

GISTED RISK ASSESSMENT

N81 Gisted Risk Assessment

1. This is an open version of a risk assessment completed by MPS for N81. The purpose of the risk assessment is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in the risk of harm to N81 if information is disclosed by the Inquiry which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N81.
2. In summary, the risk to N81 of physical harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of psychological/emotional harm is assessed as **high**; the risk of action directed against N81 likely to interfere with private and family life in the event of identification through information disclosed by the Inquiry is **high**.
3. The risk assessment is prepared by an assessor with relevant experience, following meetings with N81, and on the basis of consideration of a number of documents including a number of previous risk assessments, N81's personal file, SDS documents, Operation Herne documents and N81's witness statement; the Stephen Lawrence Independent Review Volume 1, a tactical threat assessment, Operation Motion documents and open source material.
4. N81 is a former SDS officer. N81 has been referred to, using nominal "N81" only, in reports by Mark Ellison QC, Operation Herne, and the IPCC. All the reports have been subject to extensive reporting in the media.
5. The risk assessment provides an overview of N81's career including occasions of praise given to him/her for the provision of intelligence. The assessment sets out his/her current level of exposure. The assessment contains an objective assessment of the impact on N81 and others close to N81 in the event of exposure. The objective assessment includes an examination of the group or groups infiltrated and the threat that they currently pose to N81.
6. N81 was provided with assurances regarding the following points:
 - The officer's identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch.
 - The officer had an ongoing duty not to reveal their activities or status to anyone.
 - After the operation was concluded he/she would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.
7. The preservation of an officer's anonymity and the protection of their identity were fundamental concepts that underpinned the whole SDS operation. SDS officers functioned in the absolute belief that their identities would never be disclosed under any circumstances. This was emphasised by the fact that SDS deployments were for intelligence purposes only and officers were therefore never expected to give evidence or reveal their true identities at court. The preservation of anonymity was also managed by the assimilation of an officer back into Special Branch at the end of their deployment and ensuring, at least up until the closure of the SDS, that they were not posted to a uniform role which could expose them to former associates and therefore compromise their security and the integrity of the SDS operation.

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8. The risk assessor identified the following risk factors from identification in N81's case:
 - Being targeted by former associates within the groups infiltrated, and/or by activists which are currently involved in the same areas as the groups N81 targeted. The assessor assessed the risk of physical harm to be **high**. Accordingly, the assessor did not agree with a view expressed by N81 in March 2014, that, although the possibility could not be discounted, s/he did not believe there to be a high likelihood that individuals who discovered him/her would seek to do him/her serious physical harm. The risk of action directed at N81 likely to interfere with family and private life was also assessed as **high**.
 - Being targeted by campaigners or others hostile to and seeking to expose any former undercover police officer. The risk of action directed at N81 likely to interfere with family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - Being approached by the media. The risk of intrusion reaching a level likely to interfere with N81's family and private life is assessed as **high**.
 - The psychological effects of exposure and/or fear of exposure and its potential ramifications. The risk – to both N81 and N81's family - is assessed as **high**.
9. The high risk of physical harm, harassment, media intrusion, psychological/emotional harm and interference with private and family life takes account of several factors specific to N81 and includes the public perception of the SDS as a rogue unit, the negative publicity surrounding N81's deployment, the growing number of anti-UCO campaigners seeking to expose and confront former UCOs and the risk to police officers generally. As to the latter, the current risk of terrorist action against police officers has been, since January 2015, rated 'severe' (an attack is highly likely).
10. There is a risk-specific package of measures in place to manage the existing risk to N81. The risk assessment lists the further measures available in the event of disclosure of N81's identity, but the risk assessor observes that the further available measures would not be able to reduce the impact on psychological emotional wellbeing should disclosure take place.