

<b>Title:</b>	<b>N21 - Risk Assessment</b>
<b>Summary:</b>	<b>Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)</b>
<b>Relevant to:</b>	<b>UCPI</b>
<b>Author:</b>	<b>Graham Walker</b>
<b>Version:</b>	<b>Gisted - Version 1 by Adrian baxter</b>
<b>Date created:</b>	<b>12/06/2018</b>
<b>Security level:</b>	<b>Official Sensitive</b>

### **PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N21.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N21 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N21 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

### **DATE OF DOCUMENT**

08-06-2018

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

### **AUTHOR**

The author of this risk assessment is Graham Walker

### **THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

### **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

***There are 50 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.***

### **APPENDICES**

A - Index of documents

B – Reference documents

- *Reference –DLS profile*
- *Reference – HOLMES research*
- *Reference –Personnel record*
- *Reference –Op Herne report*
- *Reference – Risk assessor interview notes N21*
- *Reference – Open source research*
- *Reference – Dated Operation Herne Witness Statement*
- *Reference – typed notes Operation Herne Witness Statement*
- *Reference – handwritten notes Operation Herne Witness Statement*
- *Reference – handwritten notes Operation Herne Witness Statement*
- *Reference – Dated Operation Herne Witness Statement*
- *Reference – Dated Operation Herne Witness Statement*

C – Group and Individual research

- *Reference – Description*
- *Reference- Description*

D – Description

- *Reference – Description*

E – General

- *Reference – Description - reference*
- *Reference –Description - reference*

- Reference – Dated IRSC review of Op
- Reference – Description
- Reference – Description
- Reference – Description

**Sections 1-3:** The risk assessment sets out details of N21's real name and cover names. N21 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation.

The risk assessment summarises N21's life before joining the MPS, their police career and post-police roles. N21 was approached about joining the SDS by two SDS officers. There was an informal interview and no psychometric evaluation.

Prior to deployment, N21 spent a period of time in the Back Office in preparing a legend and providing support to the other field operatives. N21 was loosely monitored and mentored by one of the field officers. There was no official training.

There was no formal assurance or guarantee of anonymity to N21.

There has been some discussion as to the extent of N21's exposure. There would be a negligible and minor increase in risk of respectively physical harm and interference due to the disclosure of his/her cover name, dates of deployment, geographical area of operation, and groups infiltrated.

There would be a higher increase in risk in respect of physical harm and interference should N21's real name be discovered or otherwise exposed. The current risk of physical harm and interference to N21 is assessed as very low.

**Section 4:** This section discusses N21's deployment and covert identity. [REDACTED]

There is nothing to indicate that N21 entered into an inappropriate relationship during his/her deployment. N21 has stated that s/he did not have any such relationship(s). N21 was not arrested during his/her UCO deployment. She/he was stopped by police on several occasions whilst bill posting but was never formally arrested and always reported each such incidents to the SDS management. N21 describes the assistance s/he was given during his/her deployment as 'supportive'. However, by the conclusion of their deployment, N21 was suffering from a number health issues. Management were not informed of these. N21 describes a lack of support available to them in this regard.

**Section 5-6:** This section discusses N21's post UCO roles within the MPS, as well as his/her post-police employment. N21 subsequently returned to the SDS and was mentor to a number of UCOs. The risk assessor has no concerns as to the physical harm or interference risk to N21 in respect of his/her general MPS service. N21 has undertaken a number of sensitive roles following their MPS career.

N21 has provided statements to Operation Herne regarding his/her deployment, as well as an investigation into blacklisting.

This section also discusses the extent of N21's exposure.

**Section 7:** N21 has not been subject to any formal investigation.

**Section 8:** N21's personal situation is discussed including details of his/her family as well as health issues.

**Section 9:** There has been no official confirmation of N21's deployment. N21's current level of exposure is discussed. The risk assessor discusses any potential compromises.

