

<b>Title:</b>	<b>N40 - Risk Assessment</b>
<b>Summary:</b>	<b>Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)</b>
<b>Relevant to:</b>	<b>UCPI</b>
<b>Author:</b>	<b>Brian Lockie</b>
<b>Peer Reviewer:</b>	<b>Graham Walker</b>
<b>Reference:</b>	
<b>Version:</b>	<b>Gisted</b>
<b>Date created:</b>	<b>05/10/2017</b>
<b>Security level:</b>	

#### **PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N40.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N40 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N40 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both the pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

#### **DATE OF DOCUMENT**

18/07/ 2017

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

#### **AUTHOR**

The author of this risk assessment is Brian Lockie

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

#### **THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

## **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

### **CONTENTS:**

#### **1. Real identity**

- 1.1 Real name
- 1.2 Pseudonym / cover name
- 1.3 Other names used / known by / referred to as
- 1.4 Core participant and / or subject of investigation

#### **2. Summary**

#### **3. Pre-deployment**

- 3.1 Life before joining the MPS
- 3.2 Police career pre-UCO role
- 3.3 Recruitment to UCO role
- 3.4 Guarantee or assurance of anonymity

#### **4. Undercover deployment**

- 4.1 Dates of deployment
- 4.2 Main group infiltrated
- 4.3 Secondary / peripheral interactions
- 4.4 Covert identity adopted
- 4.5 Cover occupation
- 4.6 Details of behaviour that may raise risk
- 4.7 Tasking
- 4.8 Assimilation into the group
- 4.9 Key associates
- 4.10 Group size
- 4.11 Geographical locations based
- 4.12 Compromises or other security concerns during deployment
- 4.13 Relationships entered into
- 4.14 Other behaviour that could heighten the risk
- 4.15 Arrests
- 4.16 Other UCO's who could be affected if a restriction order is not issued
- 4.17 Withdrawal / exit strategy

- 4.18 Support during deployment
- 4.19 Return to regular policing
- 4.20 Commendations
- 5. Post UC Deployment - Police**
  - 5.1 Career path
  - 5.2 Sensitivities
  - 5.3 Areas of concern (including 3<sup>rd</sup> party recognition)
- 6. Post police employment or engagement**
  - 6.1 Position(s)
  - 6.2 Sensitivities
  - 6.3 Areas of concern (including 3<sup>rd</sup> party recognition)
- 7. Formal Investigation**
  - 7.1 If yes, details
- 8. Current situation**
  - 8.1 Age and marital status
  - 8.2 Current location
  - 8.3 Family circumstances
  - 8.4 Children
  - 8.5 Current employment
  - 8.6 Route to work
  - 8.7 Roles within the community
  - 8.8 Partners' employment
  - 8.9 Internet profile
  - 8.10 Knowledge of their previous role amongst family and close friends
  - 8.11 Physical health
  - 8.12 Psychological health
- 9. Current level of exposure**
  - 9.1 Cover name
  - 9.2 True identity
  - 9.3 Where sourced
  - 9.4 Compromises or potential compromises subsequent to posting
  - 9.5 *Details of pseudonym*
  - 9.6 Official confirmation regarding deployment and / or identity

9.7 Other deployments

**10. Interview with risk assessors**

**11. Causal link in terms of completing a Mosaic / Jigsaw effect**

11.1 General impact

11.2 Specific impact

**12. Threat considerations**

12.1 Current terrorist threat level for UK

**13. Research conducted**

13.1 Initial research on HOLMES and Relativity

13.2 Basic research on individuals (PNC / PND/ IIP )

13.3 Additional research

13.4 Open source research

**14. The risk currently posed by the groups infiltrated**

**15. The risk from individuals within the group**

15.1 Associate causing the UCO particular concern / perception of risk by the UCO

15.2 Associates with a propensity for violence

15.3 Associates with research skills

15.4 Associates with previous experience of harassing their targets

15.5 Geography of people of concern

**16. Indicators of psychological risk requiring expert assessment**

16.1 Perception of the risk by the UCO

16.2 Counselling, welfare, psychological referral etc.

**17. Interference with private and family life**

17.1 Perception of the risk by the UCO

17.2 Nature and gravity of the risk

17.3 Media intrusion

17.4 Effects on friends and family

**18. Mitigating the risk**

18.1 Previous risk assessments

18.2 Security arrangements in place

18.3 The anticipated result of revealing pseudonym only

18.4 The anticipated result of revealing groups infiltrated / associated with

18.5 The anticipated result of revealing dates of deployment

- 18.6 Withholding, redacting or gisting documents in the context of this UCO
- 18.7 Use of a cipher
- 18.8 Screening
- 18.9 Voice modulation
- 18.10 Prohibition around publication
- 18.11 Evidence in private
- 19. Conclusions
  - 19.1 General comments
  - 19.2 Assessment score
- 20. Appendix – all of the below are shown as appendices at the back of this document.

