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1. Risk management within the currency of the SDS

1.1 Throughout its history very few officers and police staff outside of Special Branch ever knew of the existence of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), which was formed in 1968, including many of the units and officers who were in receipt of its intelligence. Indeed even within Special Branch although the majority of officers would know of its existence, they would be unaware of its workings and the identity of many of those deployed on the Unit at any one time. The secrecy of the Unit was strictly maintained and allowed for the SDS to function for forty years without public or media exposure. Before an officer was posted to the SDS, the management of the Unit would make a visit to the officer's home address to visit partners and ascertain that they were prepared for what a typical SDS posting entailed and to make assurances regarding the following points:

- The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch.
- The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
- After the operation was concluded they would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.

The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of his identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This is further emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and the officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities to a court.

1.2 The SDS operated from covert offices with no police footprint. Officers were given a period of up to six months in which to develop and learn their cover legends and were rigorously tested on them before entering the field. They would spend a period of up to a year developing their legend without being expected to submit significant intelligence product. They would assume cover identities which would include identity documents, and live in cover addresses paid for by cash [REDACTED]. Many SDS officers grew beards and long hair, which they maintained for the duration of their deployment, to disguise their identities giving rise to the Unit's nickname, the Hairies. They would meet twice a week for group debriefs in covert premises. For an average of four to five year deployments they would hand in their warrant cards, not visit police premises and distance themselves from other police colleagues. All this was undertaken to maintain the secrecy of the operation and to protect the officers from compromise within their group. Even before risk assessments were formally developed, the measures that were taken

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were all forms of risk mitigation. Moreover all SDS officers realised that should they be close to being compromised they would be withdrawn from the field and this happened on a number of occasions. I am

aware of at least six SDS officers who were re-housed at the expense of the Commissioner, usually because activists from their group were living or visiting near the officer's home address.

1.3 Before the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, SDS deployments were authorised annually and issues regarding risks to SDS officers were dealt with on an ad hoc reactive basis. However, post RIPA, the safety and risk management of SDS officers was included in the RIPA CHIS authorisations which were made to the Special Branch/SO15 Commander every three months with reviews every month. At the conclusion of each SDS deployment a RIPA cancellation would be made which would include a risk assessment which would consider the political, psychological, personal, legal, economic and moral implications and risks. Risk management was responsive so, if for example an ex SDS officer had a chance meeting with a former target, they would report it, and an assessment of future threat made. On leaving the SDS, officers would be deliberately posted to roles that minimised the risk of compromise. For example during the 1970s and 1980s Metropolitan Police Special Branch was responsible for Ports policing nationally and therefore officers leaving SDS were regularly posted to remote Ports outside London to minimise the chance of compromise as they gradually rehabilitated to mainstream policing. Throughout its history, SDS officers were also normally assisted in moving to roles on their return from SDS that would not compromise their security while maintaining the integrity and secrecy of the operation. Therefore during its forty year operation, it would be fair to say that protecting officers' identities and security were key priorities for SDS officers and their support staff. This was the understanding which was explicitly given to officers and their families at the outset of their deployments.

1.4 Throughout the history of the SDS, its officers were supported and managed by a team of officers known as the Back Office. This usually consisted of a DCI, DI and at least two DSs. This team would be responsible for the deployments of all the SDS officers in the field at any given time. The DS Back Office role in particular involved daily contact with the SDS officers to provide support and welfare and naturally this included a continuous assessment of risk. SDS officers would be expected to highlight any risk or concerns to the Back Office and this would be dealt with depending on the particular circumstances. If a serious security issue was identified including potential compromise, this would be highlighted to the management to decide a plan, which could result in an officer being removed from the field. In one example an officer deployed in a group in the 1970s was removed from the field as a result of a compromise. This involved [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In other cases, a potential compromise may result in the officer being redirected to another area or simply extra precautions being taken. In another example following an unfortunate

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compromise (where the officer was overheard discussing his operation during a mistakenly dialed phone-call) an officer was re-directed to groups in a different target area. The Back Office were also responsible

for an officer's welfare and the daily contact and twice weekly group meetings were designed to alleviate the feeling of isolation and stress associated with this uniquely stressful role.

1.5 Being an undercover operative can be a dangerous and extremely stressful undertaking for a police officer to carry out. SDS officers carried out this role over a period of at least four years in the absolute expectation that the MPS would protect their identity during and after deployment. This understanding existed whether the officer was deployed into Extreme Right Wing groups, Environmental Groups or the Extreme Left Wing. This duty of care extends to protecting not only the identity of the individuals working undercover but also their immediate family, support colleagues and [REDACTED] and who may be affected by the disclosure of the operative's identity. This is an important point as the ramifications of exposure of an officer's identity are far wider than for just the officer and can affect their partners, children, relatives and friends to an almost equal degree.

1.6 It should be understood that exposure of an undercover officer could also lead to the compromise of those individuals [REDACTED] It may not be immediately apparent, but it is not possible to take on a covert identity without a significant architecture in place. These may include:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] were occasionally drawn on as natural cover
- [REDACTED]
- Cover addresses
- Cover documents
- Cover vehicles

1.7. The deployment of Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) to protect the true identities of undercover operatives and other CHIS, and the tactics and methodology of deployments, is a key principle in maintaining the MPS' use of covert tactics. The MPS has taken the view that there is a real risk that any, even very limited breach of the NCND stance, will set a dangerous precedent and may jeopardise the safety of undercover operatives and future undercover operations. The MPS position on NCND is a key component in the overall risk management process and has been adhered to despite that there is detail circulating about certain SDS officers.

