

Monday, 2 November 2020

(10.00 am)

MS PURSER: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the first day of opening statements of the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Jacqueline Purser and I am the hearings manager. This is Day 1 of the opening statements in Tranche 1, Phase 1; and this phase will conclude in three weeks' time on 20 November.

I will now hand over to our Chairman, Sir John Mitting to formally start proceedings. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

We are about to embark on the first of seven days of opening statements, beginning with Mr Barr, Counsel to the Inquiry, and then proceeding to the opening statements of many, if not all, of the core participants.

Mr Barr.

Opening statement by MR BARR

MR BARR: Thank you, sir. Good morning.

This inquiry has been set up as a result of profound and wide ranging concerns arising from the activities of two undercover police units. First, the Special Demonstration Squad, which I shall refer to as

1 the "SDS", which existed between 1968 and 2008; second,
2 the undercover element of the National Public Order
3 Intelligence Unit, which I shall refer to as
4 the "NPOIU", which existed between 1999 and 2010.

5 Our terms of reference are wide enough to encompass
6 all undercover policing by English and Welsh police
7 forces in England and Wales since 1968, but we shall be
8 concentrating primarily upon the activities of these two
9 units.

10 It has emerged that, for decades, undercover police
11 officers infiltrated a significant number of political
12 and other activist groups in deployments which typically
13 lasted for years.

14 The information reported by these undercover police
15 officers was extensive. It covered the activities of
16 the groups in question and their members. It also
17 extended to the groups and individuals with whom they
18 came into contact, including elected representatives.
19 Reporting covered not only the political or campaigning
20 activities of those concerned but other aspects of their
21 personal lives. Groups, mainly on the Far Left but also
22 the Far Right of the political spectrum were
23 infiltrated, as well as groups campaigning for social,
24 environmental or other change.

25 For example, these included groups that were

1 campaigning for racial or sexual equality, as well as
2 those campaigning for nuclear disarmament.

3 Information about family justice campaigns and those
4 participating in them was reported. Mark Ellison QC,
5 who led the Stephen Lawrence independent review, found
6 that there was SDS deployment into activist groups that
7 sought to influence the Stephen Lawrence family
8 campaign, that information reported back to the SDS as
9 a result of that deployment included personal details
10 about Dr and Baroness Lawrence, and there was an MPS spy
11 in the Lawrence family camp.

12 The SDS reported on Duwayne Brooks, the victim and
13 vulnerable witness who survived the murderous racist
14 attack which claimed Stephen Lawrence' life. Mr Ellison
15 found that the reporting on Mr Brooks included
16 information about the divisions that had occurred
17 between Mr Brooks and the Lawrence family, the way in
18 which Mr Brooks was going to approach his defence to
19 serious criminal charges, and his expectations and
20 intentions in a civil action against the MPS; lines of
21 reporting which Mr Ellison concluded should have been
22 terminated.

23 The reporting of undercover officers refers to trade
24 unions and to the trade union activities of some trade
25 union members. There are concerns about why such

1 information was recorded and what it was used for, in
2 particular whether it was passed to those who
3 blacklisted workers.

4 We will be receiving evidence that a number of
5 the undercover officers who served with the SDS and
6 the NPOIU engaged in sexual activity in their cover
7 identities. Several formed long-term sexual
8 relationships. In some cases, the officer did
9 eventually reveal their cover identity. In other cases,
10 they did not do so. At least one fathered a child with
11 a woman who did not know that her partner was an
12 undercover police officer. In many cases, the deception
13 has had devastating consequences.

14 Failures properly to inform the court or the defence
15 about the involvement of undercover police officers are
16 already known to have caused miscarriages of justice.
17 Further miscarriages of justice are feared to have
18 occurred.

19 There are allegations that undercover officers
20 participated in the commission of serious criminal
21 offences, including participating in the 1987
22 firebombing of Debenhams by the Animal Liberation Front.

23 For a substantial part of its existence, the SDS
24 undercover officers based their assumed identities, to
25 at least some extent, on the particulars of a deceased

1 person, usually a deceased child. We will be receiving
2 evidence that this practice spilled over, to a limited
3 extent, into the NPOIU.

4 There is evidence that some former undercover
5 officers used their skills and contacts to work in
6 the private sector, including, in at least one case,
7 continuing to operate under the same assumed identity as
8 he had in the NPOIU.

9 The impact of conducting long-term undercover
10 operations of the sort conducted by the SDS and
11 the NPOIU on the mental health of some undercover
12 officers appears to have been considerable. In some
13 cases, particularly those in which the undercover
14 officer has been involved in a long-term, deceitful
15 sexual relationship, the officer's family has also
16 suffered.

17 The events and findings that I have just outlined
18 give rise to many questions. To identify but
19 a few: what exactly happened? How did these events come
20 to pass? How widespread were they? Who knew about
21 them? To what extent were they authorised, encouraged
22 or accepted, and by whom? Which groups were
23 infiltrated? Why? How were targets selected? Was
24 targeting influenced by racism or sexism? Was
25 infiltration of the groups concerned justified? In

1 which cases? If it was, was the extent of reporting and
2 the duration of the deployments justified? In what
3 circumstances, if any, might the use of the undercover
4 tactic to infiltrate political and activist groups be
5 justified? If so, subject to what boundaries,
6 management and oversight?

7 The Inquiry will be seeking out the truth publicly,
8 wherever that is possible, so that the full facts become
9 known and appropriate recommendations can be made for
10 the future conduct of undercover policing. We will be
11 using documents, witness statements and oral evidence,
12 tested where necessary, to establish what happened and
13 why.

14 This is not a public inquiry set up immediately upon
15 the first revelations about the activities of the SDS or
16 the NPOIU's undercover arm; it follows a series of
17 revelations, consequent investigations and some civil
18 litigation.

19 The fact that Special Branch deployed undercover
20 police officers to spy on the Vietnam Solidarity
21 Campaign prior to the massive anti-Vietnam war
22 demonstration that took place in London on
23 27 October 1968 was published in the press at the time.

24 In 2002, the BBC broadcast a short series of
25 documentaries entitled "True Spies", which contained,

1 amongst other things, interviews with former members of
2 the SDS. However, it was not until 2010 that public
3 concern began to grow.

4 I shall not attempt a comprehensive account of
5 the work of activists, a whistle-blower, investigative
6 journalists, the courts or the various formal
7 investigations which preceded the setting-up of this
8 inquiry. However, I will recite some of the salient
9 events which led to the then Home Secretary, The Right
10 Honourable Theresa May, announcing on 12 March 2015 that
11 there would be a statutory public inquiry chaired by Sir
12 Christopher Pitchford.

13 The written version of my opening statement will be
14 posted on the Inquiry's website. It contains hyperlinks
15 to all of the reports that I am just about to refer to,
16 as well as footnotes identifying the many other
17 documents that I will cite today.

18 On 14 March 2010, The Observer published an article
19 regarding the role of Officer "A", now known to be
20 Peter Francis, within the Special Demonstration Squad.
21 On 21 October 2010, the Indymedia website identified
22 Mark Kennedy as an undercover police officer based on
23 his confession to activists.

24 On 9 January 2011, The Guardian published its first
25 article about former undercover police officer

1 Mark Kennedy, in connection with the CPS's decision not
2 to proceed with prosecutions against activists in
3 connection with protests against the Ratcliffe-on-Soar
4 Power Station.

5 On 11 January 2011, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of
6 Constabulary, the HMIC, announced that it will conduct
7 a review of the National Public Order Intelligence Unit
8 with which Mark Kennedy had served. The review was to
9 cover operational accountability, authorisation and
10 proportionality.

11 On 13 January 2011, The Guardian published an
12 article which, amongst other things, raised the question
13 of links between Mark Kennedy and commercial
14 investigator Global Open.

15 The Guardian published articles about Jim Boyling,
16 Lynn Watson and Mark Jacobs.

17 On 19 January 2011 and on 22 January 2011,
18 The Guardian published an article in which a former SDS
19 officer asserted that promiscuity was used as a tactic
20 by undercover officers in activist groups and that
21 sexual relationships were sanctioned for both male and
22 female officers.

23 In July 2011, the Court of Appeal quashed
24 the convictions of 20 activists on the grounds that
25 Mark Kennedy had arguably acted as an agent provocateur.

1 On 15 October 2011, former SDS undercover officer
2 and manager Bob Lambert was publicly confronted by
3 activists. The Guardian published the story the next
4 day.

5 In October 2011, Operation Soisson, a review and
6 investigation into the alleged misconduct and
7 criminality of undercover officers engaged in by members
8 of the SDS, was commenced by the Metropolitan Police
9 Service. This later became Operation Herne, led by
10 the then chief constable of Derbyshire Police, Mick
11 Creedon.

12 On 6 December 2011, a report by retired Court of
13 Appeal judge Sir Christopher Rose into the conduct of
14 the prosecutions which followed the protest at
15 the Ratcliffe-on-Soar power station was published.

16 On 20 January 2012, The Guardian published the fact
17 that two undercover police officers had had children
18 with activists.

19 On 2 February 2012, HMIC published its review of
20 national police units which provide intelligence on
21 criminality associated with protest.

22 On 11 July 2012, Theresa May commissioned Mark
23 Ellison QC to investigate the allegations of corruption
24 relating to the investigation of Stephen Lawrence's
25 murder and whether the Metropolitan Police Service had

1 evidence of corruption that it did not disclose to
2 the Lawrence inquiry.

3 On 5 February 2015, the Home Affairs Select
4 Committee took evidence about undercover policing. On
5 the 26th of that month it published a critical interim
6 report on undercover policing.

7 On 24 June 2013, Peter Francis appeared on
8 Channel 4's Dispatches programme. The next day,
9 Paul Lewis and Rob Evans published their book,
10 "Undercover: The True Story of Britain's Secret Police".

11 On 27 June 2013, HMIC published an update on
12 progress against recommendations made following its 2012
13 report on the national police units which provide
14 intelligence on criminality associated with protest,
15 following a review which it had conducted in April of
16 2013.

17 The same day, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May,
18 commissioned HMIC to inspect the effectiveness of
19 the arrangements in place in all police forces to carry
20 out, manage and scrutinise undercover operations.

21 In July 2013, Theresa May expanded Mark Ellison's
22 terms of reference to include the investigation of Peter
23 Francis' allegations that the SDS gathered evidence with
24 which to smear the family of Stephen Lawrence.

25 On 16 July 2013, Operation Herne published its first

1 report, entitled "Use of Covert Identities". It was
2 followed on 6 March of the same year -- I beg your
3 pardon, of 2014 -- by the second report, entitled
4 "Allegations of Peter Francis: Operation Trinity".
5 The same day, Theresa May made an oral statement to
6 the House of Commons presenting the findings of
7 the Ellison review. She informed the House that she had
8 decided that a judge-led public inquiry into undercover
9 policing and the SDS was necessary.

10 On 10 March 2014, the Permanent Secretary to
11 the Home Office commissioned Stephen Taylor to conduct
12 an independent review of the Home Office's knowledge of
13 SDS activities.

14 In July 2014, Operation Herne published its third
15 report, entitled "Special Demonstration Squad Reporting
16 Mentions of Sensitive Campaigns".

17 On 14 October 2014, HMIC published the report of its
18 inspection of undercover policing in England and Wales.

19 On 12 March 2015, Theresa May published
20 Stephen Taylor's interim review; and on the same day,
21 she established the Undercover Policing Inquiry as
22 a statutory public inquiry, and appointed
23 Lord Justice Pitchford as its chairman.

24 The Inquiry's first chairman, the late
25 Sir Christopher Pitchford, formally opened the inquiry

1 on 28 July 2015 with a statement setting out
2 the Inquiry's terms of reference, explaining how he
3 intended to proceed, and inviting applications for core
4 participants' status.

5 The Inquiry's terms of reference are as follows.

6 "Purpose

7 "To enquire into and report on undercover police
8 operations conducted by English and Welsh police forces
9 in England and Wales since 1968 and, in particular, to:

10 "Investigate the role and the contribution made by
11 undercover policing towards the prevention and detection
12 of crime;

13 "Examine the motivation for, and the scope of,
14 undercover police operations in practice and their
15 effect upon individuals in particular and the public in
16 general;

17 "Ascertain the state of awareness of undercover
18 police operations of Her Majesty's Government;

19 "Identify and assess the adequacy of the:

20 "Justification, authorisation, operational
21 governance and oversight of undercover policing;

22 "Selection, training, management and care of
23 undercover police officers;

24 "Identify and assess the adequacy of the statutory,
25 policy and judicial regulation of undercover policing.

1 "Miscarriages of justice

2 "The Inquiry's investigations will include a review
3 of the extent of the duty to make, during a criminal
4 prosecution, disclosure of an undercover police
5 operation and the scope for miscarriage of justice in
6 the absence of proper disclosure.

7 "The Inquiry will refer to a panel, consisting of
8 senior members of the Crown Prosecution Service and
9 the police, the facts of any case in respect of which it
10 concludes that a miscarriage of justice may have
11 occurred as a result of an undercover police operation
12 or its non-disclosure. The panel will consider whether
13 further action is required, including but not limited
14 to, referral of the case to the Criminal Cases Review
15 Commission.

16 "Scope

17 "The Inquiry's investigation will include, but not
18 be limited to, whether and to what purpose, extent and
19 effect undercover police operations have targeted
20 political and social justice campaigners.

21 "The Inquiry's investigation will include, but not
22 be limited to, the undercover operations of the Special
23 Demonstration Squad and the National Public Order
24 Intelligence Unit.

25 "For the purpose of the Inquiry, the term

1 'undercover police operations' means the use by a police
2 force of a police officer as
3 a covert human intelligence source (CHIS) within
4 the meaning of section 26(8) of the Regulation of
5 Investigatory Powers Act 2000, whether before or after
6 the commencement of that Act. The terms 'undercover
7 police officer, 'undercover policing', 'undercover
8 police activity' should be understood accordingly. It
9 includes operations conducted through online media."

10 I have been asked to pause for a moment.

11 (Pause)

12 (A short break)

13 (11.16 am)

14 MS PURSER: Ladies and gentlemen, we are very sorry for
15 the delay. Thank you for your patience. We will now
16 resume proceedings. I will now hand over to
17 the Chairman to resume proceedings.

18 Thank you.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

20 Mr Barr, would you like to resume where you left
21 off? I think, although I'm not certain, that there will
22 not now be a break between now and 1 o'clock.

23 MR BARR: Thank you very much, sir.

24 I was reading from the terms of reference and I had
25 reached paragraph 7.

1 Paragraph 7 reads:

2 "The Inquiry will not examine undercover or covert
3 operations conducted by any body other than an English
4 or Welsh police force.

5 "Method.

6 "The inquiry will examine and review all documents
7 as the inquiry chairman shall judge appropriate.

8 "The inquiry will receive such oral and written
9 evidence as the inquiry chairman shall judge
10 appropriate.

11 "Report.

12 "The inquiry will report to the Home Secretary as
13 soon as practicable. The report will make
14 recommendations as to the future deployment of
15 undercover police officers."

16 There was a footnote which says:

17 "It is anticipated that the inquiry report will be
18 delivered up to three years after the publication of
19 these terms of reference."

20 It has, regrettably, proved impossible to comply
21 with the three-year time frame anticipated in the terms
22 of reference. The Home Secretary has been kept informed
23 of progress.

24 This is a particularly complicated public inquiry,
25 not only because of the breadth of our terms of

1 reference, but also because of the inherent difficulties
2 of enquiring publicly into secret policing of private
3 lives. We have a very large number of
4 core participants. The vast majority of the documents
5 produced to the Inquiry by state bodies bear high
6 security classifications. Much of their content refers
7 to the private lives of individuals, whether it be their
8 political beliefs or their personal affairs. A great
9 deal of time and effort has been spent preparing to
10 publish documents in a form that does not harm
11 the public interest or interfere unnecessarily with
12 the privacy of those to whom they refer.

13 We have undertaken numerous preliminary steps in
14 order to arrive at today's opening of the evidential
15 hearings.

16 The Inquiry first invited and then considered
17 applications for core participant status holding an oral
18 hearing on 7 October 2015, which was followed by
19 a ruling on 21 October 2015. 380 applications were
20 initially received, of which 198 were granted.

21 Since the expiry of the Inquiry's original deadline
22 for applications, many more late applications have been
23 received and considered. At present, the Inquiry has
24 233 core participants. Some are individuals; others are
25 groups or organisations.

1 One, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner's
2 Designated Lawyer Officers includes 113 current and
3 former police officers legally represented by
4 the designated lawyers' team, to whom I shall refer
5 as "the DL".

6 Core participants have been divided into
7 the following categories: A, police institutions; B,
8 government; C, Designated Lawyer Officers; D, political
9 organisations and politicians; E, trade's unions and
10 trade union members; F, relatives of deceased
11 individuals; G, the family of Stephen Lawrence, Duwayne
12 Brooks OBE and Michael Mansfield QC; H, individuals in
13 relationships with undercover officers; I, miscarriage
14 of justice; J, justice campaigns; K, political
15 activists; L, social and environmental activists; M,
16 families of police officers.

