

Monday, 16 November 2020

(10.00 am)

MS PURSER: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the fourth day of evidential hearings in Tranche 1, Phase 1 at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Jacqueline Purser and I'm the hearings manager.

As a reminder to those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone unless you are invited to speak by the Chairman. I will now hand over to our Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Good morning. Would you please listen to a recording made earlier this year which is played at the beginning of each session. Those of you hearing it for the first time, please listen carefully:

"I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute, the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have made a number of orders which affect what you may and may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter and may have serious consequences for you.

"If I am satisfied that a person may have breached

1 an order, I have the power to certify the matter to
2 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
3 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
4 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
5 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
6 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
7 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
8 sequestration of their assets.

9 "Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
10 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
11 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
12 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
13 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
14 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any
15 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
16 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
17 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing
18 room to any other person, but only once at least ten
19 minutes have elapsed since the event which you are
20 describing took place.

21 "This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
22 the Inquiry I have made orders permitting the public
23 disclosure of information, for example about
24 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
25 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,

1 whether by accident or design, information which I have
2 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
3 be disclosed in a hearing. If and when that happens,
4 I will immediately suspend the hearing and make an order
5 prohibiting further disclosure of the information
6 outside the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that
7 no further disclosure of that information may be made by
8 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device
9 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside
10 it.

11 "I am sorry if you find this message alarming; it is
12 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
13 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
14 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
15 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
16 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
17 evidence as I will hear, and to reach your own
18 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
19 best to ensure that you can. If you have any doubt
20 about the terms of this message, or what you may or may
21 not do, you should not hesitate to ask one of them and,
22 with my help if necessary, they will provide you with
23 the answer."

24 Could witness HN336 now be identified and sworn or
25 may he affirm, please.

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HN336

MS PURSER: Good morning, HN336. Can you see and hear me?

A. I can, thank you.

MS PURSER: I understand that you would like to swear on
the Bible?

A. I will. I would.

(Witness sworn)

MS PURSER: Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRMAN: HN336, we can see that there is another
person in the room beside you -- I hope keeping
the required distance under COVID regulations. Could
the camera please be moved so that he may be seen.

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Sir, I'm going to leave the room, if
that's ...

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, that's absolutely fine.

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: I'm grateful.

THE CHAIRMAN: You're going to leave the room now?

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Can you confirm, please, there's no one else
in the room with you.

A. I can confirm that, sir, yes.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Then would you answer questions,
please, from Counsel to the Inquiry, Mr Barr.

A. Thank you.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

1 Questions by MR BARR

2 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

3 336, you have provided a witness statement to
4 the Inquiry which is dated 9 May 2019. Are you familiar
5 with its contents?

6 A. Yes, I think so.

7 Q. And are the contents of your witness statement true and
8 correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?

9 A. Yes, they are.

10 Q. You used the cover name "Dick Epps" when you were
11 serving in the SDS; is that correct?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Before we turn to the SDS, I'd like to ask you a few
14 questions about your prior police service.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. First of all, when you were undergoing your basic police
17 training, were you given any training about requirements
18 before entering private dwellings?

19 A. I'm sure -- I'm sure we were. I mean, I'm going back
20 51 -- no, I'm going back further than that, aren't I?
21 But, yes, the use of search warrants and the like would
22 have been necessary, obviously. And it would -- there
23 were no circumstances that would normally allow a police
24 officer into a private dwelling without permission or
25 a warrant.

1 Q. And when you were training for Special Branch, did you
2 have any training on attending meetings of political
3 activists?

4 A. Not specific training, no.

5 Q. In your work for Special Branch -- and I don't need you
6 to be specific about what work. But in your work with
7 Special Branch, did you attend meetings of political
8 activists before joining the SDS?

9 A. Yes, I did.

10 Q. And did you therefore learn on the job what was expected
11 of you by Special Branch when attending such meetings?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And did that include the way in which Special Branch
14 reports of such meetings should be written up?

15 A. Yes, that was a fundamental requirement, yes.

16 Q. Were you expected to record the personal details of
17 people you could identify as attending such meetings?

18 A. Where it was possible to identify people, then those
19 details would be included in the report. Probably only
20 a name, but nonetheless, if it was known, then that
21 would be included.

22 Q. In what circumstances would you report specifically
23 about an individual?

24 A. I think their -- their -- attendance -- just their
25 attendance at the -- at the meeting was as far as

- 1 the inclusion would be required.
- 2 Q. Were there circumstances in which you would make
3 a separate report about an individual?
- 4 A. There might well be, but I can't -- I can't recall
5 circumstances where may -- where that became necessary.
- 6 Q. Were there circumstances in which you would report
7 identifying features of an individual?
- 8 A. It's -- it's possible if -- if somebody was -- was,
9 I don't know, becoming a focus of attention in a meeting
10 and was unknown to me as the Special Branch reporting
11 officer, then it's possible that -- it would entirely
12 depend upon the -- the -- dare I say, the tenor of
13 the meeting and the -- and the contribution of
14 the individual.
- 15 Q. Was there any guidance or any convention about how you
16 would describe or identify a person who you decided
17 needed to be the subject of a specific report?
- 18 A. There seemed to be accepted phrase -- phraseology. Part
19 of the induction, dare I say, of a Special Branch
20 officer would be his ability to -- to create and write
21 reports, and if it became necessary -- necessary to
22 extend -- expand upon that, then -- then there would be
23 -- that would be included. I can't -- I can't think of
24 anything specific, I'm afraid, no. I can't be very
25 helpful on that point.

- 1 Q. Were you expected to report on future plans and events
2 of the groups whose meetings you were attending?
- 3 A. That's -- I would say would be a fundamental requirement
4 of any reporting of a meeting, because part of our
5 function, part of our raison d'etre, if you like, was to
6 attend matters of public order.
- 7 Q. And would you report on the group's activities, its
8 discussions and its interests?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. Is there anything else that I might have missed that you
11 would be on the lookout for when attending a meeting of
12 political activists?
- 13 A. I think part of a policeman's basic kit bag is his
14 attention to -- to what's around him and his awareness.
15 So -- so anything that you might consider relevant or --
16 or useful should be included.
- 17 Q. Was there anything that you were instructed not to
18 include in your reports?
- 19 A. I -- I can't -- I can't recall anything particularly,
20 no.
- 21 Q. Was there anything that by convention you would not
22 include in reports?
- 23 A. I can't -- I can't recall anything. I have to -- you
24 will be well aware, I'm sure, that 51 years ago, as it
25 was, or more when I joined Special Branch, 1964,

1 the social times were different and social pressures
2 were different, political highlights were different, and
3 the phrase "political correctness", if you like, entered
4 into conversations much later. So -- so, as I say, it
5 would just be a policeman's awareness and observation
6 that would be the important factors.

7 Q. In terms of who was the arbiter of what went into
8 a report and what stayed out of a report, were you
9 the arbiter, in practice, of what you did and did not
10 report?

11 A. As the one attending a meeting or a function, yes, that
12 would -- that would be -- yes, I can't see that anybody
13 else could -- could determine what should or should not
14 go in if -- if they weren't in attendance in the first
15 place.

16 Q. And was the view that you should include all details and
17 leave it to others to analyse the content of your
18 reports?

19 A. Yes, that would be accurate, yes. I wasn't -- by no
20 means an analyst, and that was not my function.

21 Q. Were there any conventions about the style and tone to
22 be adopted in Special Branch reports?

23 A. As I mentioned a little earlier, an induction into
24 Special Branch, you went through various hoops to -- to
25 determine or learn how the style was to be created. And

1 we all, I think, as new officers within Special Branch,
2 wore a groove from our typewriters to our supervising
3 officers' desks as we went back and forth with our
4 reports being altered and changed and tweaked to conform
5 with the style that was expected at that time.

6 Q. By the time you joined the SDS, you had a few years
7 under your belt. Had you reached the stage where you
8 knew what was expected of you?

9 A. Yes, I think so.

10 Q. And by that stage, were you getting much feedback from
11 your superiors about the content of your reports?

12 A. Well, I think there was always an ongoing curiosity
13 about the content, but not necessarily the style of
14 presentation.

15 Q. Were you given any training or explanation about
16 the definition of "extremism" when you were in
17 Special Branch?

18 A. I -- I don't think so.

19 Q. Were you given any explanation, training or instruction
20 in what "subversion" meant?

21 A. No, I don't recall any specific training. I think --
22 I think I had a -- an understanding of what "subversion"
23 might be, and -- and had I had a different view to the
24 -- the general consensus, that would have been pointed
25 out to me, and I'm not aware of any -- any contrary

1 thoughts in that respect.

2 Q. What was your understanding of "subversion"?

3 A. It's very difficult to be precise now all these years
4 later, but my -- my feeling was, and is, that we are --
5 we existed within a very sophisticated political system
6 that's evolved over many years, and there is a -- an
7 order to the way that system might be changed. As
8 a parliamentary democracy, it's through the ballot box.
9 And there were and are those that seek to disturb that
10 balance of matters and -- and subvert that system by --
11 by other means. And so that would be, in the broadest
12 terms, my understanding of "subversion".

13 Q. And what was your understanding of Special Branch's role
14 in dealing with subversion?

15 A. I don't know that I had a specific view of
16 Special Branch's role as my -- my job as
17 a Special Branch officer was to assist the service
18 generally in the -- in the understanding of the policing
19 of the streets of London and the UK and -- and
20 the protection of society. That sounds very grand and
21 very bland, maybe, but I still adhere very passionately
22 to the -- the thought that protection of life and
23 property and the protection and wellbeing of our society
24 is key to the success of our society.

25 Q. Was it your understanding that information gathered by

- 1 Special Branch was used not just for public order
2 purposes but also to counter subversion?
- 3 A. I suppose so, yes.
- 4 Q. In your witness statement you've drawn a distinction
5 between what you describe as a "genuine peaceful
6 protest" and one which is, in your words, "divisive or
7 venomous". Is that a personal distinction or an
8 official distinction?
- 9 A. That's a personal distinction.
- 10 Q. And what did you mean by that?
- 11 A. Again, using a policeman's antennae, dare I say, to
12 interpret circumstances and facts that are going to
13 cause serious problems, or problems beyond -- beyond
14 a normal -- I accept that everyone has the right to
15 protest, and I have never doubted that. It's -- it's
16 a matter of how those protests are put into practice and
17 what spins from them.
- 18 Q. What sort of problems do you have in mind?
- 19 A. Outbreaks of -- of riotous public disorder and -- for --
20 for one.
- 21 Q. Did you glean from your work with Special Branch before
22 joining the SDS which groups were of interest to
23 Special Branch?
- 24 A. I don't think I gleaned any -- any more than any other
25 officer would have done, depending upon the type of work

1 that we were pursuing. There are groups that seem to
2 attract interest and -- and others not so.

3 Q. Put another way, did the groups you came to infiltrate
4 whilst serving with the SDS accord with your
5 understanding of the sort of groups Special Branch was
6 interested in?

7 A. I think prior to joining the SDS, I did not have
8 a narrow view of whether that group -- that group or
9 whatever group should be pursued or be of interest, it
10 only -- it only developed as I became a field officer in
11 the SDS that I began to fully understand some of
12 the influences that were being brought to bear.

13 Q. Did Special Branch target groups or individuals or both?

14 A. I don't think they did either. I don't think they --
15 they targeted individuals any more than they targeted
16 groups. I think they just had a broad brush overview,
17 and that was always the endeavour. That's my
18 understanding.

19 Q. You give some evidence in your witness statement about
20 attending a violent demonstration at Grosvenor Square.
21 At one point in your statement you describe it as having
22 taken place in the late 60s, but you also refer to
23 the Cuban missile crisis?

