

Impact Statement - Officer N40

1. This statement concerns the potential impact of the revelation of my true identity by the Pitchford Inquiry.
2. I served on the [REDACTED] (SDS) from [REDACTED] Afterwards I [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I would add I received no adverse comment on my performance as an undercover officer. I have been scrutinised by Operation HERNE and cooperated throughout. I have been subject to no misconduct or criminal proceedings. There has been no suggestion that any of my conduct was inappropriate.
3. The activity which creates risk are twofold - (1) my post-SDS [REDACTED] work and (2) my time on SDS. Although SDS is the primary issue, it is not exclusively so.

Post SDS risk - [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]
6. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED]

8. I now learn the inquiry might be minded to either (a) reveal our identities or, (b) via the release of intelligence, identify us by default.
9. I see absolutely no reason why revealing my true identity would benefit the inquiry, save to feed the appetite for revelation by a clique of politically-motivated activists and journalists. Suffice to say to do so would be a life-changing event for my family and me.

Special Branch / SDS

10. The information below, should it be revealed, would compromise me. I have been asked to provide it by MPS counsel and do so in good faith. During my [REDACTED] SDS tour I was involved with [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

11. [REDACTED]

12. [REDACTED]


13. Level of managerial care was higher earlier in my deployment than towards the end.


[REDACTED]


14. [REDACTED]

15. [REDACTED] With that in mind, I would categorise the risk as -

- (i) **Risk to my family** - I am [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is fully aware of my operation, my wider family are not.
[REDACTED]
The risk of threats to my family is my primary concern.

- (ii) **Direct and physical** - Members of groups with whom I developed close, long-term friendships in order to provide intelligence will feel extraordinarily betrayed. Some of these people are demonstrably violent. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that, given the opportunity, they would seek to physically attack me.
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- (iii) **Vicarious and physical** - Persons with a grudge against police may choose to target me.
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- (iv) **Psychological and sustained** - SDS has become notorious. As well as the hate campaign that would emanate from there is a sophisticated and determined group of political activists seeking to expose us as part of a deliberate agenda. None other than Doreen Lawrence, a member of the House of Lords, has demanded our exposure. This pressure would exacerbate my existing welfare and health issues (see below), as well as impacting adversely on my family. Of course, any exposure on social media would make me infamous indelibly in the eyes of many who have already made up their minds about the SDS. It would also negatively impact on my
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(v)



Welfare / Health issues

16. This part of my statement concerns how MPS Special Branch guaranteed my welfare and how the wider MPS failed in that regard. This is to fully describe how the impact of my operation has affected my family life, mental health and welfare. The primary antagonist / stress factor was the Metropolitan Police Service, which gave insufficient regard to the legacy of my undercover work on SDS. The revelation of my identity would catastrophically exacerbate these issues further, as I will describe below.

17. At the start of my operation, [REDACTED] *my partner* and I were visited at home by the Detective Chief Inspector and Detective Inspector in charge of SDS. The following points were reiterated to us, to reassure us about my decision to join the unit;

- (a) My identity would never be revealed to anyone outside of Special Branch;
- (b) I had an ongoing duty not to reveal my activities or status on SDS;
- (c) This duty was reciprocal on behalf of the MPS;
- (d) After my operation was finished I would be given fair treatment in terms of career development and postings.

18. There was [REDACTED] precedent for me to take this in good faith. I had seen how former SDS officers had been fairly treated within Special Branch after their tours.

[REDACTED]

19. SDS officers spent [REDACTED] completely outside of the police service. We were deliberately isolated and undertook no training courses or career development. Nor were we kept up-to-date on law and procedure. In fact, this 'de-policing' was seen as a positive aspect. It made us psychologically different from police officers, enabling us to maintain natural cover. Re-integrating SDS officers was managed almost exclusively and informally within Special Branch (some transitioned better than others). People who had spent many years working completely independently in a high-pressure environment usually struggled to adapt to the realities of returning to roles as low-ranking officers in a large, intensely hierarchical organisation.

20. The problems of reintegrating ex-SDS officers were acknowledged and subject to some thought within Special Branch.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

21. [REDACTED]

22. Towards the end of my SDS tour [REDACTED] my agreed resettlement posting was cancelled by [REDACTED] This was deeply unsettling for me, as I was keen to reintegrate back into the police and continue my career. [REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED]

24. [REDACTED]

25. I left [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] I tried to put SDS behind me and move on. [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
26. [REDACTED] This only heightened my sense of anger and anxiety. I became withdrawn and angry, suffering stress-related symptoms. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The one time I tried to get help I was told to stop being paranoid.

27. [REDACTED]

28. I subsequently asked senior MPS management for (1) a bespoke risk assessment (2) an alarm at my home address (3) a policy sympathetic to my circumstances around career development and postings. The risk assessment prepared by the MPS operational security branch in [REDACTED] was ignored, [REDACTED]

29. In [REDACTED] I believe I was on the verge of a complete breakdown. I was paranoid, angry and unable to sleep. My relationship with my family deteriorated. Were it not for the support of colleagues [REDACTED] I suspect I might have gone completely over the edge. During little sleep I managed, I was constantly tormented by dreams of exposure by old targets. Twice I considered suicide.

30. I was subsequently diagnosed with Depression by my old psychiatrist, [REDACTED] attributed my diagnosis directly to my treatment at work. We were not given mandatory referrals as ex-SDS officers and I did not really take to the psychologist I saw as part of my undercover obligations.

31. I was proscribed antidepressants in [REDACTED] and have remained on them since. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is that the primary stressor and cause of my ill-health is my undercover work and subsequent treatment by the MPS. They also believe, had I been managed properly post-deployment, I might not have suffered at all. It was, in effect, a trigger.

32. [REDACTED]

33. To my regret, I have been unable to put SDS behind me. The Pitchford Inquiry simply compounds the issue. Knowing you are being scrutinised by the media, a major police investigation and a public enquiry is extremely stressful. I feel that the fact I have done nothing wrong means little in such a politically-charged atmosphere. As with the Lord Brittan allegations, I have seen what happens when senior police officers are asked to make sensitive operational decisions. Some of them have been found to be less than optimal.

34. I have no doubt my exposure would exacerbate my symptoms and make managing my personal and work life extremely difficult. Even now, I live a life where I have to carefully manage everyday issues such as internet use, travelling on public transport and meeting new people. I really do look over my shoulder constantly. I cannot bear crowds, and an over-crowded tube train can bring on a panic attack. [REDACTED] I am a changed person, and not necessarily for the better. I am jaded and bitter. I genuinely worry about the person I might be should public knowledge of my identity and operation becomes known. [REDACTED]

35. [REDACTED] *My partner* dreads the enquiry and what might transpire. [REDACTED] fails to understand why the question as to why my identity requires protection even needs asking in the first place. This is a fair point. I am also at a loss how I am meant to explain this to my [REDACTED]

36. I would reiterate I am aware of no contingency plan for protecting my family should we be exposed and subsequently threatened. My professional experience

tells me I will have to manage this myself and move house, and in extremis outside the UK. Therefore, should I be compromised, the future for my family would be uncertain. I simply have no control over what might happen, nor is there any meaningful intelligence monitoring of my old associates to inform me.

37. The uncertainty of what might happen at such a high-profile and politically sensitive Public Inquiry simply worsens my anxiety and fears for the future.
38. Therefore, I would ask, in the strongest possible terms, that my identity is not revealed by the inquiry.

Officer 'N40'
December 2015

