

Cover Sheet

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING

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I, [REDACTED] **HN345** [REDACTED] c/o Designated Lawyer (DL), PO Box 73779, London, WC1A 9NL, WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:

1. This witness statement is made in response to a Rule 9 request dated 12 July 2019. It provides my full recollection of my deployment as an undercover police officer within the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).
2. When I was in the SDS, it was known as the Special Operations Squad or 'Special Ops' for short. I will call it 'the SDS' in this statement, however. My recollection is not particularly clear because these events occurred over a few months nearly fifty years ago, and very little remains of the documentary record that can help jog my memory. Save where I indicate otherwise, the source of my information and belief is my memory solely.
3. I am known in this Public Inquiry by the nominal HN345 and my cover name was 'Peter Fredericks'. There is a Restriction Order in force in respect of my real name. When I was an undercover police officer, my rank was Detective Constable.

Personal details

4. I was born ² [REDACTED] **in the 1940s** [REDACTED] I went to school ³ in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Police career before and after serving with the Special Demonstration Squad

5. I joined the MPS in ⁴ **1960s** There is a document from my personnel record behind tab 1 of my witness pack which gives my joining date as ⁵ **the mid 1960s** [REDACTED], and that sounds about right to me. I did my training and then was posted to ⁶ [REDACTED] **location** [REDACTED]. I got married in ⁷ **the late 1960s.**

6. Whilst I was at ⁸ [REDACTED], a senior officer, Chief Inspector ⁹ [REDACTED] asked me whether I had thought about doing undercover work. I thought it sounded more interesting than road traffic duties. I therefore went from uniform duties to plain clothes. ¹⁰ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Whilst I was ¹¹ at [REDACTED], I did undercover work ¹² **in relation to policing non-SDS street crime**

7. There was resistance to the war in Vietnam and to the apartheid regime in South Africa at this ¹³ time. [REDACTED]

Details of HN345's non-SDS street crime undercover work before Special Branch.

[REDACTED] The Black Power movement was

also advocating for the independence of Brixton from the rest of London. The National Front was in favour of this too, which sounds like a strange alliance until you realise it effectively amounted to segregation. It was a time of political change.

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8. My undercover work at [REDACTED] showed I had an aptitude for getting into places that I should not be. I was a sociable person and would meet all sorts of people whilst undercover, including artists and singers. I would find things out by-the-by about Black Power groups and the Stop the Tour movement just from the kind of people that I was associating with. Stop the Tour wanted to

- 15
- [REDACTED]
- Details of instance of direct action planned by Stop the Tour where HN345 is asked to participate
- [REDACTED] I would have passed on this information as a matter of course. Stop the Tour never actually carried this out.

- 16
9. However, my association with Stop the Tour had ended by the time I was in the SDS. [REDACTED]

Details of incident during his non-SDS street crime undercover work where activists from Stop the Tour do not want to associate with HN345

- 17
10. [REDACTED]
- Details of HN345's non-SDS undercover work before Special Branch.

[REDACTED]

I am fairly

certain I would have told somebody about the information I was picking up.

This led to my meeting ¹⁸ [REDACTED] ¹⁹ HN294 [REDACTED] at a pub [REDACTED]

and I gave him what I had. I thought someone should know about this but I did

not know about the SDS or much about ¹⁸ [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] at the time. It was

perhaps through my acquaintance with ²⁰ [REDACTED] HN326 [REDACTED] that I was referred to

¹⁸ [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED]. I believe he asked me to find out some more information, but I cannot

remember what happened after that or whether I found out the information. So

far as I knew then, ¹⁸ [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] was an ordinary Special Branch Inspector.

Until I was asked Rule 9 questions about him, I had no reason to think

otherwise.

11. Quite accidentally, therefore, I kept finding out things that were of interest to

the Special Branch. One Detective Constable came to see me ²¹ [REDACTED] ²¹⁽ⁱ⁾ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and was involved in Irish matters. I believe it was because I had

identified the names of some participants in the Irish extremism scene. I

passed these on and he came to see me. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ²¹⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ [REDACTED]

have no idea about whether the name I passed on was significant or not; no

feedback was ever given as to how useful the intelligence was. I do not

remember this officer's name or the name I provided to him.

12. After some time of my ²² **street crime work**, I was invited to join Special Branch during a meeting which took place at a pub ²³ [REDACTED]. Four or five senior officers were there. I do not know what the purpose of the meeting was from their perspective, but I believe that senior officers simply wanted to meet me. I am fairly certain Phil Saunders was there. ²⁴ **HN326** [REDACTED] too. There were faces there I had never seen, and I was surprised about this. It made me realise that there had been senior people taking an interest in my work, unbeknownst to me. I was later told that Commander Cunningham was there, sitting at the bar observing us incognito. I agreed to join Special Branch, [REDACTED]

²⁴⁽ⁱ⁾ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I therefore underwent the formal application process and I would have joined Special Branch in ²⁵ [REDACTED], as I recall. My personnel records give the date as ²⁶ **the early 1970s** which broadly accords with my recollection. My rank was then a police constable. I remember doing positive security vetting. The positive security vetting is significant to my departure from the SDS, which I describe below.

13. I joined Special Branch and was posted to C Squad, dealing with domestic extremism. There were two divisions to C Squad. One division was dedicated to the Communist Party of Great Britain and the other to the Trotskyists and anarchists, who were thought to be more volatile. I was with the latter division. I was given three days to familiarise myself with the office. I was shown the routine matters such as where to put secure files and how to empty the confidential waste bins. I was encouraged to look at the files of those I had mixed with undercover as well as acquaintances from my personal life. I tried

to look at the file of one of my referees, whose name I gave to vouch for me when I joined the MPS. I was unable to, and this later took on a significance that I describe below. After those three days, I was out attending meetings.

