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| <b>Title:</b>          | <b>N322 - Risk Assessment</b>   |
| <b>Summary:</b>        | <b>N322 - Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)</b> |
| <b>Relevant to:</b>    | <b>UCPI</b>   |
| <b>Author:</b>         | <b>David Reid</b>   |
| <b>Peer Reviewer:</b>  | <b>Graham Walker</b>  |
| <b>Version:</b>        | <b>Gisted Version 2 of Closed Version 2</b>   |
| <b>Date created:</b>   | <b>15.11.2017</b>   |
| <b>Security level:</b> |   |

Version 2 has been written following a further DLS profile that contained additional material to assess.

I have included within this version the 'Supplementary' report that covered N322 completing a pro-forma.

I have converted the HOLMES 'D' references to Relativity references to abide by the current method of submitting risk assessments. I have also amended the Appendices accordingly.

I have not changed the general order of contents from the original version.

#### **PURPOSE;**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N322.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N322 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N322 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both his pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

#### **AUTHOR;**

The author of this risk assessment is David Reid

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

#### **THE PROCESS ADOPTED;**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been previously set out.

The terms have also been defined.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note

the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

**LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS;**

There are a number of limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer. These have been set out elsewhere

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***There are 35 footnotes in the risk assessment.***

## **1. REAL IDENTITY**

Real name – ***name***

Undercover pseudonym – According to N322, he did not have or use a pseudonym. I can confirm that in the documentation available to me I cannot find any reference to a cover name.

From this point he is referred to as N322.

## **2. SUMMARY**

N322 was attached to the Special Operations Squad from 1968, with the intention that he be deployed into the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign in South East London. The extent of his active deployment is unclear but will have been very limited, if at all.

There is no record of him having been exposed during his deployment.

N322 is now a **age**-year old man who did not wish to be interviewed by the risk assessors, but has subsequently submitted a pro-forma which has been used during the compilation of this risk assessment.

## **3. SUMMARY OF OFFICER'S LIFE PRE-DEPLOYMENT**

**3.1-3.2: Discussion of N322's life before joining the MPS (there is nothing from this period that affects the risk assessment); and police career pre-UCO role (there is nothing from this period that affects the risk assessment).**

### **3.3 Recruitment to UCO role Discussion.**

Whilst he has not commented, it appears that psychometric testing was not part of the recruitment process at the time of his deployment.

N322 was part of SOS in 1968. I am unaware of any formal or informal training for his role. **Discussion.**

### **3.4 Assurances re future anonymity**

This section is limited given the comments of the Chairman as to whether it naturally falls into a risk assessment process.

In his pro-forma, N322 states that he was subject to the Official Secrets Act as a Special Branch officer. It would have been subject to the "reasonable assumption that we had to honour the normal rules of confidentiality and 'need to know'...confidentiality must work both ways – to protect the organisation's aims and also the rights of its members. Unqualified protection was assumed in those days as long as the work was authorized and responsibility executed".

## **4. UNDERCOVER DEPLOYMENT**

### **4.1 Dates of deployment**

*The evidence is not clear as to the date or duration of N322's SDS deployment, although it appears to have taken place at some point between 1967 and 1970, although this period also includes VIP protection duties. There is some evidence that his deployment may have lasted only two months, from September to December 1968.*

### **4.2 Main group infiltrated**

N322 is shown as having been deployed into the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (South East London) in documentation, but denies he actually infiltrated any group.

### **4.3 Peripheral interactions**

I am unaware of the details of N322's reporting so cannot comment. Presumably he would deny any peripheral interactions if he denies infiltrating any group at all.



#### **4.4 Covert identity adopted**

**Discussion.**

Whether N322 got as far as actual deployment into the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (South East London) is unclear. He states that *"As far as I can remember I was only attached to this squad for a few weeks / months. I do remember asking to be returned to normal SB duties because I had nothing specific to do. This was agreed and I had no more direct contact..."*

In later documentation N322 gave an account suggesting he had been involved with the SDS.

