

Title:	N348 - Risk Assessment
Summary:	Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)
Relevant to:	UCPI
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PURPOSE

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N348.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N348 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N348 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both the pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

17 - 07 - 2017

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR

The author of this risk assessment is Graham Walker. It has been peer reviewed by Brian Lockie.

THE PROCESS ADOPTED

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

The documents reviewed but not considered relevant to the risk assessment are referenced as follows:

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Note on an issue with the documentation, which has not materially affected this Risk Assessment.

Documents used to compile this report are referenced as follows:

- ***Documents concerning:*** SDS UCOs; SDS officers; MPS pension; research Op Soisson profile N348; Op Herne pen picture; pseudonyms; N348 Central Record of Service

Other material generated from, or pertinent to, this risk assessment is referenced as follows:

- ***References – identical to the appendices.***
- Other (administrative) documents

There were 29 footnotes in the risk assessment.

1. REAL IDENTITY

1.1 Real name:

- **Name**

1.2 Cover name:

- Not recalled by N348 nor otherwise recorded. N348 states that it is likely she would have used the first name 'Sandra' but **she cannot recall the surname used (as opposed to non-disclosure)**. There are no other documents that have been made available to me where the cover name is recorded. I have no evidence or other indicator that the fact that she could not recall the surname of her cover name was not genuine. I base this on the fact that at the time of my asking, N348 had no idea if I already held the cover name details or not from other recovered documentation, and the fact that I spent a considerable part of the time of the interview conversation on this point as it is highly relevant. (*This is also documented at Section 10 – Interview with the UCO*)

1.3 Other names used / referred to as:

- Cipher is N348

1.4 Core participant and / or investigation

- **N348 is not a core participant in the Inquiry**
- **N348 is not the subject of investigation**

From this point she is referred to as **N348** where possible.

2. SUMMARY

Details of N348's career before joining Special Branch.

In 1972 N348 was recruited into the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) by the then management with no application or formal interview. After a period in the 'Back Office' N348 deployed into Maoist issues, the main group being the Women's Liberation Front.

N348 was removed from the field in 1973 following a compromise (*See Section 4.12 – compromises*)

Details of N348's later MPS career

Details of N348's current situation

3. SUMMARY OF OFFICER'S LIFE PRE-DEPLOYMENT

3.1-3.2: Discussion of N348's life before and after joining the MPS (there is nothing from this period that affects the risk assessment); and police career pre-UCO role (there is nothing from this period that affects the risk assessment)

3.3 Recruitment to UCO role

Recruitment to SDS: Approached by SB management.

Recruitment to SDS by: Likely to have been Phil Saunders (N1251) and N294.

Psychometric testing: No

When posted to the SDS back office: Late 1971

Formal or informal training for role: Little training, more like instruction regarding how to behave, such as be in the background, do not take on positions of responsibility within the group.

Discussion.

3.4 Guarantee or assurance of anonymity

Guarantee or assurance of anonymity provided, and if so by whom:

There was no formal guarantee or assurance of anonymity that could be recollected by N348.

It should be noted that at this time the very existence of the SDS was known to only those already within it and very senior MPS managers. The work conducted was confidential in nature and the operators would have been expected to conduct themselves discreetly at all times within a veil of secrecy, and their deployment supported and monitored throughout by SDS managers. This can be shown in the fact that it was only after N348 was contacted on behalf of the Inquiry that she has decided to inform a *family member* of her previous role, who is [REDACTED]

4. UNDERCOVER DEPLOYMENT

4.1 Dates of deployment

N348 was deployed as a UCO from 1972 to 1973.

This deployment was much shorter in comparison with others and was cut short due to a *possible compromise*.

4.2 Main group infiltrated

- Women's Liberation Front (affiliated to the Women's Liberation Movement)

The group met at the private house of the 'leader' [REDACTED]. The main group was a national movement based on women's rights and Maoist teachings. Any direct action appeared focused on exploitative events, such as Miss World contest and demonstrations. N348 described the faction as vocal but aspirational only and taking part in demonstrations with placards and banners. She witnessed no violence displayed by the group and this is corroborated by the open source research conducted.

4.3 Peripheral interactions

None

4.4 Covert identity adopted

Use of deceased child identity: No

Methodology for creation: N/A

4.5 Cover occupation

Occupation: Part time student

Company / organisation (include 3rd party notification if applicable): not applicable, *discussion*.

4.6 Details of behaviour that may raise risk

Discussion

4.7 Tasking

Tasking: The tasking was aimed at intelligence gathering to manage and resource public order issues.