17 All core participants are entitled to make an
18 opening statement, and we shall be hearing their opening
19 statements for the rest of this week and on Monday and
20 Tuesday of next week.

21 It is one of the ways in which those involved in
22 the Inquiry's proceedings can have their say. There
23 will be a further opportunity at the start of each
24 tranche or phase of the Inquiry's work for those
25 directly affected by the evidence in that tranche or

1 phase to make a further opening statement, informed at
2 that stage by advanced sight of the hearing bundle.

3 Applications for funding for legal representation
4 were considered at a hearing held on 4 November 2015.
5 Further applications and the administration of awards
6 made pursuant to Section 40 of the Inquiries Act 2005
7 have been dealt with on paper since then.

8 A ruling was given on 16 January 2016 following
9 a minded to note and written submissions about
10 the standard of proof that will be applied.
11 Sir Christopher decided on a flexible and variable
12 standard of proof. That means that the starting point
13 for most decisions of fact should be the civil
14 standard: the balance of probabilities. But the
15 Chairman should not be bound by it because, depending on
16 what the issue is, it will be more useful if, having
17 examined the evidence, you, sir, express your state of
18 certainty or uncertainty upon it with such accuracy as
19 you can.

20 Following a hearing held on 27 April 2016 and
21 a ruling issued on 26 May 2016, an undertaking was
22 requested from the Attorney General in order to enable
23 witnesses to give their evidence to the Inquiry without
24 fear of self-incrimination. The Attorney
25 General provided an undertaking in the following terms

1 by letter dated 28 August 2016:

2 "It is undertaken that, in respect of any person who
3 provides evidence or produces a document, information or
4 thing to the Inquiry, no evidence he or she may give to
5 the Inquiry, whether orally or by written statement, nor
6 any witness statement made preparatory to giving
7 evidence, nor any document, thing or information
8 produced by that person to the Inquiry:

9 "(i) will be used against him or her (or their
10 spouse or civil partner) in any criminal proceedings
11 (whether present or future or on appeal from a
12 conviction); or

13 "(ii) will be used when deciding whether to bring
14 such proceedings, except proceedings where he or she is
15 charged with giving false evidence in the course of this
16 Inquiry or with having conspired with or procured any
17 other person to do so or is charged with any offence
18 under section 35 of the Inquiries Act 2005 or having
19 conspired with or procured others to commit such an
20 offence.

21 "It is further undertaken not to use in criminal
22 proceedings (whether present or future or on appeal
23 against conviction) against that person (or their spouse
24 or civil partner) any evidence itself which is the
25 product of an investigation commenced as a result of the

1 provision by that person of any evidence, document,
2 thing or information to the Inquiry.

3 "For the avoidance of doubt, this undertaking does
4 not preclude the use of a document and/or information
5 and/or evidence identified independently of the evidence
6 provided by that person to the Inquiry."

7 After two days of oral submissions and extensive
8 written submissions, on 3 May 2016, Sir Christopher
9 issued an 85-page ruling, which considered the approach
10 to be taken to determining applications for orders
11 imposing restrictions on the disclosure and publication
12 of any evidence or documents given, produced or provided
13 to the Inquiry. The care taken by the Inquiry at that
14 stage on this issue reflected its importance to
15 the levels of openness with which we can proceed.

16 The approach to the disclosure of the identities of
17 deceased children used by undercover police officers was
18 considered at an oral hearing held on 22 June 2016.
19 A ruling followed on 14 July.

20 For the reasons explained in the ruling, the Inquiry
21 has had to adopt a cautious approach to the release of
22 the relevant identities prior to the completion of
23 the evidential hearings. The evidence obtained by
24 the Inquiry about the use of deceased children's
25 identities in the construction of undercover identities

1 is to the effect that it was not immediately adopted as
2 a standard practice by the SDS. It became standard
3 practice a few years later, and its commencement will be
4 examined in the Tranche 1, Phase 2 hearings, which will
5 take place next year.

6 The Inquiry subsequently issued a public notice to
7 the parents or close relatives of children born between
8 1938 and 1975 who died in childhood who wish to know
9 whether the child's identity was used by the police to
10 create an undercover identity. Such persons were
11 invited to contact the Inquiry.

12 The Inquiry has also proactively contacted
13 the relatives of persons whose particulars are believed
14 to have been used by SDS undercover officers. As
15 a result of this process, 20 families have been informed
16 for the first time that at least some aspect of their
17 relative's identity was used by an undercover police
18 officer. In all but one of these cases the deceased
19 person was a child.

20 In a further case, the subject was still alive when
21 the SDS officer created his undercover identity.

22 The Inquiry sought witness statements from
23 appropriate persons within the Metropolitan Police
24 Service to explain matters relating to the documents
25 being provided to the Inquiry by the MPS. The process

1 is intended to provide assurance that the disclosure
2 exercise is being conducted in an appropriate manner and
3 serving its intended purpose.

4 Some of those assurance statements have been
5 published. The first was posted on the Inquiry's
6 website on 29 April 2016. Overall, seven assurance
7 statements produced by six witnesses have been published
8 by the Inquiry.

9 They are as follows: the witness statements of
10 Detective Superintendent Neil Hutchison, police team
11 senior officer for the Assistant Commissioner
12 Directorate of Professionalism's public inquiry team.
13 The witness statement of Jeffrey Lamprey, data standards
14 lead for the National Counter Terrorism Policing
15 Headquarters.

16 The witness statement of Kenneth Neale, data
17 protection officer and NSBIS administrator for
18 the National Counter Terrorism Policing Operation
19 Centre, NSBIS is a police database.

20 The witness statement of Temporary Detective
21 Superintendent Michael Killeen, head of intelligence,
22 National Counter Terrorism Policing Operations Centre.

23 The witness statement of Rob Cox, head of
24 information assurance and accreditation for the National
25 Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters.

1 The witness statement of Detective Inspector
2 Alastair Pocock, public inquiry liaison team.

3 The Inquiry has sought and received similar
4 assurance witness statements from senior officers within
5 all the regional police forces, setting out how they
6 have retained their material and how they have carried
7 out their searches for evidence relevant to
8 the Inquiry's terms of reference.

9 On 22 September 2016, Sir Christopher issued
10 a ruling in which he concluded that it would be
11 inappropriate to make any request for undertakings
12 concerning disciplinary proceedings relating to former
13 police officers long retired. He did so in the context
14 of the Policing and Crime Bill and fears expressed on
15 behalf of Mark Kennedy that it might have retrospective
16 effect.

17 The Inquiry held a significant hearing on 5 and
18 6 April 2017, to consider an application by the MPS for
19 an extension of time in which to make applications for
20 anonymity in respect of former members of the SDS, and
21 to change its appropriate to anonymity applications.
22 The occasion was also used to afford core participants
23 the opportunity to make submissions on the approach of
24 the Inquiry to its work in light of the fact that it had
25 become clear that the Inquiry would not be able to

1 report within three years of its start date as
2 anticipated in the terms of reference.

3 In a 59-page ruling issued on 2 May 2017,
4 the Chairman extended time for making anonymity
5 applications but declined to change the Inquiry's
6 approach.

7 Following extensive discussions with
8 core participants, the Inquiry issued a disclosure
9 protocol and a restrictions order protocol on
10 30 May 2017, in order to make clear how these matters
11 were to be dealt with insofar as they related to
12 the Metropolitan Police Service. These were the last
13 decisions made by the Inquiry's original chairman, who,
14 sadly, was forced to step down by serious ill-health.
15 The restrictions order protocol has recently been
16 updated to reflect changes in both law and practice,
17 particularly in relation to privacy.

18 Sir, you made your opening statement orally on
19 20 November 2017. In particular, you emphasised that
20 your priority is to discover the truth. You said:

21 "In the last sentence of paragraph 17 of his opening
22 remarks, Sir Christopher said 'The Inquiry's priority is
23 to discover the truth.' That is my priority. It is only
24 by discovering the truth that I can fulfil the terms of
25 reference of the Inquiry. I am determined to do so. In

1 making procedural decisions about the conduct of
2 the Inquiry I will do nothing which I can legitimately
3 avoid which makes fulfillment of that intention more
4 difficult. I will also make no decision whose purpose
5 is not to fulfil that aim."

6 In a series of decisions which began on
7 3 September 2017, you determined anonymity applications
8 relating to former members of the SDS in accordance with
9 published procedures. The making of those applications
10 and their determination proved to be a very considerable
11 undertaking. It involved the submission of
12 applications, supported by risk assessments and, in some
13 cases, the reports of medico-legal experts.

14 Significant redaction work was required before any
15 part of the applications and supporting evidence could
16 be made public. Oral hearings were held in
17 November 2017, February 2018 and May 2018. A series of
18 minded to and final decisions accompanied by
19 Counsel to the Inquiry's explanatory notes were
20 published by the Inquiry.

21 The procedure was streamlined in 2018, having first
22 given core participants the opportunity to comment on
23 a proposal for change. The principal result of the SDS
24 anonymity exercise is that the Inquiry has been able to
25 publish the cover names of 69 former SDS undercover

1 police officers.

2 Significant uncertainty arose as to the correct
3 interpretation of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act
4 1974 in the context of a public inquiry.

5 At an oral hearing held on 20 November 2017, oral
6 submissions were heard following the receipt of written
7 position statements and the publication of several notes
8 by you and Counsel to the Inquiry. A ruling followed on
9 27 November recording your decision to invite
10 the Secretary of State for Justice to lay before
11 Parliament an amendment to Schedule 3 to
12 the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions)
13 Order 1975. An amendment to that legislation was made
14 with effect from 24 June 2019, permitting the Inquiry to
15 consider spent convictions where necessary to fulfil
16 the terms of reference.

17 A witness statement protocol was issued on
18 22 January 2018 before the Inquiry embarked upon
19 the process of obtaining evidential witness statements
20 from former members of the SDS and from those affected
21 by their actions.

22 The Inquiry devised and implemented a process for
23 conducting the large-scale exercise needed to prepare
24 documents for provision to state witnesses, non-state
25 witnesses and hearing bundles. A part of this process

1 involved permitting state bodies an opportunity to apply
2 to restrict publication of documents or passages of text
3 within them.

4 Pursuant to the process set out in the restrictions
5 protocol, and in order to promote transparency, open
6 grounds for restriction were published by the Inquiry on
7 15 March 2018. In order to demonstrate how the process
8 would work, an important sample document, the SDS's
9 Tradecraft Manual, was published in redacted form on
10 19 March 2018.

11 Although many applications have been capable of
12 agreement, a number of closed hearings have been held at
13 which you, sir, have determined applications that could
14 not be agreed between counsel.

15 The Inquiry conducted a strategic review, announced
16 in 2017 and culminating in the publication of a document
17 in May 2018, which set out progress up to that point,
18 the Inquiry's intended future approach and the reasons
19 for rejecting alternative approaches. It was followed
20 on 18 May by a forward-looking oral hearing designed to
21 permit core participants to raise with the Inquiry how
22 the approach set out in the strategic review could be
23 executed most effectively.

24 On the same day as the hearing, you also issued
25 a statement on private meetings and public hearings. In

1 particular, this statement set out the basis upon which
2 you would meet separately and privately with non-state
3 core participants, former undercover officers, their
4 managers or, in each case, their surviving immediate
5 relatives. Since then a series of such meetings have
6 occurred.

7 An important aspect of the Inquiry's preparatory
8 work has been the preparation of issues lists to guide
9 our investigation, and in particular the gathering of
10 evidence. Our approach has been to publish a series of
11 lists, each relating to a specific part of the Inquiry.
12 In each case, Counsel to the Inquiry have prepared
13 a draft list on which core participants have been able
14 to comment in writing. The Chairman has then made
15 a decision and the Inquiry has published the list.

16 The first completed list was published on
17 5 July 2018. To date, the following lists of issues
18 have been published: Module 1, SDS issues; Module 1
19 NPOIU issues; Module 1, other undercover policing
20 issues; Module 2A, SDS issues list.

21 I shall return to the issues lists in more detail
22 later on.

23 In relation to the NPOIU, the Inquiry is conducting
24 a similar anonymity exercise to that which it has
25 conducted in relation to the SDS. The first ruling on

1 applications to restrict the real and/or cover names of
2 former NPOIU undercover police officers was made on
3 30 October 2018. The Inquiry will be publishing
4 the cover names of six of the 17 principal NPOIU
5 undercover officers.

6 The exercise is continuing. We are part way through
7 dealing with applications made in respect of NPOIU cover
8 officers and have invited applications in respect of
9 relevant NPOIU managers.

10 Complex issues arise in relation to the application
11 of data protection and privacy laws to the work of
12 the Inquiry, particularly following the coming into
13 force of the General Data Protection Regulation,
14 the GDPR, and the associated Data Protection Act 2018,
15 the DPA.

16 Two hearings were held to receive oral submissions
17 on these issues on 31 January 2019 and 25 March of that
18 year. Following these hearings, you made a written
19 statement, sir, on 11 April 2019, explaining
20 the approach which the Inquiry would follow to reconcile
21 its obligations to fulfil the terms of reference, in
22 particular to get at the truth about undercover police
23 deployments with its obligation to respect the data
24 protection rights of those affected by the deployments.

25 A second data protection and privacy statement

1 followed on 21 August 2019, which dealt with
2 the approach to be adopted to the disclosure of
3 documents and witness statements made by former
4 undercover officers to non-police, non-state
5 core participants and civilian witnesses, for
6 the purposes of taking statements from them.
7 The approach kept to a minimum the privacy redactions
8 which had to be applied to documents provided for
9 the purposes of enabling a witness to make an informed
10 witness statement.

11 A specific issue arose as to the approach to be
12 taken to the provision of photographs of undercover
13 police officers taken contemporaneously to their
14 deployments both to civilian witnesses and the public.
15 That issue was the subject of a public statement posted
16 on the Inquiry's website on 29 January 2020.
17 The Inquiry has been provided with some such photographs
18 dating from the very earliest days of the SDS, to which
19 I shall return later on.

20 On 14 September 2020, in the interests of
21 transparency, the Inquiry published its internal
22 guidance that we use when applying redactions to
23 documents for reasons of privacy. This document
24 reflects the practical application of the approach to
25 privacy set out in the restrictions protocol.

1 On 14 October of this year, sir, you issued
2 a statement explaining the approach that you will take
3 to ensuring compliance with the Investigatory Powers Act
4 2016. Most recently, on 22 October, we published
5 Counsel to the Inquiry's disclosure note, which explains
6 our approach to documents and witness statements in
7 Tranche 1, including an outline of the Phase 1 hearing
8 bundle.

9 The work of the Inquiry has been divided into
10 modules, tranches and phases. From the outset,
11 the Inquiry has divided its work into three modules.
12 Module 1 includes the examination of the deployment of
13 undercover officers in the past, their conduct and
14 the impact of their activities on themselves and others.

15 Module 2 includes the examination of the management
16 and oversight of undercover officers, including their
17 selection, training, supervision, care after the end of
18 an undercover deployment, and the legal and regulatory
19 framework within which undercover policing is carried
20 out.

21 It is subdivided into three parts.
22 Module 2A includes managers and administrators from
23 within undercover policing units. Module 2B includes
24 senior managers higher in the chain of command, as well
25 as police personnel who handled intelligence provided by

1 undercover police officers. Module 2C includes a number
2 of other government bodies with a connection to
3 undercover policing, including the Home Office.
4 Module 3 includes the examination of current undercover
5 policing practices and of how undercover policing should
6 be conducted in the future. For this final part of
7 the Inquiry, it is intended that you, sir, will be
8 joined by panel members appointed by the Home Secretary.

9 The scale of our task is such that it was decided to
10 split the Module 1 and 2 hearings into six tranches.
11 The starting point for the content of each tranche is as
12 follows, subject to minor adjustments which we are
13 making for a variety of reasons:

14 Tranche 1: the SDS, 1968 to 1982.

15 Tranche 2: the SDS, 1983 to 1992.

16 Tranche 3: the SDS, 1993 to 2008.

17 Tranche 4: the NPOIU.

18 Tranche 5: other undercover policing.

19 Tranche 6: senior managers, intelligence handlers
20 and other government bodies.

21 So far as former SDS undercover officers are
22 concerned, each has been allocated to a tranche
23 according to whether his or her start date fell within
24 the period covered by the tranche, unless there is some
25 reason to investigate the deployment out of sequence.

1 However, the approach to managers or administrators
2 within the SDS is different. They are allocated to
3 a tranche according to the date when they completed
4 their managerial or administrative posting. In this
5 way, we have sought to ensure that, save in exceptional
6 cases, we will receive evidence about undercover
7 officers before those who managed them.

8 For the purposes of Tranche 6, senior managers are
9 those who sat above the undercover units in the chain of
10 command but who had managerial responsibility for them.
11 In the case of the SDS, this means those managers in
12 the chain of command from the rank of superintendent up
13 to the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.

14 The slowing effect that the current pandemic has had
15 on our work has been such that, to avoid further delay
16 to the start of evidential hearings, it became necessary
17 to subdivide Tranche 1 into three phases.

