

<b>Title:</b>	<b>N9 - Risk Assessment</b>
<b>Summary:</b>	<b>Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)</b>
<b>Relevant to:</b>	<b>UCPI</b>
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<b>Peer Reviewer:</b>	<b>Graham Walker</b>
<b>Version:</b>	<b>Gisted - Version 1</b>
<b>Date created:</b>	<b>10.05.2018</b>
<b>Security level:</b>	<b>Official Sensitive</b>

#### **PURPOSE;**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N9.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N9 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N9 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both N9's pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

#### **AUTHOR;**

The author of this risk assessment is David Reid.

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker.

#### **THE PROCESS ADOPTED;**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been previously set out.

The terms have also been previously defined.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

#### **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS;**

There are a number of limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organisations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer. These limitations have also been set out previously.

**There are 104 footnotes in this risk assessment.**

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Appendix 'A' - Other material generated during the risk assessment and featuring in the footnotes

Appendix 'B' – Open Source material on N9 (*Reference*)

Appendix C – Interview with risk assessors – written version (*Reference*)

Appendix D – Interview with risk assessors – typed version (*Reference*)

Appendix E – Copies of research generated documents

Appendix F – HOLMES research (*Reference*)

Appendix G – DLS profile (*Reference*)

Appendix 'H' – Document provided by N9 to risk assessor on 11.09.2017

Appendix I – Pen picture of N9 for Op. Herne (*Reference*)

Appendix 'J' – Organisational assessment for group (Reference)

Appendix 'K' – news article (Reference)

Appendix 'L' - Part of email from N9 to risk assessor, 17.08.2017 – Reference

Appendix 'M' – Document provided by N9 to risk assessor on 11.09.2017 – Reference

**Sections 1-2:** These sections provide details of N9's real name and cover name and provide a summary of N9's deployment.

**Section 3.1-3.2:** These sections detail N9's life before joining the MPS and N9's police career pre deployment. There is nothing from these periods that affect the current risk assessment.

**Section 3.3:** N9 cannot recall who recruited him/her to the SDS. N9 was informally interviewed by SDS managers. N9 had no psychometric testing. N9 was initially posted to the back office. There was no specific training. N9 looked at the Tradecraft manual, spoke to other officers, and described the 'cultural knowledge' ethos that pervaded.

**Section 3.4:** In relation to assurances regarding future anonymity, N9 stated that the clear implication was that N9 would be looked after. It was not written down.

**Section 4:** This section details N9's deployment including group(s) infiltrated.

N9 stated that he/she did not enter into any sexual relationships. N9 considered SDS a disciplined role, and comprised of disciplined officers. Sexual relationships would, in N9's opinion, have been frowned upon. The risk assessor found no evidence to the contrary in any other documents.

N9 was arrested but was released without charge.

The risk assessor considered a sample of six associates of N9.

The risk assessor gives a summary of N9's post deployment career.

**Section 5:** This section deals with N9's current situation, including N9's family and work. N9 has significant issues in relation to his/her psychological health. N9 states that the Inquiry is having a major impact, and causing him/her a high level of stress.

**Section 6:** This section deals with the current level of N9's exposure.

**Section 7:** N9 met with the risk assessor in June 2017.

**Section 8:** The risk assessor considers the mosaic effect in relation to N9.

Firstly, the risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

Secondly, the risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify him or her, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

The risk assessor considers that any revelations in relation to N9 will significantly increase the efforts to identify N9 in his/her real name.

N9 has expressed concern to N9's wider family and friends. The risk assessor agrees with N9 that this is a reasonable concern. It seems reasonable to assume N9's family and friends would gain a fuller understanding of N9's SDS deployment, and that the adverse publicity around the SDS generally could cause them some distress. They may also worry about the potential revelation of N9's identity, and the impact that could have on both N9 and them.

**Section 9:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK

**Section 10:** The individuals and organisations that could be considered to present a risk have been identified from researching the HOLMES accounts for HERNE and PITCHFORD; accessing 'Relativity'; interviewing the officer; and considering other reports.

A number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (which shows convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence).

PND and PNC checks have been conducted upon the following 6 individuals mentioned in section 4.14.

**Section 11-12:** The risk assessor discusses the risks posed by group(s) infiltrated and individuals within those group(s).

**Section 13:** The risk assessor considers indicators of psychological risk requiring expert assessment. N9 states that the release of N9's cover name would lead to his/her identification. The risk assessor does not accept that this is inevitable but accepts it would clearly increase the risk. The risk assessor notes that N9 is getting some support. Given the risk of self-harm, the risk assessors suggests that N9 engage with the psychological assessment.

**Section 14:** The risk assessor considers N9's perception of risk. N9 considers the risk to be very significant.

**Section 15:** This section discusses how the risk to N9 may be mitigated and considers the risks involved in releasing N9's pseudonym or details of N9's deployment. The risk assessor considers that it is possible (but not probable) that the use of a cipher could assist. If N9 was required to give evidence then a screen would have the significant advantage from a risk assessment perspective of preventing N9's current appearance becoming known. Screens would significantly reduce the risk should N9's pseudonym be revealed or discovered. Any person would still be able to identify who N9 was from their pseudonym, but it would significantly reduce the risk without limiting the public nature of the Inquiry. The risk assessor does not consider that voice modulation would significantly assist. Voice modulation would be of some limited value, but distinctly less critical than screens. N9 would clearly prefer no publicity. The risk assessor considers that receiving evidence in private would obviously be strongly preferable in terms of risk assessment, but has an impact upon the transparency of the Inquiry. The risk assessor is satisfied that there is no significant risk that would lead the risk assessor to recommend this route as essential. The risk assessor states that he is not qualified to comment upon medical issues.