Team meetings: Twice weekly or more at non-police premises where reports were submitted.

Risk assessments: None known or recorded.

4.8 Assimilation into the group

Method: N348 could not specifically recall but likely attended a public meeting and prompted to join up.

4.9 Key associates

The leader of the faction was [REDACTED]

4.10 Group size

No more than 12. Meetings of the group would be held at the home address of [REDACTED] and concentrated on Maoist teachings. N348 described the meetings as vocal and consisted at times of the study of documentary type films of the Chinese way of life.

4.11 Geographical location(s) based

North London

4.12 Compromises or security concerns during deployment

Details of possible compromise

There were no further repercussions

The circumstances indicate that it is unlikely that the *compromiser* knew of the UCO role of N348. Should *the compromiser* have been of a mind to investigate further in respect of N348 then she has had 45 years to do so and to date there is no evidence that she has done so. She certainly knew she was a police officer.

It appears the decision in respect of N348 was one of precaution due to the knowledge of *the compromiser*, rather than direct compromise.

N348 is not still in touch with *the compromiser*, nor does she know her whereabouts or what became of her.

Further discussion

4.13 Relationships entered into

None

4.14 Other behaviour that could heighten the risk

None known or recorded.

4.15 Arrests

Not applicable

4.16 Prominent successes / arrests / convictions of other(s)

Discussion

4.17-4.18, 4.20-4.21: Discussion of any other UCOs who could be affected if a restriction order for N348 is not issued; third party concerns, withdrawal/exit strategy, return to regular policing, and any commendations.

4.19 Support during deployment

Support was provided by the SDS management as required at the regular meetings of the UCOs.

N348 wished the Risk Assessor to point out that the MPS provided no support in the field of psychological assessments or such support at the time of her deployment.

5. Post UC Deployment - Police

5.1-5.3: Discussion of career path, sensitivities and areas of concern.

6. Post police employment or engagement

6.1-6.3: Discussion of position(s) held, sensitivities and areas of concern. N348's activities have increased her internet profile

7. FORMAL INVESTIGATION

N348 is not subject to any formal investigation

7.1 If yes, details: N/A

8. CURRENT SITUATION

8.1, 8.2, 8.4-8.12: N348 is in her 70s. Discussion of N348's marital status, current location, children, current employment, partner employment, role in the community, internet profile, knowledge of deployment among family and friends, and physical and psychological health.

8.3: Family circumstances

A family member of N348 suffers from various conditions. This person is fully aware of the deployment of N348 and on the verbal evidence provided to me by N348, must be seen as a vulnerable member of her close family.

8.4:

3rd party concerns:

A family member of N348 suffers from various conditions, therefore may be more vulnerable as a consequence to any future interference with the family and / or private life of N348.

9. CURRENT LEVEL OF EXPOSURE

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any risk caused by self-disclosure or third party disclosure will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6)

Information currently in the public domain regarding deployment and identity is as follows:

9.1 Cover name

The cover name has not been documented and N348 could not recall the surname used therefore I could not commission any research to ascertain any exposure.

9.2-9.4, 9.7: Discussion of the current level of exposure of the true identity, any compromises subsequent to posting, and any other deployments by N348.

9.5 Details of pseudonym

N348 is confident that she used the first name of 'Sandra', but not so as to be sure.

9.6 Official confirmation regarding deployment and/or identity

There has been no self-disclosure, no court order, no police revelation, and no official disclosure

10 INTERVIEW BETWEEN RISK ASSESSORS AND THE UCO

Contact:

Contact was initially made by letter from the Risk Assessor to N348 and initial telephone contact was made on 23/06/2017. At the request of N348 the 'interview' to assist me to compile the risk assessment took place on the telephone on 26/06/2017.

I formed the opinion that N348 answered, or tried to answer, all the questions put. I have no evidence or other indicator that the fact that she could not recall the surname of her cover name was not genuine. I base this on the fact that at the time of my asking, N348 had no idea if I already held the cover name details or not from other recovered documentation, and the fact that I spent a considerable part of the time of the conversation on this point as it is highly relevant.

Notes made:

26/06/2017

11. CAUSAL LINK IN TERMS OF COMPLETING A MOSAIC / JIGSAW EFFECT

This section does not intend to prove the existence of the Mosaic effect, but looks at the likelihood of it applying in this case.

11.1 General impact

In general terms, a number of matters can be said.