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2. Risk management 2008 -2011

2.1 The closure of the Unit in late 2007 and early 2008 was a difficult and contentious process where the senior management of the Unit were in direct conflict with the SDS field and cover officers. Special Branch no longer existed having been amalgamated with SO13 to form SO15 in 2006. This amalgamation created a very different environment for the SDS officers returning to routine police life.

Officers

were not convinced that MPS management were taking their security concerns seriously. With the closure of the Back Office, the officers' security was handed to the Special Projects Team from SO15, a Unit who were viewed with mistrust as they were seen to be unsympathetic to the officers' concerns. From now on officers were not assisted in finding suitable post deployment postings, as a view appears to have been taken that they had been previously been given preferential treatment. SDS officers and support staff who worked on the Unit in the years prior to its closure harbor a resentment towards the MPS because they feel their risk, welfare and security were not given due consideration during this period. This legacy remains today and is a factor in the often hostile response of SDS officers to the MPS' attempts at risk mitigation following the media revelations in 2011.

2.2 On leaving the SDS in 2007

Officers were also offered psychological counselling which had become routine at the conclusion of a posting on the SDS and at regular intervals whilst they were deployed. Security concerns were dealt with on a reactive basis according to the circumstances. I am also aware that in early 2008, the one remaining member of Back Office staff was tasked by the SDS management to identify officers who may in future suffer from the psychological effects of their deployment. However, developments in 2011 were to change entirely the landscape for SDS officers and the likelihood of risk of compromise.

3. Risk management in 2011

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
3.1 A number of exposures in 2010-2011 radically changed the risk profile faced by the majority of ex SDS officers. This led to a change in the way the MPS approached risk assessments and responses for

this group. In March 2010, Peter Black, who alleged he was a former police officer who worked undercover within the SDS, wrote an article for the Observer newspaper. In this article Black disclosed that whilst deployed (between 1993 and 1994) he had two intimate relationships with members of the groups that he has been tasked to infiltrate and that he had committed criminal offences, both here and abroad. Black also admitted use of recreational drugs. Black's true identity was not disclosed and there was no further media follow up on these disclosures.

3.2 In October 2010, an activist website (Indymedia) posted an article exposing Mark Kennedy as an undercover officer working on environmental activity. Kennedy was amongst a group of protestors awaiting trial for aggravated trespass at the Ratcliffe on Soar Power Station. Between then and December 2010, there were a number of Indymedia articles on Mark Kennedy. In January 2011, as a result of the media disclosures and revelations by Mark Kennedy, the CPS offered no evidence against the six defendants. Kennedy continued to reveal information to the Guardian and Daily Mail newspapers about his role, and the identity and status of other undercover officers.

3.3 On 20th January 2011, the Guardian Newspaper published an article identifying Jim Boyling, as an undercover officer who worked for SDS. It transpired that Jim Boyling had met a woman called **Laura** who was associated with the environmental organisation he had infiltrated. Boyling had an affair with **Laura** that apparently finished when his deployment ended. However, he stated that he saw her in Kingston some time after the completion of his deployment and their relationship was rekindled leading to marriage. Whilst in this relationship **Laura** bore two children and after they married, Boyling disclosed to her the fact that he was a police officer, details of his activity whilst deployed in SDS and it is alleged the partial identity of other SDS undercover officers. Their marriage did not last and they are now divorced.

3.4 Following the initial article, the Guardian proceeded to publish further revelations concerning SDS and National Public Order Intelligence Unit deployments, including pseudonyms of other undercover officers and photographs stating that whilst their true details were not known they too were undercover officers. Subsequently the BBC Newsnight programme reported the existence of an alleged SDS officer (Simon Wellings) and displayed his photograph, asking the public to provide details of his true identity. Up until this point, apart from the self-revelation of Kennedy and Boyling's exposure by his former partner, no true identities of any other undercover officers had been revealed.

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3.5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3.6 As a result of this increased exposure, the Special Projects Team from SO15 conducted urgent risk management reviews through personal meetings with seven serving officers in January/February 2011. These meetings sought to identify their risk of exposure and put in place basic risk reduction or mitigation plans. This was coordinated by a Gold Group who requested a tactical risk assessment posed by the various domestic extremist organisations reported on by the SDS between 2002 and 2007. Consideration was given to the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SDS officers were also encouraged to report any security concerns or highlight areas of vulnerability. In order to fully understand the potential risks to each of the undercover officers who were still serving police officers, a generic threat assessment of many of the extremist groups infiltrated was completed in February 2011 (Appendix A). This has not been updated because it is not believed that the generic assessment of these groups has changed significantly since 2011, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, it was recognised that to fully identify and understand the specific threats to each officer it was necessary to risk assess them individually through personal debriefs. The information obtained from these interviews was intended to enable SCD14, the police unit responsible for operational risk management, to determine the nature and extent of the threat posed to the individual officer and/or their families and tailor appropriate risk management to the identified threats.

