

Monday, 16 November 2020

(10.00 am)

MS PURSER: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the fourth day of evidential hearings in Tranche 1, Phase 1 at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Jacqueline Purser and I'm the hearings manager.

As a reminder to those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone unless you are invited to speak by the Chairman. I will now hand over to our Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Good morning. Would you please listen to a recording made earlier this year which is played at the beginning of each session. Those of you hearing it for the first time, please listen carefully:

"I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute, the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have made a number of orders which affect what you may and may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter and may have serious consequences for you.

"If I am satisfied that a person may have breached

1 an order, I have the power to certify the matter to
2 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
3 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
4 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
5 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
6 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
7 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
8 sequestration of their assets.

9 "Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
10 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
11 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
12 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
13 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
14 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any
15 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
16 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
17 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing
18 room to any other person, but only once at least ten
19 minutes have elapsed since the event which you are
20 describing took place.

21 "This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
22 the Inquiry I have made orders permitting the public
23 disclosure of information, for example about
24 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
25 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,

1 whether by accident or design, information which I have
2 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
3 be disclosed in a hearing. If and when that happens,
4 I will immediately suspend the hearing and make an order
5 prohibiting further disclosure of the information
6 outside the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that
7 no further disclosure of that information may be made by
8 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device
9 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside
10 it.

11 "I am sorry if you find this message alarming; it is
12 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
13 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
14 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
15 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
16 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
17 evidence as I will hear, and to reach your own
18 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
19 best to ensure that you can. If you have any doubt
20 about the terms of this message, or what you may or may
21 not do, you should not hesitate to ask one of them and,
22 with my help if necessary, they will provide you with
23 the answer."

24 Could witness HN336 now be identified and sworn or
25 may he affirm, please.

1 HN336

2 MS PURSER: Good morning, HN336. Can you see and hear me?

3 A. I can, thank you.

4 MS PURSER: I understand that you would like to swear on

5 the Bible?

6 A. I will. I would.

7 (Witness sworn)

8 MS PURSER: Thank you very much.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: HN336, we can see that there is another

10 person in the room beside you -- I hope keeping

11 the required distance under COVID regulations. Could

12 the camera please be moved so that he may be seen.

13 LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Sir, I'm going to leave the room, if

14 that's ...

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, that's absolutely fine.

16 LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: I'm grateful.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: You're going to leave the room now?

18 LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Yes.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you confirm, please, there's no one else

20 in the room with you.

21 A. I can confirm that, sir, yes.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Then would you answer questions,

23 please, from Counsel to the Inquiry, Mr Barr.

24 A. Thank you.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

1 Questions by MR BARR

2 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

3 336, you have provided a witness statement to
4 the Inquiry which is dated 9 May 2019. Are you familiar
5 with its contents?

6 A. Yes, I think so.

7 Q. And are the contents of your witness statement true and
8 correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?

9 A. Yes, they are.

10 Q. You used the cover name "Dick Epps" when you were
11 serving in the SDS; is that correct?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. Before we turn to the SDS, I'd like to ask you a few
14 questions about your prior police service.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. First of all, when you were undergoing your basic police
17 training, were you given any training about requirements
18 before entering private dwellings?

19 A. I'm sure -- I'm sure we were. I mean, I'm going back
20 51 -- no, I'm going back further than that, aren't I?
21 But, yes, the use of search warrants and the like would
22 have been necessary, obviously. And it would -- there
23 were no circumstances that would normally allow a police
24 officer into a private dwelling without permission or
25 a warrant.

1 Q. And when you were training for Special Branch, did you
2 have any training on attending meetings of political
3 activists?

4 A. Not specific training, no.

5 Q. In your work for Special Branch -- and I don't need you
6 to be specific about what work. But in your work with
7 Special Branch, did you attend meetings of political
8 activists before joining the SDS?

9 A. Yes, I did.

10 Q. And did you therefore learn on the job what was expected
11 of you by Special Branch when attending such meetings?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And did that include the way in which Special Branch
14 reports of such meetings should be written up?

15 A. Yes, that was a fundamental requirement, yes.

16 Q. Were you expected to record the personal details of
17 people you could identify as attending such meetings?

18 A. Where it was possible to identify people, then those
19 details would be included in the report. Probably only
20 a name, but nonetheless, if it was known, then that
21 would be included.

22 Q. In what circumstances would you report specifically
23 about an individual?

24 A. I think their -- their -- attendance -- just their
25 attendance at the -- at the meeting was as far as

- 1 the inclusion would be required.
- 2 Q. Were there circumstances in which you would make
3 a separate report about an individual?
- 4 A. There might well be, but I can't -- I can't recall
5 circumstances where may -- where that became necessary.
- 6 Q. Were there circumstances in which you would report
7 identifying features of an individual?
- 8 A. It's -- it's possible if -- if somebody was -- was,
9 I don't know, becoming a focus of attention in a meeting
10 and was unknown to me as the Special Branch reporting
11 officer, then it's possible that -- it would entirely
12 depend upon the -- the -- dare I say, the tenor of
13 the meeting and the -- and the contribution of
14 the individual.
- 15 Q. Was there any guidance or any convention about how you
16 would describe or identify a person who you decided
17 needed to be the subject of a specific report?
- 18 A. There seemed to be accepted phrase -- phraseology. Part
19 of the induction, dare I say, of a Special Branch
20 officer would be his ability to -- to create and write
21 reports, and if it became necessary -- necessary to
22 extend -- expand upon that, then -- then there would be
23 -- that would be included. I can't -- I can't think of
24 anything specific, I'm afraid, no. I can't be very
25 helpful on that point.

- 1 Q. Were you expected to report on future plans and events
2 of the groups whose meetings you were attending?
- 3 A. That's -- I would say would be a fundamental requirement
4 of any reporting of a meeting, because part of our
5 function, part of our raison d'etre, if you like, was to
6 attend matters of public order.
- 7 Q. And would you report on the group's activities, its
8 discussions and its interests?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. Is there anything else that I might have missed that you
11 would be on the lookout for when attending a meeting of
12 political activists?
- 13 A. I think part of a policeman's basic kit bag is his
14 attention to -- to what's around him and his awareness.
15 So -- so anything that you might consider relevant or --
16 or useful should be included.
- 17 Q. Was there anything that you were instructed not to
18 include in your reports?
- 19 A. I -- I can't -- I can't recall anything particularly,
20 no.
- 21 Q. Was there anything that by convention you would not
22 include in reports?
- 23 A. I can't -- I can't recall anything. I have to -- you
24 will be well aware, I'm sure, that 51 years ago, as it
25 was, or more when I joined Special Branch, 1964,

1 the social times were different and social pressures
2 were different, political highlights were different, and
3 the phrase "political correctness", if you like, entered
4 into conversations much later. So -- so, as I say, it
5 would just be a policeman's awareness and observation
6 that would be the important factors.

7 Q. In terms of who was the arbiter of what went into
8 a report and what stayed out of a report, were you
9 the arbiter, in practice, of what you did and did not
10 report?

11 A. As the one attending a meeting or a function, yes, that
12 would -- that would be -- yes, I can't see that anybody
13 else could -- could determine what should or should not
14 go in if -- if they weren't in attendance in the first
15 place.

16 Q. And was the view that you should include all details and
17 leave it to others to analyse the content of your
18 reports?

19 A. Yes, that would be accurate, yes. I wasn't -- by no
20 means an analyst, and that was not my function.

21 Q. Were there any conventions about the style and tone to
22 be adopted in Special Branch reports?

23 A. As I mentioned a little earlier, an induction into
24 Special Branch, you went through various hoops to -- to
25 determine or learn how the style was to be created. And

1 we all, I think, as new officers within Special Branch,
2 wore a groove from our typewriters to our supervising
3 officers' desks as we went back and forth with our
4 reports being altered and changed and tweaked to conform
5 with the style that was expected at that time.

6 Q. By the time you joined the SDS, you had a few years
7 under your belt. Had you reached the stage where you
8 knew what was expected of you?

9 A. Yes, I think so.

10 Q. And by that stage, were you getting much feedback from
11 your superiors about the content of your reports?

12 A. Well, I think there was always an ongoing curiosity
13 about the content, but not necessarily the style of
14 presentation.

15 Q. Were you given any training or explanation about
16 the definition of "extremism" when you were in
17 Special Branch?

18 A. I -- I don't think so.

19 Q. Were you given any explanation, training or instruction
20 in what "subversion" meant?

21 A. No, I don't recall any specific training. I think --
22 I think I had a -- an understanding of what "subversion"
23 might be, and -- and had I had a different view to the
24 -- the general consensus, that would have been pointed
25 out to me, and I'm not aware of any -- any contrary

1 thoughts in that respect.

2 Q. What was your understanding of "subversion"?

3 A. It's very difficult to be precise now all these years
4 later, but my -- my feeling was, and is, that we are --
5 we existed within a very sophisticated political system
6 that's evolved over many years, and there is a -- an
7 order to the way that system might be changed. As
8 a parliamentary democracy, it's through the ballot box.
9 And there were and are those that seek to disturb that
10 balance of matters and -- and subvert that system by --
11 by other means. And so that would be, in the broadest
12 terms, my understanding of "subversion".

13 Q. And what was your understanding of Special Branch's role
14 in dealing with subversion?

15 A. I don't know that I had a specific view of
16 Special Branch's role as my -- my job as
17 a Special Branch officer was to assist the service
18 generally in the -- in the understanding of the policing
19 of the streets of London and the UK and -- and
20 the protection of society. That sounds very grand and
21 very bland, maybe, but I still adhere very passionately
22 to the -- the thought that protection of life and
23 property and the protection and wellbeing of our society
24 is key to the success of our society.

25 Q. Was it your understanding that information gathered by

- 1 Special Branch was used not just for public order
2 purposes but also to counter subversion?
- 3 A. I suppose so, yes.
- 4 Q. In your witness statement you've drawn a distinction
5 between what you describe as a "genuine peaceful
6 protest" and one which is, in your words, "divisive or
7 venomous". Is that a personal distinction or an
8 official distinction?
- 9 A. That's a personal distinction.
- 10 Q. And what did you mean by that?
- 11 A. Again, using a policeman's antennae, dare I say, to
12 interpret circumstances and facts that are going to
13 cause serious problems, or problems beyond -- beyond
14 a normal -- I accept that everyone has the right to
15 protest, and I have never doubted that. It's -- it's
16 a matter of how those protests are put into practice and
17 what spins from them.
- 18 Q. What sort of problems do you have in mind?
- 19 A. Outbreaks of -- of riotous public disorder and -- for --
20 for one.
- 21 Q. Did you glean from your work with Special Branch before
22 joining the SDS which groups were of interest to
23 Special Branch?
- 24 A. I don't think I gleaned any -- any more than any other
25 officer would have done, depending upon the type of work

1 that we were pursuing. There are groups that seem to
2 attract interest and -- and others not so.

