

Title:	N302 - Risk Assessment
Summary:	Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)
Relevant to:	UCPI
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PURPOSE

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N302.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N302 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N302 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

29/03/2018

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR

The author of this risk assessment is Graham Walker

THE PROCESS ADOPTED

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated

20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

APPENDICES

Appendix 'A' – contains reference material that is already held by the UCPI and the references to larger documents which can be made available when the Risk Assessor has referenced only pages or sections from it.

Appendix 'B' – holds the main documentation referenced and the relevant pages from within larger documents and is marked B1, B2, B3, et al in the footnotes to correspond with the index.

There are 38 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

Sections 1 – 3.1: The risk assessment sets out details of N302's real name, cover name and reference number.

N302 is not a core participant in the Inquiry, nor is N302 the subject of investigation.

The risk assessment summarizes N302's deployment, police career, situation, and possible consequences of revealing N302's true identity or cover name. It states that there is a clear and significant risk to both N302 and other individuals of physical harm and interference.

N302 appeared within the 'True Spies' documentary in 2002.

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

Section 3.2 – 3.4: N302's pre-UCO police role is summarized. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

The risk assessment sets out how N302 came to be recruited as a UCO. N302 received no formal training or psychometric testing / evaluation.

N302 stated that there was an unwritten rule that anonymity was assured; to the degree it was implicitly implied.

Section 4: This section sets out details of N302's deployment and covert identity, and the names of former associates within the target group(s).

N302 revealed to the risk assessor that N302 had one fleeting sexual encounter with a person of the opposite sex.

N302 was never arrested.

N302 described the deployment as a prominent success in the intelligence N302 gathered and passed consistently for an extended period of time to prevent public disorder.

N302 described the support and welfare provided during the deployment as 'non-existent'.

Sections 5 – 6: N302's post-UC deployment career in the MPS is discussed including a public facing role involving protection duties.

N302 appeared in the 'True Spies' documentary. N302 understood that the documentary had been sanctioned by ACPO-TAM (police senior body) and via the Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) within the MPS. The content of N302's input was generic and provided little or no detail of the deployment.

Section 7: N302 is not subject of any formal investigation.

Section 8: N302's current personal situation is discussed including details about N302's family. N302 stated that s/he is suffering increased stress due to the UCPI.

Section 9: N302's current level of exposure is discussed.

Section 10: N302 met with the risk assessor in November 2017. N302 fact checked the risk assessment in December 2017.

Section 11: The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels and the current threat to N302.

Section 12: It is stated in the risk assessment that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in Sections 13 and 14 of the risk assessment appropriate to the UCO.

Section 13: The risk assessor discusses the current risk of physical harm and interference to N302 from the group(s) N302 infiltrated.

Section 14: N302 identified individuals of particular concern. Individuals with a propensity for violence and associates with research skills are discussed.

Section 15: N302 is concerned about the impact on N302, the family and others should N302's true identity be officially confirmed. N302 also considers there is a risk of harm from other sources. N302 would feel betrayed if there was official disclosure of N302's dates of deployment, geographical area of operation and/or groups infiltrated.

Section 16: The risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N302, were N302's real or cover identity to be officially confirmed. The risk assessor is of the view that there is likely to be media interest in N302 for ten reasons. Other potential sources of physical harm or interference are discussed.

Section 17: Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N302. It is felt that if N302 were invited to give evidence, use of a cipher would have value should the cover name and true identity not be disclosed. Screening would have value. Voice modulation would have little value. The risk assessor does not consider the risk is so high in the case of N302 that this would be the only realistic way of proceeding, but it should remain a consideration.

Section 18: The risk assessor discusses current third party concerns and the risk of interference to third parties in the event of official confirmation of N302.

19. CONCLUSIONS

The assessment scores I have shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). I have assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching my conclusions. I understand that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

19.1 Current risk

The current risk of physical harm to N302 and his family is very low.

The current risk of interference to N302 and his family is very low.

The risk assessor bases this on two factors.

In the risk assessor's opinion, official confirmation of N302's cover name would be a risk increase and would lead to N302's true identity for three reasons.

19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make

The risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify them, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognized in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

At this time neither the cover name nor the true identity are currently in the public domain in this case.

19.3 Objective assessment of whether there is currently a sterile corridor between the officer's real and cover name

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

The open source research is discussed.

In the risk assessor's view this corridor is being significantly eroded by the following **ten factors**.

Discussion of HN302's current exposure.

19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

Discussion of current threats to the physical well-being of HN302.

The likelihood of physical attack if the real identity is officially confirmed will result in an increase in that the perceived risk is possible to occur at some stage (3).

The impact of this will be critical (5) resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety.

Overall score is (15)

19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

In the risk assessor's opinion the media interest in N302 would be of significance *for the following 11 reasons* and amount to interference;

The actual media attention will be unwarranted to N302 and N302's family who do not seek it, as the consequence of such media attention may also have an adverse effect on N302's well-being (as detailed above at 19.4).

The likelihood of interference with family and private life if the true identity is officially confirmed will result in a substantial increase in that the perceived risk is very likely to occur (5).

The impact of this will be serious (4) resulting in a major impact on the officer and family requiring significant adjustments to lifestyle.

Overall score is (20).

19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor has detailed at Section 19.3 that in the risk assessor's opinion there would be no difference in the revelation of the true identity and the cover name in this case therefore the increase would be apparent and real for the reasons detailed at Section 19.4.

The likelihood of physical attack if the cover name is officially confirmed will result in an increase in that the perceived risk is possible to occur at some stage (3).

The impact of this will be critical (5) resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety

Overall score is (15).

19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor has detailed at Section 19.3 that in the risk assessor's opinion there would be no difference in the revelation of the true identity and the cover name in this case therefore the increase would be apparent and real for the reasons detailed at Section 19.5.

The likelihood of interference with family and private life if the cover name is officially confirmed will result in an increase in that the perceived risk is very likely to occur (5). The impact score reflects the eventual outcome.

The impact of this will be serious (4) resulting in a major impact on the officer and family requiring significant adjustments to lifestyle.

Overall score is (20)

19.8 Objective assessment of the outcome of the disclosure of all or any of the

- **dates of deployment**
- **geographical area of operation**
- **groups infiltrated**

Generally the factors above would be individually assessed with a view by the UCPI for publication where possible, as for other UCO's. The risk assessor assesses this case as one where this is not possible. If the cover name is released the key associates would be quickly able to fill in the gaps as to groups, dates, and geography, but to do so would be likely to significantly increase the risk of harm and interference to N302.

Signature of author:



Date:

29/3/18.

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