3.7 Therefore in March 2011 a team of two staff within the Covert Operations Security Unit (COSU), Specialist Crime & Operations 14 (SC&O14), was asked to complete individual risk assessments for former Special Branch officers who had performed duties in the SDS and were still serving in the MPS. These assessments were completed and submitted to Commander Specialist Operations Counter Terrorism Command (SO15). They detailed the effects on each officer's and their family's health, safety and wellbeing. As part of the control strategy a review date was set to identify any change which might affect the 2011 risk assessment. This process occurred predominantly in May 2011 and involved individual meetings and assessments with over twenty officers. Both the SCD14 officers were experienced risk assessors and counter terrorist officers whose risk assessments provided a general view of the

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groups and also included details of individuals about whom the SDS officers were especially concerned. In their risk assessments of 2011 and 2012, SCD14 used the PLAICE model which is a numerical system where the impact of a compromise is given a score out of five to be multiplied by the likelihood of a compromise also out of five. This is applied to six criteria; Physical; Legal; Assets; Information

Management; Compromise; and Environment (PLAICE) and a score above twenty is classified as High Risk. The PLACE model risk assessment is at Appendix B of this report. It should be noted that the exercise undertaken in these risk assessments differs from that employed in the preparation of risk assessments for the Inquiry (See Para below), in that the SCD14 risk assessors were not considering the potential impact of disclosure of identity by the Inquiry.

3.8 The SCD14 risk assessments recommended the forming of a specific Gold Group to deal with all risks, both physical and psychological, and ensure appropriate control measures were put in place. These control measures included:

- Appointing an officer of at least DI rank to act as Safety Officer with responsibility for coordinating and reviewing all protective measures initiated.
- A Decision Log to be maintained.
- Safety Officer to consider the appointment of a Family Liaison officer.
- Considering the creation of a bespoke plan to deal with further media incursions/critical incident affecting any SDS officer.
- Planning that any incident assessed to affect the officer is (for that individual) to be treated as a critical incident.
- Any incident assessed to be linked to intelligence/historic SDS deployment to be dealt with as a critical incident.
- Collection plan to include briefing SO15 Intelligence Staff to ensure any significant intelligence is brought to attention of the appointed Safety Officer.
- Full details, including contact details of the officer's partners to be obtained and retained.
- Officer's partner/family members briefed regarding the possible threat to safety.
- Media strategy to be in place with DPA to deal with further issues arising from any publication of information.
- [REDACTED]
- Variations of duties for the officer considered.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]



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- If a compromise occurs at officer's home address obtain assistance of Criminal Justice Protection Unit (CJPU) to minimize short term risks and plan, if appropriate, for long term relocation.
- SO6 to conduct physical security review of officer's home address to identify security weaknesses and recommend improvements.
- SO6 security recommendations adopted where proportionate to the threat at the address.
- [REDACTED]
- Local police informed of risks: [REDACTED]
- Appointed Safety Officer to ensure regular audit of MPS CAD/Local force system in relation to home addresses is carried out to identify whether any incident within the locality is linked.
- Gold Group to ensure that appropriate welfare support/ psychological counseling/security advice/physical security enhancement are offered. Offers and acceptance / rejection to be detailed in the Decision Log.
- Gold Group to liaise with DLS to identify appropriate legal recourse to minimize risk to the officer.
- SO15 to develop a policy with MPS Human Resources to manage the former SDS officer's posting for the remainder of their service (to ensure that all issues affecting officer safety are taken into account when considering future postings).
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Each officer seen by the appointed Safety Officer and briefed on the measures in place and proposed.
- Information response plan in place to make each officer aware of impending media development / changes in threat / publication of any investigations into former SDS officers is in place.

3.9 By July 2011 the following had taken place:

- SCD14 had reviewed twenty five serving officers' risk assessments.
- Occupational Health had put in place a system whereby referrals for counselling or health issues for former SDS officers were prioritised.
- [REDACTED]
- Two officers had security packages fitted in their home addresses.

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However, some of the other recommendations, including most importantly the installation of security packages at the officers' home addresses, were not implemented (save in two cases). There appeared to be a dispute between management over whether specific intelligence was required to justify the installation of security equipment or whether in light of the circumstances, this should be offered to all the serving SDS officers. The disputes led once again to resentment and mistrust and in an attempt to resolve

the situation MPS management, following consultation with the officers and their Federation representative, agreed to a Statement of Expectations in July 2011, which is copied in full below and is at Appendix C in its original draft form:

1. The organisation recognises the contribution made by former SDS officers to the safety and security of London and acknowledges and accepts that it has obligations both statutory (health and safety legislation) and morally, to look after the wellbeing of these officers going forward.
2. The Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) will ensure that an intelligence collection plan is in place to assist the Command to gauge and assess the nature of any risks to individual former SDS officers or for officers who have been employed in an undercover role.
3. The Command will undertake the appropriate measures to mitigate and identify risks to those officers and, together with the risk assessments, will be reviewed on a regular basis. This review will be undertaken in conjunction with the MPS Operational Security regime. (currently SCD14).
4. As part of the mitigation of risks, HR will engage with the Command in order to manage the risks of future postings or career choices faced by the former SDS officers.
5. The former SDS officers will be expected to alert SO15 to any possible postings which they either choose to pursue or have imposed upon them to ensure that any inherent risks of the posting are recognised.
6. The former SDS officers will be expected to inform the SO15 designated point of contact of changes in their personal circumstances (including address and vehicle) which may impact on the risks or measures taken to safeguard them.