3 Q. Put another way, did the groups you came to infiltrate
4 whilst serving with the SDS accord with your
5 understanding of the sort of groups Special Branch was
6 interested in?

7 A. I think prior to joining the SDS, I did not have
8 a narrow view of whether that group -- that group or
9 whatever group should be pursued or be of interest, it
10 only -- it only developed as I became a field officer in
11 the SDS that I began to fully understand some of
12 the influences that were being brought to bear.

13 Q. Did Special Branch target groups or individuals or both?

14 A. I don't think they did either. I don't think they --
15 they targeted individuals any more than they targeted
16 groups. I think they just had a broad brush overview,
17 and that was always the endeavour. That's my
18 understanding.

19 Q. You give some evidence in your witness statement about
20 attending a violent demonstration at Grosvenor Square.
21 At one point in your statement you describe it as having
22 taken place in the late 60s, but you also refer to
23 the Cuban missile crisis?

24 A. Yes, that was --

25 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

- 1 A. -- mid-to early 60s.
- 2 Q. Which was in the early 60s.
- 3 A. Yeah.
- 4 Q. Can you help us with when the violent demonstration that
5 you are referring to at -- in your witness statement --
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 Q. -- when was it? Which demonstration was it, please?
- 8 A. I wasn't a Special Branch officer at that time, I was
9 a uniform officer. And I remember the -- the day
10 very -- very clearly. It was the day that Mr Khrushchev
11 was challenged by President Kennedy regarding the Cuban
12 missiles that were being transported across
13 the Atlantic. And there seemed to be a thought abroad
14 that was really frightening to a lot of people that
15 World War Three was about to break out. And as a result
16 of that, being a uniformed officer working in that
17 particular area of London, I was sent up with about 10
18 or 12 other officers to Grosvenor Square to the --
19 protect the embassy -- the American Embassy.
- 20 Q. I'm going to move now to joining the SDS.
- 21 When you joined the SDS, were you told to keep your
22 work and the fact of the unit's existence secret?
- 23 A. I don't remember being told specifically. I think that
24 was implicit in the whole operation, yes.
- 25 Q. Did you -- was your implicit understanding that

- 1 the existence of the unit should be kept secret from
2 the rest of Special Branch or not?
- 3 A. It was -- it was -- it was in its very early days. And
4 my memory tells me that people within Special Branch
5 knew of the existence of this group, but it was
6 something that people would know nothing of. Nor was it
7 something that you might pursue as an -- an inquiry. It
8 wasn't relevant to you as an individual. You moved on
9 and didn't ask questions.
- 10 Q. And was it your understanding that the unit's existence
11 would be kept secret from wider police circles?
- 12 A. Well, again, I think that's -- that's implicit, but I --
13 I wasn't party to -- to those decisions, yes.
- 14 Q. You talk in your witness statement about being inducted
15 into the SDS and being shown to the cover flat by
16 Conrad Dixon.
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Can you help us, please, with what that induction
19 involved?
- 20 A. "Induction" sounds rather a grand word in those
21 circumstances, but it was part of my introduction to
22 the SDS. And after having spent a -- I don't know how
23 long -- not very long, two or three days maybe in
24 Scotland Yard, within the office of the SDS, I was then
25 taken to this other place by Conrad Dixon.

1 Q. And how did you get to understand what it was that was
2 required of you as an SDS undercover police officer?

3 A. I think, just -- just conversation with -- with
4 officers. I was never sat down in a classroom and -- or
5 a training room and given a training manual, or a --
6 training lectures, it was all part of a -- a verbal
7 introduction and overview.

8 Q. To what extent did you learn on the job?

9 A. Well, to a very large extent, I have to say.

10 Q. And to what extent were you assisted by your immediate
11 colleagues in understanding what was required of you?

12 A. They were very supportive. We were all -- all, if you
13 like, being thrown into a maelstrom, and seeking to find
14 some sense of what we were trying to do to -- to try and
15 find some benefit to the police service through what we
16 were trying to do. We -- we would never sit together
17 and discuss specific activity that I or they might have
18 been involved with. That never seemed to be -- nor
19 was it encouraged to be part of our conversation. So it
20 was all in very general supportive terms and tones
21 rather than specific detail.

22 Q. Were you given any briefings about the groups that you
23 infiltrated?

24 A. No, but then I wasn't targeted into any groups either,
25 so -- so the training was on the job, in that

- 1 sense --- (overspeaking) --
- 2 Q. Were you given any guidance about whether or not to
3 assume positions of responsibility when operating as an
4 SDS undercover police officer?
- 5 A. I -- I -- I don't -- I'm sorry to be unhelpful on that
6 point. I can't remember any specific instruction; but,
7 then, I was quite determined from the outset that that
8 was never part of my role. I was never there to be a --
9 a driving point, or a pivot, or an agent provocateur, or
10 anything similar. My role was to gather intelligence
11 that affected public order. And I -- I held that point
12 close then, and I still do in my mind remember that
13 being my task.
- 14 Q. At least in the early months of your service with
15 the SDS, the unit was led by Chief Inspector Conrad
16 Dixon. Can you tell us a little bit more about
17 the style with which he ran the unit?
- 18 A. I know it was -- well, I think it was a creation of
19 Conrad's. He was an intelligent man, a very bright man,
20 very brash, very -- he was a big man, physically and
21 personally. And -- yeah. So he was a driving force in
22 -- in -- throughout, the time he was with us, yes.
- 23 Q. You've described him in your statement at one point as
24 a "brash chancer". What did you mean by that?
- 25 A. I don't mean to be unfair in my assessment of the guy,

1 because he was a -- as I say, a very intelligent man who
2 clearly had a strong understanding of what the brief
3 was. But he -- he personally, to me, would always come
4 across as a -- as a gambler. And I don't mean that in
5 a -- well, a chancer. He would -- he was brash. That's
6 -- that's my understanding, my reading of him.

7 Q. I'd like to move now to
8 the Britain-Vietnam Solidarity Front?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Was that the first group that you infiltrated?

11 A. Yeah -- yes, that was the Maoist group that met in
12 King's Cross Road, I think. Yeah, that was -- that was
13 the first group that I -- very -- looking back, it was
14 very difficult to make headway when you're -- you're
15 learning on the job, as I've said, and you have no
16 specific brief, you -- you know that's something you
17 have to do, and how you do it is a matter of how your
18 personality allows you to do it, so to speak.

19 And that was -- that was a group that seemed to be
20 a useful entrée, inasmuch as although it was Maoist --
21 very much a Maoist-orientated group, it was a group that
22 embraced other views, on those meetings anyway, and
23 always -- always sufficiently largely attended, 25/30
24 people, maybe, to make it something that you could drift
25 into rather anonymously, rather than just a few people

1 where the finger might be pointed at -- at you as an
2 individual.

3 Q. Is there anything else you can tell us about how it came
4 to be that that was your first target.

5 A. Now, you're casting around for a likely vehicle to give
6 you an opportunity to move in and move on. And as
7 I said, because it was slightly broad in its base,
8 although it was very Maoist-orientated and -- and led,
9 it gave you an opportunity to -- to use those antennae
10 that I've mentioned earlier about, you know, policeman's
11 nowse to -- to read situations and read -- read people.
12 Excuse me.

13 Q. And how did you do it? How did you come to infiltrate
14 that group?

15 A. I think "infiltration" sounds rather too strong a --
16 a word. I attended the meetings and I was interested
17 from a professional point of view in terms of learning
18 what their viewpoints were, and also trying to glean
19 anything from that that might take me elsewhere in time.
20 I did not intend to stay in that particular grouping.
21 But nonetheless it was an -- a useful introduction for
22 me to -- to -- as I say, the political nuances,
23 the political factions and -- and the particular view of
24 the Maoists.

25 Q. You describe gradually working your way onto the scene

1 in your witness statement. How long did it take you to
2 become established in that group?

3 A. I don't think I was ever established within that group.
4 I wasn't established within that group; I can say that
5 quite firmly.

6 Q. And so when you use the phrase "gradually worked
7 [your] way onto the scene", what did you mean by that?

8 A. I think you just became an accepted part of
9 the furniture on a Sunday evening. You, along with
10 others would -- would pop -- would pop along.

11 Q. When you were attending the meetings of the BVSF and
12 reporting on them, what sort of dialogue were you having
13 with SDS managers about what you were doing?

14 A. I -- I can't recall too many conversations about that.
15 I think there was an acceptance that -- that you -- you
16 would -- would find your way, you would find your level
17 and so you weren't -- you weren't being whipped into
18 a corner to do this or that, you weren't being directed
19 to pursue this line, that line. And so -- so
20 conversations would always be very general, and would be
21 rather more leaning towards creating a wider
22 understanding of me as an individual, of the task I was
23 seeking, rather than specifics.

24 Q. And what was that task that was being sought from you?

25 A. I was quite clear then, as I said, and I have ever --

1 forever been clear since, that my task, eventually,
2 ultimately, was to determine what was going to be of
3 benefit to the Metropolitan Police Service in terms of
4 public order or individuals who -- who might be seeking
5 to disrupt whatever: the -- the -- the status quo, or --
6 or the political scene.

7 Q. On the question of individuals, you refer to some in
8 your witness statement. First of all, can we take
9 Tariq Ali. Is he the sort of individual that you have
10 just referred to?

11 A. Yes, yes. Around that time -- and I can't be specific
12 about that time -- there -- there was a huge amount,
13 within London anyway and probably elsewhere around
14 the UK, a huge amount of student unrest. And it all
15 seemed to, in London, to be centred around the London
16 School of Economics. And there was -- there were almost
17 daily, maybe more than one or two daily meetings of this
18 group, that group to -- to discuss this political point,
19 the outcome of that activity or whatever. And Tariq Ali
20 was very much part of that scene.

