Cover Sheet
IN THE MATTER OF THE UNDERCOVER POLICING INQUIRY

WITNESS STATEMENT OF HN340

1. This witness statement is made in response to a Rule 9 request dated 7 June 2019. It provides my full recollection of my deployment as an undercover police officer ("UCO") within the Special Demonstration Squad ("SDS") of the Metropolitan Police Service ("MPS").

Personal details

2. I am HN340 and my date of birth is 1940s. I am known in this Public Inquiry by the nominal HN340.

3. There is a Restriction Order in force in respect of my real name dated 9 October 2018. When I was a UCO, my rank was Detective Sergeant.

Police career before and after serving with the Special Demonstration Squad

4. I joined the Metropolitan Police Service as a police cadet in the late 1950s. I was sworn in as a police constable in the early 1960s.
5. I was posted to Details of HN340's police career before joining Special Branch. At that time, I knew that Special Branch ('SB') existed and I had occasional contact with them in my role.

6. I joined SB towards the Mid 1960s as a Detective Constable. I recall that I had only been in SB a short while when George Blake escaped from Wormwood Scrubs and all SB personnel were put onto the search. I was at a posting in London for a full 24 hours on the Sunday and had been due to go to Magistrates' Court the following Monday. When I let the officer in charge know, I was told to get on with it — that was the mentality of SB.

7. I was posted to Details of subsequent Special Branch posting.

8. Details of further Special Branch postings, including a posting to 'C' squad.

9. My roles prior to joining the SDS did not involve any undercover policing or any requirement to use a cover identity.
Special Demonstration Squad – Formation

10. I was working outside London when the protest against the Vietnam War turned nasty outside the United States’ Embassy in Grosvenor Square. The stories of what had occurred filtered out to us and it was clear even at the time that our uniformed colleagues had been unprepared for the scale of the demonstration and the violence which accompanied it. Even though we had no direct knowledge, it also seemed clear that SB might have shared part of the blame because of our role in gathering pre-emptive intelligence to share with our uniformed colleagues: clearly it had not been effective on that occasion.

11. At the time, SB did not publicise its role and SB officers worked very much on a ‘need-to-know’ basis. While it may seem naïve, I have always respected that policy. In New Scotland Yard in about late 1969, I started to hear rumours about a group within SB nicknamed the ‘hairies’, and I cannot be sure whether I presumed there was a link between them and the Grosvenor Square protest at the time or I have made the connection since. I do not know who was involved in the decision to set up the SDS.

Selection for the Special Demonstration Squad

12. I transferred to the SDS in late 1969. I was approached by DI Phil Saunders, whom I knew from my time in [department] in the mid-1960s. I had not worked with him at any point prior to that and had not seen him for a few years but he must have remembered me. He stopped me in the corridor and asked if I fancied coming on the ‘hairies’. I was not sure what he meant but I went to have a chat with him.
13. The discussion I had with DI Saunders was fairly informal. He knew that I had not been based in New Scotland Yard for a little while, so I explained where I had been and what I had done. As far as I can recall, he told me that the 'hairies' were engaged in getting advance information on demonstrations, including the times and locations, as well as the groups that were likely to participate in them, and that the hours would be irregular and would include some weekend working. It sounded like interesting work that would make the job of our uniform colleagues easier and so I agreed without much question.

14. I do not know why he picked me, although I assume that at least part of the reason was because I had been \[11A\] Knowing him, it would not have been a one-off decision. He would have had chats with people and canvassed opinion from people who knew me.

15. I was already married when I joined the SDS. \[12\] My wife did not ask for details of my work and I did not discuss it with her, particularly after I joined SB. I explained that I was changing roles and that it would require more evening and weekend work and she did not enquire further. To the best of my knowledge, none of my managers spoke with my wife either before, during or after my SDS deployment.
Training and guidance in the Special Demonstration Squad

16. I did not receive any training for my undercover role beyond a brief discussion with Mike Ferguson, who instructed me to create a cover name and get a cover address and cover job. The officers who were already deployed did not come to New Scotland Yard, so I could not draw on their experience. Mike Ferguson's only real advice was to "play it by ear". I was not aware of any manuals or other materials.

17. I have been shown the Home Office circular (MPS-0727104) and this is the first time that I have seen this document. I do not recall being briefed on its contents.

18. I was not given any advice, guidance or instructions on becoming involved in the private lives of others or entering into sexual relationships. Similarly, while I do not recall any structured guidance about avoiding participating in, provoking or encouraging criminal activity, I believe it may have been mentioned and police officers of that period would have viewed it as common sense.

19. I was not given advice, guidance or instructions about what to do if I was arrested or had to appear in court in any way. Until giving this statement, I was not aware of the concept of legally privileged information, and do not recall being given any advice, instructions or guidance about what to do if I obtained this.

20. As regards the above, and any ethical or legal limitations to my role as an undercover officer, the best way to summarise the position is that we were
trusted as Detective Sergeants and Detective Constables to use our common sense and good judgement, reinforced by our previous police training, particularly the 'Instructions' – the manual we received during initial training at Hendon, to act correctly and avoid getting into any form of trouble. As far as I was aware, nothing had gone wrong in previous deployments, and so there was no perceived need for additional training.

21. I do not recall being given any additional advice, guidance or instructions on any of the matters above at any stage during my deployment. As far as I recall, there was no training on race equality in the MPS at any time prior to the end of my deployment.

Undercover identity

22. My cover name was either Alan Nixon or Andy Bailey. I would have chosen one or the other, and on reflection I believe it was Andy Bailey. I was not known by any other names or nicknames during my deployment.

Sets out method of creating cover name

Beyond that, it was a question of what I could remember easily and I was not given any specific guidance on how to choose my cover name. I clearly recall that I did not go to the records office when I was creating my cover name. It was not a deceased child's identity and I did not use any other aspect of a deceased child's or any other person's life or identity to create my cover identity.

