

**Title:** N53 - Risk Assessment

**Summary:** Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)

**Relevant to:** UCPI

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**Peer Reviewer:** Graham Walker

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**Security level:** Official Sensitive

## **PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N53.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N53 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N53 as a former undercover police officer (UCO).

The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

The author of this risk assessment is Adrian Baxter

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

## **THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

## **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

There are 4 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

**Sections 1-2:** These sections provide details of N53's real name and cover name. N53 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation.

**Section 3:** This section details N53's life before joining the MPS and recruitment into UCO work. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

N53 insisted that as far as they were concerned there was a lifetime guarantee of anonymity, although this was never given in writing.

**Section 4:** This section details N53's cover identity, the group(s) infiltrated and the names of former associates within the group(s).

No relationships were declared by N53 and none found by the risk assessor.

No arrests were declared by N53 and none found by the risk assessor.

There were prominent successes noted during N53's deployment.

N53 further stated that whilst deployed as a UCO, they did not provide evidence or intelligence that resulted in anyone being imprisoned or convicted.

N53 noted that all welfare matters were dealt with in house at meetings.

**Section 5:** This section details others roles held by N53 in the police service and elsewhere. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

**Section 7:** This section confirms that N53 is not subject to any formal investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with their deployment.

**Section 8:** This section describes N53's current personal situation which is discussed including details of their family. This section details N53's current work and a number of risk factors relevant to the same.

N53 described their psychological health at present as good. However, as the Inquiry progresses, their stress levels are rising as they hold strong reservations about being identified in their true identity.

**Section 9:** N53's current level of exposure is discussed including potential vulnerabilities for identifying them.

**Section 10:** N53 met with the risk assessor in April 2018. N53 fact checked the risk assessment in April 2018.

**Section 11:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level and the current threat to N53.

**Section 12:** It is stated that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in Sections 13 and 14 of the Risk Assessment appropriate to the UCO.

**Section 13:** This section details the group(s) infiltrated by N53.

**Section 14:** The sections details discussions with the risk assessor of any individuals of particular concern to N53. None were identified by N53.

N53 stated that there were a number of individuals with a propensity for violence within their target group(s), but none posed a threat to them.

N53 named an individual known to them during their time as a UCO with the requisite skill set to research N53 rather than present a risk of harm.

**Section 15:** N53 stated that if identified as a UCO, this would without doubt cause harm to themselves and their family. This could be both psychological as well as physical.

**Section 16:** In this section the risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N53 were their real or cover identity to be confirmed. The risk assessor is of the view that N53 would be of interest to the media based on eight factors.

**Section 17:** The risk assessor discusses possible measures to mitigate any risk to N53. The risk assessor felt that since the cipher N53 is already in the public domain in their role as a manager it could therefore remain as a consideration for providing evidence in their role as a UCO.

The risk assessor felt that a screen would provide N53 protection from being identified at a later date should they provide evidence in their cover name (as a UCO) or cipher. The risk assessor is of the view that screening and voice modulation should remain a consideration.

**Section 18:** The risk assessor found that revealing their true identity would make it impossible for them to continue in their current role.

## **19. CONCLUSIONS**

The assessment scores the risk assessor has shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching their conclusions. The risk assessor understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

### **19.1 Current risk**

The current risk of physical harm to N53 and their family is very low

The current risk of interference with N53 and their family is very low

### **19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make?**

The risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of a UCO impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was a UCO then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify them, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognised in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

The risk assessor comments on whether there has been exposure of the real or cover identities of N53.

### **19.3 Objective assessment of whether there is currently a sterile corridor between the officers' real and cover name**

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor discusses several factors with regards to N53's current exposure.

### **19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of physical harm to N53 should their real identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor has considered and assessed two key factors.

In the risk assessor's opinion, the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N53 should their true identity be disclosed is **very high (5)** the perceived risk is assessed as very likely to occur at some stage.

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact of this would be **critical (5)** resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes (such as re-location, to ensure safety).