21 He seemed, dare I say, he seemed to enjoy the --
22 the spotlight that that gave him. And he would --
23 again, my own interpretation -- relish the opportunity
24 of sitting in a corner with 50/60 students around him
25 expounding his political beliefs and -- and "political

- 1 opportunism" is a couple of words that spring to mind.
- 2 Q. How frequently did you come across him?
- 3 A. At that time, seemingly every -- every day. But he's
- 4 not a man that I ever sat down and talked to. And
- 5 subsequently, as you know, I was involved with a -- with
- 6 a group that he was very much involved with. And even
- 7 then I didn't get involved with him.
- 8 Q. Was he someone that you had been asked to keep an eye
- 9 on?
- 10 A. Not at all. Not at all.
- 11 Q. Would you report about his activities if you came upon
- 12 him?
- 13 A. If I felt it was relevant to report upon him, then
- 14 I would, yes.
- 15 Q. Were you given any briefing about Tariq Ali before you
- 16 deployed?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. Can we move now to Abhimanya Manchanda.
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Was he another of the prominent individuals that you
- 21 were referring to earlier?
- 22 A. Yeah, very much so. At that time, at the London School
- 23 of Economics, yes, certainly. He was a very able public
- 24 speaker, perhaps not in quite the passionate tones that
- 25 Tariq Ali would be able to generate, but nonetheless, he

1 was seeking to expand and expound the -- the Maoist
2 viewpoint.

3 Q. And so, were you given any briefing or guidance about
4 him by your managers or anyone else?

5 A. Not at all.

6 Q. But would you report upon him because he was a prominent
7 Maoist activist?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did you come across Ernest Tate?

10 A. I've never -- I don't know the man. Never -- never met
11 him.

12 Q. Most of your reporting on the BVSF is in the form of
13 joint reports with the officer we know as HN135. And we
14 can use this officer's real name. It was Mike Ferguson.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you operate together or independently when you were
17 undercover?

18 A. Totally independently.

19 Q. So, how do it come to be that you were both at many of
20 the same meetings and there are many reports which bear
21 both of your names?

22 A. I was, dare I say, a new boy seeking my way in, and
23 the -- the meetings that the BVSF were holding offered
24 an opportunity to -- to sit in and learn a trade, learn
25 a skill that I was going to find useful, I thought,

1 later. There was no collusion with my colleague, either
2 before the meeting, after the meeting, just a nodding
3 fact that we were there. He -- he had developed
4 a little core of friends, it seemed, within that group.
5 And it would be quite wrong for me to endeavour to swing
6 in to -- to involve myself with that.

7 Q. Did the fact that he was already reporting on the group
8 and attending its meetings influence your choice of
9 the BVSF as your first port of call?

10 A. No, no. It would -- it -- no. The fact that he was
11 there already was -- was chance, and it wasn't -- was
12 not -- was not influencing me at all.

13 Q. Who wrote up the reports on the meetings which you both
14 attended?

15 A. Well, I -- I can't remember the detail. If it was on
16 a Sunday evening, it would be written up on the Monday
17 morning. And if -- if I was in and had the opportunity,
18 I would write it, I suppose. And maybe my colleague
19 would -- would write it up separately. I would not
20 endeavour to say, "It's okay, I've done that, there's no
21 need to cover it." That would be a matter for his
22 judgment. Or similarly, my judgment.

23 Q. I'm getting the impression that you would both look --
24 you would both be involved in the production of
25 the report; is that fair?

1 A. We would not sit down together and compile a report, no.
2 That's not my memory of things like that at all.

3 Q. So could you help clarify then, what would have
4 happened?

5 A. I'm struggling, obviously, to make -- make sense of --
6 of why two reports might be in -- or why we would be
7 included. I can't -- I can't answer the question, sir.
8 I -- there was no collusion, as I -- as I recall, and
9 I can't set out a reason why I would do it or he would
10 do it. There was -- as I say, if he was not there on
11 a Monday morning, I would submit my report and it would
12 be -- picked up and dealt with. But similarly, his
13 report would be submitted and dealt with. But --

14 Q. It's not a question of collusion, 336, it's a question
15 of whether the reports are the product of both of your
16 recollections, or whether both of you separately put in
17 -- put in some material which somebody else then
18 collated and typed up -- (overspeaking) --

19 A. -- (overspeaking) -- I wouldn't know what was going into
20 his reports.

21 And again, you know, those -- those reports were
22 quite subjective, just using your policeman's antennae
23 again to include what you felt was relevant, or might be
24 deemed useful.

25 Q. Many of the Maoist meetings that bear your name on

- 1 the reports along with HN135's are marked as being
2 private meetings. Are these meetings that you could
3 have attended without using the undercover tactic?
- 4 A. No, I -- that's -- I don't know quite what's meant by
5 a "private meeting". It was a public meeting, if you
6 like, in a room above a pub. And so it wasn't within
7 four walls and entry was limited. So I'm not quite sure
8 what "private" -- how "private" relates to that.
- 9 Q. Well, put another way, if you had attended in your
10 ordinary Special Branch capacity to report on those
11 meetings, do you think you would have been able to gain
12 entry?
- 13 A. I doubt it.
- 14 Q. Why is that?
- 15 A. Because a Special Branch officer attending a normal
16 meeting would rather stand out. I think the fact that
17 your face was known made it possible to sort of glide in
18 and slide into the grouping, rather than -- than stand
19 out as a total stranger. There was always a sensitivity
20 about strange faces.
- 21 Q. Your reporting includes information about forthcoming
22 marches, demonstrations and protests. Did that fall
23 squarely within what you thought you should be
24 reporting?
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And there's at least one instance of you giving an
2 estimate of how many BVSF supporters and allied Maoists
3 would attend a march and how you were expecting them to
4 behave. You describe that you thought they were going
5 to be "vociferous", but that there was no suggestion of
6 "militant action". Was intelligence about numbers and
7 demeanour, again, the sort of thing that you thought
8 would be significant for policing purposes?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You also reported on the BVSF's intention to embark upon
11 a recruitment drive. Why would that have been of
12 interest to Special Branch?

13 A. Because -- because the -- one of the underlying gospels,
14 for want of a better word, that Abhimanya Manchanda
15 would be promoting would be revolution. And so
16 the thought of -- or the prospect of further people
17 joining that group and revolution being one of their
18 targets would be of interest.

19 Q. There are some specific reports on individuals. Why did
20 you put in specific reports about individuals who were
21 supporting the BVSF?

22 A. If an opportunity arose to identify a new face, then
23 I would -- I would report that.

24 Q. Did the person have to be an obviously committed member
25 of the group, or did you report any new face?

1 A. Where I was -- where I was able to, any new face.

2 Q. Do you know whether or not information on individuals
3 that you were reporting would have been used for vetting
4 purposes?

5 A. I have absolutely no idea where the information might go
6 beyond the submission of my report.

7 Q. In places, you report about the relative power of
8 different groups. So for example, there's a report
9 about the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation
10 conference, and the relative influences of the BVSF and
11 other groups at that conference. Why was the relative
12 influence of these different groups of interest to
13 Special Branch?

14 A. I think the make-up of any -- of any potential protest
15 would -- would need to be examined, because if you went
16 back to the demonstrations that were taking place prior
17 to my becoming an SDS officer, the Met Police and
18 the Home Office, dare I say, and the Security Service
19 were woefully underprepared for the impact of those
20 demonstrations. So there was a big catch-up going on
21 to -- to derive as much intelligence that was going to
22 restore order on the streets. That's not to prevent
23 public protest, but to prevent violent protest. So that
24 was always a consideration when it came to assessing
25 these groups.

1 Q. And how would your assessments of these groups, or your
2 intelligence about these groups help with that?

3 A. Because you began to understand more and more
4 the individuals and the influences the individuals would
5 bring to bear on various groups. Some -- it was
6 a hotbed at that time of -- of street activity. And
7 some of it was -- was very -- very reasonable in its
8 protest, but some of it was really, really violent;
9 directed not just at policemen, although they seemed to
10 be an endless target, but property as well. And so --
11 so there was a need to protect, if you like, as I say,
12 in -- in the wider sense, if that makes sense.

13 Q. A slightly different topic now: what the unit was
14 called. I've been referring to it as the "SDS". In
15 the papers in your bundle there are references to it
16 being called "the Demo Squad", "the Demonstration Squad"
17 and "the Special Ops Squad". Can you help as to what
18 you and your colleagues called the unit?

19 A. None of those phrases mean anything to me. I'm not --
20 I don't remember any of those labellings being utilised.
21 I think we -- we -- if -- I think "the Hs" was a word or
22 a phrase that was used.

23 Q. "The Hs"?

24 A. "The Hs".

25 Q. And what was that a reference to?

1 A. "The Hairies".

2 Q. And do you know what your managers referred to the unit
3 as?

4 A. I've no idea, sir.

5 Q. Back to your reporting on the BVSF. Amongst
6 the forthcoming marches that you reported on was one in
7 support of Palestinians and another in support of equal
8 rights for women. Was it the cause, or was it the BVSF,
9 or was it both that were of interest to you and
10 Special Branch?

11 A. It was the BVSF; it wasn't the cause in either of those
12 cases.

13 Q. Could you explain further, please.

14 A. As I said earlier, there were elements within Maoist
15 groupings that wished to -- to resort to -- to
16 revolutionary tactics in -- that would involve violence.
17 And so if -- if that group was involved, then there was
18 an -- then we should be aware.

19 Q. There is a report in your bundle about the April 1969
20 BVSF open conference, and there is a minute sheet as
21 well. I'd like to show you the minute sheet. Could we
22 have up, please, {MPS-0736445}, please.

23 That document reads:

24 "Chief Superintendent Cunningham to see, please.

25 "This important conference has been very thoroughly

1 covered by DS HN135 and DC HN336, who have identified 42
2 of the 50 persons present. Credit must also go to
3 DS Creamer who briefed and de-briefed these officers and
4 provided the essential ideological interpretation."

5 And then the document is to be copied, amongst other
6 people, to the Security Service, the Superintendent of
7 B Squad, C Squad, E Squad and a circulating copy was
8 going to do the rounds.

9 Is this minute sheet referring, as far as you can
10 tell, to your report on that Maoist conference?

11 A. I'm totally un -- unaware. I can't -- I can't possibly
12 tell you. It's -- it's -- it's very possible, but I --
13 I would not know. Once -- once a report had been
14 submitted, I would not know its journey or its routing.

15 Q. Was identifying as many people as possible at
16 the conference one of your objectives?

17 A. I would say so, yes.

18 Q. And did Detective Sergeant Creamer brief and debrief you
19 about -- in relation to this conference?

20 A. It's something that I'm -- I'm afraid, 51 years later,
21 I'm unable to recall.

22 Q. Does it sound like the sort of thing that he would have
23 done?

24 A. Again, I -- I couldn't -- I couldn't possibly say. I'm
25 not trying to be evasive, I can assure you, but I --

1 I don't know. I don't recall seeing Sergeant Creamer --
2 I knew Sergeant Creamer, but I don't recall seeing him
3 when I was deployed, so I can't remember any
4 circumstances where we would have met in those -- in
5 those terms.