14. I had not been in the Branch long when I was sent to a demonstration about Bangladesh. In 1971, there was a revolution/armed conflict in what was then East Pakistan. A huge number of people were killed and displaced. At the demonstration, I thought it would be useful to get to the head of the queue as that was where the leaders were. I was marching about four or five rows from the front, when I met someone called **Privacy** and we got chatting. I went along with the demonstration. There were uniform police officers on the bridge and she shrugged her shoulders at them disparagingly. I mimicked her. It was probably this initiative of mine, ²⁸ [REDACTED] that led to me being selected for the SDS.

15. I am asked how my pre-SDS undercover work differed from undercover work in the SDS. Personally I preferred the work before entry into the SDS as it was more visceral; I found the SDS work fairly boring by comparison. The meetings that I attended in SDS were very routine.

16. Furthermore, the approach to gathering intelligence differed in the SDS when compared to what I was used to ²⁹ [REDACTED]. At ³⁰ [REDACTED], I did not report every small detail but rather I would wait and report back anything that struck me as out of the ordinary. That was not the way of the SDS; they reported most things.

17. As far as I am aware, I did what was required of me in the SDS despite the change in ethos. I was a young man and all this was new to me. I had very little to compare it to. That said, I did enjoy the intelligence work and I was hurt to be dismissed from it.

18. I had some sympathy with those I mixed with undercover, as I was horrified to see pictures of the violence in East Bangladesh. Nevertheless, I did not have qualms about reporting on anything that the target groups did because I saw that there was a risk of unlawfulness. For example, during my time in Special Branch, I responded to a radio call for all units to go back to the Yard. On my way back, I was asked to stop at Whitehall. A protest against the war in East Bangladesh was taking place outside Parliament. I was in plain clothes, and there were a lot of uniformed police around with motorcycles. Their loudspeakers were blaring. I remember hearing the sound of a female crying out in panic. I looked up and saw the coach which contained the police communications equipment, and it was on fire. I saw uniformed police officers helping to evacuate a female police constable from the communications bus. She was luckily unhurt. However, the incident stayed with me. The thought ran through my mind that I was witnessing a fire in front of Parliament because of a war that was taking place on a different continent.

Selection for the Special Demonstration Squad

19. Before I joined the SDS, I knew there existed a specialist squad of undercover officers but no more than that. I had mixed with a few SDS officers before I was inducted into the Squad. In particular, I knew ³¹ **HN326** through a common acquaintance called ³² **[REDACTED]**. ³³ **Details of the area of specialism of HN326's common acquaintance.** He was around 20 to 30 years older than me, and I worked with him when I did undercover work relating to ³⁴ **his specialism.** He was based ³⁵ **[REDACTED]**, and I would speak to him about my undercover work. I would say the process of my finding out about the SDS was so gradual that no particular moment or milestone sticks out in my mind.

³⁵⁽ⁱ⁾ 20. **[REDACTED]** I was invited to a meeting with Ken Pendered. He showed me a folder with a letter in it from the Security Services. He told me not many people with my short service record got a commendation from MI5. This letter ought still to exist but I have not seen it in my witness pack, and I do not know what has become of it. I was told that I had been recommended by them for (what was then called) the Special Operations Squad. ³⁷ **[REDACTED]** **[REDACTED]** It was suggested to me that I join the SDS and that I would be given a new name and false address. I agreed because I found undercover work interesting and I was pleased to have been singled out.

21. My personnel file behind tab 1 of my witness pack suggests that I was in the SDS ³⁸ **[REDACTED]** **in 1971** **[REDACTED]** and this accords with my recollection

that I was there sometime in 1971 for a few months. I have no reason to doubt that this record is correct.

22. Supporting this is my recollection that at the time Aldershot bomb went off (in

1972), I was back in ordinary Special Branch ³⁹ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. I recall this because I was ⁴⁰ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁴¹ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23. Nothing was mentioned by the managers about the impact the SDS would have on my private life. However, I would not have expected much to be said, given that it was fairly continuous with my Special Branch work beforehand. In any event, the MPS was different then. To give an example, before I joined the SDS I was involved in ⁴² [REDACTED]

HN345 describes a traumatic work event. HN345 gives details of his response to that event.

[REDACTED] The MPS's response was to put me on light duties but the view at the time was that one

ought to get on with things. I was having ⁴³ **treatment** while I was on light

duties. The management was more hands-off with respect to one's private life than they might be in the modern day.

24. Nobody spoke to my spouse about what the work would entail. I remember ⁴⁴ **HN68** and ⁴⁵ **HN326** visited me at home. I do not think they would have met my wife, as she was likely to have been at work. I have no clear memory of the meeting, however. This could have been a social visit but I doubt it as it was during the day and it was unusual for SDS officers to socialise outside of the SDS safehouse or a planned meal at a restaurant.

25. I also remember that there was one evening reception to which spouses were invited. This took place in New Scotland Yard, but that must have been before or after my time in SDS as I did not go anywhere near the Yard during my time in SDS.

Training and guidance in the Special Demonstration Squad

26. When I was in Special Branch, I attended lectures in a large auditorium given by Security Service or army personnel amongst others. I remember one ⁴⁶ where **HN332** introduced a MI5 speaker who told us about a product you could spray onto your car windows to stop them misting up, and that helped you to maintain observation without drawing attention to yourself by rubbing a clear patch on the windscreen. This same product I knew to be available in Boots Chemist for 11 shillings, whereas it was introduced in the training as a mystical and high-tech item. I found much of the training to be

out of touch with the needs of officers actually in the streets, and this is an example of that. The lectures were rarely interesting.

27. There was no training like this for the SDS. I took the view that people who fell into the SDS mould were simply selected for it. The unit was not very streamlined and we were left to our own devices. I expect useful training is difficult to provide for this kind of work. There was no psychometric testing, and little by way of guidance or preparation.

