

Cover Sheet



1
1st Witness Statement of [redacted] HN343 [redacted] as supplemented
Date signed: May 2019

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING

1
I, [redacted] HN343 [redacted] c/o Designated Lawyers, PO Box 73779, London, WC1A 9NL, WILL
SAY AS FOLLOWS:


On 28 November 2018, I made a statement of 201 paragraphs which read as follows:

1. This witness statement is made in response to a Rule 9 request dated 19 October 2018. It provides my full recollection of the period that I spent in the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).
2. I am known in this Public Inquiry by the nominal HN343. There is a Restriction Order in force in respect of my Real Name dated 9 October 2018. My cover name whilst I was deployed undercover was John Clinton. [See clarification to this paragraph at paragraphs 212-213 below]
3. At the time I was in the SDS, my rank was Detective Constable. Nearly 45 years have passed since my deployment ended, and I have not discussed it with anyone since. It is something I have not much thought about. I am a naturally positive person, but the process of dragging up old memories has been emotionally challenging for me.



4. Although I remember being deployed, I cannot now remember much about what issues I was reporting on and when. I attended hundreds of meetings and demonstrations and after so many years a lot of them have blurred together. In preparing this statement I have been shown various reports that I have not seen since I wrote them. Were it not for the fact that my name is on the bottom of them, I would not have been able to identify them as my own.
5. Some of the Inquiry's questions in the Rule 9 request ask for very precise responses to questions about matters I only have a vague recollection of. I have tried to answer those questions to the best of my ability.
6. The only documents that I have seen to refresh my memory prior to preparing this statement are those attached to the Rule 9 request. I have expressly referenced in this statement those documents which I have been asked about in the Rule 9 request.
7. I had a long career in the MPS after I left the SDS. By the time I retired I had attained  a senior rank  2

Personal details

8.  3
Name, date of birth and family circumstances

Police career before serving with the Special Demonstration Squad

9. I have been asked to provide a short summary of my police career before joining the SDS. I have been shown extracts of my personnel file (pp 8, 10-11, 93-96, 104, and 107), Relativity reference number MPS-0722848 "(Doc 1:)",



to assist me in doing so. Page 10 of that document is a chronology of my various postings and I have no reason to doubt its accuracy. Save where I have stated otherwise, I have taken the below dates from that document, which I believe to be correct.

10. I joined the MPS in ⁴ **the mid 1960s** when I commenced police training at Hendon, graduating in ⁵ **3 months later**. I was then posted on general uniform duties at ⁵⁽ⁱ⁾ 

11. Whilst I was there, I applied to join Special Branch. This was not an easy process, it involved lots of interviews and testing. I was, however, successful, and joined the Branch in **the late 1960s** as a Detective Constable. ⁶

12.  ⁷
Sets out details of career

13. I had not done any formal undercover policing prior to joining the SDS. It was, however, common practice for Special Branch officers to attend public meetings of groups it was interested in the activities of and report back what was said.

14. Special Branch management would look in the underground press, and in publications like the Morning Star to see what meetings were being advertised. A rota would be devised of who would cover which meetings. I would attend meetings in that fashion every 10 days or so. If I was asked who I was, I would give a fake name. I would make up a different name every time. I do not remember what those names are now. Sometimes you would go along to

[REDACTED]

meetings and there would just be a few people there, in which case you would just make your excuses and leave so as not to draw attention to yourself.

Special Demonstration Squad – Formation

15. I do not have any first-hand knowledge of why the SDS was set up.
16. My understanding is that it was created as a reaction to the large public demonstrations against the Vietnam war that took place in London in the late 1960s. The MPS was totally unprepared for the scale of the riots or the level of violence that was used by some of the protestors.
17. The rumour in Special Branch was that the Home Secretary at the time, James Callaghan, was put under pressure to do something about them. I understand that the SDS was set up with the aim of providing the MPS with intelligence to better police future demonstrations. I understand, at least during the time that I was in it, that the SDS was funded by the Home Office.
18. I suspect that the directive to set up the SDS came from the Home Secretary himself rather than from someone within Special Branch. I do not know who else would have been involved in the decision.
19. I believe that during my time in the unit, the SDS was hugely effective in providing useful intelligence in advance of demonstrations. When I was in the SDS, the MPS did not have the electronic and computer resources that it does now. There were only a finite number of officers who could be deployed when there was a demonstration, and sometimes tens of thousands of protestors. Whenever MPS officers were required to police a demonstration, they would be



taken away from their usual policing duties. It was therefore vital that the MPS had good intelligence to know when it was necessary for that to happen.

20. As I have said above, it was normal practice in Special Branch to attend public meetings of groups that were of interest, including groups who might cause disorder at public demonstrations. The role of SDS officers was very different. They would not just be going to publicly advertised meetings, the main purpose of which would be to whip up public support. They would also have access to private meetings where you would get a true feel for the level of passion that actually existed, how many people would be attending a demonstration, and whether there was likely to be trouble.
21. Direct human intelligence of this kind was much more reliable than intelligence from informants, who often had their own agendas. From my experience in Special Branch, informants sometimes provided unreliable information which could not be easily validated.
22. I have been shown pages 3 to 9 of a document entitled 'Penetration of Extremist Groups', Relativity Reference number MPS-0724119 "(Doc 2:)". That document seems to suggest that the role of the SDS was solely to do with public order. That may have been true at the time that Conrad Dixon wrote it, but by the time that I had joined the unit, it addressed the broader responsibilities of Special Branch. That included counter subversion. Although the Security Service were the lead agency for counter subversion, Special Branch monitored and gathered intelligence on subversives, which it would then pass on to be actioned by the Security Services as appropriate.



23. During my time on the unit I believe the SDS was also hugely effective in gathering intelligence on subversive groups operating in the UK. As to how this intelligence was used by the Security Service, I cannot say.

Selection for the Special Demonstration Squad

24. I remember being aware of the existence of a secret unit in Special Branch before I joined the SDS. There were vague whispers, but not much was actually known by most Special Branch officers about what it did. Special Branch operated on a culture of 'need to know', and that was particularly true when it came to the SDS.

25. I recall that I was approached by the Chief Inspector of the SDS at the time, Phil Saunders. I do not remember the exact contents of that conversation, but I believe that they gave me a vague outline of what the unit did and that it involved being deployed undercover. I remember that I was flattered when I was asked to join as I knew that not many people were selected to join the unit.

26. I do not know why I was selected. Getting into Special Branch itself was not an easy process, there was an interview process and examinations that you had to take. I assume they looked at my results from that, and perhaps they asked around about me, and decided I fitted the profile. I do not remember there being any interview process to join the SDS, I was just approached and agreed to join. It seemed like a good opportunity to do interesting work.