23. When I was first asked by the Inquiry about a cover name, I could only remember that I might have used Alan Nixon. During the course of making
this statement, I believe that I may actually have used Andy Bailey but I still cannot be sure, and it is only because Andy Bailey appears when my name ceases to be used in some of the reports that I have come to this conclusion. It may equally be an unfortunate coincidence. I cannot easily explain this confusion other than to state that, when I finished my deployment, I did my best to put my undercover identity out of my mind and the intervening 45 years have done the rest.

24. I had no meaningful back story or 'legend' to support my cover identity. This was not covered in the very limited guidance I was given, although in hindsight I can see how it might have been useful. As far as I can recall, I had no identity documents in my cover name at the outset. I believe my driving licence was in my real name. I cannot recall if I ever had a driving licence in my cover identity.

25. I have been shown DCI Dixon’s memorandum on the penetration of extremist groups (MPS-0724119) but his suggested methodology bears very little similarity to how my undercover identity was created. As I have already stated, I do not believe I had any documents in my cover name when I deployed.

Cover employment

26. My cover employment was as a sales representative for a shop in Walthamstow. Provides details about the arrangement of cover employment.

It was fairly convenient and there was no special reason
for my choice beyond this. It was a small shop and I went there once and met a couple of the employees in my cover identity. I did not do any work in my cover employment.

27. I had access to a van, hired through SB, as part of my cover employment, but it only had one passenger seat in addition to the driver’s seat. I would keep a few items in the back of the van to support my cover employment.

Cover accommodation

28. My cover address was a bedsit in North London, not far from Highgate tube station, although I cannot recall the address now. I used this address throughout my deployment. The house was owned by an Irish couple. I do not know where the risk assessors got the idea that my cover address was in Golders Green.

29. I was given no guidance on finding a cover address, and arranged the room myself from an advert that I had seen — most likely in one of the North London newspapers. I had a rent book which I provided to the back office periodically — probably weekly — for it to be copied so that the back office could verify my expense claims. The amount of £22 every four weeks seems familiar (MPS-0730521).

30. It was not a very private house: the front door opened onto a corridor with the landlord’s lounge at the end. I went there once or twice each week to show my face, but I did not arrange to meet other people there. I did not give out my cover address and, unless I wrote it down on a membership
form, I would be surprised if any of the activists knew my address. It had a telephone that lodgers could use and it was convenient to get to and from meetings. On reflection, I probably did not obtain my cover address until after my deployment had started, although I cannot remember precisely when.

31. My cover accommodation was a bedsit for a single person. I did not share it with anybody else, whether another undercover officer or an activist. I did not live anywhere else than at home or at my official cover accommodation when I was deployed. There were two occasions that I can recall when I might have spent one night away from these locations as part of my deployment.

Legend building

32. As an SB officer, I was clean-shaven and my hair was trimmed, and I wore a suit and tie to work. As well as dressing down, I grew a beard and allowed my hair to grow out to collar-length. I did not spend any time living in my new identity before I made my initial approach to activists, nor did I visit anybody or anywhere as part of my preparation.

33. I used a vehicle in my cover identity but only ever as a prop to support my cover employment. I do not recall ever giving activists a lift in the van, whether before or after meetings or to and from other events, or at any other time.
Deployment

Infiltration of groups

34. I do not recall being ‘tasked’ to infiltrate any particular group. My deployment effectively began with a very strong suggestion from the chain of command – I cannot know remember who it was – that I should attend a public meeting at the Conway Hall which I believe had previously been identified as either organised by, or in some way linked to, the International Marxist Group (‘IMG’). Tariq Ali and Vanessa Redgrave spoke at this meeting and I approached both of them afterwards in the Conway Hall. I cannot recall how the conversation went but I do recall that Tariq Ali suggested that I attend the next meeting of the North London Red Circle, and I believe he supplied me with the date and location of that meeting.

35. In my view, the North London Red Circle would have regarded me as a member, albeit not straight away. I do not mean that I had a membership card but I attended its meetings relatively frequently between the mid-1970s and my withdrawal in July 1972. My understanding is that the North London Red Circle, whilst not identified to me as a ‘target’ by the chain of command, was sufficiently involved in supporting and arranging left-wing demonstrations, pickets and other events that I could provide useful reporting on potential flash-points.

36. Even after having read the supplied reports, I do not believe that the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Committee (which appears to have become the Irish Solidarity Campaign or ‘ISC’) would have regarded me as a member, but I...
cannot be sure, as I do not recall attending their meetings. For that reason, I cannot be certain of the period during which I was associated with the ISC, although from the documents I have seen, this appears to be from September 1970 until my withdrawal in July 1972. I presume that the reason for continuing to attend was because of the potential to gather information about forthcoming events, demonstrations and pickets with the intention of avoiding or preventing public order problems.

37. As I have already mentioned, I do not recall any of the specific reports. To the extent that the reports have my name at the bottom, I believe that these were typed from information that I provided, even if they incorporated additional information as well. In particular, I would not have been able to include file references for individuals or organisations: this information would only have been available to back office staff. If the report had been seen and approved by me once typed, I would have signed it in addition to my name and rank being typed on it: that was the SB way of doing things.

38. Having considered the documents provided to me for the purposes of making this statement, it seems that there is a significant quantity of information which is not present that I would have provided at the time. I cannot be certain that all of my handwritten notes were typed up into reports that bore my name at the bottom. Similarly, the occasional reports that I telephoned in because of particular urgency may not have made it into formal reports. As stated above, I did not see those reports once they were typed. Nonetheless, it seems likely to me that the information I

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provided would have been recorded somewhere because intelligence is a product of information and analysis, and if you omit certain items of information, the analysis is skewed and the intelligence is less useful.

39. I do not recall whether I checked with the chain of command about the North London Red Circle, or received any further formal direction from them. As far as I was concerned, the deployment was open-ended from the outset, although it was assumed that I could pull out if it became necessary and that I might be withdrawn, possibly with a view to being re-tasked, if I was not providing useful information.

40. Once I left the back office, I did not have any access to SB sources of information. I did not return to New Scotland Yard for the duration of my deployment. While there may have been occasional urgent updates shared orally at the meetings at the SDS cover location, I do not recall the reason for any of these or their content.