18 Phase 1 focuses on evidence relating to 27 officers,
19 most of whom deployed undercover, those affected by
20 their deployments, especially three activists from whom
21 we have obtained witness statements, and four managers
22 from the very earliest years of the SDS. It also
23 involves evidence relating to higher levels of
24 management, the involvement of the Home Office and, to
25 a limited extent, the Security Service during this

1 formative period. I shall return to introduce Phase 1
2 in greater detail shortly.

3 Phase 2 involves the remaining Tranche 1 undercover
4 officers and some of those affected by their
5 deployments.

6 Phase 3 will cover the remaining evidence from, or
7 relating to, Tranche 1 managers.

8 It remains your intention, sir, to produce an
9 interim fact finding report following the conclusion of
10 Tranche 6. Panel members will then be appointed before
11 we proceed, in Module 3, to consider current and future
12 undercover policing.

13 Phase 1 witnesses who can give evidence in public
14 are due to be called between 11 and 19 November, that is
15 to say next Wednesday through to a week on Thursday.
16 Preparations for phases 2 and 3 are ongoing. Public
17 Phase 2 hearings are now likely to take place in March
18 or April next year, and Phase 3 public hearings as soon
19 as practicable thereafter.

20 In addition to the public hearings, the Inquiry will
21 also be arranging closed hearings at which evidence
22 which cannot be given publicly will be received from
23 Tranche 1 witnesses, in particular from some of
24 the officers whose real and cover names cannot be
25 published.

1 The Inquiry's Tranche 2 investigation involves 36
2 former UCOs and 14 former managers. 28 of the former
3 UCOs are expected to be able to provide a witness
4 statement. The remainder are either deceased, excused
5 due to ill-health, or both overseas and declining to
6 cooperate. 16 of these former officers have been
7 granted anonymity. Witness statements have been
8 received from seven former UCOs and are awaited from
9 a further six. Requests for a witness statement with
10 a supporting bundle of documents are in various stages
11 of preparation for the remainder.

12 Our investigation of the eight officers who cannot
13 provide a witness statement has been completed and
14 the resulting documents are entering the restrictions
15 order process to be prepared for publication.

16 The impact of the pandemic on our capacity and that
17 of the third parties involved means that delays are
18 anticipated to the further preparatory steps required
19 for a hearing. We currently anticipate that Tranche 2
20 hearings will commence in the first half of 2022.

21 Work continues on tranches 3 and 4. Although
22 the Inquiry's resources are necessarily being
23 concentrated primarily on tranches 1 and 2. In
24 Tranche 3, following investigation, the first Rule 9
25 requests for witness statements from former UCOs are

1 being drafted. In Tranche 4, that stage should be
2 reached shortly.

3 The number of persons who can safely work in
4 the Inquiry's offices, and those of relevant third
5 parties, is limited by the need for social distancing.
6 Much investigative work cannot be done from home because
7 of the need to work on classified documents. Social
8 distancing is affecting our capacity across all tranches
9 but is particularly detrimental to the later tranches.
10 We currently anticipate that T3 hearings will commence
11 in the first half of 2023.

12 Significant work has been undertaken on tranches 5
13 and 6. However, it is currently paused pending work on
14 earlier tranches.

15 Planning for evidential hearings began some time
16 ago. In August 2018, the Inquiry published
17 a consultation document relating to the administration
18 of evidence hearings. You responded, sir, with your
19 preliminary conclusions, which were set out in your
20 statement dated 19 December 2018. Statements specific
21 to the arrangements for Tranche 1 were made on
22 7 April 2020, relating to special measures for
23 witnesses; 29 May 2020, containing proposals in response
24 to the pandemic; and 23 July 2020, following written
25 submissions on those proposals.

1 In addition, there has been a considerable amount of
2 liaison between the Inquiry legal team and
3 core participants. You have also considered and decided
4 a number of specific applications for reasonable
5 adjustments to be made to enable core participants to
6 participate in the hearings. Very considerable work has
7 been done behind the scenes by the Inquiry's hearings
8 team, and many others too numerous to identify
9 separately, to enable the Inquiry to start today.
10 Together, they have overcome the formidable challenges
11 presented by the pandemic. We are grateful to them all.

12 I now turn specifically to Phase 1 of Tranche 1.

13 The evidence that we have obtained for Phase 1 of
14 Tranche 1 concerns events preceding the formation of
15 the SDS -- the formation of the SDS, its activities in
16 the earliest years of the unit's existence and
17 the decisions which led to the SDS continuing to exist
18 beyond the specific purpose for which it was originally
19 formed. The documents suggest that the SDS's original
20 purpose was the supply of advanced intelligence relating
21 to the mass demonstration staged by
22 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign on 27 October 1968.

23 I shall refer to that as "the October demonstration".

24 In fact, the SDS went on to exist for four decades,
25 and to provide long-term intelligence on a wide range of

1 targets. It transformed from a unit created to provide
2 intelligence relating to a specific forthcoming event in
3 what was then the near future to one which continually
4 gathered intelligence about the activities and
5 intentions of numerous groups.

6 How did the SDS come into existence? Was undercover
7 policing to gather intelligence about the October
8 demonstration justified? How and why did the SDS's
9 existence become long term? Were the long-term
10 deployments which evolved justified? Did the SDS become
11 political police? We suggest that these are
12 the central, high-level questions in this era. They are
13 supplemented by numerous other questions about how
14 the unit operated, what it did and why.

15 The formative period with which we are dealing in
16 Phase 1 is one in which a high concentration of SDS
17 officers served. Some of the earliest officers served
18 for only a few weeks or months. There is a noticeable
19 trend towards longer deployments after that.

20 There will be a good deal of evidence in Phase 1 of
21 how the SDS operated in the early years. However, there
22 is no evidence in the documents or witness statements
23 that we have obtained of any specific sexual
24 relationship between an undercover officer in his or her
25 undercover identity and a member of the public. Nor is

1 there any evidence in the documents that it was official
2 practice to use a deceased child's identity in this
3 early period. There will be evidence that both of these
4 things occurred in Phase 2 of Tranche 1.

5 The documents and witness statements obtained by
6 the Inquiry contain no evidence that any Phase 1 SDS
7 officer infiltrated right wing groups. The SDS's early
8 work was entirely targeted at left wing or Irish-related
9 groups. There will be some evidence of infiltration of
10 the far right in Tranche 2.

11 Two of the Inquiry's published issues lists are, in
12 very large part, relevant to the Phase 1 investigation.
13 First, the Module 1 Special Demonstration Squad issues
14 list, which is directed at the SDS's undercover
15 officers; second,
16 the Module 2A Special Demonstration Squad issues list,
17 which concerns unit level management of the SDS.

18 The Module 1 SDS issues list itemises 158 issues
19 grouped under the following 21 headings:

20 The establishment of the SDS; the size, organisation
21 and composition of the SDS; recruitment, selection and
22 training; legend building; targeting and initial
23 authorisation; relationships; participation in or
24 encouragement of crime; criminal proceedings;
25 infringement of legal professional privilege; reporting

1 generally; reporting on justice campaigns; reporting on
2 the Stephen Lawrence campaign and Duwayne Brooks OBE;
3 reporting on elected politicians, political
4 organisations and political activists; reporting on
5 trade unions and trade union members; reporting on
6 social and environmental activists; the prevention and
7 detection of crime; management, supervision and
8 oversight; withdrawal from deployment; management of
9 post-deployment conduct; debriefing; the welfare of
10 undercover officers and their families.

11 The Module 2A SDS issues list specifies 219 issues
12 grouped under the following 30 subheadings:

13 The establishment of the SDS; the function of
14 the SDS; size, organisation and composition of the SDS;
15 management and supervisory structure and function;
16 selection and recruitment; training and guidance; legend
17 building; targeting and authorisation; the role of
18 supervisors and managers generally; reporting on justice
19 campaigns; reporting on the Stephen Lawrence campaign
20 and Duwayne Brooks OBE; reporting on elected
21 politicians, political organisations and political
22 activists; reporting on trade unions and trade union
23 members; reporting on social and environmental
24 activists; management knowledge of and attitudes towards
25 relationships between undercover officers and their

1 targets, or those upon whom they reported; management
2 knowledge of and attitudes towards participation in or
3 encouragement of crime by undercover officers;
4 management knowledge of and attitudes towards undercover
5 officers' involvement in criminal proceedings;
6 management knowledge of and attitudes towards undercover
7 officers' involvement in civil proceedings; management
8 knowledge of and attitudes towards infringement of legal
9 professional privilege by undercover officers; SDS
10 recordkeeping; whistleblowing; withdrawal from
11 deployment; debriefing; management of post-deployment
12 conduct; the welfare of undercover officers and their
13 families; the prevention and detection of crime;
14 interaction between SDS managers and those responsible
15 for overseeing its operation; dissemination of
16 intelligence; interaction with the Security Service;
17 the disbandment of the SDS.

18 In eliciting evidence, we will not draw bright lines
19 between modules, tranches and phases. The officers in
20 Phase 1 have evidence to give which goes beyond their
21 own actions, managerial issues within the SDS and
22 sometimes beyond. Some of the evidence in Phase 1 will
23 overlap with Phase 2, Tranche 6 and, to a lesser extent,
24 other parts of the Inquiry.

25 Nor will we draw bright lines between different

1 issues lists or treat them as we would treat pleadings
2 in adversarial litigation. They are a tool to direct
3 and inform our work, not an artificial boundary.

4 Witness statements have been obtained from 18 former
5 SDS UCOs for the purposes of Phase 1. Eight of these
6 witnesses will be giving oral evidence during the oral
7 hearings, which commence next Wednesday. They will be
8 called in broadly chronological order and their witness
9 statements published on the Inquiry's website at
10 the start of the session in which the witness will be
11 called.

12 Any documents referred to in evidence and not
13 already published will be published as soon as possible
14 after the hearing. The witness statements of those not
15 giving oral evidence will be summarised by junior
16 counsel to the Inquiry. These summaries have been
17 scheduled to accord broadly with each officer's place in
18 the chronology of events. The witness statement and
19 documents associated with such officers will always be
20 posted on the Inquiry's website immediately afterwards.

21 Witness statements have been obtained from three
22 civilians who were reported on by the SDS. Tariq Ali
23 was a prominent figure in the Vietnam Solidarity
24 Campaign and a leading activists throughout Phase 1 and
25 beyond. Ernest Tate was also a leading figure in

1 the VSC. Dr Norman Temple was a member of the Irish
2 National Solidarity Liberation Front, which I shall
3 refer to as "the INSLF".

4 Mr Ali and Dr Temple are due to give oral evidence.
5 Mr Tate is unable to do so. His witness statement will
6 be read by Mr Menon QC at the appropriate juncture and
7 published on the Inquiry's website together with
8 the associated exhibits.

9 Mr Ali and Dr Temple have been scheduled to give
10 evidence before the undercover officers who spied upon
11 them. Mr Ali will be the Inquiry's first witness.
12 Their witness statements and exhibits will be published
13 on the Inquiry's website at the start of the sessions
14 during which they give evidence.

15 In addition to the written and oral evidence of
16 the witnesses, a significant number of documents will
17 also be put into evidence. Written evidence which
18 the Inquiry is publishing today falls into the following
19 categories.

20 First, open source documents from the period: press
21 cuttings, film clips, and the obituaries for the founder
22 of the SDS, Conrad Dixon.

23 Second, documents passing between Special Branch and
24 the Home Office, including periodic reports of the SDS's
25 activities spanning the years 1969 to 1974. These

1 document the unit's activity from the SDS's corporate
2 perspective. They also record the grounds on which
3 continued funding was sought by Special Branch from
4 the Home Office and the Home Office's approval of these
5 requests. It was through this mechanism that the SDS
6 continued to exist. We regard them as very important
7 documents. I will speak to them in more detail later.

8 Third, the content of a Special Branch file entitled
9 "SDS Demonstration Squad Policy". These refer mainly to
10 the SDS's financial affairs in the period 1968 to 1973,
11 and flatly contradict information in the public domain
12 to the effect that the SDS, upon its foundation, had
13 a budget of half-a-million pounds. The documents refer
14 to figures, excluding salaries, of a few thousand
15 pounds per annum.

16 There is also a significant paper written by
17 Conrad Dixon, dated 26 November 1968, entitled
18 "Penetration of Extremist Groups". It records Chief
19 Inspector Dixon's thoughts on the running of a unit such
20 as the SDS and appends details of the SDS's organisation
21 at the time. I will return to it later.

22 Fourth, documents in the SDS policy file which, if
23 accurate, demonstrate that the undercover tactic had
24 been used by Special Branch before the foundation of
25 the SDS. These documents concern Woman Patrol Pelling,

1 a Special Branch officer who operated undercover in
2 the 1920s and infiltrated the Communist Party of
3 Great Britain.

4 Fifth, Home Office circular number 97 of 1969 on
5 informants who take part in crime and the Home Office's
6 terms of reference for Special Branch dated April 1970.

7 The former document, about which we will hear
8 evidence in due course, contains official guidance from
9 the Home Office to police on the participation of
10 informants in crime. It is not specifically directed at
11 undercover officers. No specific guidance on
12 the participation of undercover police officers in crime
13 has been found from this era.

14 The latter document covers all special branches
15 nationally and is pertinent because of the references to
16 their role assisting the Security Service in the defence
17 of the realm; in particular their role in countering
18 subversion.

19 Sixth, documents relating to the extent to which
20 the SDS assisted the Security Service. The relationship
21 between the two is an important line of inquiry. Five
22 documents evidencing the relationship between the SDS
23 and the Security Service are available for publication
24 and admission into evidence in Phase 1. The Inquiry has
25 received a witness statement from the Security Service

1 and further documents. The extent to which this
2 evidence can be put into the public domain is presently
3 under consideration. Such of this information as it is
4 safe to publish will be made public later in Tranche 1.

5 Seventh, documents from the Metropolitan Police
6 Service Police Special Branch files concerning
7 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. These documents date
8 mainly, but not entirely, from 1968. The approach which
9 the Inquiry has taken to such documents has been first
10 to prepare for publication two entire Special Branch
11 files. The first relates to the VSC in the period June
12 to August 1968; the second relates to the VSC in
13 the period August 1968 to January 1969.

14 The contents of these files between them cover
15 the period immediately before and after the formation of
16 the SDS, the unit formed on 30 or 31 July 1968. They
17 show that Special Branch was receiving intelligence
18 about the VSC's activities from numerous sources, not
19 just undercover police officers. They assist in
20 understanding what intelligence Special Branch was
21 gathering about the VSC, and in making a comparison
22 between the pre- and post-SDS intelligence picture that
23 Special Branch had obtained.

24 Secondly, there is a report by Chief Inspector Dixon
25 following the public disorder that occurred at the VSC's

1 mass demonstration held on 17 March 1968. Obtaining
2 intelligence to prevent a recurrence of such disorder
3 appears to have been the reason for the creation of
4 the SDS.

5 Third, there is a series of reports by
6 Chief Inspector Dixon, dated from 21 August 1968 until
7 22 October of that year, concerning intelligence about
8 preparations for the October demonstration. They
9 contain information which appears to have come from
10 a number of sources, including, by then, the SDS's
11 undercover police officers.

12 Finally, there is a selection of documents from
13 other VSC-related files which we considered necessary
14 for the purposes of the investigation. I will be
15 returning specifically to some of the more significant
16 documents from the VSC files later.

17 Any Phase 1 documents not published either today or
18 during the course of the oral hearings will be published
19 at the end of the hearings. Publication is being staged
20 to ensure fairness to those witnesses who are giving
21 oral evidence. The end result will be that the entire
22 Phase 1 bundle for the forthcoming hearing will be put
23 into the public domain.

24 Those directly affected by the actions of
25 the Tranche 1 undercover police officers have been

1 provided with a copy of the hearing bundle in advance.

2 Phase 1 takes us back more than half a century to
3 1968, and it may assist to provide some contextual
4 background.

5 The world was in the middle of the Cold War;
6 government was concerned about communism, particularly
7 but, importantly for our purposes, not limited to,
8 the Soviet version. The United States was deeply
9 involved in an increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam;
10 one of the biggest of the regional conflicts in which
11 superpowers intervened on opposing sides during the Cold
12 War. That conflict was the subject of the mass
13 demonstrations and public disorder on the streets of
14 London which led to the formation of the SDS.

15 Public disorder and discontent amongst students was
16 widespread in Europe, notably in Paris. There were
17 fears, in official circles, that the same was occurring
18 in London and could grow out of hand. In far-left
19 circles, some at least, were hoping that it would do so.
20 The Communist Party of Great Britain was not an
21 instigator of mass protest. It was advancing its aims
22 through a different strategy.

23 We shall hear evidence that Maoist and Trotskyist
24 groups were organising determination, as were other
25 groups, at a time of heightened political consciousness.

1 Those who attended such demonstrations often included
2 members of other groups, including anarchist groups or
3 the general public. Some sought lawful, orderly
4 protest. Others did not.

5 The aims and methods of different groups and their
6 ability to organise peaceful protest or to incite
7 disorder, as the case may be, will be a matter for
8 evidence.