6 Q. From your knowledge of Sergeant Creamer, did he have
7 a good understanding of the ideological positions of
8 the various groups the SDS was involved with?

9 A. Well, he was an experienced Special Branch officer.
10 I couldn't comment beyond that.

11 Q. I'd like now to go to the report itself, to pick up on
12 something you said earlier about the BVSF. So could we
13 take this document down, please, and could we have up
14 {MPS-0736446}.

15 This is the first page of the report, and you can
16 see that it's a report on the Britain-Vietnam Solidarity
17 Front's open conference in April 1969. From the second
18 paragraph you can see that it was attended by some 50
19 persons, who were almost exclusively Maoist; and a list
20 of those identified is said to be attached at appendix
21 A.

22 Could we go over the page, please, {MPS-0736446/2}
23 and could you focus in on the bottom half of the page.

24 I'm going to read from that large middle paragraph
25 from about two-thirds of the way down, where it says --

1 and it's talking about a talk by Manchanda:

2 "Considerable ruthlessness would be required of
3 the proletariat before it could achieve power. 'Before
4 coming to power, the proletariat and other revolutionary
5 people should adhere to the principle of making
6 revolution by violence, smashing the old state machine
7 and seizing political power by armed force.'"

8 And then there's a reference to the full paper that
9 Abhimanya Manchanda had delivered, which is appendix
10 B to the report.

11 Can you recall Manchanda saying that?

12 A. I can't remember the words in there. No I can't.

13 Q. Is it in keeping with the sorts of things that you heard
14 him say?

15 A. Indeed, yes. What you -- you're reading there is -- is
16 him -- him expounding the -- the true political thought
17 tract, which emanate from Chairman Mao, as you can see
18 in the report itself. So he was a devoted follower of
19 the Chairman Mao thought and the Little Red Book.

20 Q. The report goes on to read:

21 "Manchanda did not appear to hold out any immediate
22 prospects of this uncomfortable eventuality taking place
23 in England, but invited members of BVSF to view
24 the world situation, especially events in Asia, Africa,
25 and Latin America, as part of a massive anti-imperialist

1 movement inspired by Chairman Mao."

2 Is it right that the BVSF did not see any immediate
3 prospect for revolution in England?

4 A. Well, that's what he's saying there, but there's an
5 expression, isn't there: mighty oaks from little acorns
6 grow. And that would always be the thought, I'm sure,
7 in Manchanda's mind, and others, that if you can push
8 against the door long enough, hard enough, you might get
9 a little opening, or you might finally push it wide
10 open. So -- so, yeah, the process in -- in this country
11 is such that -- that it -- immediate prospects would not
12 be likely.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 Could we take the document down, please.

15 From what you saw of the BVSF and its members,
16 was it a violent organisation?

17 A. No, not compared with other groupings at that time, no.
18 The content of that group were not in themselves
19 violently disposed, I don't think.

20 Q. Did you ever see any BVSF members involved in violence?

21 A. I -- I don't remember, no.

22 Q. Did the BVSF urge its members to commit criminal acts?

23 A. Those -- those meetings that I've talked of, no. No, it
24 would be -- it would be in a -- in a quieter huddle,
25 I would expect, those sort of discussions to take place.

- 1 Q. Do you know of any BVSF member that you saw committing
2 a criminal act?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. Was the BVSF involved in fomenting public disorder?
- 5 A. That would be my interpretation, yes.
- 6 Q. Could you explain that answer.
- 7 A. Just going back to Manchanda's point about making
8 revolution, particularly in his time that I would have
9 heard him on stage, away from those meetings on
10 a Sunday, where the audience might interpret it as being
11 more volatile, he had a capacity to -- to make those
12 sort of urgings, for want of a stronger word.
- 13 Q. I would like to explore with you what the boundaries of
14 those urgings were. Was he promoting the commencement
15 of public disorder by BVSF members, or was he urging
16 BVSF members to fight back if there was any violence
17 from the police side at a demonstration?
- 18 A. No, the former rather than the latter. I -- I don't
19 think that he was making urgings to fight back, he was
20 promoting rather than fighting back.
- 21 Q. What was your managers' view of the BVSF?
- 22 A. I don't know, sir. I'm not able to comment.
- 23 Q. Did you get any feedback from them about your reporting
24 on the BVSF?
- 25 A. I -- I don't remember. I'm afraid that when it comes to

1 these details, the -- it's so far back I can't remember
2 any of the meeting details, I'm afraid.

3 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that your next
4 target group was the Camden VSC. Can you help us with
5 how you came to cease reporting on the BVSF and to
6 commence reporting on Camden VSC?

7 A. I got -- I got to a point within the BVSF where I felt
8 uneasy. There was -- there was never a finger-pointing
9 exercise, there was never a moment where any accusations
10 of any kind were made, but -- but my experience at that
11 time with Manchanda was that he, for some reason, had
12 had a view of me that didn't coincide with his. And so
13 I just -- I just read it as the time to move on.
14 I didn't -- I saw no point in remaining in a -- an
15 atmosphere or a situation where I might find myself
16 embarrassed or accused of -- of being something, who
17 knows what. But I -- I -- it was time to move on. That
18 was -- that was the -- the moment for me. And so -- so,
19 having established a little credibility amongst the --
20 or a little more understanding, dare I say, not
21 credibility. But it was time to find pastures new.

22 Q. And so how did it come to be the Camden branch of
23 the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign?

24 A. The whole -- the whole of north and north-west London
25 seemed to be the focus of interest -- or interested

1 groups. And a regular place of interest was Camden
2 Market. Not that it was anything extraordinary in
3 itself, but there was -- there was always -- you would
4 always find interesting groups there. You would find
5 leafletting going on. You would -- you would always
6 find something every week that you could perhaps latch
7 on to. And that's how I swung into the Camden VSC.
8 I -- I had never felt, dare I say, politically
9 comfortable with the Maoist thought strain anyway, and
10 the VSC crowd that I met there were much more relaxed
11 and open, shall I say, welcoming. That sounds rather
12 naive, doesn't it? I don't mean that. But they were
13 more embracing of others. And I was invited to go to
14 one or two of their meetings. That's how it started.
15 Having met at Camden Market.

16 Q. Was it difficult to get access to the Camden VSC?

17 A. Not at all.

18 Q. One of your reports talks about the left "groping in all
19 directions at that time for suitable subjects to tackle
20 with concerted enthusiasm". Does that ring a bell?

21 A. Yes. It sounds rather grandiose, but yes, there were
22 all sorts of moments of political opportunities being
23 exploited by whomsoever. And --

24 Q. Was this a time -- we're talking about 1969 -- of big
25 demonstrations, or had that time passed with the events

1 of 1968?

2 A. I think there was still a potential for big
3 demonstrations. The -- the -- the '68 experiences had
4 burst a bubble to some extent, because in terms of
5 handling demonstrations from then on, the police were
6 able to get a grip of things, and that in itself
7 quietened things down. But there was still -- there was
8 the potential for large demonstrations still to take
9 place.

10 Q. If things had quietened down but there was still
11 a concern about the potential for them to flare up
12 again, was there an element in your deployment of being
13 in place just in case?

14 A. That -- that was a management decision, so I couldn't
15 comment upon that. I remained in place. And that was
16 -- that was not how conversations went.

17 Q. I'd like to ask you about one of your specific reports
18 on an individual from this period. Could we have up,
19 please, {UCPI0000007706}.

20 This is a report dated 18 November 1969.
21 The subject is said to be the Camden VSC. And
22 the content of the report is about a female individual
23 who was involving herself to some considerable extent,
24 the report states, in the activities of the Camden VSC
25 and the Tufnell Park branch of the Women's Liberation

1 Front.

2 At paragraph 4 it states:

3 "Her description is as follows: aged about 23 years;
4 height 5'2"; long dark-brown hair; oval face, attractive
5 features; sometimes wears a fawn woolen dress, brown
6 knee length boots and a brown herring-bone patterned
7 overcoat."

8 Why did you use the phrase "attractive features"
9 when reporting on this individual?

10 A. I am unable to say. That would just be an
11 interpretation of -- of -- of mine, I would --
12 I would -- I -- I've no idea what -- if she had a wart
13 on the side of her ears, or something like that, I would
14 have commented upon that maybe. It was just she was
15 obviously a pretty woman, a young woman. I don't know,
16 sir. I can't comment beyond that. That was -- that's
17 a -- a full description of somebody that could be
18 identified maybe from that description.

19 Q. Put another way, much of what is written there is
20 objective about her height, her hair colour, the shape
21 of her face, but "attractive features" is a subjective
22 judgment about her. Was that sort of judgment
23 acceptable in Special Branch at the time?

24 A. Yes, I think it was.

25 Q. Thank you. Could we take that document down now,

1 please.

2 There's reference to a demonstration of the VSC's in
3 January 1970. I appreciate it's a very long time ago,
4 336, but can you recall whether you attended the VSC's
5 January 1970 demonstration?

6 A. No, sir, I can't remember. I'm sorry.

7 MR BARR: Sir, would that be a convenient time to break?

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly it would.

9 We'll have a quarter of an hour's break to enable
10 you to have a rest and the shorthand writers to have one
11 as well. We'll resume at half past.

12 MS PURSER: Thank you, everyone. We will now take
13 a 15-minute break until 11.30. You can please move to
14 your break-out rooms.

15 (11.15 am)

16 (A short break)

17 (11.30 am)

18 MS PURSER: Welcome back, everyone. I have a notification
19 for those of you who are at the hearing centre today.
20 There will be a fire alarm test at 1.15. So just to let
21 you know if you are at the hotel today, there will be
22 a fire alarm test at 1.15.

23 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
24 proceedings.

25 Chairman.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

2 Mr Barr.

3 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

4 336.

5 A. Sir.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 We were talking about the January 1970 VSC
8 demonstration. Could we pull up, please,
9 {UCPI0000005803}, please.

10 This report is stated to be a report of a meeting of
11 the Vietnam Solidarity Committee held at Conway Hall on
12 2 February 1970, and there was discussion at the meeting
13 about the demonstration the previous Sunday, 25 January
14 1970.

