

**Gisted risk assessment as amended by the Inquiry Legal Team**

**Title:** N30 - Risk Assessment

**Summary:** Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)

**Relevant to:** UCPI

**Author:** Adrian Baxter

**Peer Reviewer:** Graham Walker

**Version:** Gisted – Version 1

**Date created:** 28/08/2018

**Security level:**

**PURPOSE**

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N30

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N30 and third parties if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N30 as a former SDS cover officer. The report covers the situation in relation to their real identity if details became known.

**DATE OF DOCUMENT**

28 – 08 – 2018

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

**AUTHOR**

The author of this risk assessment is Adrian Baxter

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

**THE PROCESS ADOPTED**

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20<sup>th</sup> Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

### **LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS**

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organizations that may present an ongoing risk to the former cover officer.

*There are 35 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.*

#### **Section 1: REAL IDENTITY**

The risk assessment sets out details of N30's real name and cover name.

N30 is part of the Designated Lawyers core participant group, N30 is not the subject of a current or previous investigation.

#### **Section 2. SUMMARY**

N30 was a cover officer/desk officer in the SDS from 2004 until closure of the unit in 2008.

Her cover name was not that of a deceased child.

She has two security concerns (See s.9).

The current risk to N30 and her family is very low.

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#### **Section 3. SUMMARY OF OFFICER'S LIFE PRE-DEPLOYMENT**

This section summarises N30's life before joining the MPS.

There is nothing from this period that affects the current risk assessment.

N30's police career history pre-SDS role is set out. N30 joined SB in the 1980s, at times carrying out work in units which targeted groups also targeted by the SDS.

N30 declared a security concern from two police postings.

N30 was approached to join the SDS by N36. She initially declined for personal reasons. N30 informed the risk assessor that N36 had told her that she had been recommended. N30 believes the recommendation was either from N10 or N90. This convinced N30 to join the SDS as a desk/cover officer.

N30 had already completed an approved agent handling course and believed this would assist her in this new role.

There was no psychometric training. N30 moved into the back office in a support role. This comprised administrative duties, general support and cover officer roles.

No guarantees were given. However, N30 stated that she had been serving in SB since the 1980s and anonymity was assumed in all aspects of SB work. The SDS was never spoken about even within SB, including those that had served in it and returned to mainstream policing.

#### **Section 4. SDS COVER ROLE**

All the information in section 4 was taken from the initial meeting with N30 and the subsequent fact check. I have therefore not referenced them. If anything was obtained from a separate source, this will be individually footnoted.

N30 was a cover officer between 2004 and 2008 (Closure of the unit).

Other officers' performing management roles in the back office with N30 were:

Detective Chief Inspectors:

- N36
- N275
- N314

Detective Inspectors:

- N72
- N53

Detective Sergeants:

- N49
- N24
- N35

Detective Constables:

- N110

With the exception of N110, all have had individual risk assessments completed. None have declared N30 as a lateral risk and none appear to present a lateral risk to N30. However, the closure of the unit in 2008 by N314 and N275 was, in the opinion of N30, unfair and the cause of some friction with the remainder of the management team.

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N30 only used a covert identity in her capacity as an administrative support officer of the SDS. It was never used with regard to the target groups and to her knowledge, was not known within SB.

N30 stated that she was unsure how many UCOs deployed whilst she was a DS in the back office. She recalled that N72 had a list of people ready to join the unit. As vacancies appeared, he would request permission from N275 and N314.

The following UCOs have had individual risk assessments completed. None have declared N30 as a lateral risk and none appear to present a lateral risk to N30. Three UCOs were arrested during her tenure: N3, N18 and N60. (See S 4.)

N30 stated that no one to her knowledge was subject of misconduct during her tenure.

UCOs who were deployed during her tenure are detailed below.

- N18
- N3
- N60
- N77
- N79
- N118

- N104
- N44
- N66

N30 performed a variety of roles in her support function. Her main role was as a cover officer.

In 2007, N30 recommended an SDS officer for a Commissioner's commendation. It is unclear whether this was awarded.

N30 travelled as a cover officer on several occasions, supporting deployed UCO's. She travelled using her own name and passport and always separately to the UCO. On each occasion an overseas deployment authorisation was completed and signed by Commander SB. This included a risk assessment.

Tasking meetings took place twice a week; the earlier meeting was in the SDS office and the later meeting was at a cover flat. All the UCOs were to attend with all the back office staff.

The meeting earlier in the week was to de-brief the weekend's activity and the meeting later in the week was to task the UCOs for the coming weekend. This was in addition to a daily call-in (phone) by all UCOs. The call-ins were recorded on a grid and kept in a binder in the back office.

