

Title:	N27 - Risk Assessment
Summary:	Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)
Relevant to:	UCPI
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Peer Reviewer:	Graham Walker
Version:	Version 1 Gisted
Date created:	10.05.18
Security level:	Official Sensitive

PURPOSE

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N27.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N27 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N27 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

6th March 2018.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR

The author of this risk assessment is Duncan Hodge.

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker.

THE PROCESS ADOPTED

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organisations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

APPENDICES

Appendix 'A' - contains general SDS/MPS documentation which can be made available if required.

Appendix 'B' onwards - holds the main or particularly relevant documents referenced and is marked B, C, D etc. in the footnotes to correspond with the index.

There are 63 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

Sections 1 – 2: The risk assessment sets out details of N27's real name and cover name.

N27 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation.

The risk assessment summarises N27's deployment.

The general risk to N27 is 'Very High' as a result of the group(s) and individuals infiltrated and the intelligence provided.

Section 3.1: This section summarises N27's life before joining the MPS. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

Sections 3.2 - 3.4: These sections detail N27's MPS career prior to his/her SDS deployment.

N27 was recruited to the SDS by an SDS manager and interviewed for the role by two SDS managers. There was no psychometric testing. Following selection N27 was posted to the back office. There was no formal training as such and N27 learned mainly from talking to other UCOs. N27 does recall seeing and reading the tradecraft manual.

N27 and his/her partner were visited at home by SDS managers when the unique demands of the SDS and the potential pressures it could put upon a relationship were explained. There was no written guarantee of anonymity however it was explicit that your identity would be protected as part of the general secrecy surrounding the unit.

Section 4: This section details N27's cover identity, the group(s) N27 infiltrated and the names of former associates within the target group(s).

N27 states that he/she did not enter into any relationships during the deployment. There is no intelligence or other information to the contrary.

N27 was never arrested during the deployment.

Significant success whilst deployed is recorded.

N27 felt that the support and welfare he/she received was good, although the exact nature was

difficult to quantify as there was no formal provision in place. N27 was allocated a mentor from the SDS whilst deployed. During N27's post operational debriefing no serious welfare or operational issues were disclosed, other than general suggestions on how to improve the post-operational proforma.

Sections 5 - 6: N27's post-UC deployment career is discussed, including N27's work post-police career.

Sections 7: N27 is not the subject of any investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with the deployment.

Section 8: N27's current personal situation is discussed, including details of N27's family and the potential impact disclosure of N27's SDS career might have on his/her current work in the personal security field.

Section 9: N27's current level of exposure is discussed including potential vulnerabilities for identifying N27. There is discussion of a potential post deployment compromise.

Section 10: N27 met with the risk assessor in January 2018.

Section 11: The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels.

Section 12: It is stated in the risk assessment that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in Sections 13 and 14 of the risk assessment appropriate to the UCO.

Section 13: The risk assessor discusses and assesses the current risk of physical harm and interference to N27 from the group(s) infiltrated.

Section 14: N27 mentioned 14 individuals of particular concern, whom the risk assessor considered. The risk assessor determined that several pose specific risks in relation to violence and/or research skills.

Section 15: N27 feels that there is an extremely serious risk of physical harm against him/her and that any exposure of the cover name would expose N27 to a risk of attack. N27 also considers that there would be a serious impact on his/her family. N27 believes that disclosure of their cover name would lead to their identification as would disclosure of dates and details of their deployment.

Section 16: The risk assessor's objective assessment is that the media would be interested in N27 and discusses seven factors in support of his assessment. Risks arising in relation to N27's post deployment history are discussed.

Section 17: Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N27. The risk assessor felt that if N27 were invited to give evidence, use of a cipher and screening would be an advantage but would not conceal N27's identity. Voice modulation would also be of advantage and combined with other measures, would assist in preserving N27's anonymity. The risk assessor considered that hearing N27's evidence in private would alleviate most concerns.

Section 18: This section discusses current third party concerns. The risk assessor assessed third party risk as minimal.

Section 19: The risk assessor provides a summary of the risk factors concerning N27's current situation, the deployment and the post deployment life. N27 believes that should his/her pseudonym be officially confirmed then N27's real identity will be discovered. The risk assessor agrees with this view.

19.1 Current risk

The current risk of physical harm to N27 is 'Very Low'.