28. In contrast with my first day in Special Branch, I cannot remember my first day in the SDS. I expect this is because we were not office-based. I must have come to the safehouse and been introduced to other members of the SDS. The safehouse was a residential flat with a fairly relaxed atmosphere. One could cook oneself a meal there.

29. Some Probationary Reports (reference MPS-0722850 behind tab 2)

document my time in the SDS, including 6-monthly and 9-monthly reports dated ⁴⁸ [REDACTED] 1971. Of course, I was transferred out of the SDS in ⁴⁷ [REDACTED] late [REDACTED] 1971. I am asked to look at a handwritten passage by A/Commander Pendered and asked to explain why my supervisors thought my 'promise was not fulfilled'. (I believed Pendered to be a Detective Chief Superintendent but I see he is described as an A/Commander.) I have a few comments to make about these documents.

a. I cannot read most of the handwritten passage by A/Commander Pendered because of the illegibility of the writing, but I can see that it intends that I be transferred ⁵⁰ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. I was surprised by this transfer because I had no relevant experience ⁵¹ [REDACTED]. I recall being notified that my probation period would result in my being transferred out the SDS. I wanted to see my union representative but he could not be contacted. I tried several times, including over the weekend, and he appeared to be avoiding me. I then had a meeting with A/Commander Pendered the following week after lunch. I describe this meeting below, and to my mind, my positive vetting procedure explains why I was not confirmed in the SDS.

b. An alternative explanation about why I was not confirmed in the SDS is provided in the Probation Reports. In particular, I note that paragraph 4 on page 9 says that there have been two occasions on which I caused embarrassment to officers whilst on discreet observation duty. This is surprising to me because I always worked alone. I understand 'discreet observation' to be the type of duty where you follow or shadow an individual for an extended period of time in order to ascertain their daily routine and regular movements. This is my understanding of the term 'discreet observation' based on a lecture that MI5 gave whilst I was in Special Branch. I have never done anything like that. I have rarely worked with any other officers whom I could embarrass, and so much time has passed that I cannot now remember which two incidents this

Probation Report is referring to. On the contrary, there was one time during my SDS deployment when I saw Phil Saunders in a pub, sitting with another person I did not know. Later Phil asked me why I had not greeted him, and I said that it was because I did not know the other person he was with so I could not assess whether acknowledging our relationship would pose a risk to Phil. That was sensible procedure, to my mind, and one I would always have followed throughout my time in Special Branch.

- c. I also note that my reporting is criticised and paragraph 3 at page 9 implies that I have problems ⁵² [REDACTED] **with literacy** [REDACTED]. There are intelligence reports that I wrote contained in my witness pack and I will leave others to judge the quality of those. I would be surprised at the suggestion that I have difficulty ⁵³ [REDACTED] **with literacy** [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Although I did not enjoy report-writing, my literacy skills have been deemed sufficiently competent for my post-MPS career in the private sector.

- d. I do not recall any training, guidance, warnings or criticism of my reports during my time in the SDS. If there had been such a conversation, I believe I would have remembered it because such criticism would have been disappointing at the time. I would have expected to sit down with somebody and to be shown the procedure if there was any concern with my reporting. Whilst it is true that I did not

personally see the point of reporting at the level of detail that the SDS expected, I believe I always complied with protocol.

e. I had a conversation with Phil Saunders toward the end of my undercover deployment wherein I found out that there was a potential conflict with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] I describe this further below. After this conversation, I received a form to fill out that related to the positive security vetting procedure, which eventually led to the termination of my SDS deployment.

30. Nobody had an explanation for the termination of my deployment that made sense. When it transpired that I could not track down my union representative, I asked to see Ken Pendred, and we met at New Scotland Yard at around 2pm. The meeting lasted only a few minutes. He asked me if I remembered my referees. When I joined the MPS, I was asked to give the names of family members and friends who could vouch for me; this was the normal process. One of my referees, [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I presume that my positive vetting failed due to my associations with him. Pendred gestured at a dark green file on the desk, known as a '588'. This had the words '588/unregistered/.....' pre-printed on the file and then some digits added by a typist. He did not tell me whether I was the subject of this file or whether [REDACTED] was. The file was opened the year that I joined the MPS, which I thought was too much of a

coincidence to be unrelated to me in any way. This was enough to effectively conclude the meeting.

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31. I had tried to look at **my referee's** file when I joined Special Branch as we were invited to look at the files of those people we knew. I was told I could not, because I did not have the requisite authority. I must have asked why not. Somehow I became aware that he was spying for the Russians. He was said to be a double agent, to have been 'turned' by the Security Services. That later turned out to be untrue; he was only pretending to cooperate with the Security Services. I am not sure now how I came by all this information.

32. However, it was made clear to me that I was out of the SDS. At around this time, I arrived for work back at New Scotland Yard. I went to the 'cages' to get my files out of them. The cages were in the 'Comms Room' where the telex and secure phones were kept. The cages were where confidential files were put whilst they were being worked on. At least one, if not two, detective constables should always have been there and unauthorised access to files was unlikely. To my surprise, my section of the cage was empty. Someone had taken all the files out. That made me think these files were of interest to someone else in the organisation.

33. Because of this and the meeting with Pendered, I surmised that there was some doubt about me, not because of my competence but because of other suspicions they may have had.

34. I am asked if I consider the training and guidance to be adequate. I had none. However, this was not unexpected. The mindset then was that you had it in your blood or you did not. The unit was fairly new and any training that may have been created could not yet have been tested.

