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**SUBMISSIONS ON LIST OF ISSUES FOR MODULE 2(A) ON BEHALF  
OF THE CATEGORY M NON-STATE CORE PARTICIPANTS**

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1. These submissions refer to and explain the CPMs' proposed amendments to the Inquiry's Draft List of Issues for Module 2(A) ('LoI'). This Module is the key part of the Inquiry from the perspective of the CPMs, concerning as it does the investigation of managers and supervisors within undercover policing units. At the crux of the concerns of the CPMs is the extent to which the intimate relationships at the heart of this Inquiry were sanctioned or encouraged by managers, whilst the CPMs were wilfully misled or kept in ignorance of what their husbands were doing.
2. Simultaneously, they have serious concerns about the near wholesale lack of information and support provided by the MPS to the families of undercover officers, prior to, during or after deployments and the very serious consequences that this has had - and continues to have - for them and their children. The lasting effect of the events within the scope of the Inquiry has been to render the CPMs isolated and unsupported, in circumstances where they have made very considerable personal sacrifices spanning many years of their lives for what they were led to believe by the MPS were important matters in the national interest. They, and the public, are entitled to understand not only whether they were lied to, but also the extent to which, if at all, the very serious impacts upon the families formed any part of the MPS' decision making in its selection and use of undercover officers.
3. The submissions which follow are structured by reference to the sub headings within the LoI in relation to which the CPMs have made proposed amendments.

**Selection and recruitment**

4. It is the understanding of the CPMs that the preponderance of undercover officers were married or in long term relationships and that this was, from the MPS perspective, specifically desirable because it would keep the officers grounded. If that is right, it reflects a deliberate decision by the MPS to utilise the support structure of the family unit to its advantage in the

conduct of its policing operations. That becomes especially egregious and abusive if it was known or expected that those same ‘family men’ would engage in intimate relationships whilst undercover, but that fact was concealed from the family which would be expected to support them – to keep them grounded – when they came home. It would illustrate a degree of calculation from the earliest possible stage. The CPMs have added questions to enable the consideration of these issues.

5. The CPMs have divided out the question of what information was given to the families of undercover officers from that which was given to the officers themselves. It is respectfully submitted that to align the families with the undercover officers in the questions on this issue is both wrong on the facts and impressionistically unfortunate. It appears highly likely that there was a very great divergence between that which was said to the officers and that which was said to the families; and that that divergence is not explicable by reasons or sensitivity of security; nor was it simply an error.
6. The CPMs have added a series of questions to explore the extent to which the MPS considered the risks to the family of the undercover officers at this early stage. Those questions have particular pertinence in circumstances where there is reason to believe that the MPS actively sought officers in stable relationships because of the perceived operational advantage this would provide. If the MPS sought to use the existence of the family unit to its advantage, it must have been incumbent upon it to evaluate the harm that that use might cause.

### **Training and Guidance**

7. The CPMs have added a series of questions to explore the extent to which families of undercover officers were provided with adequate safety measures, emotional support and information about critical issues such as what would happen if their identities were compromised. The families of undercover officers played a pivotal role in supporting those officers in performing their duties, and in doing so they were entitled to the protection of the MPS from the harm that may come their way as a result, whether that be from external threats or psychological harm. Insofar as there was an assumption that the wives of the officers would provide support, there is also a concern that the MPS was reliant upon stereotypical assumptions about a woman’s role in a relationship. These issues are not merely historic or academic. For as long as the police operate undercover officers, these questions are of critical importance. They feature both as a pre-deployment training issue as well as in later parts of the Lol.

### **Management knowledge of and attitudes towards relationships between undercover officers and targets/those upon whom they reported**

8. The CPMs have added a series of questions to explore the extent to which the families of undercover officers were provided with any information at any stage about the fact that their husbands (or fathers) were engaging in intimate relationships during deployments. They have also asked related questions about the support available to undercover officers who had such relationships and, by comparison, the support available to the families of those officers.

### **Withdrawal from deployment**

9. The CPMs have added 2 questions to explore the extent to which the needs of the families of undercover officers were considered and met when an officer was withdrawn from a deployment. The reintegration of an officer into the family unit often after a prolonged period of deployment involving long periods away from home posed obvious risks and difficulties. As a matter which arose directly from the deployment of the officers, it was one which fell within the remit of the managers of those officers to address.

### **Debriefing**

10. The CPMs have added one further question to explore the extent to which the managers of undercover officers took steps concerning the families in response to any revelation of an intimate relationship during a debrief.

### **The welfare and safety of undercover officers and their families**

11. The CPMs have added 2 words to the title of this section to ensure that it reflects the full scope of the type of harm in issue. They have also separated out the welfare of the families from the welfare of the undercover officers, for the reasons set out above.
12. They have added questions to more thoroughly explore the welfare issues which arise in relation to the families, so that the Inquiry can better identify where any failings arose. In particular, the additional questions are designed to draw out the various stages at which consideration ought to have been given to the welfare issues, from the policy and procedures stage, through to their implementation in practice.

13. Reference is made to the practice of removing from the DVLA database general access to vehicles used by family members as well as the equivalent protection of family members' DWP records, which the CPMs understand occurred at the time of an individual's deployment as a UCO.
  
14. Questions have also been added to encompass the potential safety issues that arose for families in the event that their identities were compromised and the procedure that would be then be implemented, given the huge impact this had upon the families concerned.

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