24 A. Yes, that was --

25 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

- 1 A. -- mid-to early 60s.
- 2 Q. Which was in the early 60s.
- 3 A. Yeah.
- 4 Q. Can you help us with when the violent demonstration that
5 you are referring to at -- in your witness statement --
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. -- when was it? Which demonstration was it, please?
- 8 A. I wasn't a Special Branch officer at that time, I was
9 a uniform officer. And I remember the -- the day
10 very -- very clearly. It was the day that Mr Khrushchev
11 was challenged by President Kennedy regarding the Cuban
12 missiles that were being transported across
13 the Atlantic. And there seemed to be a thought abroad
14 that was really frightening to a lot of people that
15 World War Three was about to break out. And as a result
16 of that, being a uniformed officer working in that
17 particular area of London, I was sent up with about 10
18 or 12 other officers to Grosvenor Square to the --
19 protect the embassy -- the American Embassy.
- 20 Q. I'm going to move now to joining the SDS.
- 21 When you joined the SDS, were you told to keep your
22 work and the fact of the unit's existence secret?
- 23 A. I don't remember being told specifically. I think that
24 was implicit in the whole operation, yes.
- 25 Q. Did you -- was your implicit understanding that

- 1 the existence of the unit should be kept secret from
2 the rest of Special Branch or not?
- 3 A. It was -- it was -- it was in its very early days. And
4 my memory tells me that people within Special Branch
5 knew of the existence of this group, but it was
6 something that people would know nothing of. Nor was it
7 something that you might pursue as an -- an inquiry. It
8 wasn't relevant to you as an individual. You moved on
9 and didn't ask questions.
- 10 Q. And was it your understanding that the unit's existence
11 would be kept secret from wider police circles?
- 12 A. Well, again, I think that's -- that's implicit, but I --
13 I wasn't party to -- to those decisions, yes.
- 14 Q. You talk in your witness statement about being inducted
15 into the SDS and being shown to the cover flat by
16 Conrad Dixon.
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Can you help us, please, with what that induction
19 involved?
- 20 A. "Induction" sounds rather a grand word in those
21 circumstances, but it was part of my introduction to
22 the SDS. And after having spent a -- I don't know how
23 long -- not very long, two or three days maybe in
24 Scotland Yard, within the office of the SDS, I was then
25 taken to this other place by Conrad Dixon.

1 Q. And how did you get to understand what it was that was
2 required of you as an SDS undercover police officer?

3 A. I think, just -- just conversation with -- with
4 officers. I was never sat down in a classroom and -- or
5 a training room and given a training manual, or a --
6 training lectures, it was all part of a -- a verbal
7 introduction and overview.

8 Q. To what extent did you learn on the job?

9 A. Well, to a very large extent, I have to say.

10 Q. And to what extent were you assisted by your immediate
11 colleagues in understanding what was required of you?

12 A. They were very supportive. We were all -- all, if you
13 like, being thrown into a maelstrom, and seeking to find
14 some sense of what we were trying to do to -- to try and
15 find some benefit to the police service through what we
16 were trying to do. We -- we would never sit together
17 and discuss specific activity that I or they might have
18 been involved with. That never seemed to be -- nor
19 was it encouraged to be part of our conversation. So it
20 was all in very general supportive terms and tones
21 rather than specific detail.

22 Q. Were you given any briefings about the groups that you
23 infiltrated?

24 A. No, but then I wasn't targeted into any groups either,
25 so -- so the training was on the job, in that sense --

- 1 (overspeaking) --
- 2 Q. Were you given any guidance about whether or not to
3 assume positions of responsibility when operating as an
4 SDS undercover police officer?
- 5 A. I -- I -- I don't -- I'm sorry to be unhelpful on that
6 point. I can't remember any specific instruction; but,
7 then, I was quite determined from the outset that that
8 was never part of my role. I was never there to be a --
9 a driving point, or a pivot, or an agent provocateur, or
10 anything similar. My role was to gather intelligence
11 that affected public order. And I -- I held that point
12 close then, and I still do in my mind remember that
13 being my task.
- 14 Q. At least in the early months of your service with
15 the SDS, the unit was led by Chief Inspector Conrad
16 Dixon. Can you tell us a little bit more about
17 the style with which he ran the unit?
- 18 A. I know it was -- well, I think it was a creation of
19 Conrad's. He was an intelligent man, a very bright man,
20 very brash, very -- he was a big man, physically and
21 personally. And -- yeah. So he was a driving force in
22 -- in -- throughout, the time he was with us, yes.
- 23 Q. You've described him in your statement at one point as
24 a "brash chancer". What did you mean by that?
- 25 A. I don't mean to be unfair in my assessment of the guy,

1 because he was a -- as I say, a very intelligent man who
2 clearly had a strong understanding of what the brief
3 was. But he -- he personally, to me, would always come
4 across as a -- as a gambler. And I don't mean that in
5 a -- well, a chancer. He would -- he was brash. That's
6 -- that's my understanding, my reading of him.

7 Q. I'd like to move now to
8 the Britain-Vietnam Solidarity Front?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Was that the first group that you infiltrated?

11 A. Yeah -- yes, that was the Maoist group that met in
12 King's Cross Road, I think. Yeah, that was -- that was
13 the first group that I -- very -- looking back, it was
14 very difficult to make headway when you're -- you're
15 learning on the job, as I've said, and you have no
16 specific brief, you -- you know that's something you
17 have to do, and how you do it is a matter of how your
18 personality allows you to do it, so to speak.

19 And that was -- that was a group that seemed to be
20 a useful entré, inasmuch as although it was Maoist --
21 very much a Maoist-orientated group, it was a group that
22 embraced other views, on those meetings anyway, and
23 always -- always sufficiently largely attended, 25/30
24 people, maybe, to make it something that you could drift
25 into rather anonymously, rather than just a few people

1 where the finger might be pointed at -- at you as an
2 individual.

3 Q. Is there anything else you can tell us about how it came
4 to be that that was your first target.

5 A. Now, you're casting around for a likely vehicle to give
6 you an opportunity to move in and move on. And as
7 I said, because it was slightly broad in its base,
8 although it was very Maoist-orientated and -- and led,
9 it gave you an opportunity to -- to use those antennae
10 that I've mentioned earlier about, you know, policeman's
11 nouse to -- to read situations and read -- read people.
12 Excuse me.

13 Q. And how did you do it? How did you come to infiltrate
14 that group?

15 A. I think "infiltration" sounds rather too strong a --
16 a word. I attended the meetings and I was interested
17 from a professional point of view in terms of learning
18 what their viewpoints were, and also trying to glean
19 anything from that that might take me elsewhere in time.
20 I did not intend to stay in that particular grouping.
21 But nonetheless it was an -- a useful introduction for
22 me to -- to -- as I say, the political nuances,
23 the political factions and -- and the particular view of
24 the Maoists.

25 Q. You describe gradually working your way onto the scene

1 in your witness statement. How long did it take you to
2 become established in that group?

3 A. I don't think I was ever established within that group.
4 I wasn't established within that group; I can say that
5 quite firmly.

6 Q. And so when you use the phrase "gradually worked
7 [your] way onto the scene", what did you mean by that?

8 A. I think you just became an accepted part of
9 the furniture on a Sunday evening. You, along with
10 others would -- would pop -- would pop along.

11 Q. When you were attending the meetings of the BVSF and
12 reporting on them, what sort of dialogue were you having
13 with SDS managers about what you were doing?

14 A. I -- I can't recall too many conversations about that.
15 I think there was an acceptance that -- that you -- you
16 would -- would find your way, you would find your level
17 and so you weren't -- you weren't being whipped into
18 a corner to do this or that, you weren't being directed
19 to pursue this line, that line. And so -- so
20 conversations would always be very general, and would be
21 rather more leaning towards creating a wider
22 understanding of me as an individual, of the task I was
23 seeking, rather than specifics.

24 Q. And what was that task that was being sought from you?

25 A. I was quite clear then, as I said, and I have ever --

1 forever been clear since, that my task, eventually,
2 ultimately, was to determine what was going to be of
3 benefit to the Metropolitan Police Service in terms of
4 public order or individuals who -- who might be seeking
5 to disrupt whatever: the -- the -- the status quo, or --
6 or the political scene.

7 Q. On the question of individuals, you refer to some in
8 your witness statement. First of all, can we take
9 Tariq Ali. Is he the sort of individual that you have
10 just referred to?

11 A. Yes, yes. Around that time -- and I can't be specific
12 about that time -- there -- there was a huge amount,
13 within London anyway and probably elsewhere around
14 the UK, a huge amount of student unrest. And it all
15 seemed to, in London, to be centred around the London
16 School of Economics. And there was -- there were almost
17 daily, maybe more than one or two daily meetings of this
18 group, that group to -- to discuss this political point,
19 the outcome of that activity or whatever. And Tariq Ali
20 was very much part of that scene.

21 He seemed, dare I say, he seemed to enjoy the --
22 the spotlight that that gave him. And he would --
23 again, my own interpretation -- relish the opportunity
24 of sitting in a corner with 50/60 students around him
25 expounding his political beliefs and -- and "political

- 1 opportunism" is a couple of words that spring to mind.
- 2 Q. How frequently did you come across him?
- 3 A. At that time, seemingly every -- every day. But he's
- 4 not a man that I ever sat down and talked to. And
- 5 subsequently, as you know, I was involved with a -- with
- 6 a group that he was very much involved with. And even
- 7 then I didn't get involved with him.
- 8 Q. Was he someone that you had been asked to keep an eye
- 9 on?
- 10 A. Not at all. Not at all.
- 11 Q. Would you report about his activities if you came upon
- 12 him?
- 13 A. If I felt it was relevant to report upon him, then
- 14 I would, yes.
- 15 Q. Were you given any briefing about Tariq Ali before you
- 16 deployed?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. Can we move now to Abhimanya Manchanda.
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Was he another of the prominent individuals that you
- 21 were referring to earlier?
- 22 A. Yeah, very much so. At that time, at the London School
- 23 of Economics, yes, certainly. He was a very able public
- 24 speaker, perhaps not in quite the passionate tones that
- 25 Tariq Ali would be able to generate, but nonetheless, he

1 was seeking to expand and expound the -- the Maoist
2 viewpoint.

3 Q. And so, were you given any briefing or guidance about
4 him by your managers or anyone else?

5 A. Not at all.

6 Q. But would you report upon him because he was a prominent
7 Maoist activist?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did you come across Ernest Tate?

10 A. I've never -- I don't know the man. Never -- never met
11 him.

12 Q. Most of your reporting on the BVSF is in the form of
13 joint reports with the officer we know as HN135. And we
14 can use this officer's real name. It was Mike Ferguson.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you operate together or independently when you were
17 undercover?

18 A. Totally independently.

19 Q. So, how do it come to be that you were both at many of
20 the same meetings and there are many reports which bear
21 both of your names?

22 A. I was, dare I say, a new boy seeking my way in, and
23 the -- the meetings that the BVSF were holding offered
24 an opportunity to -- to sit in and learn a trade, learn
25 a skill that I was going to find useful, I thought,

1 later. There was no collusion with my colleague, either
2 before the meeting, after the meeting, just a nodding
3 fact that we were there. He -- he had developed
4 a little core of friends, it seemed, within that group.
5 And it would be quite wrong for me to endeavour to swing
6 in to -- to involve myself with that.

7 Q. Did the fact that he was already reporting on the group
8 and attending its meetings influence your choice of
9 the BVSF as your first port of call?

10 A. No, no. It would -- it -- no. The fact that he was
11 there already was -- was chance, and it wasn't -- was
12 not -- was not influencing me at all.

13 Q. Who wrote up the reports on the meetings which you both
14 attended?

15 A. Well, I -- I can't remember the detail. If it was on
16 a Sunday evening, it would be written up on the Monday
17 morning. And if -- if I was in and had the opportunity,
18 I would write it, I suppose. And maybe my colleague
19 would -- would write it up separately. I would not
20 endeavour to say, "It's okay, I've done that, there's no
21 need to cover it." That would be a matter for his
22 judgment. Or similarly, my judgment.

23 Q. I'm getting the impression that you would both look --
24 you would both be involved in the production of
25 the report; is that fair?