Undercover identity

Cover name

35. As I have said, my cover name was 'Peter Fredericks'. My cover name came from a name I had used in Special Branch prior to my SDS work. It was not a deceased child's name. Sergeant ⁵⁸ [REDACTED] my then-manager, asked me to pick up some documents ⁵⁹ [REDACTED]. He told me to use the name ⁶⁰ [REDACTED] ⁶¹ [REDACTED] Fredericks. I went to collect the documents, using that name. It was very soon after that that I joined the SDS.

36. These documents from ⁶¹ [REDACTED] had something to do with Operation Omega. This term must have come to me through the Branch rather than through the target group. 'Operation Omega' is a term I associate with the resistance movement against the Pakistan army and their actions in East Pakistan (as then was). These actions included raping and killing civilians. In my SDS work, I continued to be involved with groups associated with 'Operation Omega', one of which was known as Action Bangla Desh.

37. I cannot explain why I kept the name 'Fredericks' now, but I felt there was some pressure to get on with the job quickly and not to worry too much about creating a legend. I had no nicknames in the Squad.

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38. [REDACTED]

39. My cover persona was not well-developed at all; there was no cover background beyond the one I had built up already from my [REDACTED] and Special Branch days.

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Cover employment

40. My cover employment was as a delivery driver for a [REDACTED] car dealership. [REDACTED]

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41. I did not actually do any work for this company [REDACTED]

42. I did not carry any other ID to support my cover persona. Before I joined Special Branch, ⁶⁸ [REDACTED] when previously undercover [REDACTED] I carried my wallet with warrant card in it. But I realised that was a source of danger. Operations were not sophisticated in those days. The SDS was in a hurry to get the ball rolling. Everything happened in a muddle with maximum trust.

⁶⁹ [REDACTED]
43. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Cover accommodation

44. I had bedsit off Ealing Common, at 9 Disraeli Road, W5. I found it through an ad in the newspaper and rented it in my cover name. I paid rent in cash so as not to connect it with the police. I did not have any other cover accommodation, nor did I reside anywhere else whilst undercover.

45. None of my targets came to the flat. This was convenient as it was neither near ⁷⁰ [REDACTED] where my undercover work was based, nor was it near ⁷¹ [REDACTED] where my family was. I did not share the accommodation with any other officer.

46. I would go to the cover accommodation perhaps once or twice a week because I preferred to spend the time with my family. The landlady, ⁷² [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and I got on well. She asked me why I was not often there and I

said it was because I travelled a lot and that renting a bedsit was cheaper than getting a hotel every time I was in London. She seemed to accept this.

Appearance

47. I believe I was clean-shaven before my time in the SDS, although I had some facial hair when I was ⁷³ [REDACTED] **previously undercover.** In C Squad, I wore a suit.

48. My appearance once I joined the SDS was longish hair (as many had in the 1960s), a beard, and Che Guevara moustache, again much like everyone else then. I allowed it to evolve, and did not change it. You had no trouble going along with fashion trends. I wore sweater, jeans, t-shirts. Nothing too smart, but people dressed more formally in those days.

49. I did not visit people or places in order to prepare myself for my time in SDS. I did not live for a time in my undercover identity before approaching my targets.

Cover vehicle

50. I do know I had a vehicle but I cannot remember the type. It is possible that I could have requested one when it was needed. ⁷⁴ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I have a memory of driving a vehicle when, for example, I had to go to Birmingham to deliver flyers for one of the target groups. I remember that

parking vehicles was an issue because one could not park near one's real house. I had to park half a mile away and walk home, making sure I was not observed. I had a driving licence in my real name only, not in my cover name.

51. I also remember a 'POLAC' (police accident) where another driver ran into me, and there was some damage done to my car. This was during my time in SDS. I exchanged details with the driver, my cover details, and then went to the nearest police station – 75 [REDACTED]. I do not know whether I had been told to do this but I knew there would have been insurance to sort out. They asked to see my warrant card, which I did not carry, and this was thought to be suspicious. I must have then phoned Phil Saunders using an emergency telephone number that I kept pencilled in the lining of my pocket. Phil later told me that the traffic officer at the station said I had 'refused' to produce my warrant card, hence his suspicion. I did not hear any more about the traffic accident and I do not know how it was sorted out.

SDS deployment

52. I was targeted to infiltrate any groups that came under the aegis of 'Operation Omega' and the Black Power movement. As I have said, Operation Omega related to the split between East and West Pakistan. Various groups were interested in this conflict, some for political and some for humanitarian reasons. I came to know what groups were involved in the Black Power movement through talking to people at Speakers' Corner in Hyde Park.



53. If you were in the right social circle, you would just find out which individuals and groups were involving themselves in Operation Omega and the Black Power movement. I spent time in Camden Town, at the Everyman bookshop in Pentonville Road, and lots of hours were spent at Speakers' Corner. It just became a way of life. I would turn up where everyone in those movements was expected to turn up.

54. More generally, I would go out and talk to people who I would not normally talk to in my real identity. If you keep your mouth shut and become part of the furniture, other people will talk. You came across all kinds of information this way. Some things we reported turned out to be unimportant, but we did all we could because we could not assess the intelligence at the time of collecting it.

Operation Omega

55. Through the demonstration where I met Privacy, I became aware of a group who wanted to help Bangladeshis and raise awareness of their plight. They met in a residence at Privacy in Camden Town. They must have called themselves something but I cannot recall the name. The name 'Action Bangla Desh' I think relates to a larger, better-organised campaign than this group – although this group could have been part of a larger umbrella organisation. Its members could also have been members of multiple groups. Too much time has passed for me to remember the specific relationship that this group had vis-à-vis other groups or wider campaigns.

