

# Cover Sheet

[REDACTED]

13/02/19

Witness: [1] First Witness Statement of [REDACTED] HN326, as supplemented [1]

Exhibits Referred to: None

Date Statement Made: 16<sup>th</sup> April 2019

**UNDERCOVER POLICING INQUIRY**

Witness: [2] [REDACTED] HN326

Occupation: Retired

Address: c/o Metropolitan Police Service, Directorate of Legal Services, Empress State Building, London SW6 1TR

On 21<sup>st</sup> February 2019, I made a statement of 222 paragraphs which read as follows:

1. I have been asked to provide a witness statement for the purpose of assisting the Undercover Policing Inquiry. In preparing this statement I have sought to answer all the questions asked of me in the Rule 9 request dated 30<sup>th</sup> January 2019 and received by me on 11<sup>th</sup> February 2019.
2. I have referred throughout this statement to a number of documents provided to me by the Undercover Policing Inquiry.
3. A significant amount of time has elapsed since my deployment with the Special Demonstration Squad ("SDS") and my career within the Metropolitan Police Service ("MPS") came to an end. This has meant that I am not able to recall in any great detail, if at all, many of the answers to the questions asked. Where I





8. Initially, upon joining Special Branch, I was posted to C Squad which dealt with left-wing enquiries <sup>10A</sup> [REDACTED] Day-to-day, I would carry out these enquiries. Sometimes there would be a little bit of subterfuge involved: we would do what was called a 'knock-knock' and pretend to be someone else to find out about the individual who was the subject of an enquiry. I would consider this to be a discreet form of policing rather than undercover policing work because I did not maintain or repeatedly adopt the same or any formal cover identity in order to carry out these enquiries.

9. I joined the SDS in <sup>11</sup> [REDACTED] <sup>12</sup> [REDACTED] late 1968. I had only been on C Squad [REDACTED] for a short time [REDACTED] it felt like I had barely been in Special Branch for five minutes.

10. After my time on the SDS, I returned to normal Special Branch duties. I remained in Special Branch for the rest of my career. Due to the passage of time, I cannot remember all of my postings nor can I remember how long I spent in each posting or when I undertook these roles. I spent a few years on D Squad dealing with naturalisation enquiries and writing lengthy reports for the Home Office about people I had interviewed who were seeking British citizenship. I was posted to the Ports Office [REDACTED]

<sup>13</sup>

**Details of other, sensitive postings**



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**Details of other, sensitive postings**

In

the final two or three years of my career, I was posted to the vetting office.

- 11. I have been shown Annex B of Penetration of Extremist Groups (Doc 6: MPS-0724119, p.9) and an Annual Qualification Report for 1970 dated January 1971 (Doc 2: MPS-0722844 p.171), both of which state that I joined the SDS

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**in late 1968.** That was definitely my joining date.

- 12. I had not engaged in any proper undercover policing or work using a cover identity prior to joining the SDS. All I had done, on one occasion, was assist a

**15** Sergeant following a report in **15** Division that a police officer had been drinking after hours. I was on observation duties and dressed in plain clothes. This did not involve any use of a cover identity.

**Formation of the SDS**

- 13. I was not part of the cohort of officers who joined the SDS at the time of its formation so I am unable to provide much comment on this issue.

- 14. When I joined the SDS, I did not know how it had been set up or why it was set up. I was only told that the main purpose of the SDS was to gather intelligence

[REDACTED]

about demonstrations to assist the Commissioner with investigations. What was going on at these demonstrations was quite nasty and frightening at times.

15. I did not know that undercover policing was being used as a tactic by the SDS to gather intelligence. I was told this was a very sensitive post. The attitude was 'stum und krum'.
16. I later came to know that the people who had been involved in the decision to set up the SDS were Ferguson Smith and Arthur Cunningham. They were the top people.

#### **Selection for the SDS**

17. Unbeknownst to me, my Detective Inspector on C Squad, Phil Saunders, was a 'Hairy', that is to say someone who was on the SDS. He invited me to join the SDS when I was on C Squad. This was the first time I had heard of the SDS.
18. In terms of how I came to be selected for the SDS, I think I was asked by Phil Saunders whether I was interested in joining. I said yes. It was very casual. Joining the SDS was really a matter of who you knew. Only those who could be trusted were asked to join.
19. I did not know what I was joining: the SDS was so secret that nobody outside of the Squad talked about it or its work. This secrecy was drilled into us right from the start. Indeed, it was not explained to me before I joined the SDS the sort of work I would be doing. All I was told was to grow my hair and a beard and to get myself an identity and a job, all of which I did.



20. I have been asked why I joined the SDS. There was no particular reason why I joined: I was a young probationer in the Branch and in those days you did what you were told.

21. Senior managers spoke to me before I joined the SDS, but I was not told what the work would entail or any impact it might have on me. I was not married at the time of my recruitment to the SDS.

### **Training and guidance in the SDS**

22. I did not receive any training, formal or informal, for the role of an undercover police officer before I was deployed.

23. I have been shown Home Office Circular 97/1969 (Doc 5: MPS-0727104). I was not aware of this document at any time during my service as a SDS officer. It would have been well above my pay grade.

24. I did not receive any advice, guidance or instructions on how far it was acceptable to become involved in the private lives of those I met while undercover or how close my relationships with them could be.

25. I did not receive any advice, guidance or instructions on how far it was acceptable to enter sexual relationships whilst deployed undercover. In my view, in those days, we lived by what I perceive to be higher moral standards than today. This sort of activity simply would not be done.



26. I did not receive any specific advice, guidance or instructions on participating in criminal activity whilst undercover. I was told in a general sense that I was not to break the law. Sit-ins were mentioned as a common example of activity to avoid in this regard.
27. I did not receive any advice, guidance or instructions on provoking or encouraging another to participate in criminal activity whilst undercover. I knew as a matter of common sense and as a result of my time in uniform that I could not act as an agent provocateur.
28. I did not receive any advice, guidance or instructions on what to do if arrested or if brought before a court whether as a defendant or as a witness.
29. I did not receive any advice, guidance or instructions on what to do if I obtained as a result of my deployment information subject to legal privilege.
30. I did not receive any advice, guidance or instructions on any other ethical or legal limitations on the way in which I could or should behave whilst undercover. You were guided by your own common sense and personal values.
31. I was not given any advice, guidance or instructions at any later stage during my 16 deployment. I was friendly with HN68 as a result of us being on the SDS at the same time. I am sure he gave me advice based on his time in and experience of the SDS. I knew that I could also call on other officers who had been on the SDS for longer than me for advice.



32. I did not receive any training on race equality from the MPS either prior to or during my time on the SDS.

**Undercover identity**

*Cover name*

33. Whilst deployed undercover, my cover name was Doug Edwards. My cover date 17 of birth was 8<sup>th</sup> September 1945. 