N30 did not declare any compromises or security concerns during deployment and none were found by the risk assessor.

N30 stated that no one to her knowledge was involved in a sexual relationship during her tenure.

She could not recall any other notable behavior during deployment that could be relevant to risk.

Three UCOs were arrested whilst deployed when N30 was in an SDS support role.

#### 1. N3 and N60

Whilst enacting their exit strategies, N3 and N60 were arrested for conspiracy to commit a breach of the peace (Op. [REDACTED]). They were on the way to the G8 summit at Gleneagles (2005), ferrying protestors between Glasgow and Stirling from their camp. All were taken off the minibus, searched and then arrested. They were taken to a police station in Glasgow with no further action being taken against them.

**Outcome:** All were eventually released; arrestee's included activist [REDACTED] Gist: a core participant.

N3 thinks that they could be construed as organising the incident as he was a front seat passenger with N60 driving. He is insistent he did nothing wrong that would have justified his arrest. However, unlike others, he did not consider suing the police.

N30's recollection was that she had to return to London and N36 and N53 dealt with this matter.

#### 2. N18

N18 was arrested for a minor public order offence together with several others [REDACTED]

**GIST:** Although she was a supervisor and had been a cover officer for N18, N72 was the operational DI and took responsibility for the matter. N30 stated that in her opinion senior management used the perceived mismanagement of this arrest to close the unit.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

#### **4.13 Support and welfare provision during deployment**

N30 stated that N36 was excellent in this respect and viewed welfare support as an extremely important role for managers. For example, if the deployed officers were spending too much time away from home, he would ensure the officers would have a meeting with the support staff.

N30 considered that this was her primary role for deployed UCOs and took her lead from N36. N36 and N53 had implemented a system whereby all UCOs were required to visit a psychiatrist on a regular basis, and additional appointments could be made if required.

N30 stated that there was no formal welfare support in place for the back office staff. However, should the need arise, help was available: For example, a psychiatrist's appointment could easily be arranged, N30 never required this type of support.

N30 returning to regular policing following her posting in the SDS.

N30 did not receive any commendations/acknowledgment in connection with her SDS deployment.

#### **Section 5. POST-SDS DEPLOYMENT WITHIN THE POLICE**

N30 resigned from the MPS following a restructure.

#### **Section 6. POST POLICE EMPLOYMENT OR ENGAGEMENT**

The risk assessment sets out N30's post police employment or engagement.

#### **Section 7. FORMAL INVESTIGATION**

N30 has not been subject to any formal investigation or to any previous investigation, civil claim or other litigation connected with her SDS role.

#### **Section 8. CURRENT SITUATION**

The risk assessment sets out N30's current situation.

The risk assessment discusses N30 and N30's family's internet presence.

N30 described her health as good. She stated that the Inquiry is an issue in the background. She is angry and upset about the Inquiry. She worked hard and honestly for her whole career and is now expected to provide evidence at the Inquiry.

She commented; it is so unfair. This is a blame culture that began with the closure of the unit by N314 and N275. They could have closed the unit much earlier and more fairly. They used N72 as a fall guy. It was really unfair. When I talk and think about it, it really upsets me.

When commenting on the SDS, N72 stated, 'N314 and N275 undermined field officers. They had

it in for N110 and they tried to get rid of another backroom staff, N30.

"Everyone was willing to take the product (MPS/SS) and now all fingers are pointed at the SDS. It was not a rogue outfit. It is highly upsetting".

#### **Section 9. CURRENT LEVEL OF EXPOSURE**

As far as the risk assessor is aware to date, there has been no official confirmation of any aspect of N30's role in the SDS. There has been no disclosure of the cipher and it does not appear in the public domain.

N30 stated that she never used her cover name and it was not known by anyone else.

The risk assessor is not aware of any disclosure of N30's true identity with regard to her role in SB or the SDS.

N30 noted two security concerns from her police career, one of which involved the participation of N30 in a risky operation. The risk assessor assessed the risk to N30 arising from this operation should her name be disclosed. In his opinion, N30's involvement in the operation would only slightly increase the risk of harm to N30 and her family if she is identified in her real name.

N30 stated that none of their family, friends or neighbours knew she was in the SDS.

#### **Section 10. INTERVIEW BETWEEN RISK ASSESSORS AND THE COVER OFFICER**

N30 was interviewed by the risk assessor in February 2018 and fact checked the risk assessment in the following month.

#### **Section 11. GENERAL EXISTING THREAT CONSIDERATIONS**

This section sets out the threat levels that will apply to ALL officers; it is not case specific.

The current terrorist threat level for the UK is **severe**.