56 [Privacy] would have given me her contact details at the demonstration; she must have also told me where and when meetings were held. The key players in this group were [Privacy] [Privacy] and [Privacy] [Privacy] [Privacy] was leader, and [Privacy] was his wife. [Privacy] did not seem to be involved for political reasons but rather humanitarian reasons. The meetings were held at her home. She had a boyfriend who was Bangladeshi, and I believe that he was her motivation for being involved. I found him strange as he did not engage in the movement much himself. I was told by [Privacy] that her family had given £6,500 to the movement, which in those days was the equivalent of around a quarter of a million pounds. The idea was to go to the war zone to build homes for those who had been forcibly removed. The group did actually do this, I heard, and in fact [Privacy] was arrested there and gave birth in custody.

57. The group must have had connections with others who wanted to help out in the Bangladeshi conflict. They had connections in Birmingham because I drove there to deliver flyers. They also were supported by another group calling themselves the 'Young Haganah'. I am guessing that the 'Young Haganah' must have met [Privacy] somehow and been invited to the meetings. I should distinguish the 'Young Haganah' from the 'Haganah'. I have no reason to think the 'Haganah' were actively engaged on behalf of the Bangladeshis because this was a group central to the formation of the State of Israel. At first, there was a query about whether 'Young Haganah' were affiliated with the 'Haganah' but I soon determined 'Young Haganah' did not pose a public order threat. Many were ladies in their sixties, well-educated, articulate and

well-dressed. They had nothing to do with the creation of Israel but instead were interested in left-wing causes generally. Phil Saunders and I found the name 'Young Haganah' humorous because of the age of these women.

58. I am asked in the Rule 9 questions whether I reported on 'Action Bangla Desh' whilst serving with the SDS. I presume that this suggestion comes from a document behind tab 4 of the witness pack, a Secret Memorandum (reference MPS-0728971, dated 18 November 1971, page 2) giving an overview of SDS activities. I cannot say for certain if that is the name of the group whose meetings I describe attending above. All I can provide is my substantive recollection of what I did, as I have done above. This group did not emphasise what it called itself. It is possible that it called itself 'Action Bangla Desh' but there were many allied causes, and the people involved in them overlapped. I cannot say anything more certain because of the time that has elapsed.

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59. On one occasion at the safehouse, Phil Saunders told me

HN345 describes the conversation, which included reference to another individual



60. This information from Phil made certain events that happened afterward seem more significant. For example, [Privacy] once asked me: 'Peter, we don't know your surname?' On another occasion, I remember going to a large meeting in an ornate building with marbled floors. I noticed [Privacy] coming toward me and she took me aside to have a drink, deliberately redirecting me, it seemed. I believed this was to keep me away from the main meeting which included speeches from Bruce Douglas-Mann and John Stonehouse, both Labour MPs who had expressed public support for the Bangladeshi people. I was not perturbed as I thought that there was little that could be discussed at such a public event which truly counted as valuable intelligence. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, considered the father of the Bangladeshis (and Prime-Minister-designate of the newly-independent state of Bangladesh), was present but I could not get close to him. [Redacted]



61. I also met a woman called [Privacy] through these meetings. She was fairly aloof, had some involvement in news production, and she was of a very different mould to everyone else. I was convinced she had a further agenda that she was keeping from me. I went to a few restaurants with her trying to discover what this might be, but I did not get anywhere.

62. I am asked whether this group would have regarded me as a member. I do not think it would have regarded me in so formal a light; I would have been regarded as more of a functionary. The group collected news cuttings about Bangladesh and distributed flyers; they were not revolutionary. I did not consider them to be a public threat but my supervising officers continued to be interested in information about them.

63. Going to these meetings was one of my main activities during my deployment.

They were once a week, sometimes more often. I remember going to demonstrations inside and outside London. I attended up to four in total. There was a meeting in Slough in a park that was a protest against (West) Pakistan. Someone gave me a lift there. I was one of several thousand people there, many local but some from London. There were mainly Bangladeshis there, including religious figures. The speeches encouraged people to take heart, to make contributions and not to let the conflict get you down. There was some partisan speech, including the exchange of a few insults, because the Bangladeshi conflict was between two groups – but there was no imminent public order threat nor even a uniformed police presence. It was a very low-key spat. Far more frequently than these demonstrations, I would be attending meetings or going to Speakers' Corner.

64. I remember flyposting once in South London with the Bangladeshi group. I was someone who had a car so I was able to transport people and I would be asked to do so occasionally. On this occasion, a police officer gave chase. I was driving, and I deliberately slowed down. I drove down a cul-de-sac. He

reprimanded me, saying he had better things to do, and then let me go. I thought this was the best way to deal with the situation and to square my role as a police officer without losing face in front of the targets.

65. The Bangladeshi group also conducted leafletting campaigns, and I helped by stuffing envelopes.

The Black Power movement

66. Apart from Operation Omega, the other type of reporting that I was mainly concerned with was the Black Power movement.

67. My main link with such groups was through [Privacy] a [Privacy] man who supported the American Black Power movement. I do not know if he ever went to the US. He worked with figures from the Black Power movement in the UK. I got the impression that the intention was to unite the Black Power movements in Britain and the US, although the US movement was wealthier and more well-established. He would be at Speakers' Corner every Sunday. I would meet him at Speakers' Corner and we would then go for tea or coffee with others who had also been there. I met others, including Americans involved in the Black Power movement, through him. We had tea or coffee at Marble Arch in a coffee shop where an area was set aside for us, and the public were not admitted. I never got to know these others well but I wanted to develop the relationship. There are certain groups in society who wish to

advance their objectives. It was not for me to decide which of these were of interest [REDACTED] 76(ii)

68. [REDACTED] and I got along and he would take me for a spin in his [REDACTED] car, whenever he bought a new one. After Speakers' Corner, we would go to meetings in the Notting Hill Gate / Portobello Road area. There was a pub there where I would play pool and cultivate relationships that way. There would be meetings at a house in [REDACTED] which I would attend with [REDACTED]. The purpose of these meetings was to reinforce the relationships that exist between different movements, i.e. to build solidarity with Black Power movements. They seemed to be meeting for meeting's sake, as no plans were discussed nor were historic events referenced.