**Reasons for choosing cover name**

34. I was not given any guidance or instruction about the creation of a false identity. As stated above, I was just told to get an identity and to get a job.

35. I never used any aspect of a deceased child's identity or any aspect of another person's identity in the construction of my legend.

*Assumed background*

36. I did not actively develop 'Doug Edwards' to include a cover background. I played it by ear and generally relied on my cover employment as a background.

37. I have been referred to the section entitled "Identity and Background Material" in Penetration of Extremist Groups (Doc 6, p.4). This description does not accord with how I created my cover identity. I was just told to grow my hair and a beard.

38. Initially, I did not have any false documents in my cover name other than a rent book. Towards the end of my deployment I travelled to Brussels in my undercover



identity. I explain this in more detail below. I was issued with a British Visitor's Passport in my cover name and cover date of birth for this trip.

*Cover employment*

39. I had cover employment in my undercover identity: I pretended to be a lorry driver.

I chose this particular profession



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so I could not be easily reached by telephone if anyone sought to verify the employment.



40. I arranged this cover employment myself: I found it through someone I knew



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41. I did not do any work in this cover employment.



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*Cover accommodation*

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42. I had a cover address in London, E15. My supervisors wanted me to try and get into an anarchist group based in the East End of London and so I wanted an address nearby. I arranged the cover accommodation myself and without assistance from my supervisors, but I informed them of the arrangements I had made. I rented the accommodation in my cover name and received a rent book in my cover name which I presented every month to the SDS office. My supervisors arranged payment of the rent.



43. I did not share my cover accommodation with anyone else. I stayed there myself, <sup>23</sup> but not very regularly. It was grotty. I lived elsewhere the rest of the time. I would stay at my cover address mainly to keep up appearances: I felt it helped my assumed identity if was seen coming out of the door of my cover accommodation or meeting someone there.

44. I never lived anywhere other than my cover accommodation whilst undercover.

*Legend building*

45. My ordinary appearance at the time was smart. Prior to joining the SDS I was clean-shaven and had short hair. As Doug Edwards, I altered my appearance by growing long hair and a beard and by dressing scruffily.

46. I did not visit any people or places in order to prepare myself for being Doug Edwards. I did not live as Doug Edwards before joining my target groups. Whilst I was in the process of altering my appearance I did attend meetings and try to get involved in anarchist groups; it would have taken me a few months to fully grow my hair and beard and I did not want to delay. In preparation for my deployment, I no longer associated with people I had known in the section house.

47. Occasionally, I used a SDS hired-vehicle in my cover identity to attend meetings. If asked where I got the car from, I would say that I got it from my cover employer.



## Deployment

### *Infiltration of groups*

48. I was tasked to infiltrate anarchist groups in the East End of London. I was not given a particular target group or groups to infiltrate. Rather, my supervisors suggested that I hang around Piccadilly Circus in order to be recruited into a group; this was where they thought these anarchist groups tended to congregate.
49. I followed my instructions and spent some time at Piccadilly Circus but it became apparent that this strategy was a waste of time. There were no anarchist groups there, as far as I could tell. I was not recruited at all. I probably told my supervisors that this was not going to work.
50. I then decided to go to the East End of London in order to be nearer the action, so to speak. I hung around in the local pubs because I thought it was likely that people involved in these anarchists groups would go there to have a drink. I infiltrated a few groups at this stage; by 'infiltrate' in this instance I mean attending a few meetings to get up to date with what the groups were doing, rather than penetrating the groups or becoming a card-carrying member. The groups whose meetings I attended included the West Ham Anarchists and Freedom Press. There may have been other groups but due to the passage of time I cannot recall their names. Some of these groups were quite nasty pieces of work insofar as they would cause criminal damage and go wild at demonstrations. For example, I remember at a demonstration outside the South African Embassy in Trafalgar Square cries of "Anarchista!" and demonstrators throwing objects at the Embassy.



51. It became apparent to me and to my supervisors that these groups were a waste of time. Accordingly, it was decided that I would join the Independent Labour Party ("ILP") so as to have a 'handle to swing' into other groups. By this I mean that I could use my membership of the ILP as a means of going to almost any other meeting. I cannot remember which of my supervisors were involved in this decision. For the sake of clarity, the ILP has nothing to do with what today is known as the Labour Party.
52. The ILP was the main group that I was deployed into until 1971. The SDS did not have any real interest in the ILP: it was merely a vehicle for obtaining information. Through my membership of the ILP, I targeted Tri-Continental, the Dambusters Mobilising Committee ("DMC") and linked anti-apartheid groups which were causing a lot of problems at the time.
53. The ILP is the only group which, in my view, would have considered me a member. I had a membership card and I paid a very small subscription fee. In this sense, it was an official membership. As stated above, I used this membership to go to meetings of Tri-continental and the DMC. I do not recall going to any meetings of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament ("CND") but I did visit their offices as a result of my involvement in the ILP. I was not a member of each of these individual groups. I was never a member of the International Marxist Group ("IMG").
54. I described below in greater detail how reports came to be authored. Ultimately, my recollection is that all reports were written in the office; I did not write any reports myself. Accordingly, I cannot comment on whether the reporting I have



been shown reflects the reporting which I provided. I would expect given the length of time that I spent on the SDS that the reports I have been shown are merely a sample of the information I provided as a result of my deployment.

55. Due to the passage of time, I do not remember if there are any groups, individuals or periods in respect of which I believe there is a quantity of missing intelligence reports.

*Tasking*

56. As I have stated above, I was not tasked to infiltrate a particular group. Roy Creamer was probably my advisor on the particular anarchist groups to observe. He received information from a range of sources and so was very knowledgeable about the political landscape and activities of the groups.
57. I was not specifically tasked to go to meetings relating to my own groups. If managers heard about other meetings or demonstrations that were going on, and which they wanted covering, then we would be specifically tasked to attend. Tasking came direct from the managers. For example, I remember I was specifically tasked to attend an Irish demonstration outside the Northern Irish offices in Barclay Street. I bumped into <sup>24</sup> HN68 there. <sup>25</sup> HN68 said to someone from the ILP, I believe it was Bill Turner, that one of his comrades – me – was out there waving a placard in the rain. Bill came and got me and asked me <sup>26</sup> to join him in the pub and <sup>27</sup> HN68 was there too with some of his group. I had to pretend that I did not know HN68; I could not buy him a drink and he never forgave me!



58. Nobody ever told me how long I would be on the SDS for.
  
59. I was never told the kind of information I was expected to provide; I was simply told to provide intelligence about demonstrations. Similarly, I was never given any instructions on how to carry out my deployment or obtain information.
  
60. I was never provided with access to information from other sources about the intended targets of my undercover deployment. I would not know from where senior officers would have obtained other information. Similarly, I was never told where the intelligence that I provided went: as far as I was concerned, it went into the general pool of Special Branch information where it was sanitised and then utilised according to the instructions of senior officers.
  