41. I understood the primary focus of my undercover role to be the gathering of information about forthcoming events, demonstrations and pickets to prevent public order problems. Where I could provide the names of those attending, I did because those individuals might have been of interest to other squads within SB or more broadly. The same is true for what was discussed, whether as part of the meeting or at the fringes.

42. In my view, we were treated as experienced professionals and given significant discretion in how we operated. The only occasions when I can remember that discretion being restricted were when I was directed to
attend the Red Europe conference and when I was invited to join the IMG, and I was told to refuse the invitation.

Premises

43. The SDS back office was in New Scotland Yard and there was a flat in the West London area (the 'HQ Flat'). I do not recall the address. Once I deployed, the back office was effectively out of bounds. I only returned to the back office when the decision was taken to end my deployment. I visited the HQ Flat every weekday afternoon, almost without exception, to complete and put in my notes.

Pattern of life

44. The normal SB working hours were 10am - 6pm with occasional evening working and some weekends. I don't recall there being much difference in the amount of time that I was assumed to be on duty and how much I was actually on duty but the hours did not fit into quite the same regular pattern. I also don't remember it having any significant impact on my off-duty periods. During my deployment, there were SDS meetings at the HQ Flat frequently during the week if not daily, which I attended unless there was a good reason not to go. The activist meetings were mainly in the evenings, so the SDS meetings started around 1-2pm. I would write up or finish writing up what I had done and have a cuppa and a sandwich with a couple of other UCOs and staff, filling them in on any developments and giving them my paperwork. If there was a particular reason to do so, I may
have called the back office at other times from the telephone in my cover address, but more probably I would have done so from a public telephone.

45. I had some free time in the mornings during my deployment, and so I used the opportunity to get myself fit. I took limited steps to change my appearance. My superiors were aware of this and I felt fairly confident as activists were very unlikely to come across me while doing so. I would write up or complete my notes from the weekend or the previous evening’s meetings, hand them in and then get ready for that evening’s meeting.

46. I also had to remember to pay my landlord weekly in person, and get my rent book signed, as well as spending at least a bit of the week at my cover accommodation. Very often at weekends, there was a demonstration or some other event, although I tried to avoid static picket lines as I was concerned about being identified more easily in that environment. Occasionally I volunteered to sell a periodical, which may have been the Red Mole, on a Saturday morning at Archway tube station. I did not spend any time on-duty in my real identity.

*Pay and overtime*

47. As far as I can recall, serving on the SDS did not improve my take-home pay in the slightest. I would have received my salary increments in the
usual way. It certainly did not reduce my pay as I do not think that I would have continued with the role had that been the case. I would have submitted my expenses and hours worked, as recorded in my official diary, for checking on a weekly basis.

Red Europe Conference 1970

48. I have read the documents provided in relation to the arrangements for the Red Europe Conference in November 1970 (MPS-0738424, MPS-0738425, MPS-0738426, MPS-0738427, MPS-0728972 and MPS-0724189) and I remember attending this event.

49. I have been informed that this was the first overseas trip for an SDS UCO. [19]

   I was issued with an orangey-brown fold-over temporary passport, which had my photograph. [19]

50. I believe I travelled via Dover to Brussels. I remember that there was an SB officer there who was assisting the immigration officer as we passed through. He studied me closely. I knew who he was but had never worked with him before. He was trying to work out who I was. I was dreading that he would remember me, but thankfully he did not and I got through without incident.
51. I have been informed that [REDACTED] recorded in his statement for Operation Herne that we both went to the Red Conference and were issued with passports with consecutive serial numbers. I am fairly certain that we did not travel together as we were in totally separate groups. I cannot recall which group he was with at the time. I also cannot recall if our passports had consecutive numbers, but it was unlikely to have been an issue. I do not recall Mr Lawless collecting the passports together but it sounds like something he might have. I do not share the security concerns that [REDACTED] raises, even though it was a particularly stressful occasion.

52. I do not recall much from the conference itself. I do not know how many people were there, but I remember that I slept on the floor of a large hall alongside a number of activists from a variety of groups, many of whom I had never met before. I do not recall camping. I was not keen on the trip, but my supervising officers thought it would be good to go. I went to try to find out who else was attending and whether there would be any plans for significant demonstrations in the UK including groups from abroad. After SB became aware of IMG participation at the conference (MPS-0738425) and the chain of command suggested I attend, all I had to do was to put my hand up when the IMG representative at the North London Red Circle asked if anyone was interested in attending. The only other members of the group that I recall were the husband and wife who were the driving force behind the North London Red Circle, and probably IMG members themselves.
Isle of Wight Festival

53. I recall that I attended the Isle of Wight Festival in 1970, most likely with other members of the North London Red Circle, in order to attract supporters to the organisation from among the festival-goers. This event has stuck in my mind because it was particularly hot but there was a rainstorm in the night for which I was completely unprepared. I also remember Jimi Hendrix' playing keeping me awake.

54. I do not know why this has not been covered in the reports that have been provided to me for the purposes of making this statement because I would almost certainly have sought advance approval, at least as regards expenses, and have submitted a report following the event. It is also very likely that I was the only UCO who attended the festival because that sort of event would have been discussed in the HQ Flat.

Reporting on the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign

55. I have read the reports from September and October 1970 (MPS-0732319, MPS-0738663, UCPI0000022302) which I believe would have been typed up from notes that I provided because my name is at the bottom. I also believe that I am the reliable source referred to and was probably present at the meetings although I have no recollection of them.

56. I do not recall how I had gained sufficient trust to attend the meeting on 18 September 1970 at a private house (MPS-0732319) but I note that it relates to the ISC Founding Conference in Birmingham which I do recall.
attending. It may be that I was nominated by the North London Red Circle to attend the conference and that meant that my attendance at this meeting was necessary.

57. As regards the meeting on 20 October 1970, I have no recollection of the proposal that the Islington Branch of the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign was defunct and should be known as the Central London ISC. I note that the Memorandum dated 18 November 1970 (MPS-0728972) shows that the ISC was previously the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign, and that my subsequent ISC reporting mentions the Earl Russell public house, and therefore it seems very likely that the proposal was passed and my reporting relates to the same branch in its two different incarnations. I would have reported the reference to the Black Power meetings because they were mentioned in the context of proposed ‘anti-repression’ demonstrations and so there would have been an interest in them from the public order perspective. I don’t recall that there was SB interest in Black Power for any other reason.

