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| <b>Title:</b>          | <b>N337 - Risk Assessment</b>  |
| <b>Summary:</b>        | <b>Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)</b> |
| <b>Relevant to:</b>    | <b>UCPI</b>  |
| <b>Author:</b>         | <b>Graham Walker</b>   |
| <b>Peer Reviewer:</b>  |  |
| <b>Reference:</b>      |  |
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| <b>Date created:</b>   | <b>26/02/2018</b>  |
| <b>Security level:</b> |  |

**PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N337.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N337 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N337 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both the pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

**AUTHOR**

The author of this risk assessment is Graham Walker

**THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

**LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

## **CONTENTS:**

### **1. Real identity**

- 1.1 Real name
- 1.2 Pseudonym / cover name
- 1.3 Other names used / known by / referred to as
- 1.4 Core participant and / or subject of investigation

### **2. Summary**

### **3. Pre-deployment**

- 3.1 Life before joining the MPS
- 3.2 Police career pre-UCO role
- 3.3 Recruitment to UCO role
- 3.4 Guarantee or assurance of anonymity

### **4. Undercover deployment**

- 4.1 Dates of deployment
- 4.2 Main group infiltrated
- 4.3 Other groups infiltrated or secondary interactions
- 4.4 Covert identity adopted
- 4.5 Cover occupation
- 4.6 ***Other behaviour which may raise risk***
- 4.7 Tasking
- 4.8 Assimilation into the group
- 4.9 Key associates
- 4.10 Group size
- 4.11 Geographical locations based
- 4.12 Compromises or other security concerns during deployment
- 4.13 Relationships entered into
- 4.14 Other behaviour that could heighten the risk
- 4.15 Arrests
- 4.16 Prominent successes / arrests / convictions of other(s)
- 4.17 Other UCO's who could be affected if a restriction order is not issued
- 4.18 Withdrawal / exit strategy
- 4.19 Support during deployment

- 4.20 Return to regular policing
- 4.21 Commendations
- 5. Post UC Deployment - Police**
  - 5.1 Career path
  - 5.2 Sensitivities
  - 5.3 Areas of concern (including 3<sup>rd</sup> party recognition)
- 6. Post police employment or engagement**
  - 6.1 Position(s)
  - 6.2 Sensitivities
  - 6.3 Areas of concern (including 3<sup>rd</sup> party recognition)
- 7. Formal Investigation**
  - 7.1 If yes, details
- 8. Current situation**
  - 8.1 Age and marital status
  - 8.2 Current location
  - 8.3 Family circumstances
  - 8.4 Children
  - 8.5 Current employment
  - 8.6 Route to work
  - 8.7 Roles within the community
  - 8.8 Partners' employment
  - 8.9 Internet profile
  - 8.10 Knowledge of their previous role amongst family and close friends
  - 8.11 Physical health
  - 8.12 Psychological health
- 9. Current level of exposure**
  - 9.1 Cover name
  - 9.2 True identity
  - 9.3 Where sourced
  - 9.4 Compromises or potential compromises subsequent to posting
  - 9.5 Use of their real first name in their pseudonym
  - 9.6 Official confirmation regarding deployment and / or identity
  - 9.7 Other deployments

- 10. Interview with risk assessors**
- 11. Causal link in terms of completing a Mosaic / Jigsaw effect**
  - 11.1 General impact
  - 11.2 Specific impact
- 12. Threat considerations**
  - 12.1 Current terrorist threat level for UK
- 13. Research conducted**
  - 13.1 Initial research on HOLMES and Relativity
  - 13.2 Basic research on individuals (PNC / PND / IIP)
  - 13.3 Additional research
  - 13.4 Open source research
- 14. The risk currently posed by the groups infiltrated**
- 15. The risk from individuals within the group or those associated to it**
  - 15.1 Associate causing the UCO particular concern / perception of risk by the UCO
  - 15.2 Associates with a propensity for violence
  - 15.3 Associates with research skills
  - 15.4 Associates with previous experience of harassing their targets
  - 15.5 Geography of people of concern
- 16. Indicators of psychological risk requiring expert assessment**
  - 16.1 Perception of the risk by the UCO
  - 16.2 Counselling, welfare, psychological referral etc
- 17. Interference with private and family life**
  - 17.1 Perception of the risk by the UCO
  - 17.2 Nature and gravity of the risk
  - 17.3 Media intrusion
  - 17.4 Effects on friends and family
- 18. Mitigating the risk**
  - 18.1 Previous risk assessments
  - 18.2 Security arrangements in place
  - 18.3 The anticipated result of revealing pseudonym only
  - 18.4 The anticipated result of revealing groups infiltrated / associated with
  - 18.5 The anticipated result of revealing dates of deployment
  - 18.6 The anticipated result of revealing geographical areas of operation