9 We shall be hearing conflicting accounts.
10 Trotskyist, Maoist and anarchist groups are prominent
11 amongst the SDS's targets throughout the Tranche 1
12 period.

13 The late 1960s and early 1970s were a period of
14 rapid social change with an active civil rights
15 movement. There was activism and protest against
16 racism; including, notably, apartheid South Africa.
17 The same was true of gender equality, including what was
18 then called Women's Liberation. In Northern Ireland
19 the civil rights movement protested against
20 the inequalities arising from religious sectarianism.
21 A number of such groups were directly infiltrated by
22 the SDS and many others were reported on peripherally.

23 There will be evidence that groups on the far left
24 supported these causes and were influential within at
25 least some of them to varying degrees. We will be

1 examining whether the influence of such groups or
2 the methods of protest used by civil rights activists
3 were capable of justifying undercover officers spying
4 upon them. If so, did they justify the undercover
5 policing that actually took place?

6 In 1969, what became known as "The Troubles" began
7 in Northern Ireland. Sectarian violence escalated. In
8 August 1971, the introduction of internment without
9 trial, including the treatment of some detainees in ways
10 which were later held by the European Court of Human
11 Rights to have been inhuman and degrading, caused anger
12 and resentment. The killing of innocent civilians by
13 British paratroopers on Bloody Sunday in January 1972
14 caused further anger and controversy. Violence
15 escalated further.

16 Tensions in Northern Ireland spilled over onto
17 mainland Britain, for example in the terrorist bombing
18 of Aldershot Barracks in 1972, or the bombing of public
19 houses in Guildford and Birmingham in the autumn of
20 1974.

21 Some of the Phase 1 SDS undercover officers
22 infiltrated groups campaigning on Irish-related matters.
23 Some of the groups concerned were anti-sectarian.
24 Others were sectarian in outlook.

25 The Troubles may be important to the Inquiry's work

1 because the desire for intelligence about groups
2 campaigning on the mainland on Irish-related issues
3 appears, on the face of the documents recovered, to have
4 been at least one of the maintaining factors in
5 the continued existence of the SDS after 1968.

6 There were significant industrial disputes during
7 the Phase 1 period, particularly the 1972 miners' strike
8 and controversial legislation in the form of
9 the Industrial Relations Act of 1971. It was a period
10 in which there was concern in official circles about
11 the influence that groups on the far left were having
12 within the trade union movement, and a growing militancy
13 in industrial relations, which was to come to a head in
14 the late 1970s and early 1980s.

15 On the documents and witness statements obtained for
16 Phase 1 there is no evidence that any trade union was
17 specifically infiltrated by the SDS. Nor is there
18 evidence of direct contact between the SDS and
19 blacklisting organisations. However, there is reporting
20 of the interest which some of the groups which were
21 infiltrated had in industrial relations.

22 There are also reports which refer to specific
23 industrial disputes and to the trade union credentials
24 of some individuals who SDS officers came into contact
25 with whilst deployed.

1 We will be investigating whether there were indirect
2 contacts between the SDS and blacklisting organisations
3 later in the Inquiry with managers and those who
4 disseminated SDS intelligence.

5 So far as government during the Phase 1 period is
6 concerned, Sir Harold Wilson was the Labour
7 Prime Minister until 19 June 1970, and then again from
8 4 March 1974. Sir Edward Heath was the Conservative
9 Prime Minister during the intervening period. There are
10 occasional references to the Labour Party in the Phase 1
11 evidence, although there is no evidence that the Labour
12 Party was ever infiltrated or a target of the SDS.

13 The Home Secretaries during the Phase 1 period were
14 Sir James Callaghan until 19 July 1970, Sir Reginald
15 Maudling between 20 July 1970 until 19 July 1972,
16 Lord Carr from 19 July 1972 until 4 March 1974, and Sir
17 Roy Jenkins from 5 March 1974 onwards, for Phase 1
18 purposes. The Home Secretary is accountable to
19 Parliament for ensuring the Queen's peace within all
20 police areas and for the role that the police play in
21 ensuring national security.

22 The documents that we are publishing today
23 demonstrate that the Home Office was well aware of
24 the existence of the SDS and approved its continued
25 funding periodically throughout the Phase 1 period.

1 There is evidence that the government of the day was
2 very concerned about the October demonstration. It
3 includes material which suggests that, as Home
4 Secretary, James Callaghan was personally consulted
5 about the proposed arrest of an activist against whom
6 evidence had been obtained by a member of the SDS,
7 although the evidence does not suggest that he knew that
8 to be the case.

9 The Metropolitan Police, Metropolitan Police
10 Special Branch and the Special Demonstration Squad.

11 The key police personalities involved for
12 the purposes of the Phase 1 evidence at senior
13 management level are as follows.

14 The Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis
15 were: Sir Joseph Simpson until 20 March 1968, Sir John
16 Waldron from March 1968 until April 1974; and Sir Robert
17 Mark from April 1974 onwards.

18 Assistant commissioners. The post of Assistant
19 Commissioner C, that is crime, was filled by
20 Peter Brodie between 1966 and 1972 and then Colin Woods
21 between 1972 and 1975.

22 Deputy Assistant Commissioner. At the rank of
23 Deputy Assistant Commissioner and occupying the post
24 Head of Special Branch was Ferguson Smith between 1970
25 and 1972, followed by Victor Gilbert between 1972 and

1 1977.

2 At commander level, Ferguson Smith had previously
3 been Commander Special Branch whilst holding the rank of
4 Commander between 1966 and 1970. Other significant
5 personalities at the rank of commander are John Lawlor,
6 who was in charge of policing at the March and
7 October 1968 VSC demonstrations which are important to
8 understanding the genesis of the SDS, and Matthew Roger,
9 who was a commander between 1970 and 1972.

10 At the rank of chief superintendent, significant
11 documents are signed by Arthur Cunningham in the period
12 1968 to 1972. HN332, who is more significant for their
13 role as head of the SDS at lower ranks, also occupied
14 this rank in 1972.

15 Superintendents who appear in the documents are
16 TN0039 and J Lawrenson.

17 Within the SDS itself, during the Phase 1 period,
18 the managers were as follows.
19 Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon led the unit from its
20 foundation in July 1968 until approximately July 1969.
21 Dixon was succeeded by Phil Saunders from July 1969
22 until August 1971. During the first part of this period
23 until March 1970, Saunders appears to have been an
24 acting chief inspector. During this period, he may have
25 shared the role with Detective Inspector Riby Wilson.

1 Thereafter Saunders is recorded as a chief inspector.
2 Before taking command of the SDS, Saunders had served in
3 the SDS from the unit's formation as
4 a detective inspector.

5 Chief Inspector Saunders was himself succeeded by
6 HN332 in August 1971. HN332 commanded the SDS briefly
7 until early 1972. Like Saunders, he too had served as
8 a detective inspector in the SDS from the unit's
9 inception. It appears that HN332 was an SDS
10 detective inspector until at least July 1969.

11 The next SDS leader was HN294, between 1972 and
12 1974. He commenced his service in the SDS when holding
13 the rank of detective sergeant in December 1969. He
14 served as a detective inspector from March 1970 and is
15 recorded as being acting chief inspector from mid-1972
16 onwards, until his promotion to chief inspector by 1974.

17 Finally, for the purposes of Phase 1,
18 Chief Inspector Derek Kneale commanded the SDS between
19 1974 and early 1976. His significance in Phase 1 is
20 that he signed the 4 February 1975 SDS annual report.
21 He served briefly as a detective inspector in the SDS
22 before promotion to chief inspector.

23 Detective Inspector Riby Wilson was involved with
24 the SDS since its inception in an administrative
25 capacity. Between February and December 1969, he

1 countersigned a number of SDS reports on behalf of
2 the chief inspector, or as acting chief inspector.

3 The officers with essentially administrative
4 functions feature in the evidence as follows. First,
5 Detective Sergeant Roy Creamer, who appears to have
6 served in the SDS between July 1968 and July 1969.
7 Detective Constable William Furner appears to have
8 served between July 1968 and at least December 1969.
9 Finally, Detective Sergeant David Smith. There is some
10 evidence to suggest that he was involved from an early
11 stage in an administrative capacity. It appears he may
12 have returned to the unit later, signing reports as an
13 acting chief inspector.

14 The SDS officers whose deployments have been
15 included in Phase 1 I'm going to come to and list in
16 just a moment. Some are going to give oral evidence,
17 others are going to give written evidence, some are not
18 able to give evidence.

19 First, HN218, Barry Moss, who used the cover
20 name "Barry Morris".

21 Second, HN68, who used the cover name "Sean Lynch".
22 He is deceased.

23 HN331, whose real name is restricted and whose cover
24 name is unknown. He is deceased.

25 HN323, Helen Crampton, whose cover name is unknown.

1 She is deceased.

2 HN237, Dave Fisher, whose cover name is unknown. He
3 is deceased.

4 HN334, who used the cover name "Margaret White".

5 HN318, Ray Wilson, whose cover name is unknown. He
6 is deceased.

7 HN329, who used the cover name "John Graham".

8 HN330, who used the cover name, "Don de Freitas".

9 HN321, who used the cover name,
10 "William Paul Lewis", more usually "Bill Lewis".

11 HN335, Mike Tyrell, whose cover name is unknown. He
12 is deceased.

13 HN322, whose real name is restricted and who states
14 that he did not have a cover name.

15 HN328, Joan Hillier, who states that she did not
16 have a cover name.

17 HN326, who used the cover name "Douglas Edwards".

18 HN333, whose real and cover names are restricted.

19 HN135, Mike Ferguson, whose cover name is
20 restricted. He is deceased.

21 HN336, who used the cover name "Dick Epps".

22 HN340, who used the cover name "Alan Nixon".

23 HN346, Jill Mosdell, whose cover name is unknown.
24 She is deceased.

25 HN339, who used the cover name "Stewart Goodman".

1 HN349, whose real and cover names are restricted.
2 HN45, who used the cover name "David Robertson".
3 HN347, who used the cover name "Alex Sloan".
4 HN343, who used the cover name "John Clinton".
5 HN338, whose real name is restricted and whose cover
6 name is unknown. He is deceased.
7 HN348, who used the cover name "Sandra".
8 HN345, who used the cover name "Peter Fredericks".
9 Throughout our submissions and today we have
10 referred to the SDS as such for convenience. In fact,
11 its title changed over time, even during Phase 1. In
12 the early documents, particularly at working level,
13 various names are used, for example,
14 "Demonstration Squad", "Demo Squad", "Special Squad" or
15 "The Hairies". In higher level official documents
16 the unit is referred to as
17 "The Special Operations Squad" noticeably so in
18 communications with the Home Office from at least
19 December 1968.
20 It may be that nothing turns on the name, but we
21 observe that "The Demonstration Squad", or similar,
22 aptly describes what the unit first did when gathering
23 intelligence about the October demonstration. The title
24 "Special Operations Squad" better describes a unit with
25 a wider remit, which is what those using that name

1 wanted it to become and what it quickly did become after
2 the October demonstration.

3 In 1968, the Security Service's role was defined by
4 the 1952 directive issued by the then Secretary of State
5 for the Home Department, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe. It's
6 known as "The Maxwell Fyfe Directive" which, in material
7 part, stated as follows:

8 "The Security Service is part of the defence forces
9 of the country. Its task is the defence of the realm as
10 a whole from external and internal dangers arising from
11 attempts of espionage and sabotage, or from actions of
12 persons and organisations, whether directed from within
13 or without the country, which may be judged to be
14 subversive of the state."

15 Lord Harris of Greenwich defined subversion in
16 the House of Lords on 26 February 1975:

17 "Subversive activities are generally regarded as
18 those which threaten the safety or wellbeing of
19 the state and which are intended to undermine or
20 overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political,
21 industrial or violent means."

22 That definition originated from
23 the Security Services Director F in 1972 and was
24 incorporated into an F Branch instruction in
25 January 1973.

1 Special branches, including Metropolitan
2 Police Special Branch, had a role in assisting
3 the Security Service to counter subversion. Formal
4 written evidence of that responsibility within
5 the Phase 1 period is to be found in the Home Office
6 terms of reference for Special Branch dated April 1970.
7 The whole document needs to be considered, but perhaps
8 the most important passages read as follows:

9 "2. Function

10 "Special Branch is responsible for acquiring
11 security intelligence, both secret and overt (a) to
12 assist the chief officer in the preservation of public
13 order (b) as directed by the chief officer to assist
14 the Security Service in its task of defending the realm
15 from attempts at espionage and sabotage, and from
16 actions of persons and organisations which may be judged
17 to be subversive of the security of the State.

18 "3. Tasks

19 "... (d) in consultation with the Security Service
20 to collect, process and record information about
21 subversive or potentially subversive organisations and
22 individuals;

23 "... (f) to investigate any subversive background to
24 demonstrations and breaches of public order, and, in
25 consultation with the Security Service, to certain

1 industrial disputes.

2 "... (m) to maintain such records as are required
3 and ensure the security of their content."

4 And in an explanatory annex we have noted
5 paragraph 3, under the heading "Function":

6 "It is important that Special Branches should have
7 a clear idea of what constitutes 'persons and
8 organisations which may be judged to be subversive of
9 the security of the State'. Broadly speaking, these are
10 any organisation or individual whose purpose is
11 the undermining or overthrow of the established
12 democratic order."

13 There is extensive reference in SDS intelligence
14 reports and associated minute sheets to their being
15 copied to the Security Service. Higher level
16 correspondence, to which I shall return later, also
17 suggests a close working relationship between the SDS
18 and the Security Service. We are not investigating
19 the Security Service, but it will be necessary to
20 explore the relationship between the two bodies in order
21 properly to understand the SDS. We shall also be
22 seeking to establish what, in practice, was considered
23 subversive, or potentially subversive, by Special Branch
24 and especially the SDS.

25 On 17 March 1968 the VSC organised a mass

1 demonstration involving a march from Trafalgar Square to
2 Grosvenor Square, the site of the embassy of
3 the United States of America. It was a protest against
4 American involvement in Vietnam and appears to have been
5 a response to the North Vietnamese government and
6 the National Liberation front calling for mass
7 demonstrations of solidarity throughout the world on or
8 about 19 March 1968. That date was claimed to be
9 the 18th anniversary of the first mass demonstration
10 against the involvement of the United States of America
11 in the Vietnam War. The demonstration ended in a riot.

12 We are grateful to ITV for providing a copy of
13 the contemporary television news report of the event.
14 It provides an impression of events on the day and an
15 indication of how it was presented on television at the
16 time.

17 Please could we be shown the video of the March 1968
18 demonstration. That's {DOC006}.

19 (Video evidence played to the Inquiry)

20 MS PURSER: Ladies and gentlemen, I am very sorry but we are
21 having a technical difficulty and we will be back as
22 soon as possible. Thank you for your patience. Please
23 bear with us.

24 (Pause)

25 (The short adjournment)

1 (2.00 pm)

2 MS PURSER: Good afternoon and welcome to the afternoon
3 session of the Day 1 opening statements of
4 the Undercover Policing Inquiry. I will now hand over
5 to our Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to continue
6 proceedings.

7 Chairman.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

9 Mr Barr, third time lucky, I hope.

10 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

11 Amongst the documents that we are publishing today
12 are newspaper clippings found in Special Branch files
13 which relate to the demonstration and public disorder on
14 17 March 1968. Unfortunately, despite best efforts,
15 the copy quality is poor. Consequently, they have been
16 transcribed and copies of the transcript will accompany
17 the clippings published later today. They demonstrate
18 how the event was portrayed in the media. It was
19 a momentous event both politically and for the policing
20 of public order.

21 Six documents retrieved from Special Branch files
22 which pre-date the 17 March 1968 demonstration are being
23 published by the Inquiry. They indicate that
24 Special Branch was seeking to obtain in advance as much
25 intelligence about activist plans for the demonstration

1 as possible. Intelligence was obtained from multiple
2 sources. Special Branch was aware that the demonstration
3 was likely to be on a very large scale. It was also
4 aware of the potential for violence, and even of some of
5 the tactics that might be used. For example, there was
6 intelligence that some activists intended to break
7 through the police cordon at Grosvenor Square. However,
8 the documents also indicate that
9 the intelligence-gathering tactics used had their
10 limits.

11 One of the documents relates to a VSC meeting held
12 at Toynbee Hall, London E1, attended by 60 people but
13 described as "private". The Special Branch Sergeant and
14 constable who attended were recognised and asked to
15 leave.

16 Another report concerns a meeting of the VSC Ad Hoc
17 Committee held at a public house, which the reporting
18 officer had not been able to enter. I quote from
19 the report:

20 "The meeting was held in an upstairs room at
21 the premises and in view of the mode of dress of those
22 present and the fact that they arrived in groups and
23 appeared to be known on each other, I deemed it
24 inadvisable to try to obtain admittance."

25 The evidence that we have obtained about the SDS

1 indicates that it filled the gap in Special Branch's
2 intelligence-gathering capability by securing regular
3 entrance to private meetings. The issue to be explored
4 is whether it was justified in doing so.