69. I cannot think that this group had a name. I do not think this group would have regarded me as a member because there was not sufficient time to develop the relationship. For example, I remember [REDACTED]'s girlfriend asked me once why I was interested in the Black Power movement because I was not black. I do not understand sufficiently the way the group was structured vis-à-vis the American Black Power movement to say whether I would have been regarded as a member. I have no way of knowing whether [REDACTED] was their primary contact or not, or whether his acquaintances would have been accepted as members automatically.

70. I can see there are two documents (references UCPI0000026455 and UCPI0000026456) which are reports on the 'Black Defence Committee'. This

met at Pentonville Road. I cannot now say whether the group meetings that I attended were also meetings of the 'Black Defence Committee' or not, as too much time has passed to be clear on these details. However, I can say that there were many allied causes, and the personnel overlapped because many people were active in several left-wing groups. The wider political objectives were more significant than the flag they flew.

71. I remember a meeting in West London, that took place just off Ladbrooke Grove, particularly vividly. There was a lecture on violent protest and the speaker was from the Black Power movement in the US. It took place in a marquee filled with around 80 or 90 people. The speaker said something like, 'There is someone from MI5 here.' I felt my lips go dry and my heart was pounding as if it were about to burst. I do not know the name for this state of shock, but everything slowed to slow-motion and I went deaf for 4 to 5 seconds. He was joking, but he fooled me. I thought I was going to get kicked to death.

Reporting

72. I am asked to what extent the reporting in my witness pack reflects the reporting that I recall providing. I had not recalled the specifics of any of the reports. For example, now that I see the name 'Manchanda' (reference MPS-0739237), it rings a bell. However, I cannot supplement any of the information in the document about that individual because I recalled nothing about him before I saw the report. There would have been many more intelligence

reports that I would have written than appear here. I would expect there to be at least one report for every meeting of significance that I attended. However, I would not have reported matters like leafleting or flyposting.

73. Two Special Reports on the Black Defence Committee dated 16 September 1971 and 30 September 1971 (references UCPI0000026455 and UCPI0000026456) have my name on the bottom. I recall neither the pub where they took place nor attending these meetings. The name of the group, the Black Defence Committee, does not strike any particular chords with me. I therefore cannot say what that group was seeking to achieve specifically. In more generic terms, there was a feeling that the black community were not treated fairly. However, I cannot say anything more helpful than that. At paragraph 4 of the 30 September document, it is noted that questions were asked that were no interest to Special Branch. I cannot say now whether Special Branch had any specific interest in this group as too much time has passed, but this comment could mean that the questions were bland or mere spouting of typical political propaganda. I could have said that they were of no interest to Special Branch regardless of what particular concern Special Branch had with this group. I was not told about the rationale for my tasking, nor did I have any contact with the Security Services that I am aware of.

74. The SDS was formed to gather information about people and groups 'of interest'. What constituted something 'of interest' would depend on the global political situation. So Black Power groups were of interest, as well as

Operation Omega which was concerned with aid to Bangladesh during the time of the conflict between India and Pakistan.

75. I should explain how these intelligence reports came to be written. When I was in Special Branch, we would hand-write our reports at the office and then give them to a typist. In the SDS, reports were written by hand at the safehouse. I am assuming that Phil Saunders took them away and they were typed by someone. My signature does not appear on the reports (even though my name does). I know I did not have access to Special Branch file references so those must have been added by somebody else. I can see that there is a stamp on the document that says 'Box 500'; this refers to the document being received by the Security Services.

Pattern of life while undercover

76. I am asked about the hours I was on duty and the hours I was off-duty. In that environment, hours of duty ceased to be significance because the nature of the work involved living in a different persona and often working anti-social hours. You were responding to the needs of keeping up the persona of your cover identity. I would be out at meetings almost every day. Most of my undercover work was at night.

77. I spent time at my cover address, but not as much as I should have. It was important for neighbours to see me around there, and for it to look like I lived there. I probably only spent one day a week there, watching television and

drinking beer. I claimed to be travelling a lot, as I say, to compensate for the fact I was not often there.

78. My partner tolerated the erratic hours. She worked in the day time and I was out at night. I cannot say exactly when I was off duty, just as I cannot specify when I was on duty. However, I did not spend much time at home ⁷⁷ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] It was a time-consuming job.

79. I was entitled to four weeks' annual leave but I only took two days or so during my SDS posting over the summer months.

⁷⁸
80.

HN345 discusses an important personal event that took place during his deployment, and returning to undercover work hours later.

[REDACTED] It was an alienating experience – you feel that everybody has a light but that you are walking alone in the dark.

81. I am asked about the arrangements for claiming overtime. I remember the provision for Additional Rest Days (known as 'ARD's) for uniformed officers. Everyone was supposed to work eight days with two days off. If you came to work on additional days, you were paid double. However, I do not remember having ARDs in the SDS.

Pre-SDS reporting

82. There are three documents in my witness bundle that relate to my time in Special Branch before I joined the SDS. I presume I was reporting on these group as part of my duties in C Squad, due to its remit on Trotskyist and anarchist movements.

83. As to MPS-0737411, this was a large and peaceful gathering of the Young Socialists on 14 February 1971. It took place at Alexandra Palace,

80

Describes seeing someone known to him

I pretended not to know him, he instantly cottoned on, and I telephoned him later to explain my behaviour. I was with another detective constable and we may not have been the only ones from Special Branch there. I do not think that I would have written this report. It would have been written by a more senior officer, and I see it is signed by

81

another officer

84. As to MPS-0739237, the report on Manchanda, I can add little to the report other than its contemporaneous contents.

85. As to the document (reference UCPI 0000005817) on the International Marxist Group and Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, it is difficult to read the file

copy due to the dark background and blurred type. I can remember nothing beyond what I see on paper there. I see that my name is down as being the officer present but I have no recollection of this. It is certainly possible that I was there.