58. I went to Birmingham for a meeting at Digbeth Hall which was probably the Founding Conference of the ISC. My recollection is that I was sent by the North London Red Circle to show solidarity with the Irish. I cannot be certain whether Detective Constable HN68 attended the conference – although I believe he was a Detective Sergeant by this time. As the only Irish-speaker in the squad, in my recollection, I believe he would have focused on the Irish groups and therefore it was consistent with his cover identity for him to attend. If we both attended, it was
probably to cover the left-wing and Irish aspects of the conference sufficiently. It would have been coordinated with the back office, even if only from an administrative perspective to ensure the expenses were authorised. I do not recall there being any coordination between myself and any other UCOs, although the back office would probably have been aware of all our movements.

59. I am not aware that the ISC carried out any concrete action while I was attending its meetings. I do not believe that I was a member of the organisation or infiltrated it in any meaningful way. However, on one Saturday night, I was in a pub on Tottenham Court Road with the ISC contingent. I cannot recall its name, but the pub was on the left-hand side as you head north. The following day I saw on the news that a bomb had exploded in the Post Office tower restaurant, which was only a few hundred yards away. I presume it must have gone off after I had left. I think there was some sort of Irish connection. I received a phone call from the back office asking who had been at the pub, and I gave them a long list of who was there and when. I am not sure that the gathering was organised as cover for the bomb team but the coincidence is striking.

60. I am not aware that the ISC took any active part in arming or organising the Irish workers, whether for self-defence or otherwise, while I was attending ISC meetings.

61. As I was never a member of the IMG, I cannot be sure of any links between that group and the ISC. As far as I can recall, I attended ISC meetings almost as a co-opted member from North London Red Circle. It
seems that there was a system of mutual support between various left-wing groups and the Irish groups under the general 'anti-imperialist' banner.

Reporting on the Irish Solidarity Campaign

62. As mentioned above, I did not hold any office or position in the ISC and probably only attended their meetings as a North London Red Circle member. I have considered the reports from November 1970 to June 1972 and, again because my name is at the bottom of many of them, have good reason to believe that these were typed from notes that I provided, that I was the reliable source and that I attended the meetings, even though I no longer have any recollection of doing so.

63. I do not specifically recall attending any of the demonstrations mentioned in the reports, although it is very likely that I will have attended some of them at least. I do not recall any serious public disorder occurring at any of the demonstrations I attended.

64. I recorded the names of the individuals who attended meetings where I knew them already or where I could find them out without risk of compromise. As an SB officer, this was almost second nature because it was only by building up a picture from where an individual's name was reported that their potential links to public disorder or extremism could be identified.

65. I do not know why H. N1332 and HN294 started to sign off my reports on the ISC from 13 October 1971 onwards. I also note that my
real name is no longer recorded at the bottom of these reports and that Andy Bailey's name appears as an attendee for the first time.

66. If there had been a policy change within the SDS or SB, then I would have expected to see my name removed from all my reports but it still appears on the reports for the North London Red Circle. I do not know why the system changed in respect of ISC only but it may have been to protect my identity, either because the reports were being distributed more widely or because of some other concern. It is also possible that it was just because they were typed up by different individuals in the back office.

67. I would have recorded the affiliation with the Black Peoples' Defence Committee (MPS-0738162) because it was discussed and approved and because there might have been future demonstrations or other events organised with them that might have been of interest from a public order perspective. I do not know if SB was interested in the affiliation because I am not aware what was done with the information in my reports.

68. I cannot recall the extent to which demonstrations or pickets were publicised by the ISC but referring to the reports (MPS-0738184 and 'UCPI0000008471') I do not think there was any form of mass leafletting, although some leaflets would have been produced to publicise the events within the immediate circle of friends and colleagues. I do not know whether a UCO was required to find out when and where the ISC was organising marches, pickets and rallies, but only someone attending the ISC's meetings would have had a clear idea which other organisations were supporting the event and the potential for disorder. It would also have
been important to continue attending in order to maintain the UCO's cover identity in case the ISC stopped publicising its events.

69. I have considered the reports relating to Bernadette Devlin MP (MPS-0738184, MPS-0738244, MPS-0738245 and MPS-0738260). I would have recorded these matters because they occurred in my presence rather than because there was any particular interest in the individual. Clearly she was well-known and therefore her presence as a speaker could have attracted greater numbers to the event, and that would influence how it was policed.

70. The conversation between Ms Devlin, Mr McCann and Privacy that I recorded was interesting because Privacy had earlier been extremely critical of Mr McCann (MPS-0738244). As far as her decision to resign as ISC president is concerned, that could have had an effect on the ISC's popularity generally and reduced the chances that she would appear at an ISC event unannounced. These two factors would have had an impact on how subsequent events were policed. As far as I can recall, I did not receive any guidance on reporting where elected politicians were concerned, and I think it is highly unlikely that any was provided.

71. I cannot be certain whether I made the identifications of the individuals in the report dated 24 November 1970 (MPS-0738188) but if my name is at the bottom it is likely that I did and that they were shown to me at the HQ Flat. I do not know how frequently SB communicated with other constabularies about persons of interest. Until I was shown this document for the purpose of making this statement, I did not recall that they did.
72. I have seen the report dated 16 December 1970 (MPS-0738202) but I do not recall ever going to Oxford while I was deployed and I very much doubt that I would have attended the Executive Committee meeting of the ISC on 6 December 1970 at Trinity College, Oxford. Beyond guessing that perhaps I saw or heard the minutes of the meeting discussed, I cannot comment on the source of the information.

73. I cannot recall whether the views expressed in the report dated 19 January 1971 (MPS-0738209) criticising the Republican leadership for failing to make more weapons available were commonly held or not. I was not aware of any concrete steps to increase the availability of weapons during my time attending ISC meetings. As far as I can recall, the ISC was more willing to discuss issues than take action, and I do not believe they either had any weapons or a military arm as was advocated by various members in the report dated 2 February 1971 (MPS-0738216).