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7. Former SDS officers will be expected to report any incidents which might increase the risk of compromise or threat to them to a designated point of contact.
8. The Command will ensure that decisions made by HR in relation to officers are communicated to a designated OH point of contact to consider any health implications or HR proposals.
9. The MPS will comply with its obligations under health and safety legislation to consult with officers and their managers about any issues that have implications for their role and work.
10. The Police Federation will be involved in any review process and both Federation and officers will be consulted on any change or amendments to these Statement of Expectations.

3.10 After July 2011, SO6 conducted security reviews at the officers' home addresses and as a result of this security packages were gradually installed at thirteen officers' home addresses over the next two years.

[REDACTED] In the summer of 2012, SCD14 reviewed the individual risk assessments of the twelve officers who had been categorised as High Risk. Daily media monitoring was introduced to identify threats to officers' safety and potential risk of compromise. By this stage websites such as Undercoverresearch.net were actively trying to identify SDS officers and were crowd-sourcing on the internet to achieve this. Until late 2013 the officers' risk and security continued to be managed by the Special Projects Team (predominantly a DI and a DS), although in some cases the relationship had broken down.

4. Operation MOTION

4.1 Operation Motion was introduced in late 2013 by Chief Superintendent Chris Greaney as the unit responsible for the risk management and welfare of the SDS officers. Initially it was staffed from officers with previous Special Branch experience who were working on the National Domestic Extremism Development Intelligence Unit and comprised a DS and two DCs. They undertook this role along with their other daily duties and concentrated on the serving officers. By mid 2014, with the announcement of a Public Inquiry into Undercover Policing, it was decided that the Operation Motion role should become full time as the scope of the coverage needed to widen to include all those who had served on the Unit since 1968, not just the remaining by this time, fifteen officers. The new dedicated Unit comprises two officers, a Detective Inspector and a Detective Sergeant, working full time. The CVs for the two Operation Motion officers are at Appendix D.



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4.2 The objective of the new unit was to attempt to meet with those SDS officers currently serving in the MPS, beginning with those assessed at High Risk. This began with those who were deployed on the Right Wing side as they were at the greatest overall risk, and then followed by those deployed on Irish Support Groups and Extreme Left Wing. The purpose of the meetings was to gain a better understanding of the roles they undertook, while assessing their risk and welfare to form part of a risk review process. The other key function of the Unit was to attempt to build a comprehensive database of officers who had served in the SDS since 1968. Once all the serving officers had been seen, Operation Motion began to

meet and build profiles on the retired officers, starting with those most recently retired and then working backwards in time. So, as a general rule the serving officers were seen in risk priority order, whereas the retired officers were met in reverse chronological order.

4.3 The risk assessment process carried out by Operation Motion is detailed at Section 5 below. The risk management systems currently in place or available in response to identified harm are detailed in Sections 6-9 of this report.

5. Risk assessment process

5.1 In its ongoing risk assessment and management, Operation Motion has not employed a numerical system but has completed a holistic review of each officer's deployment and their current circumstances. As with the SCD14 risk assessments, the Operation Motion final assessment from High to Low depends on the likelihood and impact of compromise. Operation Motion has now completed forty risk assessments. Whilst risk is always assessed on an individual basis, it is right to note the majority of those deployed on Extreme Right Wing, Red Action, Antifa or Irish Support Groups have been assessed as High Risk because of the potential impact of their compromise. Where some information is already known in public, this may also lead to an assessment of High Risk, because of the increased likelihood of their identities being further or fully compromised. Thus far, [REDACTED] officers have had their cover identities, photographs and real identities revealed, while a further [REDACTED] have had either their cover identity and/or their photograph revealed. A number of organisations and individuals are making determined and rigorous efforts to expose and identify undercover officers and there are several websites and social media forums dedicated to this task.

5.2 One of the objectives for Operation Motion has been to prevent further SDS officers being exposed by those they reported on in the field, or by the media or campaigners. The other objective is to prevent those officers already compromised in some way from having their home addresses revealed.



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The likelihood of compromise typically reduces in proportion to the length of time elapsed since deployment. Therefore an officer deployed in the 1970s is likely to be assessed as lower risk of compromise than his former colleague deployed in 2005. But this is not certain as some persons have had their cover and real identities exposed notwithstanding a passage of many years and the effects on personal life have been pronounced.

5.3 The main risk assessment emanates from a full debrief with each officer, which provides a comprehensive overview of their deployment and their current circumstances and is supplemented by

subsequent research. The meetings, which can last up to four hours, cover all aspects of the roles they undertook including:

(NB: all comments in italics)

- The groups and period in which they were deployed.
This is extremely significant when assessing risk from those particular groups as there is far more physical and psychological risk in infiltrating certain Extreme Right Wing or Irish Support Groups more recently [REDACTED] when compared with the Socialist Workers Party a longer time ago [REDACTED]
- The geographic areas they were deployed
It is important to ensure they are minimising the risk by not having to return to an area where they are more likely to be recognised.
- The geographic location of their cover address
It is important to ensure they are minimising the risk by not having to return to an area where they are more likely to be recognised.
- The geographic location of their real address.
Certain officers still live in London, while many retired officers live outside of London. Those living and working outside London have a reduced risk of accidental compromise.
- Their cover story.
As some cover stories have been compromised, a similar exit strategy would heighten suspicion and the risk of compromise.
- Their exit strategy.



