

**Title:** N76 - Risk Assessment

**Summary:** Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)

**Relevant to:** UCPI

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**Peer Reviewer:** Graham Walker

**Version:** Gisted – Version 1

**Date created:** 14/06/2018

**Security level:** Official Sensitive

### **PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N76.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N76 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N76 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

### **AUTHOR**

The author of this risk assessment is David Reid

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

### **THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

### **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

**There are 162 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.**

**Sections 1- 2:** These sections provide details of N76's real name and cover name.

N76 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation. There is no evidence of misconduct regarding N76.

The risk assessment summarises N76's deployment and post-deployment work.

**Section 3.1:** This section details N76's family and life before joining the MPS. There is nothing from this period that affects the risk assessment.

**Sections 3.2 – 3.4:** The risk assessor sets out N76's MPS career history before joining the SDS. N76 worked in various MPS roles before joining the SDS. N76 had an informal interview with another UCO and a later formal interview with others. N76 undertook a psychometric test, a meeting with a psychiatrist and a further informal interview with a former SDS UCO. N76 was recommended for the SDS. N76 spent time after selection but before deployment building his legend and training. N76 received a home visit from three other UCOs.

N76 states that anonymity was clearly inferred and there was a culture of secrecy. N76 states that there was a guarantee of anonymity because there were discussions about keeping N76 safe post-deployment.

**Section 4:** This section deals with N76's cover identity, the group(s) N76 infiltrated and the names of former associates in the target group(s).

There were positive assessments of N76's deployment throughout. N76 received praise. N76's intelligence reports were considered of a high quality, and of benefit. There is recognition of the potentially serious ramifications of N76's deployment. N76 provided significant quantities of reporting upon N76's target group(s).

No security concerns arose during N76's deployment.

N76 states that the concept of sexual relationships was covered during an SDS meeting, and it was clear that UCO's would not be allowed to continue on the SDS if they were involved in such relationships. N76 states they did not have any inappropriate relationships. There is no evidence to suggest the contrary.

N76 was not arrested during their deployment.

There were prominent successes during N76's deployment.

N76 had a number of visits during their deployment with a mental health professional as part of N76's support and welfare.

N76 had twice weekly meetings with managers and other UCOs. N76 also had monthly meetings with their manager.

N76 received multiple commendations and various letters of thanks.

**Section 5 – 6:** These sections deal with N76's post-deployment career in the police and elsewhere.

**Section 7:** N76 is not subject to any formal investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with the deployment.

**Section 8:** N76's current personal situation is discussed including details of N76's family. N76 has no issues with their own physical or psychological health.

**Section 9:** N76's current level of exposure is discussed, including any post-deployment risks to N76 and/or their family.

**Section 10:** N76 met the risk assessor in January 2018. N76 fact checked the assessment in February 2018.

**Section 11:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from [www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels](http://www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels) and the current threat to N76.

**Section 12:** It is stated in the risk assessment that a number of computer systems have been searched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence), and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in sections 13 and 14 of the risk assessment appropriate to the UCO.

**Section 13:** The risk assessor discusses the current risk of physical harm and interferences to N76 from the group(s) infiltrated.

Some members of the group(s) infiltrated were known for violence, demonstrations, fundraising, intimidation, leafleting, recruiting, pickets and assaulting/verbally abusing police.

**Section 14:** The risk assessor considered a number individuals of particular concern to N76, including some that have a propensity for violence. The risk assessor also referred to previous remarks made in sections 12, 13 and 19.

**Section 15:** The risk assessor discusses N76's perception of the risk of physical harm and interference from the group(s) infiltrated and those individuals within the group(s) as well as from other sources. N76 stated that they felt there would be a significant risk of physical harm if their details were known and there would be high media interest.

The risk assessor discusses possible wider risks of harm based on the assessor's own research.

The risk assessor discusses N76's perception of the risk if their cover name was revealed.

The risk assessor discusses N76's perception of the risk if their dates of deployment, area and names of group(s) infiltrated were revealed. In that context, the risk assessor considered the risk if there was a restriction order over both N76's cover and real names.

**Section 16:** The risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N76, were their real or cover identity be officially confirmed. The risk assessor is of the view that N76 would be of significant interest to the media based on several factors.

The risk assessor considers other potential sources of physical harm and interference.

**Section 17:** Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N76. The risk assessor felt that, should N76 be invited to give evidence, giving full evidence in █ cipher would offer no additional protection to giving evidence in █ cover name. The value of this approach is therefore strictly limited.

The risk assessor takes the view that a screen would have significant benefit, should N76 give live evidence.

The risk assessor takes the view that if N76 was giving evidence but there was an attempt to protect █ identity by limiting the areas of questioning, then voice modulation would be of benefit, by preventing recognition from former associates. This would not assist if N76 had been identified sufficiently by any target group(s).

The risk assessor believes that N76 giving evidence in private deserves serious consideration.

The risk assessor also considers that giving evidence by video link could be beneficial.

**Section 18:** The risk assessor discusses current third party concerns and identifies various other risks to third parties.

## 19. CONCLUSIONS

The assessment scores the risk assessor has shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching my conclusions. I understand that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

The risk assessor discusses factors in relation to N76's deployment and identifies possible risks and ongoing threats.

N76 was not arrested during his deployment.

N76 has not been investigated in relation to any misconduct or criminal allegation.

### 19.1 Current risk

The current risk is virtually negligible. This applies to both the risk physical attack and the risk of

interference.

**19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make**

The risk assessor comments on whether there is existing exposure of N76's real or cover name.

**19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor considers any increase in risk of physical harm to N76 should N76's real identity be confirmed as a result of the inquiry.

The risk assessor assess the risk of a physical attack as high (4) as probable to occur at some time.

The likely impact is assessed as 'critical' (5) in that life threatening injury would be possible.

**The overall score in this category would therefore be 20.**

**19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor considered the likelihood of interference with the personal and family life of N76.

The likelihood of N76 being subject to some form of interference was assessed as high (4).

The risk assessor assessed the impact as moderate (3). This includes, for example, causing real anxiety with family or friends.

**The overall score in this category would therefore be 12.**

**19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

Should the cover name of N76 be disclosed, the risk assessor considers the likelihood of N76 being attacked as 'medium' (3).

The risk assessor assess the impact as 'critical' (5), in that life threatening injury would be possible which is the same as 19.4.

**The overall score in this category would therefore be 15.**

**19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor assessed the likelihood of interference with N76's personal and family life if only N76's cover identity was known as low (2).

The risk assessor considers the likely impact as moderate (3) for the reasons referred to in section 19.5.

The overall risk in this category would therefore be 6.

19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any

- dates of deployment
- geographical area of operation
- groups infiltrated

The risk assessor takes the view that disclosing any of the above factors would not increase the risk if N76's cover name was to be disclosed. In the risk assessor's opinion, the evidence N76 would provide is likely to identify N76, and people from N76's target group would already know which group N76 was deployed into, the geographical area, and the approximate dates of the deployment.

Signature of moderator:



Date:

14/06/2018

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