

Title:	N6 - Risk Assessment
Summary:	Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)
Relevant to:	UCPI
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Peer Reviewer:	Graham Walker
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PURPOSE

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N6.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N6 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N6 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR

The author of this risk assessment is David Reid

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

THE PROCESS ADOPTED

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

There are 137 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

Sections 1- 2: These sections provide details of N6's real name and cover name.

N6 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation. There is no evidence of misconduct regarding N6.

The risk assessment summarises N6's MPS career including N6's deployment. N6 was arrested in their cover name but not prosecuted. A summary of N6's post-MPS career is discussed.

Section 3.1: This section details N6's life before joining the MPS. There is nothing from this period that affects the risk assessment.

Sections 3.2 – 3.4: The risk assessor sets out N6's MPS career history before joining the SDS.

N6 heard of the SDS whilst working in another section of the MPS. N6 had worked with another UCO. N6 was approached to join the SDS and was recommended by another UCO. N6 was visited at home by an SDS manager and was spoken to with N6's partner present. N6 stated that there was no formal training. N6 started in the back office prior to deployment.

N6 states that anonymity was guaranteed verbally. N6 believed the guarantee extended to moving home and preventing compromises that may undermine SDS operations.

Section 4: This section deals with N6's cover identity, the group(s) N6 infiltrated and the names of former associates in the target group(s)

N6 stated there were two meetings a week with other SDS officers, where issues such as their safety could be addressed. N6 also recalls a psychiatrist attending one of these meetings. The meetings also allowed for the exchange of intelligence.

N6 states that they did not enter into any relationships. There is no evidence to suggest anything to the contrary.

N6 was arrested in their cover name but not charged, N6's line manager was aware of the arrest.

N6 considers there were prominent successes during N6's deployment.

N6 had links to several other UCOs during deployment.

Section 5 – 6: These sections deal with N6's post-deployment career in the police and elsewhere.

Section 7: N6 is not subject to any formal investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with the deployment.

Section 8: N6's current personal situation is discussed including details of N6's family. N6 states that they suffered from some issues with their psychological health as a result of their work as UCO, but that counselling has helped.

Section 9: N6's current level of exposure is discussed including potential vulnerabilities for identifying N6. Reference is made to the impact of the inquiry upon N6 and their partner.

Section 10: N6 met the risk assessor in January 2018. N6 fact checked the assessment in March 2018.

Section 11: The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels and the current threat to N6.

Section 12: It is stated in the risk assessment that a number of computer systems have been searched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence), and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in sections 13 and 14 of the risk assessment appropriate to the UCO.

Section 13: The risk assessor discusses the current risk of physical harm and interferences to N6 from the group(s) infiltrated. Some of N6's former associates were known for violence, firearms and ability to conduct research.

Section 14: The risk assessor considered a number of individuals of particular concern to N6 who have a propensity for violence. The risk assessor considered them all to have research capabilities. The risk assessor considered that most associates of N6 in the group(s) infiltrated by N6 would likely have previous experience of harassing their targets.

Section 15: The risk assessor discusses N6's perception of the risk of physical harm and interference from the group(s) infiltrated and those individuals within the group(s) as well as from other sources. N6 stated that they were most concerned about several named former associates and fears revenge attacks. N6 states that should their cover name be released, N6 also feared that their health may deteriorate and articulates other concerns as to being identified.

N6 feels sure they would be identified should dates of deployment, area and name of group(s) inflated be made public.

Section 16: The risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N6, were their real or cover identity be officially confirmed. The risk assessor is of the view that N6 would be of interest to the media based on several factors.

Section 17: Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N6. The risk assessor was of the opinion that any evidence given in public would lead to the identification of N6 in their cover name as a UCO, regardless of mitigation. Given the risks to N6 posed by the group(s) infiltrated, the risk assessor states that the option of N6 giving evidence in private would mitigate his risk and should be considered.

Section 18: The risk assessor discusses current third party concerns and the risk of interference to third parties. The risk assessor identifies several risks to other UCOs including a specific UCO should N6 be identified. The risk assessor also identifies various risks to third parties.

19. CONCLUSIONS

The assessment scores the risk assessor has shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching my conclusions. I understand that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

The risk assessor discusses factors in relation to N6's deployment and identifies possible risks and ongoing threats.

19.1 Current risk

The risk is currently low. That relates both to the risk of physical assault as well as the risk of interference with his private and family life.

19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognized in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

The risk assessor comments on whether there is existing exposure of N6's real or cover name.

19.3 Objective assessment of N6's current exposure

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor discusses several areas of risk regarding N6's current exposure.

19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor considers any increase in risk of physical harm to N6 should N6's real identity be confirmed as a result of the inquiry.

The risk assessor assess the risk of a physical attack as high (4) as probable to occur at some time.

The likely impact is assessed as 'serious' (4) in that a significant injury would be possible.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 16.

19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor considered the likelihood of interference with the personal and family life of N6.

The likelihood of N6 being subject to some form of interference was assessed as medium (3)..

The risk assessor assessed the impact as moderate (3). This includes, for example, causing real anxiety with family or friends.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 9.

19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

Should the cover name of N6 be disclosed, the risk assessor considers the likelihood of N6 being attacked as 'medium' (3). The risk assessor identified several risk factors that may lead to the real identity of N6 being revealed should N6's cover name be disclosed.

The risk assessor assess the impact as serious (4) which is the same as 19.4.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 12.

19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor assessed the likelihood of interference with N6's personal and family life if only N6's cover identity was known as low (2).

The risk assessor considers the likely impact as moderate (3) for the reasons referred to in section 19.5.

The overall risk in this category would therefore be 6.

19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any

- dates of deployment
- geographical area of operation
- groups infiltrated

The risk assessor takes the view that disclosing any of the above factors would not increase the risk if N6's cover name was to be disclosed. In the risk assessor's opinion, the evidence N6 would provide is likely to identify N6, and people from N6's target group would already know which group N6 was deployed into, the geographical area, and the approximate dates of the deployment.

Signature of moderator:



Date: 13/06/2018