1 A. We would not sit down together and compile a report, no.
2 That's not my memory of things like that at all.

3 Q. So could you help clarify then, what would have
4 happened?

5 A. I'm struggling, obviously, to make -- make sense of --
6 of why two reports might be in -- or why we would be
7 included. I can't -- I can't answer the question, sir.
8 I -- there was no collusion, as I -- as I recall, and
9 I can't set out a reason why I would do it or he would
10 do it. There was -- as I say, if he was not there on
11 a Monday morning, I would submit my report and it would
12 be -- picked up and dealt with. But similarly, his
13 report would be submitted and dealt with. But --

14 Q. It's not a question of collusion, 336, it's a question
15 of whether the reports are the product of both of your
16 recollections, or whether both of you separately put in
17 -- put in some material which somebody else then
18 collated and typed up -- (overspeaking) --

19 A. -- (overspeaking) -- I wouldn't know what was going into
20 his reports.

21 And again, you know, those -- those reports were
22 quite subjective, just using your policeman's antennae
23 again to include what you felt was relevant, or might be
24 deemed useful.

25 Q. Many of the Maoist meetings that bear your name on

- 1 the reports along with HN135's are marked as being
2 private meetings. Are these meetings that you could
3 have attended without using the undercover tactic?
- 4 A. No, I -- that's -- I don't know quite what's meant by
5 a "private meeting". It was a public meeting, if you
6 like, in a room above a pub. And so it wasn't within
7 four walls and entry was limited. So I'm not quite sure
8 what "private" -- how "private" relates to that.
- 9 Q. Well, put another way, if you had attended in your
10 ordinary Special Branch capacity to report on those
11 meetings, do you think you would have been able to gain
12 entry?
- 13 A. I doubt it.
- 14 Q. Why is that?
- 15 A. Because a Special Branch officer attending a normal
16 meeting would rather stand out. I think the fact that
17 your face was known made it possible to sort of glide in
18 and slide into the grouping, rather than -- than stand
19 out as a total stranger. There was always a sensitivity
20 about strange faces.
- 21 Q. Your reporting includes information about forthcoming
22 marches, demonstrations and protests. Did that fall
23 squarely within what you thought you should be
24 reporting?
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And there's at least one instance of you giving an
2 estimate of how many BVSF supporters and allied Maoists
3 would attend a march and how you were expecting them to
4 behave. You describe that you thought they were going
5 to be "vociferous", but that there was no suggestion of
6 "militant action". Was intelligence about numbers and
7 demeanour, again, the sort of thing that you thought
8 would be significant for policing purposes?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You also reported on the BVSF's intention to embark upon
11 a recruitment drive. Why would that have been of
12 interest to Special Branch?

13 A. Because -- because the -- one of the underlying gospels,
14 for want of a better word, that Abhimanya Manchanda
15 would be promoting would be revolution. And so
16 the thought of -- or the prospect of further people
17 joining that group and revolution being one of their
18 targets would be of interest.

19 Q. There are some specific reports on individuals. Why did
20 you put in specific reports about individuals who were
21 supporting the BVSF?

22 A. If an opportunity arose to identify a new face, then
23 I would -- I would report that.

24 Q. Did the person have to be an obviously committed member
25 of the group, or did you report any new face?

- 1 A. Where I was -- where I was able to, any new face.
- 2 Q. Do you know whether or not information on individuals
3 that you were reporting would have been used for vetting
4 purposes?
- 5 A. I have absolutely no idea where the information might go
6 beyond the submission of my report.
- 7 Q. In places, you report about the relative power of
8 different groups. So for example, there's a report
9 about the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation
10 conference, and the relative influences of the BVSF and
11 other groups at that conference. Why was the relative
12 influence of these different groups of interest to
13 Special Branch?
- 14 A. I think the make-up of any -- of any potential protest
15 would -- would need to be examined, because if you went
16 back to the demonstrations that were taking place prior
17 to my becoming an SDS officer, the Met Police and
18 the Home Office, dare I say, and the Security Service
19 were woefully underprepared for the impact of those
20 demonstrations. So there was a big catch-up going on
21 to -- to derive as much intelligence that was going to
22 restore order on the streets. That's not to prevent
23 public protest, but to prevent violent protest. So that
24 was always a consideration when it came to assessing
25 these groups.

1 Q. And how would your assessments of these groups, or your
2 intelligence about these groups help with that?

3 A. Because you began to understand more and more
4 the individuals and the influences the individuals would
5 bring to bear on various groups. Some -- it was
6 a hotbed at that time of -- of street activity. And
7 some of it was -- was very -- very reasonable in its
8 protest, but some of it was really, really violent;
9 directed not just at policemen, although they seemed to
10 be an endless target, but property as well. And so --
11 so there was a need to protect, if you like, as I say,
12 in -- in the wider sense, if that makes sense.

13 Q. A slightly different topic now: what the unit was
14 called. I've been referring to it as the "SDS". In
15 the papers in your bundle there are references to it
16 being called "the Demo Squad", "the Demonstration Squad"
17 and "the Special Ops Squad". Can you help as to what
18 you and your colleagues called the unit?

19 A. None of those phrases mean anything to me. I'm not --
20 I don't remember any of those labellings being utilised.
21 I think we -- we -- if -- I think "the Hs" was a word or
22 a phrase that was used.

23 Q. "The Hs"?

24 A. "The Hs".

25 Q. And what was that a reference to?

1 A. "The Hairies".

2 Q. And do you know what your managers referred to the unit
3 as?

4 A. I've no idea, sir.

5 Q. Back to your reporting on the BVSF. Amongst
6 the forthcoming marches that you reported on was one in
7 support of Palestinians and another in support of equal
8 rights for women. Was it the cause, or was it the BVSF,
9 or was it both that were of interest to you and
10 Special Branch?

11 A. It was the BVSF; it wasn't the cause in either of those
12 cases.

13 Q. Could you explain further, please.

14 A. As I said earlier, there were elements within Maoist
15 groupings that wished to -- to resort to -- to
16 revolutionary tactics in -- that would involve violence.
17 And so if -- if that group was involved, then there was
18 an -- then we should be aware.

19 Q. There is a report in your bundle about the April 1969
20 BVSF open conference, and there is a minute sheet as
21 well. I'd like to show you the minute sheet. Could we
22 have up, please, <MPS-0736445>, please.

23 That document reads:

24 "Chief Superintendent Cunningham to see, please.
25 "This important conference has been very thoroughly

1 covered by DS HN135 and DC HN336, who have identified 42
2 of the 50 persons present. Credit must also go to
3 DS Creamer who briefed and de-briefed these officers and
4 provided the essential ideological interpretation."

5 And then the document is to be copied, amongst other
6 people, to the Security Service, the Superintendent of
7 B Squad, C Squad, E Squad and a circulating copy was
8 going to do the rounds.

9 Is this minute sheet referring, as far as you can
10 tell, to your report on that Maoist conference?

11 A. I'm totally un -- unaware. I can't -- I can't possibly
12 tell you. It's -- it's -- it's very possible, but I --
13 I would not know. Once -- once a report had been
14 submitted, I would not know its journey or its routing.

15 Q. Was identifying as many people as possible at
16 the conference one of your objectives?

17 A. I would say so, yes.

18 Q. And did Detective Sergeant Creamer brief and debrief you
19 about -- in relation to this conference?

20 A. It's something that I'm -- I'm afraid, 51 years later,
21 I'm unable to recall.

22 Q. Does it sound like the sort of thing that he would have
23 done?

24 A. Again, I -- I couldn't -- I couldn't possibly say. I'm
25 not trying to be evasive, I can assure you, but I --

1 I don't know. I don't recall seeing Sergeant Creamer --
2 I knew Sergeant Creamer, but I don't recall seeing him
3 when I was deployed, so I can't remember any
4 circumstances where we would have met in those -- in
5 those terms.

6 Q. From your knowledge of Sergeant Creamer, did he have
7 a good understanding of the ideological positions of
8 the various groups the SDS was involved with?

9 A. Well, he was an experienced Special Branch officer.
10 I couldn't comment beyond that.

11 Q. I'd like now to go to the report itself, to pick up on
12 something you said earlier about the BVSF. So could we
13 take this document down, please, and could we have up
14 <MPS-0736446>.

15 This is the first page of the report, and you can
16 see that it's a report on the Britain-Vietnam Solidarity
17 Front's open conference in April 1969. From the second
18 paragraph you can see that it was attended by some 50
19 persons, who were almost exclusively Maoist; and a list
20 of those identified is said to be attached at appendix
21 A.

22 Could we go over the page, please, <MPS-0736446/2>
23 and could you focus in on the bottom half of the page.

24 I'm going to read from that large middle paragraph
25 from about two-thirds of the way down, where it says --

1 and it's talking about a talk by Manchanda:

2 "Considerable ruthlessness would be required of
3 the proletariat before it could achieve power. 'Before
4 coming to power, the proletariat and other revolutionary
5 people should adhere to the principle of making
6 revolution by violence, smashing the old state machine
7 and seizing political power by armed force.'"

8 And then there's a reference to the full paper that
9 Abhimanya Manchanda had delivered, which is appendix
10 B to the report.

11 Can you recall Manchanda saying that?

12 A. I can't remember the words in there. No I can't.

13 Q. Is it in keeping with the sorts of things that you heard
14 him say?

15 A. Indeed, yes. What you -- you're reading there is -- is
16 him -- him expounding the -- the true political thought
17 tract, which emanate from Chairman Mao, as you can see
18 in the report itself. So he was a devoted follower of
19 the Chairman Mao thought and the Little Red Book.

20 Q. The report goes on to read:

21 "Manchanda did not appear to hold out any immediate
22 prospects of this uncomfortable eventuality taking place
23 in England, but invited members of BVSF to view
24 the world situation, especially events in Asia, Africa,
25 and Latin America, as part of a massive anti-imperialist

1 movement inspired by Chairman Mao."

2 Is it right that the BVSF did not see any immediate
3 prospect for revolution in England?

4 A. Well, that's what he's saying there, but there's an
5 expression, isn't there: mighty oaks from little acorns
6 grow. And that would always be the thought, I'm sure,
7 in Manchanda's mind, and others, that if you can push
8 against the door long enough, hard enough, you might get
9 a little opening, or you might finally push it wide
10 open. So -- so, yeah, the process in -- in this country
11 is such that -- that it -- immediate prospects would not
12 be likely.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 Could we take the document down, please.

15 From what you saw of the BVSF and its members,
16 was it a violent organisation?

17 A. No, not compared with other groupings at that time, no.
18 The content of that group were not in themselves
19 violently disposed, I don't think.

20 Q. Did you ever see any BVSF members involved in violence?

21 A. I -- I don't remember, no.

22 Q. Did the BVSF urge its members to commit criminal acts?

23 A. Those -- those meetings that I've talked of, no. No, it
24 would be -- it would be in a -- in a quieter huddle,
25 I would expect, those sort of discussions to take place.

- 1 Q. Do you know of any BVSF member that you saw committing
2 a criminal act?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. Was the BVSF involved in fomenting public disorder?
- 5 A. That would be my interpretation, yes.
- 6 Q. Could you explain that answer.
- 7 A. Just going back to Manchanda's point about making
8 revolution, particularly in his time that I would have
9 heard him on stage, away from those meetings on
10 a Sunday, where the audience might interpret it as being
11 more volatile, he had a capacity to -- to make those
12 sort of urgings, for want of a stronger word.
- 13 Q. I would like to explore with you what the boundaries of
14 those urgings were. Was he promoting the commencement
15 of public disorder by BVSF members, or was he urging
16 BVSF members to fight back if there was any violence
17 from the police side at a demonstration?
- 18 A. No, the former rather than the latter. I -- I don't
19 think that he was making urgings to fight back, he was
20 promoting rather than fighting back.
- 21 Q. What was your managers' view of the BVSF?
- 22 A. I don't know, sir. I'm not able to comment.
- 23 Q. Did you get any feedback from them about your reporting
24 on the BVSF?
- 25 A. I -- I don't remember. I'm afraid that when it comes to

1 these details, the -- it's so far back I can't remember
2 any of the meeting details, I'm afraid.

3 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that your next
4 target group was the Camden VSC. Can you help us with
5 how you came to cease reporting on the BVSF and to
6 commence reporting on Camden VSC?