15 Could we go down, please, so we can see the bottom
16 of paragraph 6.

17 It says:

18 "The general feeling of the meeting seemed to
19 indicate a feeling of moderate success as far as
20 the turnout for the demonstration was concerned, but
21 there was considerable criticism of the fact that there
22 appeared to be little or no cohesion amongst those
23 taking part when the procession reached Downing Street.
24 It was suggested that it was at that time of indecision
25 and uncertainty (at Downing Street) that the police were

1 able to move in and split the demonstration and it was
2 decided that at the next similar event something ought
3 to be arranged to counteract police actions."

4 Does that ring any bells?

5 A. Not at all, I'm afraid.

6 Q. I see.

7 Could we go over the page, please, and look at
8 paragraph 9 of the same report, {UCPI0000005803/2}.

9 Paragraph 9 says:

10 "A call is to go out to all VSC supporters and
11 affiliated organisations throughout the country for
12 demonstration to take place at each meeting where
13 members of the Government and Shadow Cabinet are to
14 speak. This is an attempt to introduce 'British
15 complicity in Vietnam as an election issue'. [privacy]
16 said the first instance of this 'tactic' could be
17 illustrated by the planned Nottingham VSC demonstration
18 to take place on Friday 6th February 1970 in Nottingham
19 where the Prime Minister is to attend a Labour Party
20 banquet. [Privacy] expected about 50-100 demonstrators
21 to participate but there was no suggestion that there
22 would be any supporters from London."

23 Does the fact that the demonstrations referred to in
24 this paragraph were to take place in the context of
25 the then forthcoming general election cause any change

- 1 in the SDS's attitude to reporting?
- 2 A. I'm unable to assist, I'm afraid. I don't -- I don't
- 3 recall any -- any detail of this at all.
- 4 Q. But were you ever told to report differently, or to
- 5 avoid reporting on the participation of your target
- 6 groups in relation to electoral activity?
- 7 A. Not -- not at all.
- 8 Q. Would there still have been a policing concern about
- 9 demonstrations of the size indicated in this paragraph?
- 10 A. Yes, I would say so.
- 11 Q. Could we take that document down now, please.
- 12 In your file, there are a couple of reports about
- 13 the working committee of the Vietnam Solidarity
- 14 Campaign. Can you recall what the committee was?
- 15 A. Not at all, I'm afraid. I'm unable to assist. My -- my
- 16 memory doesn't allow me to go back to that point, or
- 17 that detail.
- 18 Q. Can you recall how you got on to the VSC's working
- 19 committee?
- 20 A. No. No, I can't.
- 21 Q. Can you recall any management reaction to the fact you
- 22 were on that committee?
- 23 A. No. I can't even remember being on the committee, I'm
- 24 sorry. It's -- seems to have slipped past me somehow.
- 25 Q. I see.

1 There is then a series of six reports dating from
2 March and April 1970 about what is described first as
3 the April 19th and later April 26th Ad Hoc Committee.
4 That appears to be a committee formed to organise
5 a demonstration that was originally going to be on
6 19 April 1970 and the date was then put back to
7 26 April 1970. Can you recall being a part of that
8 committee?

9 A. No, I can't.

10 Q. Can you recall anything at all about either the role you
11 played, or your managers' reaction to it?

12 A. I'm unable to assist in this regard totally.

13 Q. I'll move on then, please, and ask you about what you
14 learned of Conrad Dixon's participation in the Camden
15 branch of the VSC. You describe in your witness
16 statement that he had become a figure of fun, he was
17 remembered, and that he was remembered for wearing
18 a yachtsman's outfit. Can you help us: did they say
19 anything else about what he had done or how he had
20 behaved?

21 A. No, I think -- I think I referred to him as being
22 a figure of fun, and I think it was just his -- his
23 sheer physical presence. A big man with a big
24 sailor-type beard and a jaunty yachtsman's cap and
25 a smock. He had that sort of mariner's air about him,

1 and slightly out of place in Camden, dare I say. But
2 nonetheless, they -- they -- they -- no, they didn't
3 dwell upon him, but they laughed about him when they
4 talked -- one or two remembered him being just that:
5 a rather sort of large and brash figure of fun.

6 Q. You were involved with Camden VSC for a period of
7 approximately a year; is that right?

8 A. I -- I can't remember the -- the timing detail.

9 Q. How closely did you get to know the members of
10 Camden VSC whilst you were reporting on that group?

11 A. I wouldn't say I got very close to them at all. I --
12 I was -- they were, as -- I've described them right at
13 the outset as a rather sort of loose knit, very friendly
14 group of people, and -- and they -- they used to talk --
15 talk of me as -- as, "Oh, it's our Trot-mate", because
16 I think they had a sort of Communist Party leaning, and
17 I don't know that specifically, that was just my
18 impression, and the views that I would try to expound
19 clearly, in their views, were seen as Trotskyist, so
20 I was their "Trot-mate" as opposed to -- but I didn't
21 get close to any of them beyond the meetings and Camden
22 market outings, and the like.

23 Q. Did you socialise with them in public houses?

24 A. No, we might have a pint after the meeting downstairs,
25 but beyond that, no.

- 1 Q. You describe the Camden VSC as very much on
2 the mainstream end of the VSC. What did that mean in
3 practice?
- 4 A. Because they were -- as I say, they were -- they were
5 friendly and -- and had -- had wide ranging views. They
6 -- they were -- were easy to -- to -- I'm trying to
7 over -- not overdramatise this. The whole -- the whole
8 objective of the penetration of what was going on was --
9 was to provide your individual persona with credibility.
10 And -- and the membership of the VSC -- the Camden VSC
11 gave me an opportunity. And by that time I'd been
12 around a little while, and your face gets known at these
13 things; like you do when you go to a football match; if
14 you become an habitual supporter, people recognise you.
15 It was just that.
- 16 Q. There is some mention as well of the Kentish Town branch
17 of the VSC, how much did you have to do with them?
- 18 A. I can't remember very much detail of that at all now,
19 I'm afraid.
- 20 Q. Can you remember what the branch was like in comparison
21 to the Camden branch?
- 22 A. No, I'm afraid -- I'm afraid I can't. I think I was
23 probably looking to -- to move on to some other grouping
24 or something, and that -- I think I was maybe thinking
25 that they would provide an opportunity. But I didn't

- 1 develop any alliance there at all.
- 2 Q. Were any of the VSC members that you encountered
- 3 violent?
- 4 A. Not that I can recall, no.
- 5 Q. Did any of them participate in criminal activity?
- 6 A. Not that I'm aware of.
- 7 Q. And did the VSC members that you knew promote public
- 8 disorder at demonstrations?
- 9 A. I don't know about promotion. They were certainly ever
- 10 present at demonstrations. I can't -- I can't comment
- 11 upon how individuals within those groupings might react
- 12 as a demonstration would proceed or develop. But
- 13 I don't recall seeing -- seeing any violent behaviour
- 14 from those that I knew.
- 15 Q. Can you recall whether -- can you recall any of the VSC
- 16 members that you saw behaving in a disorderly way on
- 17 a VSC march?
- 18 A. No. No, no. I mean, beyond -- beyond using loudhailers
- 19 maybe, or shouting and protesting in that sense, no, not
- 20 at all.
- 21 Q. What did your managers think of the VSC at the time?
- 22 A. I couldn't tell you, sir. I don't know.
- 23 Q. Can we move now, please, to the British Campaign for
- 24 Peace in Vietnam?
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you report on them?

2 A. Yes, I did.

3 Q. You've described attending meetings in a private house

4 where one of the members lived.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Was there any formality required before you entered

7 a private house in the capacity of an undercover police

8 officer?

9 A. No formality, no.

10 Q. Did your managers know that you were doing that?

11 A. They would have seen from my subsequent reports that I'd

12 been to a -- a meeting in a private house.

13 Q. And what was their reaction, if any?

14 A. I don't recall there being a reaction.

15 Q. You describe in your witness statement having a couple

16 of drinks with a member called -- and we've redacted

17 the name for privacy --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- outside of the meetings?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Which you state gave you credibility.

22 You go on to say:

23 "I cannot remember how long I was involved with them

24 but would have been for six months at least. They were

25 in Kentish Town, their conversations centred around

1 protest and building up pedigree. They would whip up
2 anti-war fervour."

3 I'd like to ask you about the person you had drinks
4 with?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Was that person male or female?

7 A. Female.

8 Q. Can you help as to how often you had drinks with that
9 person?

10 A. Once.

11 Q. So when you refer later on in the following sentences
12 about being involved with them for about six months at
13 least, are you referring to the individual or not?

14 A. No, I'm not referring to the individual. As -- as
15 I recall, I was at one of these meetings, and it was at
16 her suggestion that we met for a drink. It was -- it
17 was a totally ordinary conversation that we had when we
18 were having a couple of drinks. There was never
19 anything beyond that ordinary conversation. It could
20 have been male or female. And -- but -- but we were
21 nodding acquaintances from then on. If -- if she had
22 any desire to develop a relationship or a friendship,
23 she didn't convey that and neither did I. So it -- it
24 didn't -- it didn't arise.

25 But as I say, we were nodding acquaintances, and --

1 and in -- in terms of me being accepted within
2 the group, the fact that I knew her and people knew we'd
3 been out for a drink maybe gave me a little credibility
4 in terms of acceptance.

5 Q. Was the BCPV violent?

6 A. No. It was -- it was a very Communist Party background,
7 and that wasn't their style.

8 Q. Does it follow that it was -- wasn't criminal or
9 disorderly either?

10 A. It follows.

11 Q. Can I move now, please, to the Stop the Seventy Tour.

12 You describe being introduced by a BCPV member to
13 the Stop the Seventy Tour. What was it that led you to
14 develop that lead?

15 A. There was an awful lot of passionate revulsion to
16 anti- -- the anti-apartheid situation in South Africa.
17 And the fact that the South African cricket team, and
18 I think then subsequently the rugby team, were to visit
19 the UK gave the protesters an opportunity to really vent
20 their objections. And so on that basis -- and there was
21 a -- a feeling -- and it wasn't something that was
22 promoted from management, it was certainly something
23 that I -- I felt was worth pursuing in terms of
24 potential public order difficulty.

25 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that you attended

1 meetings at Mill Hill, Lewisham and Barnet?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Why such a geographically diverse mix of branches?

4 A. There was no -- there was no specific reason. You went
5 the way the wind blew, if you like. Barnet and Mill
6 Hill are in the same sector of London, an extension of
7 that north west London sector.

