

Title: N4 - Risk Assessment

Summary: Assessment of risk in the event of identification during the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI)

Relevant to: UCPI

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Peer Reviewer: Graham Walker

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PURPOSE

This risk assessment has been prepared in relation to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and concerns the officer known as N4.

The purpose of the document is to provide an objective assessment of the creation of or increase in risk to N4 and third parties, if information is disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) which directly or indirectly leads to the identification of N4 as a former undercover police officer (UCO). The report covers the situation in relation to both their pseudonym and real identity, if details became known.

DATE OF DOCUMENT

19th December, 2017

A risk assessment is a 'snap shot' in time. New information received, or a change in circumstances, could raise or lower the risk. It is therefore appreciated that assessments require regular monitoring, and may require updating.

AUTHOR

The author of this risk assessment is Duncan Hodge

It has been peer reviewed by Graham Walker

THE PROCESS ADOPTED

There are a number of methods used in the assessment of risk. The process adopted in the production of this report has been documented.

The terms have been documented.

The risk assessment includes the sources of the material as requested by the Chairman of the Inquiry (Risk Assessments – note to core participants - paragraph 11). A copy of the material is annexed to the assessment (paragraph 12). The risk assessors are aware of the contents of that direction, and note the Chairman's need for evidence and assessment of present risk, as well as future risk should the restriction order not be made (paragraph 17). They also note the comments re differential risk in terms of disclosure of the undercover

identity (paragraph 18), and specifics around how the 'jigsaw' could be completed (paragraph 19).

The reports are structured to include all of the areas covered by the Chairman in his note dated 20th Oct 2016, specifically in paragraphs 29 and 30.

LIMITATIONS ON THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND GENERAL COMMENTS

There are a number of documented limitations placed on the process, either due to time constraints, or in compliance with directions given by the Inquiry. This includes the parameters set for researching subjects or organisations that may present an ongoing risk to the former undercover officer.

There are 38 footnotes in this risk assessment. The risk assessment does not contain a contents section.

Section 1: The risk assessment sets out details of N4's real name, cover name and reference numbers. N4 is amongst a group of officers represented by the DL who are seeking core participant status.

N4 has previously been the subject of an investigation having been charged and subjected to internal discipline.

Section 2: This section summarises N4's posting in the SDS including details of N4's deployment and post-SDS career.

Sections 3.1 – 3.2: The risk assessment sets out details of N4's life before joining the MPS and N4's police career history pre-UCO role.

There is nothing in this section that affects the risk assessment

Sections 3.3 – 3.4: The risk assessment describes N4's recruitment to the SDS. N4 was recruited on the recommendation of another SDS officer. N4 was interviewed by a senior manager in the SDS. N4 did not undergo psychometric testing and there was no formal access to welfare or professional advice.

N4 spent approximately six months in the back office developing the cover identity and learning fieldcraft.

N4 was given an assurance of anonymity during the interview stage and this assurance was also repeated to N4's partner. To paraphrase the recruiting senior SDS manager, "prosecutions would be dropped if they would lead to the compromise of UCOs". The same senior SDS manager spoke to N4's partner about the long hours N4 would be expected to work and they were also warned of character changes that could occur during the deployment and the need to share issues with each other.

Sections 4: This section sets out N4's dates of deployment, the main group(s) infiltrated, peripheral interaction and details of N4's covert identity. N4 was deployed into two branches of one group in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

N4 was tasked to report on the numbers, members and intentions of the targeted group and the threat posed by them at public order events.

Specific tasking when required was given at the twice weekly meetings on Monday and

Thursday which all officers were expected to attend, barring exigencies. N4 does not remember being specifically tasked other than in relation to a particular demonstration.

N4 recalled the names of nine key associates. When asked about individuals of concern, N4 stated that s/he had no concerns about physical violence from any of the people mentioned but some might feel a sense of betrayal.

N4 stated categorically that s/he did not enter into any sexual relationships during the deployment. N4 and N4's partner had been warned by the SDS manager who recruited N4 of the dangers of this, and there was no encouragement to form sexual relationships as a means to gather intelligence. N4 recalls that there was information about the dangers of overly close relationships in the Tradecraft binder kept in the SDS office.

N4 was arrested during the deployment, charged and convicted. N4 was subjected to internal discipline. Representations were made by Special Branch management in support of N4.

N4 could not recall any prominent successes arising out of the deployment and there is nothing recorded on file.

N4 felt that there was an adequate support and welfare system in place during the deployment but with hindsight, N4 felt that s/he could have made more use of the options available. N4 felt that the ability to seek meaningful support depended very much on the attitude of the SDS management at the time and cited a particular SDS manager as 'a person s/he could have taken anything to', however this was not the case for all senior officers.

