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## COUNSEL TO THE INQUIRY'S DISCLOSURE NOTE REGARDING TRANCHE 1

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### Introduction

1. This note is intended to explain the investigatory methodology used by the Inquiry to gather and publish contemporaneous documentary evidence and witness statements in Tranche 1.<sup>1</sup> The Inquiry has adopted a similar methodology throughout its investigation of the Special Demonstration Squad ('SDS'),<sup>2</sup> but specific details of material sought and received will differ by tranche.

### Investigatory Methodology and Process

2. The Inquiry has systematically sought to obtain contemporaneous documentary evidence potentially relevant to the terms of reference, as set out in the [Module One Special Demonstration Squad Issues List](#). This included, but was not limited to:
  - i. police reporting which was the direct or partial product of a deployment of an undercover police officer;
  - ii. evidence of the discussion, dissemination or use of such reporting by state parties;
  - iii. evidence relating to the management of the SDS and/or those within it up to and including the head of the unit;
  - iv. evidence of the guidance or training given to members of the SDS;
  - v. evidence originating from the wider police careers of former members of the SDS, which related (directly or indirectly) to our investigation of the SDS or to the management of their safety and welfare;
  - vi. open source documents (selectively);

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<sup>1</sup>This concerns the investigation of officers who served with the Special Demonstration Squad, and whose deployments commenced between 1968 and 1982. The investigation of some officers who fall into this category has been deferred to later tranches where there has been reason to do so. Tranche 1 also includes the investigation of managers who served in the SDS as such entirely within the period 1968-1982.

<sup>2</sup> For ease of reference the term Special Demonstration Squad or SDS is used to refer to the unit in question throughout this note, notwithstanding the fact it was initially known as the Special Operations Squad.

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- vii. documents from other government departments;
  - viii. documents held by those from whom a witness statement has been requested.
3. To this end, members of the Inquiry Legal Team ('ILT') reviewed, in situ, files which contained documents of potential relevance (below). The Inquiry then issued requests for the production of such documents under Rule 9(2) of the Inquiry Rules 2006. Alternatively, where the Inquiry considered that a detailed review was unnecessary, often because the overwhelming majority of the material was of potential relevance, the Inquiry issued a formal request for the totality of such evidence, or sought and received its voluntary disclosure from state parties. To date, the Inquiry has issued over fifty formal requests for evidence and received over 15,000 documents of relevant evidence in relation to Tranche 1.
  4. Due to the age of the material being considered, the majority of the documents reviewed were either held in hard copy files, often on poor quality thin paper, or stored on microfiche or similar media. Material requested had to be transferred onto modern electronic media before provision to the Inquiry. As a result, it was often found that achieving a clear electronic copy of material held in this way was difficult, and occasionally impossible. Where the Inquiry received illegible material, attempts were made to improve the resolution quality of the document within the Inquiry. If this proved to be impossible, the Inquiry requested an improved quality version of the document from the provider. At times it was found that this task proved to be impossible due to the media on which the documents were originally stored.

### *Metropolitan Police Service*

5. The initial source of documentary evidence sought by the Inquiry was from the Metropolitan Police Service ('MPS').
6. The Inquiry was provided with access to the unit managing all sensitive Special Branch files held by the MPS; Intelligence Management and Operation Support ('IMOS').<sup>3</sup> To facilitate this, the MPS established the Public Inquiry Liaison Team ('PILT'). This was staffed by employees of the MPS and directly responded to requests made by the ILT and facilitated the practical arrangements for the viewing of material.<sup>4</sup>
7. At a preliminary stage of the investigation, the ILT sought and received a series of evidence assurance statements from suitably qualified staff of the MPS. Such statements were made in response to a Rule 9 request made by the Inquiry. These

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<sup>3</sup> This unit is, inconsistently, also referred to as 'Information Management and Operational Support'.

<sup>4</sup> See statement of [Alastair Pocock](#) dated 6 April 2017.