27. I do not remember the exact timeline, but I joined a few months after I was approached. As stated above, I have been shown extracts from my personnel file, page 10 of which shows my various postings whilst in Special Branch. That

document states that I joined the SDS in **early** 1971. I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of that document and it accords with my recollection that I joined around that sort of time. As I will go on to explain below there was a delay between me joining the SDS and starting my preparation for my deployment.

28. No one spoke to me before I joined the SDS about the impact that undercover work might have on me personally. It definitely changed me as a person. I am very private about my personal affairs, and I believe that is because of the time I spent deployed undercover.
29. I was a single, unmarried, man at the time I was in the SDS. Neither my parents or any other family members were told about my recruitment to the SDS or what effect it might have upon me.

Training and guidance in the Special Demonstration Squad

30. I did not receive any formal training in undercover police work prior to being deployed. The only training of any sort that I received whilst in the SDS was that I spent around 3 of 4 months in the back office prior to being deployed. The idea was that you would slowly immerse yourself in undercover work by reading the reports of others and talking to the officers that were currently deployed about their experiences when you could.
31. Initially, I would work at the office at New Scotland Yard, but I would also accompany Phil Saunders or **HN294** (the DI of the unit) when they would meet with field officers. That would happen fairly regularly, though not necessarily every day.



32. I would also attend a weekly meeting at the safe house. All of the field officers would attend that meeting so I had the opportunity to talk to them and learn what they had done in their deployments.
33. The rest of my time in the back office I spent reading reports that had been submitted and getting up to speed with the political landscape at the time.
34. As stated above, I have been shown pages 3 to 9 of a document entitled 'Penetration of Extremist Groups' (Doc 2: **MPS-0724119**). I can confirm that I was not made aware of this document during my time in the SDS. Indeed, the first time I ever saw this document is when I was shown it for the purpose of preparing this statement. I can see that it was authored by Conrad Dixon, who was not in the SDS at the time I was in it.
35. I have also been show pages 2 and 3 of Home Office Circular 97/1969, "(Doc 3: **MPS-0727104**)". I do not have any specific recollection of being handed this document, but I am aware of its contents (that police officers should not act as agent provocateurs) from when I undertook **a police course unconnected with the SDS** ¹¹ I believe I undertook that course after I had joined the SDS, but prior to me commencing my preparations for being deployed.
36. During my time in the SDS I do not recall being given any advice, guidance, or instructions on any of the following:
- a. How far it was acceptable for undercover officers to become involved in the private lives of those they met whilst undercover, or how close those relationships could be;



- b. How far it was acceptable for undercover officers to enter into sexual relationships whilst deployed on an undercover operation;
- c. Participation in criminal activity whilst undercover;
- d. Provoking or encouraging another to participate in criminal activity whilst undercover (although, as set out above, I received this training on this separately during 12
a police course unconnected with the SDS);
- e. What to do whilst arrested undercover;
- f. What to do if brought before a Court, whether as a Defendant or witness;
- g. What to do as an undercover officer if you obtained as a result of your deployment information subject to legal privilege;
- h. Any other ethical or legal limitations on the way in which undercover officers could behave.

37. I recall being told that if I ever had any issue whilst I was deployed undercover, I could always call the office. It was left to our discretion when we did that.

38. Everyone on the SDS had been a Special Branch officer prior to joining. As I have said above, joining Special Branch was not an easy process. I do not think that SDS recruits were just selected at random, they were looking for particular kinds of people with particular qualities. I am sure that one of the things they would have looked for were people who were able to exercise common sense and good judgment.



39. I do not think it would have occurred to SDS management that they would have needed to tell police officers not to have sexual relationships with members of groups they infiltrated, for example. It is common sense that you would not do something like that.
40. From my perspective, I deliberately avoided making any enduring friendships or becoming too involved in the affairs of the group I infiltrated. My role was purely to gather intelligence. Although I had to be seen as a 'good comrade' in order to be invited to the pub after meetings (which was often when you gathered the most useful information), beyond that I did not want to become too close to anyone as it would have made a compromise more likely.
41. In a large group such as the one I infiltrated, it was easy to avoid positions of responsibility as there were plenty of willing volunteers. I can see how it might have been difficult for UCOs in smaller organisations to avoid assuming some responsibility for the affairs of their group.
42. I did not receive any training on race equality from the MPS either prior to or during my time with the SDS.

Undercover Identity & Legend Building

43. My cover name when I was deployed undercover was John Clinton. That was the only cover identity I used and I was not known to anyone by any other name.
[See clarification to this paragraph at paragraphs 212-213 below]

13

44. I chose my cover name.

Gives details about how cover name was chosen. Believes he took advice from other field officers on this topic.




45. For the avoidance of doubt, I did not use the identity of a deceased child, or the identity of any other person living or dead.
46. I do not remember the conversation, but my cover name would have been approved by SDS management.
47. I had a basic legend, which was that I was a van driver with an interest in left wing politics. I chose that profession because it would give me an excuse if I was seen by members of my group in areas of London that they may not have expected to see me.
48. My legend did not have any elaborate detail to it. I deliberately avoided forming any friendships with people so I never really needed anything more than the above. Throughout my deployment I cultivated an image of being perennially late, unreliable and a bit 'flaky'. Those were not uncommon traits in members of the group I infiltrated, and helped me to avoid becoming too involved in what they did.
49. Again, I do not remember the conversation, but I believe I discussed my legend with my managers prior to being deployed.
50. I have been asked whether my recollection of how my cover identity was created corresponds with the paragraph under the sub-heading 'Identity and Background Material' at page 6 of the document entitled 'Penetration of Extremist Groups' (Doc 2: MPS-0724119). Although I believe I had a conversation with my managers about what my cover identity would be before I was deployed,



I do not think that I supplied an 'autobiography' or that there was a process of 'eradicating inconsistencies'. It is however correct that I obtained a library card in my cover name, and that I did not carry my warrant card whilst operating in my undercover identity.

13b

51.



Further details given regarding steps taken to create and maintain cover identity.

52. I was tasked to infiltrate International Socialists (IS), but not any particular branch. For the first few weeks of my deployment I went to meetings and demonstrations in various areas of London. I felt that the meetings in Hammersmith and Fulham were the most interesting as there was a lot of Irish activity discussed at them. Although I was not specifically tasked to report on Irish activity, this was something that I was aware was of great interest to the MPS. I would have sought approval for this decision from the SDS management.