86. I am asked how intelligence-gathering differed in Special Branch from SDS. I have already described how report-writing was different. In Special Branch, there were constables who scoured the newspapers for information and for advance notice of meetings. In Special Branch, you would be told on the day to attend a certain meeting and you would go there. We would then come back and go to the canteen to write it out. Overnight, the reports would be left in the 'cages'. In the morning, we would hand the report to the typists. I think somebody else would probably add the file references. Unfortunately, this is the most I can recall.

87. As to how we behaved when attending meetings in Special Branch, we were not in uniform. I would interact with people at meetings but it would usually be to strike up a conversation for the first time and it was not a longer-term relationship. People did not share much at these occasions as they would be there to listen to the speaker normally.

88. I remember one occasion when I met someone who had lived a few doors up the road from me in ⁸² [REDACTED]; I do not know if he recognised me, but I do not think so. ⁸³ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I got the impression that

he was reluctant to talk and that there was something holding him back. I did not tell him I had lived in [REDACTED] ⁸⁴ So even with that familiar subject matter, I did not gain anything useful from the interaction. I cannot remember much about routine procedure for intelligence-gathering beyond these specific events that stand out in my mind because they had a personal importance.

89. I believe the SDS way of finding out about meetings (through the grapevine) was a better way to get information than the Special Branch way of reading public advertisements of meetings. For example, when I was in [REDACTED] ⁸⁵ a squad within Special branch at New Scotland Yard, I was sent to attend an ⁸⁵⁽ⁱ⁾ [REDACTED] 'open' meeting in East London. ⁸⁵⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ [REDACTED] Although I went into the pub and talked with people, I saw no evidence of any meeting. I did not see any large group gathering or a trickle of people coming in. I wonder whether it was advertised as an open meeting so that ⁸⁵⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾ [REDACTED] could see who would turn up.

Sexual relationships

90. I did not have any sexual relationships or non-sexual intimate relationships with targets. I am not aware of any SDS member doing so.

Other relationships

91. I am asked with which individuals I formed the closest personal relationships. When I met people, I made an effort to get along because otherwise they would not share information with me. I got a reputation for liking a pint and

being sociable. You also can tell quite a lot about a person's risk profile by their associates. If I met a new person, I could add another name to my oral report. However, I did not form any particularly intimate relationships with anyone. It was a political camaraderie, and we did not spend weekends together or anything like that. I was not involved in the groups for long enough to really get to know people well.

92. I did not assume any position of trust among any of the people I mixed with.

Criminal justice

93. I did not participate in or provoke any criminal activity whilst undercover. My targets did not engage in vandalism, trespass, breaking & entering, criminal damage, blackmail, drugs, or driving offences. I was present once when some people I was with shoplifted, but I did not get involved. I was at this expensive house in Notting Hill, which I believe was a squat. I do not recall which target group took me there. I went with some residents of the squat to a fish and chip shop, where they distracted the attendant whilst they stole some food. They then ran out of the shop. I did not help them but I ran out as well. I do not recall ever seeing those people or visiting the squat again. I never witnessed any criminal activity from those I regularly associated with.

94. A rationale for targeting the Black Power movement was its subversive activities and the attendant risk of public disorder. I did not get close enough

to discover any imminent intentions of anyone in the movement toward this end, however.

95. I was never arrested, charged or prosecuted in my undercover identity. I never appeared as a witness in any proceedings. I was never privy to confidential legal advice given to targets. I was not involved in any legal or other disciplinary proceedings.

96. I am not aware of my reporting being used in a criminal investigation or prosecution.

Managers and administrative staff

97. I am asked about my chain of command. A chain of command usually involves constables, sergeants, inspectors, etc. In the SDS, I was not conscious of the chain of command at all. There was no rigid structure.

86

HN339 was a sergeant when I was in the SDS but I did not interact with

him. Everyone was doing their own thing, mainly operating alone. Philip

87

Saunders was in charge of the Squad. He was later replaced by HN332

HN332. They channelled the information that the undercover officers gave

88

them up the chain of command. I did not interact with HN294 when I

was in SDS, only prior to my entry into the SDS.

often there, unless they were at meetings. There was always someone there to talk to, which was pleasant, whereas most of the undercover work was done at evenings and weekends.

103. There was always one Detective Constable present at the flat. The particular Detective Constable rotated but I recall that in my time [REDACTED] 91 HN340 was one. In theory, we could go there at any time of day or night although most of us went in the daytime. We treated it as an office. We went there to write reports, to exchange information, and to unwind. A secure phone line was installed there.

104. Phil Saunders would hold squad meetings there. These meetings were very sociable. Meetings would take place up to two times a week. There were never meetings for the sake of having meetings though. I never reported to anyone except my manager, although I am certain it was passed on.

105. Even though I was not told by my managers which specific events to attend, I would mention the ones that I had attended as a matter of course. I would also mention my plans at meetings, and the names of those I had mingled with. This was the only way to do things because I could not make contemporaneous notes in a policeman's notebook.

106. Phil would bring us up to date, and we would report back to him too. There were no handling officers beneath Phil but we all received help from one another. You went in to find out what you could find out, and unknown

others would put it into some intelligence framework. The MPS were triangulating lots of sources of information that they had in the background.

107. There must have been process for Phil Saunders to get and pass on intelligence. The telephone installed in the safehouse had a button which, by pressing it, would scramble the conversation so that you could talk securely to the Yard. However, I do not know how Phil obtained intelligence or instruction from Box or elsewhere.