Firstly, the risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' is required before the full picture is revealed.

Secondly, the risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the

attempts to identify him or her, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

11.2 Specific impact

In the case of N348, the cover name, or any possible part of it, is not in the public domain.

12. THREAT CONSIDERATIONS

12.1 Current terrorist threat level

The current terrorist threat level for the UK is **severe**

That is relevant to all officers, but arguably more so to those ex-SB and CTC officers whose details become public knowledge.

The risk assessors see this as a risk, but less in specific terms to N348 than those discussed elsewhere in this report because **reasons**.

13. RESEARCH CONDUCTED

13.1 Initial research on HOLMES and Relativity

The individuals and organizations that could be considered to present a risk have been identified from researching the HOLMES accounts for HERNE and PITCHFORD; accessing 'Relativity'; interviewing the officer; and considering other reports.

HOLMES and Relativity hold separate albeit overlapping documentation. All of the material on HOLMES has been used for the assessment, as recorded against their nominal profile. It is accepted there may well be material that is not shown within that profile, particularly generic documents, that could be argued to have relevance to risk. However, given the time scales that apply this is deemed a proportionate search.

Relativity contains a vast amount of material. To check all of the documents would be simply impossible within the time scales, even should fairly restricted search terms be used. As a result there is reliance upon the DLS profile that has been prepared and submitted to the Risk Assessor. The risk assessors do have access to Relativity should further enquiries be required.

The risk assessors have worked through examples to quantify the amount of material. The results of these searches are recorded and have been retained. Should it be felt that the risk assessors should have attempted to review more material in preparing the risk assessments these details can be provided.

13.2 Basic research on individuals (PNC / PND / IIP)

The second phase of the research has been a need to then research those individuals identified during the first phase to see what risk they currently present, as there is often a significant period of time between deployment and the present day.

A number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (which shows convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence).

However, it needs to be made clear that undercover officers commonly interacted with a large number of people during their deployments. As a result it is not possible to research thoroughly all of the subjects with whom they engaged. The risk assessors have therefore concentrated upon subjects with a known propensity for violence or for disrupting family life, or where the UCO has specific concerns, or where the UCO was particularly close to an individual, or where there is another specific reason to research that

person. There is not a blanket intention to research everyone with whom the UCO came into contact, or upon whom he reported.

PNC, PND and IIP checks have been conducted upon the following 2 individuals as mentioned in sections 4.9 [REDACTED] and 4.12 (name).

The main issue here is whether only researching only that number reduces the quality of the assessment. In one sense it undoubtedly does because it cannot by definition be such a thorough process. The critical distinction between the normal actions of a police officer and these matters is the perceived level of betrayal, given the personal nature of the interaction by the UCO, and the potential for criminal enterprise for gain. Hence the focus in this process upon those people the undercover officer was particularly close to.

In terms of PND checks I have asked the researcher to primarily look at the last 5 years. I am aware that this allows for the possibility of information being missed, but realistic search parameters need to be set to make the process feasible. I am primarily looking at recent offences or intelligence to assess the current (rather than historical) risk. I appreciate there may be a need to look at other material in terms of assessing the overall proportionality of the operation, but that is not the aim of this document.

- [REDACTED] – no trace PNC / PND or IIP on variations of the name provided.
- **Name** - no trace PNC / PND or IIP on variations of the name provided.

13.3 Additional research

There has also been an assessment of material held and no additional research has been commissioned that would benefit this assessment.

13.4 Open source research (also at Appendix 'A')

The open source research undertaken has been focussed and conducted at a level of competence. It does not seek to assert that a more experienced and dedicated individual, group or state sponsor with extensive knowledge and access could not uncover more information.

The cipher of N348 is in the public domain on the UCPI website.

The cover name is not known therefore it has not been researched against the true identity to provide evidence of a link.

The true identity of N348 is easily found within the research conducted. This includes: **details. Discussion of whether the true identity appears connected to any police, Special Branch or SDS work.**

The open source research is attached at Appendix 'A'.

14. THE RISK CURRENTLY POSED BY THE GROUP INFILTRATED

I have found no existing documentation that the Women's Liberation Movement would provide any physical risk to N348. The group was aspirational as to direct action with occasional intrusion and / or harassment and / or disruption, such as the Miss World event in 1970 at the Royal Albert Hall, London, broadcast live on television.