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statements concerned the following issues which are of direct relevance to Tranche 1:<sup>5</sup>

- i. the arrangement and operation of files in the IMOS catalogue, and how this changed over time;
  - ii. the file retention and destruction process employed by IMOS;
  - iii. the ability to, and limitations of, using search tools to examine the IMOS catalogue.
8. Where the ILT considered that the statement received was insufficient or required further explanation, an addendum Rule 9 request was made to clarify such matters. The Inquiry received several statements in response to such requests, and has published a number of those of relevance to Tranche 1 in a redacted form.
9. The Inquiry sought the generic or management material which was relevant to the operation of the SDS. The Inquiry also obtained material produced by or considered by previous investigations (such as Operation Herne) and sought a number of categories of primary material known to be held by the MPS. For the purposes of Tranche 1 this material included:
- i. Special Demonstration Squad management hard copy files;
  - ii. Special Demonstration Squad annual reviews/reports;
  - iii. all available personnel documents relating to all Special Demonstration Squad officers and managers.
10. This material was sought by, or volunteered to, the Inquiry in its entirety and without prior review. Further evidential assurance statements were received from the MPS confirming the method of collation and/or location of the material provided. Where material was not provided by the MPS, for instance because it was unavailable or had been destroyed (often in relation to [iii] above), the MPS provided further statements detailing the steps taken to locate and obtain the material sought.
11. The material received in respect of 9(i) consisted of the totality of documents which were obtained by Operation Herne from the SDS hardcopy records. This material was assessed alongside the relevant exhibiting statement by the Inquiry and considered it to be complete. Few of the documents within this material related to the Tranche 1

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, also see the statements of [Jeff Lampery](#) and Neil Hutchinson (dated [9 June 2016](#) and [17 June 2016](#)).

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time period. Those that did concern the day-to-day operational management of the Special Demonstration Squad, including personnel, facilities and finances. The documents available were not a comprehensive record of the unit's activities throughout the time period, appeared in a fragmented manner and were often not chronological.<sup>6</sup>

12. The disclosure received in relation to 9(ii) above concerned the reports written by the officer in charge of the Special Demonstration Squad, again seized by Operation Herne as part of the SDS hardcopy records. This disclosure was complete and considered to be comprehensive by the Inquiry. These documents were prepared for the Home Office, in support of the annual renewal of funding of the unit. They summarise the activities of the unit over the preceding year, and normally included a list of the groups upon whom at least some reporting had been received.<sup>7</sup>
13. The material received in relation to 9(iii) above was partially complete, insofar as it was available for the officer concerned. Two types of personnel records were created and kept by the MPS in relation to former officers:
  - i. A Central Record of Service. This consisted of a two page document which recorded, inter alia, basic personal information, dates of joining and leaving the MPS, ranks achieved, advancements in pay, courses/qualifications obtained and a brief note of any disciplinary issues.<sup>8</sup>
  - ii. A Personal File. This was a more comprehensive file which contained joining papers, records of quarterly/yearly assessments undertaken and any letters of commendation and/or records of disciplinary procedures received during service with the MPS.

The Inquiry sought both types of personnel documents in respect of each officer and manager included in Tranche 1. Some form of personnel record was received in respect of the majority of officers and managers in Tranche 1. In respect of those not provided, assurance statements were received from the MPS which explained where files had been destroyed due to the passage of time.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Material deemed relevant and necessary by the Inquiry (to Phase 1) from this disclosure is contained at Tab C of the Tranche 1, Phase 1 hearing bundle.

<sup>7</sup> This material, insofar as it relates to Phase 1, is contained at Tab B of the Tranche 1, Phase 1 hearing bundle.

<sup>8</sup> Due to the significant amount of irrelevant personal information contained within these documents, where considered relevant and necessary, the Inquiry has usually published a gist of the relevant information contained within the document.

<sup>9</sup> These have not been published by the Inquiry as they are not considered necessary documents.

