

Title: N97 - Risk Assessment

Summary: Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)

Relevant to: UCPI

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Version: Gisted – Version 1

Date created: 22/06/2018

Security level: Official Sensitive

PURPOSE

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N97.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N97 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N97 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

22/06/2018

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR

The author of this risk assessment is Graham Walker.

It has been peer reviewed by David Reid.

THE PROCESS ADOPTED

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS¹

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organisations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

There are 90 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

APPENDICES

Appendix 'A' – contains reference material that is already held by the UCPI and the references to larger documents and can be made available as the Risk Assessor has referenced only pages or sections from it, or have no bearing or relevance and referenced having been commissioned (such as research).

Appendix 'B' – holds the main documentation referenced and the relevant pages from within larger documents and is marked B1, B2, B3, et al in the footnotes to correspond with the index.

Section 1: This section provides details of N97's real and cover name(s). N97 is not the subject of a previous or current investigation. N97 is not a core participant.

Section 2: The risk assessment summarises N97's MPS career including N97's deployment. A summary of N97's post MPS career is discussed.

The current risk to N97 in terms of physical harm and interference is very low.

The assessment for N97 in increase of risk in terms of physical harm is high and interference is very high should their true identity, cover name(s) other relevant aspects of their deployment be disclosed or otherwise exposed.

Sections 3.1 – 3.4: These sections detail N97's MPS career before working in the UCO role.

It records that there is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

Details are recorded as to how N97 was recruited into the UCO role. N97 was approached, interviewed twice, and then had informal training, mainly from other UCOs.

An assurance of anonymity was provided to N97.

Section 4.1 – 4.21: sections 4.1 – 4.17 deals with N97's dates of deployment, main group(s) that they infiltrated, peripheral interactions with other groups, and their cover identity and key associates in target group(s). This sections notes triggers for those seeking to identify N97. The tasking of N97 and assimilation into target group(s) is noted. This section records any compromises or security concerns relating to N97 during their time in deployment.

N97 states that they did not have any relationships whilst deployed and the risk assessor notes that there is no intelligence or evidence to the contrary.

The risk assessor records that N97 was not arrested during deployment. An interaction with

police during deployment is noted but assessed as not raising third party or security concerns.

Relevant risk factors are noted namely existing photographs and moving images and notable behaviour whilst in deployment.

N97 discussed any prominent successes during deployment. The risk assessor notes any identifiable links to other officers as a result of the deployment.

Section 4.18 details the nature of N97's exit/withdrawal strategy.

Section 4.19 records that N97 describes good support from colleagues including regular meetings with other UCOs and managers.

Section 4.20 details N97's return to regular policing.

Section 4.21 records the position with respect to any commendations for N97 during their UCO deployment.

Section 5 – 6: This section deals with N97's career post-deployment.

Section 7: This section confirms that N97 has not been subject to any formal investigation, previous investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with their employment.

Section 8.1-8.8: This section details N97's current personal situation including details of their family, current location and accommodation. N97's own and family current and future employment is detailed. N97's route(s) to work (and any precautions taken by them) are detailed.

N97 discusses any community role(s). It is noted that identification may impact on future roles within the community.

Section 8.9: The risk assessor discusses the impact of any social media, online or other profile of N97.

Section 8.10: Knowledge of N97's role amongst family and colleagues is noted.

Section 8.11 – 8.12: N97 describes physical and psychological health as good. Anxiety post deployment is described. N97's anxiety about the UCPI is noted.

Section 8.13: The risk assessor discusses any internet profile or other areas for discovery of this officer.

Section 9.1-9.7: This section details N97's current level of exposure including potential vulnerabilities for identifying them. N97 discusses any actual or potential compromises and/or exposures. Additional compromises / potential compromises subsequent to UC posting are discussed. It is noted that there have been no instances of physical harm or interference to N97 or family.

Section 10: N97 was interviewed by the risk assessor in March 2018. Fact checks were made in April 2018 and May 2018.

Section 11: The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK as being severe and relevant to all officers and particularly to ex Special Branch.

Section 12: This section states that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in Sections 13 and 14 of the Risk Assessment appropriate to the UCO.

Section 13: This section details information about the group(s) infiltrated including facts regarding set up, purpose, focus, any intelligence held and associated individual(s).

Section 14.1-14.5: This section details discussions with the risk assessor about any individual(s) either of particular concern to N97 or uncovered by the risk assessor as relevant to N97. The risk assessor notes any associates that could have access to wider research resources, any with a propensity to violence and any with convictions. Any associate(s) with research skills are noted. A discussion about any individual(s) with propensity to harassment is recorded.

Section 15.1-15.16: This section details discussion about N97's perception of the risk of physical and other harm and interference from group(s) infiltrated and individual(s) within said group(s) as well as from other sources.