8 Lewisham, I -- I can't recall how that got into
9 the orbit. It was strange to be out of the north or
10 north-west London loop in any terms. But as I say,
11 the passion that was being developed over
12 the anti-apartheid protest was -- was wider spread. And
13 I think maybe I just caught wind of a -- of a -- of
14 a meeting and grabbed an opportunity.

15 Q. You say that the potential for violence and public
16 disorder at demonstrations was huge in a context which
17 suggests you're talking about the STST.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Was that your opinion?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You say in your witness statement that they got up to
22 all sorts of well publicised antics; and you go on to
23 say digging up the pitch at Lords and pouring oil over
24 the wickets?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. We've not been able to find any press coverage of such
2 an event during the STST's campaign. Although there is
3 historic media coverage of such an event a few years
4 later, in the context of a protest about a man who was
5 alleged to be a bank robber. Is it possible that you
6 have -- that your recollection is confused on this
7 point?

8 A. I have no recollection of a bank robber being involved
9 in anything to do with the wicket.

10 In my memory, and as I say, it goes back an awfully
11 long way and has become blurred maybe in that process,
12 if it didn't happen then there were certainly serious
13 threats of it happening. You surprise me that you can
14 find no -- or have found no press comment in -- in that
15 regard. It's been long -- long held in my mind that
16 that was a situation that -- that either existed or had
17 been proposed.

18 Q. Can you help with what you might actually have seen
19 whilst you were infiltrating the STST. Did you see any
20 public disorder?

21 A. Yes, I did. At a rugby match at Twickenham. Very
22 violent scenes.

23 Q. Can you remember which match that was?

24 A. I'm sure it was England against South Africa. I can't
25 remember exactly.

1 Q. Can you remember when it was?

2 A. No, sir, I can't.

3 Q. Is this the match in which you say that there was an
4 instruction to attack the police?

5 A. There -- there -- yes, the -- the -- by -- if memory
6 serves -- and that's questionable -- the --
7 the instruction to STST protesters was that, on given
8 signals around the ground, the -- the police would be
9 attacked, attempts would be made to rush the pitch,
10 perhaps push players around and generally disrupt
11 the game. But the police were to be targeted in
12 anticipation that any riotous behaviour in one corner or
13 another corner and then subsequent corner would be
14 sufficient to perhaps cause a delay or postponement of
15 the game. That was always an objective.

16 Q. How were the police to be targeted?

17 A. Well, I -- I -- I don't have the -- I didn't have
18 the detail to hand, but there were groupings of
19 STS people -- and I don't remember how ticketing became
20 available. But anyway, access to the ground seemingly
21 had been obtained. And I can't remember how I -- I got
22 in, but -- at one given signal -- there were probably 30
23 or 40 STST supporters in the little corner that I was
24 in, set about trying to push -- push police around to
25 start with, and then one or two people started to throw

- 1 punches at policemen and the like. I found that
2 difficult.
- 3 Q. Who gave the instruction to attack the police?
- 4 A. Well, it was at the -- I don't know what the signal was.
5 I can't remember. But if it was -- I -- I don't know
6 what the -- I wouldn't even offer conjecture. But at
7 some given signal, the -- the disruption would begin.
- 8 Q. I'm more interested in who gave the signal rather than
9 --
- 10 A. I've no idea.
- 11 Q. -- what it was.
- 12 A. I've no idea. No idea.
- 13 Q. Can you remember whether anyone was arrested or removed
14 from the ground?
- 15 A. No, I can't. No. I --
- 16 Q. I don't think -- (overspeaking) --
- 17 A. Nothing -- (inaudible).
- 18 Q. Sorry, carry on.
- 19 A. No, I can't remember, I'm sorry.
- 20 Q. I don't think this was something you spoke about when
21 you were interviewed for the BBC's True Spies programme.
22 Is your witness statement the first time you've given an
23 account of these events?
- 24 A. I suppose so, yes. Yes.
- 25 Q. Can you recall whether it occurred before or after you

- 1 had ceased reporting on the Camden VSC?
- 2 A. No, the timing would -- would have passed me by, by now,
3 I'm afraid.
- 4 Q. Could I ask you now about Mike Ferguson and the STST.
5 In particular, do you know whether Mike Ferguson assumed
6 any positions of responsibility within the STST?
- 7 A. No, I don't know. My understanding was that he -- that
8 he had a good understanding of what was going on, and
9 that made it useful from the police point of view. But
10 beyond that, I have no idea what his role might have
11 been.
- 12 Q. Can I ask you the same question in relation to
13 Mike Ferguson and the Anti-Apartheid Movement?
- 14 A. I -- no, I don't -- I've no idea about his
15 Anti-Apartheid Movement involvement at all.
- 16 Q. You described in your witness statement Mike Ferguson as
17 being Peter Hain's right-hand man. If you were unaware
18 of him having an official position within the STST, what
19 did you mean by that?
- 20 A. I think just a jokey reference that if he was that well
21 placed, then he must have been Peter Hain's right-hand
22 man. But I had no knowledge of that being the case at
23 all.
- 24 Q. You've also --
- 25 A. -- (overspeaking) -- it was the case.

- 1 Q. You've also said that you did not see his position as
2 necessary for the job that you were required to do.
3 What did you mean by that?
- 4 A. That's -- that's just a very personable -- personal
5 reaction. I -- I don't think, in retrospect, I was
6 a particularly successful undercover officer. Some had
7 more capability than I did. And maybe I think I'm
8 interpreting -- interpreting that in that way, that
9 I would not have had the drive or the nowse to be able
10 to do what some other officers were able to do,
11 seemingly.
- 12 Q. Did you think that becoming influential within a target
13 group was a good idea?
- 14 A. I -- I never saw it as part of my brief.
- 15 Q. Now, there are a number of reports on the STST in your
16 pack. In one of them you identify members of
17 the north-west London STST committee. What would that
18 information have been used for, as far as you are aware?
- 19 A. I -- I think at that -- at that stage it would have just
20 been useful to have known the people who were driving
21 the protest. But how that information might be utilised
22 by others, I've no idea.
- 23 Q. Were you ever a member of that committee?
- 24 A. No.
- 25 Q. You've reported on some forthcoming activities: pickets

1 and demonstrations. Do you know how that information
2 was used?

3 A. No. I presume that if there was any deemed benefit to
4 the police service deriving from that information, then
5 that would be forwarded to the appropriate point of
6 interest.

7 Q. You've reported at one stage on the identity of a lawyer
8 who was going to be approached for legal advice. Why
9 did you do that?

10 A. I just thought it was of -- of interest at the time. If
11 somebody was utilising his professional knowledge to
12 provide others with a way of avoiding arrest when
13 perhaps arrest would be appropriate, then -- then that
14 certainly would be of interest.

15 Q. Was there any prohibition on reporting on lawyers?

16 A. I don't remember -- no, there was no -- no prohibition,
17 as the word you used, no.

18 Q. Were there any restrictions on what you might report
19 about a lawyer or the legal advice that they gave?

20 A. It would just be a factual reporting of
21 the circumstances and the content of that presentation,
22 and it wouldn't be my place to add further comment.

23 Q. Do you know what was done with the information about
24 the lawyer that you reported?

25 A. I've no idea, no.

1 Q. One of the things you reported on was the inaugural
2 meeting of the North London branch of the STST. Was
3 reporting on the formation of a new branch of
4 the movement something that was welcomed by your
5 managers?

6 A. Yes, I think so, yes.

7 Q. Can we look now, please, at {MPS-0736257}. Thank you.

8 This is a report dated 29 April 1970. The subject
9 is the STST. Paragraph 2 reads:

10 "At a party organised by the NW London
11 Stop the Seventy Tour Committee held on Saturday
12 25 April 1970 at [privacy] [privacy] [privacy] an active
13 member of the Notting Hill Militants Association and
14 a frequent attender at extreme left-wing activities, was
15 overheard to say that an attempt is to be made to abduct
16 the South African Ambassador prior to the arrival of
17 the South African Cricket Team."

18 Paragraph 3 says:

19 "He went on to say that the observation had been
20 kept on the ambassador's address: [privacy] [privacy]
21 [privacy], and the time of his daily departure and
22 arrival and the nights he is likely to return late are
23 known by a member of his organisation who lives nearby."

24 If we can look now at paragraph 4, please.

25 Paragraph 4 said:

1 "[privacy] elaborated to the extent that even though
2 they might not succeed in abducting the Ambassador at
3 least an attempt would be made 'following the example of
4 the Guatemalan guerillas'. He added that the sole
5 reason for this action would be to achieve
6 the cancellation of the forthcoming Cricket Tour.
7 The Ambassador would only be released on a guarantee
8 being given that the tour would not take place, or would
9 be abandoned, if the abduction took place after
10 the arrival of the cricketers."

11 Paragraph 5 says:

12 "He was also overheard to say that it was known
13 amongst his associates that there were no security
14 guards attached to the Ambassador's household and that
15 no uniform or Special Branch had been assigned to HE's
16 personal protection."

17 Was this information that was of interest to your
18 managers?

19 A. I'm certain it was, yes.

20 Q. Can you recall whether they did anything with it?

21 A. I wouldn't know what they might do with any of
22 the information that was submitted.

23 Q. Do you know whether an attempt was made to abduct
24 the ambassador?

25 A. I -- I have no idea. I know that he had a residence in

1 Notting Hill and -- but beyond that, I have no idea at
2 all whether any activity took place that posed a threat.

3 Q. Could we take that document down, please, and could we
4 now have {UCPI 0000014418}.

5 This is a report dated 4 May 1970, subject STST.
6 It's a report on an individual. Paragraph 2 says that:

7 "[privacy] is the Secretary of the North West London
8 Committee of the Stop the Seventy Tour."

9 Paragraph 3 says:

10 "She is currently living with [privacy] at [privacy]
11 [privacy] and employed as a secretary at [privacy]."

12 Paragraph 4:

13 "She is a close friend of [privacy], Chairman of
14 the NW STST, but cannot be described as
15 being 'politically aware'. She is, in fact, a somewhat
16 immature, naive person and it would seem that she was
17 made Secretary of the group because of her clerical
18 experience."

19 Paragraph 5 relates to forthcoming employment as
20 a probation officer.

21 And could we scroll down to paragraph 6, please.

22 Paragraph 6 reads:

23 "Her description is as follows:-

24 "Aged about 23 years; height 5'0"; short fair hair;
25 slim build with well-developed bust; slightly Jewish

1 appearance; often wears dark rimmed spectacles and has
2 a slight cast in her left eye."

3 336, why did you describe this person as having
4 a "well developed bust"?