There are 102 footnotes in the risk assessment

#### Contents

Documents used to compile this report are referenced as follows:

- DLS profile of N40
- Summary of Holmes information
- Operation Herne Profile
- Operation Herne Statement of N40
- One other document setting out whether there are any other misconduct matters to be considered

Other material generated from or pertinent to this risk assessment:

- Open source research
- Risk assessor interview notes
- Fact checked notes
- N40's personal note to SDS
- Notes on who interviewed N40
- Authorisation for deployment and targeting strategy
- Legend and cover information
- Intelligence reports
- Information re concern of N40
- Withdrawal and exit strategy of N40
- Research profiles of several individuals and groups who may pose a threat
- Research on a topic
- N40 overview of SDS operations
- Several other documents

All of the above are appendices to this risk assessment

**Sections 1 – 3:** The risk assessment sets out N40's real name and undercover pseudonym. It summarises N40's background, police career before the deployment, recruitment to the SDS, and deployment.

N40 is not a core participant at the public inquiry. There is no evidence of misconduct in relation to N40.



N40 was given assurances as regards anonymity, and was also given an assurance of a favourable posting after N40's deployment. To N40's mind, these assurances were absolute and made in the presence of a family member.

There was no official training for UCO deployment.

**Sections 4 – 7:** The risk assessment sets out the details known of N40's legend and deployment, using the sub-headings provided in the index. A number of key associates reported on by N40 were identified.

Members of the group(s) and/or their associates were involved in serious violent crime during the deployment. The deployment included one occasion when N40 was prosecuted in cover name.

N40's post deployment career is also discussed, including at least once giving evidence in open court in a different pseudonym, and screened.

**Section 8:** The risk assessment sets out N40's current situation, using the sub-headings in the index.

**Section 9:** The risk assessment discusses whether N40's real or cover name are in the public domain, and the open source research done. There has been no official confirmation of N40's deployment.

**Section 10:** N40 met with the risk assessors in June 2017. Notes were completed and typed. N40 gave examples of where images of N40 while deployed are likely to exist.

**Section 11:** The risk assessment discusses the general impact and specific impact of the Mosaic effect and whether N40's pseudonym was in the public domain.

**Section 12:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level, sourced from the Mi5 website.

**Section 13:**

The risk assessor identified the key groups and people identified that N40 reported on. The risk assessor concentrated on people likely to cause concern to N40 in relation to violence, harassment, research skills and/or likely to hold a personal grievance.

**Section 14:** The risk assessor discusses the risks posed by the main group(s) infiltrated by N40

The full research document is saved within Holmes and attached in Appendix X.

**Section 15:** The risk assessor met with N40 on in July 2017 to fact check this document. The officer was satisfied with most of the section but wished to alter some of the names. Various individuals are discussed under the headings set out in the index. It states that during the interview with N40, the officer mentioned certain people as having research skills, and that N40 is fearful of physical threats.

There is also a discussion of physical risks by reference to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.

**Section 16:** The risk assessor discusses N40's perception of the risk and whether N40 was receiving, or required, any counselling or psychological support.

**Section 17:** This section discusses the risks to N40. The nature of the risk is the threat or fear of being subject to an extreme form of violence. N40 holds a perception that the risk of violence towards N40 and family is high if N40's UC identity is officially confirmed.

**Section 18:** The risk assessor considered the anticipated results of officially confirming N40's pseudonym or deployment. Various other measures to mitigate risk are discussed. It was felt that use of a cipher would minimise the potential for N40 to be recognised by former associates. Voice modulation was also felt to add an additional layer of security should N40 be questioned in evidence. It was also felt that giving evidence in private would address a number of N40's concerns, namely being recognised by former associates.

The disclosure of N40's pseudonym will in the view of the risk assessor trigger a research of times, places and events that will involve the research and review of images that will in time secure a visual image of N40. Further research will eventually lead to the risk of N40's true identity being disclosed.