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14. Thereafter, the Inquiry conducted a broadly chronological, officer-by-officer, investigation in respect of each officer deployed in the Special Demonstration Squad. The PILT were required to highlight any material held within Special Branch file records, which could be of some relevance to the Inquiry's terms of reference in this regard.
15. To aid this task the PILT were provided with the following information by the Inquiry:
  - i. the known (or suspected) dates of the deployments of the officer concerned, extended a year on either side;
  - ii. the known (or suspected) groups reported on;
  - iii. the real and (if known) cover name of the officer concerned.

In response, the PILT provided the Inquiry with a report in respect of each officer, detailing the parameters of the searches conducted and identifying all files of possible relevance for review. This report also identified files of possible relevance which were believed to have been destroyed and the investigations conducted to reach this conclusion.

16. A member of the ILT reviewed each report to ensure that the search conducted was correct and comprehensive. Once so satisfied, the available files were then reviewed by the ILT and all material of potential relevance (paragraph 2) was identified for provision to the Inquiry in hardcopy, or subsequently, in electronic format.
17. As part of this process, the Inquiry did review a number of MPS files in respect of core participants primarily affected in Tranche 1. The Inquiry did not undertake a systematic search of MPS records in this regard, but where the Inquiry considered that the investigative process required that such files were requested, this was undertaken. Such files were, on occasion, also highlighted within the search reports produced by the PILT (above) as containing material of possible relevance. In either case, where relevant files were available (i.e. not destroyed), these were reviewed by a member of the ILT and any material of potential relevance requested.
18. The majority of MPS files reviewed by the ILT did not consist of reporting resulting exclusively from undercover policing. To the Inquiry's knowledge, there were no dedicated files kept by the MPS which catalogued the product of SDS reporting over time. Rather, in addition to being sent to other agencies, SDS reporting was placed on 'mixed' Special Branch files containing other intelligence and reports which often

derived from wider Special Branch and other police reporting. These files focused on groups or individuals of interest to Special Branch and, therefore, the SDS.

19. Those from the ILT reviewing these files therefore sought to identify those reports which *did* contain intelligence originating from members of the Special Demonstration Squad. Other police reporting was generally considered to have fallen outside the Inquiry's terms of reference, save exceptionally to the extent that it went to the question of the justification for or proportionality of a deployment.
20. The Inquiry reviewed over a hundred files of possible relevance to Tranche 1 as part of this exercise. A significant proportion of the files which were identified to be of possible relevance were believed to have been destroyed, and so were unavailable for review by the Inquiry. The Inquiry considered that it would have been both impractical and disproportionate to have obtained all of the material contained within the files reviewed, given their 'mixed' content. To have done so would also have lengthened an already extensive process significantly.
21. It also became apparent during the process of collating documents that the material available from the MPS did not represent a full picture of the reporting within Tranche 1. This was in part due to the 'mixed' filing structure mentioned above, but also due to a long-running process of file review and destruction by the MPS (see assurance evidence above). However, the Inquiry sought and obtained extensive evidence of SDS reporting from the Security Service as part of its investigatory process.

### **Consideration of Documents Received**

22. The Inquiry has been using a central secure document management platform on which to store and index documents electronically since the spring of 2017. Prior to this point, documents were provided to the Inquiry in hardcopy alone or on electronic media for use on standalone computers.
23. After the document management system was installed, documents requested were usually provided by the MPS in electronic format. Once received, this material was uploaded to the Inquiry's secure electronic document platform and tagged (i.e. linked to) to the officers, managers and core participants concerned. This allowed the Inquiry to marshal those documents to the extent that those persons concerned were mentioned within them. The reporting of undercover officers received prior to the spring of 2017, relevant to Tranche 1, has also been uploaded and processed.
24. If an individual or group was designated a core participant *after* the Inquiry's investigative phase had begun, as was commonly the case in Tranche 1, tags were

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created and a retrospective exercise was conducted to attempt to capture documents mentioning the person or group concerned. Due to the age and poor quality of many of the documents received by the Inquiry, it was often impossible to search effectively across the document database held by the Inquiry. This exercise therefore required the ILT to re-review documents in some quantity to identify those which mentioned core participants.