5 A. When I -- when I read descriptions like that, I see what
6 I would have viewed then to be a helpful build of
7 a picture for somebody to cast in their mind's eye and
8 understand the person I'm talking about and describing.
9 Nothing more sinister than -- than that. So I -- I was
10 trying to be as -- as descriptive as possible.

11 Q. Why would they need to develop a picture in their mind's
12 eye?

13 A. I -- I've no idea. This was -- this is just
14 a policeman's nowse, if you like, a policeman's
15 antennae, putting something together that may or may not
16 be useful. And -- and -- and that was -- and just that.
17 Obviously, in -- in the light of social pressures these
18 days, that's seen to be quite unnecessary. In those
19 terms, in -- 51 years ago, I think it was deemed to be
20 helpful.

21 Q. And why did you describe her as being of "slightly
22 Jewish appearance"?

23 A. Because that's how I would have seen her. That's how
24 I would have understood her appearance.

25 Q. That comment is a subjective judgment, isn't it?

1 A. I think that paragraph and things like that would always
2 be subjective.

3 Q. Well, something like "short, fair hair", or "height
4 5 feet" is an objective fact. "Slightly Jewish
5 experience" depends on a stereotype, doesn't it, of what
6 a Jewish person looks like?

7 A. Can I say, that's a modern-day interpretation and not
8 how it would have been viewed then.

9 Q. You've reported quite a lot of detail about this person:
10 her work, her home situation, her private life, her
11 degree of political sophistication. Why did you go into
12 so much detail?

13 A. I think I was just, dare I say, fortunate enough to
14 piece that to -- together. The more information make --
15 one makes available, then the more helpful it may or may
16 not be.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 Could we take that document down, please.

19 There's another document. We can go to it if
20 necessary, but you report that the north-west London
21 STST was organising a peaceful demonstration for Lords
22 in contrast to the south-east London STST's
23 demonstration smothering the Oval with posters.
24 Suggestions for the north-west London STST event
25 included a torchlight midnight procession, which seemed

1 to receive some favour.

2 What was the policing value in reporting an
3 intention to conduct an entirely peaceful demonstration?

4 A. I -- I, again, was not the analyst. My task was to
5 report facts as they were presented to me. And -- and
6 I -- I would still maintain that that -- to fail to do
7 that would be negligent in -- in -- in my view. How --
8 how it's subsequently utilised was never my role or
9 something that I needed to assess.

10 Q. Why, in your mind, would it have been negligent not to
11 have reported that information?

12 A. I think the -- because there was -- there's a potential.
13 For people to get out on the streets at midnight on a --
14 albeit a peaceful protest, it's still something that
15 the police should be aware of. And to -- to fail to be
16 aware of, or fail to attend just to -- to be assured
17 of -- of a peaceful demonstration, again, is part of
18 the policeman's protective role of society.

19 Q. What was your managers' view of the STST?

20 A. I think they were very concerned about the potential for
21 criminal damage and violence.

22 Q. How well did you get to know the participants in
23 the STST with whom you mixed?

24 A. Not very well at all. I drifted in and drifted out, as
25 I have done other organisations.

- 1 Q. Did you socialise with them?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. What brought your deployment with the STST to an end?
- 4 A. I can't remember. I can't remember. I think -- I think
- 5 maybe the experience I had at Twickenham in -- in
- 6 the rugby would have -- would have drawn -- drawn me
- 7 away from that organisation.
- 8 Q. You tell us that the final group that you infiltrated
- 9 was the International Marxist Group.
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And that you had an introduction from a member of
- 12 the Kentish Town VSC. Can you tell us any more about
- 13 how you came to get into the IMG?
- 14 A. No, I can't. I'm unable to assist there. Just it was
- 15 -- it was all part of these general rather drifting
- 16 conversations that you would have with people. And
- 17 somebody would say, "Oh, come along to our meeting" or,
- 18 "We meet here on a Friday night", or Sunday night or
- 19 whatever, "and you might find it interesting, and you've
- 20 got something interesting to say, Come and tell us what
- 21 you think about this or that." And so that move into
- 22 the IMG would have been along those lines.
- 23 Q. You say in your statement that one of the reasons that
- 24 you saw for infiltrating the IMG was that it took part
- 25 in every demonstration going. Was the IMG a violent

- 1 organisation?
- 2 A. I -- I don't know if it was a violent organisation. It
3 certainly was -- was much more vociferous in its
4 protests, mainly because of its organiser, and -- and
5 I think therefore the -- the potential to pick up
6 violence on the fringe was -- was always there to be
7 promoted in the organiser's view.
- 8 Q. And who are you referring to as the "organiser"?
- 9 A. Tariq Ali.
- 10 Q. Did you see anyone from the IMG committing criminal
11 offences to promote the IMG's cause?
- 12 A. I can't remember, no.
- 13 Q. Did you see --
- 14 A. I don't think --
- 15 Q. Did you see any IMG member behaving in a disorderly way
16 at a demonstration?
- 17 A. Not -- I can't be specific now, sir, it goes -- it goes
18 back too -- too far. There were much more busy at
19 demonstrations than other -- other groups.
- 20 Q. You do say in your witness statement that some of
21 the violence at demonstrations you thought was
22 spontaneous and centred on anarchists?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Did you make any attempt to infiltrate the anarchists?
- 25 A. None at all.

- 1 Q. If they were the ones who were precipitating
2 the violence in your estimation, why not?
- 3 A. Well, as I've said, they -- they were spontaneous.
4 I mean, I -- I can recall a visit of President Reagan,
5 I think, and to -- to London. And there were perhaps
6 a dozen or so cars set alight in the vicinity of
7 Claridge's, I think, where he was staying. And they
8 were -- they were really spontaneous moments by
9 harebrained bunches, thinking that it was a great way to
10 extend the protest. And so -- so when there's -- that's
11 on spontaneity. It's difficult to anticipate and
12 difficult to pass that information on early.
- 13 Q. I'm not sure that quite answers my question, which
14 was: why didn't you infiltrate the anarchists if they
15 were the source of the trouble?
- 16 A. I -- I don't know that it ever occurred to me that that
17 was a route that I might find useful. But some of them
18 were, as I say, harebrained and a little -- a little
19 ex- -- overexcited at these moments, and I didn't feel
20 drawn to that sort of grouping.
- 21 Q. Can we move now, please, to the True Spies programme.
22 You've explained that there had been some communication
23 between senior officers Pearce and Gunn, and is it Peter
24 Taylor, Mr Taylor, who made the film?
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Can you help us with any further detail about
2 the circumstances in which Mr Taylor was assured of
3 assistance from Special Branch in the making of
4 the programme?

5 A. My understanding was/is that he had approached
6 Special Branch with a view to making this programme and
7 seeking sanction.

8 Q. And got it?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You told Taylor that one of the things you'd done whilst
11 infiltrating the IMG was to take an impression of
12 the IMG office keys; is that right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And do you stand by that account?

15 A. I do. I do. It was -- it's rather more a comic story
16 than anything sinister. They -- for some peculiar
17 reason I remember I'd been to a -- a number of meetings
18 and the -- the office was always manned from 5.30, where
19 it was normally manned by somebody through the day, 5.30
20 to 8.30, in case there were phone calls or drop-ins, or
21 whatever. And the person who would normally seemingly
22 cover that shift wasn't going to be available. And
23 those at the -- at; one meeting said, "Well, is there
24 anybody else that would -- that can help us out?" So --
25 so I apparently reluctantly offered my services. And --

1 which meant that I was -- would go there at 5.30, be
2 given the keys, and stay in the office until 8.30, then
3 lock up and pop the keys through a letterbox next door.

4 And having then realised that I would have the keys
5 to this -- these premises, I raised with my senior
6 officer the fact that I would have -- would have these
7 keys, and would anyone -- anyone be interested. And
8 the next thing I knew, the next day, the opportunity to
9 press those keys was given. And beyond that -- and
10 I rather flippantly said, "Well, just in case somebody
11 wants to visit ..." But that's been rather serious --
12 more seriously interpreted since then. But it was never
13 intended as a serious quip. And it was not something
14 that Special Branch would be interested in. Why would
15 we be interested? We already had the keys in our
16 possession. It's not something that we would need to
17 do.

18 Q. But presumably taking an impression of the keys would be
19 for the purpose of gaining access to the building at
20 another time?

21 A. Maybe, yes. Yes. I raised the question and
22 the question was answered, and so I did as I was
23 requested.

24 Q. Were your managers pleased with you for obtaining those
25 keys, or the impression of the keys?

1 A. I've no idea. It's not something that one -- one
2 sought. It was another facet of the activity.

3 Q. Do you know if any of your colleagues -- and please
4 don't name anybody when answering this -- do you know
5 whether any of your colleagues obtained keys to
6 the premises occupied by their target groups?

7 A. I've no idea.

8 Q. You've described your colleagues being -- some of your
9 colleagues being upset at your having participated in
10 that television programme.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. As far as you could tell you, what was it about your
13 participation that upset them?

14 A. I -- I'm -- I'm still at a loss to -- to understand
15 that. I've -- I've lost a whole bunch of good friends
16 from -- from that time. And I hastened to point out to
17 them that that which I spoke of had occurred something
18 like 37/38 years prior to that programme. And if it
19 related to some disclosure about SDS activity, then
20 the SDS had not moved on in any way from the rather
21 bumbling times when I'd been a junior -- early officer
22 in that organisation. And I've no idea what happened.
23 When you leave the SDS, you -- you, you know, you're
24 constantly looking forward, you don't look back, and
25 I didn't seek to find out what was going on. Nobody

1 would ever tell you what was going on beyond your
2 involvement with it.

3 But it was -- it was disappointing that -- that
4 some -- some seemed to take such exception to rather
5 frivolous comments. And I thought they should have
6 known better and sought a fuller explanation from me
7 rather than rush -- rushing to judgment.

8 Q. To put it in very simplistic terms, did you think what
9 you were telling the BBC was an account of good things
10 or bad things?

11 A. I -- I have a view, and I'm not relating it to any
12 specific circumstances, I think -- I think we as
13 a society have an expectation that there will be people
14 guarding the edges of our civilisation to prevent an
15 over -- overrunning, if you like, and -- and
16 a disturbance of our political status quo. And so --
17 so, yeah, that's my rather innocent -- dare I say,
18 innocent view of how things should be; and I think other
19 people have an expectation that -- that our boundaries
20 will be guarded.

21 Q. Did you think that your colleagues were upset because
22 they were concerned you had compromised the operational
23 security of the SDS, or did they regard you as
24 a whistleblower?