53. I obtained cover accommodation in Fulham. My cover accommodation was a bedsit, which I arranged myself. I found it through an advert in a newsagent. The landlord did not know I was a police officer. In those days you did not need to provide references or anything like that. I would pay in cash, which I would put in an envelope and pin behind the wardrobe for the landlord to go in and collect. I did not share my cover accommodation with anyone else.

54. For a few weeks at the start of my deployment, before I got the bedsit in Fulham, I stayed at the safe house at which weekly meetings were held. Other than that, my cover flat in Fulham was only place I 'lived' whilst in my cover identity. I would



stay there a couple of nights per week, and always after meetings. I would make sure that the bed looked like it was slept in whenever the landlord came over, and generally made sure it looked like someone lived there in case anyone dropped round unexpectedly. That only happened on a couple of occasions, but I thought it was important to maintain that aspect of my legend.


55. I would describe my appearance before I joined the SDS as neat and tidy. During my time in the back office before I was deployed I grew my hair and a bushy beard. Instead of wearing a suit, when I was deployed I donned 'comradely attire' – flares, an army surplus jacket, and an old pair of boots.
56. I did not visit any places or people to prepare myself for my deployment, nor did I spend time living in my new identity before approaching my target group.
57. The MPS provided me with a cover vehicle. I do not recall the brand or model now. I lived in ¹⁴ an area of London at the time and so it was convenient for me to have a vehicle to get to and from Fulham. I would sometimes use it to travel to and from meetings so people would see me in it occasionally. I never used it to transport any members of my group.

Deployment

Infiltration of groups

58. Having reviewed p.95 of my personnel file (Doc 1), I recall that shortly after I joined the SDS, I became ill ¹⁵

Provides details of time off work due to illness and attending a course unconnected to the SDS



As such there

was a break of several months between me joining the unit and me beginning my preparation for my deployment.

59. As I have also said above, I then spent around 3 or 4 months in the back office before being deployed.
60. The only group I infiltrated was IS. As I have stated above, I was not deployed towards any particular branch of IS and for the first few weeks I went to meetings in lots of different areas. For the reasons set out above, IS meetings in Hammersmith and Fulham were the most interesting, so that is where I based myself.
61. I just started turning up to meetings and demonstrations and expressing my enthusiasm for the cause. Pretty quickly I was invited to join. It was not a particularly difficult group to join as they were eager to have more members.
62. Membership was an official status in that my name would probably have been on some sort of membership list, though I did not have a membership card or anything of that sort.
63. Although I was tasked towards IS, members of other groups would sometimes speak at IS meetings about their cause, so I would sometimes end up reporting on them in that way. Lots of different groups would attend demonstrations as

[REDACTED]

well, so if I was reporting on a demonstration I probably would have mentioned any groups or individuals I recognised.

Anti-Internment League

64. I have been asked whether I was tasked to infiltrate the Anti-Internment League (AIL). I was not. If my reporting mentioned the AIL, it would only have done so for the reasons set out at paragraph 63 above or because it was mentioned by someone at an IS meeting. See for example the intelligence report dated 11 November 1972, Relativity reference MPS-0728859 "(Doc 35:)"

which is a report on IS attendance at an AIL demonstration. The information in the reports I have been shown dated 18 September 1972, Relativity reference UCPI0000007986 "(Doc 33:)", and the 11 November 1972 report, above (Doc 35:), would have been matters I learned about at meetings of IS.

Missing reporting

65. I have been asked to consider nearly 50 intelligence reports which I have not seen since I submitted them around 45 years ago. In particular, I have been asked whether there are any groups, individuals or periods in respect of which I believe there is a significant quantity of missing intelligence reports. It is very difficult for me to answer that question after so many years.

66. As I have said above, the only group I infiltrated was IS. Sometimes other groups and/or individuals would come into contact with IS either through attending a



meeting, or by being discussed at a meeting, or by being at the same demonstration as IS, but I only reported on them to that extent and not otherwise. I cannot now recall which groups or individuals I would have mentioned in reports in that fashion.

67. In terms of periods in which I believe reports may be missing, I do not believe that the reporting I have been provided with is fully comprehensive for any period of my deployment. I submitted written reports or called into the office roughly once per week throughout the course of my deployment, so probably would have submitted many more reports than have been provided to me for the purpose of preparing this witness statement.
68. I can see that all of the reports I have been provided with have my name on the bottom. I do not think that all of my reports would have necessarily had my name on them, so it may be that the Inquiry does have them in its possession but does not know that they are my reports.
69. There were also occasions where my reporting would have just been fed into a larger report. If I attended a large demonstration, for example, I would not have submitted a written report. I would have called into the office to say that I was OK, tell them if there was anyone at the demonstration I recognised, and if there were any groups that broke away from the main demonstration. All of the verbal reports from officers who were at a particular demonstration would have then been collated into a single report.
70. I do not now remember what the contents of each of the reports that I prepared were, but all of the reports I have been provided with for the purpose of preparing my response to the Rule 9 request have my signature on the bottom, so they



must have either been prepared by me, or on the basis of information that had come from me. Any missing reporting would be similar in nature to the reports that I have been shown.

71. I have been asked whether I filed any reports prior to the report dated 13 October 1971, Relativity reference MPS-0731835 "(Doc 4:)". As I have stated above, there was a delay between me joining the SDS and actually starting my preparation for being deployed. Once that preparation began it was a further 3 or 4 months before I actually started attending meetings. I cannot now recall the exact date that I began attending meetings, but it may well be that there are reports written by me or on the basis of information provided by me prior to 13 October 1971. Any reports prior to 13 October 1971 would have been in relation to IS and similar in nature to the reports I have been provided with.
72. As the Inquiry has identified, the frequency of the reports decreases from 1973 onwards. I do not believe that my reporting did decrease in frequency from 1973 onwards. As I have said, my recollection is that I submitted reports on a roughly weekly basis throughout my deployment until it ended.
73. I have also been asked whether I believe the Inquiry is missing reporting from me regarding any groups in West and/or North West London. As the Inquiry have identified, a number of the reports that I have been provided with relate to IS meetings in Croydon, which was not where most of the meetings that I went to took place. As I have already set out above, I do not believe that the reports I have been provided with represent the totality of my reporting. Any missing reporting would be about IS meetings, and the majority of it would be about

[REDACTED]

meetings and demonstrations in the Hammersmith and Fulham area (though sometimes they were held in other areas of London).

Tasking

74. I was tasked by SDS management. When I joined that was Phil Saunders and

16: [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] I believe Derek Brice might also have become a manager who tasked me later during my deployment.

75. The tasking that I received before I was deployed was general in nature, I was just told to infiltrate IS. As I have stated above, I was of the view that it would be most useful to report on IS in Hammersmith and Fulham. I would have discussed this with my managers before proceeding with that course of action.