The overall score in this category is said to be **very high (25)**

**19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of interference to N53 should their real identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor has considered and assessed two key factors:

In their opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of interference to N53 should their true identity be disclosed is **very high (5)** the perceived risk is assessed as very likely to occur at some stage

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact would be **serious (4)** in terms of impact upon their family and personal life it would require major readjustments to their lifestyle, significantly impacting on their private life.

The overall score in this category is said to be therefore **very high (20)**

**19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of physical harm to N53 should their cover identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor has considered and assessed three key factors.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N53 should their cover name be disclosed is **low (2)** and considered unlikely.

The impact of this will be **critical (5)** resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety.

The overall score in this category is said therefore to be **low (10)**

**19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

Section 16.1 provides the rationale for why the risk assessor concludes that N53 will be of interest to the media and other interested parties.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in interference to N53 should their cover name be disclosed is **low (2)** and considered unlikely.

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact would be **serious (4)** in terms of impact upon their family and personal life and would require major readjustments to their lifestyle, significantly impacting on their private life. The overall score in this category is said to be **low (8)**.

**19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any?**

If the dates of deployment, geographical area of operation and group(s) infiltrated were to be confirmed, it is the risk assessor's view that there would be no increase in risk to that if their cover name was confirmed.

**Section 20:** This section details a number of other officers operating during N53's tenure as DI in charge of operations and any risks. None were identified.

## **21 CONCLUSIONS IN ROLE AS A MANAGER**

### **21.1 Current risk:**

The current risk of physical harm to N53 and their family is very low

The current risk of interference with N53 and their family is very low

### **21.2 – 21.6 Mitigation Considerations:**

The risk assessor notes that the cipher N53 is already in the public domain in their role as a manager. It could therefore remain as a consideration for providing evidence in their role as a manager. The risk assessor is of the view that a screen and voice modulation would provide N53 protection from being identified at a later date, should they provide evidence in their cover name (as a manager) or cipher.

### **21.7 What is your objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed in their role as a manager?**

The risk assessor notes that when N53 was the operational deputy in charge of the SDS, their involvement in the supervision of some nominals may be of interest to the Inquiry.

The risk assessor highlights that the evidence given by N53 in their managerial position is likely to attract significant attention, both from the media, and also from those people interested in identifying UCOs per se, and particularly those who went on to become managers.

The risk assessor opines that the the risk in this category is based upon the same criteria in section 19 and is therefore identical to the risk of physical attack if their real identity is confirmed as in their UCO deployment.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N53 should their true identity be disclosed is **very high (5)** the perceived risk is assessed as very likely to occur at some stage.

The risk assessor is of the view that the impact of this would be **critical (5)** resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety.

The overall score in this category is said to be **very high (25)**

### **21.8 What is your objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed in their role as a manager?**

In considering the increased risk in this area, the factors in section 21 above equally apply.

In essence, the factors the risk assessor has considered with regard to the increased risk in this category are virtually identical to those in section 19, as the same risks for the same reasons apply.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of interference to N53 should their true identity be disclosed is **very high (5)** the perceived risk is assessed as very likely to occur at some stage

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact would be **serious (4)** in terms of impact upon their family and personal life and would require major readjustments to their lifestyle, significantly impacting on their private life.

The overall score in this category is said to be **very high (20)**

**21.9 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed in their role as a manager**

In terms of increase in the risk of physical harm to N53 should their cover identity as a manager be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor has considered and assessed three key factors.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N53 should their cover name be disclosed is **low (2)** and considered unlikely.

The impact of this will be **critical (5)** resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety.

The overall score in this category is said to be **low (10)**

**21.10 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed in their role as a manager**

In terms of increase in the risk of interference to N53 should their cover identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor has considered and assessed two factors.

In the risk assessors' opinion the likelihood of the increase in interference to N53 should their cover name be disclosed is **low (2)** and considered unlikely.

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact would be **serious (4)** in terms of impact upon their family and personal life it would require major readjustments to their lifestyle, significantly impacting on their private life.

The overall score in this category is therefore **low (8)**

**Overall observation**

The risk assessor is of the opinion that N53 could therefore provide evidence of their role as a UCO in their UCO cover name.

The risk assessor notes that In providing evidence as a manager, their cipher is already in the public domain as in a managerial role.

**Signature of author:**



**Date:**

4/6/18