5 A report dated 17 March 1968 signed by Detective
6 Superintendent Gilbert summarised the background to
7 the demonstration and events on the day from
8 Special Branch's point of view. It is clear that both
9 disorder and violence had been anticipated. Advanced
10 intelligence had led to coaches being stopped and
11 arrests being made for possession of offensive weapons.
12 The utterances of speakers at the demonstration,
13 including Tariq Ali, had been monitored, and I quote,
14 "but nothing of an apparently actionable nature was
15 said".

16 One of those speakers, Reg Taylor, is reported as
17 saying -- and I quote from the report:

18 "... that as an AEU shop steward and a member of
19 the Ruislip constituency Labour Party, he had assisted
20 in the passage of several resolutions, favoured at trade
21 union level and Labour Party Conference, protesting
22 against the Vietnam War."

23 I highlight that as an example of pre-SDS
24 Special Branch reporting which refers to a trade
25 unionist and a mainstream political party in the course

1 of policing the March 1968 demonstration. References
2 such as these are found in the later reports of SDS
3 undercover officers.

4 The report moves on to provide an account of
5 the disorder which followed. The presence of
6 a contingent of German demonstrators appears to have
7 made a particular impression on police. It is described
8 as follows.

9 "It was particularly noticeable during the March
10 that whilst the general standard of cohesion between
11 the numerous political groups was very low,
12 the organisation of the German contingent were
13 sufficiently competent to enable them to act as a ginger
14 group for the occasion. They set a pattern for others
15 by linking arms and the poles of their banners, holding
16 the shoulders of persons in front and encouraging other
17 demonstrators to form a solid block of 200 or 300 and
18 surge forward as a mass."

19 We note that Tariq Ali takes issue with the police
20 account of the behaviour and impact of the German
21 contingent. Wherever the truth lies on that issue,
22 there is no doubt that internal police reports
23 emphasised their impact.

24 In addition to their mention here, two reports
25 specifically concerning the role of foreign

1 demonstrators are amongst the documents obtained by
2 the Inquiry. There is also a Special Branch report on
3 a meeting of Camden Human Rights Year held on
4 26 April 1968 to discuss "Protest: Grosvenor Square and
5 after", which records a member of the executive
6 committee of the VSC stating that future policy would be
7 -- and I quote:

8 "To resist police by linking arms as continental
9 demonstrators do, and to ensure that anyone arrested was
10 immediately rescued."

11 He recognised that this implied the use of more
12 violence than CND had been prepared to use, but it had
13 achieved results in drawing attention to the Vietnam
14 issue.

15 Detective Superintendent Gilbert described events in
16 Grosvenor Square in the following terms:

17 "As the demonstrators approached Grosvenor Square
18 from North Audley Street, the leading column immediately
19 broke into a run and attempted to breach the police
20 cordon drawn up across the road leading to the US
21 Embassy. Uniformed police, who had strong reserves at
22 their disposal, prevented this, and succeeding in
23 funneling the column along the north side of
24 Grosvenor Square. By this time, the demonstrators
25 numbered some 10,000 people, and by sheer weight managed

1 to force their way into the gardens. Encouraged by
2 this, they showed that they intended to use every means
3 in their power to assault the US Embassy. Sticks,
4 banners, bags of paint, fireworks, clods of earth and
5 missiles of varying kinds were hurled at the police and
6 towards the embassy, where, despite the fact that
7 the crowd was held by police at a line not nearer to
8 the building than about 50 yards, about 12 windows were
9 broken, possibly by persons firing ball bearings by
10 means of catapults from the near of the crowd.
11 Concerted and sustained attacks were made upon
12 the police lines for a period of one hour. Many persons
13 were arrested and several police officers injured.
14 The demonstrators were slowly pushed back and
15 Grosvenor Square and the streets leading from it were
16 clear by about 7 pm."

17 Gilbert concluded that:

18 "Today's activity emphasises that the Vietnam issue
19 is one upon which younger elements of the militant left
20 wing and student groups will demonstrate with terrifying
21 ferocity, particularly when guided by foreign groups
22 such as the Germans, who today comprised some 120 adept
23 agitators, who nevertheless contrived to avoid being
24 arrested. On this occasion only, firm and resolute
25 action by a strong force of police prevented serious

1 damage to the United States Embassy."

2 Chief Inspector Dixon -- I'm just going to stop for
3 a moment. There is some background noise; I am going to
4 see if it can be terminated. I won't take long.

5 (Pause)

6 Sir, I shall resume. Thank you for your patience.

7 Chief Inspector Dixon wrote his slightly later
8 report dated 2 April 1968 about the March 1968
9 demonstration. Like Detective Superintendent Gilbert's
10 report, it acknowledges that Special Branch had some
11 intelligence that the protest might become violent. It
12 states that police officers had gained entry to some of
13 the private meetings at which different activist groups
14 had discussed their plans for the event. No violent
15 intentions had been expressed at those meetings.

16 The sources of intelligence available to
17 Special Branch in March 1968 were thought to be compared
18 with what the SDS later produced in order to establish
19 whether, and to what extent, the SDS added to the public
20 order intelligence picture. The unit's annual reports
21 and Special Branch's requests to the Home Office for
22 funding assert that a considerable contribution was
23 made.

24 A number of other aspects of Chief Inspector Dixon's
25 April 1968 report deserve mention.

1 There is reference to "come armed" having been
2 overprinted onto advertisements for the demonstration.
3 The scale of the disorder is illustrated by reference to
4 the number of criminal charges, comprising of 52
5 "assault on a police officer", 71 "threatening or
6 insulting behaviour", 14 "carrying offensive weapons".
7 We note, however, that these figures do not tell us how
8 many individuals were charged or how many were actually
9 convicted. A supplementary report dated 4 April 1968
10 provides some of that information. By that point in
11 time, 239 people had been prosecuted, of whom nine had
12 been sentenced to imprisonment, 171 fined and 18
13 conditionally discharged. 41 cases were still pending.

14 The scale of the disorder is further illustrated by
15 casualty figures. 171 police officers are stated to
16 have been injured and 42 civilians to have received
17 hospital treatment. Two of the civilian
18 core participants giving evidence in Phase 1 are
19 specifically mentioned: Ernest Tate and Tariq Ali.

20 Mr Ali is a subject of a dismissive assessment of
21 his roles in the VSC and the demonstration, which are at
22 odds with his public profile. Both were clearly
23 the subject of Special Branch's and
24 Chief Inspector Dixon's attentions before the formation
25 of the SDS. All that appears to have changed when

1 the SDS was formed is the introduction of an additional
2 means of gathering information about them:
3 the undercover tactic.

4 At paragraph 16 there is reference to a solicitor,
5 including the comment that he is -- I quote -- "a well
6 known defender of left wingers". This is a precursor to
7 references in SDS reporting to lawyers and, on
8 occasions, the advice that they have given.

9 Special Branch continued to gather information about
10 the VSC after the March 1968 demonstration as it had
11 before that event, using the same methods. There are
12 documents in the VSC material that we are publishing
13 which evidence that fact. There is, however, very
14 little exactly contemporaneous material to record
15 the formation of the SDS.

16 The SDS appears to have been formed on either 30 or
17 31 July 1968. Chief Inspector Dixon's report, entitled
18 "Penetration of Extremist Groups", dated
19 26 November 1968, at appendix B, records
20 Chief Inspector Dixon's own start date and that of
21 a number of others as having been 31 July 1968.
22 A memorandum from Chief Superintendent Cunningham to
23 command a Special Branch, dated 20 May 1969, states that
24 the unit was formed on 30 July 1968.

25 Perhaps more importantly, that document constitutes

1 an official record of the initial purpose of the unit
2 and the methods that it was to use to achieve its
3 purpose. They are recorded in the following terms.

4 The squad was formed on 30 July 1968, with
5 the objective of obtaining information relating to
6 the demonstration held on 27 October 1968. It was
7 envisaged that information concerning the demonstration
8 would be obtained from publications, informants, police
9 sources, technical devices and undercover police
10 officers. "In the event", the report continues,
11 "the last method proved to be the most successful".

12 The documents that we have seen and are publishing
13 are consistent with the original intention that the SDS
14 would use multiple methods with which to gather
15 intelligence. We have also formed the impression, to be
16 tested in evidence, that undercover policing very
17 quickly became the dominant method of intelligence
18 gathering. The transition from a unit formed to gather
19 intelligence about a demonstration using multiple
20 methods including undercover policing to an undercover
21 police unit appears to have been very rapid.

22 Two further documents are worth introducing. First,
23 a report dated 30 July 1968 signed by Dixon about
24 a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for the 27 October
25 demonstration held between 7.30 pm and 10.15 pm at

1 Toynbee Hall, Commercial Road, London E1, on the same
2 day. The document states that the meeting was chaired
3 by Tariq Ali and that Ernest Tate spoke at it. Acting
4 on what he had heard there, Dixon afterwards went to
5 inspect the nearby offices acquired by the Ad Hoc
6 Committee. It reads:

7 "At one stage during the evening it was revealed
8 that Ed Guiton was the secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee
9 and that it had offices at 120 Commercial Road, E1.
10 I took the opportunity of examining this address
11 the same evening and found it to be three floors of
12 empty offices above a sewing machine shop. A to let
13 sign still hung there and there were no signs of life.
14 It would appear the committee has acquired the premises
15 but has not yet moved in."

16 This document is arguably the SDS's first report.
17 Whether or not that is the correct analysis, it is
18 typical of Chief Inspector Dixon, based upon what we
19 have read, to have been so hands on as a leader.

20 The second document is a Security Service file note
21 dated 2 August 1968. It records a meeting between
22 persons known as "Director F", "F1" and "F4" of
23 the Security Service with commander Ferguson Smith,
24 Chief Superintendent Cunningham and
25 Chief Inspector Dixon at Scotland Yard, I quote "about

1 arrangements to cover the demonstration in
2 Grosvenor Square on 27 October".

3 The meeting was held on 1 August 1968, either one or
4 two days after the creation of the SDS. The account
5 given in this document about the formation of the unit
6 reads as follows:

7 "The Head of Special Branch told us he had recently
8 attended a high level meeting under the chairmanship of
9 Mr Brodie in which plans were drawn up to handle the VSC
10 demonstration on 27 October in Grosvenor Square.

11 The intention was to use 5,000 uniformed police and
12 Special Branch were very much on trial in that they were
13 required to provide all the necessary information in
14 advance for the benefit of the uniformed branch and
15 where possible to provide evidence for some
16 prosecutions. Chief Inspector Dixon had been put in
17 charge of a special Special Branch squad to coordinate
18 the intelligence for this operation."

19 The above passage not only records the formation of
20 the SDS, it also evidences the gravity with which
21 preparations for the October demonstration were being
22 taken more widely.

23 The remainder of the file note demonstrates
24 the prior existence of a close working relationship
25 between both Special Branch and Chief Inspector Dixon

1 personally on the one hand and the Security Service on
2 the other. It also shows an intention on the part of
3 both Special Branch and the Security Service for the SDS
4 to work closely together. Relevant passages from
5 the note read:

6 "It was agreed in principle that one of Mr Dixon's
7 squad should be attached to the Security Service team
8 where he would be able to see the information and plan
9 such use as could be made of it."

10 And:

11 "It was agreed that F4 would continue their
12 cooperation at its present level, which would pose no
13 problems in that [identity redacted] and Mr Dixon were
14 already working closely together against Trotskyist and
15 anarchist targets."

16 A great deal of Special Branch effort clearly went
17 into gathering intelligence about the October
18 demonstration in the months which preceded it.
19 Prominent amongst the documents obtained from the MPS
20 and made public by the Inquiry today is a series of 10
21 reports written by Chief Inspector Dixon between
22 21 August and 22 October 1968. Each contains an update
23 about the intelligence obtained and Conrad Dixon's
24 analysis of the situation. It comes from a variety of
25 sources, including SDS undercover officers. A good deal

1 of the content relates to public order concerns, but
2 there is also discussion of the political affiliations
3 of the organisations and the subversive agendas of some
4 participating groups.

5 On the face of the reports, both Special Branch's
6 role in public order policing and counter subversion
7 seem to have been on Dixon's mind. Not only that, they
8 were linked.

9 In his report dated 10 September 1968,
10 Chief Inspector Dixon wrote:

11 "Indeed, the more vociferous spokesmen on the left
12 are calling for the complete overthrow of Parliamentary
13 democracy and the substitution of various brands of
14 socialism and workers' control. They claim that this
15 can only be achieved by action on the streets. And
16 although few of them will admit publicly or in the press
17 that they desire a state of anarchy, it is nevertheless
18 tacitly accepted that such a condition is a necessary
19 preamble to engineering a breakdown of our present
20 system of government and achieving a revolutionary
21 change in the society in which we live."

22 And:

23 "In the past few months, a number of revolutionary
24 leaders have produced study papers on this
25 demonstration. The theme is common. It is said that

1 the anti-Vietnam War protest movement is merely part of
2 the continuing struggle to bring about worldwide
3 revolution, and that this demonstration can only be
4 regarded as a skirmish before the larger battle.
5 The figure of 100,000 demonstrators began to be bandied
6 about. There was general agreement that this number of
7 militant demonstrators would bring about a total
8 breakdown of law and order."

9 The major events in the planning of
10 the demonstration are covered, including a planning
11 meeting of the National Council of the VSC held in
12 Sheffield on 7 September 1968, which was attended by an
13 SDS undercover officer and the large meeting held by
14 the VSC Committee at Conway Hall on 17 September 1968
15 which was attended by numerous SDS officers, including
16 managers.

17 Significant events, such as the VSC disowning
18 the avowedly militant Earls Court and Notting Hill
19 branches, are recorded. So, too, is the formation of
20 a rival, Maoist-led organisation, the October 27
21 Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam, which I shall
22 refer to as "the October 27th CSV". Both of these
23 branches and the October 27th CSV were infiltrated and
24 reported on by a number of SDS undercover officers.

25 There is mention of a conference attended by

1 the Home Office, Metropolitan Police and
2 Security Service, at which arrangements to ensure
3 the physical security of buildings along the route of
4 the demonstration were discussed. The minutes of that
5 meeting survive and are being published today.

6 Different VSC branches and ad hoc committees,
7 official and unofficial, are listed and changes such as
8 the formation of the Havering branch noted.

9 The moderate Havering branch was the subject of
10 infiltration by two SDS officers acting as
11 a couple: HN330, alias Don de Freitas, and HN334, alias
12 Margaret White.

13 Key personalities are identified and discussed,
14 including Tariq Ali and Ernest Tate. Mr Ali is once
15 again referred to in uncomplimentary terms.

16 Brief reference is made in the penultimate report
17 dated 16 October 1968 to a document entitled
18 "The Potential of a Militant Demonstration".

19 Chief Inspector Dixon wrote:

20 "Recent press reports have highlighted the fact that
21 this branch has obtained a copy of the leaflet
22 entitled 'The Potential of Militant Demonstration'.

23 There has been a tendency to link this leaflet with
24 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, but it should be noted
25 that the leaflet is Black Power in origin. We obtained

1 our copy at a VSC meeting, but there is no evidence that
2 VSC elements encouraged its distribution or approved
3 the contents. The leaflet in question was obtained by
4 the SDS and in particular HN323, Sergeant
5 Helen Crampton. The contents were such that
6 the distributor was produced. Sergeant Crampton gave
7 evidence for the prosecution in her real identity in
8 proceedings which led to the conviction and imprisonment
9 of the defendant."

10 The terms in which Chief Inspector Dixon refers to
11 this leaflet demonstrate on this issue a nuanced
12 understanding which appears to be the result, at least
13 in part, of SDS undercover activity.

14 It is not the only example of Chief Inspector Dixon
15 being well informed enough to be able to put alarming
16 information into context. In a 5 September 1968 update,
17 he wrote:

18 "The Evening News and Times reports are
19 unnecessarily alarming in their presentation of
20 the facts in the situation. They categorically state
21 that certain groups have manufactured Molotov cocktails
22 from electric light bulbs, have acquired a cache of
23 small arms and have made plans to occupy certain public
24 buildings. There has been fairly comprehensive coverage
25 by Special Branch of the activities of the most extreme

1 of the groups involved in the forthcoming October
2 demonstration. This has produced information that
3 individuals in certain groups have talked about
4 the possibility of making Molotov cocktails and
5 occupying public buildings, but no firm plans to execute
6 these have so far been made."

7 By the time of the October demonstration,
8 Chief Inspector Dixon appears to have had a detailed
9 understanding of who will be demonstrating and what
10 their intentions were. He knew that, whatever
11 revolutionary aspirations some of them might have had,
12 the organisers were publicly promoting a peaceful
13 demonstration and that newspaper coverage had
14 exaggerated the likely form and scale of violence. He
15 also believed that a minority of those attending,
16 the Maoists and anarchists, would not shy away from
17 confrontation. That is what in fact occurred.

18 For consideration is the role played by the use of
19 undercover policing in obtaining this comprehensive
20 intelligence picture. Was use of the tactic necessary?
21 Was it proportionate? What did Special Branch need to
22 know? Could it reasonably have expected to obtain such
23 information without the use of the undercover tactic?