76. During my deployment, I was generally tasked at the weekly meeting that all undercover officers would attend. Tasking was always communicated to me verbally. I would have a discussion with either Phil Saunders or [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] at 16a that meeting about what I had been doing that week and would be told if there were any upcoming demonstrations or anything of that sort that they would be interested in having more information about IS involvement with. For example, if there was an upcoming visit from a foreign dignitary, and there was the possibility of public disorder during that visit, they would be interested in the likely IS involvement in demonstrations related to that.

77. Sometimes, if a report was urgent, I would call it in on the telephone. I would sometimes receive tasking during that telephone call.



78. I was not tasked with how to obtain particular pieces of information. My information would always be obtained in the same way: attending meetings and demonstrations of IS.
79. I was not told how long my deployment would last, it was open ended. I was tasked towards IS, and was able to provide useful intelligence. Had my deployment not been providing useful intelligence, I might have been re-deployed into a different group. I always knew it would be long-term in the sense of being for months or years as opposed to just a few weeks.
80. I cannot remember what intelligence about my group I was provided with before I was deployed. I did not see reports from any other undercover officer whilst I was deployed, though if people from different groups were at the same demonstration, we likely would have discussed it, at least briefly, at the weekly meeting.
81. It was not my choice to be tasked towards IS, I was just told that was the group that I should infiltrate. They were a large group who would attend lots of demonstrations, so it made sense to have intelligence on their activities from a public order policing perspective. They were also a Trotskyist subversive groups with links into Irish groups, so I can also understand why they were of interest to Special Branch from a subversion point of view.
82. There were no changes to the group I was tasked towards during my deployment, or changes to how I was tasked, or the kind of information I should be reporting. I had considerable discretion as to what I reported on during my deployment within sensible parameters.



83. I was a trained Special Branch officer, so I knew the kinds of things that the MPS would be interested in by reference to the major issues of the day: Ireland, Anti-Vietnam protests, Industrial Disputes. Obviously if there was a demonstration coming up, any information about that would be of interest. I might also decide to choose to mention a particular individual in a report if they appeared to be a rising star in IS who might set direction and policy. That is the kind of information that Special Branch was interested in. The overarching goal was to provide information that might impact public order, and about the activities of subversive groups who intended to undermine parliamentary democracy.
84. As I have set out above, sometimes my reporting would cover the activities of other groups where they crossed over with the activities of IS. If the AIL was discussed at an IS meeting, for example, I would have put that in my report.

Premises

85. During my time in the SDS it had an office at New Scotland Yard (which I did not attend whilst I was deployed). As I have said above, there was also a 'safe house', which was the flat that myself and other offices would attend for the weekly meeting. The location of that flat changed at least once whilst I was in the SDS. I recall that one of the flats was in a mews somewhere in the central 16b  London, and another was in south-east London 16c

Pattern of life whilst undercover

86. I assumed my cover identity whenever I would go to a meeting or demonstration. In a 'normal' week I would go to a couple of meetings per week and then a demonstration at the weekend. Sometimes demonstrations would be small local



events, sometimes they would be large protests in the centre of London. IS meetings were not at the same time every week, so there was no set pattern to what my week would involve. When I was not at meetings I would sometimes spend time at my cover flat.

87. I would also attend the weekly meeting at the safe house, and would hand write my reports at home. Although that sounds like I was not very busy, it did not feel that way. Because of the timing of IS meetings and demonstrations there were late nights and weekend working.

88. Life in the SDS was totally different to normal Special Branch work. When I was at the Yard I would go into the office every morning in business attire. I would operate in accordance with whichever squad I was attached to which would generally include a lot of desk work. As I have said above, we would go along to meetings in plain clothes, but then I would immediately return to the office again. I would have set working hours, unlike the SDS when you would go to meetings and demonstrations whenever they were held. I did not set foot in New Scotland Yard whilst I was deployed.

Pay and overtime

89. I do not remember being in the SDS as having any effect on my take home pay. When you worked on public holidays or weekends, you would however be given the option of taking those days as leave or being paid for time in lieu. I would always take them as leave, which meant I ended up with quite a lot of holiday, but no extra pay.



90. I would use the time off to go travelling, which worked with my legend as someone who was not very reliable and prone to drop in and out of IS.
91. My cover flat was paid for by the office, and I also submitted receipts for money that I spent on fuel for my cover vehicle. I do not remember claiming any other expenses during my time in the SDS.

Particular questions arising from reporting on International Socialists

92. I have been shown a report dated 3 November 1971, pp54-57 of the document with Relativity reference number MPS-0731848 "(Doc 6:)", and have been asked what my understanding of the extent of the SDS's interest in the Women's Liberation Movement (WLM) was.
93. I do not remember the meeting or writing this report. I do not know what interest SDS management may have had in the WLM. I can see from reading the report that I am reporting on the WLM because that is the topic the speaker was addressing. I would report public meetings in the same manner that I did when I was a Special Branch desk officer, including the topic discussed, and who was publically affiliating themselves with the platform of the group who was hosting the meeting, in this case IS.
94. I have been shown a report dated 18 November 1971, Relativity reference MPS-0731845 "(Doc 9:)", and have been asked what my understanding of the extent of the SDS's interest in the Clerical and Administrative Worker's Union (CAWU) was.
95. I do not remember the meeting or writing this report. I do not know what interest the SDS management may have had in the CAWU. There is a reference number



next to CAWU's name near the end of that document. That would be because there was already a Special Branch file on the CAWU. I do not know what interest Special Branch may have had in the CAWU.

96. The Inquiry have asked why a number of my reports concern IS activities vis-à-vis trade unions. Part of IS philosophy was to mobilise the proletariat as the vanguard of the revolution, if necessary by supporting union activity. IS would encourage industrial action and deploy to picket lines in support. This had clear public order implications, so I felt it was appropriate to report on it.
97. I do not know what happened with any of my reporting after I submitted it, that was dealt with by the back office. It would no doubt have been copied to the Security Service as they were the lead agency for counter subversion.
98. I have been shown a report dated 23 November 1971, Relativity reference MPS-0731852 "(Doc 11:)", and asked how I came into possession of the document appended to the report. I do not remember how I came to have this document, but I probably would have been given it at a meeting.
99. I have been shown a report dated 1 December 1971, Relativity reference MPS-0731853 "(Doc 12:)". I have been asked why I considered it necessary to report what was said at the meeting and why I provided a physical description of the speaker.
100. I have no recollection of the meeting or writing this report, however looking at paragraph 5 of the report, I can see that I was reporting on future recruitment tactics of IS. That is something that in my view Special Branch would have been interested in, as it is relevant to how IS might grow as a group. It is normal police



procedure to provide a physical description of someone you cannot identify who appears significant. That way, they might later be identified by another officer who encounters them.

