consistently used around exit strategy:

- Increasing (expression of) moodiness, depression and paranoia. Erratic behaviour.
- On the scene for a period of approximately four years (at 7 years, Kennedy is the exception rather than the rule). During this time they will often move from one group to another.
- Breaking up of relationships messily.
- Vanishing without a trace, often claiming to be moving abroad, and in a good number of cases with a new love otherwise unknown to the scene around them. Minimal contact for a short while before utterly disappearing thereafter.

Finally, a key bit of evidence is there being a death certificate for a child in the name of the person, though this tactic died out in the late 1990s / early 2000s.

- Profiling a UCO deployment:

As well as identifying suspected former UCOs, the Undercover Research Group canvasses for details about their deployment. Once the researchers are confident that they have sufficient verifiable information, then a profile of the UCO is published utilising the Wikipedia page format. This will include their true identity (if known), a timeline of their deployment, photographs in the field etc with all the information linked back to a source. The group has published detailed profiles of a number of SDS officers that are clearly the result of hours of painstaking analysis and research.

- Undercover Research Group - the threat to UCOs:

The work of the Undercover Research Group arguably poses one of the gravest threats to the anonymity of any former SDS or NPOIU UCO; their *modus operandi* exploits the 'Mosaic Effect' to a level which produces results that could not be achieved by an individual working alone.





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The group epitomises the 'Mosaic Effect' in action and they spell this out in their article

\_\_\_\_\_ "Investigating undercovers: how we work" (reproduced in full on pages 6-8):

Of particular note and concern in this extract is the concluding reference to research: "it requires... access to particular resources that are not commonly available." We can only speculate as to what these resources might be, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ for example Department of Social Security information obtained from sympathetic employees, or personal financial information and telephone subscriber details from private detective agencies. This is illustrated by the ex-girlfriend of SDS UCO Jim Boyling who employed a private detective to obtain subscriber details to help her trace him (see para 4.1 - Tracing Jim Sutton).

Also of concern is that one of the three founding members of the Undercover Research Group, Mr. Donal O'Driscoll, has been granted core participant status at the public inquiry and he will be entitled to the disclosure of material which that status affords. Therefore it can be assumed that any information released in a core participant bundle will become part of the group's research and used to profile and expose more former UCOs.



\_\_\_\_\_ [Gist: That the group has the resources, analytical expertise and considerable knowledge to do this is clearly illustrated by their blog posts such as "Investigating undercovers: How we work;" "The Fifteen Questions we work with;" "Checklist of how to identify a UCO" and by the profiles of UCOs that have been published. Their work is professional and meticulously researched and this is unsurprising given that] another of the co-founders of the group is Eveline Lubbers, a research fellow at the University of Bath, who wrote her Phd about corporate and police spying published as the book 'Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark.'

At the first preliminary hearing of the public inquiry on 7 October 2015, when the Undercover Research Group made their application for core participant status, Lord Justice Pitchford asked their legal representative "was its purpose to out undercover policemen?" In her reply she avoided answering the question directly and instead gave the lengthy reply (already reproduced in full on pages 4-6) indicating that the primary purpose of the group was "an assistance and support role"





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i.e. to offer help, support, advice and assistance to people affected by undercover policing deployments. However in her submission she also indicated that:

"The purpose of the organisation was to facilitate the gathering of information that was coming forward in relation to suspected activities by undercover officers..."

\*\*\*\*\*

"In essence it is to gather information about undercover police officers..."

\*\*\*\*\*

"What I have been told is they have been consulted by hundreds of individuals, and they have managed to gather a lot of information from a wide variety and a number of campaigning organisations in the intervening couple of years..."

\*\*\*\*\*

"...they will be able to draw upon their considerable knowledge in order to make connections, to be able to cross-refer evidence, and so to ensure that there is the fullest and rigorous cross-examination of witnesses with the considerable knowledge they have amassed to date."

\*\*\*\*\*

"...the Undercover Research Group...has gathered information and has contact with those that are involved in some of the now defunct campaigning groups going back to the 1970s, and also obviously where people have now sadly died. Again, in my submission this is a group that would be able to assist the Inquiry with ensuring that as much information is provided to the Inquiry as possible in relation to more historic matters where there may be less currently available information."

When these statements are considered along with the blog articles and UCO profiles that are published by the Undercover Research Group there is compelling evidence that the primary purpose of the group is indeed to "out undercover policemen," contrary to the altruistic motives which were presented to the public inquiry about their work.

When the group state that "we do not have a list of unconfirmed undercovers through which we are steadily working in preparation to systematic exposure" this is also disingenuous. On their website they list a number of suspected UCOs and they are periodically releasing comprehensive new profiles of 'confirmed' former UCOs. Furthermore they also state "might be worth saying that investigating undercover officers is by far not the only thing we do. Check the Undercover Research portal to see the many other profiles on officers and units involved in political policing, their networks and subsequent careers."

The real motivation of the group is also revealed through other blog posts and Twitter comments; two recent examples are reproduced here:

1. Twitter post 27 October 2015: "Working hard to profile all undercovers that we know of."





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This post is self-explanatory in revealing the true intentions of the Undercover Research Group.