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As some exit strategies have been compromised, a similar exit strategy would heighten suspicion and the risk of compromise e.g. moving abroad

- Their cover occupation and its location.



- Any activists they would be concerned about.
 - Some activists have displayed a propensity for violence.
 - With some activists close relationships are developed, so the personal sense of betrayal is that much greater.
 - Some activists have displayed particular skill in being able to research, trace and identify SDS officers.
 - Some activists have shown previous skill in harassing their targets in their home addresses.
- Any security concerns during their deployment.

This could naturally have a bearing on their likelihood of exposure.
- Any potential compromises during their deployment.

This heightens their chances of compromise now there is far more information in the public arena.
- Their current role in the police if still serving.

This may have an effect if the role is either particularly sensitive, covert or prominent.
- Their current employment or any significant role played in the local community.

This could have an effect on any employment but more specific examples are provided below

 - Some former officers have sensitive roles which would heighten the impact of public exposure.
 - Some retired officers run their own businesses and compromise may lead to the closure of that business and loss of employment for staff.



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-Some former officers have prominent roles in their local community which would heighten the impact of public exposure [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- Their partner's/children's employment.

-Some family members have roles where the revelation that they were related to an SDS officer would cause difficulty, including those with employment in [REDACTED] academia or in jobs where the Union representation is strong.

-The risk is heightened when the family member shares the same surname.

- The approximate age of children or dependants.

The fact that an officer has children at home who attend local schools potentially heightens the impact of compromise contrasted with an officer whose children have already left home.

- Their social media profile.

The extent (if any) of their engagement on social media is established and officers are reminded of the risks of doing so.

- Their or their partner's business with internet presence.

Most businesses try to maintain a high internet profile. A high internet profile increases the likelihood of compromise.

-Equally the fact of compromise may jeopardize the business interest of the person.

- The effects the role had on their lives.

The role always had an effect on SDS officer's lives, it just varies by degree. This is naturally linked to the officer's current mental health and personal circumstances..

- Their mental health

Their psychological well being is an important factor when assessing the potential impact of compromise on the officer and his family.



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- Physical health
Any medication they are taking
Regular visits to a doctor, psychiatrist or counsellor
- The knowledge of their role amongst family and close friends
Some officers' children, close family members or friends are unaware of their undercover role.
Therefore exposure would have a greater impact on that officer's life.
- The security on their home address
It may be assessed that their current security is insufficient and requires a review.


5.4 Operation Motion has prepared up to date risk assessments in respect of a number of ex SDS officers for the assistance of the Public Inquiry. These provide the MPS' objective assessment of the creation of, or increase in, the risk of harm to each assessed person, in the event that information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of the assessed person as a UCO. Each UCPI Risk Assessment details the types of harm of which the assessed person would be at risk, if identified as a UCO. Operation Motion have assessed whether these identified risks are real and immediate (i.e. objectively verified and likely to be present and continuing), and given a Low, Medium or High assessment of likelihood of occurrence and impact. In preparing the UCPI Risk Assessments the Operation Motion officers have reviewed a number of documents. Typically, these include the assessed person's MPS Personal Files, notes of interviews or meetings with Operation Herne investigators, any previous risk assessments, and any Operation Motion records held on the person. Each individual assessment lists the documents actually considered.

6. Physical security measures currently in place or available

6.1 The physical security measures installed at officers' addresses varies depending on the existing level of security on each individual address; the environment (which might depend on the remoteness of the location); and the wishes of the officer. SO6, the physical security department, generally carry out an inspection of each address and suggest the security measures required. Security measures are only ever installed with the officers' agreement and cooperation.

6.2

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A budget was approved that has allowed for security to be installed at fifteen addresses and includes the maintenance of these systems for the next three years. It is sometimes a difficult balance to improve security at these addresses without making families overly conscious of their own security. However, without doubt the installation of security systems has allowed officers and their families a feeling of security and a sense of protection.

6.3 On account of the serious consequences of compromise for some of the officers, it may be necessary to relocate them either temporarily or permanently away from their home addresses. Therefore Operation Motion has liaised with the Witness Protection Unit of the MPS to learn best practice and identify the correct process. In early 2016 Operation Motion will liaise with all the officers assessed as High Risk and agree a relocation plan with them in the event of a threat being identified or if media or activists are camped outside their home address making their normal lives untenable. The MPS retains a duty of care for these officers whether serving or retired. To date at least six officers have been relocated from their home addresses by the MPS at considerable expense because of security concerns.

7. Response arrangements

7.1 Since the closure of the SDS in 2008 the serving officers have always had a designated point of contact, although the identity of this point of contact has changed regularly and it would be fair to say on account of various reasons already described, they have sometimes not been willing to engage with that person. For this reason Operation Motion now operates an on call system where one the Operation Motion officers is always available on a 24 hour basis, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition the serving officers and many of the retired officers have been provided with the direct contact details of the two Operation Motion officers and this has enabled continuity of contact. [REDACTED] Operation Motion provides these officers with regular updates regarding major events relating to the SDS (such as the publication of the Public Inquiry Terms of Reference) and forthcoming media coverage. Furthermore, individual officers or groups of officers receive warnings informing them of demonstrations and protests thereby enabling them to avoid certain areas on particular days. Officers are also pre-warned individually if there are media articles that relate directly to them or may affect their security.