7 A. I got -- I got to a point within the BVSF where I felt
8 uneasy. There was -- there was never a finger-pointing
9 exercise, there was never a moment where any accusations
10 of any kind were made, but -- but my experience at that
11 time with Manchanda was that he, for some reason, had
12 had a view of me that didn't coincide with his. And so
13 I just -- I just read it as the time to move on.
14 I didn't -- I saw no point in remaining in a -- an
15 atmosphere or a situation where I might find myself
16 embarrassed or accused of -- of being something, who
17 knows what. But I -- I -- it was time to move on. That
18 was -- that was the -- the moment for me. And so -- so,
19 having established a little credibility amongst the --
20 or a little more understanding, dare I say, not
21 credibility. But it was time to find pastures new.

22 Q. And so how did it come to be the Camden branch of
23 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign?

24 A. The whole -- the whole of north and north-west London
25 seemed to be the focus of interest -- or interested

1 groups. And a regular place of interest was Camden
2 Market. Not that it was anything extraordinary in
3 itself, but there was -- there was always -- you would
4 always find interesting groups there. You would find
5 leafletting going on. You would -- you would always
6 find something every week that you could perhaps latch
7 on to. And that's how I swung into the Camden VSC.
8 I -- I had never felt, dare I say, politically
9 comfortable with the Maoist thought strain anyway, and
10 the VSC crowd that I met there were much more relaxed
11 and open, shall I say, welcoming. That sounds rather
12 naive, doesn't it? I don't mean that. But they were
13 more embracing of others. And I was invited to go to
14 one or two of their meetings. That's how it started.
15 Having met at Camden Market.

16 Q. Was it difficult to get access to the Camden VSC?

17 A. Not at all.

18 Q. One of your reports talks about the left "groping in all
19 directions at that time for suitable subjects to tackle
20 with concerted enthusiasm". Does that ring a bell?

21 A. Yes. It sounds rather grandiose, but yes, there were
22 all sorts of moments of political opportunities being
23 exploited by whomsoever. And --

24 Q. Was this a time -- we're talking about 1969 -- of big
25 demonstrations, or had that time passed with the events

1 of 1968?

2 A. I think there was still a potential for big
3 demonstrations. The -- the -- the '68 experiences had
4 burst a bubble to some extent, because in terms of
5 handling demonstrations from then on, the police were
6 able to get a grip of things, and that in itself
7 quietened things down. But there was still -- there was
8 the potential for large demonstrations still to take
9 place.

10 Q. If things had quietened down but there was still
11 a concern about the potential for them to flare up
12 again, was there an element in your deployment of being
13 in place just in case?

14 A. That -- that was a management decision, so I couldn't
15 comment upon that. I remained in place. And that was
16 -- that was not how conversations went.

17 Q. I'd like to ask you about one of your specific reports
18 on an individual from this period. Could we have up,
19 please, <UCPI0000007706>.

20 This is a report dated 18 November 1969.
21 The subject is said to be the Camden VSC. And
22 the content of the report is about a female individual
23 who was involving herself to some considerable extent,
24 the report states, in the activities of the Camden VSC
25 and the Tufnell Park branch of the Women's Liberation

1 Front.

2 At paragraph 4 it states:

3 "Her description is as follows: aged about 23 years;
4 height 5'2"; long dark-brown hair; oval face, attractive
5 features; sometimes wears a fawn woolen dress, brown
6 knee length boots and a brown herring-bone patterned
7 overcoat."

8 Why did you use the phrase "attractive features"
9 when reporting on this individual?

10 A. I am unable to say. That would just be an
11 interpretation of -- of -- of mine, I would --
12 I would -- I -- I've no idea what -- if she had a wart
13 on the side of her ears, or something like that, I would
14 have commented upon that maybe. It was just she was
15 obviously a pretty woman, a young woman. I don't know,
16 sir. I can't comment beyond that. That was -- that's
17 a -- a full description of somebody that could be
18 identified maybe from that description.

19 Q. Put another way, much of what is written there is
20 objective about her height, her hair colour, the shape
21 of her face, but "attractive features" is a subjective
22 judgment about her. Was that sort of judgment
23 acceptable in Special Branch at the time?

24 A. Yes, I think it was.

25 Q. Thank you. Could we take that document down now,

1 please.

2 There's reference to a demonstration of the VSC's in
3 January 1970. I appreciate it's a very long time ago,
4 336, but can you recall whether you attended the VSC's
5 January 1970 demonstration?

6 A. No, sir, I can't remember. I'm sorry.

7 MR BARR: Sir, would that be a convenient time to break?

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly it would.

9 We'll have a quarter of an hour's break to enable
10 you to have a rest and the shorthand writers to have one
11 as well. We'll resume at half past.

12 MS PURSER: Thank you, everyone. We will now take
13 a 15-minute break until 11.30. You can please move to
14 your break-out rooms.

15 (11.15 am)

16 (A short break)

17 (11.30 am)

18 MS PURSER: Welcome back, everyone. I have a notification
19 for those of you who are at the hearing centre today.
20 There will be a fire alarm test at 1.15. So just to let
21 you know if you are at the hotel today, there will be
22 a fire alarm test at 1.15.

23 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
24 proceedings.

25 Chairman.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

2 Mr Barr.

3 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

4 336.

5 A. Sir.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 We were talking about the January 1970 VSC
8 demonstration. Could we pull up, please,
9 <UCPI0000005803>, please.

10 This report is stated to be a report of a meeting of
11 the Vietnam Solidarity Committee held at Conway Hall on
12 2 February 1970, and there was discussion at the meeting
13 about the demonstration the previous Sunday, 25 January
14 1970.

15 Could we go down, please, so we can see the bottom
16 of paragraph 6.

17 It says:

18 "The general feeling of the meeting seemed to
19 indicate a feeling of moderate success as far as
20 the turnout for the demonstration was concerned, but
21 there was considerable criticism of the fact that there
22 appeared to be little or no cohesion amongst those
23 taking part when the procession reached Downing Street.
24 It was suggested that it was at that time of indecision
25 and uncertainty (at Downing Street) that the police were

1 able to move in and split the demonstration and it was
2 decided that at the next similar event something ought
3 to be arranged to counteract police actions."

4 Does that ring any bells?

5 A. Not at all, I'm afraid.

6 Q. I see.

7 Could we go over the page, please, and look at
8 paragraph 9 of the same report, <UCPI0000005803/2>.

9 Paragraph 9 says:

10 "A call is to go out to all VSC supporters and
11 affiliated organisations throughout the country for
12 demonstration to take place at each meeting where
13 members of the Government and Shadow Cabinet are to
14 speak. This is an attempt to introduce 'British
15 complicity in Vietnam as an election issue'. [privacy]
16 said the first instance of this 'tactic' could be
17 illustrated by the planned Nottingham VSC demonstration
18 to take place on Friday 6th February 1970 in Nottingham
19 where the Prime Minister is to attend a Labour Party
20 banquet. [Privacy] expected about 50-100 demonstrators
21 to participate but there was no suggestion that there
22 would be any supporters from London."

23 Does the fact that the demonstrations referred to in
24 this paragraph were to take place in the context of
25 the then forthcoming general election cause any change

- 1 in the SDS's attitude to reporting?
- 2 A. I'm unable to assist, I'm afraid. I don't -- I don't
- 3 recall any -- any detail of this at all.
- 4 Q. But were you ever told to report differently, or to
- 5 avoid reporting on the participation of your target
- 6 groups in relation to electoral activity?
- 7 A. Not -- not at all.
- 8 Q. Would there still have been a policing concern about
- 9 demonstrations of the size indicated in this paragraph?
- 10 A. Yes, I would say so.
- 11 Q. Could we take that document down now, please.
- 12 In your file, there are a couple of reports about
- 13 the working committee of the Vietnam Solidarity
- 14 Campaign. Can you recall what the committee was?
- 15 A. Not at all, I'm afraid. I'm unable to assist. My -- my
- 16 memory doesn't allow me to go back to that point, or
- 17 that detail.
- 18 Q. Can you recall how you got on to the VSC's working
- 19 committee?
- 20 A. No. No, I can't.
- 21 Q. Can you recall any management reaction to the fact you
- 22 were on that committee?
- 23 A. No. I can't even remember being on the committee, I'm
- 24 sorry. It's -- seems to have slipped past me somehow.
- 25 Q. I see.

1 There is then a series of six reports dating from
2 March and April 1970 about what is described first as
3 the April 19th and later April 26th Ad Hoc Committee.
4 That appears to be a committee formed to organise
5 a demonstration that was originally going to be on
6 19 April 1970 and the date was then put back to
7 26 April 1970. Can you recall being a part of that
8 committee?

9 A. No, I can't.

10 Q. Can you recall anything at all about either the role you
11 played, or your managers' reaction to it?

12 A. I'm unable to assist in this regard totally.

13 Q. I'll move on then, please, and ask you about what you
14 learned of Conrad Dixon's participation in the Camden
15 branch of the VSC. You describe in your witness
16 statement that he had become a figure of fun, he was
17 remembered, and that he was remembered for wearing
18 a yachtsman's outfit. Can you help us: did they say
19 anything else about what he had done or how he had
20 behaved?

21 A. No, I think -- I think I referred to him as being
22 a figure of fun, and I think it was just his -- his
23 sheer physical presence. A big man with a big
24 sailor-type beard and a jaunty yachtsman's cap and
25 a smock. He had that sort of mariner's air about him,

1 and slightly out of place in Camden, dare I say. But
2 nonetheless, they -- they -- they -- no, they didn't
3 dwell upon him, but they laughed about him when they
4 talked -- one or two remembered him being just that:
5 a rather sort of large and brash figure of fun.

6 Q. You were involved with Camden VSC for a period of
7 approximately a year; is that right?

8 A. I -- I can't remember the -- the timing detail.

9 Q. How closely did you get to know the members of
10 Camden VSC whilst you were reporting on that group?

11 A. I wouldn't say I got very close to them at all. I --
12 I was -- they were, as -- I've described them right at
13 the outset as a rather sort of loose knit, very friendly
14 group of people, and -- and they -- they used to talk --
15 talk of me as -- as, "Oh, it's our Trot-mate", because
16 I think they had a sort of Communist Party leaning, and
17 I don't know that specifically, that was just my
18 impression, and the views that I would try to expound
19 clearly, in their views, were seen as Trotskyist, so
20 I was their "Trot-mate" as opposed to -- but I didn't
21 get close to any of them beyond the meetings and Camden
22 market outings, and the like.

23 Q. Did you socialise with them in public houses?

24 A. No, we might have a pint after the meeting downstairs,
25 but beyond that, no.

- 1 Q. You describe the Camden VSC as very much on
2 the mainstream end of the VSC. What did that mean in
3 practice?
- 4 A. Because they were -- as I say, they were -- they were
5 friendly and -- and had -- had wide ranging views. They
6 -- they were -- were easy to -- to -- I'm trying to
7 over -- not overdramatise this. The whole -- the whole
8 objective of the penetration of what was going on was --
9 was to provide your individual persona with credibility.
10 And -- and the membership of the VSC -- the Camden VSC
11 gave me an opportunity. And by that time I'd been
12 around a little while, and your face gets known at these
13 things; like you do when you go to a football match; if
14 you become an habitual supporter, people recognise you.
15 It was just that.
- 16 Q. There is some mention as well of the Kentish Town branch
17 of the VSC, how much did you have to do with them?
- 18 A. I can't remember very much detail of that at all now,
19 I'm afraid.
- 20 Q. Can you remember what the branch was like in comparison
21 to the Camden branch?
- 22 A. No, I'm afraid -- I'm afraid I can't. I think I was
23 probably looking to -- to move on to some other grouping
24 or something, and that -- I think I was maybe thinking
25 that they would provide an opportunity. But I didn't

- 1 develop any alliance there at all.
- 2 Q. Were any of the VSC members that you encountered
- 3 violent?
- 4 A. Not that I can recall, no.
- 5 Q. Did any of them participate in criminal activity?
- 6 A. Not that I'm aware of.
- 7 Q. And did the VSC members that you knew promote public
- 8 disorder at demonstrations?
- 9 A. I don't know about promotion. They were certainly ever
- 10 present at demonstrations. I can't -- I can't comment
- 11 upon how individuals within those groupings might react
- 12 as a demonstration would proceed or develop. But
- 13 I don't recall seeing -- seeing any violent behaviour
- 14 from those that I knew.
- 15 Q. Can you recall whether -- can you recall any of the VSC
- 16 members that you saw behaving in a disorderly way on
- 17 a VSC march?
- 18 A. No. No, no. I mean, beyond -- beyond using loudhailers
- 19 maybe, or shouting and protesting in that sense, no, not
- 20 at all.
- 21 Q. What did your managers think of the VSC at the time?
- 22 A. I couldn't tell you, sir. I don't know.
- 23 Q. Can we move now, please, to the British Campaign for
- 24 Peace in Vietnam?
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you report on them?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. You've described attending meetings in a private house

4 where one of the members lived.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Was there any formality required before you entered

7 a private house in the capacity of an undercover police

8 officer?