74. I have read the report dated 22 June 1971 (MPS-0738269) and I do not recall whether the view expressed about placing a bomb at King Street attracted either support or criticism. I do not recall that the ISC participated in any act of violence while I attended its meetings, although I have previously noted the unfortunate coincidence between the ISC 'social' at a public house on Tottenham Court Road and the explosion in the Post Office Tower in the early hours of the following morning.

75. I have read the report dated 1 September 1971 (UCPI0000008926) and I do not recall why I would have recorded that the address was no longer being used by IMG and Spartacus League members, other than that this
information might have been useful to my colleagues in SB who were responsible for producing intelligence on these two groups. Similarly, my report dated 11 November 1971 (UCPI0000007779) is only relevant insofar as it appears to reflect the view of a powerful individual in the group, as Mr Lawless was, that he was against IRA bombing in England, at least for the time being.

76. For the same reasons, it made sense to record Mr Purdie’s view that an IRA victory was a necessary requirement for the creation of a revolutionary socialist state in Ireland in my report dated 14 December 1971 (UCPI0000007799) because it provided a context for the organisation’s likely future actions.

77. While I was still serving as a UCO when the report dated 23 June 1972 was produced (UCPI0000008516) I had been withdrawn well before 1 September 1972 (UCPI0000008520) and I was able to sign the report in my own name. I was still serving within the SDS when both reports were written and the latter is clearly written with access to reporting that would not have been available to me as a UCO (see paragraph 4 in particular). As a key individual within the ISC and IMG, Mr Lawless warranted particular attention as did those who associated with him, particularly if they occupied a key position such as contacts secretary. On close reading, the report assesses whether Privacy is likely to replace Privacy in Mr Lawless’ affections rather than making a value judgement on any of the three individuals, and is therefore a consideration of the internal dynamics of the organisation.
78. I would like to reiterate that, while the inquiry has published the fact that I was involved with the ISC, I did not infiltrate the ISC. As far as I am aware, the North London Red Circle backed the anti-Imperialist and left-wing Irish groups, but I do not remember attending any event such as an ISC meeting with the exception of the conference in Birmingham, even though it appears from my reporting that I did. So, although I cannot say that my connection with the ISC was nil, it was only as a spin-off to the North London Red Circle. I was only involved with the ISC in as much as the North London Red Circle was involved.

North London Red Circle

79. I have read the reports about the meetings of the North London Red Circle between 24 July 1970 and 25 April 1972. I note that the majority of these have my name at the end and so, while I cannot recall them, I believe that these were typed from notes which I provided, although they may incorporate additional information that I did not supply, and I also believe that I am the reliable source referred to.

80. I cannot recall the aims of the North London Red Circle but it appeared to me to be a recruiting ground for the IMG. I was invited to attend the first meeting of the North London Red Circle following my approach to Tariq Ali and Vanessa Redgrave at the Conway Hall at the very beginning of my deployment and so it was the first organisation to which I gained access. My only association with other members outside meetings was attendance at demonstrations and when selling a publication which I believe was 'Red Mole'.

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81. The North London Red Circle was a 'talking shop' and was not, as far as I was aware, engaged in any criminality while I attended its meetings. It did support a revolutionary agenda and was subversive to the extent that it advanced the overthrow of the established political system in the United Kingdom albeit it never took any concrete steps. I was directed to the North London Red Circle's meetings having put myself forward as the supporter of a left-wing agenda following a public talk at the Conway Hall. They were expecting me when I turned up at the next meeting. The only role I occupied in the organisation was administering the tea fund as this gave me a way to find out members' surnames without attracting attention.

82. I do not recall the strike by dock workers mentioned in the report dated 24 July 1970 (UCPI0000008179). I do not believe there was any direct link between the North London Red Circle and the Spartacus League but I believe the latter was the 'youth wing' of the IMG. I do not recall being tasked to report on support for strikes, whether specifically in relation to the dock workers' strike or any other industrial action, although clearly an indication of the size of any march, demonstration or picket would have been valuable to assist with appropriate policing.

83. Having considered the report dated 25 August 1970 (UCPI0000008180) I am unable to remember the reasons for the affiliation with the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign (later the ISC) but I believe that it was common for left-wing organisations to support each other and raise each other's public profiles by trying to get as many members involved in events as possible. To the extent that the North London Red Circle and the ISC...
shared an anti-imperialist left-wing agenda, they would have been natural affiliates.

84. I did not infiltrate the IMG. Indeed, it was the IMG's approaches to me, and my refusal to join which precipitated the end of my deployment. I have read the report dated 18 September 1970 (UCPI0000008182) and this confirms my recollection that the North London Red Circle was a recruiting organisation for the IMG — in the same way that the Cub Scouts leads into the Boy Scouts proper. As I was never a member of IMG, there will not be any direct reporting of their meetings from me. The reference to my being tea club secretary was in relation to the North London Red Circle rather than the IMG.

85. I have read the reports dated 11 January 1971 (UCPI0000008836) and 25 April 1972 (UCPI0000008953). I was not given any specific instructions on what was or was not of interest. If you were an officer in SB, it was assumed that you were reasonably intelligent and could be trusted to report what was or might be relevant. As well as contributing information on demonstrations and potential public disorder, information on individuals and organisations contributes to the mosaic that is intelligence. The talks and the discussions which followed could be repetitive and, insofar as what was said did not provide additional information about the organisation's support for events or contribute to the broader intelligence picture, I would not record or report it. Those two reports specifically record the encouragement to support a one-day strike and the Trotskyite
leanings of the group respectively, so it is not the case that there was nothing of potential relevance at those meetings.

86. As far as I can recall, the link between the North London Red Circle and the 'Red Mole' was the IMG and, while some North London Red Circle members may have contributed articles to it, most members' only helped with selling the publication. I did so myself with "comradely enthusiasm" outside Archway tube station on a number of occasions. The Pentonville Road address at which North London Red Circle meetings were held initially was a printer's and there may also have been some connection in that regard. I certainly believe that the meeting organisers, a husband and wife, were IMG members.