I cannot discount that an individual who feels they should, or to display that they can, [might] attempt to research and disclose the true identity of N348. **Discussion of how easy it would be to uncover N348's true identity without further personal details.**

15. THE RISK FROM INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE GROUP

15.1 Associate causing particular concern / perception of risk by the UCO

None disclosed or otherwise recorded

15.2 Associates with a propensity for violence

None disclosed or otherwise recorded

15.3 Associates with research skills

None disclosed or otherwise recorded

15.4 Associates with previous experience of harassing their targets

None disclosed or otherwise recorded

15.5 Geography of people of concern

N/A

16. INDICATORS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK REQUIRING EXPERT ASSESSMENT

It must be stressed that the risk assessors do not have medical qualifications.

16.1 Perception by the UCO of the risk.

None provided to the Risk Assessor.

16.2 Counselling, medication, welfare, psychological referral etc.

Discussion

17. ASSESSMENT OF RISK OF INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY AND PRIVATE LIFE

The risk assessors are aware of the comments of the Chairman of the Inquiry in relation to Article 8, and an individuals' right of respect for private and family life terms (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.10)

17.1 Perception of the risk

The risk from the group infiltrated and the named leader is considered as minimal in respect of physical harm. There is more risk from intrusion resulting in an adverse effect economically (job security) and within the community, on her and her immediate family. **Official confirmation** is seen by N348 as disproportionate to her sanctioned, authorised and unremarkable deployment with no misconduct issues or suspicion.

17.2 Nature and gravity of the risk

The risk may come from a number of areas, including SDS officers who have existing knowledge disclosing her true identity, or simply those individual(s) who would seek to expose N348 merely because they think they should which is difficult if not impossible to quantify. The risk would likely be confined to harassment and / or intrusion, but would be effective enough to potentially adversely affect her employment status and standing in the community; both would affect her income.

The risk to N348 would increase should the true identity of N348 be disclosed. ***Discussion of whether there is a public link between N348 and her SDS deployment or being a UCO.*** N348 would be easy to locate at her home.

17.3 Media intrusion

This would be likely to only become apparent should there be exposure or disclosure of the true identity of N348. The adverse media perception now of the SDS generally may increase the appetite to expose UCOs, together with the gender of N348 and the use of female officers may only heighten interest. In addition it could be argued that the deployment of N348 into such a non-violent group was disproportionate and may feed a media angle. It should be noted that the intelligence gathered to support a police response in strategic and tactical options is difficult to quantify and therefore equally as difficult to explain.

17.4 Effect on friends and family

N348 feels that any risk would be heightened due to ***the health of a family member.***

18. MITIGATING THE RISK

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any alternative methods available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm or damage will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19 (3) (b), section A.6).

He has subdivided that grouping (B.1) into "*means other than a restriction order that may be available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm*" (section B.1.7) and "*whether those means would, without the restriction order, avoid the risk or the extent to which those means would, without the restriction order, reduce the risk*" (section B.1.8)

18.1 Previous Risk Assessments and recommendations (if allowed access)

None known or otherwise recorded

18.2 Security arrangements in place

Discussion

18.3 The anticipated result of revealing cover name only

The full cover name is not known nor can it be ascertained therefore cannot be considered in full.

I have considered the anticipated result of revealing the first part of the cover name. ***N348*** stopped short of being confident enough ***[about the name 'Sandra']*** so as to be sure. Without this assurance I would consider the release of perhaps incorrect and therefore misleading information as a potential organisational risk to the MPS rather than to N348, to whom I would consider the increase in risk of the disclosure (of 'Sandra') as minimal.

I would support the view that the release of the first name with a qualifier (for instance, 'probably was Sandra') would reduce any reputational risk and again the increase in risk to N348 by doing this would be minimal.

18.4 The anticipated result of revealing groups infiltrated / associated with

Minimal consequence to the revelation of the group infiltrated as the Women's Liberation Front do not exist in the same form as at the time of deployment of N348, and remain non-violent. There is no criminal trace of the leader of the group, nor were any other individuals cited as being any risk to N348. It remains that there may be a risk of reputation to the MPS in the media or public perception that the deployment of N348 into such a group could be seen as disproportionate.

18.5 The anticipated result of revealing dates of deployment

Minimal consequence to the revelation of the dates of deployment as the Women's Liberation Front do not exist in the same form as at the time of deployment of N348. There is no criminal trace of the leader of the group, nor were any other individuals cited as being any risk to N348. **Name** also has no criminal or intelligence trace and has had the last 45 years to expose N348 but to date has not done so if she was in fact aware N348 was also a UCO.