The threat level in regards to Dissident Irish Republican terrorism in the mainland UK is **substantial**.

Sourced from [www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels](http://www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels).

That is relevant to all officers, but arguably more so to those ex-SB and Counter Terrorism Command officers whose details become public knowledge.

#### **Section 12. THE OFFICER'S SUBJECTIVE VIEWS**

N30 is very concerned about the risk of physical harm/interference with her family and private life were her identity confirmed.

N30 is not concerned about the risk arising from disclosure of her cover name as it was only used in completing administrative roles, never toward target groups or individuals. It was not known to anyone within SB.

#### **Section 13. OTHER POTENTIAL SOURCES OF HARM TO THIS OFFICER**

In the risk assessor's objective assessment, N30 will be of some interest to the media based on the following criteria:

- Some of the UCO's she supervised and/or was cover officer for, are of interest to the inquiry and the media. Some were arrested during her tenure. Although none were known to her to have been involved in inappropriate sexual relations, there were some UCOs that were subsequently suspected of such activity.
- N30 was serving in the back office when it was closed in acrimonious circumstances.

#### **Section 14. MITIGATING THE RISK**

The Chairman of the Inquiry makes clear that any alternative methods available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm or damage will be material considerations (Part 6, conclusions and summary of findings, the public interest balance under section 19(3)(b), section A.6).

He has subdivided that grouping (B.1) into "means other than a restriction order that may be available to avoid or reduce a risk of harm" (section B.1.7) and "whether those means would, without the restriction order, avoid the risk or the extent to which those means would, without the restriction order, reduce the risk" (section B.1.8).

The risk assessment sets out the security arrangements currently in place concerning N30 and any additional security arrangements that could be put in place.

The use of a cipher in this case would be an effective measure to protect the true identity of N30 should the true name not be available.

Screening would be of some value to prevent later recognition (as opposed to identification) should she provide evidence and should remain a consideration.

Voice modulation would be of little value to N30 as she never interacted with any individual from a target group.

The risk assessor did not consider that any evidence provided by N30 would be of a significance that would require evidence in private.

#### **Section 15. THIRD PARTY RISK**

##### **Family:**

N30 is concerned that if there is any harm or harassment aimed at her, then her family would inevitably be impacted upon. This is, in the risk assessor's opinion, a genuine concern and has some merit.

##### **Cover name:**

The cover name N30 assumed was not that of a deceased child's identity. It was only used in an administrative role, never with target group members. It was not, to her knowledge known within SB.

#### **Section 16. CONCLUSIONS**

The assessment scores the risk assessor has shown below are based on what increased risk the former SDS officer would be facing in the event of identification or disclosure during the

Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI). The risk assessor has assessed both objective and subjective factors in reaching his conclusions. He understands that this risk assessment will form part of the Metropolitan Police Service decision making in relation to whether a restriction order is applied for or not.

#### **16.1 Current risk**

The current risk of physical harm to N30 and her family is very low.

The current risk of interference with N30 and her family is very low.

#### **16.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make**

The risk assessors acknowledge that 'believing' is different from 'knowing'. Assessing how official confirmation of the identity of SDS operative impacts upon risk is speculative. The argument is that official confirmation raises the risk as it will increase the efforts to establish the real identity of the officer, and additional time and resources will be put into those attempts. In essence, that would depend upon a number of factors, including the level of certainty with which the person is already exposed. If there is no real doubt that the person was an SDS cover officer then official confirmation of that person is unlikely to add to the attempts to identify them, as those attempts will have already occurred or be proceeding. However, if the exposure is largely speculative then official confirmation could add significantly to the attempts to discover their real identity.

The risk assessors are aware that the Chairman has recognized in his 'Minded to' note that being named in connection with the Inquiry may result in a "stimulation or revival of adverse interest".

#### **16.3 Objective assessment of N30's current exposure**

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people 'build a picture' before naming a person as an SDS officer. Therefore the risk assessors cannot reasonably know what other 'pieces of the jigsaw' are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor assesses N30's current exposure in her true identity, cover name and cipher.

#### **16.4 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of physical harm to N30 should her real identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor considered and assessed five key factors.

In the risk assessor's opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N30 should her true identity be disclosed is **medium (3)** the possibility of the risk occurring could reasonably be foreseen, and is considered distinctly possible to occur at some stage.

In terms of the impact on the officer, I considered the following key factors:

- The age of the officer.
- The current threat posed.

I would consider the impact as **serious (4)** – this represents a major impact on the officer, in physical terms would result in a serious injury.