61. My tasking was not changed or refined during my deployment, save as I have described above in relation to abandoning the Piccadilly Circus strategy, going to the East End of London and then joining the ILP.
  
62. I did not suggest strategies or targets to report on per se. I influenced my own tasking insofar as I used my initiative to find anarchist groups at the outset of my deployment and then to attend meetings that related to my target groups in order to maintain my cover and provide information to the office.
  
63. I have been asked the extent to which my reporting covered matters, including groups or individuals, on which I had not been specifically asked to obtain intelligence. I would report on other groups or individuals that I came across when attending meetings or demonstrations. To be a good Special Branch officer, you



had to know all about the groups, meetings, individuals at the meetings and what was going on. These were all interlinked. For example, you would be able to work out how many people and who might attend a demonstration relating to a particular group if, at that group's meetings, you were able to identify the number of regular members, who they were, the groups they came from and how many more people they might be able to bring along as a result of which groups they were involved in.

**Management**

*Managers and administrative staff*

- 64. Conrad Dixon was a character. He managed the Squad loosely. He was friendly but knowing. He was highly intelligent and had been in the position of an undercover officer before so there was not much he did not know.
  
- 65. To my mind, Conrad Dixon was seeking to assist the Commissioner by bringing in the intelligence necessary to ensure public order was maintained.
  
- 66. I have been shown Annex A of Penetration of Extremist Groups (Doc 6, p.8) and, in my view, this document is an overly formalised description of the chain of command. As far as I was concerned, there was no real chain of command. There certainly was no formal chain of command or hierarchy as usually exists in policing; it was a much looser system of liaison in the SDS. It was very whimsical. My liaisons in the office, for want of a better word, were Phil Saunders, Roy Creamer, Bill Furner, 28 HN294 Riby Wilson and Dave Smith.



67. I would say the managers of the SDS were Conrad Dixon, Riby Wilson, Phil Saunders.
68. The administrative staff were Bill Furner, Dave Smith and Roy Creamer. Bill Furner was the stalwart of the office.
69. I do not know if the managers and administrative staff held distinct roles or responsibilities between them. Part of the role of the administrative staff was to research the information provided by undercover officer in the field in order to provide full, presentable reports. For example, they would look in records and Special Branch files for further information of relevance to include in the reports. Management liked to have a standalone report with all of the information in a single place so that they did not have to go looking for matters in Special Branch files.
70. I would only come into contact with the administrative staff in the office when I put in some paper with information on it. I cannot say how frequently this happened: it would happen as and when it was necessary to produce a bit of paper.
71. We also had a weekly diary which would be submitted to the governor of the section every week. It would contain descriptions of our work, for example "engaged on special enquiries".



*Management and supervision: general arrangements*

72. I had no routine contact with any particular manager or managers in the SDS during my deployment. The Squad would meet weekly, or more frequently, at the SDS flat. Phil Saunders or HN294 would also attend these meetings and 29 come over to the flat occasionally to say hello. I do not recall having any face-to-face meetings with managers other than at the meetings which were attended by the whole Squad. The kind of things that we discussed at the meetings would include what was going on with demonstrations and particular groups.

73. I mostly reported back to the SDS by writing information on a bit of paper. It would then be taken over to Scotland Yard. We were not allowed to go near the Yard so someone would meet us halfway to collect the bit of paper. Additionally, a secret telephone had been installed in the SDS flat on a secure telephone line, so if something really serious was going to happen you could call Special Branch or the Security Service in confidence.

74. I do not remember what the general response to my reporting was. I was never given feedback.

75. There was no formal or informal welfare monitoring. We were assisted in the fact that people knew us as individuals. It was all very amateur.

*Premises*

76. I have already mentioned we had a SDS flat. This was located in [REDACTED] 30  
the west London area.

To my knowledge, there were no other safe houses or offices outside of the Yard.



77. I visited the SDS flat for our weekly, or more frequent, meetings which I described above. Sometimes I would also attend the flat on a morning if I did not have a meeting or demonstration to attend to see what was going on.

*Pattern of life whilst undercover*

78. I have difficulty remembering how I apportioned my time whilst I was deployed. Generally speaking, you would work around Special Branch hours which were 10am to 6pm. However, if there was a meeting or a demonstration in the evening then you were expected to work late and you would do so. If I did not have a meeting or a demonstration to attend during work hours, I would generally go to my cover accommodation in order to maintain my cover.

79. The worst time during my deployment was when I was in Brussels. I was undercover all hours of the day and that was really hard work. I remember waking up and remembering that I had to be Doug Edwards. It would have been a strain if I did that all the time, rather than simply putting on the pretence for meetings and demonstrations.

80. My work-life balance varied from Special Branch to the SDS in that my work hours in the Branch were very regular whereas on the SDS I never really knew when I was going to finish outside of my core hours.

*Pay and overtime*

81. Serving on the SDS did not affect my take home pay. We received expenses and Detective Duty Allowance, but the latter meant we did not get any overtime. I also

[REDACTED]

did not receive overtime when I stayed late to go to meetings. Essentially the only benefit, in pay terms, was the payment of expenses.

## Reporting

82. I have been shown a number of documents which relate to reporting. Owing to the passage of time, I have no independent recollection of any of the meetings or events referred to within these reports save where I have expressly stated otherwise.

### *Reporting in 1968 on the VSC*

83. I have been shown Doc 3: MPS-0730768, which is a Routine Meeting / Poster Parade Report dated 12<sup>th</sup> November 1968 regarding a meeting of the VSC on 11<sup>th</sup> November 1968.

84. I note that the report includes my name under "officers present". I assume, therefore, that I was present at the meeting. Due to the passage of time, I do not know why I was at this meeting. The presence of so many officers was probably Conrad Dixon's way of showing how active the SDS was.

31 85. I do not remember Detective Sergeant [TN0034] being a member of the SDS. I knew him as being in Special Branch. He was a specialist short-hand writer: Conrad Dixon may have asked him to attend the meeting in order to make shorthand notes of what was going on.

86. I note that the report records Tariq Ali talking about the possibility of a revolution. At the time, we were worried about these people and groups overthrowing the



government-of-the-day. I assume this was the effect of the revolution about which he was talking. With hindsight, I think it was an entirely theoretical, nonsense revolution but at the time it would have seemed real hence why it was included in the report.

*Reporting in 1969 on the West Ham Anarchists*

87. I have been shown Doc 4: UCPI0000008160, which is a Special Report dated 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1969 regarding a meeting of the West Ham Anarchists held on 20<sup>th</sup> January 1969.
88. I have been asked whether I attended this meeting. I note that my name is typed at the bottom of the report. On this basis, I assume I provided some of the information in the report which means I would have been present at the meeting. The practice was not to include the name of the undercover officer present in the list of attendees.
89. I would not have written the report: I would have provided the information to the office and the report would have been typed up in the office. My name would go at the bottom without me having seen the final report. Other information may well have been added to the report which was not provided by me. The only way I would have seen the report once it was written is if I had been asked to sign it as well.
90. I do not remember if there was a particular reason for attending this meeting. As I have said above, at the start of my deployment I attended meetings of the West Ham Anarchists. This report may be from this initial period of my deployment.



