

Title:	N83 - Risk Assessment
Summary:	Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)
Relevant to:	UCPI
Author:	Brian LOCKIE
Peer Reviewer:	Graham WALKER
Version:	Gisted – Version 1
Date created:	29/03/2018
Security level:	[REDACTED]

PURPOSE:

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N83.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N83 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N83 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT:

29/03/2018

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR:

The author of this risk assessment is Brian LOCKIE.

It has been peer reviewed by Graham WALKER.

THE PROCESS ADOPTED:

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of the present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS:

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organisations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

There are 40 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

Sections 1-3.1: The risk assessment sets out details of N83's real name, cover name and reference numbers. N83 is applying via the designated lawyer to become a core participant. N83 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation.

The risk assessment summarizes N83's deployment, police career, and life before deployment. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

N83 was not subject to any misconduct allegations at the time or since.

Section 3.2 – 3.4: N83's pre-UCO police role is summarized. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

The risk assessment sets out how N83 came to be recruited as a UCO. N83 was approached by a senior manager on the SDS at the time. After N83 showed an interest they discussed a possible field of deployment. N83 does not remember too much of the detail of recruitment apart from it being quite informal. N83 spent time in the back office learning what the SDS was about and speaking to UC officers. There was no psychometric testing in those days.

N83 and partner were visited at home by a senior manager who initiated the recruitment. N83 was given an unequivocal assurance in regards to future anonymity and was also given a specific assurance regarding career after deployment.

Section 4: This section sets out details of N83's deployment and covert identity. The information regarding the latter was provided by N83. A third party matter is discussed; the risk assessor assessed that there are no third party risks attached to N83's legend and cover details.

The risk assessor was shown no information or intelligence that suggests that N83 was involved in any inappropriate sexual relations with any third party during the SDS deployment. This was confirmed by N83.

N83 saw N83's main role being to feedback information about the thoughts and actions of the group(s) infiltrated and other groups in the same field.

N83 was satisfied with N83's managers at the time. N83 provided the names of the managers.

N83 was worried about going back to the real world and getting into the routine of it all.

Sections 5-6: N83's post-deployment career in the MPS and elsewhere is discussed. It included work in sensitive areas. A matter which increases N83's risk is set out. Later in N83's career N83 was involved in the welfare side of the SDS, working with prospective SDS candidates. N83 was proud of this work and thinks this helped the recruitment process. The risk assessor notes that N83 was not expected to approve or decline officers, the role was to be an informal sounding board to prospective candidates. N83 has made a major lifestyle change as a result of this

Inquiry.

Section 7: N83 was not subject of any formal investigation.

Section 8: N83's personal situation is discussed, including details of N83's family and N83's roles in the community. N83 is suffering from high levels of anxiety due to this Inquiry.

Section 9: There has been no official confirmation of N83's deployment. N83's current level of exposure is discussed. Five possible risks/vulnerabilities are discussed.

Section 10: N83 met with the risk assessor in November 2017. N83 fact checked the risk assessment in December 2017.

Section 11: The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels.

Section 12: It is stated in the risk assessment that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in Sections 13 and 14 of the risk assessment appropriate to the UCO.

Section 13: The risk assessor discusses the current risk of physical harm and interference to N83 from the group(s) N83 infiltrated. Some of N83's associates are known for violence.

Section 14: N83 mentioned individuals whom the risk assessor considered. The risk assessor determines that one poses a specific risk to N83, and that N83 will be of heightened risk of violence if N83's real name is disclosed.

Section 15: The risk assessor discusses N83's perception of the risk of physical harm and interference from the group(s) infiltrated and those individuals within the group(s). N83 stated that N83 has a high level of concern and believes that N83 and family could be at risk of physical harm and high risk of interference with private life if N83's real name is disclosed.

N83 did not add other sources of potential physical harm. N83 mentioned another SDS officer who might wish to "take revenge" on N83.

N83 believes that there is a risk attached to the Inquiry confirming N83's dates of deployment, geographical area of operation and groups infiltrated.

Section 16: The risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N83, were N83's real or cover identity to be official confirmed. The risk assessor is of the view that there is likely to be media interest in both N83's deployment and in N83's later welfare role.

Other potential sources of physical harm or interference to N83 are discussed. A specific individual was researched; the risk assessor determined that this individual poses an indirect risk to N83.

Section 17: Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N83. It is felt that if N83 were invited to give evidence, use of a cipher would have value should the cover name and real name not be disclosed. Screening and voice modulation would be of significant value to N83 in reducing the risks faced. The risk assessor concluded that, save for one specific aspect of N83's evidence, the risk is not so high in N83's case that a closed procedure would be the only

realistic way of proceeding, but it should remain a consideration. Closed proceedings may be the only practical solution to the one specific aspect of the evidence mentioned.

