

**Title:** N91 - Risk Assessment

**Summary:** Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)

**Relevant to:** UCPI

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**Peer Reviewer:** Graham Walker

**Version:** Gisted – Version 1

**Date created:** 21/06/2018

**Security level:** Official Sensitive

### **PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N91.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N91 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N91 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

### **DATE OF DOCUMENT**

21 June 2018.

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received or a change in circumstances could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

### **AUTHOR**

The author of this risk assessment is Duncan Hodge.

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker.

### **THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the

production of this report has been documented. The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

### **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organisations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

### **APPENDICES**

Appendix "A" - this contains general SDS/MPS documentation which can be made available if required.

Appendix "B" onwards – this holds the main or particularly relevant documents referenced and is marked B, C, and D etc. in the footnotes to correspond with the index.

The appendices are marked A-Z; A-A, A-B, A-C and A-D.

There are 39 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

### **SECTIONS**

**Section 1.1.-1.5:** This section details N91's real and cover name and confirms that they have not been the subject of a current or previous investigation.

**Section 2:** This section summarises N91's dates of deployment and UCO work.

**Section 3.1-3.4:** This section details N91's life before joining the MPS and before working as a UCO. It records that there is nothing from this period which affects the risk assessment.

Details are also recorded as to how N91 was recruited into their UCO role. N91 was first approached and then signposted towards other field officers to find out more about the unit. N91 spent some time in the back office prior to deployment.

N91 was not explicitly promised anonymity. However it was explained to N91 that the SDS operated under conditions of absolute secrecy and they would be expected to maintain their anonymity. Nothing was put in writing for N91 but they say that it was made clear that this was a reciprocal arrangement.

**Section 4.1-4.20:** section 4.1-4.17 deals with N91's dates of deployment, main group(s) that they infiltrated, peripheral interactions with other groups, and their cover identity and key associates in target group. This section records any compromises or security concerns relating to N91 during their time in deployment.

N91 states that they did not have any relationships whilst deployed and the risk assessor notes that there is no information to suggest otherwise.

The risk assessor records that N91 was not arrested during deployment (or since).

N91 discussed any prominent successes during deployment. The risk assessor notes that they could not identify a mosaic effect with respect to N91 and other UCOs.

**Section 4.18** details the nature of N91's exit/withdrawal strategy. The risk assessor notes that N91 felt they had good support from some other UCO operatives. N91 also states that they had visits with a psychiatrist during their time in deployment.

**Section 4.19** details N91's return to regular policing.

**Section 4.20** records the position with respect to any commendations for N91 during their UCO deployment.

**Section 5-6:** This section details N91's post-deployment career.

**Section 7:** This section confirms that N91 has not been subject to any formal investigation, previous investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with their deployment.

**Section 8.1-8.12:** This section details N91's current personal situation including details of their family, current location and accommodation. N91's current employment is also detailed and the negative impact that identification would have on their ability to perform their current role. N91's route to work (and precautions taken by them) are also detailed.

N91 discusses any community role(s). N91 discusses their concern about the effect of the Inquiry on both them and their partner. N91 states that they are in reasonably good psychological health and not under any medical supervision. However N91 states that they still go through periods of anxiety and stress, particularly in connection with the prospect of them and their partner having unwanted intrusion into their lives.

**Section 9.1-9.5:** This section details N91's current level of exposure including potential vulnerabilities for identifying them. N91 discusses any exposures to date.

**Section 10:** N91 met the risk assessor in January 2018.

**Section 11:** The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the US sourced from [www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels](http://www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels).

**Section 12:** This section states that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in Sections 13 and 14 of the Risk Assessment appropriate to the UCO.

**Section 13.1-13.4:** This section details the risk assessor's discussion of the current risk of physical harm and interference to N91 from any group(s) infiltrated.

**Section 14.1-14.4:** This section details discussions with the risk assessor about any individuals of particular concern to N91. The risk assessor notes that one associate could have access to wider research resources and one has convictions for violence.

