

<b>Title:</b>	<b>N355 - Risk Assessment</b>
<b>Summary:</b>	<b>Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)</b>
<b>Relevant to:</b>	<b>UCPI</b>
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<b>Peer Reviewer:</b>	<b>Graham Walker</b>
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<b>Security level:</b>	<b>Official Sensitive</b>

### **PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N355.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N355 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N355 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

### **AUTHOR**

The author of this risk assessment is David Reid

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

### **THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

### **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

***There are 47 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.***

**Sections 1-2:** These sections provide details of N355's real name and cover name.

N355 believes that an application for core participant status has been made through N355's designated lawyer.

N355 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation.

The risk assessor provides a summary of N355's MPS career including deployment and N355's post MPS life.

**Section 3.1:** This section details N355's life before joining the MPS. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

**Sections 3.2 - 3.4:** The risk assessor sets out N355's police career history before joining the SDS. N355 volunteered to join the SDS. There was no psychometric testing at this time on the SDS. N355 initially working in the back office. N355 saw this as very practical training. N355 would attend meetings with UC's that were deployed regularly where UC's would describe the issues they were facing. In addition N355 would go and speak to those deployed UC's on a one-to-one basis to get a greater understanding of the problems that UC's encountered.

In relation to guarantees of anonymity N355 makes it clear that the SDS was a secret organisation, run from covert premises. The importance of anonymity was obvious, or it could have led to embarrassment. There was a danger to the operatives if their details were revealed.

**Section 4:** This section details N355's deployment including the group(s) N355 was deployed into. The risk assessor discusses any potential compromises. N355 states that they did not enter any intimate relationships, and there is nothing on the papers seen by the risk assessor that suggests to the contrary.

**Section 5-6:** This section details N355's career post deployment within the police and elsewhere.

**Section 7:** N355 is not subject to any formal investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with the deployment.

**Section 8:** N355's current personal situation is discussed including details of N355's family. There are particular risk factors raised in this section.

**Section 9:** N355's current level of exposure is discussed.

**Section 10:** N355 met with the risk assessor in January 2018. N355 fact checked the risk assessment in February 2018.

**Section 11:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from [www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels](http://www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels).

**Section 12-14:** It is stated in the risk assessment that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence).

No individual was named by N355 as a particular concern.

**Section 15:** The risk assessor discusses N355's perception of the risk of physical harm and interference from the group(s) infiltrated and those individuals within the group(s) as well as from other sources. N355 is concerned that disclosure of the dates of deployment and area into which N355 infiltrated could lead to N355's identification. The risk assessor concurs with N355 that it increases the risk.

**Section 16:** The risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N355 were N355's real or cover identity to be officially confirmed. N355 does not appear to have been involved in malpractice and was not arrested.

**Section 17:** Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N355. The risk assessor felt that if N355 were invited to give evidence, use of a cipher would reduce the risk of N355 being identified. However, the level of risk attached to this deployment is not of such magnitude that the risk assessor considers it is a necessary measure that needs to be adopted. The risk assessor considers that screening would have significant value in preventing N355's current image becoming available. The risk assessor considered the value of voice modulation to be limited. The risk assessor did not consider that the risk arising from N355's deployment is such that N355 needs to give evidence in private.

**Section 18:** The risk assessor discusses current third party concerns and the risk of interference to third parties including N355's family in the event of official confirmation of N355's true identity. The risk assessor considers there would be significantly adverse impacts in relation to N355's family should N355 be identified.

## **19. CONCLUSIONS**

The assessment scores the risk assessor has have shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching my conclusions. The risk assessor understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service's decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

There is nothing from N355's life before joining the police that impacts upon this risk assessment.

N355 was not arrested during his/her deployment.

The single biggest concern identified by the risk assessor relates to N355's family.

### **19.1 Current risk**

The current risk is low. That applies to both the physical risk as well as the risk of interference with N355's family life.

### **19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make**

The risk assessor considered that confirmation would make a substantive difference with a corresponding increase in risk.

### **19.3 Objective assessment of N355's current exposure**

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the

totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor discusses areas of risk with regards to N355's current exposure.

**19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor considers the likelihood of an attack on N355 would be greater if his/her real name was known than in the circumstances when only a pseudonym or cipher was known.

The risk assessor has not considered risks in relation to specific individuals as N355 did not name any of particular concern.

The risk assessor assesses the risk of a physical attack as very low (1) as (whilst possible) it would remain highly improbable.

The risk assessor has also considered whether there would be an increase in risk of physical injury from infiltrated group(s). The risk assessor assesses the likely impact as 'moderate' (3). This is very hard to assess, but there is no intelligence to suggest a violent attack of any severity.

**The overall risk in this category would therefore be 3.**

**19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

This is the area that causes the risk assessor the most concern.

The risk assessor considers that the likelihood of interference with the personal and family life of N355 must logically be greater if his/her real name was known than in the circumstances below when only a pseudonym or cipher was known.

The risk assessor considers this risk more likely than that of a physical attack.

The risk assessor assesses the likelihood of N355 being subject to some form of interference as high (4).

The risk assessor assesses the impact as serious (4). This includes, for example, 'significantly adversely impacting on their private life'.

The risk assessor's view is that the nature of the process itself is already causing a real and sometimes overwhelming pressure on individuals including N355, and impacts upon their families, which is unfortunate. That pressure will increase hugely if the real identity of N355 became known, but it is important to appreciate that the negative impact of this process is already having a sizeable affect.

**The overall risk in this category would therefore be 16.**

**19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

Should the pseudonym of N355 be disclosed the risk assessor considers the likelihood of N355 being attacked as 'very low' (1)

The likely impact remains unchanged as in section 19.4 above, and the risk assessor therefore assess the impact as moderate (3)

The overall risk in this category is therefore assessed as 3.

**19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor assesses the probability of interference with N355's family and private life as higher than the risk of physical assault. The risk assessor assesses the likelihood of interference with N355's personal and family life if only N355's cover identity was known as very low (1).

The risk assessor considers the likely impact as serious (4) for the reasons stated above in section 19.5.

The overall risk in this category would therefore be 4.

**19.8 Objective assessment of the outcome of the disclosure of all or any of the:**

- cover name
- dates of deployment
- geographical area of operation
- groups infiltrated

The risk assessor considers that revealing this information would add to the risk of N355 being identified, albeit marginally.

Signature of author:

Date:

Signature of peer reviewer:

Date:

10/5/18.

## Appendix 'A'

Index of documents that have been referred to, footnoted, and can be made available

Pitchford / Holmes	Description
<i>Reference</i>	Entitled Special Operations Squad Policy
<i>Reference</i>	Personal file
<i>Reference</i>	Schedule of SDS officers 1968 – 2008
<i>Reference</i>	List
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Reference</i>
<i>Reference</i>	Central record of service
<i>Reference</i>	Basic information record
<i>Reference</i>	Article
<i>Reference</i>	Email
<i>Reference</i>	Email from N355 dated 27.02.2018

Appendix B – Internet research – *Reference*

Appendix C – HOLMES research – *Reference*

Appendix D – DLS profile – *Reference*

Appendix E – Notes of interview between risk assessor and N355 – *Reference*