25. The experience of the Inquiry showed that some of the documents received later in the process were, in fact, duplicated within the material already held. This arose for a two primary reasons:
- i. Due to the way in which reporting was filed (para 18 above), reports often appeared on multiple Special Branch files reviewed by the ILT. It was often impossible to determine whether a report had been seen before when reviewing a file in situ, which allowed duplicate reports to be requested and obtained by the Inquiry.
  - ii. Similarly, when files held by other state agencies were reviewed by the ILT in situ, it was often impossible to determine whether a report had been received before. This also resulted in duplicate reports being requested and obtained by the Inquiry.

Where this occurred, an assessment was conducted by the ILT of the documents with reference to their legibility, completeness and origin. The Inquiry then selected the version of the document which was the most legible and complete for further use within investigation files and for possible publication, if deemed relevant and necessary.

26. As documents were received, they were compiled into investigation files in respect of each officer. These files were compiled by a member of the ILT, who analysed the material received in the context of each officer's deployment. This analysis also considered whether the reporting received and attributed to the officer was accurately identified as being the likely product of their deployment (below).
27. Investigation files then formed the basis for requests for written evidence under Rule 9 or the Inquiry Rules, sent to living officers whose deployments occurred within the tranche. Such requests were prepared by a senior member of the ILT.
28. Exceptionally, some officers who were unable to provide evidence due to their state of health or location outside of the jurisdiction, were not sent requests for written evidence. This occurred in respect of seven officers whose deployments fell within

Tranche 1.<sup>10</sup> In respect of each such officer an investigation was undertaken by the ILT and, where not prevented by reasons of public interest, the Inquiry will publish documents relevant to their deployments.

29. Officers who were asked to provide written evidence to the Inquiry were provided with the totality of what was believed to be their reporting, as far as it was held by the Inquiry.
30. It was the experience of the ILT that there was often some uncertainty regarding the authorship of reporting. This primarily arose due to an apparent change in practice regarding naming reports. Despite initially submitting information which was written up bearing the officer's real name, from around the middle of the 1970s, the practice by which the report bore the name or signature of the officer in question stopped<sup>11</sup>. This meant that reports were only signed by a receiving manager within the Special Demonstration Squad, and a superior within Special Branch.<sup>12</sup> Where this led to some uncertainty regarding the source, the Inquiry asked officers to consider the reporting which had been attributed to them by the ILT, and comment on whether they considered that this identification was correct. Any dispute was subsequently considered when the witness statement was received. In conducting this assessment, the ILT took a cautious approach towards claims by officers that reporting had been misattributed to them. Unless the ILT considered that reporting *had* likely been incorrectly attributed to an officer, it remained within their pool of documents. This resulted in documents remaining attributed to an officer where there remains some doubt over their authorship.
31. A similar investigative process is ongoing in respect of Tranche 1 SDS managers. In respect of each living SDS manager, analysis was conducted to identify key documents authored by those they managed and themselves. This, along with more general management documents, then formed the basis for similar requests for written evidence under Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules.

### **Selection of Documents**

32. At the point in time at which a request for a witness statement was prepared (or, for an officer who would not be providing a witness statement, upon completion of that

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<sup>10</sup> HN86, HN125, HN296, HN303, HN332, HN337 and HN344.

<sup>11</sup> The procedure for writing reports, including who wrote them, will be the subject of evidence. See, for example, the witness statement of HN326.

<sup>12</sup> These were more senior officers who operated outside of the SDS but within Special Branch. When intelligence reports were submitted it appears they also signed them, signifying passing up the chain of command. Where this superior Special Branch officer's name was considered to be potentially relevant by the Inquiry, they were allocated a temporary nominal (for example TN39, who signs many early SDS reports).

officer's investigation file), the ILT also considered which of the documents attributed to each officer were deemed relevant and necessary to publish. In respect of living officers, this selection was sometimes subject to further revision at the point at which a witness statement was then received, as more was known then about the deployment. This reduction to the material published was necessary due to the large volume of documents (mainly reporting) which were collected for some officers – in some cases this stretched to many hundreds of documents.