**Section 15.1-15.16:** This section details discussion about N91's perception of the risk of physical harm and interference from group(s) infiltrated and individual(s) within said group(s) as well as from other sources.

N91 voiced concern about a confrontation if they met specific individuals on the street. N91 felt there was a high risk of interference with their private and family life and that it would not be hard to identify them if their cover name was made public.

N91 stated that they felt the risk of exposure was high and detailed the likely impact on their current life and their family. N91 said they would rather their dates of deployment and geographical location were not disclosed due to possible identification from the jigsaw effect. N91 stated that disclosure of group(s) infiltrated would almost inevitably lead to their identification.

**Section 16.1-16.2:** The risk assessor considers in this section whether the media would have an interest in N91 if their real or cover name was to be made public. The risk assessor was of the view that the media would have an interest in N91 and cites five factors in support of this view.

**Section 17.1-17.8:** This section discusses possible protective measures to mitigate any risk to N91.

N91 is said to be willing to assist the UCPI if required. Giving evidence under their cipher is something that they would keenly support.

The risk assessor notes that the use of screens would be of benefit and make recognition and/or identification more difficult.

The risk assessor notes that voice modulation would also be of benefit to prevent N91's voice from being recognised.

The risk assessor notes that giving evidence in private would mitigate many of N91's concerns but says they feel that this measure may not be an option to N91 as they are unlikely to give evidence of such a sensitive nature that would justify evidence being given in private.

**Section 18:** The risk assessor discusses current third party concerns and the risk of interference to third parties. The risk assessor has identified third party risks to other UCO's as "minimal". The risk assessor identifies various risks to other third parties.

## **19. CONCLUSIONS**

### **19.1 Current risk**

The current risk of physical harm to N91 is 'Very Low'.

The current risk of interference with N91 and their family is 'Very Low'.

This assessment is based on the fact that there is no information to suggest that anyone is seeking them or suspects them of being a UCO.

### **19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make?**

The risk assessor comments on whether there has been any existing exposure of N91's real or cover name.

### **19.3 Objective assessment of whether there is currently a sterile corridor between the officers' real and cover name**

*The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people build a picture before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other pieces of the jigsaw are required before the full picture is revealed.*

*The assessment scores shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). I have assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching my conclusions. I understand that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.*

The risk assessor discusses the sterile corridor position with respect to N91.

### **19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor considers any increase in the risk of physical harm to N91 should their real identity be confirmed as a result of the Inquiry.

The risk assessor relies on three factors to state that the likelihood of increase in the risk of physical harm occurring must be greater if N91's real identity is known than if only their pseudonym is known.

The risk assessor assesses the increase in risk as 'medium' (3), in that the probability of this risk occurring is considered distinctly possible to occur at some stage.

The risk assessor considers the impact as 'moderate' (3).

The risk assessor states that the overall score in this category would be 9.

**19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor considers the increase in risk of interference with the family and private life of N91.

The risk assessor assesses this risk as 'high' (4), in that the perceived risk is probable to occur at some stage.

The risk assessor assessed the impact as 'serious' (4).

The risk assessor states that the overall score in this category would be 16.

**19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor assesses the likelihood in this category as 'low'(2) in that it is considered unlikely.

The risk assessor would consider the impact as 'moderate' (3).

The overall score in this category is recorded as 6.

**19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

The risk assessor considers the risk of interference with or to family and private life occurring if N91's cover identity were officially confirmed and notes vulnerabilities in this area as covered at 19.3.

The risk assessor assesses the likelihood in this category as medium (3), in that the probability of the risk occurring can reasonably be foreseen.

The risk assessor states that the overall score in this category is 12.

**19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any?**

- dates of deployment

- geographical area of operation
- groups infiltrated

The risk assessor takes the view that were N91's cover name to be confirmed, disclosing this information would not add to the overall level of risk recorded at 19.7.

Signature of author:



Date: 25/6/18.

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