UndercoverResearch@UndercoverNet:

Twitter post on 27 October 2015:

Home About

**UNDERCOVER**

**RESEARCH GROUP**

**UndercoverResearch**  
@UndercoverNet

Investigating political policing, spying on activists and the undermining of dissent

📍 UK and elsewhere

🌐 [undercoverresearch.net](http://undercoverresearch.net)

📷 Photos and videos

TWEETS 618 FOLLOWING 231 FOLLOWERS 413

Tweets Tweets & replies

UndercoverResearch Retweeted

**Tom Fowler** @tombfowler · 2 hrs  
Start of @ReelNewsLondon c  
#spycops, interviews with @c  
/m8GsY7yM3F8

👍 5 🌟 1

**UndercoverResearch** @Under  
Working hard to profile all unc  
@UndercoverNet. Today we e  
powerbase.info/index.php/Lyr

👍 1 🌟

2. Blog post on 23 November 2015: re. "The spycops supervisors."





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This post on the Undercover Research Group website purports to name senior officers who are alleged to have held supervisory posts with responsibility for the SDS, NPOIU or a national remit in respect of covert or undercover policing or domestic extremism. Only the title of the article and the concluding comment have been reproduced because firstly the opening comment demonstrates collaboration between researchers and secondly, the concluding 'NB' comment again illustrates the intentions of the group to expose and profile all officers involved in covert or undercover policing, regardless of whether they deployed as UCOs or not (also see para. 4.8 - Gordon Mills).

There is also a comment at the foot of the blog: "Request for information: We actively ask people who know of undercover officers or spying on activists and justice campaigners to get in touch. Support to develop the Undercover Research Project and the help (sic) and improve the site is very welcome too."

<http://undercoverresearch.net/2015/11/23/the-spycops-supervisors-who-remain-accountable/>

Blog post on 23 November 2015:





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# The spycops' supervisors who remain accountable

After the unreserved apology of the Metropolitan Police to the eight women conceding undercover relationships were an abuse of power and violated women's human rights, Tom Coburg did an overview of the supervisors responsible for the #spycops, their tasking and their behaviour – based on *Undercover Research profiles*.



*Repost of Undercoverinfo blog, by Tom Coburg, originally 20 November 2015*

\*\*\*\*\*





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*N.B. As you can see, the Undercover Research Group portal does not have p  
of these supervisors yet. Assistance to populating the wiki would be warmly we  
Get in touch with us!*

SHARE THIS:



This entry was posted in Uncategorized by admin. Bookmark the permalink.

#### DISCLAIMER

The Undercover Research Group endeavours  
to ensure that all material published is fully  
sourced and checked as far as possible. We  
understand that this is not an infallible  
process...

[Read full Disclaimer](#)

#### UNDERGROUND RESEARCH GROUP

This Wordpress site serves as the entrance to  
the Undercover Research Group portal at  
[Powerbase.info](#).

The list of other groups we collaborate with can  
be found in the right hand menu.

#### REQUESTS

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### 3. Contributing to the 'Mosaic Effect':

#### 3.1 Other research and researchers:

Activists and researchers have recognised that the internet affords them unique opportunities to identify former UCOs by collating and analysing information from diverse sources and they have proved that they have the capability to exploit this to its maximum potential and thereby prove the 'Mosaic Effect' in action.

The last Undercover Research Group post (copied above) is an example of how information is shared online because it is a repost of an article originally published on 20 November 2015 by Tom Coburg on the website [undercoverinfo.wordpress.com](http://undercoverinfo.wordpress.com). This has a broader agenda than the Undercover Research Group but complements and supports their work.





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This online collaboration and sharing of information is a key feature of the 'Mosaic Effect', another example being the retrospective exercise undertaken to profile Mark Kennedy's deployment after he self-disclosed his role as an NPOIU UCO. Using the internet, activists crowd-sourced information from other activists and uploaded it to an online spreadsheet, which eventually included details of meetings, events, protests and social functions he is known to have attended, together with who else was present and any resultant police action or other outcomes.

Other websites, blogs and social media sites complement the work undertaken by the Undercover Research Group by reaching out for information across the spectrum of protest groups. Another example of how this research is undertaken is shown by a post by 'Bristle' on 1 May 2015:

<https://bristle.wordpress.com/>

Mayday! Mayday! Help needed to fill in the blanks on spycop Bob Lambert's timeline...

After spending rather a lot of time working on a series of articles about our old friend Dr Bob for the Undercover Research Group's wiki project, it struck me that it's just not clear what Lambert did between leaving SDS sometime after Aug 1998, and the establishment of the Muslim Contact Unit in Jan 2002.

### 3.2 'Undercover - The True Story of Britain's Secret Police' (book):

The activists' research is being ably assisted by sections of the media, such as Guardian journalists Rob Evans and Paul Lewis and on one occasion the BBC Newsnight programme.