I have no reason to dispute N322's claims that he did not infiltrate any group. Whether that would include never attending any open meetings even as an observer I cannot say. **Discussion of possible risk factors.**

I am not aware of any arrests, and hence unaware of whether his disposal was consistent with the others arrested.

Clearly if his assertion that he did not infiltrate the group is correct none of this would be applicable.

#### **4.5 Tasking**

I am unaware how N322 was tasked.

#### **4.6 Assimilation into the group**

It is not known how he assimilated to the group, if indeed he did.

#### **4.7 Group size**

Not known

#### **4.8 Geographical location(s) based**

Documentation suggests that the aim was to target him towards South East London, but how far that progressed is unclear.

#### **4.9 Cover occupation**

Not known. N322 himself would suggest none.

#### **4.10 Compromises or security concerns during his deployment**

None known

#### **4.11 Risk assessments during deployment**

None known

#### **4.12 Relationships entered into, or other behaviour that could heighten the risk**

None known

#### **4.13 Arrests**

None known

#### **4.14 Key associates**

None identified

**4.15 Other Undercover officers who would be affected if a restriction order was not issued**  
*Discussion*

**4.16 Withdrawal / exit strategy**  
No details known

**4.17 Return to regular policing**  
*Discussion, including that N322 spent time on uniformed duties and in sensitive roles.*

**4.18 Commendations**  
*Discussion*

**4.19 Support during deployment**  
None known

**4.20 Whether N322 is a Core Participant at the Public Inquiry**  
N322 is not a core participant in the Inquiry.

**5. CURRENT SITUATION WITH N322**

Op. Motion received an email dated 17<sup>th</sup> December 2016 that stated...

*"Dear (name provided - DR),*

*In response to your letter forwarded by (name provided - DR)*

*I do recall receiving your last communication and being totally confused as to what was being sought. The latest message is a bit more enlightening, referring, I assume, to what was known as the Hairy Squad all those years ago? These days I am lucky to remember what happened yesterday, let alone 40+ years ago, so I am quite certain that nothing I can tell you would be of the remotest use to you. I enjoyed my police career but, now in my seventies, it all seems in the very dim and distant past. **Discussion of police career**, making it even more difficult to recall those early years. If I could be of any practical help I would but the passage of time dictates that I really do not want to be contacted again.*

*All the very best to you and your team,*

*(N322)"*

Hence the risk assessors have complied with his written wishes and not contacted him. In fairness, he subsequently submitted a written response via the pro-forma that is supplied behind Appendix D.

**5.1-5.3; 5.5-5.10, 5.12-5.13: Discussion of N322's age, marital status, location, family circumstances, current employment, role in the community, partner's employment, children, internet profile, physical and psychological health.**

**5.4 Subject to any formal investigation**  
N322 is not subject to any formal investigation.

**5.11 Knowledge of their role amongst family and close friends**



Not known

## **6. CURRENT LEVEL OF EXPOSURE**

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any risk caused by self-disclosure or third party disclosure will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6)

Information currently in the public domain regarding deployment and identity is as follows:

### **6.1 Cover name**

Not applicable

### **6.2-6.3: Discussion of the current level of exposure of the true identity,**

### **6.4 Compromises / potential compromises subsequent to his posting**

I am unaware of any compromises subsequent to his posting

### **6.7: Details of any other deployments by N322.**

### **6.5 Details of pseudonym**

I am unaware of N322's pseudonym so cannot comment upon *the details*, on the assumption that he had a pseudonym at all. Not all of the UCO's deployed in the early stages of the SDS had pseudonyms in the manner of latter officers. Given that N322 claims he was never deployed that may well be the case in this instance.

### **6.6 Official confirmation regarding deployment and/or identity**

There has been no self-disclosure, no court order, no police revelation, and no official disclosure.

## **7. INTERVIEW BETWEEN RISK ASSESSORS AND THE FORMER UCO**

N322 declined to meet the risk assessors so this section does not apply. The pro-forma that he completed is behind Appendix D.

## **8. CAUSAL LINK IN TERMS OF COMPLETING A MOSAIC / JIGSAW EFFECT**

This section does not intend to prove the existence of the Mosaic effect, but looks at the likelihood of it applying in this case.