9 A. No formality, no.

10 Q. Did your managers know that you were doing that?

11 A. They would have seen from my subsequent reports that I'd

12 been to a -- a meeting in a private house.

13 Q. And what was their reaction, if any?

14 A. I don't recall there being a reaction.

15 Q. You describe in your witness statement having a couple

16 of drinks with a member called -- and we've redacted

17 the name for privacy --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- outside of the meetings?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Which you state gave you credibility.

22 You go on to say:

23 "I cannot remember how long I was involved with them

24 but would have been for six months at least. They were

25 in Kentish Town, their conversations centred around

1 protest and building up pedigree. They would whip up
2 anti-war fervour."

3 I'd like to ask you about the person you had drinks
4 with?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Was that person male or female?

7 A. Female.

8 Q. Can you help as to how often you had drinks with that
9 person?

10 A. Once.

11 Q. So when you refer later on in the following sentences
12 about being involved with them for about six months at
13 least, are you referring to the individual or not?

14 A. No, I'm not referring to the individual. As -- as
15 I recall, I was at one of these meetings, and it was at
16 her suggestion that we met for a drink. It was -- it
17 was a totally ordinary conversation that we had when we
18 were having a couple of drinks. There was never
19 anything beyond that ordinary conversation. It could
20 have been male or female. And -- but -- but we were
21 nodding acquaintances from then on. If -- if she had
22 any desire to develop a relationship or a friendship,
23 she didn't convey that and neither did I. So it -- it
24 didn't -- it didn't arise.

25 But as I say, we were nodding acquaintances, and --

1 and in -- in terms of me being accepted within
2 the group, the fact that I knew her and people knew we'd
3 been out for a drink maybe gave me a little credibility
4 in terms of acceptance.

5 Q. Was the BCPV violent?

6 A. No. It was -- it was a very Communist Party background,
7 and that wasn't their style.

8 Q. Does it follow that it was -- wasn't criminal or
9 disorderly either?

10 A. It follows.

11 Q. Can I move now, please, to the Stop the Seventy Tour.

12 You describe being introduced by a BCPV member to
13 the Stop the Seventy Tour. What was it that led you to
14 develop that lead?

15 A. There was an awful lot of passionate revulsion to
16 anti- -- the anti-apartheid situation in South Africa.
17 And the fact that the South African cricket team, and
18 I think then subsequently the rugby team, were to visit
19 the UK gave the protesters an opportunity to really vent
20 their objections. And so on that basis -- and there was
21 a -- a feeling -- and it wasn't something that was
22 promoted from management, it was certainly something
23 that I -- I felt was worth pursuing in terms of
24 potential public order difficulty.

25 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that you attended

1 meetings at Mill Hill, Lewisham and Barnet?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Why such a geographically diverse mix of branches?

4 A. There was no -- there was no specific reason. You went
5 the way the wind blew, if you like. Barnet and Mill
6 Hill are in the same sector of London, an extension of
7 that north west London sector.

8 Lewisham, I -- I can't recall how that got into
9 the orbit. It was strange to be out of the north or
10 north-west London loop in any terms. But as I say,
11 the passion that was being developed over
12 the anti-apartheid protest was -- was wider spread. And
13 I think maybe I just caught wind of a -- of a -- of
14 a meeting and grabbed an opportunity.

15 Q. You say that the potential for violence and public
16 disorder at demonstrations was huge in a context which
17 suggests you're talking about the STST.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Was that your opinion?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You say in your witness statement that they got up to
22 all sorts of well publicised antics; and you go on to
23 say digging up the pitch at Lords and pouring oil over
24 the wickets?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. We've not been able to find any press coverage of such
2 an event during the STST's campaign. Although there is
3 historic media coverage of such an event a few years
4 later, in the context of a protest about a man who was
5 alleged to be a bank robber. Is it possible that you
6 have -- that your recollection is confused on this
7 point?

8 A. I have no recollection of a bank robber being involved
9 in anything to do with the wicket.

10 In my memory, and as I say, it goes back an awfully
11 long way and has become blurred maybe in that process,
12 if it didn't happen then there were certainly serious
13 threats of it happening. You surprise me that you can
14 find no -- or have found no press comment in -- in that
15 regard. It's been long -- long held in my mind that
16 that was a situation that -- that either existed or had
17 been proposed.

18 Q. Can you help with what you might actually have seen
19 whilst you were infiltrating the STST. Did you see any
20 public disorder?

21 A. Yes, I did. At a rugby match at Twickenham. Very
22 violent scenes.

23 Q. Can you remember which match that was?

24 A. I'm sure it was England against South Africa. I can't
25 remember exactly.

1 Q. Can you remember when it was?

2 A. No, sir, I can't.

3 Q. Is this the match in which you say that there was an
4 instruction to attack the police?

5 A. There -- there -- yes, the -- the -- by -- if memory
6 serves -- and that's questionable -- the --
7 the instruction to STST protesters was that, on given
8 signals around the ground, the -- the police would be
9 attacked, attempts would be made to rush the pitch,
10 perhaps push players around and generally disrupt
11 the game. But the police were to be targeted in
12 anticipation that any riotous behaviour in one corner or
13 another corner and then subsequent corner would be
14 sufficient to perhaps cause a delay or postponement of
15 the game. That was always an objective.

16 Q. How were the police to be targeted?

17 A. Well, I -- I -- I don't have the -- I didn't have
18 the detail to hand, but there were groupings of
19 STS people -- and I don't remember how ticketing became
20 available. But anyway, access to the ground seemingly
21 had been obtained. And I can't remember how I -- I got
22 in, but -- at one given signal -- there were probably 30
23 or 40 STST supporters in the little corner that I was
24 in, set about trying to push -- push police around to
25 start with, and then one or two people started to throw

1 punches at policemen and the like. I found that
2 difficult.

3 Q. Who gave the instruction to attack the police?

4 A. Well, it was at the -- I don't know what the signal was.
5 I can't remember. But if it was -- I -- I don't know
6 what the -- I wouldn't even offer conjecture. But at
7 some given signal, the -- the disruption would begin.

8 Q. I'm more interested in who gave the signal rather than
9 --

10 A. I've no idea.

11 Q. -- what it was.

12 A. I've no idea. No idea.

13 Q. Can you remember whether anyone was arrested or removed
14 from the ground?

15 A. No, I can't. No. I --

16 Q. I don't think -- (overspeaking) --

17 A. Nothing -- (inaudible)

18 Q. Sorry, carry on.

19 A. No, I can't remember, I'm sorry.

20 Q. I don't think this was something you spoke about when
21 you were interviewed for the BBC's True Spies programme.
22 Is your witness statement the first time you've given an
23 account of these events?

24 A. I suppose so, yes. Yes.

25 Q. Can you recall whether it occurred before or after you

- 1 had ceased reporting on the Camden VSC?
- 2 A. No, the timing would -- would have passed me by, by now,
3 I'm afraid.
- 4 Q. Could I ask you now about Mike Ferguson and the STST.
5 In particular, do you know whether Mike Ferguson assumed
6 any positions of responsibility within the STST?
- 7 A. No, I don't know. My understanding was that he -- that
8 he had a good understanding of what was going on, and
9 that made it useful from the police point of view. But
10 beyond that, I have no idea what his role might have
11 been.
- 12 Q. Can I ask you the same question in relation to
13 Mike Ferguson and the Anti-Apartheid Movement?
- 14 A. I -- no, I don't -- I've no idea about his
15 Anti-Apartheid Movement involvement at all.
- 16 Q. You described in your witness statement Mike Ferguson as
17 being Peter Hain's right-hand man. If you were unaware
18 of him having an official position within the STST, what
19 did you mean by that?
- 20 A. I think just a jokey reference that if he was that well
21 placed, then he must have been Peter Hain's right-hand
22 man. But I had no knowledge of that being the case at
23 all.
- 24 Q. You've also --
- 25 A. -- (overspeaking) -- it was the case.

- 1 Q. You've also said that you did not see his position as
2 necessary for the job that you were required to do.
3 What did you mean by that?
- 4 A. That's -- that's just a very personable -- personal
5 reaction. I -- I don't think, in retrospect, I was
6 a particularly successful undercover officer. Some had
7 more capability than I did. And maybe I think I'm
8 interpreting -- interpreting that in that way, that
9 I would not have had the drive or the nous to be able
10 to do what some other officers were able to do,
11 seemingly.
- 12 Q. Did you think that becoming influential within a target
13 group was a good idea?
- 14 A. I -- I never saw it as part of my brief.
- 15 Q. Now, there are a number of reports on the STST in your
16 pack. In one of them you identify members of
17 the north-west London STST committee. What would that
18 information have been used for, as far as you are aware?
- 19 A. I -- I think at that -- at that stage it would have just
20 been useful to have known the people who were driving
21 the protest. But how that information might be utilised
22 by others, I've no idea.
- 23 Q. Were you ever a member of that committee?
- 24 A. No.
- 25 Q. You've reported on some forthcoming activities: pickets

1 and demonstrations. Do you know how that information
2 was used?

3 A. No. I presume that if there was any deemed benefit to
4 the police service deriving from that information, then
5 that would be forwarded to the appropriate point of
6 interest.

7 Q. You've reported at one stage on the identity of a lawyer
8 who was going to be approached for legal advice. Why
9 did you do that?

10 A. I just thought it was of -- of interest at the time. If
11 somebody was utilising his professional knowledge to
12 provide others with a way of avoiding arrest when
13 perhaps arrest would be appropriate, then -- then that
14 certainly would be of interest.

15 Q. Was there any prohibition on reporting on lawyers?

16 A. I don't remember -- no, there was no -- no prohibition,
17 as the word you used, no.

18 Q. Were there any restrictions on what you might report
19 about a lawyer or the legal advice that they gave?

20 A. It would just be a factual reporting of
21 the circumstances and the content of that presentation,
22 and it wouldn't be my place to add further comment.

23 Q. Do you know what was done with the information about
24 the lawyer that you reported?

25 A. I've no idea, no.

1 Q. One of the things you reported on was the inaugural
2 meeting of the North London branch of the STST. Was
3 reporting on the formation of a new branch of
4 the movement something that was welcomed by your
5 managers?

6 A. Yes, I think so, yes.

7 Q. Can we look now, please, at <MPS-0736257>. Thank you.

8 This is a report dated 29 April 1970. The subject
9 is the STST. Paragraph 2 reads:

10 "At a party organised by the NW London
11 Stop the Seventy Tour Committee held on Saturday
12 25 April 1970 at [privacy] [privacy] [privacy] an active
13 member of the Notting Hill Militants Association and
14 a frequent attender at extreme left-wing activities, was
15 overheard to say that an attempt is to be made to abduct
16 the South African Ambassador prior to the arrival of
17 the South African Cricket Team."

18 Paragraph 3 says:

19 "He went on to say that the observation had been
20 kept on the ambassador's address: [privacy] [privacy]
21 [privacy], and the time of his daily departure and
22 arrival and the nights he is likely to return late are
23 known by a member of his organisation who lives nearby."