101. I have been shown a report dated 18 January 1972, Relativity reference UCPI0000007937 "(Doc 19:)", and asked how I came into possession of the documents appended to it, and why I considered it necessary to report on and provide copies of these documents.

102. I do not remember how I came into possession of these documents. I would have been handed them by someone, probably at a meeting. The documents set out IS's position on various issues.

103. IS were of interest to Special Branch both because they were often present at demonstrations, and because they were a Trotskyist subversive group that was seeking to use the trade union movement to promote its own goals, i.e. revolution by the proletariat. Special Branch was interested in information about subversive groups whose goal was to undermine parliamentary democracy. Any information which might inform Special Branch as to what that group might do next was useful. These documents appeared to me to be of that sort, as they set out IS's beliefs and broad aims for the future.

104. I have been shown a report dated 24 January 1972, Relativity reference UCPI0000007938 "(Doc 20:)", and asked how I came into possession of the document appended to it, and why I considered it necessary to report on and provide copies of this document.



105. Once again, I do not remember how I came into possession of this document. For the same reasons as set out at paragraph 103 above, this document would have been of interest to Special Branch. In addition, it relates to IS plans to support and encourage industrial action, which may well have public order implications.
106. I have been shown a second report dated 24 January 1972, Relativity reference UCPI0000007939 "(Doc21:)". I do not remember this meeting or writing this report. I have been asked to what extent I reported on the activities of the Anti-Apartheid movement. The answer is that I did not, save to the extent that IS were involved in Anti-Apartheid demonstrations. This report relates to IS support for a proposed demonstration in Central London.
107. I have also been asked to what extent I reported on the activities of the Rhodesia Emergency Campaign Committee. Again, I did not, save to the extent that IS interacted with them in support of the Anti-Apartheid movement by attending demonstrations.
108. I have also been asked to what extent I reported on the activities of Amnesty International. Again, I did not report on them, save for the fact that they organised this particular demonstration.
109. I have been shown a report dated 10 March 1972, Relativity reference UCPI0000007889 "(Doc 25:)", and asked how I came into possession of the document attached to the report. I do not remember how I came to be in possession of the report, but it would have been given to me by a member of IS, probably at a meeting.



110. I have been shown a report dated 27 April 1972, Relativity reference UCPI0000007931 "(Doc 29:)". The report relates to a conference held between 1 and 3 April 1972 but is dated 27 April 1972. I have been asked why that is and how I was able to report so much detail about the conference 3 weeks after it had taken place.
111. The Inquiry has assumed that date on the report is the date that it was written. That is not correct. The date on the report is the date it was finalised and submitted.
112. I would have made notes every day after the attending the conference, and after the conference had finished I would have hand written my report. It is a long report so that would have taken me a while. It is also non-urgent, as no immediate police response was required in response to it (unlike a report on an upcoming demonstration). I would have handed my hand-written report in at the next weekly meeting, and it then would have been typed up by someone in the office. Because it was such a long report the typed version would then have been given back to me at the weekly meeting after that so I could make corrections. A final version of the report would then have been typed up. That whole process could take a long time, hence the disparity between the dates of the conference and the date on the report.
113. I have been shown a report dated 18 May 1972, Relativity reference UCPI0000007894 "(Doc 31:)". I have been asked how I came by information about national branches of IS and why I considered it necessary to report information about national branches. I do not remember writing this report, how I came by the information, or whether I was asked to report on national



branches. From reading the document I can see that it refers to IS cooperation with Clann na h'Eireann, IMG and Maoists. All of those were groups of interest to Special Branch. The threat of Irish terrorism at that time was significant, so if I came into possession of information about Irish groups and their supporters of course I would have reported it.

114. I have been shown a report dated 18 September 1972, Relativity reference UCPI0000007986 (Doc 33:), and a report dated 11 November 1972, Relativity reference MPS-0728859 (Doc 35:). As I have set out above at paragraph 64, I only reported on the AIL to the extent that it was discussed at IS meetings or by members of IS.

115. I have been shown a report dated 9 August 1973, Relativity reference UCPI0000007908 "(Doc 44:)", and asked how I came into possession of the document attached to the report. I do not remember how I came into possession of it. Once again, I probably would have been given the document at a meeting.

116. I have been shown a report dated 23 October 1973, Relativity reference UCPI0000007910 "(Doc 46:)". I have been asked what information I based the report on and what caused me to write a report of this nature.

117. I do not remember writing this report. I would have written it on the basis of information I had learned at various meetings of IS. As an officer reporting on a Trotskyist subversive organisation I would have thought that its contents were something that Special Branch would wish to know about. I doubt I would have been specifically asked for a report like this, however it talks about the direction

[REDACTED]

that IS were intending to move and who the main people in the organisation were.

118. My remit was to gather intelligence on IS. That was both with a view to public order, but also information that was relevant to counter subversion. What they were doing politically, how they were organised, and the identity of influential individuals was all important information.

119. I have been shown a report dated 28 November 1973, Relativity reference UCPI0000007920 "(Doc 48:)". There is a disparity between the date of the conference it reports on and the date of the report. The reason for the disparity is the same as in relation to the report dated 27 April 1972 (Doc 29:), see paragraphs 111 to 112 above.

Trade Unions

120. I did not join any trade union whilst I was undercover in the SDS. Although IS encouraged its members to join unions, it was easy for me not to do that as a van driver in a small company would not be unionised.

121. I probably would have attended demonstrations in support of industrial action that were organised by trade unions, but I did not become involved in their affairs.

Public Order & Violence

122. I frequently witnessed public disorder whilst I was serving undercover with the SDS. Some of the demonstrations I attended were massive. Thousands of



people would go marching. Often they would become heated and disorder would break out.

123. Buildings and statues would be damaged. People would throw missiles and flick coins into the eyes of police officers. That might not sound too bad until you are on the receiving end of it, which I have been when in uniformed roles. Coins would be thrown like discuses; it could do some real damage.

124. I saw marbles thrown under the hooves of police horses and banners used like jousting poles to unhorse mounted officers or attack police lines. If you found yourself at the front of a demonstration like that it was very frightening.

125. Although groups like IS were non-democratic in their politics, and would be very vocal, they would not set out to specifically cause trouble. Violence would rarely come directly from IS members. There would, however, be a minority of other groups also attending the same protests who were hell-bent on violence, and changing the nature of the demonstrations.

