

## GISTED RISK ASSESSMENT

### N15 Gisted Risk Assessment

1. This is an open version of a risk assessment completed by MPS for N15. The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in the risk of harm to N15 if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of him/her.
2. In summary, the risk to N15 of physical harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of action directed against N15 likely to interfere with private and family life in the event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is **high**. The risk assessor was unable to assess the risk of psychological and/or emotional harm on the information available.
3. The risk assessment is prepared by assessors with relevant experience, and on the basis of consideration of a number of documents including N15's personal file, historical tactical risk assessments prepared in different years, Operation Herne documents, and open source material. N15 did not meet risk assessors for the purposes of assessment, although s/he has engaged with risk assessments in the past.
4. N15 is a former SDS officer. The risk assessment provides an overview of N15's career, including occasions of praise given to him/her for the provision of intelligence. The assessment also sets out his/her current level of exposure and an objective assessment of the impact on N15 and others close to N15 in the event of exposure. The objective assessment includes an examination of the group or groups infiltrated and the threat that they currently pose to N15.
5. N15 completed a recruitment process which included a series of interviews and psychological profiling. N15 was assessed as showing every sign of being able to cope with the particular stresses attached to the work during a long tour of duty. An established part of the recruitment process from the outset of the SDS was a visit by SDS management to the home address of the prospective SDS UCO, to check that the officer and their partner were prepared for what a typical SDS posting entailed, and to make assurances regarding the following points:
  - The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch.
  - The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
  - After the operation was concluded they would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.
6. It is expected that N15 also received such assurances. The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of their identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This was emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities at court. The preservation of anonymity was also managed by the assimilation of an officer back into Special

## GISTED RISK ASSESSMENT

Branch at the end of their deployment and ensuring, at least up until the closure of the SDS, that they were not posted to a uniform role which could expose them to former associates and therefore compromise their security and the integrity of the SDS operation. N15 was, however, posted into a uniformed role at a later point in his/her career, although s/he was removed from such duties following a risk assessment.

7. The risk assessor identified the following risk factors from identification in N15's case:
  - Being targeted by groups infiltrated, acting at group level. The risk of physical harm from groups infiltrated acting at group level was considered to be **low**.
  - Being targeted by former associates within the groups infiltrated or persons currently involved in groups in the same areas as those N15 targeted. The risk of physical harm is assessed as **high**. The risk of action directed at N15 likely to interfere with family and private life is also **high**.
  - Being targeted by campaigners or others hostile to and seeking to expose any former undercover police officer. The risk of action directed at N15 likely to interfere with family and private life is assessed as **high**.
  - Being approached by the media. The risk of intrusion likely to interfere with N15's family and private life is assessed as **high**.
  - The psychological effects of fear of identification and/or its potential ramifications. This could not be assessed.
8. The risk assessment considered matters including the current level of activity of the groups infiltrated, and information about individuals against whom the N15 was targeted. The risk of physical harm, media intrusion and interference with private and family life also takes account of several factors specific to N15 and includes the public perception of the SDS as a rogue unit, the growing number of anti-UCO campaigners seeking to expose and confront former UCOs, and the risk to police officers generally. As to the latter, the current risk of terrorist action against police officers has been, since January 2015, rated 'severe' (an attack is highly likely).
9. The risk assessment notes risk to others including N15's family. The risk of harassment and media scrutiny likely to interfere with the private and family life of N15's family members was assessed to be **high**.
10. There is a risk-specific package of measures to manage the existing risk to N15 which is already in place. The risk assessment lists some further security measures which could be taken.