[Gist: Evans and Lewis published the book 'Undercover - The Story of Britain's Secret Police' (working with information supplied by former SDS officer Peter Francis) which is an account of the activities of several SDS and NPOIU UCOs. The book is being used by activists to assist their research and an example of this is shown in another post by 'Bristle' which is too long to include



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here, but in summary it outlines how the author has been attempting to piece together information from the 'Undercover' book with details from other diverse sources to identify UCOs:

<https://bristle.wordpress.com/https://bristle.wordpress.com/tag/simon-wellings/>



[Gist: There are other references which contribute to the 'Mosaic Effect' because they could, when placed alongside other information, be used to tentatively or positively identify UCOs, for example, published photographs of NPOIU UCOs Marco Jacobs and Rod Richardson.]

### 3.3 Information that can contribute to the 'Mosaic Effect:'

It follows that given the issues outlined so far, the release of any information into the public domain about an SDS or NPOIU UCO deployment, however apparently inconsequential, could directly or indirectly contribute to the identification of a UCO, particularly taking account the aggregation of such information over time. This is the crux of the 'Mosaic Effect': the fact that no one, not even individuals with legal expertise and a clear understanding of the policy of 'Neither Confirm Nor Deny' (NCND), can arguably ever be in possession of all the necessary information to accurately and confidently judge what details about an SDS or NPOIU UCO/UCO deployment can be revealed without there being any risk of compromising the identity of a UCO and thereby breaching NCND.

In order to illustrate this and in an attempt to demonstrate the 'Mosaic Effect' in action, this report draws on case studies to demonstrate how information about a number of SDS UCOs has already been revealed and outlines how the information came into the public domain. The report





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concludes with examples of the consequences for individual officers exposed as former UCOs and the impact on them and their families.

Comment: The case studies include links to online sources in blue and where possible a summary of the information.

The true identities of UCOs are only included if they have been openly identified.

#### 4. Case studies of former UCOs and the methods employed to attempt to identify them:

##### 4.1 Identification motivated by a personal relationship:

- Tracing John Barker:

Helen Steel is a long-term and prominent activist in the field of animal rights and came to wider public attention during the McLibel trial. In 1987 she met John Barker (SDS officer John Dines, his true identity is widely known although still subject to NCND by the MPS) at a protest meeting and in due course the two formed a close relationship which lasted until 1991 when Barker gave reasons for leaving and ceased contact. Steel subsequently conducted exhaustive research to trace him which culminated with her identifying Barker's true surname and travelling to New Zealand where she had traced his family. This has been reported extensively in the media, the article below gives a snapshot of the enquiries she conducted and illustrates her determination and motivation.

<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/feb/03/woman-search-police-spy>

#### Woman's 18-year search for truth about police spy who used dead child's name (online extracts):

In 1990 the man Clare (*comment: now acknowledged as Helen Steel*) knew as John Barker asked to borrow money so he could fly to New Zealand for his mother's funeral. "The night before he got the flight to go there, he stayed at my place and kind of poured his heart out. We became emotionally close. When he got back, we got together."

There was no funeral in New Zealand and Dines had no need to borrow money. But Clare had known Dines as a fellow protester for three years and had no reason to suspect him. The couple would end up in an intimate relationship for two years.

\*\*\*\*\*

In March 1992 an emotional-sounding Dines called from Heathrow airport saying he was about to fly to South Africa. After that, Clare received two letters with South African postmarks. Then her boyfriend vanished altogether.



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Clare was left distraught and confused. "I was very worried about his mental state," she said. "I was also sick with worry that he might kill himself."

Clare contacted the British consulate in South Africa and frantically phoned hostels she thought he may have stayed in Johannesburg. She later hired a private investigator who could find no trace of Dines.

It was the start of a journey for the truth that would last almost two decades and eventually take her to New Zealand. It was not until 2010 that she found out for sure the man she had loved was a police spy.

\*\*\*\*\*

In her search for clues, one of the first things Clare did was locate a copy of what she assumed was her boyfriend's birth certificate. The document confirmed the details he had always given her: it named a city in the Midlands where he was born in January 1960. She had no idea that the identity was a forgery, or that the real John Barker had died as a boy.

In April 1993, desperate after a year of searching, Clare decided to visit Barker's family home in the hope of finding any surviving relatives, but when she knocked on the door of the terrace house there was no answer. She went back later but the occupants said the family no longer lived there.

It was another 18 months before Clare decided to inspect the national death records. "I just suddenly got this instinct. It was a whim: I thought, I'm going to go in there and look through the death records." She recalls her horror when she discovered the real John Barker was dead.

Clare now knew her boyfriend had lied about his identity, but still had no idea who he was. The idea that he might have been a police spy crossed her mind, but he might also have worked in corporate espionage or had a hidden criminal past. It was another 10 years of searching before she got closer to the truth.

Clare had two clues to go on. One was the name of a woman in New Zealand who Dines had told her was an aunt. The other was a letter in which he had made a curious reference to his biological father being a man he had never met, called Jim Dines.

The woman in New Zealand was not his aunt but, bizarrely, the mother of Dines's real wife. Stranger still, Jim Dines was, in fact, the officer's real father and had brought him up in London.