126. Even when the main body of the demonstration was not violent, there could still be issues from those demonstrators. When a large body of people decide to move in a certain direction it can be difficult to stop it. The people at the back would not know why the people at the front had stopped so would try to push through. People would get pushed into police lines. This would sometimes result in clashes.

127. The demonstrations were a big issue for the police. They could not allow them to go unpoliced or go wherever they wanted unimpeded. A lot of the



demonstrations were directed at the US Embassy on Grosvenor Square. When they went along, shops and other property would sometimes get damaged.

128. Those who were intent on causing violence would often try and provoke the police into a reaction. Some of the more radical elements of the extreme left sought to provoke police violence as they thought it would elicit public sympathy for their cause.

129. Whilst I did not participate in public disorder at these demonstrations, I was often caught up in it, along with the rest of the non-violent protestors. Sometimes that was very unpleasant, however I did not suffer any serious injuries.

Subversion

130. Monitoring and gather intelligence on subversive groups was one of the key roles of Special Branch. It was always a partnership with the Security Service, who had national responsibility for subversion in the same way that we had national responsibility for Irish matters. Since they had the lead they would have received copies of Special Branch reports of that nature. There was probably an exchange of information at a senior level, but that was not something I was ever party to.

131. I witnessed a lot of subversive activity whilst I was deployed undercover. IS were constantly trying to exploit whatever industrial or political situation that existed in the aim of getting the proletariat to rise up. During industrial disputes they would deploy to picket lines and stand there in solidarity.

132. I believe that my reporting was provided to the Security Service, but I did not have sight of who my reports were copied to.



133. I did not have any personal contact with the Security Service during my time in the SDS.

Sexual relationships

134. I did not engage in any sexual activity whilst in my undercover identity.

Other relationships

135. I did not form any close personal relationships during my time with the SDS. As I have said at paragraph 40 above, I tried to be seen as a good comrade, but I do not think that anyone would have regarded me as their friend. I deliberately avoided forming relationships of that sort.

136. I did not assume any position of trust within any group I reported on. As I have also set out at paragraph 48 above I cultivated a reputation for being flaky and unreliable to avoid that situation.

Criminal justice

137. I did not participate in any criminal activity whilst I was in the SDS.

138. I was never arrested, charged, tried or convicted of a criminal offence whilst in the SDS.

139. I have never appeared in criminal proceedings as a witness in my undercover identity.

140. My role in the SDS has never been disclosed in connection with any legal proceedings.



141. I did not provoke, encourage or cause any other person to participate in any criminal activity whilst I was in the SDS.

142. To my knowledge, the product of my reporting was never used in support of, or otherwise disclosed in connection with, a criminal investigation or prosecution.

143. I have never provided evidence for use in any prosecution arising from my undercover deployment.

Other legal or disciplinary proceedings

144. I was not otherwise involved in any legal proceedings in my cover identity.

145. I was never involved in any way in any complaint against a police officer or any disciplinary proceedings involving a police officer in my cover identity.

Legal professional privilege

146. I did not receive any legally privileged information whilst I was in the SDS.

Elected politicians

147. I do not believe that any of the people upon whom I reported were elected politicians.

148. The only time that politicians would have been mentioned in my reporting would have been if they were speaking at a public event. For example, I have had sight of a report dated 11 November 1972, Relativity reference MPS-0728859 (Doc 35:), which is a report of an upcoming demonstration at which Bernadette Devlin MP was due to speak.



The use to which my reporting was put

149. I did not see what happened to my reporting after I submitted it. I assume that things relevant to public order would have been sanitised and sent to uniform branch. Anything to do with subversion would have gone into Special Branch records and to the Security Service.
150. I believe that my reporting about upcoming demonstrations helped uniformed officers to be appropriately deployed at those demonstrations.
151. I believe my reporting was of assistance to the Security Service as I was reporting on a subversive group, but I cannot speak as to how my reporting was used by them.

Withdrawal from deployment

152. I cannot remember the exact date my deployment ended. I have been shown excerpts of my personnel file (Doc 1), page 10 of which states that I left the SDS in September 1974. I assume that date is correct, and it corresponds with my broad recollection.
153. It was my decision that my deployment should end. I had eventually just had enough of the life of being an undercover officer. I was a young single man and being deployed undercover made it very difficult to have any kind of personal life. I was also tired of not being able to speak to anyone about what I did. I spoke to management and asked to come off the unit.
154. Management were absolutely fine about that decision, and were very supportive of me.

[REDACTED]

155. I do not recall there being a rule that an undercover officer should serve no longer than 12 months as stated in the 'Penetration of Extremist Groups' document (Doc 2).

156. I agreed with management that I would undertake a phased withdrawal, and that I would tell members of my group that I was going travelling for a while.

157. I do not remember exactly how long my withdrawal took, but it was not instantaneous. It took at least a few weeks, and possibly a few months. The reason for that was that a suitable vacancy had to be found for me elsewhere.

17 [sets out area where found.]
Eventually one arose in [REDACTED]. There was a policy of getting SDS officers away from London after their deployments, although I do not think that happened in all cases.

158. I did not contact anyone from IS or any other group after my deployment ended.

Managers and administrative staff

159. Conrad Dixon was not a member of SDS management when I was in it. To my knowledge, he had nothing to do with the unit during the time that I was in it. I never met him.

160. The managers of the SDS when I joined the unit were Phil Saunders (who was a Chief Inspector) and [REDACTED HN294] (who was a Detective Inspector). 18

161. I believe that during my deployment that Phil Saunders left, [REDACTED HN294] 18
became the CI, and Derek Brice became the DI. It is, however, difficult to be sure now that so many years have passed.



162. There was also a man in the office – Dave Smith. They would answer the telephone, and when it was urgent take reports over the telephone. They would come to most of the weekly meetings at the cover flat and collect in all of the handwritten reports from the field officers. Special Branch had a secure vetted typing pool, so they would have typed up our hand written reports.

Management and supervision: general arrangements

18

163. The managers I had routine contact with were Phil Saunders, **HN294** and, later, Derek Brice. One of them would always be at the weekly meeting at the safe house. I would sometimes speak to them on the telephone as well. I rarely saw or spoke to them outside of that.

164. My conversations with them would usually be an update on what the current situation within IS was, and if there were any demonstrations coming up that were likely to cause public order issues and what I knew about them. If I had had any concerns about compromise or I had any welfare issues I would raise them. I would also discuss the usual administrative things like my leave entitlement and when I wished to take holiday.

165. I would generally submit my reports at the weekly meeting in longhand written format. They would then be typed up. If the report was urgent I would telephone it in. As I have said above, I submitted reports on a roughly weekly basis, though there would sometimes be weeks when I would submit several, or none.