24 The documents from Special Branch's VSC files help
25 to establish in more detail what Special Branch knew and

1 how. It is clear from them that Special Branch was
2 gleaning information from multiple sources, both before
3 and after the formation of the SDS. For example, there
4 is evidence of information being submitted from regional
5 police forces and obtained from sensitive sources.

6 Information was still being gathered by ordinary
7 Special Branch officers using their traditional methods.
8 Information in the public domain, especially newspaper
9 reports, was being collated. After the formation of
10 the SDS, these sources were supplemented by
11 the information which SDS undercover police officers
12 reported back. This is partly evidenced in
13 the documents being released today and will be
14 supplemented by the evidence which will be called or
15 published during the forthcoming oral hearings.

16 A Security Service file note dated 29 August 1968
17 suggests that there was a two-way flow of information
18 between it and Special Branch during the period leading
19 up to the demonstration. The note records a visit by F4
20 to meet Superintendent Lawrenson, Superintendent
21 Cunningham and Chief Inspector Dixon. The meeting
22 concerned coverage of London University and various
23 polytechnics. Each party promised to assist the other
24 and to keep in close touch. I quote from the report:

25 "Cunningham offered to assist us in any way that he

1 could as regards obtaining information from colleagues
2 ... He made this offer quite genuinely and sincerely and
3 in return I assured him that we would pass on any
4 information we obtained ... that I thought would assist
5 them in their law and order problem at demonstrations.
6 He suggested that when we had finished our meeting
7 I might like to get together with Dixon and arrange
8 certain details. This we did.

9 "Briefly, Special Branch have set up a special squad
10 under Dixon, bearded and unwashed males and scruffy
11 females, who are participating in demonstrations where
12 they make contact with students and then hope to turn
13 then and use them as short-term informers. They are
14 meeting with some success. Any information which they
15 pick up this way which they think might be of interest
16 to us will be passed on. Cunningham is obviously
17 worried about the October demonstration and this is one
18 of the reasons why he wanted to see me. I assured him
19 that we would pass on information ... in the same manner
20 we had done for the March Grosvenor Square
21 demonstration.

22 "... We had promised to keep in close touch with one
23 another ..."

24 In the result, the October demonstration did not
25 involve the same level of violence and disorder as had

1 occurred on 17 March 1968. The Maoists broke away from
2 the main demonstration as planned and marched to
3 Grosvenor Square. There was some violence and disorder
4 there, however the main demonstration passed off with
5 little trouble.

6 On the police side, Chief Superintendent Cunningham
7 wrote a lengthy report on events the following day. He
8 wrote:

9 "In fact, although disorder ensued, for the most
10 part on the south side of Grosvenor Square and in South
11 Audley Street, the demonstrators were never able to
12 break the police cordon at that junction and very much
13 less violence occurred than had been anticipated."

14 On 29 October 1968, the American ambassador, David
15 Bruce, wrote in the following terms to Commander Smith
16 to thank Special Branch for the role it had played in
17 events. He wrote:

18 "I have been informed of the outstanding
19 intelligence effort by your branch relative to
20 the events which culminate on October the 27th. I would
21 appreciate it if you would express my gratitude to your
22 staff for their supremely efficient work which
23 undoubtedly contributed greatly to the splendid
24 performance of the uniformed police."

25 Perhaps we could pause now and watch the video clip

1 of the October demonstration at {DOC007}.

2 (Video evidence played to the Inquiry)

3 Thank you.

4 It is clear that in official circles Special Branch
5 took its share of the credit for what was regarded as
6 the successful policing of the October demonstration.
7 Others take a different view. Tariq Ali's position was
8 that if the police stayed away, trouble would thereby be
9 avoided. Chief Inspector Dixon was dismissive of that
10 assertion and understood other activists to have thought
11 disorder inevitable.

12 The National Council for Civil Liberties felt that
13 the change of police tactics from the use of cordons,
14 horses and truncheons was wholly successful as far as
15 the main march was concerned. It deprecated the use of
16 undercover police officers.

17 Ernest Tate's evidence will be that it was the VSC
18 which deserves credit for the overall good discipline
19 and peaceful nature of the main demonstration. He
20 refers to the account given in chapter 17 of the second
21 volume of his memoir. We will be examining this issue
22 further during the hearing when, amongst other things,
23 we will be exploring in more detail what each SDS
24 officer in this period actually did.

25 A curious feature of the evidence that we have

1 obtained is that the use of undercover police officers
2 by Special Branch was published in the press immediately
3 after the demonstration. On 29 October 1968, Percy
4 Hoskins and Alain Cass wrote in The Daily Express:

5 "Under the direction of the Commissioner, Sir John
6 Waldron and Assistant Commissioner Peter Brodie, in
7 charge of Special Branch, an enormous undercover
8 operation was mounted to penetrate the secrets of
9 the organisation behind the march.

10 "Throughout the country, hundreds of detectives, 50
11 in London alone, were assigned to prepare dossiers on
12 each of the extremist groups.

13 "Men were infiltrated into many of them. No sooner
14 was a plan laid than the operations headquarters at
15 Scotland Yard knew about it.

16 "The undercover men were so effective that once
17 a detective actually chaired a meeting of revolutionaries.
18 One man was present at nearly every meeting of
19 the official Ad Hoc Committee, the organisation involved
20 in the national and international planning of the March.

21 "By mid-September the police knew enough to advise
22 the Home Secretary that he could let the march go ahead
23 safely. A conference was then held to work out
24 a detailed plan for the day."

25 The source of the information is unknown, although

1 anyone contemplating the continued existence of the SDS
2 would surely have hesitated before informing the media.

3 The Morning Star also covered the story but from
4 a different editorial perspective. Its piece on
5 26 November concluded:

6 "The use of police spies and provocateurs to
7 infiltrate working class and democratic groups in
8 Britain goes back centuries. How much longer will it go
9 on Mr Callaghan?"

10 The Morning Star was not the only one asking
11 the Home Office for how much longer the SDS would
12 continue to operate.

13 Within a fortnight of the October demonstration,
14 Conrad Dixon had produced a memorandum setting out, and
15 I quote:

16 "... the basic requirements for a long-term
17 operation of this type involving penetration in depth of
18 these organisations."

19 Assistant Commissioner Brodie wrote to
20 the Home Office on 21 November 1968 seeking funding for
21 the cover accommodation used by SDS undercover officers.
22 Consideration of periodic requests for funding for
23 accommodation, vehicle and other costs become
24 the vehicle by which the Home Office, for all practical
25 purposes, appears to have decided whether or not the SDS

1 should continue in existence throughout the Phase 1
2 period.

3 The fact that more than funding lay behind these
4 decisions is evidenced in the documents. A memorandum
5 signed by Commander Smith records that he and Assistant
6 Commissioner Brodie went to the Home Office on
7 13 December 1968 to meet James Waddell Deputy Under
8 Secretary of State, and David Stotesbury. One of
9 the items discussed concerned
10 the Special Operations Squad under
11 Chief Inspector Dixon. The memorandum states that
12 the Home Office was, at that stage, only cautiously
13 supportive of the continuing existence of the SDS. It
14 reads as follows:

15 "Mr Waddell expressed his appreciation of the value
16 of the work of the Squad in relation to
17 the demonstration of 27 October and said how valuable it
18 had been in helping to keep the Home Secretary abreast
19 of developments. He saw there was a good case for its
20 continuance, but he asked that we keep the reasons for
21 its existence under review as he did not think that it
22 should be a permanent feature of the Branch. It was
23 agreed that the events of the next six months might
24 quite well provide an indication as to whether it was
25 worthwhile carrying on with the work of the Squad. We

1 promise to bear this in mind."

2 A written response from Mr Waddell authorising
3 the expenditure sought until about mid-summer 1969 was
4 issued on 16 December 1968. The letter expressed
5 a reservation in the following terms:

6 "It appeared to me that experience during the period
7 before the October demonstration fully justified
8 the extra effort which had been made by Special Branch
9 officers and that it would be right to facilitate their
10 work in the way proposed in your letter for a further
11 period which would at least take us past the coming
12 spring. I also felt, however, that in an enterprise of
13 this kind there is always some slight danger of
14 innovations like the one we are considering becoming an
15 accepted part of the scene, so that discontinuance might
16 be thought to be a drastic change: hence the suggestion
17 that we ought to look at the matter again mid-summer.

18 "I was glad to have the assurances you gave me about
19 the close working between yourselves and the Security
20 Service on this particular enterprise."

21 On 27 May 1969 Assistant Commissioner Brodie sought
22 a further extension of funding from the Home Office
23 until the end of 1969. The request was made on
24 the basis that Special Branch did not consider, and
25 I quote "we are out of the woods yet" and that it was

1 necessary to have undercover officers in place before
2 trouble began. The groups being infiltrated were said
3 to be very much more security minded and Special Branch
4 "would not be able to achieve our present patiently won
5 position in a short space of time". The Assistant
6 Commissioner C, Peter Brodie, concluded:

7 "The Commissioner is firmly in favour of our Squad's
8 operations and Commander Smith tells me that
9 the Security Service fully support our view that it be
10 allowed to continue. The product of the squad is shared
11 with them, of course, and regular consultation takes
12 place between that service and our own officers."

13 The request for funding was granted by
14 the Home Office in the letter from David Stotesbury
15 dated 6 June 1969. The Home Office continued to have
16 reservations. In this letter, the specific concern
17 ventilated was stated to be the unconventional nature of
18 the accommodation. Mr Stotesbury put it as follows:

19 "In reviewing the matter again towards the end of
20 the year you will, I know, bear in mind the reservations
21 expressed in the second sentence of the second paragraph
22 of Waddell's letter of 16 December. One of the factors
23 that troubles us is that if the provision of this
24 accommodation goes on for too long, its existence is
25 likely to leak out into the press and lead to criticism

1 of the Home Secretary. It is the unconventional nature
2 of the accommodation, rather than the activity, which we
3 feel may be more difficult to justify if public
4 questions are asked."

5 There followed a series of annual requests for
6 funding by the Metropolitan Police and approvals of
7 the same from the Home Office. James Waddell's letter
8 dated 21 December 1970 approving funding for 1971 merits
9 specific mention for two reasons. First,
10 the Home Office expressed continuing concern that
11 revelation of the accommodation arrangements could be
12 a source of acute embarrassment for the Home Secretary.
13 Second, this letter evidences the personal approval of
14 the then Home Secretary, Sir Reginald Maudling, for
15 the continued funding of the SDS. The material passages
16 read as follows:

17 "You will remember that when you were talking to
18 Philip Alen and me about other matters last week we
19 spoke about the accommodation arrangements made for
20 a number of Special Branch officers. Peter Brodie's
21 letter to me of 30 November seeks authority to continue
22 these unusual arrangements.

23 "You emphasised the value of the information which
24 has been obtained through these officers and assured us
25 that a careful watch would be maintained to guard

1 against disclosure. Plainly, the arrangements could, if
2 made known in the wrong quarters, be a source of acute
3 embarrassment to the Home Secretary.

4 "We have in the light of these assurances, consulted
5 the Home Secretary and I now write to let you know that
6 the arrangements may be continued for a further year, up
7 to a cost of £4,000 for the year."

8 For 1970 and 1971 funding was granted for
9 the calendar year. From financial year 1972/1973
10 onwards, it was granted by the financial year. That
11 administrative step might of itself be thought to be
12 evidence that the SDS was taking more permanent root.
13 The grant of authority once again impressed upon
14 Special Branch the Home Office's desire for the funding
15 arrangements to be kept secret. It stated:

16 "I would, however, like to repeat what has been said
17 before on this subject. Plainly, in present
18 circumstances, it is extremely important to have
19 the sort of advance information which will enable
20 the force to prevent crime and mitigate violence; but it
21 is equally important to take special care that nothing
22 about the arrangements becomes known. I would be
23 grateful if in January or February 1973 you would again
24 get in touch with us so that we have plenty of time to
25 consult the Home Secretary before the end of the period

1 we are now covering."

2 The final authority in the Phase 1 bundle, dated
3 9 April 1973, continued in a similar vein. It did not
4 question the value of the information being obtained by
5 the SDS but security clearly remained on the minds of
6 those at the Home Office.

7 "I certainly accept that the information obtained
8 through the arrangements is valuable particularly at the
9 present time and I welcome your assurance that
10 the Commissioner and you are satisfied about
11 the security aspects ..."

12 Behind the financial correspondence between
13 the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office lie police
14 reports about the activities of the SDS. They appear to
15 be written to support or provide information with which
16 to support the funding requests, and may need to be read
17 in that light. However, subject to that caveat, these
18 reports are important evidence in seeking to understand
19 what happened.

20 The first report is dated 20 May 1969 and is in
21 the form of a memorandum from Chief Superintendent
22 Cunningham to Commander Special Branch. Thereafter
23 the reports are signed by SDS managers and become an
24 annual product linked to the funding request.

25 The reports follow in broadly similar format

1 covering the composition of the SDS and review of
2 activity over the reporting period, including a summary
3 of the groups being targeted and usually an indication
4 of the volume of SDS reporting. There is also
5 a forward-looking section.

6 Of note in Chief Superintendent Cunningham's
7 May 1969 report are paragraphs 3 and 4 which expressly
8 address the SDS's transition from a unit formed in
9 response to the October demonstration to one with
10 a broader purpose. They include this passage:

11 "... Following the 27 October, it was agreed that
12 the Squad should continue to operate, and it was then
13 possible to look at the larger canvas of the political
14 scene, to establish what the new aims should be and to
15 see how these compared with the results being
16 achieved~..."

17 Chief Superintendent Cunningham went on to describe
18 the aims and results he claimed were being achieved.
19 The relevant passage reads as follows:

20 "Aims.

21 "(a) To supply information about the intentions of
22 left-wing extremists on the occasions of public
23 demonstrations.

24 "Results.

25 "Accurate forecasts of numbers, intentions and mood

1 of the demonstrators was, and is, being supplied."

2 Aim:

3 "(b) Identification of those who engage in
4 preliminary planning or who take part in such
5 demonstrations."

6 Results:

7 "Identifications at outdoor public demonstrations
8 have ranged from 12% to 50% over the past nine months.
9 At indoor meetings and conferences up to 100 of
10 the participants have been identified."

11 Aim:

12 "(c) Obtaining evidence and identifying suspects in
13 relation to breaches of the law before, during and after
14 demonstrations.

15 "One successful prosecution has been obtained for
16 incitement, four have been secured for offences allied
17 to riot, etc, and four cases are still pending."

18 Aim:

19 "(d) Gathering and recording information for
20 long-term intelligence purposes.

21 "New entrants to the extreme left-wing political
22 scene are being identified and recorded within weeks of
23 their manifesting an interest in extremist affairs.

24 Personal descriptions are obtained by officers working
25 within groups and this material is submitted personally

1 or passed to officers engaged on normal enquiry work.
2 A balanced view is thus obtained of these individuals
3 from two aspects. New groups are being dealt with
4 similarly. (over 200 information reports, and over
5 1,000 minor meetings attended, in addition to
6 the coverage at major demonstrations.)"

7 The passage above suggests that the SDS was
8 identifying and reporting on individuals on some scale
9 for a unit comprising, at that time, of 14 police
10 officers.

11 Chief Superintendent Cunningham's report evidences
12 that the unit was adapting to life without a major
13 demonstration of the kind that the October demonstration
14 had been. He wrote:

15 "Disorderly demonstrations are diminishing, due to
16 some extent to superior intelligence supplied by
17 the Squad. At the present time, emphasis of the Squad's
18 work is shifting somewhat in that more information is
19 being obtained in relation to (c) and (d) above than
20 hereto-fore."

21 We have not recovered intelligence to corroborate
22 the claim that more information in relation to breaches
23 of the law or evidence of the same was being obtained.
24 However, the evidence that we have found and which will
25 be adduced during Phase 1 does demonstrate that the SDS

1 was gathering and recording a great deal of information
2 on individuals and on groups which was then filed on
3 a long-term basis.

4 The report addresses the publicity that the SDS had
5 received in the press. It does so in terms which
6 overlook the objection taken by the National Council of
7 Civil Liberties and the Morning Star, to which I have
8 already referred, to the use of undercover police
9 officers at the October demonstration. Special Branch
10 evidently and rightly concluded that the SDS had
11 survived press coverage. Chief Superintendent
12 Cunningham wrote:

13 "Activities of the squad received some press
14 publicity immediately prior to the 27 October, but no
15 solid facts emerged and publicity soon subsided. There
16 has been no criticism of these undercover methods by
17 the public, by extremists or by the civil liberties
18 groups. No officer has been exposed as a 'police spy'
19 and the precautions taken are such that this is not now
20 regarded as a likely contingency."

21 The superiority of the undercover tactic is also
22 asserted:

23 "Both by volume and worth the end product of
24 the officers engaged on this type of work compares very
25 favourably with that of officers engaged on normal

1 enquiries. Moreover, in certain sensitive areas
2 information is being obtained which could not be secured
3 by the most skillful Special Branch officer using
4 orthodox methods.

