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| Title: | N112 - Risk Assessment |
| Summary: | Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) |
| Relevant to: | UCPI |
| Author: | Duncan Hodge |
| Peer Reviewer: | Brian Lockie |
| Version: | Gisted – version 2 |
| Date created: | 03/07/2018 |
| Security level: | Official sensitive |

PURPOSE

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N112.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N112 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N112 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

5th February 2018

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received or a change in circumstances could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR

The author of this risk assessment is Duncan Hodge

It has been peer reviewed by Brian Lockie

THE PROCESS ADOPTED

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters

set for researching subjects or organisations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

There are 20 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

Sections 1 - 2: These sections provide details of N112's real name and cover name.

N112 has applied for core participant status as part of the Designated Lawyer Officer's group.

N112 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation.

The risk assessment summarises N112's work up to and including their deployment. The risk assessor discuss the general risk to N112.

Section 3.1 – 3.2: These sections detail N112's life before joining the MPS and N112's MPS career prior to joining the SDS. There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

Sections 3.3 – 3.4: These sections discuss N112's recruitment to the role of UCO with the SDS and any guarantee or assurance of anonymity.

N112 was recruited to the role by another SDS officer and underwent psychometric testing. N112 stated they did not recall and formal interview with SDS managers. N112 started work in the back office, developing their cover background and learning fieldcraft. N112 states recalling documents that the risk assessor believed to be the Tradecraft manual. N112 stated that their legend was tested and was given a list of do's and don'ts but did not recall seeing a code of conduct, nor did they recall receiving any advice on participation in criminal activity. N112 states they received advice from another UCO in relation to stated cases but that N112 was reliant upon themself to develop their legend and field skills.

N112 states that no guarantee or assurance of anonymity was given. N112 had no home visits nor was their partner spoken to about N112's deployment and any effects upon them

Section 4: This section details N112's work within the SDS. N112 was not deployed within any groups however the section also discusses cover identity, cover address and cover employment and development of the identity. It also discusses the risk to third parties.

N112 is recorded as having visited the SDS psychologist. It is noted this was standard practice.

N112's post-SDS work within the police is discussed.

Sections 5 - 6: This section deals with N112's post-deployment work within the police and/or elsewhere.

Section 7: This section details one incident unrelated to N112's deployment within the SDS. No further action was taken against N112 as a result. N112 is not subject to any formal investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with the deployment.

Section 8: N112's current personal situation is discussed including details of N112's family. N112's current employment and health are also discussed, and the risk assessor discusses the risk of N112's role as an SDS officer being publicly disclosed in various ways.

Section 9: N112's current level of exposure is discussed including potential vulnerabilities for identifying N112.

Section 10: N112 met with the risk assessor in January 2018.

Section 11: The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels.

Sections 12 – 14: These sections are not applicable to N112.

Section 15: The risk assessor discusses N112's perception of the risk of interference with their private and family life. N112 stated that they felt that the only risk to them was that they may be "tarred with the same brush" as SDS officers who had committed transgressions and this may result in unwarranted attention. N112 expressed serious concerns about the results of any attempts to trace them.

N112 stated that should their cover name be disclosed, attempts to trace N112 may result.

Section 16: The risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N112, were N112's real or cover identity to be officially confirmed. The risk assessor is of the view that N112 would be of interest to the media based on two factors.

The risk assessor also discussed other potential sources of harm or interference.

Section 17: Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N112. The risk assessor felt that if N112 were invited to give evidence, the use of a cipher, screens or voice modulation would not be necessary. N112 giving evidence in private, and other measures, were not applicable.

Section 18: The risk assessor refers to third-party risks already identified and discussed elsewhere in the risk assessment. Current third party concerns and the risk of interference to third parties including N112's family are summarised.

19. CONCLUSIONS

The risk assessor summarises their conclusions in relation to N112 taking account of various factors including the time N112 was attached to the SDS and the work carried out; any "mosaic effect"; the risk of physical harm to N112, and the risk to the family of N112.

19.1 Current risk

The current risk of physical harm to N112 is very low.

The current risk of interference with N112 and their family is very low.

19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make?

There is no existing exposure of N112's real or cover name.

19.3 Objective assessment of N112's current exposure

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents

the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people build a picture before naming a person as an ex-UCO. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other pieces of the jigsaw are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor discusses areas of risk with regards to N112's current exposure.

19.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor assessed the likelihood of increase in the risk of physical harm occurring if N112's real identity is known rather than if only their pseudonym is known. The risk assessor took into account the fact that N112 was not deployed into a group or individuals. The threat of harm from an unconnected individual knowing or becoming aware of N112's involvement in the SDS was considered.

The increase in risk is assessed as 'low' (2), in that the probability of this risk occurring is considered unlikely.

In the risk assessor's opinion, the impact would be 'minor' (2), in that it would have a limited effect and could be readily mitigated. In reaching that conclusion, the risk assessor considered N112's age, health and physical well-being.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 4.

19.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor considered that the increase in risk of interference with the family and private life of N112 must be greater if their real identity is known. The risk assessor believes that there will be a general interest in discovering any available information about every SDS officer, regardless of their circumstances.

Although he was not deployed, N112 was officially attached to the SDS and was present at the closing of the unit which may increase the interest in N112. The risk assessor assess the risk as 'medium' (3), in that the probability of the risk occurring can reasonably be foreseen.

The impact was considered to be 'moderate' (3), in that it would significantly impact on the welfare of N112 and their family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 9.

19.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

The risk assessor considers that the likelihood of increase in the risk of physical harm occurring if N112's pseudonym is known as less than that for their real name.

The increase in risk was assessed as 'very low' (1), in that the probability of this risk occurring is considered highly improbable.

The impact was considered to be 'minor' (2), in that it would have a limited effect and could be readily mitigated. In reaching that conclusion, the risk assessor considered N112's age, health and physical well-being.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 2.

19.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

This risk assessor discusses the increase in the risk of interference with or to family and private life occurring if N112's cover identity was officially confirmed.

The likelihood in this category was assessed as 'low' (2), in that the probability of the risk occurring is unlikely.

The impact remains the same as 19.5, that is 'moderate' (3), in that it would significantly impact on the welfare of N112 and their family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 6.

19.8 If the cover name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the names of the groups infiltrated by this officer, the dates of the officer's deployment and the geographical location of their areas of operation, if any

- dates of deployment)
- geographical area of operation) these details are not applicable to N112
- groups infiltrated)

Signature of author:



Date: 3/7/18