\*\*\*\*\*

Whatever his reason the clues led Clare to a public archive in New Zealand. It was there, in 2003, that she made a crucial connection: a document that linked Dines with the woman he married, Debbie.

Clare instantly realised they must have been a married couple. Back in London, she ordered the couple's wedding certificate. "What hit me like a ton of bricks is that he listed his occupation as a police officer"...

Clare was now agonisingly close to the truth. She knew that Dines was a police officer when he married his wife in 1977. But there was still a possibility that he gave up his job before becoming a political activist.

In 2010 she was contacted by a woman who had recently divorced a police officer who had worked undercover for the SDS shortly after Dines. The woman said her ex-husband had revealed that Dines was a fellow spy.

- Tracing Jim Sutton:

Jim Sutton is the cover-name of former SDS officer Jim Boyling (his true identity is widely known and is no longer subject to NCND following a High Court ruling in August 2014). Jim struck up a relationship with an activist while in the field which he terminated at the end of his deployment, however as was the case with Helen Steel such was the strength of her feelings and concern for him after he left that she initiated enquiries to trace him. The effort she put into this was





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extraordinary and is outlined at length in the book 'Undercover'; she is referred to under the pseudonym 'Laura':

### Extracts from 'Undercover - The True Story of Britain's Secret Police' (pages 190-192):

In September of that year, Boyling left, saying he was going to travel to Turkey and South Africa. A postcard from Turkey arrived soon afterwards, and it was followed by a phone call. 'I told him I loved him and he sobbed his heart out. He said he thought he had messed everything up,' she says. 'He was supposed to call me again when he was hitchhiking through Syria. When he didn't, I became worried and called the Foreign Office to ask what was going on. They told me he hadn't left Istanbul and they were instigating a missing persons search.'

Laura was a case in point. Hers was an extraordinary and single-minded quest to find the man she loved. She began looking into his background. She was worried that he may be at risk in some way. She had also become increasingly distressed and confused by his behaviour, and needed counselling for her depression and panic attacks. 'I tried to locate his parents because I was worried, but I couldn't find them, or his brother, who he said was an independent travel agent in Nottingham. I wanted someone to know to contact me if something happened to him,' she says. 'If Jim was a nice guy, I wanted to help him. If he wasn't a nice guy, I needed to know that so I could move on.'

Unable to find any trace of Boyling, she began to consider the possible explanations. 'I was suspicious, but I kept thinking there was some explanation,' she says. 'I kept trying to turn to something solid to base the truth on but I couldn't find it - each time it crumbled.' She discovered from official records that he was not adopted and neither was he born on the day he claimed. '

\*\*\*\*\*

Tenaciously, Laura pressed on. Boyling had emailed her to say that he still loved her, but had been forced to leave her against his wishes. He claimed that he was not coping very well, but hoped that he could go back to her. Another email led her to believe that he was working in a vineyard in South Africa. In the summer of 2001, she travelled there and spent three months searching for him. As months passed by, Laura became exhausted and the strain was showing. She returned to London, but with nowhere to live.

\*\*\*\*\*

What happened next was extraordinary. Although enfeebled, Laura managed to track down one of the squad's secret safe houses. The trail began some months before with a list of all the phone numbers Boyling had rung while he was living with her. Laura sifted through the list of telephone numbers for clues, and found two she did not recognise. She dialled the first number and said she wanted to speak to Jim Sutton. The man who answered sounded panicked and demanded to know how she had got the number. Later she called the second number; another voice answered and said he did not know anyone called Jim Sutton, but offered to help and took down all of Laura's details. He never called back.

With the help of a private detective, Laura traced the two numbers to a rundown office block on Camberwell New Road in south London. In November 2001, more than a year after Boyling had melted away, Laura sat in a pub opposite the block and watched who came in and out. She noted down the registration numbers of the cars parked nearby. She could not have known that she was conducting surveillance on what was at the time the clandestine headquarters of the SDS, situated above the nondescript City Office Superstore stationers.

She had however previously discovered that the phone numbers belonged to a government agency. By now she was 'very, very scared' that she had stumbled upon some sort of malevolent secret state. She did not know if Boyling was part of this state or running away from it.

It was a low point in her search but, two days later, she saw him again. Her detective work had yielded several leads about his real identity. Part of this information had come by tracing the locations of the computers he had used to send his recent emails. She believed that she had found out his real name, his relatives and the school he had attended. In one of his emails, he had appeared to encourage her to believe that he was in England. She had come to suspect that he was living in Kingston in Surrey and had





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started to spend a lot of time in the area. She took a job in a local bookshop. 'I remember thinking it was the kind of place Jim would go,' she says.

On the first day in her new job, Boyling walked in. It was more than a year since he had disappeared.

The outcome of this encounter, Laura says, was that Jim recommenced his relationship with 'Laura' and from the outset confided in her that he had been a UCO. She says that he disclosed his real name, claimed that his experience working undercover had changed him and that he regretted what he had done. Now that contact had been made their relationship was quickly re-established and they began living together again, later married and had children, but subsequently split up acrimoniously. It is assessed that this prompted 'Laura' to disclose details about their relationship to the media and expose him as a UCO.