Following N4's withdrawal from the field, the stresses of SDS deployment became more recognised and systems were put in place to identify stress initiators at an earlier stage. This included external factors such as domestic circumstances and career issues outside of the SDS. Measures adopted included immediate counselling after traumatic experiences, the establishment of ex-SDS officers as informal mentor/counsellors and structured involvement of officers' partners in the support process.

N4 returned to regular Special Branch duties following the deployment. N4 was promoted to Detective Sergeant, having passed the examination.

Sections 5- 6: These sections set out N4's post-UC deployment within the police and post police employment. N4 is currently employed. S/he has not held any sensitive roles.

Section 7: The risk assessment states that N4 was not subject to any formal investigation.

Sections 8 - 9: N4's current situation is discussed including N4's age, marital status, location, family, current employment. The risk assessment summarises N4's current level of exposure and describes incidents involving inadvertent disclosures, none of which has resulted in physical harm.

Section 10: The risk assessor interviewed N4 by telephone in November 2017.

Section 11: The risk assessor discusses the current terrorist threat level for the UK sourced from www.MI5.gov.uk/threat-levels and the current threat to N4.

Section 12: It is stated in the risk assessment that a number of computer systems have been researched, including PNC (convictions), PND (nationwide intelligence) and IIP (MPS intelligence). PNC, PND and IIP checks are conducted upon groups and individuals contained in Sections 13 and 14 of the risk assessment appropriate to the UCO.

N4 has not described any of his/her previous associates as being of concern to him/her. Basic research has been conducted on N4's key associates and has not identified any intelligence to suggest otherwise.

Section 13: The risk assessor discusses the current risk of physical harm and interference to N4 from the group(s) N4 infiltrated.

Section 14: N4 did not identify any individuals of particular concern.

Section 15: The risk assessor discusses N4's perception of the risk of physical harm and interference from the group(s) N4 infiltrated and those individuals within the group(s), as well as the risk from other sources. N4 has no fear of physical harm from the target group(s) and individuals. N4 feels that there are a number of diverse groups and individuals who have an interest in exposing former UCOs, any of whom could interfere or cause interference with the private life of N4 and N4's family.

Section 16: The risk assessor objectively assesses whether the media will be interested in N4, were N4's real or cover identity to be officially confirmed. The risk assessor is of the view that N4 had a generally unremarkable deployment and that the level of interest will be determined by four factors. N4 raised three potential sources of physical harm or interference.

Section 17: Various possible measures are discussed to mitigate the risk to N4. It is felt that if N4 were invited to give evidence, use of a cipher would have limited value as the potential content of N4's information is personally identifying. The use of a screen would minimise the risk of recognition and make a distinction between recognition and identification. In N4's own words, N4 has changed but not overly and would still be identifiable under close scrutiny. The risk assessor considers that voice modulation may be unnecessary in the context that N4 is likely to be able to give. Evidence in private would mitigate most of N4's concerns, however the risk assessor considers this to be unnecessary if the use of a cipher and screening are made available. The risk assessor's rationale is that N4 is unlikely to give significant and/or sensitive information regarding the deployment that would justify being heard in private.

Section 18: In this section the risk assessor considered and assessed third party risks. These fall into seven categories.

Section 19: CONCLUSIONS

- N4 was deployed into two branches of one group in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The group does not have a recorded propensity for violence.
- N4's deployment was largely unremarkable. N4 did not engage in any sexual relationships.
- The key associates with whom N4 had contact are of a similar age to N4 and do not have violent antecedents. N4 does not believe that they present a physical threat to N4 or N4's family.

- The risk of physical harm from other people involved in activism or political issues is unlikely, but this cannot totally exclude a threat from an unconnected individual knowing or becoming aware of N4's former role as an undercover operative.
- N4 had a cover employer throughout the deployment. To N4's knowledge this cover was not compromised or tested.
- There has been some exposure of N4's identity.
- The risk assessors are not medical experts. However there are obvious signs that N4 is in poor health.

19.1 Current risk

The current risk of physical harm to N4 is 'Very Low'.

The current risk of interference with N4 and N4's family is 'Very Low'.

19.2 If existing exposure of the cover or real identity, what difference does official confirmation make

The risk assessor discusses any existing exposure of N4's real or cover name.

19.3 Objective assessment of N4's current exposure

The risk assessors do not assume that the material currently in the public domain represents the totality of the information available. For example, there is evidence that people build a picture before naming a person as an ex-UCO. The risk assessors therefore cannot reasonably know what other pieces of the jigsaw are required before the full picture is revealed.