## **16. CONCLUSIONS**

### **16.1 General comments**

N9 strenuously denies having done anything wrong, or being an agent provocateur, or engaged in any criminality, or engaged in any inappropriate relationship.

The risk assessor sets out four issues in relation to third party risks.

N9 was arrested during deployment, but not cautioned or charged, and the risk assessor does not consider that this has significant impact upon N9's risk.

N9 expresses concern that the impact upon N9's family will be heightened because of a specific risk factor.

The risk assessor considered the 6 individuals that N9 mentions.

The risk assessor comments upon the impact of revealing details of N9's deployment.

### **16.2 Assessment scores**

N9 – Increase in risk of a physical attack if pseudonym officially confirmed

It does not seem likely that the people N9 primarily associated with would inflict violence upon him.

The risk assessor assesses the chances of a physical attack occurring if N9's pseudonym was released as very low (1).

It is very hard to quantify what form of physical attack would occur, and therefore hard to assess the potential impact. The risk assessor considers that a severity score of moderate (thereby requiring hospital treatment - 3) is reasonable. This would result in an overall score of 3.

That does represent an increase in risk on N9's current situation, but only minimally.

The risk assessor stresses that an over reliance upon a numerical score would be a dangerous route to adopt.

N9 – Increase in risk of physical attack if real identity officially confirmed

The risk of actual physical attack if N9's real identity was known is higher than if N9's pseudonym is revealed. The risk assessor assesses the chances of it happening as low (2).

Scoring against the moderate impact (3) with the same considerations that the risk assessor outlined above would result in an overall score of 6.

That does represent an increase in risk on N9's current situation.

N9 – Increase in risk of interference with family and private life if pseudonym officially confirmed

The risk assessor assesses the likelihood of interference with family and private life as higher than the likelihood of physical injury.

The risk assessor believes on balance that this justifies a slight increase to a probability scoring of low (2).

In terms of impact, examples would include embarrassment with a UCO's family, or an impact upon their career, or a significant impact in their standing in the church or community, merited or otherwise. The risk assessor would assess the damage to N9's professional and family life as moderate (3).

The overall risk would therefore be 6. This does represent an increase on the current position, for the rationale outlined above.

N9 – Increase in risk of interference with family and private life if real identity was officially confirmed

The increase in risk to N9's family and private life if N9's real identity was known is higher than if N9's pseudonym is revealed.

This is the area where the risk assessor has greatest concern. This risk assessor believes the probability reaches the next threshold, and therefore the risk assessor again assesses the chances of it happening as medium (3).

Scoring against the moderate impact (3) with the same considerations outlined above would result in an overall score of 9.

That does represent an increase in risk on N9's current situation.

The risk assessor would therefore support the suggestion that N9 should be afforded screens and any other means of protecting N9's real identity, should N9 be invited to give evidence in N9's pseudonym.

Please note the dangers outlined in working off the simplified numerical assessment given. These are outlined in (Reference).

Please also note that the risk assessor has attempted to assess the risk objectively. Just because the risk assessor consider the risks towards the lower end of the spectrum, especially in terms of physical risk, does not mean that N9 is necessarily in a position to deal with the issues that arise.

**Signature of author:**

**Date:**

**Signature of peer reviewer:**

**Date:**

10/5/18.

#### **Appendix 'A' - Other material generated during the risk assessment and featuring in the footnotes**

- Reference – List of SDS officers (Reference)*
- Reference – Emails between N9 & MPS manager (Reference)*
- Reference – List of legends and addresses (Reference)*
- Reference – List of UCO details with addresses (Reference)*
- Reference – Memo showing staff changes (Reference)*
- Reference – N9 Basic information held (Reference)*
- Reference – chart of arrests whilst under cover (Reference)*
- Reference – Meeting with N9 23.05.2015 minutes (Reference)*
- Reference – Debrief notes for senior SDs officer (Reference)*
- Reference – Op. Soisson research pro-forma (Reference)*
- Reference – Report re arrests of N9*
- Reference –*
- Reference – Memo from N9*
- Reference – RA for UCO (not N9)*
- Reference – tenure risk assessment*
- Reference – description of N9*
- Reference – cover officer role*
- Reference – cover officer role*
- Reference - Note on personal file re the impact on N9's family of 'True Spies'*

The following documents were created during the research phase and are included behind Appendix E or Appendix J;

All of the document numbers refer to the Pitchford (rather than the Heme) account;

#### **List of references**

**Appendix 'B' – Open Source material on N9 (reference)**

**Appendix C – Interview with risk assessors – written version (reference)**

**Appendix D – Interview with risk assessors – typed version (reference)**

**Appendix E – Copies of research generated documents**

**Appendix F – HOLMES research (reference)**

**Appendix G – DLS profile (reference)**

**Appendix 'H' – Document provided by N9 to risk assessor on 11.09.2017 re other active nominals (reference)**

**Appendix I – Pen picture of N9 for Op. Herne (reference)**

**Appendix 'J' – IRSC Organisational assessment for group(s) (reference)**

**Appendix 'K' – (reference)**

**Appendix 'L' - Part of email from N9 to risk assessor, 17.08.2017 – (reference)**