24 If we can look now at paragraph 4, please.

25 Paragraph 4 said:

1 "[privacy] elaborated to the extent that even though
2 they might not succeed in abducting the Ambassador at
3 least an attempt would be made 'following the example of
4 the Guatemalan guerillas'. He added that the sole
5 reason for this action would be to achieve
6 the cancellation of the forthcoming Cricket Tour.
7 The Ambassador would only be released on a guarantee
8 being given that the tour would not take place, or would
9 be abandoned, if the abduction took place after
10 the arrival of the cricketers."

11 Paragraph 5 says:

12 "He was also overheard to say that it was known
13 amongst his associates that there were no security
14 guards attached to the Ambassador's household and that
15 no uniform or Special Branch had been assigned to HE's
16 personal protection."

17 Was this information that was of interest to your
18 managers?

19 A. I'm certain it was, yes.

20 Q. Can you recall whether they did anything with it?

21 A. I wouldn't know what they might do with any of
22 the information that was submitted.

23 Q. Do you know whether an attempt was made to abduct
24 the ambassador?

25 A. I -- I have no idea. I know that he had a residence in

1 Notting Hill and -- but beyond that, I have no idea at
2 all whether any activity took place that posed a threat.

3 Q. Could we take that document down, please, and could we
4 now have <UCPI 0000014418>.

5 This is a report dated 4 May 1970, subject STST.
6 It's a report on an individual. Paragraph 2 says that:

7 "[privacy] is the Secretary of the North West London
8 Committee of the Stop the Seventy Tour."

9 Paragraph 3 says:

10 "She is currently living with [privacy] at [privacy]
11 [privacy] and employed as a secretary at [privacy]."

12 Paragraph 4:

13 "She is a close friend of [privacy], Chairman of
14 the NW STST, but cannot be described as
15 being 'politically aware'. She is, in fact, a somewhat
16 immature, naive person and it would seem that she was
17 made Secretary of the group because of her clerical
18 experience."

19 Paragraph 5 relates to forthcoming employment as
20 a probation officer.

21 And could we scroll down to paragraph 6, please.

22 Paragraph 6 reads:

23 "Her description is as follows:-

24 "Aged about 23 years; height 5'0"; short fair hair;
25 slim build with well-developed bust; slightly Jewish

1 appearance; often wears dark rimmed spectacles and has
2 a slight cast in her left eye."

3 336, why did you describe this person as having
4 a "well developed bust"?

5 A. When I -- when I read descriptions like that, I see what
6 I would have viewed then to be a helpful build of
7 a picture for somebody to cast in their mind's eye and
8 understand the person I'm talking about and describing.
9 Nothing more sinister than -- than that. So I -- I was
10 trying to be as -- as descriptive as possible.

11 Q. Why would they need to develop a picture in their mind's
12 eye?

13 A. I -- I've no idea. This was -- this is just
14 a policeman's nouse, if you like, a policeman's
15 antennae, putting something together that may or may not
16 be useful. And -- and -- and that was -- and just that.
17 Obviously, in -- in the light of social pressures these
18 days, that's seen to be quite unnecessary. In those
19 terms, in -- 51 years ago, I think it was deemed to be
20 helpful.

21 Q. And why did you describe her as being of "slightly
22 Jewish appearance"?

23 A. Because that's how I would have seen her. That's how
24 I would have understood her appearance.

25 Q. That comment is a subjective judgment, isn't it?

1 A. I think that paragraph and things like that would always
2 be subjective.

3 Q. Well, something like "short, fair hair", or "height
4 5 feet" is an objective fact. "Slightly Jewish
5 experience" depends on a stereotype, doesn't it, of what
6 a Jewish person looks like?

7 A. Can I say, that's a modern-day interpretation and not
8 how it would have been viewed then.

9 Q. You've reported quite a lot of detail about this person:
10 her work, her home situation, her private life, her
11 degree of political sophistication. Why did you go into
12 so much detail?

13 A. I think I was just, dare I say, fortunate enough to
14 piece that to -- together. The more information make --
15 one makes available, then the more helpful it may or may
16 not be.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 Could we take that document down, please.

19 There's another document. We can go to it if
20 necessary, but you report that the north-west London
21 STST was organising a peaceful demonstration for Lords
22 in contrast to the south-east London STST's
23 demonstration smothering the Oval with posters.
24 Suggestions for the north-west London STST event
25 included a torchlight midnight procession, which seemed

1 to receive some favour.

2 What was the policing value in reporting an
3 intention to conduct an entirely peaceful demonstration?

4 A. I -- I, again, was not the analyst. My task was to
5 report facts as they were presented to me. And -- and
6 I -- I would still maintain that that -- to fail to do
7 that would be negligent in -- in -- in my view. How --
8 how it's subsequently utilised was never my role or
9 something that I needed to assess.

10 Q. Why, in your mind, would it have been negligent not to
11 have reported that information?

12 A. I think the -- because there was -- there's a potential.
13 For people to get out on the streets at midnight on a --
14 albeit a peaceful protest, it's still something that
15 the police should be aware of. And to -- to fail to be
16 aware of, or fail to attend just to -- to be assured
17 of -- of a peaceful demonstration, again, is part of
18 the policeman's protective role of society.

19 Q. What was your managers' view of the STST?

20 A. I think they were very concerned about the potential for
21 criminal damage and violence.

22 Q. How well did you get to know the participants in
23 the STST with whom you mixed?

24 A. Not very well at all. I drifted in and drifted out, as
25 I have done other organisations.

- 1 Q. Did you socialise with them?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. What brought your deployment with the STST to an end?
- 4 A. I can't remember. I can't remember. I think -- I think
- 5 maybe the experience I had at Twickenham in -- in
- 6 the rugby would have -- would have drawn -- drawn me
- 7 away from that organisation.
- 8 Q. You tell us that the final group that you infiltrated
- 9 was the International Marxist Group.
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And that you had an introduction from a member of
- 12 the Kentish Town VSC. Can you tell us any more about
- 13 how you came to get into the IMG?
- 14 A. No, I can't. I'm unable to assist there. Just it was
- 15 -- it was all part of these general rather drifting
- 16 conversations that you would have with people. And
- 17 somebody would say, "Oh, come along to our meeting" or,
- 18 "We meet here on a Friday night", or Sunday night or
- 19 whatever, "and you might find it interesting, and you've
- 20 got something interesting to say, Come and tell us what
- 21 you think about this or that." And so that move into
- 22 the IMG would have been along those lines.
- 23 Q. You say in your statement that one of the reasons that
- 24 you saw for infiltrating the IMG was that it took part
- 25 in every demonstration going. Was the IMG a violent

- 1 organisation?
- 2 A. I -- I don't know if it was a violent organisation. It
3 certainly was -- was much more vociferous in its
4 protests, mainly because of its organiser, and -- and
5 I think therefore the -- the potential to pick up
6 violence on the fringe was -- was always there to be
7 promoted in the organiser's view.
- 8 Q. And who are you referring to as the "organiser"?
- 9 A. Tariq Ali.
- 10 Q. Did you see anyone from the IMG committing criminal
11 offences to promote the IMG's cause?
- 12 A. I can't remember, no.
- 13 Q. Did you see --
- 14 A. I don't think --
- 15 Q. Did you see any IMG member behaving in a disorderly way
16 at a demonstration?
- 17 A. Not -- I can't be specific now, sir, it goes -- it goes
18 back too -- too far. There were much more busy at
19 demonstrations than other -- other groups.
- 20 Q. You do say in your witness statement that some of
21 the violence at demonstrations you thought was
22 spontaneous and centred on anarchists?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Did you make any attempt to infiltrate the anarchists?
- 25 A. None at all.

- 1 Q. If they were the ones who were precipitating
2 the violence in your estimation, why not?
- 3 A. Well, as I've said, they -- they were spontaneous.
4 I mean, I -- I can recall a visit of president Reagan,
5 I think, and to -- to London, and there were perhaps
6 a dozen or so cars set alight in the vicinity of
7 Claridge's, I think, where he was staying. And they
8 were -- they were really spontaneous moments by
9 harebrained bunches thinking that it was a great way to
10 extend the protest, and so -- so when there's -- that's
11 on spontaneity it's difficult to anticipate and
12 difficult to pass that information on early.
- 13 Q. I'm not sure that quite answers my question, which
14 was: why didn't you infiltrate the anarchists if they
15 were the source of the trouble?
- 16 A. I -- I don't know that it ever occurred to me that that
17 was a route that I might find useful. But some of them
18 were, as I say, harebrained and a little -- a little ex
19 -- over excited at these moments, and I didn't feel
20 drawn to that sort of grouping.
- 21 Q. Can we move now, please, to the True Spies programme.
22 You've explained that there had been some communication
23 between senior officers Pearce and Gun -- and is it
24 Mr Taylor who made the film?
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Can you help us with any further detail about
2 the circumstances in which Mr Taylor was assured of
3 assistance from Special Branch in the making of
4 the programme?

5 A. My understanding was/is that he had approached
6 Special Branch with a view to making this programme and
7 seeking sanction.

8 Q. And got it?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You told Taylor that one of the things you'd done whilst
11 infiltrating the IMG was to take an impression of
12 the IMG office keys; is that right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And Do you stand by that account?

15 A. I do. I do. It was -- it's rather more a comic story
16 than anything sinister. They -- for some peculiar
17 reason I remember I'd been to a -- a number of meetings
18 and the -- the office was always manned from 5.30 where
19 it was normally manned by somebody through the day, 5.30
20 to 8.30, in case there were phone calls or drop ins, or
21 whatever, and the person who would normally seemingly
22 cover that shift wasn't going to be available and those
23 at the -- one meeting said, "Well, is there anybody else
24 that would -- that can help us out"? So -- so
25 I apparently reluctantly offered my services, and --

1 which meant that I was -- would go there at 5.30, be
2 given the keys, and stay in the office until 8.30, then
3 lock up and pop the keys through a letterbox next door.
4 And having then realised that I would have the keys to
5 this -- these premises, I raised with my senior officer
6 the fact that I would have -- would have these keys and
7 would anyone -- anyone be interested. And the next
8 thing I knew, the next day, the opportunity to press
9 those keys was given, and beyond that -- and I rather
10 flippantly said, "Well, just in case somebody wants to
11 visit ...". But that's been rather serious -- more
12 seriously interpreted since then but it was never
13 intended as a serious quip and it was not something that
14 Special Branch would be interested in. Why would we be
15 interested in we already had its keys in our possession.
16 It's not something that we would need to do.

17 Q. But presumably taking an impression of the keys would be
18 for the purpose of gaining access to the building at
19 another time?

20 A. Maybe, yes. Yes. I raised the question and
21 the question was answered and so I did as I was
22 requested.

23 Q. Were your managers pleased with you for obtaining those
24 keys, or the impression of the keys?

25 A. I've no idea. It's not something that one -- one

1 sought. It was another facet of the activity.

2 Q. Do you know if any of your colleagues -- and please
3 don't name anybody when answering this -- do you know
4 whether any of your colleagues obtained keys to
5 the premises occupied by their target groups?

6 A. I've no idea.

7 Q. You've described your colleagues being -- some of your
8 colleagues being upset at your having participated in
9 that television programme.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. As far as you could tell you, what was it about your
12 participation that upset them?

13 A. I -- I'm -- I'm still at a loss to -- to understand
14 that. I've -- I've lost a whole bunch of good friends
15 from -- from that time, and I hasten to point out to
16 them that that which I spoke of had occurred something
17 like 37/38 years prior to that programme, and if it
18 related to some disclosure about SDS activity, then
19 the SDS had not moved on in any way from the rather
20 bumbling times when I'd been a junior -- early officer
21 in that and I've no idea what happened. When you leave
22 the SDS, you -- you, you know, you're constantly looking
23 forward, you don't look back and I didn't seek to find
24 out what was going on, nobody would ever tell you what
25 was going on beyond your involvement with it.

1 But it was -- it was disappointing that -- that
2 some -- some seemed to take such exception to rather
3 frivolous comments, and I thought they should have known
4 better and sought a fuller explanation from me rather
5 than rush -- rushing to judgment.