18.7 Withholding, redacting or gisting documents in the context of this UCO

18.8 Use of a cipher

18.9 Screening

18.10 Voice modulation

18.11 Prohibition around publication

18.12 Evidence in private

## 19. Conclusions

19.1 General comments

19.2 Assessment score

## 20. Appendix

'A' - Index of documents that have been referred to and footnoted

'B' – Notes of interview with Risk Assessor 11/07/2017

'C' – Op Herne research

'D' – OP Herne pen picture

'E' – HOLMES research

'F' – SDS Policy

'G' – Index of Individual research

'H' – emails from N337 to Risk Assessor 12/07/2017

'I' – Op Herne interview notes with N337 18/08/2015

'J' – SDS file on security threat

'K' – Index of Threat Considerations

'L' – DLS Profile

'M' – Open source research on N337

'N' – Target Group Research

'O' – Open source research on *further matter*

**The risk assessment contains 52 footnotes.**

**Sections 1 – 3.1:** The risk assessment sets out details of N337's real name, cover name, code name and reference number. It notes that the documentation concerning N337's cover name does not accord with N337's recollection of the cover name.

N337 is not a core participant in the Inquiry nor is N337 the subject of investigation.

The risk assessment summarizes N337's deployment, and states that N337 remained within SB after deployment in a managerial role. During this period there were several issues with UCOs requiring N337's

attention, including a security threat, tasking and strategic and tactical management of sensitive deployments of interest to the Inquiry. N337 was deployed against four groups in the 1970's.

N337's current situation is stated.

N337's life before joining the MPS, including N337's date and place of birth, and details of N337's family are stated. There is nothing from that period that affects the current risk assessment.

**Sections 3.2 – 3.4:** N337's pre-UCO police role is summarized. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment. N337's recruitment to the UCO role is discussed; N337 was approached and told to "give it a go for 6 months". There was no psychometric testing and no formal training. N337's legend was outlined. N337 could not recall if a guarantee of anonymity had been formally provided.

**Section 4:** This section sets out details of N337's deployment and covert identity, using the sub-headings in the contents.

The risk assessor highlighted difficulties facing N337 in the deployment. The risk assessor considered a possible third party concern but concluded that it did not require further consideration or highlighting.

Key associates were discussed, including their previous convictions and evidence of behaviour that may raise risk to N337.

N337 was adamant that N337 did not have any kind of relationship during the deployment, and that nor was any relationship expected.

N337's withdrawal was discussed. N337 considered that support provided during the deployment was "pretty good".

**Sections 5 – 6:** N337's post-UC deployment career in the MPS includes work within several Special Branch squads. N337 had managerial responsibilities in the mid 1990's within the SDS when deployments of interest to the Inquiry took place. Specific sensitivities are discussed. The Risk Assessor notes that N337 gave an emphatic denial of any relationship and considered N337 to be sincere. N337 states that N337 would have left the SDS if required to do any such thing.

The Risk Assessor found no negative elements within the managerial role of N337 that would affect risk in terms of interference by the media. In contrast N337 appeared to the Risk Assessor to have a robust approach to management. A risk identified by the Risk assessor to N337 is the possibility that UCOs might themselves confirm N337's name.

The Risk Assessor discussed the risks arising from the deployment itself.

**Section 7:** N337 is not subject to any formal investigation.

**Section 8:** N337's current personal situation is discussed including details about N337's family, one of whom suffers from health problems.

**Section 9:** N337's current level of exposure is discussed.

**Section 10:** N337 was interviewed by the risk assessor on 11 July 2017, with some follow-up communication received afterwards. N337 fact-checked the risk assessment on 25 August 2017.

**Section 11:** The risk assessor discusses the general and specific impact of the mosaic effect with respect to N337.

**Section 12:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from [www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels](http://www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels) and the current threat to N337. The risk assessor discusses another relevant document.

**Section 13:** It is stated in the risk assessment that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC and PND checks were made on two individuals. Additional research was also commissioned. The Risk Assessor assessed exposure of N337 on the internet.

**Section 14:** The risk assessor examined the risk currently posed by the group(s) infiltrated.

**Section 15:** The risk assessor assessed the risk posed by five named individuals and some associates. The risk assessor concluded that some associates present a physical risk to N337.

N337 could not recall the names of any individual who would be of particular concern to N337 now.

The risk assessor discussed who might pose a risk to N337.

**Section 16:** a health risk is discussed.

**Section 17:** N337 is more concerned regarding the media intrusion into the misconduct of some SDS officers and their deployments, and the effect this is highly likely to have on N337's family and standing. N337 would consider this to be devastating, life changing and without justification, as N337 considers that N337 sought to improve supervision, welfare, support and discipline.