166. There were no formal welfare arrangements that I recall in terms of counselling. However, I always felt able to raise any issues of concern to me. If I thought I had been compromised and needed to be moved, I believe that would have been

[REDACTED]

handled sensitively and positively. There were probably officers who did have issues of that kind. In my view this system was perfectly adequate and fit for purpose.

Senior management and oversight bodies

167. Occasionally senior managers would visit the safe house when the weekly meeting took place. That would happen a couple of times per year. I cannot be sure who they were now but I think the Commander (Ops), the Head of Special Branch, and possibly the Assistant Commissioner of the MPS may have visited. Generally, they would just come over and tell us what a fine job the unit was doing. My experience in Special Branch was that most senior officers held the SDS in high regard as an effective intelligence gathering unit.

168. To my knowledge, no outside body with any form of regulatory or oversight responsibility for policing visited the SDS during my tour of duty.

169. I did not receive any form of commendation for my work as an SDS officer.

Deployments of contemporaries

170. I have been asked whether the following individuals worked within the SDS, and if so whether their service overlapped with mine and what role they performed. I have given my answers under each of their names below.

a. Conrad Dixon

Worked within the SDS, but before my time. I believe they were the CI.

[REDACTED]

b. [REDACTED] HN332 [REDACTED] 21

Worked within the SDS, but before my time. I do not know what role they had.

c. Derek Kneale

I do not know if they were involved with the SDS.

d. Phil Saunders

Part of the management structure of the SDS at the time I was in the unit. They were my CI when I joined.

e. Derek Brice

Part of the management structure of the SDS at the time I was in the unit. They may have been a DS when I joined, and I believe they became a DI. I am not sure if they were still in the unit when I left it.

f. Paul Croyden

I cannot recall if they were involved with the SDS.

g. [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] 24

Part of the management structure of the SDS at the time I was in the unit. They were a DI when I joined. [REDACTED] 24

Provides details of rank

h. Matthew Roger



I do not know if they were involved with the SDS.

i. Geoffrey Craft

Worked within the SDS but after my time so I am not sure of his role. I believe they were in a management role.

j. David Smith

Worked within the SDS at the same time as me. They were a member of administrative staff in the office.

k. Les Willingale

Worked within the SDS but after my time. I believe they were in a management role.


171. I have also been asked if the following individuals were deployed as SDS undercover officers and whether their service overlapped with mine. I have given my answers under each of their names below, as best as I can recall:

29A

HN343 recalls that officers, including the following, were deployed undercover and their service overlapped with his: HN353, HN351, HN298, HN338, HN303, HN344, HN45, HN301, HN68, HN299/342, Jill Mosdell, HN340, HN348. HN343 recalls that officers, including the following, worked within the SDS, but before or after he joined the unit: HN326, HN336. HN343 believed that officers, including the following, worked within the SDS and were deployed undercover but was not sure whether their service overlapped with his: HN345, HN339, HN300. HN343 did not know if officers, including the following, worked within the SDS: HN351, Dave Fisher, HN13, Barry Moss, HN347, HN200."




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


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




29A



29A



172. I have been asked several questions in the Rule 9 request about various individuals.

59a

a. I cannot recall if [redacted] HN68 [redacted] was a member of the SDS throughout my time in the unit. I know our deployments did overlap, but I am not sure for how long.

b. I do not remember David Fisher being in the SDS.

61

c. I do not know if [redacted] HN332 [redacted] used a cover name whilst serving in the SDS.

d. I do not know if Conrad Dixon used a cover name whilst serving in the SDS.

62

e. I do not know if [redacted] HN294 [redacted] used a cover name whilst serving in the SDS.

173. I do not recall serving with anyone else other than the individuals named above.

174. I do not know if any of my contemporaries in the SDS:

[REDACTED]

- a. Committed a criminal offence whilst undercover;
- b. Provoked, encouraged or caused a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst deployed;
- c. Engaged in sexual activities whilst in a cover identity;
- d. Were arrested, charged, tried or convicted in their undercover identities.
I remember hearing a suggestion that [REDACTED] HN68 [REDACTED] had been "lifted" which I understood to mean arrested for a minor offence, but I do not know any details, whether it is true, nor do I know how it was resolved;
- e. Were involved in any incidents of public disorder, violence or any other criminal activity whilst they were deployed. We often found ourselves caught up in public disorder at demonstrations, but I am not aware of anyone participating in it;
- f. Reported any legally privileged information whilst deployed; or
- g. Reported on the activities of any elected politicians whilst deployed.

63

175. I believe my contemporaries achieved a huge amount for the benefit of policing. You have to place the unit into the historical context it arose out of. There had been violent student protests in France in the late 60's which had almost toppled the government. The scale and level of violence at the protests in London was unprecedented. The MPS were, prior to the establishment of the SDS, completely underprepared to deal with the protests as it had very little intelligence to inform how its resources should be deployed. Resources deployed to deal with a demonstration would leave other areas of London under

[REDACTED]

policed. By helping to solve this problem my contemporaries and I made a very significant contribution to policing.

176. As I have said, the Security Service had national responsibility for counter subversion. It would really be for them to say whether our reporting assisted that, although I believe that it would have done.

Post deployment

Period immediately after leaving the SDS

177. I do not remember taking any time off after my deployment ended. I probably took the balance of my leave, but there was no mandatory cooling off period. That suited me fine.

178. I do not recall being formally debriefed by anyone, but there would have been conversations about what had been achieved during my deployment, and what needed to be done in terms laying the groundwork for whoever took over from me.

179. I was not offered any ongoing advice or support by the SDS or the MPS following my withdrawal. I was, however, posted to Port duties, which took the pressure off me and helped avoid the risk of compromise. I believe that the SDS management tried to do their best for me.

Post Special Demonstration Squad police career



64

180. My first posting after leaving the SDS was to




Sets out role

181. I do not think my work in the SDS had any effect on my later postings.

65

182.




Sets out subsequent career

183.

184.

I consider that one of my subsequent roles exposed me to a risk of being identified. I asked not to be placed in that role but was put there nonetheless. I believe they were eager to have professional and reliable people in this particular role, and that was treated as more important than my concerns.

185.



Sets out subsequent career details, including spending a few months on the C Squad in the late 1980s.


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186. I have been asked what contact with or knowledge of the SDS I had in during this posting. I recall having some awareness of the unit existing, but I did not know what they were doing or which groups they were infiltrating. I would have received intelligence gathered from the SDS, but it would have been sanitised and not obviously from them. I had no meetings or contact with anyone in the SDS.