### 4.2 Disclosure by former officers:

- True Spies:

This was a BBC documentary broadcast in three parts in 2002

The interviewees discussed tradecraft such as the use of deceased children's identities which contributed to the activists' store of knowledge and facilitated identification of former UCOs by the 'Mosaic Effect.'

- Peter Francis:


Peter Francis is a former SDS officer who has spoken extensively to the media about the unit and made allegations about improper tasking and inappropriate behaviour by officers. He appeared on Channel 4's 'Dispatches: The Police's Dirty Secret' and collaborated with Guardian journalists Rob Evans and Paul Lewis on the book 'Undercover'.

As previously noted, given the level of contact between Francis and investigative journalists it is believed that the amount of information he has disclosed is likely to be far in excess of that which has been published.






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


**4.3 Exposure accompanied by publication of a photograph:**





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Gist: Once Simon Wellings was provisionally identified, a photograph of him in the field was published alongside a request for information:

<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12867187>

Undercover police work revealed by phone blunder (online extract):

A blunder by an undercover policeman has revealed how the Metropolitan Police spied on the private lives





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of members of an anti-capitalist group.

Newsnight has obtained an audio tape in which the officer is heard discussing the personal lives of Globalise Resistance activists with other police.

Calling himself Simon Wellings, he infiltrated the group from 2001-2005.

Newsnight is looking for more information on this man (comment: posted alongside two photos of Simon Wellings on the BBC website).

He was known as Simon Wellings during the time that he was a member of Globalise Resistance and was active in London as well as joining protests in New York, Paris, Seville and many other cities.

If you are Simon Wellings or have any information about him please e-mail us in confidence at [NewsnightInvestigations@bbc.co.uk](mailto:NewsnightInvestigations@bbc.co.uk)

#### **4.4. Linking information utilising open source research**

- Locating Bob Lambert:


In this example, an interview given by a woman who allegedly had a sexual relationship with UCO Bob Robinson while he was in the field (SDS officer Bob Lambert, his true identity is widely known and is no longer subject to NCND following a High Court ruling in August 2014), provides a snippet of information which when researched further [REDACTED]

[Gist: has traced his involvement with a Park Run event.]

Separately researchers knew that another ex-SDS officer (Jim Boyling) is a keen runner and they discovered that he took part in Park Run events in SW London. Both officers are known to have worked closely on the SDS and subsequently on the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) and this enabled the Undercover Research Group to identify that Bob Lambert also competes in Park Run events at Nonsuch Park:



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4.5. Identification by Op HERNE - Report 1 - Use of covert identities

- Roger Pearce:


In Chapter 7 titled "SDS Management Oversight" it refers to: "Former Commander N85, (Head of Special Branch between 2000 and 2004 and SDS UCO between 1978 and 1980)"; it is on public record that Roger Pearce was the Special Branch Commander between 2000 and 2004.

Chapter 11.3 of report 1 concludes that "The genuine identities of the deceased children were blended with the officer's own biographical details."



- Other identifications:

Unsurprisingly the activists have taken a great interest in any officially published document and by cross reference have used it make purported identifications









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
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
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#### **4.7 Identification during court proceedings - Ratcliffe-on-Soar appeal:**

On 20 July 2011 in the Court of Appeal, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales Mr. Justice Treacy and Mr. Justice Calvert-Smith quashed the convictions of twenty (20) appellants who had been convicted at Nottingham Crown Court on 14th December 2010 for conspiracy to commit aggravated trespass, *to wit* to invade and occupy a power station at Ratcliffe-on-Soar in protest against climate change. Their arrest was as a direct result of information supplied by NPOIU UCO Mark Stone (true identity Mark Kennedy) and the appeal centred on whether the prosecution had complied with their duties in relation to disclosure.



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In the course of proceedings an NPOIU officer DI David Hutcheson (his true identity) was named in open court and his name subsequently published in a transcript of the hearing in paragraph 11 on page 6:

Paragraph 11 of transcript of appeal between David Robert Barkshire and Others and the Queen:

Kennedy was not authorised to take part in any occupation of the power station until 9 April 2009, and the authorisation included the requirement of his handler, DI Hutcheson, to liaise with the Crown Prosecution Service:

"UCO133 (that is Kennedy) will decline the offer for a solicitor. UCO133 will be engaged in driving and dropping off of activists prior to them committing offences. UCO133 will withdraw from the vicinity of the power station to avoid arrest and avoid becoming a witness to offences. SIO Inspector David Hutcheson will be regularly informed of the situation of UCO133 and in the event of ...arrest will be immediately informed in order to liaise with the Nottinghamshire Senior management and the Criminal Prosecution Service."

It is not known what legal representations, if any, were made by the Crown on behalf of DI Hutcheson in respect of his anonymity. What is known is that he had no prior knowledge that his identity was likely to be revealed in open court during the proceedings.