Section 18: The risk assessor discusses current third party concerns. The risk assessor discusses and discounts one third party risk, and identifies one specific third party vulnerability to N83, which the risk assessor assesses as "minimal".

19. CONCLUSIONS: The assessment scores I have shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching his conclusions. The risk assessor understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

19.1 Current risk: The current risks to N83 and family in relation to physical harm and the risk of interference to private life is very low.

19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make:

The risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify them, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognised in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

N83's level of exposure is discussed.

19.3 Objective assessment of N83's current exposure

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

There are three specific vulnerabilities facing N83; these are discussed. A screen and voice modulation would significantly reduce risk.

19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed:

The risk assessor's assessment and opinion is that it is highly probable that N83 or N83's family would be at higher risk of physical harm if N83's real identity were disclosed.

Objectively the risk assessor would assess the probability in this category as 'medium' (3) - the probability of the risk occurring could reasonably be foreseen, and is considered distinctly possible to occur at some stage.

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'high' (4) – in physical terms would result in a significant injury. I have considered N83's age and that any assault would require professional help.

The overall score in this category would therefore be **12 (Medium Risk)**.

19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed:

Objectively the risk assessor would assess the probability in this category as 'medium' (3) - the probability of the risk occurring could reasonably be foreseen, and is considered distinctly possible to occur at some stage.

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'medium' (3) – in terms of impact upon their family and personal life it would require additional support, 'target hardening' at their address, or cause real anxiety within their family or close associates.

The overall score in this category would therefore be **9 (Medium Risk)**.

19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed:

Objectively the risk assessor would assess the probability in this category as 'low' (2) – the probability of the risk occurring is considered unlikely.

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'high' (4) – In physical terms would result in a significant injury. I have considered N83's age and that any assault would require professional help. The overall score in this category would therefore be **8 (Low Risk)**.

19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed:

The relevant factors in relation to N83's current position are shown in Q19.6.

Objectively the risk assessor would assess the probability in this category as 'low' (2) – the probability of the risk occurring is considered unlikely.

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'medium' (3) – in terms of impact upon their family and personal life it would require additional support, 'target hardening' at their address, or cause real anxiety within their family or close associates.

The overall score in this category would therefore be **6 (Low Risk)**.

I will place a caveat on this score; *Discussion of a basis on which the risk to N83 and family would be greater.*

19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any:

- dates of deployment
- geographical area of operation

- groups infiltrated

If the cover name was officially confirmed, then the risk assessor takes the view that releasing the additional information would not add to the risk.

Signature of moderator:



Date: 29/3/18

20. Appendices

References are displayed as follows:

Pitchford references contain numbers only – e.g. 0003051

Pitchford HC references are preceded by the letters HC in the following format – e.g. HC-0000818

Holmes references are always preceded by the letter D in the following format – e.g. D8471

Appendix 'A' - Index of documents that have been referred to and footnoted and can be made available

	Pitchford / Holmes	Description	Page no.
A1	<i>Reference</i>	Brian Lockie – CV - and Conflict Statement	All
A2	<i>Reference</i>	Graham Walker – CV - and Conflict Statement -	All
A3	<i>Reference</i>	Process adopted	All
A4	<i>Reference</i>	Terms of Reference	All
A5	<i>Reference</i>	Limitations	All
A6	<i>Reference</i>	Research general document and parameters	All

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Appendix 'B'- Index of documents – General

	Pitchford / Holmes	Description	Page no.
B1		Risk assessor interview with N83	All
B2		Fact check meeting	All
B3		Information re tasking of N83	
B4		Information re <i>matter</i>	
B5		Information re <i>different matter</i>	

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Appendix 'C'- Index of documents – People

	Pitchford / Holmes	Description	Page no.
C1		Open source research N83	All
C2		PND/ PNC <i>Name</i>	All
C3		<i>Research on name</i>	All
C4		Open Source <i>Name</i>	All
C5		PND/ PNC <i>Name</i>	All
C6		Open source <i>Name</i>	All
C7		PNC/ PND <i>Name</i>	All
C8		Open source research on <i>Name</i>	All
C9		Open source research on <i>Name</i>	All
C10		Open source <i>Name</i>	All

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Appendix 'D'- Index of documents – Groups

	Pitchford / Holmes	Description	Page no.
D1		<i>Profile of group</i>	All
D2		<i>Profile of group</i>	All

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