

Title:	N241- Risk Assessment
Summary:	Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)
Relevant to:	Under Cover Policing Inquiry
Author:	Brian Lockie
Peer Reviewer:	Graham Walker
Reference:	
Version:	Gisted
Date created:	3/10/2017
Security level:	

PURPOSE;

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N241.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N241 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N241 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both N241's pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT; 18/07/2017

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR;

The author of this risk assessment is Brian Lockie.
It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker.

THE PROCESS ADOPTED;

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report is documented.

The terms are documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material has been updated onto Holmes/ Relativity with the relevant search numbers shown as footnotes. The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS;

There are a number of limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer and have been documented.

CONTENTS:

1. Real identity

2. Summary

3. N241 pre-deployment

- 3.1 Life before joining the MPS
- 3.2 Police career pre-UCO role
- 3.3 Recruitment to UCO role
- 3.4 Assurances re future anonymity

4. Undercover deployment

- 4.1 Dates of deployment
- 4.2 Main groups infiltrated
- 4.3 Peripheral interactions
- 4.4 Covert identity adopted
- 4.5 Tasking
- 4.6 Assimilation into the group
- 4.7 Group size
- 4.8 Geographical locations
- 4.9 Cover occupation
- 4.10 Compromises or security concerns DURING deployment
- 4.11 Risk assessments DURING deployments
- 4.12 Relationships or other behaviour that could heighten risk
- 4.13 Arrests
- 4.14 Key associates
- 4.15 Other UCO's who could be affected if a restriction order for N241 is not issued
- 4.16 Withdrawal / exit strategy
- 4.17 Return to regular policing
- 4.18 Commendations
- 4.29 Support DURING deployment
- 4.20 Whether N241 is a core participant at the public inquiry

5. Current situation

- 5.1 Age and marital status
- 5.2 Current location
- 5.3 Family circumstances
- 5.4 Subject to any formal investigation
- 5.5 Current employment
- 5.6 Route to work
- 5.7 Roles within the community
- 5.8 Partners' employment
- 5.9 Children
- 5.10 Internet profile
- 5.11 Knowledge of their previous role amongst family and close friends
- 5.12 Physical health
- 5.13 Psychological health

6. Current level of exposure

- 6.1 Cover name
- 6.2 True identity
- 6.3 Where sourced
- 6.4 Compromises or potential compromises subsequent to posting
- 6.5 *Details of pseudonym*
- 6.6 Official confirmation regarding deployment and / or identity
- 6.7 Other deployments by N241

7. Interview between risk assessors and N241

8. -Causal link in terms of completing a Mosaic / Jigsaw effect

- 8.1 General impact
- 8.2 Specific impact

9. Threat considerations

- 9.1 Current terrorist threat level

10. Research conducted

- 10.1 Initial research on HOLMES and Relativity
- 10.2 Basic research on individuals (PNC / PND/ IIP)
- 10.3 Additional research
- 10.4 Open source research

11. The risk currently posed by the groups infiltrated

12. The risk from individuals within the group

- 12.1 Associate causing N241 particular concern / perception of risk by the UCO
- 12.2 Associates with a propensity for violence
- 12.3 Associates with research skills
- 12.4 Associates with previous experience of harassing their targets
- 12.5 Geography of people of concern

13. Indicators of psychological risk requiring expert assessment

- 13.1 Perception of the risk by the UCO
- 13.2 Counselling, welfare, psychological referral etc

14. Interference with private and family life

- 14.1 Perception of the risk by the UCO
- 14.2 Nature and gravity of the risk
- 14.3 Media intrusion
- 14.4 Effects on friends and family

15. Mitigating the risk

- 15.1 Previous risk assessments
- 15.2 Security arrangements in place
- 15.3 The anticipated result of revealing pseudonym only
- 15.4 Withholding, redacting or gisting documents in the context of this UCO
- 15.5 Use of a cipher
- 15.6 Screening
- 15.7 Voice modulation
- 15.8 Prohibition around publication

15.9 Receiving evidence in private

16. Conclusions

16.1 General comments

16.2 Assessment scores

17. Appendices

There are 23 footnotes in the risk assessment.

CONTENTS:

N241 is not a core participant in this inquiry nor is N241 the subject of any misconduct investigation.

The following documents have been used in the compilation of this risk assessment:

- Stage 1 DLS profile of N241 (Appendix A)
- Risk assessor meeting on the April 2017 (Appendix B)
- Holmes research (Appendix C)

Other material generated from or pertinent to this risk assessment:

- Open source research
- SO15 intelligence document
- PNC report
- Open source research
- Research on the groups that N241 infiltrated
- Research on the groups that N241 infiltrated
- Stage 2 DLS profile of N241
- Open source research

Sections 1 – 3: The risk assessment set out N241's real name and undercover pseudonym. It summarised N241's background, police career before and after the UCO deployment, recruitment to the SDS, and current living situation.

N241 was not made any assurances regarding anonymity and nothing official was ever said regarding future anonymity. N241 saw this role as a job that you would do and then move on to another role within Special Branch.

Section 4: The risk assessment set out the details known of N241's deployment, using the sub-headings provided in the index. One key associate was identified. N241's later police career included public-facing work in protection duties.

N241 was arrested but not charged with a criminal offence.

N241 was the subject of one or more compromises, including an occasion when N241 avoided a threat of violence.

N241 is not a core participant at the public inquiry.

Section 5: The risk assessment set out N241's current situation, using the sub-headings provided in the index.

Section 6: Open source research was completed by the researchers; they discussed whether N241's real and/or cover names were in the public domain. There has been no official confirmation regarding N241's deployment.