There are several observations to be made concerning this disclosure:

- The officer was not invited to make any representations as to the risk to him of his identity being revealed together with details of his role;
- The description of his role in the appeal transcript is incorrect; DI Hutcheson was Mark Kennedy's Controller and not his Handler;
- The fact that the officer was not a UCO in no way mitigates the risk to him; by being publicly linked to Mark Kennedy he is vulnerable to many of the same risks as former UCOs such as physical attack, harassment by former associates or activists and media intrusion, with the subsequent potential impact on his private and family life which is explored further in paragraph 5 of this report. An example of the impact this can have on an officer who was not a UCO but is identified by activists as having been associated with covert policing activity is that of retired DCI Gordon Mills (see below).

#### 4.8 Identification by Members of Parliament:

- Gordon Mills:

Between 2006 and 2011 when he retired, Gordon Mills was a DCI on the National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU). On 10 November 2014 he was named by John McDonnell MP in a letter to the Home Secretary Teresa May, subsequently made public, which linked him to





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allegations of 'blacklisting'. The allegation derives from a leaked handwritten memo of a meeting which Mr. Mills attended in 2008 with representatives of the construction industry in his role as head of liaison at NETCU. Mr. Mills strenuously denies any involvement in blacklisting and states that there was nothing untoward in his presence at the meeting.

Regardless of the veracity or otherwise of the allegation, and noting that Mr. Mills was not deployed as a UCO, he has nevertheless been the subject of considerable attention by activists campaigning on blacklisting and he has a profile published by the Undercover Research Group. The impact this has had on him and his family is outlined in an interview he gave to the Evening Standard on 27 October 2015, the key points are summarised here:

<http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/exterror-cop-corbyn-allys-smears-have-put-me-and-my-family-in-danger-a3100071.html>

### Ex-terror cop: John McDonnell's smears have put me and my family in danger:

A former Scotland Yard counter-extremism officer has accused one of Jeremy Corbyn's most senior allies of putting him and his family in danger by using his position as an MP to spread false allegations about his conduct.

Gordon Mills said he had become a "target" since John McDonnell, Labour's shadow chancellor, sent a letter to the Home Secretary naming him as being involved in a blacklisting operation against trade union members.

Mr. Mills said the "highly damaging and serious allegation" was "simply not true", but had prompted a hate campaign against him by activists. He said the campaign had included abuse and a demonstration to "shame" him outside his office and had undermined his job prospects since leaving the police. But he said his main concern was the potential danger to his family and he accused Mr. McDonnell of acting irresponsibly by using his status as an MP to "smear" him.

Speaking exclusively to the Standard, Mr. Mills said: "This attack on my integrity by John McDonnell has blighted my life, leaving me unable to move job and fearful for the safety of my family. In the past year I have been called a blacklister, a spy cop, a colluder and an undercover operative - all of which are untrue.

"All I have ever tried to do is fulfill my duties as a police officer and protect the public, yet I have been pilloried by one of the most senior politicians in the land in a shocking abuse of his privileged position."

\*\*\*\*\*

The MP added that it was "shocking" that police still denied involvement in blacklisting and called on Mrs May to order an inquiry.

Mr. Mills, 58, who was a Detective Chief Inspector in Scotland Yard's National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination Unit, said the notion that he had gone to a meeting with the Consulting Association to help with the blacklisting of union members was "completely false".

\*\*\*\*\*

Mr. Mills, who retired from the police in 2011 after a 30-year career, added: "Both the nature and purpose of the meeting and my role in it have been misunderstood."

He said Mr. McDonnell had found him "guilty by association" without checking the facts and added: "Stating I was involved in blacklisting was simply untrue. Mr. McDonnell has never asked me for my account. I was named with what appears to be no consideration to my personal safety or the safety of my family against an extremist backlash."



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"I have become ... an ongoing target for those campaigning in relation to blacklisting. A protest demonstration was organised to publicly 'shame' me. As matters have intensified, I have become increasingly concerned about the repercussions.

"With power comes responsibility. Mr. McDonnell should think about the horrendous impact this has had on me and my family and apologise for initiating this campaign on an ex-police officer who was simply doing his job."

\*\*\*\*\*

Mr. Mills's lawyer, Adele Ashton from Slater and Gordon, said that legal action was being considered against those who had made "unfounded allegations" against her client. She added: "He was an exemplary police officer for 30 years, but the comments by Mr. McDonnell ... have tarnished his reputation and left him concerned about the security of his family..."

- Bob Lambert:

In June 2012, in the House of Commons and under the cloak of parliamentary privilege, Caroline Lucas MP alleged that Bob Lambert was responsible for a fire-bomb attack on a Debenhams store in July 1987 while deployed undercover. This was given prominent media coverage by the BBC and Guardian newspaper.