**Section 10:** N21 met the risk assessor in May 2017.

**Section 11:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK.

**Section 12:** The risk assessor sets out a number of computer systems which have been researched including, PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence).

**Section 13-14:** The group(s) infiltrated and individuals of particular concern are discussed by the risk assessor.

**Section 15:** The risk assessor discusses N21's perception of the risk of harm and interference from the group(s) infiltrated and individuals of particular concern.

**Section 16:** The risk assessor assesses objectively the likely media interest in N21. The extent of N21's current exposure is discussed. The risk assessor considers that it is likely/highly likely that the media will have an interest in N21 in the event that (respectively) his/her cover/real name is released.

**Section 17:** Various possible measures to mitigate the risk to N21 are discussed. The risk assessor considers that the use of a cypher in conjunction with a screen could assist in allowing N21 to present his/her evidence to the Inquiry in order to preserve N21's identity. Voice modulation was considered to be of little value. The risk assessor considered that the benefits of giving evidence in private should remain a consideration.

**Section 18:** The risk assessor discusses third party concerns and the risk of interference to third parties including N21's family.

## 19. CONCLUSIONS

The assessment scores the risk assessor shows below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of disclosure or identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching his conclusions. The risk assessor understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

### 19.1 Current risk

The current risk to N21 and his/her family from physical harm or interference is, in the opinion of the risk assessor, **very low** in that the risk of occurrence is considered highly improbable.

The risk assessor sets out the reasons for his conclusions based on the current level of N21's exposure.

### 19.2 The difference official confirmation can make where there is existing exposure of the of the real or cover identity

The risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity

of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify him or her, as those attempts will have already occurred, be proceeding, or just not progressed. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognised in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

The extent of N21's existing exposure is discussed.

### **19.3 Objective assessment of N21's current exposure**

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. The risk assessor discusses areas of risk in relation to N21's current exposure.

### **19.4 Objective assessment of the outcome of the disclosure of all or any of the dates of deployment, the geographical area of operation, and the groups infiltrated**

The risk assessor considers N21's current exposure and concludes that there would be no increase in risk to N21 in relation to physical harm or interference by disclosure of all of the 3 elements stated.

### **19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

In my opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N21 should his/her true identity be disclosed is **low (2)** and considered unlikely.

I would consider the impact as **moderate (3)** to significantly impact upon the welfare of the officer and require professional attention.

The overall score is **(6)**.

The risk assessor discusses areas of risk and harm that have informed his conclusions including the risk posed from the group(s) infiltrated, the individuals concerned, as well as N21's health and wellbeing.

### **19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

In my opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of interference to N21 and his/her family should his/her true identity be disclosed is **high (4)** and considered probable to occur at some stage.

I would consider the impact as **moderate (3)**, to have an impact upon the officer and his/her family in readjustments to their lifestyle, and adversely impacting upon their private life.

The overall score is **(12)**.

The risk assessor discusses N21's current exposure. Discussion of cover name. The risk assessor

also considers the impact on N21's home and private life as well as his/her age.

**19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

In my opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N21 should his/her cover name be disclosed is **low (2)** and considered unlikely.

I would consider the impact as **moderate (3)** to significantly impact upon the welfare of the officer and require professional attention.

The overall score is **(6)**.

The risk assessor discusses areas of risk and harm that have informed his conclusions including the risk posed from the group(s) infiltrated and the individuals concerned.

**19.8 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

In the risk assessor's opinion, the likelihood of the increase in risk of interference to N21 and his/her family should his/her cover name be disclosed is **low (2)** and considered unlikely.

The risk assessor considers the impact as **moderate (3)**, having an impact upon the officer and his/her family in readjustments to their lifestyle, and adversely impacting upon their private life.

The overall score is **(6)**.

The risk assessor discusses areas of risk and harm that have informed his conclusions including the risk posed from the group(s) infiltrated and the individuals concerned. N21's current exposure is also discussed.

**Signature of Gister:**



**Date:** 12/06/2018