87. I do not recall the speaker mentioned in the report dated 22 February 1971 (UCPI000008894) but the North London Red Circle, for all its revolutionary posturing, was a talking shop which passively supported revolution rather than contributing to it actively. Violence would have been the last thing on many of their minds: sloganeering was about as far as things went.

88. The report dated 25 June 1971 (UCPI0000008919) records the discussion about the Black Peoples' Conference precisely because it occurred. I was not aware of any SB interest in the Black Peoples' Conference but given that they were able to attract 600 people to an event there was clearly a potential that future events could have public order implications, even if the North London Red Circle's view was that the venue was too ambitious.

89. I have read the report dated 25 June 1971 (UCPI0000008920) but cannot recall the talk nor that SB had any particular interest in it, the Socialist
Women's Group or its demands. Some detail would probably have been recorded for context and because of the link to the trades unions and the potential for demonstrations to attract additional numbers as a result.

90. I am not aware of any IMG activity within the trades unions, despite refreshing my memory with the report dated 16 August 1971 (UCPI0000008923). In hindsight, it is very likely that there was some activity but I did not have any knowledge of it at the time and cannot say whether it was overt or covert. It was reported because of the potential for the IMG to subvert industrial action, which may have altered the policing requirements. I do not know how my reporting about industrial relations matters was used.

91. I was not aware of how the IMG worked with militants in the steel industry because I was not a member of that organisation. I believe that the report dated 19 November 1971 (UCPI0000008935) constitutes my sole knowledge at that time of IMG activity within the steel industry. It was reported because the discussion occurred and it might have been possible to link it with other information from other sources. I was not aware of any particular SB interest in the steel industry.

92. I have read the report dated 10 January 1972 (UCPI000008941) but I have no recollection of the talk. I do not believe that SB had any particular interest in women in the trades unions, although the speaker's comments about whether Mrs Sturdy might be of interest to the "movement" and the militancy of the women involved in the protests at the thermometer factory
could have had potential future public order implications, which is probably why they were recorded.

93. I did not know that SB were interested in the IMG’s relationship with the miners. Having refreshed my memory by reference to the report dated 24 January 1972 (UCP10000008943), it seems that the potential for disorder around pickets and demonstrations associated with the miners’ strike was sufficient to justify reporting it. I do not know how my reporting of the IMG’s relationship with the National Union of Mineworkers was used, if at all.

94. I have read the report dated 22 March 1972 (UCP10000008947). It is important to recall that a lot of police time and effort was spent in 1970 policing ‘Stop the ’70 Tour’ demonstrations, which ultimately succeeded in preventing a South African cricket team from touring England that year, as part of the anti-Apartheid and broader civil rights movements. As the organisations involved were flushed with that success, any focus on South Africa might have future public order implications. I do not know how this reporting was used: I trusted the back office and SB to circulate it appropriately.

95. The North London Red Circle was not a violent organisation or one which advocated violence. I have read the report dated 4 April 1972 (UCP10000008949) and the tone of the discussion seems entirely consistent with what I can recall: namely that it was a talking shop.
96. I have read the report dated 18 September 1970 \(\text{(UCPI0000005812)}\) and, as it has my name on it, I believe that it is typed from notes that I provided and that I was the reliable source referred to. I do not recall attending this meeting, nor any others, and I cannot recall why I might have done so. I note that Tariq Ali spoke and, as he had originally directed me towards the North London Red Circle, it could be that the North London Red Circle was supporting the VSC and its speaker.

97. I do recall that I attended some VSC demonstrations and one of these is particularly memorable because I remember a uniformed constable looking at me very intently. I was concerned that he had recognised me and would try to speak to me, so I did my best to get deeper into the crowd. I cannot recall the dates or locations of these events although they were probably in the London area.

*Trade Unions*

98. I did not join a trade union or become in trade union affairs while I was undercover or at any time during my service with the SDS.

*Public Order*

99. I did not witness any public disorder while I was undercover nor did I participate in any. To my mind, the success of the reporting that I and my colleagues provided was that the demonstrations were peaceful.
Violence

100. I did not witness any violence to people or property while undercover with the SDS. I certainly did not become involved in any violence to people or property, either as victim or perpetrator, while undercover with the SDS.

Subversion

101. Until this inquiry, I was not aware of a formal MPS SB role in countering subversion or subversive activity, although I was aware that we gathered information on individuals and organisations which were unfriendly towards the state and its institutions, and might use criminal methods to achieve their aims. While I reported the suggestion that a bomb should be planted at King Street (MPS-0738269), it was not in the nature of the North London Red Circle to engage in truly subversive activity, however much they talked about revolution. I do not know why my reporting was copied to the Security Service, nor did I ever knowingly have contact with the Security Service.

Sexual relationships

102. I never engaged in any sexual activity whilst in my undercover identity.

Other relationships

103. I would not say that I formed any close personal relationships with others during my undercover deployment. I did my best to present as a committed “comrade” to allow me to continue reporting, and I deliberately took on the role of tea club secretary for the North London Red Circle
when the previous incumbent gave it up so that I could find out other members' surnames, but otherwise I kept a distance between myself and those that I met while undercover. My back story was virtually non-existent and this would rapidly have unravelled, as indeed happened.

Criminal Justice

104. I did not participate in any criminal activity while undercover with the SDS, nor was I ever arrested, charged, tried or convicted of a criminal offence while serving as an undercover officer. I certainly did not appear as a witness in my undercover identity. I am not aware that the fact that I was a UCO was disclosed in connection with any criminal proceedings and, given that SB was protective of its existence and the secrecy surrounding the SDS above and beyond that, I believe that it would be very unlikely that such a disclosure would have been made.

105. I did not provoke, encourage or cause any other person to participate in any criminal activity whilst I was deployed undercover with the SDS.

106. I do not know whether any of my reporting was used in support of or disclosed in connection with any criminal investigation or prosecution. For example, while I might speculate, I do not know whether the raids on the homes of members and former members of the ISC in March 1972 (UCPI0000008501) were based on my reporting or on other leads. I did not provide evidence for use in any prosecution arising from my undercover deployment.
Other legal or disciplinary proceedings

107. I was not involved in any way in other legal proceedings in my undercover identity. I was similarly not involved in any complaint against a police officer or any disciplinary proceedings involving a police officer.