The overall score in this category is therefore **medium (12)**

### **16.5 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of interference to N30 should her real identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, the risk assessor considered and assessed the following key factors:

- When N30 was performing her role in the back office, a number of UCOs were deployed who are of significant interest to the Inquiry.
- Section 13 details 3 reasons why the media may take an interest in N30.
- To locate N30 at her home address would take some degree of research.
- The press and associated interested parties are likely to have an interest in back office staff and cover officers who performed support roles to UCOs that are of interest to the Inquiry.
- The factors in S 16.4 above were also considered as they equally apply.

In my opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of interference to N30 should her true identity be disclosed is medium (3) the possibility of the risk occurring could reasonably be foreseen, and is considered distinctly possible to occur at some stage.

I would assess impact on the Officer as moderate (3) In terms of impact upon their family and personal life it would require additional 'target hardening' at their address, or cause real anxiety within their family or close friends.

The overall score in this category is therefore medium (9)

### **16.6 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of physical harm to N30 should her cover identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, I have considered and assessed four key factors, including:

- N30's current exposure. (See S 16.3)
- Her cover name was not known to SB officers.
- N30 did not interact with any individual from a target group in her real or cover name during her SDS posting.
- When N30 travelled in support of a deployed UCO, she did not use her cover identity.

In my opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of physical harm to N30 should her cover identity be disclosed is very low (1) the probability of the risk occurring is considered unlikely.

In terms of the impact on the officer, I considered the same factors in S 16.4

I would consider the impact as serious (4) – this represents a major impact on the officer, in physical terms would result in a serious injury.

The overall score in this category is therefore very low (4)

### **16.7 Objective assessment of the increase to the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed**

In terms of increase in the risk of interference to N30 should her cover identity be confirmed as a result of this Inquiry, I have considered and assessed the same 4 key factors in S. 16.6

In my opinion the likelihood of the increase in risk of interference to N30 should her cover identity be disclosed is very low (1) the probability of the risk occurring is considered unlikely.

I would assess impact on the Officer as moderate (3) In terms of impact upon their family and personal life it would require additional 'target hardening' at their address, or cause real anxiety within their family or close friends.

The overall score in this category is therefore very low (3)

16.8 If the real name were to be officially confirmed, what is the risk of additionally confirming the dates of the officer's deployment in the SDS role.

In my opinion, if the dates of N30's attachment are confirmed, there would be no additional increase in the documented risks to this officer above those recorded in S 16.4 to 16.7.

Signature of author.

Date: 31/08/201

Signature of moderator.

Date:

## 17. Appendices

References are displayed as follows:

Pitchford references contain numbers only – e.g. 0003051

Pitchford HC references are preceded by the letters HC in the following format – e.g. HC-0000818

Holmes references are always preceded by the letter D in the following format – e.g. D8471

### Appendix 'A' - Index of documents that have been referred to and footnoted and can be made available

No.	Pitchford / Holmes	Description	Page no.
1	<i>Reference</i>	Adrian Baxter CV  Conflict Statement	All
2	<i>Reference</i>	Graham Walker  CV  Conflict Statement -	All
3	<i>Reference</i>	Process adopted	All
4	<i>Reference</i>	Terms of Reference	All
5	<i>Reference</i>	Limitations	All

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**Appendix 'B'- Index of  
documents – General**

<b>No</b>	<b>Pitchford / Holmes</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Page no.</b>
1	<i>Reference</i>	DLS profile	All
2	<i>Reference</i>	Initial interview with N30 on 02/2018	All
3	<i>Reference</i>	Fact check interview with N30 on 03/2018	All
4	<i>Reference</i>	Holmes Risk Assessment	All
5	<i>Reference</i>	Operation Soisson	P2,3
6	<i>Reference</i>	structure of SDS	P7
7	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Document</i>	All
8	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Document</i>	All
9	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Document</i>	All
10	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Document</i>	All
11	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Document</i>	All

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**Appendix 'C'- Index of documents**

**Organisations and People researched**

<b>No</b>	<b>Pitchford / Holmes</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Page no.</b>
1	<i>Reference</i>	Open source research on N30 and family	All
2	<i>Reference</i>	Research on Operation	All
3	<i>Reference</i>	Open source research	All
4	<i>Reference</i>	Document	
5	<i>Reference</i>	Document	All
6	<i>Reference</i>	Open source research	All

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**Appendix 'D'- Index of documents**

**N30 in supervisory role**

No	Pitchford / Holmes	Description	Page no.
1	Reference	N72 statement on SDS and N30	P4
2	Reference	N30 recommends an SDS officer for a Commissioners commendation	P3
3	Reference	Arrest of N3 and N60 in 2005 at G8	P8
4	Reference	Arrest of N18 at DSE1 and outcome	P42 and all