### **8.1 General impact**

In general terms, a number of matters can be said.

Firstly, the risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

Secondly, the risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a

number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add significantly to the attempts to identify him or her, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

## **8.2 Specific impact**

In the case of N322, his pseudonym is not in the public domain, and he may indeed not have had one. Naming him as a UCO in his true identity would be likely to generate significant interest.

However, against that is the length of time since his deployment, and the likelihood of many people from his target group no longer being active, and presumably not alive.

And this is always assuming that he got as far as deployment, which is contested by N322.

Whilst he appears not to have had a pseudonym, his 'role' could be highlighted without reference to his real identity if his 'deployment' was revealed, for example in the context of his cipher. I appreciate the general principle that a revelation of a UC where there had been no previous speculation would generate significant interest, even if only as a cipher. The reality in this instance, at least from the information available to me, is that his deployment was so lacking in depth that it is unlikely to generate significant interest, if indeed 'deployment' is an accurate description.

## **9. THREAT CONSIDERATIONS**

### **9.1 Current terrorist threat rating.**

The terrorist threat level is currently severe.

That is relevant to all officers, but arguably in particular to those ex-SB and Counter Terrorist Command officers whose details become public knowledge.

The risk assessors see this as a risk, but less in specific terms to N322 than those other risks discussed elsewhere in this report.

## **10. RESEARCH CONDUCTED**

### **10.1 Initial research on HOLMES and Relativity**

The individuals and organizations that could be considered to present a risk have been identified from researching the HOLMES accounts for HERNE and PITCHFORD; accessing 'Relativity'; interviewing the officer; and considering other reports as highlighted.

HOLMES and Relativity hold separate albeit overlapping documentation. All of the material on HOLMES has been used for the assessment, as recorded against their nominal profile. It is accepted there may well be material that is not shown within that profile, particularly generic documents, that could be argued to have relevance to risk. However, given the time scales that apply this is deemed a proportionate search.

Relativity contains a vast amount of material. To check all of the documents would be simply impossible within the time scales, even should fairly restricted search terms be used. As a result there is a reliance upon the DLS profile that has been prepared from the Relativity material. The risk assessors do have access to Relativity should further enquiries be required.

The risk assessors have worked through examples to quantify the amount of material. The results of these searches are recorded and have been retained. Should it be felt that the risk assessors should have attempted to review more material in preparing the risk assessments these details can be provided.

### **10.2 Basic research on individuals (PNC / PND / IIP)**



The second phase of the research has been a need to then research those individuals identified during the first phase to see what risk they currently present, as there is often a significant period of time between deployment and the present day.

No individuals have been identified that present a current threat to N322, so no research has been conducted.

#### **10.3 Additional research**

This section is not applicable given the comments in section 10.2 above

#### **10.4 Open source research**

A simple search of N322's name reveals *discussion*.

The research profile is included in Appendix B.

### **11. THE RISK CURRENTLY POSED BY THE GROUPS INFILTRATED**

The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign no longer exists so no threat exists from the group.

### **12. THE RISK FROM INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE GROUP**

#### **12.1 Associate causing N322 particular concern / perception of risk by the UCO**

Given that N322 has stated he did not infiltrate any group, none have been identified

#### **12.2 Associates with a propensity for violence**

None identified

#### **12.3 Associates with research skills**

None identified

#### **12.4 Associates with previous experience of harassing their targets**

None identified

#### **12.5 Geography of people of concern**

No issues identified

### **13. INDICATORS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK REQUIRING EXPERT ASSESSMENT**

It must be stressed that the risk assessors do not have medical qualifications. However, the following can be stated as points of fact;

#### **13.1 Perception by the UCO of the risk.**

Given that N322 has declined to meet the risk assessors I cannot answer this section. He does not comment in the pro-forma he submitted.

#### **13.2 Counselling, medication, welfare, psychological referral etc.**

*Discussion*



#### **14. ASSESSMENT OF RISK OF INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY AND PRIVATE LIFE**

The risk assessors are aware of the comments of the Chairman of the Inquiry in relation to Article 8, and an individuals' right of respect for private and family life terms (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.10)

##### **14.1 Perception of the risk**

Apparently low, although I note his comments about how unwelcome attention from either activists or the media would be.