187. I have been asked to comment on what the role of the SDS was during this posting in relation to: disorder in industry, subversion, extreme left, and public order. That is not something I am able do. As I have said, I was not privy to what the SDS were doing during that time.

188.



65

189.

Sets out subsequent career

190. I retired from the MPS in **the mid 1990s.** 66

191. I have been asked whether being on the SDS had any long term impact on my welfare. Whilst it definitely changed me as a person, I have not had any psychological issues as a result of it.



192. I was never offered any welfare or support services by the MPS as a result of me being a former undercover police officer, but I do not feel that I ever needed those services.

Leaving the police

67

193. I retired from the MPS. I was a **senior rank** I left on positive terms after 30 years' service.

68

194.



Sets out current employment.

Undercover work in the private sector

195. I was not given any instructions or guidance about working undercover in the private sector, nor the use of any cover identity before leaving the MPS.

196. I did not undertake any undercover work after leaving the MPS for any organisation in the private sector, either as an undercover operative, or as an organiser, or as a manager, or as a supervisor of such work.

Any other matters

197. I do not believe there are any other matters about which I am able to give evidence which are of relevance to the work of the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

Request for documents



198. I do not possess any documents or other information which are potentially relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference.

199. The only documents I have seen prior to preparing this statement are those attached to the Rule 9 request.

200. My memory has not been refreshed by any other documents prior to the preparation of this statement.

Diversity

201. I am a white British male.

Supplementary Material

202. The Inquiry has made a further rule 9 request and asked me to comment on 4 specific intelligence reports. These formed part of the original rule 9 pack of documents but the Inquiry did not ask me any specific questions on them in the first rule 9. I address the reports and the questions below.

Intelligence Reports

203. I have been asked some additional rule 9 questions by the Inquiry in relation to four reports (MPS-0735005: doc 8) (MPS-0731851: doc 10) (**MPS-0731854** doc 13) and (**MPS-0731828** doc 15). As explained in my first statement, I cannot recall the specifics of many of the meetings that I attended, nor the individuals with whom I dealt. Each of the four



documents that I have now been asked about bear my real name at the bottom by way of a typed signature. They do not bear my handwritten signature.

204. Although the documents bear my typed name, it is unlikely that I would have typed any of these documents myself, and I am also unlikely to have seen the final document. Where I refer at paragraph 4 above to having written reports, what I am referring to is having provided the contents of the report to the back office staff. When submitting reports whilst undercover, I would mainly have submitted handwritten notes of information when I attended the SDS meetings which would then have been typed up by or via a member of back office staff. I may also have provided information verbally to back office staff at those meetings. Alternatively, where the information was urgent, I may have telephoned it in and provided an oral report over the telephone. Again, that information would have been typed up and put into a written report by or via a member of back office staff.

205. Where I provided a substantial amount of information such as a report of a conference, it is more likely that I would have been provided a draft of the report and had the ability to make any corrections. However, I am unlikely to have seen the typed reports of events from ordinary meetings. Where a report or annex to a report contains  RF references, this is not information that I would have been aware of, but is information that the back office staff would have had access to, and attached to or included in the report.

206. Whilst I did not type the reports, it is my understanding that the information would be put into a sanitised form, and that the information may be placed on a variety of files (to which a number of different people would have access). Given the



sensitivity of the existence of the SDS, it is unlikely that the report would be written in a way that drew attention to its existence, or written in the first person. I cannot say whether I would have provided all of the information in any given report, and it is possible that a report contained information from more than one source, albeit that the final report bore my name.

207. In respect of the report dated 22 November 1971 relating to a meeting on 18 November 1971 (Doc 10: MPS-0731851) I do not recall specifically attending this meeting or the contents of the report. I do recall that I attended a number of meetings in the first year of my deployment in the Croydon area, and therefore it is possible that I attended this meeting. The report states that five persons were present and lists the names, although this does not include my cover name.

208. I do not believe that my cover name is included on any of the lists of names of attendees at meetings over my deployment. When submitting my report (whether handwritten or oral) the management or back office would generally have been aware whether I was at a meeting as I would have likely informed them during the previous meeting if I knew where I was going. I would not necessarily expressly have said that I was present at the meeting, but it may well have been apparent from the report provided. I would have reported those present who I had identified and likely given the number or approximate number of attendees.

209. As explained above, I would not have typed up the final report, and therefore cannot comment on why the typist of the report has written it in this way. I note that none of the reports that I have seen include my name, but am unaware whether this was a matter of policy at the time. It is possible that the person



typing the report did not want to draw attention to my cover name or the existence of the SDS. It is likely that when submitting my report (whether handwritten or verbal) that the focus would be on providing the details of those present rather than expressly stating that I was there, and the fact that I was present would be obvious from the contents of what I reported to the back office staff.

210. I have been asked whether the information in this report could have come from a different source. I think that it is unlikely that this information came from a different source, and believe that is more likely than not that I attended the meeting.

211. I have also been asked about three reports relating to three separate Croydon IS meetings held at Ruskin House in Croydon. The first meeting dated 11 November 1971 was a public meeting (in report of 17 November 1971 **MPS-0735005** doc 8) and then the next two meetings were branch meetings on 7 December and 13 December 1971 respectively (in reports dated 7 and 13 December 1971 respectively **MPS-0731854** doc 13 and **MPS-0731828** doc 15). Again, I have no specific recollection of the contents of any of these meetings, although I do recall attending some meetings in the Croydon area. Again, each report is signed (by way of typed signature in my real name albeit no handwritten signature). The fact that the report bears my name suggests to me that it is more likely than not that I attended those meetings and provided some or all of the information to the back office. Given the reports are relatively short and each relates to one particular meeting, it seems more likely than not that I provided all of the information in them.



Cover Name

212. Since submitting my statement dated 28 November 2018, I have also been asked about whether my cover surname may not have been Clinton but rather a different surname. I understand that the Inquiry has been provided a document, which I have not seen, and which gave rise to that suggestion. It has since been clarified that the Inquiry is satisfied that the document does not refer to me.

213. Having been asked whether I might have had a different surname, I initially thought that there is a possibility that this was the cover name that I used during my SDS deployment. However, I could not be sure. As the Inquiry is aware my deployment took place over 45 years ago. I have not been provided a single document that confirms my cover name and so can only go by my recollection. What I can confirm is that when undercover in the International Socialists I only used one cover name. When deployed I would have used my cover surname relatively rarely and would mainly have gone by the first name of my cover name "John". Given the Inquiry has now satisfied itself that the other document does not relate to me, I think it most likely that my cover surname was Clinton, as was my original recollection. Otherwise paragraphs 2, and 43-45 of my original statement are accurate.

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed: 71
HN343

Dated: 72
29 May 2019