The risk assessor agrees with N337's assessment of the risk of interference, but also sees a risk arising from the deployment.

Media interest is likely to be high for N337.

**Section 18:** Officially confirming N337's cover name will increase the risk to N337. Aspects of vulnerability are discussed. If released in isolation, the disclosure of the dates of deployment or the geographical area of deployment is less likely to lead to harm to N337, although it will increase interest in further disclosure.

A cipher would be of benefit should the cover name and true name be restricted. This measure would be valid for both the SDS UCO role and the managerial position within SB, including the SDS. The risk assessor can see no increase in risk if this measure was employed in this way to both roles. Should the cover name and / or the true identity be disclosed then this would have very limited value. Screening and voice modulation would also be of great benefit to N337 in protection from recognition. Prohibition of publication has real benefit if the identity of N337 is not confirmed in cover name or true identity. The impact of publication in either of these names would be to increase the risk of harm to N337. Evidence in private would be an appropriate method of hearing sensitive evidence from N337 and would assist significantly to mitigate the likelihood of identification of N337 from the content of N337's evidence. Should the content of the evidence likely to identify N337 be managed effectively, then providing evidence in a cipher with the use of screens and a voice modulator would have the same effect as giving evidence in private.

## **19. CONCLUSIONS**

### **19.1 General comments**

26 general comments are made including that:

- N337 has been cooperative with the Risk Assessor throughout this process.
- N337 would like to continue to cooperate with the UCPI process; a caveat is given.
- N337 deems that any third party interference with family and private life is unjustified and unwarranted. The effects would be significant
- The SDS deployment of N337 bore no issues of misconduct or compromise.
- There are no third party issues.
- N337 has upheld the strictest standards of secrecy since the deployment.

- There is currently no physical risk from the individuals named. This does not detract from any sense of betrayal they must have.
- No confirmation has been made by N337 or the MPS to date of any aspect of the deployment, nor has N337 self-disclosed or otherwise revealed the deployment aside from to N337's partner.
- N337 was a senior manager. This neither increases nor diminishes the risk of harm faced.
- The risk assessor can find no documentation to the contrary that N337 displayed a high degree of integrity and professionalism in N337's management of various SDS issues. N337 was also instrumental in the increase in the welfare and support programme for UCOs.
- There remains a risk 'from within', as other previous UCOs and SDS managers have knowledge of the identity of N337.
- **The risk assessor has a serious concern for the physical safety of N337 should the cover name or true identity be officially confirmed.**

## **19.2 Assessment scores**

The assessment scores the Risk Assessor has shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The Risk Assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching my conclusions. The Risk Assessor understands that this risk assessment will inform the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

The Risk Assessor has taken into account the separate roles for N337 as a UCO and in management.

The group(s) and individuals concerned are highly likely to have research capability.

Any physical assault on N337 is highly likely to result in a life threatening injury, regardless of age and physical condition.

The increase in risk in respect of the private and family life of N337 is highly likely to come from the media, more so the Risk Assessor assesses in N337's managerial role than the SDS deployment. This is highly likely to be due to issues including the alleged misconduct of some of the operatives, and attempts to introduce mitigating policy and procedures. The research capability of the media cannot be underestimated.

The current risk status of N337 is assessed as low, and reasons are given.

### **N337 – Increase in risk of physical attack if the cover name officially confirmed**

The likelihood of physical attack if the cover name is officially confirmed will result in an increase in that the perceived risk is probable to occur at some stage (4).

The impact of this will be critical (5) resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety

Overall score is (20).

### **N337 – Increase in risk of physical attack if real identity officially confirmed**

The likelihood of physical attack if the real identity is officially confirmed will result in an increase in that the perceived risk is probable to occur at some stage (4).

The impact of this will be critical (5) resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety

Overall score is (20)

### **N337 – Increase in risk of interference with family and private life if cover name officially confirmed**

The likelihood of interference with family and private life if the cover name is officially confirmed will result in an increase in that the perceived risk is very likely to occur (5).

The impact of this will be serious (4) resulting in a major impact on the officer and family requiring significant adjustments to lifestyle.

Overall score is (20)

N337 – Increase in risk of interference with family and private life if real identity officially confirmed

The likelihood of interference with family and private life if the true identity is officially confirmed will result in a substantial increase in that the perceived risk is very likely to occur (5).

The impact of this will be serious (4) resulting in a major impact on the officer and family requiring significant adjustments to lifestyle.

Overall score is (20).

Signature of author:

Date: 26/2/18