108. Each SDS officer would work in a particular area. If the management wanted specific information, they would ask for it, but there was not a lot of direction from them. It was not a highly structured unit. There was never any documentary guidance provided, or a critical conversation about what guidance would be appropriate. The main criterion that the unit relied upon was the ability of the undercover officer to carry out their job well.

109. There was no way to monitor the welfare of undercover officers when deployed in the field. There was nobody checking up on welfare, at least not overtly, at other times. I felt that peer support was sufficient.

Senior management and oversight bodies

110. No senior managers of the rank Superintendent or above visited the SDS during my time there, or at least not to my knowledge. Unnecessary

visits were not encouraged. Nor did any external body with oversight or regulatory responsibility visit to my knowledge.

111. I did not receive any commendation for my SDS work. I have already mentioned the commendation from Box that led to me being selected for the SDS initially.

Deployment of contemporaries

112. During my time, Phil Saunders and ⁹³ [redacted] **HN332** [redacted] were managers of the SDS. ⁹³ **HN332** [redacted] took over from Phil. David Smith was not a manager; he was an undercover officer (unless I am confusing his name with ⁹⁴ [redacted] ⁹⁵ **someone else** [redacted]). **HN294** [redacted] was not in the SDS to my knowledge. He came to see me in connection with the piece of information I found about ^{95A} [redacted] and I do not think he was undercover at the time. I knew he was an Inspector in Special Branch but I did not interact with him in SDS. He was never at any of the meetings. It is possible he may have been a former member but I do not know that.

113. The following members of the SDS overlapped with me as undercover officers: David Smith (unless I am confusing his name with ⁹⁶ **someone else** [redacted] ⁹⁷ **HN68** [redacted]; ⁹⁸ **HN339** [redacted] – I think he was a sergeant when I knew him [redacted] ⁹⁷ **HN340** [redacted] ⁹⁷ **HN342/HN229** [redacted] ⁹⁷ **HN348** [redacted], Jill Mosdell.

99

114. The following names do not ring a bell:

HN218, HN336, HN338, HN343, HN344,
HN347, David Fisher

100

115. I have no memory of HN322

101

116. HN68 was a member of the SDS throughout the time that I served with the unit.

117. I remember nobody by the name of Wilson.

118. I do not remember a David Fisher so I cannot help with his cover name.

102

119. HN332 did not use a cover name, so far as I am aware, because he was a manager.

120. I do not know of any unhappy relationship between anyone in the SDS.

121. As far as I am aware, none of my contemporaries committed criminal offences, nor were they involved in public disorder, violence or criminal activity; I believe I would have known about it if they had. Nor did they provoke others into criminal behaviour, to my knowledge. Even though we worked separately, this is not something I would have expected them to do.

103

Given my experience in Special Branch and my previous street crime undercover work

██████, this sort of thing would be likely to need prior clearance. None of my contemporaries engaged in illicit sexual activity with others whilst undercover to my knowledge. None of them were arrested, charged or convicted to my knowledge. I do not think they would have reported legally privileged information although I would not know.

122. I have no recollection of any involvement with political parties, trades union or anything like that.

123. It is difficult for me to assess what my contemporaries achieved for the benefit of policing as I did not handle their intelligence. I did not always think, in my own case at least, that the tasking made the best use of resources – but I accept that you can only say that with hindsight.

124. I cannot say what my contemporaries achieved for the Security Services because I do not know what was needed from them, nor what they went on to provide by way of intelligence. I was only in the unit for a few months. I do not know how and by whom tasks were authorised, though I expect there was some Security Services involvement (either directly or through an intermediary). I recall seeing the army intelligence corps at Special Branch before my time in the SDS. I also recall seeing Asian women at Black Power meetings, and they were not usual attendees so they drew my attention. When I asked Phil about it, he told me ██████████

103(i)

██████████ However, undercover officers were not privy to the management's instructions.

125. I was told by Phil Saunders

about an arrangement that indicated a close working relationship between the Squad and the Security Service

103(ii)

I never had any personal contact with the Security Services.

Withdrawal

126. I did not have an exit strategy. I simply left the field. I do not recall there being any debriefing. It was a very unmemorable occasion.

127. I was sent to a psychiatrist as a matter of course at the end of my deployment. I did not think that she understood what undercover work is like, and it was not helpful.

Post deployment

104

128. After my Special Branch deployment [redacted] details of HN345's [redacted] career after Special Branch. [redacted] I was posted there without consultation.

104(i) [redacted], I noticed someone that may have recognised me from my SDS days. I phoned Special Branch but nobody called me back about it.

129. I was looking around for something else to do and so I resigned voluntarily from the police [redacted] 105 [redacted] in the mid 1970s [redacted] (as my personnel record has

it).

HN345 sets out subsequent employment

130. Much later, I found out that [Privacy] had committed suicide. I was shocked to hear it. This was after I left the MPS. I knocked on the door of her home on a whim, only because I was in the area. I had no quarrel with the MPS or with the people I dealt with in my undercover identity. I heard a window open upstairs. It was a lady called [Privacy] and she was a [Privacy] of [Privacy]s. There was a photo of [Privacy] on display, and [Privacy] saw me looking at it. She realised I did not know about her death, and told me.

131. As it happened, I was walking away from my visit with [Privacy] when I met [Privacy]. She said, 'Please tell me you were not working for the Pakistan government.' I reassured her that I was not. [107]

132. I have had no other interactions with my targets since I left the SDS.

133. I kept no documents from that time.

134. [108] I have been asked about my racial origin. I have a mixed heritage. [108] I am unsure what more to say on this

[REDACTED]

as a preoccupation with racial origin is a more recent phenomenon. My

heritage is certainly a mixture

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

109

[REDACTED]

Signed: ...

HN345

.....

Dated:

20.08.2019