Legal Professional Privilege

108. Having had the concept of legal professional privilege explained to me for the purpose of this statement, I did not receive or become aware of any legally privileged information while I was deployed as an undercover police officer.

Elected Politicians

109. There is reference in the reporting which I believe to be mine to Bernadette Devlin MP but as far as I am aware, that is the full extent of my reporting on elected politicians. I reported about the proposed arrangements for a speaking tour by her (MPS-0738184) which would have had policing implications because of her prominence. She is mentioned in passing in a later report (MPS-0738244) because she arrives with another individual who had been strongly criticised during the earlier meeting. Finally, her decision to resign as joint president of the ISC is reported (MPS-0738260) because of the potential impact on the organisation's popularity and the policing implications that this might have.

110. I do not know how my reporting was used or the contribution this reporting made to policing.
Exfiltration

111. My withdrawal from my deployment was effectively a “midnight flit”. It ended suddenly in late June or early July 1972. I went to my flat one day and spoke to my landlady, who asked if I knew many Irish people. She said that she had taken a phone call the other day from someone wanting to speak to me. My landlady had told the caller that I was not in, but then overheard him say to somebody else: “He’s not there at the minute, but we’ll get the bastard” or words to that effect. I made light of it when she passed this on to me. I mentioned it to my superiors. I feel that they panicked and withdrew me from the field. I was prepared to go on longer, but they were probably right. I collected my few belongings from my cover accommodation and left. I never gave anyone any explanation for my withdrawal, and I did not tell my landlady I was leaving.

112. HN326 says that I was outed but this is incorrect in a number of respects. A photograph was published of me competing in a public event. I was immediately spoken to by DI Dave Smith who asked me to attend New Scotland Yard. He raised the issue with me and I explained my position. but the SDS did not see it that way. It made the alarm bells ring. This roughly coincided with the phone call made to my landlady and was a factor in my being removed from the field. The coverage did not link me to undercover policing.
113. I was asked if I would join the IMG on a few occasions after I had been a member of the North London Red Circle for a significant period of time. By the third time I was asked to join the IMG, it was becoming very difficult to say 'no'. For the activists, it was the greatest compliment they could pay me to invite me to join their group. It must have seemed very strange that I had professed to be interested up until then, but repeatedly turned them down. It was the beginning of the end of my deployment as it resulted in people starting to question me and my background: I had no back story to speak of and so this became awkward very quickly.

114. I refused to join the IMG because I was ordered not to by my superiors in the SDS. Even if the IMG was not a political party in the strict sense, it was an established political group. I believe that my chain of command was concerned that my joining the IMG could potentially interfere with the political process in a way which was inconsistent with my role as a police officer.

115. I have considered the documents relating to the end of my deployment and security concern (MPS-0724170) and I am surprised that this went as high as the DAC. These documents largely reflect my recollection of those events. After my deployment ended, I informed my superiors that I wanted to compete in a public competition however, I was not allowed to compete in order to protect my cover identity, the SDS and SB.
116. I was also prevented from competing in another event but I pleaded my case to compete in yet another event. Reluctantly, they said I could go, but undertook some protective measures.

117. While I have now seen Conrad Dixon's recommendation that UCOs should not be in the field any longer than one year (MPS-0724119) I do not believe that this is realistic. It took the best part of 18 months for the IMG to invite me to join so had that been a target of my deployment, I would never have succeeded. This gives an indication of how cautious some organisations were of penetration by unknown individuals. I understand the strain that undercover deployment places on individuals and why Conrad Dixon would have wanted to limit the period of any deployment. In hindsight the nose bleeds and headaches I experienced whilst a UCO were probably attributable to stress.
118. I do not know any of the details of [HN68] deployment so I cannot comment on how long he spent undercover.

119. As far as I know, there had never been a plan for the end of my deployment and the situation which developed meant that my withdrawal was totally unplanned and had to be managed on the hoof. As far as I recall, there were no contingency plans in place. I did not know how long I was going to be deployed, so I did not expect or ask for an explanation about the length of my deployment.

120. I did not keep in contact with anybody on whom I had been reporting and I did not use my cover name any further. I realised that, once my undercover deployment ended, that period of my life was over and I did my best to put it behind me and focus on my 'regular' SB career.

121. I am fairly sure that a UCO did join the IMG after I had been withdrawn from the field. The thought of joining the IMG seemed to scare the life out of our people. As mentioned above, there was an assumption that membership of the IMG was inconsistent with being a police officer and might constitute political interference. The height of the naivety was that they wanted me to stay involved on the fringes of the IMG even though I was not joining them.

Managers and administrative staff

122. In the back office, there was usually a Chief Inspector, two Inspectors and a Sergeant. At the beginning of my deployment, they were DCI Phil Saunders and DI Wilson and [HN294] I cannot recall who the DS was.
Conrad Dixon was no longer in charge of the SDS when I joined. Within the first few weeks I got to know ##HN294 and got on with him very well. I cannot remember DI Wilson's first name, but it was not Ray, and I think he moved on in 1970 shortly after I went undercover. ##HN332 signed off on a number of the reports that I have seen but I do not remember him in the back office. Eventually, DI ##HN294 was promoted and took overall charge of the SDS. I think DI Dave Smith came in to fill the role he left.

123. I have looked at the organisation chart (MPS-0724119, p.6) and it is possibly inaccurate. I do not recall there being three DIs, just two, or any separation between operations and administration. In addition, I do not recall a DC clerical role: that work was done by whoever was in the back office preparing to deploy, or just back following a deployment. I do not remember who the DS clerical was. There were around 10 UCOs deployed at the time I was with the SDS, but there was probably more of a mix of Detective Sergeants and Detective Constables than the organisation chart shows.