91. I note that physical descriptions of [Privacy] and [Privacy] are provided. This would have been because I would have known that they did not have a Special Branch file and so the descriptions were necessary in order to identify them in the future.
92. I note that the report states that [Privacy] and [Privacy] attended meetings of the East London Libertarian Group. I do not recall ever going to meetings of this group. I think the East London Libertarian Group were involved in sit-ins and so I would not have been allowed to go to these meetings because it would have resulted in either participation in criminal activity or encouraging others to participate in criminal activity.
93. I have been shown Doc 7: UCPI0000008161, which is a Special Report dated 26<sup>th</sup> April 1969 regarding the West Ham Anarchist Group.
94. I do not remember what the “minor acts of malicious damage against the local offices of the Conservative and Labour party”, described in the report, were. I expect this relates to actions such as daubing or graffiti. I am unable to say how this description fits with the idea of members tending not to be “sufficiently interested” in the Anarchist meeting in the pub and tending to “merely sit in the bar downstairs talking and drinking”.
95. I have been shown Doc 8: UCPI0000008162, which is a Special Report dated 29<sup>th</sup> April 1969 regarding [Privacy]



96. I cannot remember why I considered it relevant to know that Privacy's father was a mechanic. It may be that this information, as a result of research, came to me from the office and so was put into a report.

*Reporting in 1970 on the VSC*

97. I have been shown Doc 22: UCPI0000005813 which is a Special Report dated 25<sup>th</sup> September 1970, Doc 23: UCPI0000005814 which is a Special Report dated 6<sup>th</sup> October 1970 and Doc 26: UCPI0000005816 which is a Special Report dated 9<sup>th</sup> October 1970. These reports concern meetings of the VSC on 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1970, 29<sup>th</sup> September 1970 and 6<sup>th</sup> October 1970 respectively.

98. I note that my name is typed at the bottom of each report. On this basis, I assume I provided some of the information in the report. As I have explained above, the reports would have been typed up by someone else in the office and so I would not have produced them.

99. I probably was the "reliable source" referred to in these reports. This form of words would have been added to the report in the office as a means of sanitising the source of the information.

100. I do not know or recall how I came to resume reporting on the VSC in 1970. I was not a member of the VSC and did not regularly attend these meetings.

101. I do not know whether these reports were about the activities of the national committee of the VSC in 1970.



102. I note that paragraph 1 of Doc 22 records a suggestion by a person at the meeting that an act of criminal damage be committed against the car in which President Nixon would be travelling on 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1970. I cannot recall if anything was done with this intelligence; indeed, I would not have been told if anything had been done. I do not know whether the suggested attack on the car ever happen, but I do not think it did.

103. I note that paragraph 5 of Doc 23 suggests that the march proposed for 31<sup>st</sup> October 1970 was to be timed to make policing more difficult. Due to the passage of time, I cannot remember if this was a proposal or a firm plan endorsed by the meeting. I further note that paragraphs 5 and 6 of Doc 23 suggest that the majority of attendees favoured an orderly demonstration but that a minority advocated causing damage and disruption. Due to the passage of time, I do not recall if this is a fair summary of the meeting. However, it very much accords with my impression of the VSC, namely that it was very much a minority who wanted violence and disorder.

104. I note that paragraph 8 of Doc 26 states "information from another source". I do not know who, or what, the other source was:

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**Discussion of types of source**

I would not have known at

the time what the other source was. I further note that paragraph 8 of Doc 26 states that the VSC will withdraw if the demonstration is violent. I do not feel I am in a position to make a judgement as to whether the VSC wanted to be disassociated with violence and disorder.



105. I do not know or remember what, if anything, was done by the MPS to address the likelihood of violence at the October demonstration.

*Reporting on the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign*

106. I have been shown Doc 20: MPS-0732317 which is a Special Report dated 14<sup>th</sup> September 1970 and Doc 24: MPS-0732339 which is a Special Report dated 7<sup>th</sup> October 1970. Both reports relate to supporters of the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign.

107. I note that these reports bear my typed name at the bottom of the page. I have no recollection of being placed in this group or attending meetings of this group. Accordingly, I cannot see how I would have produced this report.

108. I note that the information in each report is said to have come from a "reliable source". I do not know who, or what, this source was. It could have been another person from the SDS – another 'Hairy' – based on how the report is written. Given what I have said above, I would not have been the source.

109. Special Branch recorded the sort of information contained in this report because it had a national responsibility for Irish terrorism. These people were a front for the IRA and it was incumbent on us to identify the people mixed up in these activities.

110. I assume Special Branch sent this information to the Security Service because it would have been of interest to them. As I have said above, at the time Special Branch had a national responsibility for Irish terrorism; the Security Service only

[REDACTED]

took over this responsibility from Special Branch at a later stage. I have no idea why these particular reports were copied to Box 500.

### *The IMG*

111. I was not involved in the IMG. It was already covered within the SDS. I think [REDACTED]

[33] HN340 was deployed into the IMG.

112. I did attend the Red Europe Conference held in Brussels in November 1970. The [34] IMG and HN340 also attended this Conference. This was the only Red Europe Conference or Rally I attended. I attended with activists from the ILP. The opportunity was there to attend so I must have asked my supervisors what they wanted me to do. Ultimately, the purpose of my attendance was to find out what the conference was all about.

### *Infiltration of the ILP*

113. The ILP was a rump of the old Labour Party, comprising Kier Hardie and the rest. They were held in disdain by the main Labour Party. They were quite left-wing but very pleasant, sociable people wrapped up in the world of intellectual Marxism. They were people who would like to have been politicians.

114. The ILP did not do very much, to be honest. They would support different demonstrations depending on the issue. One demonstration, for example, was outside the Northern Irish office.



115. I am unable to recall precisely how I infiltrated the ILP. I remember that I got chatting at one of the meetings to one of their members who had been involved for donkeys' years. There were only a handful of people involved in the ILP.

116. The extent of my involvement in the ILP was attending meetings and supporting them at demonstrations. I did not hold any office or post within the ILP. I did not influence any political activity in the ILP.

117. My involvement in the ILP came to an end when I realised I had had enough of being an undercover officer on the SDS. I simply stopped attending meetings and demonstrations and disappeared from the ILP.

