

GISTED WITNESS STATEMENT OF EN42

EN42 has provided the Inquiry with a witness statement comprising 44 paragraphs.

Italicised text below represents where the contents of the witness statement have been gisted.

1. This statement has been drafted with a view to supporting a shorthand restriction order application to the Inquiry. The statement summarises the risks posed to me and others through the confirmation of my real or National Public Order Intelligence Unit cover identities; it is not a comprehensive statement addressing all the risks posed.
2. **Gist:** *For the purposes of preparing this statement, EN42 had sight of intelligence reports relating to undercover operations in which EN42 was involved. They do not refer to the National Public Order Intelligence Unit or more recent and ongoing undercover work. The contents of this statement are therefore largely based on EN42's memory of events that occurred a significant time ago.*
3. **Gist:** *In summary, if EN42's real or National Public Order Intelligence Unit cover identity was confirmed and published by the Inquiry, key risks would arise, which include the following:*
 - (i) *EN42 and others would face a risk of serious physical harm from former targets in organised crime groups;*
 - (ii) *An ongoing police investigation of a serious crime would be jeopardised; and*
 - (iii) *The operation (relating to the investigation of a serious crime) on which EN42 is currently deployed would be jeopardised.*
4. **Gist:** *The witness statement details EN42's career as a police officer. Initially EN42 worked on uniformed duties. EN42 then worked as a full time undercover officer for a number of years before joining the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. For a number of years before joining the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, EN42 worked as a test purchase officer, working on short drugs operations lasting for a few days. EN42 adopted various fictitious names while deployed. EN42 sometimes gave evidence in court during trials as a result of this work. When EN42 gave evidence, the courts permitted him/her to do so in a fictitious first name to protect EN42's real name. EN42's real name was never disclosed or given in evidence. The defendants in those cases received lengthy prison sentences for offences including supplying Class A drugs. EN42 recalls that some of the defendants were violent individuals. EN42 is concerned that if his/her real or National Public Order Intelligence Unit cover name is published then some of the convicted persons could seek retribution against him/her. This is because of how EN42 believes his/her National Public Order Intelligence Unit cover name could lead to the identification of his/her real name. Subsequently, EN42 was deployed on a large number of other undercover operations, involving targets many of whom were convicted of serious offences and sentenced to lengthy prison sentences and many of whom remain unaware that EN42 was an undercover officer. These operations were targeted against the most serious criminality, including drug trafficking, firearms and serious violence. The length of the deployments varied from a few days to many months.*

5. **Gist:** EN42 returned to undercover work after leaving the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. EN42 still works as an undercover officer and in another covert role and is currently deployed.
6. **Gist:** EN42 provides details regarding his/her use of a cover identity. On several occasions following criminal deployments, EN42 gave witness statements and evidence using his/her cover identity but was always permitted to do so using only his/her fictitious first name.
7. **Gist:** EN42 believes that photographs may exist of him/her whilst deployed by the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. If his/her National Public Order Intelligence Unit cover name were to be confirmed, any such photographs would be published online. This would potentially compromise all previous and current undercover operations.
8. **Gist:** The witness statement sets out in detail a number of examples of undercover operations targeting serious and organised crime. The operations detailed are said by EN42 to give rise variously to risks to EN42 and EN42's family, to police tactics and to other officers. In one of these operations, EN42 gave evidence in his/her fictitious first name only and the defendants only knew EN42 by that first name. EN42 also gave evidence in several cases which resulted from a large-scale operation. EN42 is concerned however that widespread publication of his/her cover name by the Inquiry or media would expose EN42 to unprecedented scrutiny, far beyond that which has come from giving evidence.
9. **Gist:** The witness statement exhibits a questionnaire which sets out details of EN42's secondment to the National Public Order Intelligence Unit including the dates of EN42's deployment and the group(s) infiltrated. The questionnaire also details assurances EN42 says were given about confidentiality. EN42 states that at all times there was an advance agreement that his/her details would never be disclosed. EN42 states that without this agreement, EN42 would never have taken part in this or any other operations. There was a constant assurance given to EN42 that if required to give evidence, EN42 would do this with the protection of special measures/screens. This was discussed on the National Public Order Intelligence Unit course. EN42 has said that he/she had no relationships and engaged in no other behaviour that may be subject to criticism. EN42 believes that photographs may exist of EN42 whilst deployed which may be used to find him/her. The questionnaire also details a number of personally imposed security measures adopted by EN42.
10. **Gist:** The witness statement summarises EN42's undercover work since leaving the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, including his/her current deployment. The statement identifies the work where EN42 has used his/her National Public Order Intelligence Unit pseudonym. Details of EN42's current deployment are set out; EN42 does not use his/her National Public Order Intelligence Unit pseudonym on this deployment.
11. There is a real risk of my compromise if my National Public Order Intelligence Unit cover or real identity went into the public domain. The targets may recognise my cover name or recognise me from any photograph. The operation would have to come to an end. I understand from my cover and welfare officer that this would have a devastating impact on the investigation. **Gist:** EN42 explains the potential impact on other officers also.

12. I could also be deployed on future crime and counter-terrorism operations, but until my restriction order application is resolved my line managers would be reluctant to permit me to be deployed on another operation. The absence of a restriction order poses a risk to my career. If I was refused a restriction order, my career as an undercover officer and a cover officer would end.
13. **Gist:** *EN42 explains why other ongoing operations could be jeopardised if photographs of EN42 are posted online following confirmation of his/her real name and how this would also pose a risk to other officers.*
14. I believe the content of this statement to be true.

SIGNED: EN42

DATED: 18 August 2017