33. The following general criteria were used to identify which documents were selected for publication (subject to the restriction orders process):

- i. Any document naming, identifying or relating to a civilian core participant or known civilian witness (this included documents in which the only reference to the person concerned is in the list of names and file references at the end of the document). Duplicates, documents falling outside the terms of reference and documents from previous investigations which do not advance the work of the Inquiry excepted.<sup>13</sup>
- ii. Any document which had some specific significance, having regard to the published list of issues (for instance this would include the first and last known report by that officer).
- iii. In relation to officers whose cover names had been published (or were unrestricted), material which would especially assist members of the public to identify whether they have been spied upon by the officer (e.g. photographs of them as they appeared when undercover or other identifying features such as the weight or height of the officer).

34. The ILT also ensured that a representative sample of documents were selected for each deployment. In determining what constitutes such a representative sample, the following (non-exhaustive) list of factors were taken into consideration:

- i. The volume of documents. If there were only a very few substantive documents, it was likely that all would be selected.
- ii. The importance of the deployment to the Inquiry's work. As a general rule the more important the deployment, the greater the amount of material that was included.

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<sup>13</sup> For example, the Inquiry is not investigating the efficacy of Operation Herne and so its internal working papers are usually irrelevant. However, a witness statement taken in the course of Operation Herne may be both relevant and necessary.

- iii. The need to put the documents selected into context.
- iv. The extent to which the material was evidenced in other deployments. The more that this was evidenced in other deployments, the less the reason to select more than minimal representative examples.
- v. The prospects (as best they could be foreseen) of disclosure eliciting significant further evidence from members of the public. Where there is specific reason to believe that doing so was likely to attract further such evidence, then more material was included.
- vi. Where there was an inquiry witness statement from the officer (e.g. a statement received in the course of the anonymity process), the content of that statement. Where the statement was worded in terms which were consistent with relatively insignificant documents, then there was likely to be scope for a narrower selection.
- vii. Whether the documents had already been selected for publication. If they had, then this militated in favour of including them.
- viii. The need to publish, where possible, the name of groups which were not the main target of the officer but were the subject of peripheral reporting.

### Publication of Documents

35. Once this selection was made, the MPS (and any other state party with an interest) were then invited to consider what, if any, applications for restriction orders were sought over the documents selected, under s19 Inquiries Act 2005 and in accordance with the Inquiry's published [Restriction Order Protocol \(as amended\)](#). They were also asked to consider applications over any witness statement from the officer concerned.
36. Applications received from the MPS were categorised according to the nature of the restriction sought. The overwhelming majority of applications submitted to the Inquiry by the MPS concerned names<sup>14</sup> and signatures<sup>15</sup> within documents. To ease the administrative burden on the Inquiry, the ILT agreed that where applications were over these aspects of a document only, these could be provided to the Inquiry in one composite schedule for each officer, with each redaction sought highlighted.<sup>16</sup> All other

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<sup>14</sup> Open Grounds 1 (Subject to Anonymity Order) or 3 (Name).

<sup>15</sup> Open Ground 5 (Signature/Handwriting).

<sup>16</sup> Restriction Protocol, as amended, paragraph 15(ii).

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applications over documents (including officer witness statements) were provided in the form of a bespoke schedule with corresponding applications.

37. If required, applications for restriction orders were made with reference to the generic evidence and submissions received by the Inquiry when considering its restriction order approach.<sup>17</sup> No further generic evidence was received by the Inquiry as part of this process. All applications were also made under one or more of the Closed (and corresponding Open) generic grounds for restriction, previously agreed between the police state parties and the Inquiry.<sup>18</sup>
38. All applications for restriction orders were considered initially by a senior member of the ILT and a response provided to the party making the application. Where an application was agreed, the reasoned application was not referred to the Chairman.<sup>19</sup> Where an application was not agreed by the ILT at first instance, the party making the application was permitted an opportunity to modify or withdraw the application.<sup>20</sup> If maintained, the application was then referred to the Chairman for a final determination, and, if necessary, considered at a Closed hearing.<sup>21</sup>
39. A different approach was taken in relation to officers with restriction orders in respect of both their real *and* cover names. In such cases the existence of these orders meant that it would be more difficult to publish a representative sample of their reporting in the same way, without potentially undermining the orders themselves. As a result, no initial selection of documents was undertaken by the ILT, but the MPS were instead asked to submit applications for restriction orders over the officer's documents in their totality. All such applications in relation to Phase 1 of Tranche 1 have been granted. However, the Inquiry has not closed its mind to publishing some reports of fully anonymous officers where it is safe and necessary to do so. We anticipate being able to do so in some cases in relation to later officers.
40. A different selection of documents was undertaken in relation to the material provided to non-state core participants or witnesses who were asked to provide evidence to the Inquiry. The Inquiry provided them, as a minimum, with any document in which that person is named in the text of the document or is otherwise identified in the document, subject to redaction of particularly sensitive material for reasons of privacy or where