118. I have been shown the following documents:

- a. Doc 9: UCPI0000008204, which is a Special Report dated 14<sup>th</sup> June 1969 regarding a meeting of the Tower Hamlets Branch of the ILP on 12<sup>th</sup> June 1969;
- b. Doc 10: UCPI0000008203, which is a Special Report dated 16<sup>th</sup> June 1969 regarding the ILP;
- c. Doc 11: UCPI0000008205, which is a Special Report dated 22<sup>nd</sup> August 1969 regarding Privacy;
- d. Doc 12: UCPI0000008206, which is a Special Report dated 26<sup>th</sup> September 1969 regarding a meeting of the ILP on 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1969;
- e. Doc 13: UCPI0000008207, which is a Special Report dated 3<sup>rd</sup> October 1969 regarding a debate between the ILP and the National Front;



- f. Doc 14: UCPI0000008208, which is a Special Report dated 16<sup>th</sup> October 1969 regarding a meeting of the Organising Committee of the ILP on 14<sup>th</sup> October 1969;
- g. Doc 15: UCPI0000008209, which is a Special Report dated 10<sup>th</sup> November 1969 regarding a meeting of the Action Committee against NATO dated 10<sup>th</sup> November 1969;
- h. Doc 16: UCPI0000008210, which is a Special Report dated 11<sup>th</sup> December 1969 regarding the offices of the ILP;
- i. Doc 18: UCPI0000008211, which is a Special Report dated 21<sup>st</sup> April 1970 regarding a meeting of the National Convention of the Left on 11<sup>th</sup> April 1970;
- j. Doc 21: UCPI0000008212, which is a Special Report dated 14<sup>th</sup> September 1970 regarding a meeting of the Tower Hamlets branch of the ILP on 8<sup>th</sup> September 1970;
- k. Doc 34: UCPI0000008213, which is a Special Report dated 11<sup>th</sup> February 1971 regarding Privacy

119. I note that each of the above reports bear my typed name at the end. As above, this means I may have provided some of the information contained in the reports but I would not have authored them. The only report that bears my signature is Doc 34. It is fair to say on this basis that I would have seen the report once it had been typed up and before I signed it but I would not have written it. Having reviewed Doc 34 there is definitely information contained in the report which I would not have known, for example when someone came to the attention of Special Branch; the report must have been typed in the SDS office and this additional information added from Special Branch files [REDACTED]

35

35

**Discussion about authorship of Doc 10**

I am certain I would not have written the report in Doc 10.

120. I am unable to say whether I was the source of all of the intelligence across the above reports. I may have been the source of some of the intelligence because my name is at the bottom of each report, but I could not say how much of it or for which intelligence I was responsible. I probably did attend the meetings detailed in Doc 9, Doc 12, Doc 14, Doc 15 and Doc 21 given the small numbers in attendance. As above, my name would not have been included in the list of attendees.

121. I note that in paragraph 4 of Doc 9 a description of Privacy is provided. I have no idea who she is. If I had provided the information which forms the basis of the report, I would have provided her name to the office and they would have gone to Special Branch records, looked her up and then provided the description in the report as a means of identifying a person.

122. I note that paragraph 2 of Doc 10 states that “the ILP are on the whole content to work within the framework of conventional politics”. To my knowledge, the ILP did not endorse or participate in any criminal activity whilst I was deployed into the group. To my knowledge, the ILP did not seek to undermine parliamentary democracy whilst I was deployed into the group though they did support demonstrations which were seen to have the potential to undermine parliamentary democracy. To my knowledge, the ILP did not promote public



disorder per se but on one view there was a degree of promoting public disorder insofar as they would have a constituent group at demonstrations.

123. I note that paragraph 3 of Doc 10 states “[t]here is a trend within ILP towards Revolutionary Socialism and this has brought some of its members to notice in a public order context. It may therefore to be appropriate to take a closer look at ILP with a view to placing this development in its proper perspective”. I am unable to explain further what these two sentences mean, or what the reason is for their inclusion in this report. As I have stated above, I am certain I did not author this report.

124. I cannot recall how the detail about the ILP in Doc 10 was obtained.

125. I cannot recall any specific reason why it was considered necessary to report the personal information about Privacy contained in Doc 11. Generally, this sort of information was included in reports so that you could identify an individual or individuals who attended the meeting. This would then assist with identifying membership of a group and in turn the identities of people likely to attend demonstrations and cause public order concern. However, information of the kind about Privacy tended to be of no great significance.

126. I assume that Special Branch collated intelligence about the proposed debate between the ILP and the National Front, which is referred to in a number of the above reports, because it was a public order concern in the event that these groups were not kept well apart.



127. I cannot recall how I came to report specifically on a meeting of the Action Committee against NATO, as recorded in Doc 15. It was another group that I associated with as a result of my membership of the ILP. I assume there was a general worry about NATO and so I was asked to attend the meeting.

128. I note that paragraph 2 of Doc 34 quotes an informant and states Privacy "can in no way be regarded as militant". As I have said above, I did not compile this report; at most, I may have provided some of the information contained in this report. I assume that Special Branch recorded intelligence about Privacy Privacy because it was deemed by the powers-that-be of the time to be of interest. I have no idea why Special Branch recorded intelligence about an individual's participation in the democratic process, i.e. Privacy's opposition to the nomination of Bill Turner as a parliamentary candidate for Bethnal Green.

#### *Infiltration of Tri-Continental*

129. I do not remember what Tri-Continental was or what it was about, nor do I remember what they did.

130. I cannot remember exactly how I infiltrated Tri-Continental. I tended to drift from one organisation or group into another as a result of my association with the ILP. I may have become involved in Tri-Continental as a result of someone I knew.

131. I do not remember why I infiltrated Tri-Continental.



132. I did not become formally involved in Tri-Continental in any way. I attended some meetings, but due to the passage of time I do not know why they were of particular interest.

133. I did not hold any office or post within Tri-Continental. It is incorrect to say that I became the Treasurer of Tri-Continental; rather, I became treasurer of the Tower Hamlets branch of the ILP.

134. I do not remember whether I participated any political activity for Tri-Continental, nor do I remember whether I influenced any political activity within the group in any way during my deployment.

135. I do not remember how and why my infiltration of Tri-Continental came to an end, nor do I remember for how long I attended these meetings. I do not remember if I reported on any people or activity in Tri-Continental.

*Infiltration of the DMC*

136. My limited recollection is that the DMC was concerned with a dam in Mozambique or South Africa and it had something to do with South African politics too. I do not remember what the group stood for or what they did.

137. I do not remember how I infiltrated the group or why I infiltrated them. It may have been something to do with the group being on the fringes of all of the trouble with the movement against apartheid.



138. My involvement in the group was limited to attending meetings and keeping my ears open. I might have attended one of the demonstrations as well. I did not hold any office or post within the organisation.

139. My only participation in campaigning activity for the DMC, if it can even be characterised as such, would have been by attending a demonstration. I did not influence the activities of the DMC in any way during my deployment. I kept a very low profile.

140. I do not remember exactly how my infiltration of the DMC came to an end. Either I simply stopped turning up to meetings or the organisation petered out.