## **Section 19:**

### **19.1 General comments**

- The risk to other individuals arises.
- The risk of attack is highly probable if N40's identity is released.
- This risk assessment was shown to N40 on the 11<sup>th</sup> July 2017. The risk assessor will document the changes the officer wished to make and attach as an appendix.
- Fourteen further matters were discussed, including that the group(s) targeted by N40 will resort to violence if required.

**19.2 Assessment scores;** The assessment scores I have shown below are based on what risk the former UCO is facing now against any new risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). I have assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching my conclusions. I understand that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police's decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

There is a discussion on open source research done in relation to N40's real and cover identity. The current risk to N40 is assessed as low. There is a discussion of the nature of that risk.

#### **N40 – Risk of physical attack if pseudonym officially confirmed**

There is a discussion of N40's beliefs of the risks were the pseudonym to be officially confirmed. The risk assessor assesses the probability of N40 being physically attacked if the officer's pseudonym is officially confirmed as **Medium (3)**.

The risk assessor considers the impact if something happened as **'Serious' (4)**. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered any likely attack as being a serious and significant injury and would have a significant impact on the officer's welfare.

The overall score in this category is stated as **12**.

#### **N40 – Risk of physical attack if real identity officially confirmed**

The risk assessor reiterates their assessment of the current threat level to N40 as low.

It is stated that if as a result of this Inquiry the officer's real identity is disclosed this will have a major impact on N40 and the officer's family.

The risk assessor assesses the probability of N40 being physically attacked if the officer's real identity is officially confirmed as **Medium (3)**.

The risk assessor considers the impact if something happened as **'Serious' (4)**. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered any likely attack as being a serious and significant injury and would have a significant impact on the officer's welfare.

The overall score in this category is stated as **12**.

#### **N40 - Risk of interference with family and private life if pseudonym officially confirmed**

Open source research has been undertaken. The risk assessor assesses the current threat level to N40 as low.

The risk assessor sees N40's 'real risk' as being a physical attack to the officer or their family. The risk assessor also believes N40 may be subject to harassment from interested 3<sup>rd</sup> parties.

The risk assessor assesses the probability of N40 and the officer's family being at risk of interference with family and private life subject if the officer's pseudonym is officially confirmed as **Medium (3)**.

The risk assessor considers the impact if something happened as **'Serious' (4)**. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered any interference as being serious and would have a significant impact on the officer's welfare.

#### **N40 - Risk of interference with family and private life if N40's real identity was officially confirmed**

Open source research has been completed. The risk assessor assesses the current threat level to N40 as low.

The impact on N40 and N40's family is considered. The risk assessor assesses the probability of N40 or the officer's family being subject to interference if the officer's real identity is officially confirmed as **Medium (3)**.

The risk assessor considers the impact if something happened as **'Serious' (4)**. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered any likely attack as being serious and would have a significant impact on the officer's welfare.

The overall score in this category is stated as 12.

**Signature of author:**



**Date:** 01/11/2017

**Signature of peer reviewer:**

**Date:**

#### **20.0 Appendices**

**Appendix A – DLS Profile of N40**

**Appendix B – Document setting out whether there are any misconduct matters to be considered**

**Appendix C – Summary of Holmes information**

**Appendix D – Operation Herne profile re N40's deployment**

**Appendix E – Operation Herne statement of N40**

**Appendix F- Open source research on real and cover names**

**Appendix G – Risk assessor's notes of interview**

**Appendix H – Fact checked notes**

**Appendix I – N40 personal note to SDS**



Appendix J – Notes on who interviewed N40

Appendix K – Authorisation for deployment and targeting strategy

Appendix L – Legend and cover information

Appendix M - Document

Appendix N - Document

Appendix O - Document

Appendix P – Intelligence report

Appendix Q – Information re concern of N40

Appendix R – Document

Appendix S – Research profile

Appendix T – Withdrawal and exit strategy

Appendix U - Research profile

Appendix V - Research profile

Appendix W - Research profile

Appendix X - Research profile

Appendix Y- Research profile

Appendix Z - Research profile

Appendix AA - Research profile

Appendix AB - Research profile

Appendix AC - Research profile

Appendix AD - Research profile

Appendix AE - Research profile

Appendix AF - Research profile

Appendix AG - Document

Appendix AH - Research profile

Appendix AI - Research profile

Appendix AJ – Document

Appendix AK – Document

Appendix AL – N40 Overview of SDS operations