##### **14.2 Nature and gravity of the risk**

I cannot comment specifically given N322's reluctance to engage, but see the conclusions below.

##### **14.3 Media intrusion**

None identified. N322 may consider that no-one would be interested in the specifics of his particular case. That may well be the case, but I consider there may be a level of interest in anyone who was a former SDS officer. That means interest in him may be higher than he assumes. However, there is no information or evidence to suggest that the media intrusion, however unwelcome, would be overwhelming.

##### **14.4 Effect on friends and family**

No specific information known

#### **15. MITIGATING THE RISK**

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any alternative methods available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm or damage will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6).

He has subdivided that grouping (B.1) into "means other than a restriction order that may be available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm" (section B.1.7) and "whether those means would, without the restriction order, avoid the risk or the extent to which those means would, without the restriction order, reduce the risk" (section B.1.8)

##### **15.1 Previous Risk Assessments and recommendations**

None have been identified

##### **15.2 Security arrangements in place**

Not known. N322 did not comment upon this in his submitted pro-forma.

##### **15.3 The anticipated result of revealing pseudonym only**

The question of how official confirmation as opposed to unofficial publicity could increase the risk, albeit possibly marginally, is discussed in section 8.1.

I am not aware whether N322 even had a formal pseudonym, or the extent of his cover details, so I cannot comment further.

#### **15.4 Withholding, redacting, or gisting documents in the context of this UCO**

In general terms, these would need to be considered on a 'document by document' basis, and falls outside of the scope of this risk assessment.

There is not a specific exemption to this principle in this case.

#### **15.5 Using a cipher**

With the absence of a cover name, the use of a cipher may be the only reasonable alternative should his true identity not be suitable for revealing. A cipher would provide an additional layer of protection for N322 IF (as was commonly the case with early deployments, and appears to be the case with him) his deployment was limited to attending public meetings etc.

However, if his involvement was significantly deeper than that it is likely that adopting a cipher would be of limited benefit. The rationale for that argument is that the evidence of N322, if sufficiently detailed, would be enough to 'give away' his identity to his target group. I can however find no conflicting details to dispute the account offered by N322.

Without having an appreciation of the nature of his deployment I cannot comment further. I suspect from having written other risk assessments from this period that his deployment may well have been very superficial, particularly when the brief nature of it is borne in mind. If that is the case then using his cipher would be of additional benefit in terms of risk assessment, but I appreciate the disadvantage in terms of transparency to the Inquiry.

#### **15.6 Screening**

From a risk assessment perspective, any risk however minimal would be lowered by the use of screens. If the appearance of a UCO is not known then it would be harder to identify them. There are various methods of identifying a person, some of which are entirely dependent upon knowing their appearance. Because the risk is assessed as in the conclusions below it may not be deemed necessary to provide screens. However, if the Inquiry decided they wished to protect the real identity of N322 then screens would be of value in preventing his identification by recognition. As stated elsewhere, I appreciate that the use of screens limits the transparency of the Inquiry.

#### **15.7 Voice modulation**

The same principles would apply as in section 15.6 above, although I consider to a lesser degree.

#### **15.8 Prohibition around publication**

The same principles would apply as in section 15.6 above

#### **15.9 Receiving evidence in private**

The same principles would apply as in section 15.6 above

### **16. CONCLUSIONS**

#### **16.1 General comments**

***N322's covert identity is not in the public domain.***

The risk from the group he targeted is nil as it no longer exists. It was a specific group for a specific purpose, so the threat from linked groups, or organisations that emerged from his target group, is not relevant.

I have not identified any former associates who may constitute a threat.



### ***Discussion of N322's health.***

Given the fact he has declined to meet the risk assessors and I have limited information I cannot comment properly upon any risks or vulnerabilities to his family.

It would appear unlikely that there are any third party risks.