141. I have been shown Doc 17: UCPI0000008111, which is a Special Report dated 11<sup>th</sup> February 1970 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 30<sup>th</sup> January 1970.

142. I note that this report bears my typed name at the bottom of the report. As I have stated above, I would not have authored this report but I may have provided some of the information which is contained in the report.

143. The reference to "informant" in paragraph 1 of Doc 17 is probably a reference to me insofar as I provided information contained in the report.

144. I have been shown the following documents which relate to the DMC:

- a. Doc 25: UCPI0000008112, which is a Special Report dated 7<sup>th</sup> October 1970 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1970;



- b. Doc 27: UCPI0000008113, which is a Special Report dated 26<sup>th</sup> October 1970 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 20<sup>th</sup> October 1970;
- c. Doc 28: UCPI0000008114, which is a Special Report dated 18<sup>th</sup> November 1970 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 12<sup>th</sup> November 1970;
- d. Doc 29: UCPI0000008115, which is a Special Report dated 2<sup>nd</sup> November 1970 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 29<sup>th</sup> November 1970;
- e. Doc 30: UCPI0000008116, which is a Special Report dated 19<sup>th</sup> December 1970 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 17<sup>th</sup> December 1970;
- f. Doc 31: UCPI0000008117, which is a Special Report dated 26<sup>th</sup> January 1971 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 20<sup>th</sup> January 1971;
- g. Doc 32: UCPI0000008118, which is a Special Report dated 5<sup>th</sup> February 1971 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 29<sup>th</sup> January 1971;
- h. Doc 33: UCPI0000008119, which is a Special Report dated 18<sup>th</sup> February 1971 regarding a meeting of the DMC on 12<sup>th</sup> February 1971;
- i. Doc 35: UCPI0000008109, which is a Special Report dated 5<sup>th</sup> April 1971 regarding the purchase of shares in Barclays Bank Ltd by members of the DMC.

145. I do not think I was the source of the information contained in any of the above reports because my name is not at the bottom of the reports. Whilst I attended a few meetings of the DMC, I do not think I attended any or all of the meetings detailed in the above reports. Accordingly, I am unable to respond to specific questions about the contents of these reports.

146. I believe the name "Detective Sergeant" <sup>36</sup>HN339 whose name is at the bottom of these reports, <sup>37</sup>refers to HN339. This is the first time I have been shown this

[REDACTED]

reporting on the DMC. I assume, on the basis of what I have read, that HN339 38

[REDACTED] infiltrated the DMC but I do not have any independent knowledge of his deployment or the group(s) he infiltrated. I was not aware of the nature of his deployment during my time in the SDS.

147. We did not infiltrate this group during the same period: I do not have any recollection of the two of us attending meetings together or at the same time. It may be that 39 HN339 infiltrated the DMC after I stopped attending their meetings; I would not have known at the time that another officer would be coming into the group after I left.

*The CND*

148. My interaction with the CND was limited to visiting their offices with someone from the ILP. I did not have regular contact with the CND; attendance at their offices would have been ad hoc. I do not remember specifically why I had contact with the CND. I assume I went there with someone from another group, probably someone from ILP.

149. I did not infiltrate the CND to any extent. [REDACTED] 40

**Details of an incident whereby Special Branch officers "stupidly" informed a civilian informant (within a different group) of the identity of an undercover officer (not HN326) within their group, leading to a potential risk of the officer's compromise**




41

150.



42

151



**Public disorder**

152. I witnessed public disorder whilst serving undercover with the SDS when I attended demonstrations. I have already mentioned the incident outside the South African Embassy. I also remember attending a demonstration in Grosvenor Square and I got hit and chased by a policeman. The police would see you with long hair and a beard so you got clobbered. I do think the police were generally quite restrained though and tended to respond to actions initiated by activists. It is difficult to generalise about the scale and severity of the public disorder considering my limited memory of these incidents, but I remember it was quite frightening to be there in it.



153. I did not participate in any public disorder whilst serving undercover with the SDS.

This lack of participation made you a suspect within the group but it was something I had to put up with.

154. I witnessed violence to people and property whilst serving undercover with the SDS at demonstrations, for example outside the South African Embassy, as I have already described.

155. I did not participate as a perpetrator in any violence to people or property whilst deployed undercover with the SDS. As I have explained, this made you a suspect within the group. Sometimes it was a handicap that you could not become involved. I had to keep a low profile. Demonstrations sometimes became very violent, so much so that police horses were brought out. The only occasion that I recall I was the victim of violence to people was in Grosvenor Square, where I was hit by a police officer as I have explained above.

### **Subversion**

156. At the time of my deployment, I did not understand Special Branch to have a role in countering 'subversive activity'. I was so new in the Branch then and there was no instruction to that effect. This sort of thing just washed over my head.

157. I would not say that the activity I witnessed when I was undercover was subversive, but the groups I infiltrated were planning and plotting to do things that had the potential to be subversive. When they were discussing these plans and plots at meetings, they seemed rather dramatic and you could not necessarily tell



whether they would follow through with them or whether the outcome might be dulled.

158. The fact that my reporting was copied to the Security Service was just part of the normal way the Branch operated. I now know that most things are copied to the Security Service where it bears on matters for which they have national responsibility, but at the time I did not know at the time that my reporting was copied to Box. I was aware at the time that the Security Service had interest in some of the meetings we attended.  42A



159. I personally had no contact with the Security Service whilst I was deployed with the SDS. This sort of thing was above my pay grade.

### **Sexual relationships**

160. I did not engage in any sexual activity whilst in my undercover identity.

### **Other relationships**

161. I did not form any close relationships with anyone during my deployment. All the relationships that I did form were very superficial insofar as I would buy people beer and then have a chat. There were very few women involved.

162. I would describe my relationship with Bill Turner of the ILP as superficial. He was an 'old boy', easy to get on with and pleasant enough. I would go to the pub with him and see him at meetings. That was the extent of our contact.



163. I would describe my relationship with [Privacy] of the ILP in the same way as my relationship with Bill Turner, if not even more shallow. [Privacy] was a crony of Bill's. Between the two of them, my mate, if I could even put it that high, was Bill Turner.

164. I would describe my relationship with Terry Liddle as superficial as well. We had a committee-comrade sort of relationship. He was a bit more of an activist than the other two. [Privacy] became his wife. I remember being invited to their wedding, goodness knows why. I attended because I felt it would be very anti-social to decline the invitation or not to show up. I kept well away from any photographs and just went to the pub.

165. I did not assume any position of trust of any kind with any of the people with whom I mixed as an undercover officer.

### **Criminal justice**

166. I did not participate in any criminal activity whilst I was deployed undercover, nor did I provoke, encourage or cause any other person to do the same.

167. I was never arrested, charged, tried or convicted of a criminal offence whilst serving as an undercover police officer.

168. As far as I am aware, the fact that I was an undercover police officer was never disclosed in connection with or in the context of someone else's arrest, charge, trial or conviction.