5 "Such information is only made available to trusted
6 members of groups with a checked history of commitment
7 and activity, and members of the Squad have been able to
8 build up reputations over the months and to be in
9 a position to receive information when it is
10 disseminated."

11 As for the size of the SDS during the Phase 1
12 period, according to the annual reports, it varied
13 between 11 and 17 between May 1969 and February 1975.
14 There were usually, but not always, a chief inspector in
15 charge. At the time of the November 1969 and
16 February 1972 reports, the most senior officer was an
17 inspector.

18 The SDS's targets, as recorded in the annual
19 reports, broaden and change over time. For example,
20 Irish-related groups become more prominent once
21 The Troubles begin. The Anti-Apartheid Movement and
22 Stop the Seventy Tour are targeted. Other groups
23 associated with then current issues are also reported
24 on: for example, in 1971, Action Bangla Desh about which
25 HN345 will give evidence. A justice campaign,

1 the Shrewsbury 2 Defence Committee, is specifically
2 mentioned in the report dated 4 February 1975 as having
3 been penetrated -- and I quote -- "to a lesser degree".
4 A full list of the groups referred to in the SDS's
5 annual reports during the Phase 1 period is set out in
6 appendix 1 to the written version of this opening. It
7 will fall to be compared with the evidence of
8 the witnesses and their reporting.

9 In this area, we suggest that it is important to
10 distinguish between groups which are infiltrated and
11 groups which are not directly infiltrated but which are
12 reported on. In this second category, there is a wide
13 range between, on the one hand, groups which are
14 the subject of a significant amount of reporting and, on
15 the other, groups which appear simply to be mentioned in
16 passing.

17 I'm now going to read the list of groups from
18 the annual reports.

19 These are the groups reported on by the SDS as set
20 out in those reports. Starting first with Chief
21 Superintendent Cunningham's report dated 20 May 1969:
22 Maoists, anarchists, international socialism,
23 International Marxist Group,
24 Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, Independent Labour Party,
25 People's Democracy, Save Biafra.

1 In Detective Inspector Saunders' report dated
2 7 November 1969 the list was as
3 follows: People's Democracy,
4 Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign,
5 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association,
6 The Independent Labour Party,
7 Action Committee Against NATO, Tricontinental Committee,
8 Britain Vietnam Solidarity Front, The Revolutionary
9 Marxist-Leninist League, Maoists, Vietnam Solidarity
10 Committee (under various guises), Group 68,
11 International Socialism Group,
12 International Marxist Group, students, Revolutionary
13 Socialist Students' Federation, anarchists, national
14 Convention of the Left.

15 Chief Inspector Saunders' report dated
16 18 November 1970 listed the following groups: the Irish
17 Solidarity Campaign (formerly
18 the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign), the
19 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association,
20 the Independent Labour Party, New Socialists, Agitprop,
21 Peace Action, (an amalgam of
22 Action Committee Against NATO and Chemical and
23 Biological Warfare Action Group -- CABWAG), Friends of
24 Korea, Maoists, including the Britain Vietnam Solidarity
25 Front, the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League,

1 the Vietnam Solidarity Committee,
2 International Socialism, International Marxist Group,
3 the Spartacus League, Red Circle, the Anti-Apartheid
4 Movement, the Dambusters Mobilising Committee,
5 the Women's Liberation Front, and Action Committee
6 Against Racialism.

7 That report also noted that information less full
8 but of value is also obtained on peripheral
9 organisations, including the Black Defence Committee,
10 students and anarchists.

11 Chief inspector HN332's report dated
12 18 November 1971 lists: the Irish Solidarity Campaign,
13 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, Sinn Fein
14 London, the Anti-Internment League,
15 International Socialists,
16 the International Marxist Group, the Spartacus League.
17 Red Circle, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign,
18 Friends of China, the Marxist-Leninist Workers
19 Association, the North London Alliance in Defence of
20 Workers' Rights, the Women's Liberation Front,
21 St Pancras & Camden United Tenants Association,
22 the Hackney United Tenants Ad Hoc Committee,
23 the Claimant's Union, the Anti-Apartheid Movement,
24 Action Committee Against Racialism, the Dambusters
25 Mobilising Committee, the Women's National Coordinating

1 Committee, Action Bangla Desh, the Afro Asian American
2 Association. The report went on to state information
3 has also been forthcoming on
4 the Black Defence Committee, Black Unity and
5 Black Freedom Party, Schools Action Union and
6 the Palestine Solidarity Campaign.

7 Detective Inspector HN294's report dated
8 14 February 1973 lists: the Anti-Internment League,
9 the Irish Solidarity Campaign (now the Central London
10 Anti-Internment League),
11 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, the Irish
12 Civil Rights Association, International Socialists,
13 International Marxist Group, the Red Defence Group,
14 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, Friends of China,
15 the Marxist-Leninist Workers Association, the Schools
16 Action Union, London Alliance in Defence of Workers'
17 Rights, the Revolutionary Women's Union,
18 the Women's Liberation Movement, the Claimant's Union,
19 the Commitment Group, Croydon Libertarians, the Ceylon
20 Solidarity Campaign, Action Committee Against Racism.

21 It went on to state that information has also been
22 provided on the Northern Minority Defence Force,
23 the Black Unity and Freedom Party, Palestine Solidarity
24 Campaign, the Black Defence Committee,
25 the Stoke Newington 8 Defence Group, Justice for

1 Rhodesia Campaign and Indochina.

2 Chief inspector HN294's report of 6 March 1974 lists
3 under the heading "Irish or pro-Irish organisations"
4 the Anti-Internment League. Under
5 the heading "Trotskyists": International Socialists,
6 International Marxist Group, Workers' Revolutionary
7 Party (formerly the Socialist Labour League).

8 Under the heading "Anarchist -- alternative society
9 groups": the Claimant's Union. Under
10 the heading "Maoists", the Indo China Solidarity
11 Committee. Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour. And states
12 the groups penetrated to a lesser degree were the Irish
13 Civil Rights Association and the Croydon Libertarians.

14 The final annual report in Phase 1 is that of Chief
15 Inspector Kneale, dated 4 February 1975. It lists
16 "pro-Irish organisations"; under "Trotskyist Groups",
17 the International Socialists,
18 the International Marxist Group, the Workers'
19 Revolutionary Party; Maoists; Anarchists, alternative
20 society and racialist -- I think they must mean
21 anti-racialist -- the Revolutionary Communist Group,
22 Freedom Collective, Lower Down, Pavement,
23 the Claimant's Union, Battersea Redevelopment Action
24 Group, Stop All Racialist Tourist (formerly Stop
25 the Apartheid Rugby Tour).

1 such groups, for example the North London Alliance with
2 the Black Unity and Freedom Party; International
3 Marxist Group with the Black Defence Committee.

4 On the same theme, HN294's 14 February 1973 report
5 stated, at paragraph 6:

6 "... Coloured and foreign organisations, because of
7 their exclusivity, continue to be resistant to
8 penetration, due to the shortage of ethnically qualified
9 officers: when such groups solicit the support of less
10 racially selective organisations, for their
11 demonstrations, however, they become immediately, if
12 temporarily, more susceptible."

13 In the same report, HN294 makes clear that he felt
14 that the SDS did have the capability to infiltrate other
15 groups, namely the Communist Party, or extreme right
16 wing groups, if that was required. He wrote:

17 "The Communist Party and right wing extremist
18 groups, who in recent times have not posed much of a
19 threat to public order, are not covered by the SDS, but
20 there are no technical reasons why they could not be,
21 should the position deteriorate."

22 Overall, the impression created by the reports is
23 that, as the mid-seventies approached, the SDS was
24 becoming steadily more established. It was
25 infiltrating, or at least reporting on, a wide range of

1 left wing groups. The unit was confident enough to
2 assert that it had the capability to go further. Its
3 existence was known to and had been approved by
4 successive Home Secretaries and Commissioners of Police
5 for the Metropolis.

6 Returning to November 1968 for a moment. When the
7 SDS was making its pitch for its continued existence,
8 Chief Inspector Dixon wrote the paper entitled
9 "Penetration of Extremist Groups". It is described as
10 a study paper and reads as his blueprint for the SDS's
11 future operation. Dixon argued that using undercover
12 police officers had three advantages. In his words:

13 "(a) The information gained in this way is more
14 accurate because the information-gatherers are trained
15 observers.

16 "(b) The delay occurring when the authorities have
17 to wait for public announcements, or reports of
18 informants, is eliminated.

19 "(c) We are able to make much more accurate
20 assessments of future trends and developments."

21 Chief Inspector Dixon advocated a unit of between 12
22 and 20 in size. He espoused detailed daily supervision
23 to ensure that officers concentrated on the right areas
24 of enquiry. Recruitment by personal approach was
25 recommended. So was the use of supervising officers

1 on -- I quote "certain delicate assignments in groups
2 where great experience is required" and "as liaison
3 officers with the parallel organisation in
4 the Security Service".

5 As to length of deployment, Chief Inspector Dixon
6 wrote:

7 "... it should be the rule that an officer serve for
8 no longer than 12 months unless there are special
9 circumstances why he should be retained for a longer
10 period."

11 So far as evidence gathering and female officers
12 were concerned, he opined:

13 "When we are in a position to obtain evidence about
14 a serious offence arrangements have to be made so that
15 it is obtained by an 'uncommitted officer' and thus
16 avoid compromising the undercover man. An 'uncommitted
17 officer' is an essential part of the unit; women
18 officers fill the role extremely well and can be taken
19 to public or private gatherings where the evidence is
20 obtainable with little risk of denunciation."

21 The way in which HN323, Sergeant Helen Crampton, was
22 used appears to be consistent with the role of an
23 'uncommitted officer' described above. We will be
24 exploring this issue in evidence, but on the basis of
25 the paper evidence we have obtained, HN323's use in this

1 way appears to have been uncommon.

2 HN328, Woman Detective Constable Hillier, is marked
3 in appendix B to Penetration of Extremist Groups as
4 having been an 'uncommitted officer'. However, we shall
5 hear evidence from HN328 that that is not the role that
6 she fulfilled.

7 On the subject of premises, Chief Inspector Dixon
8 argued that an unmarked office, cover accommodation for
9 undercover officers and an office at New Scotland Yard
10 were all required.

11 As to cover identity, there is no suggestion that
12 a deceased person's identity should be used. Rather,
13 the proposed method involved the preparation and
14 refinement of an autobiography. Warrant cards were not
15 to be carried and contact with uniformed officers
16 discouraged.

17 So far as activity undercover was concerned,
18 Chief Inspector Dixon was emphatic. He wrote:

19 "A firm line must be drawn between activity as
20 a follower and a leader, and members of the squad should
21 be told in no uncertain terms that they must not take
22 office in a group, chair meetings, draft leaflets, speak
23 in public or initiate activity."

24 Some of Chief Inspector Dixon's thinking was
25 followed long after he had left the unit; for example,

1 the size of the unit and the use of an unmarked office
2 and cover accommodation. Some of his advice, notably
3 the two issues on which he used the firmest language,
4 was not followed religiously. First, length of
5 deployment, which soon grew regularly to exceed
6 12 months. Second, the extent to which SDS
7 undercover officers sometimes participated in group
8 activities. The extent to which this happened and why
9 it did so will be explored in evidence.

10 Appendix B to Penetration of Extremist Groups
11 provides a useful snapshot of the composition of the SDS
12 as at 26 November 1968. It also sheds light on
13 the continuity of the SDS after 27 October 1968. In
14 particular, its contents indicate that the SDS was
15 operating on the basis that it was going to continue
16 even before Special Branch had secured funding from
17 the Home Office for continued accommodation. Two of
18 the then officers are recorded as having recent start
19 dates that had fallen after 27 October 1968. A third
20 officer is listed as a first reserve. Some of
21 the existing officers are marked as being due to be
22 retained well into 1969.

23 The Inquiry's Rule 9 requests for witness statements
24 made to SDS officers follow a standard template, under
25 the headings which are reproduced in the witness

1 statements. Standard questions are supplemented by
2 bespoke questions. This approach has been adopted to
3 ensure that all issues are covered to provide breadth
4 of evidence where that is necessary, and to facilitate
5 analysis of the witness statements. Those following
6 the Inquiry will be able to consider the evidence
7 themselves once we have published the statements and
8 the contents of the witness statements are, of course,
9 subject to the oral evidence of those witnesses who are
10 to be called.

11 However, it may be of assistance to give an advanced
12 indication of the following features which will emerge
13 from the witness statements.

14 Most Phase 1 SDS undercover officers were detective
15 constables but a few were detective sergeants.

16 Many worked in parts of Special Branch, either
17 before or after their SDS service, which gathered
18 information about the same groups as were targeted by
19 the SDS, namely B and C squads.

20 Only one statement-maker had done conventional
21 undercover police work prior to joining the SDS.

22 Most were invited to join following a personal
23 approach, although some of the earliest officers
24 describe being allocated to the unit.

25 Both married and single officers were well

1 represented in the SDS at this stage in its history.

2 No officer recalls formal training being provided by
3 the SDS.

4 There is little evidence of specific guidance being
5 given to undercover officers by the SDS on involvement
6 in people's private lives, sexual relationships,
7 criminal activity or respecting legal professional
8 privilege.

9 SDS undercover officers in this era generally do not
10 appear to have practised living in their cover
11 identities before reporting. Most, but not all, of
12 the officers describe being directed to a target by SDS
13 managers.

14 None states that he or she participated in public
15 disorder at demonstrations. None states that he or she
16 was involved in serious crime whilst deployed. Most
17 state that they did not commit any form of offence
18 whilst deployed. The majority did not witness any
19 violence. With the exception of one officer who was
20 prosecuted for drink driving, none state that they were
21 involved in criminal proceedings in their undercover
22 identity.

23 Some officers recalled the unit being visited by
24 senior police officers. None states that he or she
25 worked undercover in the private sector.

1 It may also assist if we display some representative
2 examples of the intelligence reports and photographs
3 obtained during our investigation taken from the Phase 1
4 hearing bundle.

5 Please could we show {MPS/735443}. Could we focus
6 in, please, on the photograph.

7 This is a photograph of Chief Inspector Dixon
8 believed to have been taken in the late autumn of 1968.

9 Could that be taken down, please.

10 Could we now have {MPS/0735445}. Could you scroll
11 down, please, until you get to the photograph
12 {MPS/735445/2}. Thank you. Could you zoom in on
13 the central character.

14 This is another photograph of Conrad Dixon taken at
15 or about the same time.

16 Could that be taken down, please.

17 Could we have next {MPS/0735447}. Again, could you
18 scroll down, please, until we get to the photograph
19 {MPS/073544/2}, and could you zoom in a little bit on
20 the two characters. Thank you.

21 This is a photograph again taken from late 1968.
22 The gentleman on the left is believed to be
23 Detective Inspector Saunders, as he then was, who went
24 on to become Chief Inspector Saunders and to lead
25 the SDS. And the person on the right is believed to be

1 Detective Constable Furner, one of the SDS's
2 administrators.

3 Could that be taken down, please.

4 Could {MPS/0735438} be brought up, please. Again,
5 could you scroll down to the photograph {MPS/5735438/2}.
6 Could with you zoom in.

7 Again, late 1968. The gentleman on the left is
8 believed to be HN327, Detective Sergeant Dave Fisher, an
9 undercover police officer, and on the right is HN318,
10 Sergeant Ray Wilson, also a member of the SDS. Could
11 that be taken down now, please.

12 Could we have {MPS/735442}, please. If you scroll
13 down to the photograph {MPS/735442} and zoom in, please,
14 on the character on the left.

15 That is HN323, Sergeant Helen Crampton.

16 Could that be taken down, please.

17 The final photograph for today, could we have
18 {MPS/735439/2}. Could you zoom in, please. Thank you
19 very much.

20 This is a photograph believed to have been taken on
21 the same occasion in late 1968. Many of the faces are
22 those I've just had shown, but I'm directing your
23 attention, please, to the two people to the right of
24 HN334. They're in the middle row. The first person to
25 the right of 334 is believed to be

1 Detective Inspector Riby Wilson, and the person on
2 the far right in that row is believed to be
3 Detective Sergeant Roy Creamer, one of the unit's
4 administrators.

5 Thank you. Could you take that down, please.

6 Could we now have {MPS/738583}. Could you zoom in,
7 please. Thank you very much.

8 This is a report which I mentioned a little bit
9 earlier. It's a report on a large public meeting of
10 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign's October 27 Ad Hoc
11 Committee held on 17 September 1968. It's filled in on
12 a type of form called a "Routine Meeting/Poster Parade
13 Report". We will be seeing a lot of those. It's
14 the form that tended to be used early in the SDS's
15 history, and later on we see a different type of form
16 which I will show you later. One of the features of
17 this type of form is that it records whether the event
18 was public or private. You'll be able to see that this
19 is recorded as a public meeting. The chair and
20 the speakers are all recorded.

21 Could you scroll down, please. Thank you.

22 This form also records attendance numbers. This was
23 a very large meeting: 250 people.

24 Could you scroll down further, please
25 {MPS/738583/2}.

1 I'll give people a moment to absorb that text

2 (Pause).

