

Title:	N87 - Risk Assessment
Summary:	Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)
Relevant to:	UCPI
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Peer Reviewer:	Brian Lockie
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PURPOSE

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N87.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N87 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N87 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR

The author of this risk assessment is David Reid

It has been peer reviewed by Brian Lockie

THE PROCESS ADOPTED

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

There are 112 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

Sections 1-3: The risk assessment sets out details of N87's real name and cover name as well as group(s) into which s/he was deployed. N87 was one of a number of officers investigated as part of a potential miscarriage of justice that may have occurred when a number of activists were arrested for property offences, although the risk assessor is satisfied that N87 was not involved.

N87's life before joining the MPS as well as N87's pre-UCO police career is summarised. N87 held some sensitive posts before joining the SDS. N87 cannot recall who recruited him/her to the SDS. S/he initially spent some time in the back office. There was no psychometric testing prior to recruitment.

N87 believes that there was an implied guarantee of anonymity and states that s/he was informed by managers that they did not want his/her identity becoming known. The fact that the SDS was a secret, covert group made the implication obvious.

Section 4: This section discusses N87's deployment and covert identity. The main group(s) infiltrated as well as peripheral interactions are set out. One group is highlighted as being violent in outlook. N87 believes that one specific individual presents an ongoing threat. [REDACTED] N87 stated that s/he did not have any inappropriate relationships. There is no information on the papers to suggest the contrary. N87 was not arrested although s/he was stopped when driving and requested to produce documents.

In relation to welfare and support N87 states that s/he tended to 'just get on with it'. Most of N87's colleagues would have been supportive. N87 did not request or require input when s/he was deployed.

Section 5-6: This section deals with N87's post-UCO role within the police as well as their current situation including family and work. N87 believes his/her identity is at risk from another UCO.

Section 7: N87 was considered as part of a potential miscarriage of justice that may have occurred when a number of activists were arrested for property offences but appears not to have been involved.

Section 8: N87's personal situation is discussed including details of N87's family. N87 has high levels of anxiety in relation to the Inquiry. N87 suffers from sleepless nights and an increase in blood pressure. There are also concerns about the wider impact of the Inquiry on N87's family. N87 had declined to co-operate with Operation Heme and there are concerns expressed about the manner in which they conducted their inquiries.

Section 9: There has been no confirmation of N87's deployment. N87's current level of exposure is discussed.

that his/her UCO role is revealed. Additionally, the risk assessor discusses risks to N87 from his/her former associates and the group(s) infiltrated, as well as the risks to N87's privacy in the event that N87's real name is discovered.

19.1 Current risk

The current risk of physical harm or interference to N87 and his/her family is negligibly low because his/her deployment is not in the public domain. The risk assessor discusses a third-party risk and concludes that that stands as a largely separate issue to that of a restriction order.

19.2 If there is existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make?

This is not applicable as N87 has not been exposed in his/her real identity or in his/her cover name.

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognized in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

19.3 Objective assessment of N87's current exposure

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as a former UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor sets out the ways in which N87 might be exposed.

19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor accepts that there would be an increase in risk, as the current 'starting point' is virtually negligible, as (it appears) N87's deployment is not in the public domain.

The risk assessor considers the likelihood of an attack on N87 would be greater if his/her real name was known than in the circumstances when only a pseudonym or cipher was known.

The risk assessor discusses the risk to N87 from the group(s) infiltrated and former associates.

On balance the risk assessor therefore assesses the risk of a physical attack as low (2) as (whilst possible) it would remain unlikely.

The risk assessor assesses the likely impact as 'moderate' (3) given the past history of a named group and the age of N87.

The overall risk in this category would therefore be 6.

19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

This is the area that causes the risk assessor the most concern.

The risk assessor considers the likelihood of interference with the personal and family life of N87 must logically be greater if his/her real name was known than in the circumstances below when only a pseudonym or cipher was known.

The risk assessor considers this risk more likely than that of a physical attack deriving from his/her SDS role.

The risk assessor assesses the likelihood of N87 being subject to some form of interference as medium (3). This is based upon the adverse public media attention his/her deployment is likely to attract. Discussion of N87's cover name. Medium is defined as 'the risk occurring could reasonably be foreseen' and the risk assessor is satisfied the probability reaches this threshold in N87's case.

The risk assessor points to some very significant issues in relation to impact.

On the sole basis of what the risk assessor knows he would assess the impact as moderate (3). This includes, for example, causing real anxiety with family or friends.

The risk assessor was close to assessing the impact as 'serious' (4) and goes on to discuss a risk factor that would influence this upgrade.

However, on the sole basis of the information available to the risk assessor, he assesses the overall risk in this category as 9, with the strong assertion that it is likely to be 12 or higher if one of the risk factors identified came to fruition.

19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

Should the pseudonym of N87 be disclosed the risk assessor considers the likelihood of N87 being attacked as 'very low' (1)

The risk assessor considers N87's current exposure.

The likely impact remains unchanged as in section 19.5 above, and the risk assessor therefore assesses the impact as moderate (3).

With the same caveat as in sections 19.4 and 19.5, the overall risk in this category is therefore assessed as 3.

19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor assesses the probability of interference with N87's family and private life as higher than the risk of physical assault. He assesses the likelihood of interference with N87's personal and family life if only N87's cover identity was known as low (2), one grade lower than if N87's real identity was revealed. That is because making that transition, whilst far from impossible, is a significant bridge to cross.

The risk assessor considers the likely impact as moderate (3) for the reasons stated above in section 19.5.

With the same caveat as in section 19.5 above, the overall risk in this category would therefore be 6.

19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any

The risk assessor takes the view that disclosing any of the above factors would not increase the risk IF

the pseudonym was to be disclosed in any event. This is largely because the evidence N87 would provide is likely to identify him/her, and people from his/her target group would already know which group he was deployed into, the geographical area, and the approximate dates of the deployment.

Signature of author:



Date:

Signature of gister:

Date: 12/06/2018

Appendix 'A'

Index of documents that have been referred to and footnoted and can be made available

Reference	Description
<i>Reference</i>	2014 research by Op. Herne on N87 and their family
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Reference</i>	Schedule of SDS officers 1968 - 2008
<i>Reference</i>	Identities of deceased persons version 4
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Reference</i>	List of SDS officers with their details
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Reference</i>	SDS policy documents
<i>Reference</i>	SDS Policy file
<i>Reference</i>	Groups targeted by SDS 1968 - 2008
<i>Reference</i>	Identities of deceased persons version 6
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Description</i>

<i>Reference</i>	Op. Motion material re contact with N87
<i>Reference</i>	List of SDS officers
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Reference</i>	Basic computer print information on N87
<i>Reference</i>	Correspondence between N87 and Op. Herne
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Description</i>
<i>Reference</i>	<i>Description</i>

- Appendix B – Internet research – *Reference*
Appendix C – HOLMES research – *Reference*
Appendix D – DLS profile – *Reference*
Appendix E – *Reference* – N87 Op. Soisson research pro-forma
Appendix F – *Reference* – *Description*
Appendix G – Notes of interview between risk assessor and N87 – *Reference*
Appendix H – Research on highlighted group(s)
Appendix I – Research on highlighted individuals
Appendix J - *Reference* – *Description*
Appendix K – List of individuals shown to N87 as part of fact checking process (unmarked = *Reference*, marked = *Reference*)

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