The risk assessor discusses the results of open source research into N4 and other exposure of N4's identity.

19.4 Objective assessment of the increase in the risk of physical harm to this officer if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The likelihood of increase in the risk of physical harm occurring must be greater if N4's real identity is known than if only N4's pseudonym is known. The risk assessor has taken into account N4's deployment and the profiles of key associates.

As such the risk assessor assesses the increase in risk as 'low' (2), in that the probability of this risk occurring is considered unlikely.

The risk assessor considers the impact as 'moderate' (3), in that it would significantly impact on the welfare of the officer. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered N4's age, health and psychological well-being.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 6.

19.5 Objective assessment of the increase in the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their real identity were to be officially confirmed

The increase in risk of interference with the family and private life of N4 must be greater if N4's real identity is known.

Taking into account N4's SDS deployment and personal circumstances, the risk assessor assesses this as 'medium' (3), in that the probability of this risk occurring can reasonably be foreseen.

The risk assessor considers the impact as 'moderate' (3), in that it would cause real anxiety. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered the age, health and psychological well-being, coupled with the likely effect on N4's partner and family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 9.

19.6 Objective assessment of increase in the risk of physical harm to this officer if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

In terms of increase in the risk of physical harm occurring if their cover identity were officially confirmed, the risk assessor assessed N4's current exposure. The risk assessor also took into account the group infiltrated and N4's key associates.

As such the risk assessor assessed the likelihood in this category as 'very low' (1) in that it is considered highly improbable.

The risk assessor considered the impact of such risk occurring as 'moderate' (3), in that it would significantly impact on the welfare of the officer. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered N4's age, health and psychological well-being.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 3.

19.7 Objective assessment of the increase in the risk of interference with this officer and their family if their cover identity were to be officially confirmed

In terms of increase in the risk of interference with or to family and private life occurring if their cover identity were officially confirmed, the risk assessor assessed N4's current exposure.

As such the risk assessor assessed the likelihood in this category as 'low' (2), in that the probability of the risk occurring is unlikely.

The risk assessor considered the impact of such risk as 'moderate' (3), in that it would cause real anxiety. In reaching that conclusion the risk assessor considered N4's age, health and psychological well-being, coupled with the likely effect upon N4's partner and family.

The overall score in this category would therefore be 6.

19.8 Objective assessment of the outcome of the disclosure of all or any of the:

- **dates of deployment**
- **geographical area of operation**
- **groups infiltrated**

Were the cover name to be disclosed, disclosure of this further information would not increase the risk to N4.

Signature of author:

Date: 21/09/2018

Signature of moderator:

Date:

IRSC DLS
LOG D13916
OFF SENSITIVE

N4 Appendix 'A'

Index of documents that have been referred to and footnoted and can be made available

References are displayed as follows:

Pitchford references contain numbers only – e.g. 0003051

Pitchford HC references are preceded by the letters HC in the following format – e.g. HC-0000818

Holmes references are always preceded by the letter D in the following format – e.g. D8471

Pitchford / Holmes	Description	Page no.
<i>Reference</i>	Schedule of all identified SDS officers 1968-2008	
<i>Reference</i>	N4 MPS Personal file	
<i>Reference</i>	SDS deployments 1968 -2008	
<i>Reference</i>	SDS vehicles	p. 56
<i>Reference</i>	File notes re SB welfare provisions	p. 22-28
<i>Reference</i>	File note re return to work	
<i>Reference</i>	Op Herne reference to N4	p.8
<i>References</i>	Negative research for key associates	

Appendix 'B'

Reference - DLS profile of N4

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Appendix 'C'

Reference - Summary of Holmes documents, N4

IRSC DLS
LOG D13916
OFF SENSITIVE

Appendix 'D'

Reference - Open source research, N4

IRSC DLS
LOG D13916
OFF SENSITIVE

Appendix 'E'

Reference - Op Herne pen picture of N4

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Appendix 'F'

Reference - N4 Interview with Risk Assessor 11/17

IRSC DLS
LOG D13916
OFF SENSITIVE

Appendix 'G'

Reference - N4 Statement to Op Herne

IRSC DLS
LOG D13916
OFF SENSITIVE

Appendix 'H'

Reference - Birth certificate

Reference - Death certificate

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Appendix 'I'

Reference

File notes

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Appendix 'J'

Reference

Discipline papers

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Appendix 'K'

Reference

File notes

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Appendix 'L'

Reference

File re conviction

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Appendix 'M'

Reference

Welfare notes post arrest

IRSC DL69
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Appendix 'N'

Reference - File notes re welfare of N4, p.6-9

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Appendix 'O'

Reference

File notes

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Appendix 'P'

Reference

Group summary

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