

<b>Title:</b>	<b>N349 - Risk Assessment</b>
<b>Summary:</b>	<b>Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)</b>
<b>Relevant to:</b>	<b>UCPI</b>
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<b>Security level:</b>	<b>[REDACTED]</b>

### **PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N349

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N349 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N349 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

### **DATE OF DOCUMENT**

06 – 04 - 2018

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

### **AUTHOR**

The author of this risk assessment is Adrian Baxter

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

### **THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

## **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organisations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

***There are 29 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.***

**Sections 1 – 3.1:** The risk assessment sets out details of N349's real name and cover name. N349 is a core participant in the Inquiry. N349 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation.

The risk assessment summarizes N349's life before joining the MPS and police career, including N349's posting to the SDS.

The current risk to N349 and his family is very low.

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

**Sections 3.2 – 3.4:** N349's pre-UCO role within the MPS is summarized. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

N349 had not heard of the SDS before being approached regarding a role within the unit. N349 was initially approached by a DS and introduced to another SDS officer, who had been a UCO. N349 does not recall any formal interview or any psychometric testing. N349 was informed by the SDS officer that the role was an undercover role and that the work could be dangerous. N349 was also told he would be cut off from the rest of the MPS.

There was no formal training when N349 joined. N349 worked in the back office, learning tradecraft from other UCO's. N349 did not build a cover story or create a cover name; N349 stated to the risk assessor that N349 was expected to play it by ear.

N349 did not receive anything in writing with regard to anonymity, but assumed anonymity would be given. Everything at that time was secret.

**Section 4:** N349 did not manage to infiltrate any group despite being tasked to do so.

This section sets out details of N349's covert identity. N349 did not create or prepare a cover legend.

The risk assessment discusses a security concern in relation to N349

There is no evidence of any intimate relationship during the deployment.

N349 did not have an exit strategy prepared. None was required as no group was infiltrated.

N349 returned to the back office of the SDS following his unsuccessful infiltration.

**Sections 5 - 6:** N349's post-UC deployment career is discussed, including N349's work post-police employment and engagement in the community.

**Section 18:** The risk assessor discusses current third party concerns. The risk assessor is of the view that there is a real possibility that third parties would suffer harassment if N349's deployment were officially confirmed.

## **19. CONCLUSIONS**

The assessment scores the risk assessor has shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching his conclusions. The risk assessor understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

### **19.1 Current risk**

The current risk of physical harm to N349 and N349's family is very low

The current risk of interference with N349 and N349's family is very low

### **19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make**

The risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify them, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognized in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

### **19.3 Objective assessment of N349's current exposure**

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

Based on the open source research conducted, the risk assessor considers N349's current exposure and highlights vulnerabilities.

### **19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of physical harm to N349 should N349's real identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor has considered and assessed four key factors.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N349 should N349's true identity be disclosed is **low (2)** and considered unlikely.

When assessing the impact on N349, the risk assessor has taken into consideration N349's age, physical and psychological health (S8.10 and 8.11).

**Sections 7:** N349 is not the subject of any investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with the deployment.

**Section 8:** N349's current personal situation is discussed including details of N349's family.

N349 and N349's partner are experiencing stress as a result of the Inquiry. N349 is concerned about the disclosure of N349's true identity.

**Section 9:** N349's current level of exposure is discussed, including two potential vulnerabilities for identifying N349.

**Section 10:** N349 met with the risk assessor in December 2017. N349 fact checked the risk assessment in January 2018.

**Section 11:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from [www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels](http://www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels) and the current threat to N349.

**Section 12:** In this risk assessment, there was no requirement to undertake research using a number of computer systems.

**Section 13:** N349 did not infiltrate any group therefore there is no discussion in the risk assessment of the current risk of physical harm and interference to N349 from the group(s) infiltrated.

**Section 14:** N349 did not identify any individuals of particular concern.

**Section 15:** The risk assessor discusses N349's perception of the risk of physical harm and interference from the group(s) N349 sought to infiltrate, as well as the risk from other sources. N349 is concerned about the risk of interference with the private lives of N349 and N349's family from researchers and the media. Other areas of risk are discussed. N349 stated to the risk assessor that any media intrusion would have a disproportionate effect upon both N349 and N349's partner given they are advanced in age.

Should the dates of N349's deployment and area of operation were to be disclosed, N349 did not believe s/he would be remembered, as N349 was not close to anyone.

**Section 16:** The risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N349, were N349's real or cover identity to be official confirmed. The risk assessor is of the view that N349 will not be of interest to the media over that of any other SDS UCO, based on three factors.

**Section 17:** Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N349. Should the true or cover name of N349 be disclosed then it is considered that use of a cipher would be of little value. Should this not be the case then this measure would be an effective one to protect the true identity of N349 and should remain as a consideration.

N349 never infiltrated any group. Screening would therefore not be required from target groups' perspective. However, the risk assessor considers that this measure would be of value to N349, to prevent recognition, should any provision of evidence be in his cover name or cipher, and should therefore remain a consideration.

Voice modulation would be of little value to N349 since N349 never infiltrated any group. The risk assessor does not consider that giving evidence in private is necessary.

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact would be **moderate (3)** – This would significantly impact on the welfare of the officer and in physical terms would require professional attention.

The overall score is therefore **low (6)**

**19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of harassment to N349 and N349's family should N349's real identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor has considered and assessed the following key factors:

- The potential media interest as documented in S 16.1.
- The four factors considered in S 19.4.

Objectively the risk assessor assesses the probability in this category as **medium (3)** - the perceived risk is assessed as distinctly probable to occur at some stage.

When assessing the impact on N349, the risk assessor has taken into consideration N349's age physical and psychological health (S8.10 and 8.11).

In my opinion, the impact would be **moderate (3)** – This would significantly impact on the welfare of the officer and N349's family: It would require additional support, 'target hardening' at their addresses or cause real anxiety within their family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be **9 (Medium Risk)**.

**19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed.**

In terms of increase in the risk of physical harm to N349 should N349's cover identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, I considered and assessed the same key factors as in S 19.4 above.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N349 should N349's cover identity be disclosed is **very low (1)** and considered highly improbable

When assessing the impact on N349, the risk assessor has into consideration his age, physical and psychological health (S8.10 and 8.11).

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact would be **moderate (3)** – This would significantly impact on the welfare of the officer and in physical terms would require professional attention.

The overall score is therefore **very low (3)**

**19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of harassment to N349 and N349's family should N349's cover identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor has considered and assessed the same key factors as in S 19.5 above.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of harassment to N349 and N349's family should N349's cover identity be disclosed is **very low (1)** and considered highly improbable

When assessing the impact on N349, the risk assessor has taken into consideration N349's age, physical and psychological health (S8.10 and 8.11).

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact would be **moderate (3)** – This would significantly impact on the welfare of the officer and the family: It would require additional support, 'target hardening' at N349's address or cause real anxiety within their family.

The overall score is therefore **very low (3)**

**19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any**

- **dates of deployment**
- **geographical area of operation**
- **groups infiltrated**

N439 never successfully infiltrated any target group; therefore this area of concern does not apply. With regard to the dates of deployment and the geographical area of operation, were N349's cover name to be confirmed, the risk assessor does not believe N349 would be remembered.

**Signature of moderator:**



**Date:**

9/4/18.

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