The current risk of interference with N27 and his family is 'Very Low'.

19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make?

The risk assessor comments on whether there is existing exposure of N27's real or cover name.

The risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify them, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognised in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

19.3 Objective assessment of N27's current exposure

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people build a picture before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other pieces of the jigsaw are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor discusses N27's current exposure.

- The assessment scores the risk assessor has shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching his conclusions. The risk assessor understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The likelihood of increase in the risk of physical harm occurring must be greater if N27's real identity is known than if only his/her pseudonym is known. The risk assessor has taken into account four factors in relation to this.

As such the risk assessor assesses the increase in risk as 'very high' (5), in that the perceived risk is very likely to occur at some stage.

The risk assessor considers the impact as 'serious' (4), in that it would result in a significant injury. In reaching that conclusion, the risk assessor has considered the individuals of concern and N27's age, health and physical well-being.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 20.

19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The increase in risk of interference with the family and private life of N27 must be greater if his/her real identity is known. The risk assessor has taken into account:

- N27's SDS deployment, group(s) infiltrated and strong sense of betrayal
- the sensitivity of N27's intelligence and likely media interest
- N27's current employment

As such the risk assessor assesses the increase in risk as 'very high' (5), in that the perceived risk is very likely to occur at some stage.

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'critical' (5), in that it would require total changes such as moving locations. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered N27's occupation, the post-deployment compromise and the psychological well-being of N27 and his/her family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 25.

19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor assesses the increase in risk as 'high' (4), in that the perceived risk is probable to occur at some stage.

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'serious' (4), in that it would result in a significant injury. In reaching that conclusion, the risk assessor has considered the individuals of concern and N27's age, health and physical well-being.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 16.

19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor assesses the increase in risk as 'high' (4), in that the perceived risk is probable to occur at some stage.

I would consider the impact as 'critical' (5), in that it would require total changes such as moving locations. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor has considered N27's occupation, the post-deployment compromise and the psychological well-being of N27 and his/her family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 20.

19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any

- dates of deployment
- geographical area of operation
- groups infiltrated

Were N27's cover name to be officially confirmed, disclosing this information would not add to the overall level of risk.

Signature of author



Date:

12/05/18

Signature of moderator:

Date:

OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
MPS DLS
LOG D17192

N27

Appendix 'A'

Index of documents that have been referred to and footnoted and can be made available

References are displayed as follows:

Pitchford references contain numbers only – e.g. 0003051

Pitchford HC references are preceded by the letters HC in the following format – e.g. HC-0000818

Holmes references are always preceded by the letter D in the following format – e.g. D8471

Pitchford / Holmes	Description	Page no.
<i>Reference</i>	Schedule of all identified SDS officers 1968-2008	
<i>Reference</i>	Schedule	
<i>Reference</i>	N27 SDS personnel file	p.19-21 p.36
<i>Reference</i>	correspondence (Restricted document) re an operation	
<i>Reference</i>	N27 MPS personal file	
<i>Reference</i>	SDS welfare file	p.180
<i>Reference</i>	Wikipedia entry	

Inquiry's gist: Appendices B-AU

B	References	N27 DLS Profile
C	References	N27 Summary of HOLMES documentation
D	References	N27 Op Herne Pen Picture
E	References	N27 Interview with Risk Assessor 01/2018
F	References	N27 aide memoire for risk assessment
G	References	Memo from SDS officer re N27 recruitment
H	References	Targeting strategy N27
I	References	Application
J	References	--
K	References	Operation briefing note
L	References	SDS personnel file N27
M	References	SDS personnel file N27
N	References	Correspondence
O	References	N27 Open source research
P	References	Open source reporting
Q	References	Research
R	References	Research
S	References	Research
T	References	SDS report
U	References	Risk assessment
V	References	Report
W	References	Open source
X	References	Open source research
Y	References	Open source research
Z	References	Research
AA	References	Research
AB	References	--
AC	References	Research
AD	References	Research
AE	References	Research
AF	References	Research
AG	References	Research
AH	References	Research
AI	References	Research
AJ	References	Research
AK	References	Research
AL	References	--
AM	References	Research
AN	References	Research

AO	References	Research
AP	References	--
AQ	References	SDS Operational Strategy reports
AR	References	Article, Report
AS	References	SDS Operational Strategy reports
AT	References	--
AU	References	--