6 Q. To put it in very simplistic terms, did you think what
7 you were telling the BBC was an account of good things
8 or bad things?

9 A. I -- I have a view, and I'm not relating it to these
10 specific circumstances. I think -- I think we as
11 a society have an expectation that there will be people
12 guarding the edges of our civilisation to prevent an
13 over -- overrunning, if you like, and -- and
14 a disturbance of our political status quo, and so -- so
15 yeah, that's my rather innocent -- dare I say innocent
16 view of how things should be and I think other people
17 have an expectation that -- that our boundaries will be
18 guarded.

19 Q. Did you think that your colleagues were upset because
20 they were concerned you had compromised the operational
21 security of the SDS, or did they regard you as
22 a whistleblower?

23 A. I -- I don't -- I don't think they viewed me as
24 a whistleblower. I think it was just a -- a rather
25 shortsighted thing to have said on -- on my part, and

1 maybe they were right in that respect.

2 Q. Can I go back to the IMG, please, and how it was that

3 you came to leave the IMG. You've described a political

4 interrogation which made you uncomfortable.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you feel in any physical danger?

7 A. Not in physical danger, no.

8 Q. You've described that you decided at that point to bring

9 the deployment to an end and you describe drifting away

10 gradually after that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Why did you feel the need to make it a gradual

13 exfiltration?

14 A. When I say "gradual", it wasn't the next morning I --

15 I took my box and walked away, but then again it wasn't

16 a six-month departure, it was probably three or four

17 weeks of drifting in, "Hi, I'm off, I'm going to do this

18 or that" and then disappearing. So a gradual withdrawal

19 in that sense, but nothing -- nothing dramatic nor

20 lengthy.

21 Q. In terms of the length of SDS deployments at this time,

22 you've given the impression in your statement that

23 the duration of SDS deployments was for as long as

24 the undercover officer was considered by management to

25 be useful, subject, I suppose, to being compromised or

- 1 asking to leave. Is that fair?
- 2 A. I think it would always be a matter of the -- unless --
3 unless the individual officer proved to be incapable, or
4 -- or not -- not -- not able, then it would always be
5 a matter for the individual, and I had reached the end
6 of my time, I knew that. It was time to pull away.
- 7 Q. I'm going to now ask you about a few general topics
8 before I finish.
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. First of all, you've described the SDS as being able to
11 fill gaps in intelligence, being more focused. How --
12 how did you mean that it was more focused?
- 13 A. As I -- as I said earlier, I think the Metropolitan
14 Police and the Home Office and the Security Service
15 collectively had been em -- embarrassed by the failure
16 of the police service to be able to contain two very
17 considerable demonstrations in London that had caused
18 massive disruption, damage, damage to police officers,
19 police horses, and the creation of the SDS as a -- as
20 a means of reducing the impact of such damage was -- had
21 to be viewed as useful and necessary.
- 22 Q. You've said in your statement that you would report --
23 produce about two or three reports a week and that your
24 income increased as a result of the overtime payments
25 that you received. Were there also quiet periods during

- 1 your deployment?
- 2 A. I don't recall quiet periods. Once you launched into
3 it, there was always something bubbling and worth
4 pursuing, it sealed. So there were higher points maybe,
5 but no -- no quieter and low points.
- 6 Q. You've described attending the SDS flat daily.
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Did you see a good deal of your colleagues during your
9 time with the SDS?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And how well did you get to know them?
- 12 A. I -- I think very well. Very well. A very -- very
13 committed bunch of individuals and people whom I have
14 great admiration for.
- 15 Q. And were you there to help one another if you ran into
16 problems and wanted to talk to people about how to deal
17 with problems you were having in your deployment?
- 18 A. Yes, if that need ever arose, then -- then I had
19 the satisfaction of knowing that there was a shoulder to
20 lean upon --
- 21 Q. And did you -- sorry, carry on.
- 22 A. But I -- I never -- never felt it necessary to -- to
23 develop a shoulder rather than just a normal friendly
24 conversations with my colleagues.
- 25 Q. I don't want you to give me any details, but did

1 you know, in broad terms, basically what your colleagues
2 were doing in terms of who they were infiltrating?

3 A. To -- to be honest, no. I was -- I was working with --
4 at that time there were probably about seven or eight of
5 us, and if that many, I don't remember. But -- but
6 having a very broad brush overview of what -- what field
7 they might be in, it didn't seem ever appropriate to
8 pursue what they were doing within that field, and --
9 and neither did they deem it necessary to pursue me in
10 that regard.

11 Q. You've described reading literature as one of the things
12 that you did at the SDS flat. Is that literature that
13 you had obtained when attending group functions and
14 events, or was it material that was coming from
15 the police side for you to read, or both?

16 A. Nothing coming from the police side, it was all manner
17 of books and literature that was being filtered --
18 (inaudible) newspapers handed out at meetings and book
19 shops and Camden Market, for instance, thing -- things
20 like that, there was -- there was a whole raft of
21 material available and it was --

22 Q. You describe your bosses usually being round at about
23 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Does it follow from that
24 that you saw a good deal of them?

25 A. Yes, at the time I was involved, it seemed, yes, they

- 1 were not ever-present, but certainly often present.
- 2 Q. Did you feel they were there for you if you needed them?
- 3 A. Absolutely.
- 4 Q. And although you've been very clear to explain that you
- 5 made a lot of decisions as to how you went about your
- 6 job, would it be fair to say they were well aware of
- 7 what you were doing?
- 8 A. Absolutely.
- 9 Q. You've referred to a CID diary. Did you include details
- 10 of your undercover work in that diary?
- 11 A. No. It was a report of my daily activity, and from
- 12 the time I'd become a detective I'd submitted a daily --
- 13 a daily diary and it was never something that was
- 14 included in the content of that diary, it was -- you --
- 15 you are doing what you were doing, and I wrote my diary
- 16 up and passed it on to my supervisors, who audited it
- 17 and passed it back to me.
- 18 Q. So if you had attended an activist meeting, what would
- 19 your diary for that day look like?
- 20 A. It's so long ago, apart from the fact that saying that
- 21 I'd been to a meeting at so and so, it wouldn't be more
- 22 detailed than that.
- 23 Q. I appreciate this may not be an easy question, but do
- 24 you have any idea what happened to your diaries?
- 25 A. Absolutely none at all.

1 Q. You refer in your witness statement to the fact at that
2 a couple of pubs in Kilburn you thought there were
3 sometimes people there who were associated with the IRA.
4 Did you ever report on them whilst you were a member of
5 the SDS?

6 A. No.

7 Q. You've explained in your witness statement that you
8 think you were always conscious that you were a police
9 officer and it held you back from your undercover work.
10 You've touched upon that again today. Can you explain
11 what you mean by that?

12 A. It's -- it's something that was almost in-- in grained,
13 if you like, and perhaps some people have -- have more
14 -- more ability to -- to glide into another persona than
15 -- than I did. I'm not suggesting for one moment that
16 I was not useful, and that would be not for me to assess
17 anyway, but I think what I did was useful, but I think
18 others were more useful because of their ability. And
19 they're -- not suggesting that they were forgetting they
20 were police officers too, but 90% of me the whole time
21 was telling me that I -- that I was a Metropolitan
22 Police officer doing my very best to aid the police in
23 its contribution to society. That sound rather grand,
24 but that's -- in -- in the back of my mind, that's how
25 I viewed things.

1 Q. You've described carrying your warrant card with you
2 whilst on operations undercover. Was that something you
3 were supposed to have done?

4 A. I never received an instruction to the contrary. Again,
5 it was -- it was a policeman thing to do. It seemed
6 obvious not to carry it in your wallet where -- where it
7 could have been picked up by accident or otherwise. But
8 yes, I -- I don't recall ever not having it secreted
9 around me in some place or another.

10 Q. Can I move now to the industrial section of
11 Special Branch. You describe being aware of
12 the existence of the industrial section before you
13 joined the SDS knowing about the Economic League and
14 that the chief Superintendent of C Squad had joined
15 the Economic League after leaving Special Branch.

16 Is the industrial section the same as the industrial
17 desk, or are they two different things in?

18 A. They're -- they're the same -- same thing.
19 The industrial section was -- was nothing -- nothing
20 more than a small I small S group of guys working in one
21 particular office with a particular task, and ... yeah,
22 that was it.

23 Q. Did you have -- (overspeaking) --

24 A. (inaudible).

25 Q. I beg your pardon?

1 A. It was a mainstream activity.

2 Q. Did you have anything to do with the industrial section
3 before you joined the SDS?

4 A. No, I don't -- I don't remember being -- being
5 particularly busy anyway. No, I don't -- I didn't, no.

6 Q. If I've understood your evidence correctly, later on in
7 your career though you did work in the industrial
8 section covering engineering; is that right?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. And that you've described that there was great concern
11 about Russian backed infiltration into industry; is that
12 right?

13 A. Absolutely.

14 Q. Can you help us -- again, please don't name names -- did
15 any former SDS officers, to your knowledge, ever join
16 the Economic League or any other similar organisation?

17 A. I've no idea, no. The reason why I mentioned my former
18 chief Superintendent, when I -- when I joined
19 Special Branch, we went through a series of induction
20 lectures, and I remember being quite alarmed by
21 the man's assessment of the infiltration of the --
22 the British political movement, particularly the trade
23 union movement, by the Russians at that time, and he was
24 -- he was -- he strongly held the view that within ten
25 years of that particular time Great Britain would be

1 under the -- his terms -- the yolk of communism, and
2 I -- I was amazed that he should see that. It was
3 something that rather stuck -- stuck with me. And then
4 he did subsequently go to work, and I don't know for how
5 long or in what capacity, with the Economic League, but
6 beyond that I've no idea.

7 Q. When you were working on the industrial section, was any
8 information flowing from the industrial section to
9 the Economic League or any or similar organisation?

10 A. No. No, no, that wasn't how -- no. I mean, I don't
11 even recall what -- it would be -- it would be naive of
12 me to say that I was not aware of the Economic League
13 any more than I was aware of other people that were
14 swimming in that same pool, if -- if you like. There
15 was -- no. It wasn't -- it didn't work like that.
16 People -- people would come to -- to us. Many -- there
17 were many people in the British trade union movement at
18 that time who were not tainted by the -- by communism
19 or -- or the -- but -- but the communists held huge sway
20 in large elements of the British trade union movement
21 and there were people within the British trade union
22 movement who were concerned about that, and -- and you
23 would be contacted by them often, passing on detail
24 about activity and potential activity and potential
25 election rigging, as was seemingly commonplace in those

1 days.

2 Q. In doing your work for the industrial section, did you
3 have access to Special Branch records?

4 A. Yes, I did, as did every other Special Branch officer.

5 Q. And so, if the SDS had reported upon the trade union
6 membership or activities of someone who was also active
7 in one of the SDS's target groups, would it follow that
8 that reporting might have been available to you on
9 the industrial section if you had been looking up
10 the name of someone who had been reported to you by one
11 of the concerned trade unionists that you have just
12 referred to?

13 A. There -- there would be no overlap between the --
14 whatever was held within the SDS would -- would remain
15 there. I can't conceive of any situation where SDS
16 information intelligence would leak into the normal pool
17 of Special Branch records activity.

18 Q. Do you know anything about the filing system or is that
19 something we should ask others about?

20 A. I -- I know they had a filing system but beyond how
21 the workings of it, there must be others who are able to
22 respond to that.

23 Q. Can I come now to the Security Service, please. You've
24 described knowing that the reports that you saw were
25 copied to MI5. How did you know that?

1 A. Because -- I don't know about the SDS time. I don't
2 know what happened to my reports from the time that
3 I offered a manuscript report. But in -- in normal
4 Special Branch activity, my reports would be submitted
5 to a supervising officer who would read it, determine
6 how it should be disseminated and very often within that
7 dissemination would be a minute to copy it to
8 the Security Service.

9 Q. So would it be fair to say that your knowledge that SDS
10 reporting would have been disseminated to
11 the Security Service comes from your wider understanding
12 of how Special Branch operated?