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8. Arrangements to monitor social media and identify threats

8.1 Since 2011 a daily key word search has been undertaken of social media. In its current format this consists of an automatic daily report being created and sent to Operation Motion by the National Domestic Extremism Unit. This is then reviewed and if necessary further research is completed to identify potential compromises or vulnerability to officers. For instance, 'Sack Bob' demonstrations at the London Metropolitan University are usually identified in this way and allow Operation Motion to inform local police and ensure that Bob Lambert was not teaching at the University when a demonstration was due.

8.2 The Undercover Research Group website and Twitter feed is regularly monitored and any new profiles on SDS officers are carefully analysed to identify actual risk. Numerous organisations and individuals are making determined and sophisticated efforts to expose and identify undercover officers, tactics and covert methodology. As the Bob Lambert case illustrates, the risk is not simply from those infiltrated but is from others who are on social media and who wish to campaign against and often harass those who acted as UCOs once they have been identified.

8.3 A regular liaison is maintained with SO15's Domestic Intelligence Unit to ensure Operation Motion are briefed on forthcoming demonstrations or particular trends in domestic extremism that may affect the SDS officers. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The subject expert on Extreme Right Wing is aware of both the cover and real identities of the SDS officers from that area, and maintains a watching brief. Within Operation Motion we rely heavily on our own historical knowledge and experience of these groups.

8.4 In addition Operation Motion has implemented a system to identify potential threats to those most recently deployed on [REDACTED] [Gist: Irish groups] where the risk of harm is identified is HIGH. [REDACTED]

9. Psychological risk and support

9.1 Whilst deployed in the SDS, the officers received regular psychological support from the late 1990s. Latterly this involved four sessions per year with initially [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] [Gist: named psychiatrists] (both forensic psychiatrists), and officers could also request further consultations at

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any time. It would also appear that the SDS management could refer an officer to [redacted] [Gist: named psychiatrist] to explore a particular area of concern but rather than breach confidentiality, [redacted] [Gist: named psychiatrist] would encourage the officer to be open with his managers about the issue. During 2011, at the height of the media revelations, all serving SDS officers were offered an appointment with an Occupational Health counsellor and any applications they made were prioritised through a single point of contact. Even today serving officers can see an Occupational Health Counsellor, although recent cuts and the bureaucratic referral system have rendered the likelihood of utilising a single point of contact most unlikely. However, there is no provision for retired officers or the partners of serving/retired officers as use of the occupational health system is restricted to serving MPS officers.

9.2 As well as the official psychological support, a large part of the Operation Motion role is to provide support for the officers and this involves a substantial amount of unofficial counselling. Following an initial meeting or contact, certain officers are content to have contact details and to receive occasional updates. However, there are a number of officers who require extensive support and with these officers we are in weekly contact. It is worth noting that the requirement for this support can fluctuate greatly with the nature of the condition. For instance those officers who are prone to depression often have periods where little support is required, but something will trigger a period where they require far more regular assistance. The range of symptoms is reflected in an article by A.D. Macleod entitled 'Undercover Policing: A Psychiatrist's Perspective' published in the International Journal of Law and Psychiatry Vol. 18. at Appendix E. I refer to "Results" and "Discussion" sections.

10. Overview of the implications of official confirmation, and exposure for former UCOs

Physical risk:

10.1 Despite the SDS closing in 2008, there remains a very real physical risk for officers who were deployed in a number of groups including:

- Extreme left-wing: Red Action, [redacted] and Antifascist Action,
- Extreme right- wing: [redacted],
- Irish groups [redacted]
- [redacted]



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10.2 These are all groups or attached to groups with violent ideologies who may take retributive action against UCOs who are identified. Although it is unlikely that the groups themselves would actively organise retribution, it is very possible that individuals within these groups either out of a sense of grievance or betrayal would seek to exact violent revenge. This risk is heightened by the very close friendships formed by SDS officers over their lengthy deployments and the personal sense of betrayal engendered should their identity as a UCO be revealed. The risk of exposure and possible physical attack has resulted in two UCOs deployed in groups in the categories outlined above being relocated after associates from their respective groups were identified frequenting the vicinity of the officer's home addresses to visit friends or family in the area.


- Physical attack: An example of someone who has undertaken an undercover role being attacked for doing so is former undercover reporter Donal MacIntyre. In 1999 he infiltrated the Chelsea

Head Hunters to expose football hooliganism and he filmed them planning an attack on rival fans which subsequently resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of five men. In June 2009, MacIntyre was enjoying a quiet evening out with his wife when he was recognised by associates of the group he had infiltrated ten years earlier and he was verbally abused and then he and his wife were assaulted; he was knocked unconscious and his wife received bruising to her arms.

- Physical compromise: Over the years a number of former UCOs have had chance encounters with people that they associated with during their time in the field. The fact that this might happen is accepted by the officers as an on-going risk which is an inevitable consequence of being deployed as a UCO and they all have prepared self generated cover stories for dealing with this kind of incident. However the probability of a former SDS officer being able to successfully talk his way out of a chance encounter with a former activist has dramatically decreased due to the amount of information about the SDS which is now in the public domain. This increases the risk that a chance encounter could very quickly develop into a physical confrontation and even attack.