### **Other legal or disciplinary proceedings**

169. I was not involved in any way in my undercover identity in any legal proceedings.

170. I was not involved in any way in my undercover identity in any complaint against a police officer or in any disciplinary proceedings involving a police officer.

### **Legal professional privilege**

171. To my knowledge, I did not receive or become aware of any legally privileged information whilst I was deployed as an undercover police officer.

### **Elected politicians**

172. To my knowledge, none of the people on whom I reported were elected politicians.

### **The use to which my reporting was put**

173. As I have said, reports would be typed up in the office. Once I had passed the information I had obtained to the office, I had no involvement in the writing of the reports. Similarly, I had no involvement or say in what happened with the reports thereafter. Beyond knowing that information I provided would invariably make its way into reports, I did not know what would then be done with this information or the reports themselves. This was beyond my role and above my pay grade. For example, as I have said above, I had no knowledge of the particularities of information sharing between Special Branch and other agencies.

174. I did not know at the time what my contribution was to policing. I was just a cog in a big machine and I provided information as best I could. I did not have any



idea of how I was helping, one way or the other: nobody ever told me or gave me feedback and there was no other way of me knowing.

### Exfiltration

175. I have been shown an Annual Qualification Report for 1970 dated January 1971

(Doc 2, p.171). This document suggests that I was principally engaged clerically

43 from [REDACTED] 1970. This accords with my recollection: I believe my active

44 deployment ended around [REDACTED] 1970. Thereafter, I spent a few months in

the office. My recollection is that I was filling in in the office before going on the

CID course. I note that a report on my attendance at Detective Training School

(Doc 2, p.87) states that I attended the CID course in 1971. [REDACTED]

45

[REDACTED] I would have formally left the SDS by the date of the CID course.

176. On the basis of the above, my active deployment lasted for just over two years and I was on the SDS for almost two and a half years. For my part, there was no real reason for the length of my deployment; I was merely providing information and it must have been considered of continued use.

177. I have been referred to the section entitled "Period of Service" in Penetration of Extremist Groups (Doc 6, p.4) which suggests that it was a rule that an officer serves for no longer than twelve months on the SDS. I do not remember this

46 being a rule. Indeed, I know that HN68 was on the SDS for years. I did not know that I was serving for longer than some of my colleagues.

178. As I have said, I withdrew from the field simply by no longer attending meetings.

I did not have a withdrawal plan: I just disappeared. I was not close to any of the



people in my target groups and so it was pretty straightforward for me to just not come back. I have read on the UCPI website that Peter Francis described early undercover officers in the SDS as “merely paddling”; that is one way of describing it.

179. As I have said above, my withdrawal was prompted by the fact that I had had

enough of being an undercover officer on the SDS. I joined [REDACTED] 47

during the currency of my deployment but in my real identity, and so I had long

hair and a scruffy beard; it was not me. I would go to restaurants [REDACTED] 48

[REDACTED] and I would be turned away because I looked like some sort of ‘down-and-out’. I found it embarrassing and over time it wore me down.

180. I do not think I had any conversation with my supervisors about my withdrawal and so I do not think they had any involvement in it. It just happened.

181. Following my withdrawal, I did not maintain contact with anyone in the groups on which I had been reporting. I only maintained contact with other people on the SDS. I made no further use of my cover identity following my withdrawal.

### **Senior management and oversight bodies**

182. We did have senior managers visit the SDS whilst I was on the Unit. I recall we had a Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner come to the SDS flat on one occasion; I cannot remember who this was or when the visit took place. I think he just turned up to thank us for the work we were doing and he brought us a bottle of whisky which was very well received.





187. My recollection is that when I was on the SDS Joan Hillier ran the SDS flat. However, I think she was also deployed into Havering VSC before she ran the flat.

188. I do not remember what role <sup>68</sup> **HN322** played in the SDS.

189. <sup>69</sup> **HN331** definitely would have used a cover name but I do not know what it was.

190. <sup>70</sup> **HN68** was a member of the SDS throughout the time I was on the Unit. He remained at least until I left the SDS; I cannot remember when he left.

191. I knew two people with the surname Wilson: Riby Wilson and Ray Wilson. As I have said, Riby Wilson overlapped with me on the SDS. As far as I am aware, Ray Wilson was not in the SDS; he might have joined after I left.

192. I do not know if Dave Fisher used a cover name; he was on the SDS before my time.

193. I do not remember if <sup>71</sup> **HN324** used a cover name. As far as I am aware, <sup>72</sup> **HN324** <sup>72</sup> **HN324** was deployed into the VSC. I do not recall which branch of the VSC he infiltrated. I do not know if he was deployed into any other group.

194. As far as I remember, Phil Saunders was not deployed into the field so I assume he did not have a cover name. He was a manager.



73  
195. I do not remember if HN332 used a cover name whilst on the SDS. If I had any interaction with him at the VSC meetings that we both covered, and assuming we were pretending to know each other, I would have called him by his cover-name. However, I do not remember if we did have any interaction with each other and I do not remember if we pretended to know each other. I remember that I had to deny all knowledge of 74 HN68 after I bumped into him on a demonstration.

196. I do not know if Helen Crampton used a cover name whilst on the SDS.

75  
197. I do not remember if HN294 used a cover name whilst on the SDS. I think he was deployed in the field, but not for very long.

198. Conrad Dixon used the pen name John Coles for publishing, after his time on the SDS. I do not know if he used this cover name when he was on the SDS; he may have done.

199. As far as I am aware, none of my contemporaries, whilst deployed, committed a criminal offence whilst undercover or provoked, encouraged or caused a third party to commit a criminal offence.

200. As far as I am aware, none of my contemporaries, whilst deployed, engaged in any sexual activity with others in their cover identity.

76  
201. I know that a contemporary was arrested whilst he was deployed in his cover name. I 77  
think he was on a demonstration 

[REDACTED]

77

[REDACTED]

**Recollection of arrest details**

I do not know

what came of this: Phil Saunders sorted it all out. This is the only arrest of a contemporary of which I am aware. I am not aware of any of my contemporaries, whilst deployed, being charged, tried or convicted in their cover identities.

202. As far as I am aware, none of my contemporaries, whilst deployed, were involved in incidents of public disorder, violence or other criminal activity.

203. As far as I am aware, none of my contemporaries, whilst deployed, reported any legally privileged information.

204. As far as I am aware, none of my contemporaries, whilst deployed, reported on the activities of any elected politicians.

**Post deployment**

*Period immediately post deployment*

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205. As I have said above, I believe I left the SDS in [REDACTED] 1971.

206. Other than the few months in which I was undertaking clerical duties in the office, I do not remember having a period of rest between the end of my time in the field and my next role. In some ways my time in the office was a period of rest.