Section 7: N241 met with two risk assessors in April 2017. Notes were made at the time and subsequently a typed version was produced for reference. N241 was cooperative and answered all questions asked. N241 would rather not attend the inquiry, but will cooperate if required.

Section 8: The risk assessment discusses the general impact and specific impact of the Mosaic effect, including a discussion about whether N241's real name and pseudonym were in the public domain. N241 indicated only one person as being of any concern to N241; this individual is discussed elsewhere.

Section 9: The risk assessment discussed the current terrorist threat level.

Section 10: The risk assessor conducted research on two individuals and two groups.

Sections 11-12: The risk assessor considered the two groups to be of very low risk to N241. The risk assessor assessed the two individuals as being of a low risk to N241 in relation to physical attacks/ causing harassment to N241 or N241's family at the moment, but cannot discount that one individual is a risk if they become aware of this inquiry or choose to release or comment on N241's pseudonym.

Section 13: The risk assessor discussed whether N241 was receiving, or required, any counselling or psychological support.

Section 14: N241 does not believe that N241 is currently under threat or risk of either harassment or physical harm, although N241 did raise one specific possibility of how such threat or risk might come about. N241 is concerned that use of N241's real name in the inquiry may lead to interference with N241's private and family life. N241 fears media intrusion. The risk assessor's opinion of N241 was of a person who does not over-exaggerate risk and takes incidents that would cause others to be concerned within N241's stride. N241 feels safe and secure within N241's current situation, and does not believe that official confirmation of N241's name in this inquiry will have a significant impact on existing family and friendship groups.

Section 15: The risk assessor considered the anticipated results of officially confirming N241's cover name, and how any risk could be mitigated. N241 would prefer to give evidence in a cipher. Screening was assessed as a significant additional measure to N241. Voice modulation was considered unnecessary but should not be discounted. Prohibition around publication was assessed as having limitations, given the cross-boundary nature of the internet. Receiving evidence in private would significantly mitigate the concerns of N241.

16. Conclusions

16.1 General comments

N241 does not wish to give evidence to this inquiry, but understands that this is a public inquiry and will attend if required.

- There was one or more occasions on which N241 was compromised.

- The risk of attack from former associates (in any form) is considered as very low. N241 cannot recall any individual N241 believes is likely to present a risk of physical harm to N241 or N241's family now.
- In relation to N241 the risk of attack is assessed as low. It cannot exclude a threat from an unconnected individual knowing, or becoming aware of, N241's former role as an undercover operative.
- N241's prime concern is the fear of physical reprisals should N241's true identity be officially confirmed, and secondary the potential negative impact on N241's family life and professional standing within N241's friends. N241 is prepared to cooperate with the Inquiry, but would rather not give evidence.
- In N241's view the deployment was unremarkable.
- Matters were discussed in five other bullet points.

16.2 Assessment scores: The assessment scores shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of official confirmation during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching his conclusions. The risk assessor understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police's decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

N241 does not believe that N241 is under any risk at the moment and is comfortable and happy within N241's current situation.

The risk assessor, having considered all the evidence before him (including the period of N241's deployment, groups infiltrated, people associated with these groups, subsequent career and other factors), assessed N241's current risk as very low.

N241 – Risk of physical attack if pseudonym officially confirmed

In terms of risk to physical attack if pseudonym is officially confirmed the risk assessor considered three named factors, and assessed the probability in this category as 'very low' (1).

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'moderate' (3). In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered N241's age and health. The overall score in this category would therefore be 3.

N241 - Risk of interference with family and private life if pseudonym officially confirmed

In terms of risk of interference with family and private life if pseudonym is officially confirmed, the risk assessor considered a number of the same three factors, and assessed the probability in this category as 'medium' (3).

The risk assessor would consider the impact in this category as 'moderate' (3). In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor has considered N241's age and health, coupled with the likely impact upon N241's family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 9.

N241 - Risk of physical attack if real identity was officially confirmed

The probability of a risk of a physical attack if N241's real identity is confirmed on N241 must logically be greater if N241's real identity is confirmed than if only N241's pseudonym is confirmed. The obvious changes in circumstances are that N241's real name and deployment would be available to the public.

The factors of why N241 may be of interest and be targeted are shown above.

The risk assessor would assess the probability in this category as 'low' (2). The increase in this rating against the rating above in relation to a physical attack is that N241's identity will be accessible and known to more people if N241's real identity is officially confirmed.

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'moderate' (3). In reaching that conclusion he has considered N241's age and health.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 6.

N241 - Risk of interference with family and private life if real identity was officially confirmed

In terms of risk of interference with family and private life if N241's real identity is officially confirmed is a more straight forward path to follow. N241's identity would be known and N241's address could be found by basic searches on the internet.

As stated above under risk/ pseudonym being confirmed, the risk assessor believes N241 would be of interest to 3rd parties and may be seen as a legitimate target for harassment. N241's deployment was a long time ago, but the facts as stated above would make N241 and family open to media intrusion or other 3rd party harassment.

The risk assessor would assess the probability in this category as 'medium' (3).

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'moderate' (3). In reaching that conclusion he has considered N241's age and health, coupled with the likely impact upon N241's family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 9.

Signature of author;



Date;

11/2017

Signature of peer reviewer;

Date;

17.0 Appendices

Appendix A - Stage 1 DLS profile of N241

Appendix B - Risk assessor meeting on the April 2017

Appendix C - Holmes research

Appendix D - Open source research *Details*

Appendix E - SO15 intelligence document *Details*

Appendix F – PNC report *Details*

Appendix G - Open source research *Details*

Appendix H – Open source research *Details*

Appendix I – Open source research *Details*

Appendix J - Stage 2 DLS profile of N241

Appendix K - Open source research *Details*

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