N322 states he did not have a pseudonym. I cannot confirm or deny this, but have found nothing in the documentation to suggest to the contrary. The most likely position appears to be that he attended meetings (as many desk officers did) but did not get to the level of properly infiltrating the group.

### **16.2 Assessment scores**

#### **N322 – Risk of physical attack if cipher officially confirmed**

I would normally be assessing the risk of physical attack if his pseudonym was **officially confirmed**, but it appears that he did not have one. At the very least I have not found one amongst the documentation available to me.

Some of his colleagues at the time had largely superficial involvement with their target groups, primarily attending meetings and demonstrations, so it is possible (if that was the case with N322) that giving evidence by use of a cipher would provide some protection in preventing his real identity becoming known. It is not as if his evidence would immediately lead to identification of him in his cover role, as would be the case with some 'deeper' deployments.

If he was identified in his cipher only I would consider the likelihood of him being attacked as 'very low' (1). I would have assessed him in the same way if I had identified a pseudonym, and that discussion was not purely academic.

I would normally consider the likely impact as negligible. However, I appreciate the age of N322, and without making general assumptions, and in the light of his comments, I consider 'moderate' may be a more appropriate assessment of impact (3).

The overall risk in this category would therefore be 3.

#### **N322 – Risk of physical attack if real identity officially confirmed**

I consider the likelihood of an attack on N322 would be greater if his real name was **officially confirmed** than in the circumstances above when only a pseudonym or cipher was known. This does involve a small increase in risk. However, I do not consider the risk is elevated to the next grading, and so I still consider the likelihood of him being attacked as 'very low' (1) even if his real identity **were to be officially confirmed**.

My rationale is based upon the likelihood that he had either no operational SOS career, or a deployment that was entirely superficial and that was limited to attending the occasional public meeting in an observer capacity. In either case I assess the only realistic concern being people who would wish to attack any SOS (or SDS) officer, rather than anything specific to his deployment.

As above, I would normally consider the likely impact as negligible or minor. However, I would also bear in mind the age of N322, and therefore 'moderate' would be a more appropriate assessment (3).

The overall risk in this category would therefore be 3.

#### **N322 - Risk of interference with family and private life if cipher officially confirmed**

Please see the explanatory comments above re why I cannot assess in the 'pseudonym' format as is usually the case.

I note that in his pro-forma N322 comments that "No one in later age would welcome the attention of media / extremists etc."



Given the comments above concerning the apparent lack of a formal cover identity, I would consider the likelihood of interference with his personal and family life if only his cipher was known as very low (1). I would have assessed identically if he did have a pseudonym, albeit that may well be academic.

I would consider the likely impact as minor (2).

The overall risk in this category would therefore be 2.

N322 - Risk of interference with family and private life if real identity was officially confirmed

I consider the likelihood of interference with personal and family life on N322 would be greater if his real name **was officially confirmed** than in the circumstances above when only a pseudonym or cipher was known. I consider it more likely than a physical attack. I do therefore consider the risk would be elevated to the next grading, and so I assess the likelihood of him being subject to some kind of interference as low (2). This allows for the interest that would be generated by revelation of any SDS or SOS officer, even one with as low a profile as N322. It does therefore represent an increase in risk.

I would normally consider the likely impact, given the comments from N322 about the current age of any living subject against whom he was targeted, as negligible or minor.

I am wary of underscoring in this category as I appreciate that any direct approach to him, whether from the media or otherwise, may have a significant impact. That is not to say that I have any information that a journalist would necessarily act unprofessionally. I am just aware that an approach from any individual may have a disproportionate impact given his clear reluctance to engage. I therefore consider 'moderate' would be an appropriate assessment (3) of impact.

The overall risk in this category would therefore be 6.

If the Inquiry was minded that it was not appropriate to identify N322, for any other reason concerning his vulnerability, then I consider screens and (to a lesser extent) voice modulation would be appropriate measures.

Should there be a significant delay in the Inquiry calling live evidence it may be that the health and welfare of N322 would need to be reassessed.

Signature of author;



Date;

15/11/17

Signature of moderator;

Date;

*Appendices, as listed in the index.*