3 You will have seen that one of the things that
4 happened at the meeting is a ballot. This was
5 the ballot at which the Maoist view of the route that
6 should be taken by protestors was voted down. Keep in
7 mind the numbers, please, as we scroll down further.
8 You will see "Officers Present", there is a long list.
9 So amongst those eligible to vote at that meeting were
10 a significant number of police officers {MPS/738583/2}.
11 They include Chief Inspector Dixon, the head of the SDS,
12 Detective Inspector Saunders, his second in command, as
13 well as Detective Sergeant Wilson,
14 Detective Sergeant Creamer, who was an administrator,
15 Detective Sergeant Fisher and Detective Constable Moss,
16 who were both undercover officers. We will be hearing
17 some oral evidence about that meeting in due course.

18 At the bottom of the page you will see
19 the circulation details. This type of form has
20 circulation details at the bottom. There is a different
21 type of form that we sometimes see called a "circulating
22 copy" which doesn't have circulating details.

23 The entry on the left in manuscript which says "Box
24 500". That means the document has been copied to
25 the Security Service.

1 Could that document be taken down, please.

2 Can we have {UCPI/7931}, please. Can you blow it up
3 a little bit further. Is that possible?

4 I'm afraid a feature of the documents from this era
5 is that copy quality is poor.

6 This is a report by HN343, whose cover name was
7 "John Clinton". It's a very lengthy report on
8 the International Socialist's April 1972 annual
9 conference. It's an example of a lengthy report on
10 a major event in the calendar of a large group. I'm not
11 going to take you through all of the details, but one
12 can see, just from what is displayed there, that it was
13 a very large conference attended by almost 400 people.

14 Could that be taken down, please.

15 Can we have next {MPS/731855}. Can we start with
16 page 2, please {MPS/731855/2}. Could that be blown up
17 a little bit. Thank you.

18 This is an intelligence report. It's, again, one of
19 HN343's. That's the man who used the cover
20 name "John Clinton". It's dated 7 December 1971. I'm
21 afraid it's had to be redacted quite extensively for
22 privacy reasons, but one can see clearly that what it is
23 is the report about, "The results of the recent election
24 of the National Committee of International Socialists,
25 in order of priority".

1 Could you scroll down, please.

2 And then there is some accompanying explanation.

3 I'll give people a moment to absorb that. (Pause)

4 Can you scroll down further, please. And a bit
5 further {MPS/731855/3}.

6 There at the end you'll see it's been signed by
7 HN343. It's been countersigned, as is absolutely
8 typical for this type of report, by the Chief Inspector
9 of the SDS, by this stage HN332. They're quite often
10 signed by a subordinate and then they get signed again
11 by a chief superintendent. My purpose in showing you
12 this report, which is an example of reporting on
13 the internal affairs of the International Socialists, is
14 because of the associated minute sheet.

15 Could we go back to the top, please, page 1
16 {MPS/731855/1}, and if we could zoom in on that, please.

17 In the files, the minute sheets accompany
18 the reports. This one has been signed by
19 a chief superintendent, and you will see that it's to be
20 drawn to the attention of the DAC,
21 the Deputy Assistant Commissioner, a very senior
22 officer, and the Chief Superintendent is remarking,
23 "Very useful information which highlights the function
24 of the Special Demonstration Squad and reflects credit
25 on HN343". So, whatever the merits of reporting this

1 information, it was certainly information which
2 the SDS's managers were very pleased to get their hands
3 on and which more senior officers were being informed
4 about.

5 Again, you will see it's marked to be sent to
6 the Security Service, that is to say "box 500", and
7 circulated also to the Chief Superintendent of B squad.
8 As I remarked earlier, B squad was one of the squads
9 that was working on similar groups to the SDS.

10 Thank you. Could you take that down, please.

11 Can we have next {UCPI/15671}. Thank you.

12 This is a report which is signed by HN321. His
13 cover name was "Bill Lewis". As you can see, it's dated
14 6 August 1969, and if you look at paragraph 2 you will
15 see that it's about the International Marxist Group's
16 annual summer camp, which was held at a campsite in
17 Scotland in July and August of 1969, attended by up to
18 42 people. This is an example, a very early example of
19 an SDS officer, in the course of his undercover
20 operation, crossing a national border and certainly
21 operating well outside the geographical area of
22 the Metropolitan Police Force.

23 Could we go down to paragraph 13, please
24 {UCPI/15671/2}, and if we could zoom in on that, please.
25 Thank you very much.

1 You will see that appended to the report -- not, I'm
2 afraid, attached to this file but at the time appended
3 to the report -- were photographs of the people who had
4 been attending the summer camp. That's something that
5 we see SDS officers sometimes getting involved in,
6 either providing photographs or identifying people from
7 photographs already in the possession of the police.
8 Again, it contains the typical signature block,
9 the reporting officer, countersigned by a senior member
10 of the unit. The precise way in which the reports are
11 compiled, who exactly wrote which parts of them, is
12 going to be a matter for evidence.

13 Could we take that down now, please.

14 Can we have now {MPS/739236}. If we could scroll in
15 on that. Thank you.

16 A very common feature of the reporting that we have
17 recovered from the files is reports about individual
18 people. This is a report made by HN45, or at least in
19 HN45's name. His cover name was "David Robertson".
20 This one is dated 27 February 1971 and it concerns two
21 individuals, Abhimanya Manchanda and his then partner
22 Diane Langford, both very prominent Maoist activists of
23 the time. But if one looks at the content of the report
24 you will see that it's recording information about their
25 financial affairs, and about how they were arranging

1 their private life and about their child. That is
2 the sort of information that we often see.

3 Could you scroll down, please.

4 Again, we see the typical signature block, HN45,
5 and then Chief Inspector Saunders.

6 Thank you. Could that be taken down, please.

7 Could we have {MPS/731911}, please. Could that be
8 blown up. Thank you.

9 This is a very early report from 5 October 1968.
10 You'll see at the top it's marked "circulating copy".
11 It's one of those that doesn't record who the main
12 report had been circulated to. This is a report in
13 the names of HN330, cover name "Don de Freitas", and
14 HN334, cover name "Margaret White", to whom I referred
15 earlier. These are the a couple who pretended to be
16 a couple and infiltrated the Havering branch of the VSC.

17 If you could scroll down just a little bit, please.
18 Just a little bit up. Thank you.

19 You'll see there that it's a private meeting and
20 there's detailed record of who attended. You'll see
21 from the attendance figures this is a small meeting;
22 only nine people attended.

23 Can we go up to the very top again, please. Thank
24 you.

25 You'll see that this meeting occurred in a public

1 house, which is, again, typical of a lot of the activist
2 meetings that were attended by early SDS officers.

3 Can that be taken down, please.

4 Can we have {MPS/731845}. Thank you.

5 This is a report of HN343's dated 18 November 1971.
6 He went by the cover name "John Clinton", as I have
7 mentioned before. This is another report essentially
8 about an individual, although in a slightly wider
9 context, and it's been selected as an example today
10 because of the trade union context. You will be able to
11 see from reading it that the member of
12 the International Socialists about whom this report is
13 focused is proposing to call a meeting with other
14 members of International Socialists who are also members
15 of the Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union with
16 a view to drawing up a programme of policies with which
17 it was hoped the most militant and advanced workers
18 could fight. We see quite a lot of references to trade
19 unions, but they're very often in a context of this
20 sort.

21 Could that be taken down, please.

22 Can we have now {UCPI/7908}.

23 This is an example of an SDS officer reporting on
24 the membership of a target group. It's, again, one of
25 HN343's report, this time from August 1973, and what

1 he's reporting is recent changes in the membership
2 numbers of the International Socialists.

3 Can it be blown up any more? I'm afraid the copy
4 quality is quite poor. Thank you.

5 I'll give people a moment to fully absorb
6 the content. (Pause)

7 Of particular interest is the attached list, which
8 goes into some detail about the background of the new
9 recruits.

10 Could you scroll down, please. A bit further.
11 There should be an attached list {UCPI/7908/2}. Thank
12 you.

13 I'm afraid the copy quality is really very poor, but
14 for my purposes I don't think that's going to matter.
15 What you can see quite clearly from this list is that
16 the new members were recorded statistically by
17 the geographical area from which they came and from
18 the acronyms by the trade unions to which they belonged.

19 Could that be taken down now, please.

20 Could we now have {UCPI/8831}.

21 This is a report of HN338. We don't know 338's
22 cover name. It's from February 1973. The last report
23 was not uncommon in that it was reporting membership
24 details of a target group, but it was uncommon in that
25 it did not name names. This is an example of a report

1 on people associated with the group which does name
2 names. This one is about
3 the International Marxist Group, and you will see from
4 paragraph 2 that it reads:

5 "The following persons have applied for information
6 on the International Marxist Group and have expressed
7 interest in the politics of the organisation."

8 To protect their privacy we have redacted
9 the individual people's details -- but please could you
10 scroll down. Just to give an impression -- can you go
11 up a little bit and then down, thank you -- an
12 impression of the number of people who may have been
13 under that redaction. It says three people:

14 "All three will eventually be visited by a member of
15 the IMG who will invite them to attend meetings."

16 Paragraph 4:

17 "There is no trace in Special Branch records of ..."

18 Two of the people.

19 This is there for an example of people having their
20 identities recorded, reported and filed not for being
21 a member of the IMG but for having expressed an interest
22 in the IMG, and two of them had not come to
23 the attention of Special Branch previously.

24 Could that be taken down, please.

25 Can we have {UCPI/26518}. Thank you very much.

1 This is another report of HN338. It dates from
2 December 1971. It's been selected because it's an
3 example of a report about anti-racist activism. I'll
4 give people a moment to consider the contents. (Pause)

5 You will note that it was a very small meeting and
6 that it was simply a talk about racism and in particular
7 Rhodesia and the system there.

8 Could you scroll down, please, so we can see
9 the bottom of the report.

10 You see there that it's got the usual signature
11 block.

12 Could that be taken down, please.

13 Could we have {UCPI/21998}. Thank you.

14 This is a report of HN45's, "David Robertson". It's
15 dated 3 February 1971 and it concerns a Maoist group.
16 The main purpose of the meeting appears to have been to
17 hear what had happened after a delegation had visited
18 China. I'd invite you to read that, and then we'll
19 scroll down in a little bit to see what else it says.
20 (Pause)

21 Thank you. If you could scroll down, so we can read
22 from paragraph 4 onwards.

23 So you'll see that despite the purpose of
24 the meeting being to hear from the delegation about
25 the delegation that had gone to China, at the end of

1 the report there is reporting about industrial action
2 and that the racial origin of some of those who attended
3 is being remarked upon.

4 Thank you. Could that be taken down, please.

5 Could we have {UCPI/10570} please. This is another
6 report of HN45's dated 16 February 1971. It's an
7 example of an undercover officer submitting a leaflet.
8 It's also an example of reporting on campaigning for
9 sexual equality, because the leaflet is
10 a Women's Liberation Front recruitment leaflet. I'll
11 give people a moment to absorb the content of the top
12 half of the document and then we'll scroll down. You'll
13 note from paragraph 2 that there's believed to be
14 a Maoist connection to the group in question, and we'll
15 be hearing evidence about the Women's Liberation Front
16 towards the end of our oral hearings in Phase 1.

17 Could we scroll down now, please.

18 You see the signature block, HN45,
19 Chief Inspector Saunders, in the usual format.
20 The stamp on the left shows it's been copied to
21 the Security Service, the stamp "box 500".

22 Could we scroll down further, please. If you keep
23 scrolling down, we should get the leaflet underneath.
24 Keep scrolling, please. {UCPI/10570/3}

25 This is a document I'm going to give people a moment

1 to read. People will be able to form their own views
2 about what was being advocated by
3 the Women's Liberation Front. (Pause)

4 Could we scroll down, please. (Pause)

5 Thank you. Could the document be taken down,
6 please.

7 Could we have next {UCPI/5823}. Could you blow that
8 up a little bit further, please. Thank you very much.

9 You'll have to bear with me, this is a particularly
10 poor copy, but if you look hard enough you will see that
11 it's a report dating from 25 June 1971. I can tell you
12 that it's one of HN338's report. What this is an
13 example of is an SDS undercover officer reporting on
14 journalistic activity and possibly obtaining a position
15 of influence within activist circles, because it's about
16 a very small meeting in a private flat of the editorial
17 board of an activist publication called "Indo China",
18 and I'll leave people to read the rest for themselves.

19 (Pause)

20 Could we scroll down, please. Thank you.

21 Could the document be taken down, please.

22 Next could we have up {UCPI/15700}.

23 This is another of HN338's reports dating from
24 April 1973 and it concerns a large public meeting
25 organised by a number of groups,

1 the International Marxist Group,
2 the International Socialists and the Socialist Labour
3 League, as we can see from paragraph 1. This is an
4 example of an SDS officer reporting on activism critical
5 of the police, because also in paragraph 1, one will see
6 that the topic for this meeting was "police oppression
7 and victimisation".

8 From paragraph 2 you will see that one of our
9 non-state core participants and Phase 1 witnesses,
10 Tariq Ali, was present at the meeting and addressed it.

11 Could we scroll down, please. I'll give people
12 a moment to absorb that. (Pause)

13 Could you scroll down further, please {UCPI/15700/2}
14 to the next page, please. Thank you.

15 Could we scroll down further.

16 You'll see there the people who attended the meeting
17 have been listed, including Tariq Ali.

18 Could you scroll down further, please
19 {UCPI/15700/3}. Thank you.

20 The typical signatures at the end.

21 Could we scroll down so we can see the signatures.
22 Thank you very much.

23 Could that be taken down.

24 The final example I'm proposing to show you today
25 {UCPI/17021}. This is an example of reporting on

1 a justice campaign. It's a report which bears HN343's
2 name. It's dated 14 January 1974. HN343 used the cover
3 name "John Clinton". It relates to a very large
4 Socialist Worker rally in benefit of the Shrewsbury 24
5 and their families.

6 Could I direct your attention, please, to
7 paragraph 3 and some of the people who are the subject
8 of the justice campaign are named there. For those
9 watching, the name "Eric Tomlinson" is of a man who is
10 known more commonly to most as Ricky Tomlinson,
11 the famous actor. And you will see from the bottom of
12 paragraph 2 that there were 900 people at this event.

13 Thank you. Could that be taken down, please.

14 The counsel team has prepared appendix 2 to
15 the written version of this opening statement in which
16 we consider the written evidence relating to each of
17 the SDS officers involved in Phase 1. We hope that it
18 will assist those involved in and those following
19 the Inquiry. In particular, recognised legal
20 representatives proposing lines of questioning in
21 accordance with our Rule 10 process need not repeat
22 the issues that we raise in the appendix in relation to
23 any given witness. Witnesses will see from the appendix
24 the areas on which we will be seeking their further
25 assistance, although questioning will not necessarily be

1 limited to these areas.

2 We shall be hearing oral evidence from the following
3 10 witnesses in Phase 1. What I say next about their
4 role must obviously be taken subject to the oral
5 evidence that they will give.

6 Tariq Ali, the activist leader in
7 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and a prominent member
8 of the International Marxist Group during the Phase 1
9 period.

10 HN329, cover name "John Graham", who infiltrated
11 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign in 1968 and 1969.

12 HN328, "Joan Hillier", who attended meetings of
13 the VSC's Notting Hill branch in October 1968 and then
14 discharged administrative duties until 1969.

15 HN326, cover name "Douglas Edwards". He reported on
16 the West Ham Anarchists, the Independent Labour Party,
17 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee and Tricontinental
18 between 1968 and 1970.

19 HN336, cover name "Dick Epps". He infiltrated
20 various groups between 1969 and 1970.

21 HN340, "Alan Nixon" -- that's his cover name. He
22 infiltrated Red Circle and reported on
23 the International Marxist Group, then the Irish
24 Solidarity Campaign and the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign.
25 He was active between 1970 and 1972.

1 Dr Norman Temple, a member of the INSLF.

2 HN347, cover name "Alex Sloan", who infiltrated
3 the INSLF in 1971 and reported on Dr Temple amongst
4 others.

5 HN348 "Sandra" -- that's her cover name. She
6 infiltrated the Women's Liberation Front, which was
7 latterly known as the Revolutionary Women's Union,
8 between 1971 and 1973.

9 And finally, HN345, cover name "Peter Fredericks".
10 He operated in 1971 and will give evidence about
11 the Black Power movement, the Black Defence Committee,
12 Operation Omega, Action Bangla Desh and Young Haganah.

13 Sir, unless I can assist you further, that is my
14 opening.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Despite the hiccups,
16 you got to the end of your opening in very good time.
17 I'm obliged to you.

18 That, I think, concludes today's proceedings. We
19 will resume tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

20 MS PURSER: Thank you very much, everyone. As the Chairman
21 has said, the hearings are now finished for today and we
22 will be back tomorrow morning at 10 am. Thank you.

23 (4.27 pm)

24 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Tuesday,
25 3 November 2020)

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Opening statement by MR BARR1