124. I remember Roy Creamer because he was regarded as an authority on the British left-wing but as far as I remember he was 'C' squad and I don't recall that he was ever SDS. William Furner is a complete unknown to me and, while I remember Wilf Knight and Rodger Matthew, I do not associate their names with the SDS.
Management and supervision: general arrangements

125. At least one officer from the back office would be at the HQ Flat at least several times a week, although it would not be the same officer each time. I did not go back to New Scotland Yard until my deployment was brought to an end, so my only face-to-face contact with the managers was in the HQ Flat. I would provide my notes to them on loose bits of paper and they would come back the following day or shortly thereafter with any requests for clarification or further queries but unless there was something specific nothing further would be asked for until the next set of notes. It was also an opportunity for them to update us with urgent matters that might affect us, although I cannot recall what these might have been.

126. I don’t recall welfare ever being raised as an issue, which is in keeping with the attitude of the time. It is not easy when you are actually undercover and thinking all the time “does this match up with what have I said previously” and knowing nothing is solid. Some UCOs needed to have 2 or 3 pints to work at all. My attitude was the opposite: I wanted to give myself a sporting chance of remembering what I had said. When we sometimes went around the corner to a pub after the UCO meeting, I would make an excuse to slip off early.

Senior management and oversight bodies

127. There may have been the odd visit to the HQ Flat by a Superintendent or Chief Superintendent during my time as a UCO but I cannot recall their names or the occasions. I do not recall any visits by any regulatory or
oversight body such as HMIC. I was not commended for my work on the SDS.

Deployments of contemporaries

128. When I was deployed, I believe that those listed below were also members of the SDS. I operated on the ‘need to know’ basis and so I do not believe I ever knew their cover names, and cannot recall them now even if I did:

HN298, HN338, HN326, Mike Ferguson, HN45, HN345, HN339, HN301, HN294, HN68, HN342/HN299, Jill Mosdell, HN347, HN348
129. To the best of my knowledge the following individuals were not contemporaries of mine on the SDS:

HN321, HN322, Helen Crampton, HN329, Barry Moss, HN331

130. I cannot be sure either way whether any of the following were on the SDS at the same time as me:

HN344, Dave Fisher, HN330, Mike Tyrell
131. I cannot think of anyone else who may have served with the SDS at the same time as me whose name is not included above, or who I have not already mentioned within this statement.

132. DI [redacted], never went undercover as far as I was aware, so I would be surprised if he had a cover name and I did not know it even if he did. The same is true of [redacted], and I was not aware that he covered any VSC meetings. I certainly did not notice him at any VSC event that I can recall attending. There was only one DI Wilson on the SDS with that surname that I can remember and, if I knew his first name then, I don’t any longer.

133. Bearing in mind that I kept to the ‘need-to-know’ principle quite strictly and so did not ask questions of my colleagues, as far as I am aware none of them committed a criminal offence or encouraged, provoked or caused another to commit a criminal offence while deployed. They also did not engage in sexual activity whilst undercover as far as I am aware – not that this would have been spoken of even if they had.
134. I was never aware that any of my contemporaries had been arrested, charged, tried or convicted in their undercover identity, or that they participated in any public disorder, violence or criminal activity while deployed, nor did they report any legally privileged information.

135. In the same way that I did, it is possible that my contemporaries may have reported on the activities of elected politicians while they were deployed undercover but I do not know that they did, or on whom.

136. In terms of their achievements for the benefit of policing, I do not know what they achieved. I think it is significant that there was no repeat of the violence of the Grosvenor Square demonstration in 1968, despite the militancy of some of the groups that were active at the time, the frequency of strike action and the large number of demonstrations and rallies.

137. I do not know if or how my contemporaries assisted the Security Service in its work. I am not aware of any connections whether formal or informal between the SDS and the Security Service during my time, or that the latter influenced the manner in which we operated.

Post deployment

*Period immediately post-deployment*

138. I do not recall taking any leave following the end of my time in the field. I shaved and had a haircut and then went to work in the back office until late March or early April 1973. I do not recall anyone debriefing me. I was not offered any advice or ongoing support by the SDS or the MPS more
generally. I just got on with it and would not have thought to ask. That was the attitude of the time.

Post Special Demonstration Squad police career

139. After about nine months in the back office, I went to squad at a policing role that did not include the handling or dissemination of intelligence and did not involve domestic extremism.

I do not recall having much choice about these duties, and certainly the fact that I was ex-SDS did not give me any additional influence.

140. I believe I then spent some time on squad before my retirement in the late 1980's. Again, I do not recall having any 'pull' in getting these roles as a result of my SDS service.

141. Undercover work with the SDS did not have any long-term effect on my welfare as far as I am aware, although my nose bleeds and headaches
have returned since I became involved in the inquiry. I suffered with a medical condition after retiring but I do not attribute this to my role as a UCO. I do not recall what welfare services were available to me within the MPS generally, so I cannot comment whether anything different or additional was available to me as a former UCO. As I do not believe I ever accessed these services, I cannot comment whether they were adequate either.

Leaving the police

142. When I joined SB, the expectation was that you would not return to uniform or other duties, and that was the case for me. I retired from the MPS as a Detective Sergeant on ill-health grounds because of I have not taken any form of full-time paid employment since leaving the MPS but I have volunteered for a number of organisations, including a significant period with Despite being of state-pension age, I continue to volunteer at events that interest me.

Undercover work in the private sector

143. I was never given any instructions or guidance about working undercover in the private sector, or using any aspect of my undercover identity in the private sector before I left the MPS. In the end, I did not take up any further employment, let alone the kind of work where this might have been necessary. I have never worked as an undercover operative, or
as an organiser, manager or supervisor of undercover work. My link to undercover roles ended when I left the SDS back office in 1973.

Any other matters

144. This rule 9 statement has covered so much ground that I had forgotten that I cannot think of any further information which might be of relevance to the work of the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

Documents

145. Apart from the single document provided with this statement, I do not have any documents of any kind which might potentially be relevant to the Inquiry. I did not retain any documents, official or unofficial souvenirs of my time in the MPS, let alone the SDS: that sort of careless behaviour was just unthinkable at the time. Likewise, my memory has only been refreshed by reference to the witness bundle provided to me for the purposes of giving this statement.

Diversity information

146. I am male.

147. I am ICI—White British.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed: HN340

Date: 10.07.2019