10.3

[REDACTED] In October 2014 four men were arrested for planning terrorist attacks including on Shepherds Bush Police Station. In France and Australia there have been several Islamic State (IS) inspired attacks on police in the past year. The most recent occurred on Thursday 6th January 2016, when a man who has been identified in the French media as Sallah ALI attempted to attack a police officer with a bladed weapon in a police station in Paris. He was shot and killed by police. The UK security forces, including police, are considered a 'legitimate' target for attack by Islamists, extremists, including Al Qaeda and IS amongst others. With IS supporters being encouraged to strike at the West by any available means, police continue to be a target globally. [REDACTED]

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[Gist: Of

particular concern are possible attacks by lone terrorists or small self-organised groups]. Police have received continuous briefings about their security and advice on how to maintain a low profile on social media, when leaving police premises and when off duty. Not only are all the former SDS officers either serving or retired police officers, but as part of Special Branch or SO15, are identified as having a role in Counter Terrorism. This would make them an attractive target for such individuals described above who inspired by violent rhetoric may seek to carry out opportunistic attacks in the UK, possibly against the police, with little or no warning. Therefore the revelation of the identity of SDS officers does carry an additional risk due to the current threat from International Terrorism.

Psychological issues:

10.4 All former UCOs experience a degree of anxiety associated with the fear that their role as a former SDS officer could be exposed and the level of mental stress varies on a case by case basis. All are primarily concerned about the potential impact on them, their families and their relationships with friends and colleagues. This worry is exacerbated by the overwhelmingly negative media coverage of the SDS and the likelihood that they will be tainted by the campaigners' narrative that the SDS was a 'rogue unit' which allowed its officers to conduct illicit relationships and engage in unauthorised activities in order to obtain intelligence on lawful and legitimate campaigns and protest groups. In some cases their exposure as a former UCO could have an effect on their current employment or business.

10.5 For former UCOs, this stress exhibits in psychological symptoms that could include anxiety, depression, and in the worst cases post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or nervous breakdown. For the spouses, partners, and the families of a UCO, the effects can be equally as devastating. After having to contend with the worry of their husband/wife/partner working undercover, often for many years, without being able to confide in anyone, they now have to deal with the fear and implications of their exposure or possible exposure. Moreover, for many officers the post- deployment period has been as stressful (if not more so) than their deployment for a variety of reasons. This period of readjustment to a normal home life and a return to regular police duties can prove exceptionally difficult (as mentioned in the document at Appendix E). The stress of a long period of intensive undercover work often leaves officers stressed and emotionally exhausted. The adrenalin high of the undercover work is then followed by a low period and there is also a feeling of loss of operational control when officers leave the field. This period of adjustment



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and re-assimilation is difficult for all officers, and a number have left the MPS because they were unable to readjust to routine police life. Many have an overwhelmingly pessimistic outlook and no confidence in the ability of the MPS to protect their identities and thereby safeguard their families.

10.6 Case study - impact on psychological wellbeing: A former UCO admitted to a psychiatric hospital to obtain treatment for mental health issues has also moved from the house he/she was living in at the time of the deployment as a direct result of fear being tracked down by former associates.

10.7 Fear of physical attack: As previously mentioned, for some officers there is a physical risk to them should their identity be compromised. For others, although an objective assessment would suggest that this concern may be exaggerated, it does not lessen their perception of the risk.

10.8 Fear of compromise: While deployed in the field, UCOs live with the daily fear of compromise and there is an acknowledged psychological legacy to the role and its concomitant stresses. It varies according to the nature and risks of each deployment, the individual's personality and often their success at reintegrating and adjusting to normal life and routine work on exiting their UCO role.

10.9 For many UCOs their greatest concern is being compromised by a chance encounter with a target of their deployment or an associate and this will continue after they have left the field and eventually performed the role many years ago. Another often unspoken concern is that another of their former colleagues will decide to speak to the media about the SDS and thereby either compromise their identity directly or reveal enough new information that will enable them to be identified by the 'Mosaic Effect.' This concern is heightened because of the way the SDS operated which was to bring all the UCOs together twice a week in a covert location for a de-brief and to discuss upcoming events and deployments. Therefore any individual former SDS UCO will have knowledge not only of his own group but also about the activities of all groups subject to an SDS deployment during his time in the field and he will know and be able to identify all the UCOs.

**TOTAL POLICING****OFFICIAL**Harassment by former associates:

10.10 Many of the activists involved in animal and environmental protest were practised at researching and locating individuals involved in businesses or companies that were the focus of their protests e.g. Huntingdon Life Sciences. They would then wage a coordinated campaign of harassment against them which might include demonstrations at their home, criminal damage to their property (graffiti) and their cars (paint stripper) and by putting excrement through their letterbox. Should they identify and locate a former SDS UCO they may deploy similar tactics, something which the officers are well aware of. This could mean that the officers would be forced to relocate to a different address on a temporary or even permanent basis therefore leading to a total upheaval in their personal and family lives.