13 A. It's -- it's reasonable to assume that much of
14 the reports that I did submit through my time with
15 the SDS would have gone to the Security Service, but
16 I have no idea, I would have had no knowledge of -- of
17 the process of -- or progress of that report, or
18 the direction of it.

19 Q. You have described speaking to someone from MI5 once in
20 a pub?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. About the impact of protests in your field?

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Do you know whether any of your colleagues did the same?
25 Please don't name them if the answer is yes.

1 A. That was a totally chance meeting. It wasn't -- it
2 wasn't by design. I had not met the chap previously,
3 nor did I meet him subsequently. It just so happened
4 that I literally bumped into him whilst he was in
5 conversation with a Special Branch officer, and in
6 the process of that rather brief conversation I was
7 asked a question about the likely possible impact --

8 Q. Could I just stop you there. Please don't go into any
9 details.

10 A. Okay.

11 Q. My question was: do you know whether any of your
12 colleagues did the same?

13 A. I've no idea. I -- no.

14 Q. Do you know whether MI5 were pleased with whatever it
15 was that you provided them with?

16 A. On that instance you mean? In that instance?

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. I've absolutely no idea. I can't imagine that
19 the conversation that we had would have been in any way
20 an eyebrow raiser.

21 Q. Can you -- it's a different topic now. Involvement of
22 SDS officers in criminal prosecutions.

23 Can you recall whether any of your colleagues were
24 involved in prosecuting people as a result of their work
25 for the SDS?

1 A. No.

2 Q. No you can't remember, or no it didn't happen?

3 A. No, it didn't happen, in my recollection.

4 Q. Again, I don't want you to identify anybody in answer to
5 my next question, which is about informants. Was
6 the SDS as a unit using informants other than undercover
7 police officers whilst you were serving with the unit?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Welfare. You've described your undercover service as
10 a stressful experience and a huge sense of relief when
11 it was over. Do you think you were properly supported
12 from a welfare point of view?

13 A. Yes, I do. I -- I -- perhaps if I -- stress --
14 "Stressful" is a dramatic word. It was -- it was -- if
15 I was feeling stress, it was because I felt it needed
16 concentration and it needed commitment, but that didn't
17 mean to say I was incapable of shouldering that
18 commitment, but it was -- it was a relief to me when it
19 stopped. It was like butting your head against a brick
20 wall. It was great when it stopped.

21 Q. Dummy files. Can you help us with what a dummy file is?

22 A. No, sorry.

23 Q. SDS reunions. Have you attended any SDS reunions?

24 A. I -- I went to one. I can't remember when or where that
25 was --

1 Q. Were sexual relationships with activists mentioned at
2 that reunion?

3 A. No. No. This is something that is -- is quite
4 abhorrent to me, I'm afraid, so no.

5 Q. When did you first learn about them?

6 A. I learned through the press, amazingly. But then I've
7 retired from the police service some long time ago, and
8 these things -- I -- I don't want to dwell upon it, sir.
9 It's something that is so alien to my understanding of
10 what we were there to do that I -- I'm afraid I don't
11 find myself in sympathy with any of these situations at
12 all.

13 Q. 336, you've been very patient. I expect you'll be
14 pleased to hear that that was the last of my questions,
15 but if you will stay there, I understand, sir, that
16 there may be some applications under rule 10?

17 THE CHAIRMAN: So do I.

18 Ms Brander, I think you have an application.

19 MS BRANDER: Yes, thank you, sir. It's really just for
20 permission to ask a couple of questions in relation to
21 this officer's evidence about having had a couple of
22 drinks with a member of the Kentish Town branch of
23 the VSC. This wasn't something that I fully had an
24 opportunity to submit questions in relation to in
25 advance. I did submit questions in relation to it, but

1 of course because of the redaction, it's not clear on
2 the face of the witness statement whether it was a man
3 or a women.

4 Having now learned that it was a woman and in light
5 of HN336's account that it was in order to bolster his
6 credibility, I would just ask for permission to be able
7 to ask just a couple of questions in relation to that.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think, in fact, when the unredacted
9 documents were disclosed to relevant non-state parties,
10 the name of the individual would have been in it, but
11 these oversights are easily made.

12 MS BRANDER: I see. Thank you, sir. I wasn't privy to
13 the unredacted version, so thank you.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, you may.

15 MS BRANDER: Thank you, sir.

16 HN336, you'll recall in your evidence just now you
17 were asked by Mr Barr about an occasion when you had
18 a couple of drinks with a member of the Kentish Town
19 VSC. You'll have heard just now I've said that in
20 the version of your witness statement that I have,
21 the name's redacted, and I don't want you to say
22 the name, but is it right that you remember the name of
23 the person?

24 A. Yes, I do. I do.

25 Q. And how is it that you remember that name after all this

- 1 time?
- 2 A. I've no idea. I can remember an awful lot of things.
- 3 Life -- life has many signposts and that name for some
- 4 reason is on one of them, as I -- and it's -- it's
- 5 lasted. But I've no idea why. I have no relationship
- 6 with that lady beyond a couple of drinks.
- 7 Q. And a couple of drinks, you said, outside of
- 8 the meetings. So was this outside of the meetings on
- 9 a couple of occasions?
- 10 A. It was only on one occasion. If -- if -- yeah, memory
- 11 -- yeah, no, I didn't have any meetings beyond the one.
- 12 Q. And you said it gave you credibility. Was that
- 13 a recognised tactic within the SDS, that having drinks
- 14 with a member of the opposite sex would give you a way
- 15 in with -- with credibility?
- 16 A. I was approached by this lady to have a drink, it wasn't
- 17 something that I was seeking, and how others would
- 18 react, I've no idea. It's -- it wasn't something that
- 19 I saw as a prerequisite on my part to progress my
- 20 credibility. But at the same time, it was -- it was
- 21 a -- it was just a drink, literally.
- 22 Q. Was it something that was ever discussed within the unit
- 23 as a good way of building credibility?
- 24 A. Not at all.
- 25 Q. And --

1 A. Not at all. Techniques were not something that we
2 discussed within the unit.

3 Q. Did you -- you never discussed techniques within
4 the unit?

5 A. Certainly not to the point of developing relationships
6 with women, no.

7 Q. Did you report to your managers that you went for
8 the drink?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Would it be included in your report at all?

11 A. I -- no, I doubt it, no. I might have included it in my
12 daily CID diary, but beyond that, no. There was --
13 there was -- I hate to say this, there was nothing
14 sinister in that meeting at all, and to have progressed
15 it beyond just a meeting to have a drink would -- would
16 be placing it at a different place all together.

17 Q. I see. So it wasn't ever something that you discussed
18 with your colleagues?

19 A. No.

20 MS BRANDER: Okay.

21 Thank you, sir. That's all I wanted to ask.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: (inaudible) I believe you have an application
23 under rule 10 as well?

24 NEW SPEAKER: I'm just be places with Ms Brander. We have
25 had some evidence today in relation to events at

1 Twickenham which goes a little beyond material that
2 we've had before and I would ask if I can ask some
3 follow-up questions in relation to those matters.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: You're right, it does. You may.

5 NEW SPEAKER: I'm very grateful.

6 HN336, can I take it you can hear me?

7 A. I can, thank you.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 You said in your evidence today that it was as
10 a result of your experiencing at Twickenham that led you
11 to leave your infiltration of the STST; is that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Now, if I could have, please, shown on the screen
14 document <MPS-0736268>.

15 MR GREENALL: As his speaker name.

16 We can see here that the date of that document is
17 22 April 1970, and that is a report submitted by you.
18 If we scroll down to the bottom we can see that it has
19 your details at the bottom.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. If we move back up again to the top we can see it
22 reports about the inaugural meeting of the north London
23 Stop the Seventy Tour being held on Friday,
24 17 April 1970. So you would sketch that certainly in
25 April 1970 you are still seeking to gather information

1 about the Stop the Seventy Tour?

2 A. Yes. Well, if I was at what meeting, yes, yes, correct.

3 Q. Well, the Twickenham matches, they all took place in
4 December of 1969, so in light of the fact that in April
5 of '70 you are still seeking to infiltrate new groups of
6 the Stop the Seventy Tour, would you accept that
7 the Twickenham matches did not in fact lead you to leave
8 the Stop the Seventy Tour?

9 A. I -- I do see the point you're making. I still would
10 contend that my attendance at that meeting was part of
11 my brief to glean what information I could. I didn't --
12 wasn't able to make a hard and fast ruling that I would
13 not ever entertain the idea of going to an STST meeting
14 again. I was just horrified at the amount of violence
15 people were prepared to use against policeman and it --
16 it turned a corner for me in terms of my projected or
17 you know protected -- projected involvement with that
18 organisation. The fact that you can show me something
19 that happened four or five months later doesn't preclude
20 me from extending the brief that I was to report
21 whatever I could whenever I could without getting
22 involved in the way that I had been at Twickenham.

23 Q. And in relation to matters at Twickenham, you said that
24 your first written record made of that was in your
25 witness statement that was made in May of last year; is

- 1 that correct?
- 2 A. Yes, yes.
- 3 Q. So presumably that explains why we don't have any record
4 from the records of the SDS about events at Twickenham;
5 is that correct?
- 6 A. I -- I don't know why the events at Twickenham are not
7 more thoroughly recorded.
- 8 Q. You accept that the events of Twickenham would have been
9 the sort of thing that the SDS would have been
10 interested to know about, yeah?
- 11 A. Well, I thought we did know, because certainly
12 the police would have -- would have known, they would
13 have received the same sort of information I was in
14 possession of prior to the game taking place, that
15 outbreaks of violence would be attempted at given
16 signals at various points around the ground, and if
17 I was party to that, it was not something that I would
18 sit upon, I would have passed that on. But whether
19 I picked that up or whether I --
- 20 Q. -- (overspeaking) --. (inaudible) you yourself didn't
21 make any written record of events at Twickenham?
- 22 A. No.
- 23 MR GREENALL: Thank you. I have no further questions.
- 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
- 25 Mr Sanders, do you have any questions arising out of

1 what -- the evidence that's been given today?

2 MR SANDERS: No questions. Thank you, sir.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

4 Would you bear with me, please, while I ask a couple
5 of questions of my own.

6 If I put to you an event which did occur and was
7 widely reported, could I ask you just to reflect
8 a moment.

9 On 19 July 1975, the cricket pitch at Headingley was
10 dug up by the free George Davis campaign, a man who was
11 serving I think 20 years for a serious offence at the
12 time and some people thought that he was wrongly
13 convicted. Does that ring a bell?

14 A. I remembered the George Davis incident, sir. I don't
15 remember the cricket pitch at Headingley being involved,
16 but -- but I remember the George Davis bank robbery
17 interest.

18 Q. None of us have been able to find any instance on which
19 the cricket pitch was dug up at Lords, as you've said,
20 and if that had happened, one would have expected it to
21 have appeared in the newspapers.

22 A. Indeed.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Is it possible you're muddling up the two
24 incidents?

25 A. I don't think I'm muddling up. I think, in retrospect,

1 when it's been pointed out by you, sir, and by Mr Barr,
2 that it hadn't appeared in the newspapers, it -- I'm
3 confused therefore in my mind that something had
4 occurred at a meeting prior to the -- the tour taking
5 place that -- that would have indicated that they were
6 the -- they were the intentions of the demonstrators,
7 and -- and clearly I'm mistaken and I accept that.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: These mistakes are very easy to make after
9 the distance in time that you're being asked to
10 remember.

11 A. Thank you.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: One final topic, if I may.

13 A. Sir.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: You did infiltrate and take the keys or an
15 impression of the keys of the IMG offices.

16 A. Yes.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you remember whether you were
18 infiltrating the IMG at the same time as you were
19 reporting on the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign?

20 A. I couldn't pass I don't know the timing now, so I --
21 I don't think so. The IMG incident was really quite at
22 the closing of my SDS involvement, so I can't
23 necessarily see an overlap with the STST. That --
24 the incident involving that meeting was -- was my last
25 commitment, if you like, to a meeting with the -- for