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<sup>17</sup> Restriction Protocol, as amended, paragraph 11.

<sup>18</sup> Restriction Protocol, as amended, paragraph 17.

<sup>19</sup> Restriction Protocol, as amended, paragraphs 7 and 25.

<sup>20</sup> Restriction Protocol, as amended, paragraph 23(i).

<sup>21</sup> Restriction Protocol, as amended, paragraph 24.

the public interest or a rule of law prevented disclosure.<sup>22</sup> In some cases, further documents have been included where it was considered necessary to enable the witness to provide evidence that the Inquiry wished to obtain. The Inquiry will publish the same, subject to general redactions applied by the ILT for reasons of privacy (below) and any application the core participant in question may have for restriction orders on the basis of their privacy.

41. All documents published by the Inquiry have also been considered for redaction on the basis of data protection and public privacy. This separate process involved the practical application of the [Chairman's Statement on Privacy](#) dated 11 April 2019, and was conducted by members of the ILT. An [internal guidance note](#) was prepared by the ILT to assist with this task and has been published by the Inquiry.

### **Witness Statements**

42. Upon receipt, all witness statements were considered by the Inquiry. If any matters required significant expansion or further clarification, an addendum request for a witness statement was made to cover this information under Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules.
43. In response to Rule 9 requests for statements, the Inquiry received 38 witness statements from officers whose deployments fall within Tranche 1.
44. The Inquiry will publish all witness statements received from officers in Tranche 1 who are not subject to any restriction order over their real name, or with restriction orders over their real name only, subject to redaction on the basis of public interest or privacy.
45. The Inquiry will also publish similarly redacted statements in relation to two officers who *are* the subject to restriction orders over their real and cover name.<sup>23</sup> However, the Inquiry considers that for the remainder of the officers in Tranche 1 subject to such restriction orders and from whom statements have been received, it is in fact possible to publish more information than would otherwise have been achieved by way of a composite gist. It is the Inquiry's intention to publish this gist as part of Tranche 1, Phase 2.
46. In response to Rule 9 requests for statements, the Inquiry also received 10 witness statements from individuals affected by undercover policing within the Tranche 1 time

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<sup>22</sup> See the [Chairman's Second Statement on Privacy](#), dated 21 August 2019, as supplemented by [Counsel to the Inquiry's Note](#) dated 18 November 2019. See also the exceptions that were applied as set out at para 33(i) above.

<sup>23</sup> HN333 and HN349 – these appear in the Phase 1 hearing bundle.

period. The Inquiry will publish these witness statements subject only to redaction on the basis of privacy.<sup>24</sup>

## Hearing Bundles

47. Separate hearing bundles will be published in respect of each phase and will be arranged according to topic and/or origin and ordered chronologically. Due to this arrangement some documents will appear in a bundle on more than one occasion and some documents may appear in the hearing bundle for more than one phase.

48. The bundle for Phase 1 consists of eight tabs:

*i. Tab A – Open Documents of General Application*

This contains public documents which are intended to provide context to the events of the time. It contains press cuttings originating from general Special Branch files compiled on the VSC demonstrations, along with some press film reports of the demonstrations. The obituary of HN325 (Conrad Dixon – founder of the SDS) is also included.