#### 4.9 Accidental disclosure:



- The Public Inquiry into Undercover Policing:

It is acknowledged that the inquiry team will be cognisant of the requirement to handle any material concerning UCOs with the utmost discretion to ensure that the identity of officers is not compromised. However, it must be recognised that as information is shared between the MPS and the inquiry team and the legal representatives of each, not to mention the core participants, that this can only increase the likelihood of an accidental disclosure of sensitive details about a UCO or a UCO deployment. While this has not happened yet, the inquiry team has already suffered its first lapse in security whereby they inadvertently disclosed personal details relating to the core participants as reported in the Guardian on 22 October 2015:





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<http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/21/undercover-police-inquiry-witnesses-data-activist>

Undercover police inquiry accidentally reveals witnesses' data - legal order issued in effort to preserve anonymity of people giving evidence on officers' infiltration of activist groups:

The public inquiry into police infiltration of political groups has issued a legal order designed to preserve the anonymity of those giving evidence after it mistakenly sent out an email which allowed recipients to see each others' addresses.

The chairman of the inquiry, which will examine the activities of undercover police officers spying on political campaigners and the public since 1968, issued a ruling on Tuesday on applications by more than 300 people who had sought to play a key role in its inquiries.

The ruling was accompanied by the publication of a list containing the names of a range of witnesses including political activists, trade unionists and victims of miscarriages of justice but which preserved the anonymity of police officers who were identified only on the basis of numbers.

It later emerged that the inquiry team had sent out an email on Tuesday to update various people on their applications for "core participant" status but had failed to use the BCC function to hide the email addresses of other applicants and their solicitors.

The inquiry then issued a restriction order compelling those who had received the email to delete it, destroy any hard copies and notify the inquiry team that they had done so.

### 5. Implications of exposure or potential exposure for former UCOs:

#### 5.1 Physical risk:

Despite the SDS closing in 2008, there remains a very real physical risk for officers who were deployed in a number of groups including:

- Extreme left-wing: Red Action, [REDACTED] and Antifascist Action,
- Extreme right- wing: [REDACTED]
- **Irish Groups** [REDACTED]

These are all groups or attached to groups with violent ideologies who may take retributive action against UCOs who are identified. Although it is unlikely that those groups would actively organise retribution, it is very possible that individuals within these groups either out of a sense of grievance or betrayal would seek to exact violent revenge. This risk is heightened by the very close friendships formed by SDS officers over their lengthy deployments and the personal sense of betrayal engendered should their identity as a UCO be revealed.

The risk of exposure and possible physical attack has resulted in two UCOs deployed in groups in the categories outlined above being relocated after associates from their respective groups were identified as frequenting the vicinity of the officer's home addresses to visit friends or family in the area.



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- Physical attack:

An example of someone who has undertaken an undercover role being attacked for doing so is former undercover reporter Donal MacIntyre. In 1999 he infiltrated the Chelsea Head Hunters to expose football hooliganism and he filmed them planning an attack on rival fans which subsequently resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of five men. In June 2009, MacIntyre was enjoying a quiet evening out with his wife when he was recognised by associates of the group he had infiltrated ten years earlier and he was verbally abused and then he and his wife were assaulted; he was knocked unconscious and his wife received bruising to her arms.

- Physical compromise:

Over the years a number of former UCOs have had chance encounters with people that they associated with during their time in the field. The fact that this might happen is accepted by the officers as an on-going risk which is an inevitable consequence of being deployed as a UCO and they all have contingency plans for dealing with it. However the probability of a former SDS officer being able to successfully talk his way out of a chance encounter with a former activist has dramatically decreased in inverse proportion to the amount of information about the SDS which is now in the public domain. This increases the risk that a chance encounter could very quickly develop into a physical confrontation and even attack.

## 5.2 Psychological issues:

- Fear of physical attack:

As previously mentioned, for some officers there is a physical risk to them should their identity be compromised. For others, although an objective assessment would suggest that this concern may be exaggerated, it does not lessen their perception of the risk.

- Fear of compromise:

While deployed in the field, UCOs live with the daily fear of compromise and there is an acknowledged psychological legacy to the role and its concomitant stresses. This varies according to the nature and risks of each deployment, the individual's personality and often their success at reintegrating and adjusting to normal life and routine work on exiting their UCO role.





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For many UCOs their greatest concern is being compromised by a chance encounter with a target of their deployment or an associate and this will continue after they have left the field and even if they performed the role many years ago. The psychological issues are well-documented by psychiatrists who have completed studies of undercover officers (*comment: copies of published papers can be supplied if required*).

Another often unspoken concern is that another of their former colleagues will decide to speak to the media about the SDS and thereby either compromise their identity directly or reveal enough new information that will enable them to be identified by the 'Mosaic Effect.' This concern is heightened because of the way the SDS operated which was to bring all the UCOs together twice a week in a covert location for a de-brief and to discuss upcoming events and deployments. Therefore any individual former SDS UCO will have knowledge not only of his own group but also about the activities of all groups subject to an SDS deployment during his time in the field and he will know and be able to identify all the UCOs.

### **5.3 Harassment by former associates and/or current activists:**

Many of the activists involved in animal and environmental protest were practised at researching and locating individuals involved in businesses or companies that were the focus of their protests e.g. Huntingdon Life Sciences. They would then wage a coordinated campaign of harassment against them which might include demonstrations at their home, criminal damage to their property (graffiti) and their cars (paint stripper) and by putting excrement through their letterbox. Therefore were they to identify and locate a former SDS UCO they would be particularly adept at disrupting their personal lives, something which the officers are well aware of. This could mean that the officers would be forced to relocate to a different address on a temporary or even permanent basis therefore leading to a total upheaval in their personal and family lives.