10.11 These skills are not, of course, limited to these groups.

Harassment by anti UCO campaigners

10.12 As has been mentioned already, there are a number of groups and individuals dedicated to the exposure and harassment of UCOs. These persons may have no connection with the groups infiltrated by the UCO - as illustrated in the case of Bob Lambert, where 'Sack Bob' demonstrations were attended by students from the university.

Media intrusion:

10.13 Given the current media interest in the SDS and the Public Inquiry into Undercover Policing, any exposure of an officer as a former UCO is likely to generate media coverage on the television news, in newspapers, and online on websites and social media. This issue has national prominence and experience has shown that the focus on any officer who is identified will be intense. If journalists locate the officer then it is very likely that they would be 'door-stepped' which would be disruptive and distressing for them and their family. **An example is given of journalists door-stepping an individual they believed to be associated with a former SDS officer.**

Many officers have never even disclosed to neighbours that they were a police officer, so revelation of their identity would have a profound impact on their personal lives. Again this could mean that the officers would be forced to relocate to a different address on a temporary basis or even permanent basis therefore leading to a total upheaval in their and their families' lives. In addition this could damage business or work interests or other aspects of their private life.

10.14 Case study - media exposure: "Simon Wellings" was exposed on the BBC website and Newsnight as a suspected UCO. This was justified by the programme makers because he had allegedly been



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recorded "discussing the personal lives of Globalise Resistance activists with other police," rather than as part of an investigation into serious wrongdoing.

Calling himself Simon Wellings, he infiltrated the group from 2001-2005.

Newsnight is looking for more information on this man (comment: posted alongside two photos of Simon Wellings on the BBC website).

He was known as Simon Wellings during the time that he was a member of Globalise Resistance and was active in London as well as joining protests in New York, Paris, Seville and many other cities.

If you are Simon Wellings or have any information about him please e-mail us in confidence at NewsnightInvestigations@bbc.co.uk

<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-12867187>

This demonstrates that the threshold which the media has set to justify disclosure is low.

10.15



Impact on private and family life:

10.16 Many partners are extremely concerned by the effect that any compromise could have on their family business or their employment. There are particular professions such as [REDACTED] or any role with a strong union representation where the revelation that their partner was a former SDS officer could have a negative impact on their employment. It is not uncommon for partners to exhibit stress that could include anxiety, depression, and in the worst cases post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or nervous breakdown. Partners are often the innocent victims who have not had the same support as the officers themselves but are equally affected by any compromise of identity.

10.17 In many cases the children of SDS officers were never aware of their parent's role in the SDS and the revelation of this fact could have a significant impact on their family life. More significant is the effect that any protest at their home address or media attention is likely to have on their children. An example is given where the protection of the children was the primary concern of a former SDS officer, and the officer's current and former partner.

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10.18 Many families believe that it is inevitable that they will be exposed at some point in the future, either as a direct result of the Public Inquiry or as a consequence of piecing together information released into the public domain from other sources such as Freedom of Information Act requests i.e. by activists or journalists utilising the 'Mosaic Effect'. The related anxiety and stress is a constant challenge to many in maintaining a normal day to day life because their perception of risk can dominate their lives. The bleak outlook of many of the officers in respect of the likelihood of their identity being exposed either deliberately or accidentally during the Public Inquiry process has been reinforced by the first security lapse by the Inquiry team, whereby they have inadvertently disclosed witnesses' data (as reported in the Guardian on 22 October 2015).

10.19 An officer who has acted as a UCO has described the strain on his/her relationship caused by the prospect of his/her identity being revealed. His/her partner fears being ostracised by friends and associates were the individual's role as an undercover officer to be revealed. These fears are assessed to be well-founded and not exaggerated or paranoid. Consequently the officer is under considerable stress because he/she is worried about the catastrophic impact this would have on his/her partner, their relationship and his/her own life. The strain has entailed him/her seeking medical help.

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11. Conclusion

11.1 The SDS operated from 1968-2008 with minimal public exposure or compromise of officers' identities. However, since the Francis and Kennedy revelations in 2010/11 knowledge of the SDS and the number of officers exposed has increased dramatically. This demonstrates the 'snowball effect' initiated by the discovery of SDS tradecraft, tactics and personnel over the previous five years. It is axiomatic that each piece of such knowledge is utilised to identify SDS officers and the cumulative effect is such that it potentially leads one step closer to identifying each and every SDS officer. To date [REDACTED] officers have their cover identity, real identity and photograph in circulation in the public arena. Their lives as UCOs have been [REDACTED] mapped [REDACTED] other officers have been partially compromised with a name and photograph in circulation, while [REDACTED] officers have had their cover identities exposed.

11.2 Risk assessment is not an exact science and there remains a degree of subjectivity in the process. However, it is clear that the assessment of risk has remained an integral part of the SDS operation since its inception. Officers were promised and have every right to expect protection on account of the roles they undertook. The MPS has gone to great lengths to ensure the protection of its officers, and it is hoped that although the Public Inquiry will increase the chance of exposure, every effort is made to continue to protect their identities and preserve their anonymity. The exposure of an officer could lead to physical harm or severe disruption to that person's life potentially resulting in the need to relocate officers and their families. The risk for individuals is detailed in specific UCPI Risk Assessments which will be provided as required.

[REDACTED] [Gist: Jaipur]

13th January 2016