18.6 The anticipated result of revealing geographical areas of operation

Minimal consequence to the revelation of the geographical areas of operation as the Women's Liberation Front do not exist in the same form as at the time of deployment of N348. There is no criminal trace of the leader of the group, nor were any other individuals cited as being any risk to N348.

18.7 Withholding, redacting, or glisting documents in the context of this UCO

In general terms, these would need to be considered on a 'document by document' basis, and falls outside of the scope of this risk assessment.

18.8 Using a cipher

The use of a cipher by N348, should she be invited to the Inquiry, may be the only legitimate way of reference without stating her true identity as the cover name is not available with certainty.

18.9 Screening

The use of a screen would minimise the risk of recognition rather than identification from a current image capture being circulated on the internet.

18.10 Voice modulation

With the large passage of time it is unlikely that any individual from the group infiltrated would recognise N348 from her voice. This measure would fall to one of recognition of her true identity and should remain an option for N348.

18.11 Prohibition around publication [of N348's true name]

This measure has limitations. *Discussion.*

18.12 Evidence in private

This measure would mitigate the fears of N348 of giving evidence to the Inquiry. I assess this to be an unnecessary element if the use of a cipher and screening be made available should N348 be required to give evidence. My rationale for this is that it is unlikely that N348 would possess significant and / or sensitive information regarding her deployment that would justify being heard in private not already

discussed with the Risk Assessor or recorded within existing documentation, and given the group infiltrated and their non-violent action.

19. CONCLUSIONS

19.1 General comments

- N348 is prepared to cooperate with the Inquiry but feels she is limited as to how she could assist.
- N348 infiltrated a non-violent faction of a national group advocating the issues of women in the early 1970's. She did not hold a prominent position.
- There is no evidence or suggestion of misconduct in the case of N348.
- The 3rd party concerns are restricted to the immediate family members of N348.
- **Details of other risk**
- The general risk from the group targeted is minimal as they were non-violent then and exist not in the same form.
- N348 described the faction as vocal but aspirational only and taking part in demonstrations with placards and banners. She witnessed no violence displayed by the group.
- The risk of attack from former associates (in any form) is considered as minimal. N348 named only 1 individual but only as the leader of the faction and would likely suffer the most betrayal.
- **Name of possible compromiser** has had 45 years to implicate N348 but to date has failed to do so. It may be that she remains unaware that N348 was a UCO. She did know that N348 was a police officer. There is no other motive that can be found, including criminal motivation such as blackmail or other gain, as there is no trace of any criminal activity.
- The risk of attack from people currently involved in issues for women is assessed as minimal.
- **Details of psychological well-being**
- It remains that there are other UCO's and managers who know of the true identity of N348.
- The cover name of N348 is not known.
- The true identity of N348 is in the public domain; **whether or not it is linked to her police, Special Branch or SDS work.**
- The **details of N348's family members are obtainable through research.**
- **Level of compromise and intrusion so far.**
- The risk to N348 would be minimal should the disclosure of the dates of deployment, geographical areas of operation, and group infiltrated [be] revealed.
- The risk to N348 would increase in respect of intrusion into her family and private life should her true identity be disclosed.

19.2 Assessment scores

The assessment scores below are based on what risk N348 is facing now against any new risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). I have assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching my conclusions. I understand that this risk assessment will inform the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation as to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

Level of compromise and intrusion so far.

I have limited the scores to the true identity only as the cover name is not known and therefore not considered in this element.

Should consideration be made to disclose the first name of the cover name with a qualifying remark then I would assess the increase in risk to N348 as 'very low' (1) to the probability of physical attack and interference to her private and family life. The impact would be 'moderate' (3) given her gender and age.

N348 – Increase in risk of physical attack if real identity officially confirmed

I consider that there is no evidence available to me that N348 would be in physical danger if her true identity was disclosed.

I assess the probability as 'very low' (1). The impact is hard to assess, but I am mindful of the age and gender of the UCO, and I therefore assess it as 'moderate' (3).

The overall score is therefore 3.

N348 – Increase in risk of interference with family and private life if real identity was officially confirmed

The likelihood of interference with the family and personal life of N348 is logically greater should her true identity be disclosed.

I would therefore assess the probability as 'low' (2). The likely impact remains at 'moderate' (3) for the reasons outlined above.

The overall score is therefore 6.

As with other UCO's of a similar age and disposition there will be a need to monitor this advice for changes in circumstance.

Signature of author:



Date:

3/11/17