*ii. Tab B – SDS Annual Reports (1969-74)*

These reports, obtained from the MPS, were prepared on an annual basis by the senior officer within the SDS and detailed the activities of the unit over the preceding year (see paragraph 12 above).

*iii. Tab C – SDS Policy File Documents*

Documents within this section originate from the MPS (see paragraph 11 above) and relate to the operation and management of the unit in its early years.

*iv. Tab D – Home Office Documents*

This tab contains two documents issued by the Home Office which are of relevance to the early operation of the unit and Special Branch more generally.

*v. Tab E – Liaison between the SDS and the Security Service*

Documents within this tab relate to the cooperation between the Security Services and the SDS in its very early years. These documents chart the

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<sup>24</sup> Statements from Tariq Ali, Ernest Tate and Norman Temple are to be published in the Phase 1 hearing bundle. The remaining statements will be published as part of Phase 2.

evolution of this relationship from a focus on the VSC demonstrations to other groups.

*vi. Tab F – Vietnam Solidarity Campaign File Material*

Material within this section originates from the Special Branch files on the VSC demonstrations held in 1968. This includes two such files in their complete form (MPS-0722098 and MPS-0722099), subject to redaction for reasons of public interest and privacy. These files, along with the weekly reports prepared by Conrad Dixon in the run up to the October demonstration, illustrate the type of information which was gathered by the SDS, and Special Branch more generally on the demonstrations and protesters involved. These files were also typical of the ‘mixed’ Special Branch files reviewed by the ILT (see para 18 above).

*vii. Tab G – Civilian Witness Statements and Documents*

This tab contains witness statements received by the Inquiry in response to requests for evidence from three civilians who were impacted by the activities of the SDS in its early days. Also included are those reports or documents in which the individuals are mentioned, along with any documents provided by them to the Inquiry.<sup>25</sup>

*viii. Tab H – UCO Witness Statements and Documents*

This section contains witness statements from former officers received by the Inquiry in response to requests for evidence. Also included are documents which the Inquiry has attributed to the officer concerned,<sup>26</sup> or are in some way relevant to their deployment. Where no witness statement has been obtained by the Inquiry (because the officer is deceased), documents relevant to that officer’s deployment are published.

49. Using the hearing bundle presentation platform (Opus 2), the documents contained within each tab can be manipulated to appear in chronological date order.<sup>27</sup> They also appear including a name which briefly describes the content of the document.

50. Where information has been redacted for reasons of privacy or data protection, this appears marked on the documents in a *white* box with the word ‘Privacy’ (or an applicable gist) in black text. This is distinct from redactions for reasons of public

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<sup>25</sup> These documents span the time period of the SDS and are not limited to Tranche 1.

<sup>26</sup> See para 30 above.

<sup>27</sup> This relates to the date of the report or document in question, rather than the meeting or the event being described.

interest which are marked with *black* boxes, with any applicable gist imposed over the redaction, if necessary.

51. The Inquiry has also published a number of contemporaneous photographs of officers within the bundle. These photographs are subject to redactions in accordance with the Chairman's Statements on this subject.<sup>28</sup>
52. In addition to the documents contained within the hearing bundle, the Inquiry will also publish some corresponding open ground schedules. Where provided, these illustrate the reason for a numbered public interest redaction, by reference to the [Open generic grounds for restriction](#). Given the high proportion of similar redactions sought on similar grounds (paragraph 36 above), it has proved to be disproportionate to do this for all documents.<sup>29</sup> A schedule will therefore not be provided where a document only contains redactions agreed on certain limited grounds.<sup>30</sup> Any document which contains public interest redactions for other reasons will be accompanied by an open ground schedule.

**Counsel to the Inquiry**

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<sup>28</sup> Dated [29 January 2020](#) and [7 April 2020](#).

<sup>29</sup> Restriction Order Protocol, as amended, paragraph 53(iii).

<sup>30</sup> Open Grounds 1 (Subject to Anonymity Order), 3 (Name), 5 (Signature/Handwriting) or 27 (Sensitive: other).