N97 voiced concern about any retribution or repercussion being in the form of violence. N97 discussed the risk and type of interference with their private and family life.

N97 stated that they would be nervous should the cover name be disclosed or otherwise exposed. N97 discussed nervousness should their dates of deployment and geographical location be disclosed. N97 stated that disclosure of group(s) infiltrated would add significantly to their profile.

Section 16.1-16.2: The risk assessor considers in this section whether the media would have an interest in N97 if their real or cover name(s) were to be made public. The risk assessor is of the view that the media would have an interest in N97 and cites several factors in support of this view. It is noted that there is no other potential source of physical harm or interference.

Section 17.1-17.8: This section discusses possible protective measures to mitigate any risk to N97.

N97 is said to be willing to assist the UCPI if required. Giving evidence under their cipher is something that they would keenly support.

The risk assessor notes that the use of screens would be of benefit and make recognition and/or identification more difficult.

The risk assessor notes that voice modulation would also be of benefit to prevent N97's voice from being recognised.

The risk assessor notes that giving evidence in private would mitigate many of N97's concerns. The risk assessor states that this measure should be a consideration.

Section 18: The risk assessor discusses current third party concerns and the risk of interference to third parties. Numerous third party concerns are discussed.

19. CONCLUSIONS

The assessment scores the risk assessor has shown below are based on what increased risk the former UCO would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the

Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching conclusions. The risk assessor understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

The risk assessor has a real and genuine concern that there would be a significant increase in the risk to N97 should the true identity or cover name(s) be disclosed. In the risk assessor's view there will be an overwhelming interest in this deployment by all interested parties, including previous members of the groups infiltrated, the media, and others.

Section 19.1: Current risk

The risk assessor notes that current risk to N97 comes from four categories of risk. Three of the categories cite multiple reasons and examples.

The risk assessor assesses the current risk to N97 and family from physical harm is very low.

The risk assessor assesses the current risk to N97 and family from interference is very low.

This is based on the lack of public exposure of the true identity and cover name(s)/cipher in connection with the SDS or as a UCO. There appears to be no suspicion at this time that N97 was in fact a UCO.

Section 19.2: If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make? The risk assessor notes that there is currently no exposure of the true identity, cover name (s) or cipher of N97 in the public domain linked to the SDS or as a UCO.

19.3 Objective assessment of whether there is currently a sterile corridor between the officer's real and cover name(s)

The risk assessor does not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessor cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor discusses the current disclosure position in relation to N97.

19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed.

The risk assessor notes that N97 identifies a risk of interference and notes agreement with this identification of risk. The risk assessor with reference to factors in *section 19.1* notes that there would be an increase in the risk of physical harm to N97 but notes that cannot say for certain that the increase is significant. It is noted that if physical harm were to occur it is likely to be extreme.

The risk assessor notes possible mitigation strategies.

In the risk assessor's opinion, disclosure or exposure would result in a significant adverse impact to the psychological well-being of N97 and family in anxiety and distress.

The risk assessor assesses the likelihood of physical attack, if the real identity is officially confirmed, will result in an increase in that the perceived risk is possible to occur at some stage (3).

The risk assessor notes that the impact of this will be critical (5) resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety.

The risk assessor states that the overall score is (15)

19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor states that there would be a significant increase in the risk of interference or harassment to N97 and refers to *Section 19.3* and the factors listed at *Sections 16.1 and 19.1*.

The risk assessor assesses the likelihood in this category as very likely to occur at some stage (5).

The risk assessor considers the impact of this will be critical (5) resulting in an overwhelming impact on N97

The overall score is (25)

19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity(s) were to be officially confirmed

The risks assessor discusses of N97s current level of disclosure and note what may happen should the cover name(s) be published and refers to *Section 19.3* and the factors listed at *19.1*.

The risk assessor considers the increase as possible (3).

The risk assessor states that the impact of this will be critical (5) resulting in a life threatening injury, and require total changes, such as re-location, to ensure safety.

The overall score is (15)

19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity(s) were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor makes note of the current level of disclosure and notes what may happen should the cover name(s) be published and refers to *Section 19.3* and the factors listed at *Sections 16.1 and 19.1*.

The risk assessor assesses the likelihood of interference or harassment if the real identity is officially confirmed will result in an increase in that the perceived risk is very likely to occur at some stage (5).

The risk assessor states that the impact of this will be critical (5) resulting in an overwhelming impact on N97 and family.

The overall score is (25)

19.8 If the cover name(s) were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation

The disclosure of any of the dates of deployment, groups infiltrated, or geographical area of

operation would significantly contribute to the increase in risk to N97. The risk assessor discusses the effect on the sterile corridor referring to section 19.3 and the factors listed at Sections 16.1 and 19.1.

Signature of author:



Date: 25/6/18

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