207. I was not debriefed by anyone once I had withdrawn from the field, or once I had left the SDS.



*Post SDS career*

208. I have described above my career following the SDS in as much detail as I can recall. As I have said, I remained in Special Branch for the rest of my career following the SDS.

209. I had no real say in the postings to which I was assigned after my time on the SDS. When you were a young boy in the Branch, which I was, you were very much told what to do; there was some flexibility when I came off the SDS because I was initially asked where I would like to go, but after that it was merit and ability which carried you through. I was sought out for particular jobs at various points, but my role in the SDS did not give me any sort of advantage in this regard. I was not interested in promotions.

210. As far as I am aware, after I left the SDS I never requested or received or used intelligence from the SDS or other intelligence emanating from undercover policing about any form of domestic extremism. Whilst I was dealing with a lot of intelligence, I did not know where it came from; I would not have known whether a source was an SDS officer quite apart from any other source.

211. I have been asked whether in my work on industrial matters, including during the miners' strike, I, or my squad, received intelligence from undercover police officers about any industrial issues. I never dealt with industrial matters and I was never on the miners' strike. I have been shown a copy of manuscript notes from my interview with Operation Herne (Doc 39: ) where reference is made on page 7 to C Squad industrial. It is correct that other people or agencies, such as the Security Service, would contact C Squad about people they were



interested in and would ask that they be identified from our sources. This would have been in the form of an enquiry, akin to those I dealt with in the Branch.

212. I did not know at the time if any intelligence obtained by undercover police officers was passed between Special Branch and either industry or blacklisting organisations working for industry, because I was not involved in this sort of work. I only heard about this by rumour after my time.

213. Working as an undercover officer did not have any long-term effects on my mental, physical or emotional health. 79  
  
 Details of subsequent illness

214. There were no welfare or other forms of support made available to me or brought to my attention.

215. My rank on leaving Special Branch and the MPS was Acting Sergeant/Detective Sergeant.

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216. I retired from the MPS  in the early 2000s.  I left the MPS on good terms. I am still retired.

*Undercover work in the private sector*

217. Before I retired from the MPS, I was not given any instructions or guidance of any kind about working undercover in the private sector or using any aspect of my assumed identity in the private sector.



218. I did not do any undercover work after leaving the MPS for any organisation in the private sector. I went straight into retirement and have remained in retirement ever since.

### **Any other matters**

219. There is no other evidence which I am able to give which is of relevance to the work of the Undercover Policing Inquiry. Where I have been able to provide any contextual or relevant information in addition to that asked for in the Rule 9, I have done so at appropriate stages throughout this statement.

### **Request for documents**

220. To my knowledge, I do not have any documents or other information in my possession which would be potentially relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference.

221. In providing this witness statement, I have not refreshed my memory from any document other than those contained in my witness pack.

### **Diversity information**

222. I am male and white British.

### **Supplementary matters**

223. I have been asked to provide a supplementary witness statement for the purpose of assisting the Undercover Policing Inquiry. In dealing with these supplementary matters I have sought to answer all the questions asked of me in the second Rule 9 request dated 5<sup>th</sup> April 2019 and received by me on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2019.



224. Further to what I have said at paragraphs 73 and 89 above, I wish to clarify what I recall about the process of how reports were written. After attending a meeting or a demonstration, I wrote out by hand or typed out what I had learnt on a bit of paper in the SDS flat. This bit of paper would then be taken over to the Yard via a secure bag: either someone from the Yard would come to the SDS flat with the secure bag in order to pick up the information, or we would meet someone at a location away from the Yard in order to hand the information over. Sometimes it was Phil Saunders who would go between the Yard and the SDS flat to collect our intelligence, but it was also often an officer of a lesser rank. Reports were then collated and typed up in full in the office, either by the officers in the office – Bill Furner, Roy Creamer and Dave Smith – or by the typing pool. They typed the reports with the appropriate formatting and alignment on a better typewriter than we had access to in the SDS flat. When writing the reports, those in the office would collate all of the information provided about a particular meeting, demonstration or issue. They would look at the information I provided on the bits of paper alongside other information

83

**Discussion of types of information and sources**

I assume this is how information which I do not recognise or do not think I was responsible for came to be included in some of the reports which I have been shown. For example, whilst I have assumed at paragraphs 98 and 99 above that I was the “reliable source” referred to in the reports at Docs 22, 23 and 26 and that I provided some of the information in the reports because my name is at the bottom of the report, I do not have any recollection of attending these meetings. Additionally, I do not recognise any of the individuals listed in the report save for Bill Turner and



therefore I would not have been able to identify them myself. This leads me to assume that, at minimum, the information concerning the attendees of the meeting came from another source.

225. The key recipient of intelligence in the office was Bill Furner. Roy Creamer and Dave Smith were also in the office and involved in the report writing process.

226. As I have said above, I would not have seen the final report typed in the office unless I was later asked to sign it. Accordingly, I would not necessarily have known at the time what information in a given report originated from me, from other officers or from other intelligence sources. Reports were sanitised by the office so as not to reveal the source of the information, that is to say even where the source was an SDS officer. I was not involved in the process of sanitising reports. Given that these reports were written some 50 years ago, I cannot be sure what intelligence within the reports that I have been shown came from me. As I have said above, there is information in certain of these reports which I did not know at the time and therefore which I know I would not have provided.

227. I do not know why I signed only two of the reports which have been shown to me as part of my Witness Pack. It may be that the system changed during my deployment and different office managers operated different systems insofar as they required signatures at the bottom of intelligence reports.

228. The flow of my intelligence would go up and down depending on the extent of activity in the field and within the groups into which I was deployed. When there were lots of meetings and demonstrations I would have produced more



intelligence and I assume this would have resulted in a greater volume of individual intelligence reports. Equally, there were periods of time when there were fewer meetings and demonstrations and I would have produced less intelligence at that time.

229. When there were quieter periods for SDS officers, I assume that intelligence reports were put in their name to justify their continued deployment. It is an assumption I have made since being shown the reports in my Witness Pack because there are certain reports which bear my name but I do not recall having any involvement with these groups. For example, as I have stated at paragraphs 107 and 108 above, I have no recollection of being placed in an Irish group or attending meetings of the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign. Accordingly, I cannot see how I would have produced the reports at Doc 20 and Doc 24 and assume these reports were put in my name.

230. Senior managers had to justify the existence of the Unit. Ultimately, if, as a UCO, you were not producing any intelligence then your deployment could not be justified and would be brought to an end. I cannot say how frequently the practice of putting reports in other officers' names may have occurred; it would have happened in the office when information was collated and reports were typed up, and I did not play a part in this. I was not aware of this practice at the time.

231. Having looked at Doc 26 since I gave my initial witness statement, I can confirm that the signature of the Chief Superintendent is that of Bill Greenup. He was a Chief Superintendent on C Squad.



I believe the content of this statement to be true.

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Signed.....

HN326

Dated.....

16.04.2019