### **5.4 Media intrusion:**

Given the current media interest in the SDS and the Public Inquiry into Undercover Policing, any exposure of an officer as a former UCO is likely to generate media coverage on the television news, in newspapers, and online on websites and social media. Were journalists able to locate the officer then it is very likely that they would be 'door-stepped' which would be disruptive and distressing for them and their family. Many officers have never even disclosed to neighbours that they were a police officer, so revelation of their identity would have a profound impact on their personal lives. Again this could mean that the officers would be forced to relocate to a different



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address on a temporary basis or even permanent basis therefore leading to a total upheaval in their and their families' lives.

- Case study - media exposure:

See para. 4.3 - Simon Wellings who was exposed on the BBC website and Newsnight as a suspected UCO. This was justified because he had allegedly been recorded "discussing the personal lives of Globalise Resistance activists with other police," rather than as part of an investigation into serious wrongdoing.

- Case study - media approach:



[Gist: Redacted example gives an account of an alleged SDS officer being "door stepped" by journalists]

## 6. Impact on private and family life:

All former UCOs experience a degree of anxiety associated with the fear that their role as a former SDS officer could be exposed and the level of mental stress varies on a case by case basis. All are primarily concerned about the potential impact on them, their families and their relationships with friends and colleagues. This worry is exacerbated by the overwhelmingly negative media coverage of the SDS and the likelihood that they will be tainted by the campaigner's narrative that the SDS was a 'rogue unit' which allowed its officers to conduct illicit relationships and engage in unauthorised activities in order to obtain intelligence on lawful and legitimate campaigns and protest groups. In some cases their exposure as a former UCO could have an effect on their current employment or business.

For former UCOs, this stress exhibits in psychological symptoms that could include anxiety, depression, and in the worst cases post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or nervous breakdown.

For the spouses, partners, and the families of a UCO, the effects can be equally as devastating. After having to contend with the worry of their husband/wife/partner working undercover, often for many years, without being able to confide in anyone, they now have to deal with the fear and





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implications of their exposure or possible exposure. What's more for many officers the post-deployment period has been as stressful (if not more so) than their deployment for a variety of reasons outside the scope of this report. Many have an overwhelmingly pessimistic outlook and no confidence in the ability of the MPS to protect their identities and thereby safeguard their families. Many believe that it is inevitable that they will be exposed at some point in the future, either as a direct result of the public inquiry or as a consequence of piecing together information released into the public domain. The related anxiety and stress is a constant challenge to many in maintaining a normal day to day life because their perception of risk can dominate their lives.

The bleak outlook of many of the officers in respect of the likelihood of their identity being exposed either deliberately or accidentally during the public inquiry process has been reinforced by the first security lapse by the inquiry team, whereby they have inadvertently disclosed witnesses' data as reported in the Guardian on 22 October 2015 (see para. 4.7).

- Case study - relationship impact:

**An officer who has acted as a UCO has described the strain on his/her relationship caused by the prospect of his/her identity being revealed. His/her partner fears being ostracised by friends and associates were the individual's role as an undercover officer to be revealed. These fears are assessed to be well-founded and not exaggerated or paranoid. Consequently the officer is under considerable stress because he/she is worried about the catastrophic impact this would have on his/her partner, their relationship and his/her own life. The strain has entailed him/her seeking medical help.**

- Case study - impact on psychological wellbeing:

**A former UCO admitted to a psychiatric hospital to obtain treatment for mental health issues has also moved from the house he/she was living in at the time of the deployment as a direct result of fear being tracked down by former associates.**



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## 7. Conclusion:

The SDS operated from 1968-2008 with minimal public exposure or compromise of officers' identities. However, since the Francis and Kennedy revelations in 2010/11 knowledge of the SDS and the number of officers exposed has increased dramatically. This demonstrates the 'snowball effect' initiated by the discovery of SDS tradecraft, tactics and personnel over the previous five years. It is axiomatic that each piece of such knowledge is utilised to identify SDS officers and the cumulative effect is such that it potentially leads one step closer to identifying each and every SDS officer. To date [REDACTED] officers have been fully identified with their cover identity, real identity and photograph in circulation in the public arena. Their lives as UCOs have been [REDACTED] mapped [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A further [REDACTED] officers have been partially compromised with a name and photograph in circulation, while [REDACTED] officers have had their cover identities exposed. There is a real danger that through the combined effects of the revelation of material and the resultant 'Mosaic Effect', the public inquiry will inadvertently cause the revelation of UCOs' identities. This is likely to have a profound effect on the officers and their family's psychological, and in some cases physical well being. This would in turn pose an incremental risk to all the UCOs and could lead to the compromise of a large number of their identities. This would have a detrimental impact on the successful running of the public inquiry and potentially undermine the use of covert human intelligence assets in the future.

1 December 2015

[Gist: Jaipur / Karachi]