25 A. I -- I don't -- I don't think they viewed me as

1 a whistleblower. I think it was just a -- a rather
2 shortsighted thing to have said on -- on my part. And
3 maybe they were right in that respect.

4 Q. Can I go back to the IMG, please, and how it was that
5 you came to leave the IMG. You've described a political
6 interrogation which made you uncomfortable.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Did you feel in any physical danger?

9 A. Not in physical danger, no.

10 Q. You've described that you decided at that point to bring
11 the deployment to an end, and you describe drifting away
12 gradually after that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Why did you feel the need to make it a gradual
15 exfiltration?

16 A. When I say "gradual", it wasn't the next morning I --
17 I took my box and walked away, but then again, it wasn't
18 a six-month departure. It was probably three or four
19 weeks of drifting in, "Hi, I'm off, I'm going to do this
20 or that," and then disappearing. So it was a gradual
21 withdrawal in that sense, but nothing -- nothing
22 dramatic nor lengthy.

23 Q. In terms of the length of SDS deployments at this time,
24 you've given the impression in your statement that
25 the duration of SDS deployments was for as long as

1 the undercover officer was considered by management to
2 be useful; subject, I suppose, to being compromised or
3 asking to leave. Is that fair?

4 A. I think it would always be a matter of the -- unless --
5 unless the individual officer proved to be incapable, or
6 -- or not -- not -- not able, then it will always be
7 a matter for the individual, and I had reached the end
8 of my time; I knew that. It was time to pull away.

9 Q. I'm going to now ask you about a few general topics
10 before I finish.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. First of all, you've described the SDS as being able to
13 fill gaps in intelligence, being more focused. How --
14 how did you mean that it was more focused?

15 A. As I -- as I said earlier, I think the Metropolitan
16 Police and the Home Office and the Security Service
17 collectively had been em -- embarrassed by the failure
18 of the police service to be able to contain two very
19 considerable demonstrations in London that had caused
20 massive disruption, damage, damage to police officers,
21 police horses; and the creation of the SDS as a -- as
22 a means of reducing the impact of such damage was -- had
23 to be viewed as useful and necessary.

24 Q. You've said in your statement that you would report --
25 produce about two or three reports a week, and that your

1 income increased as a result of the overtime payments
2 that you received. Were there also quiet periods during
3 your deployment?

4 A. I don't recall quiet periods. Once you launched into
5 it, there was always something bubbling and worth
6 pursuing, it seemed. So there were higher points maybe,
7 but no -- no quieter and low points.

8 Q. You've described attending the SDS flat daily.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did you see a good deal of your colleagues during your
11 time with the SDS?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And how well did you get to know them?

14 A. I -- I think very well. Very well. A very -- very
15 committed bunch of individuals, and people whom I have
16 great admiration for.

17 Q. And were you there to help one another if you ran into
18 problems and wanted to talk to people about how to deal
19 with problems you were having in your deployment?

20 A. Yes, if that need ever arose, then -- then I had
21 the satisfaction of knowing that there was a shoulder to
22 lean upon --

23 Q. And did you -- sorry, carry on.

24 A. But I -- I never -- never felt it necessary to -- to
25 develop a shoulder rather than just a normal friendly

- 1 conversations with my colleagues.
- 2 Q. Now, I don't want you to give me any details, but did
3 you know, in broad terms, basically what your colleagues
4 were doing in terms of who they were infiltrating?
- 5 A. To -- to be honest, no. I was -- I was working with --
6 at that time there were probably about seven or eight of
7 us, and -- if that many, I don't remember. But -- but
8 having a very broad brush overview of what -- what field
9 they might be in, it didn't seem ever appropriate to
10 pursue what they were doing within that field. And --
11 and neither did they deem it necessary to pursue me in
12 that regard.
- 13 Q. You've described reading literature as one of the things
14 that you did at the SDS flat. Is that literature that
15 you had obtained when attending group functions and
16 events, or was it material that was coming from
17 the police side for you to read, or both?
- 18 A. Nothing coming from the police side, it was all manner
19 of books and literature that was being filtered --
20 (inaudible) newspapers handed out at meetings and
21 bookshops and -- Camden Market, for instance, thing --
22 things like that, there was -- there was a whole raft of
23 material available. And it was useful --
- 24 Q. You describe your bosses usually being round at about
25 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Does it follow from that

1 that you saw a good deal of them?

2 A. Yes, at the time I was involved, it seemed, yes, they
3 were -- not ever present, but certainly often present.

4 Q. And did you feel they were there for you if you needed
5 them?

6 A. Absolutely.

7 Q. And although you've been very clear to explain that you
8 made a lot of decisions as to how you went about your
9 job, would it be fair to say they were well aware of
10 what you were doing?

11 A. Absolutely.

12 Q. You've referred to a "CID diary". Did you include
13 details of your undercover work in that diary?

14 A. No. It was a report of my daily activity. And from
15 the time I'd become a detective I'd submitted a daily --
16 a daily diary. And it was never something that was
17 included in the content of that diary, it was -- you --
18 you were doing what you were doing, and I wrote my diary
19 up and passed it on to my supervisors, who audited it
20 and passed it back to me.

21 Q. So if you had attended an activist meeting, what would
22 your diary for that day look like?

23 A. It's so long ago, apart from the fact that saying that
24 I'd been to a meeting at so and so, it wouldn't be more
25 detailed than that.

1 Q. I appreciate this may not be an easy question, but do
2 you have any idea what happened to your diaries?

3 A. Absolutely none at all.

4 Q. You refer in your witness statement to the fact that at
5 a couple of pubs in Kilburn you thought there were
6 sometimes people there who were associated with the IRA.
7 Did you ever report on them whilst you were a member of
8 the SDS?

9 A. No.

10 Q. You've explained in your witness statement that you
11 think you were always conscious that you were a police
12 officer and it held you back in your undercover work,
13 and you've touched upon that again today. Can you
14 explain what you mean by that?

15 A. It's -- it's something that was almost in-- ingrained,
16 if you like. And perhaps some people have -- have more
17 -- more ability to -- to glide into another persona than
18 -- than I did. I'm not suggesting for one moment that
19 I was not useful; and that would be not for me to assess
20 anyway. But I think what I did was useful, but I think
21 others were more useful because of their ability. And
22 they're -- not suggesting that they were forgetting they
23 were police officers, too, but 90% of me the whole time
24 was telling me that I -- that I was a Metropolitan
25 Police officer, doing my very best to aid the police in

1 its contribution to society. That sounds rather grand,
2 but that's -- in -- in the back of my mind, that's how
3 I viewed things.

4 Q. You've described carrying your warrant card with you
5 whilst on operations undercover. Was that something you
6 were supposed to have done?

7 A. I had never received an instruction to the contrary.
8 Again, it was -- it was a policeman thing to do. It
9 seemed obvious not to carry it in your wallet where --
10 where it could have been picked up by accident or
11 otherwise. But, yes, I -- I don't recall ever not
12 having it secreted around me in some place or another.

13 Q. Can I move now to the industrial section of
14 Special Branch. You describe being aware of
15 the existence of the industrial section before you
16 joined the SDS, knowing about the Economic League, and
17 that the chief superintendent of C Squad had joined
18 the Economic League after leaving Special Branch.

19 Is the industrial section the same as the industrial
20 desk, or are they two different things?

21 A. They're -- they're the same -- same thing.
22 The industrial section was -- was nothing -- nothing
23 more than a small I small S group of guys working in one
24 particular office with a particular task, and ... yeah,
25 that was it.

1 Q. Did you have anything to do with -- (overspeaking) --

2 A. (inaudible).

3 Q. I beg your pardon?

4 A. It was a mainstream activity.

5 Q. Did you have anything to do with the industrial section

6 before you joined the SDS?

7 A. No, I don't -- I don't remember being -- being

8 particularly busy anyway. No, I don't -- I didn't, no.

9 Q. If I've understood your evidence correctly, later on in

10 your career though you did work in the industrial

11 section covering engineering; is that right?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And that you've described that there was great concern

14 about Russian-backed infiltration into industry; is that

15 right?

16 A. Absolutely.

17 Q. Can you help us -- again, please don't name names -- did

18 any former SDS officers, to your knowledge, ever join

19 the Economic League or any other similar organisation?

20 A. I've no idea, no. The reason why I mentioned my former

21 chief superintendent, when I -- when I joined

22 Special Branch, we went through a series of induction

23 lectures. And I remember being quite alarmed by

24 the man's assessment of the infiltration of the --

25 the British political movement, particularly the trade

1 union movement, by the Russians at that time. And he
2 was -- he was -- he strongly held the view that within
3 ten years of that particular time, Great Britain would
4 be under the -- his terms -- "the yoke of communism".
5 And I -- I was amazed that he should see that. It was
6 something that rather stuck -- stuck with me. And then
7 he did subsequently go to work, and I don't know for how
8 long or in what capacity, with the Economic League, but
9 beyond that I've no idea.

10 Q. When you were working on the industrial section, was any
11 information flowing from the industrial section to
12 the Economic League, or any other similar organisation?

13 A. No. No, no, that wasn't how -- no. I mean, I don't
14 even recall what -- it would be -- it would be naive of
15 me to say that I was not aware of the Economic League,
16 any more than I was aware of other people that were
17 swimming in that same pool, if -- if you like. There
18 was -- no. It wasn't -- it didn't work like that.
19 People -- people would come to -- to us. Many -- there
20 were many people in the British trade union movement at
21 that time who were not tainted by the -- by communism
22 or -- or the -- but -- but the communists held huge sway
23 in large elements of the British trade union movement,
24 and there were people within the British trade union
25 movement who were concerned about that. And -- and you

1 would be contacted by them often, passing on detail
2 about activity and -- potential activity and potential
3 election rigging, as was seemingly commonplace in those
4 days.

5 Q. In doing your work for the industrial section, did you
6 have access to Special Branch records?

7 A. Yes, I did. As did every other Special Branch officer.

8 Q. And so, if the SDS had reported upon the trade union
9 membership or activities of someone who was also active
10 in one of the SDS's target groups, would it follow that
11 that reporting might have been available to you on
12 the industrial section if you had been looking up
13 the name of someone who had been reported to you by one
14 of the concerned trade unionists that you have just
15 referred to?

16 A. There -- there would be no overlap between the --
17 whatever was held within the SDS would -- would remain
18 there. I can't conceive of any situation where SDS
19 information, intelligence would leak into the normal
20 pool of Special Branch records activity.

21 Q. Do you know anything about the filing system, or is that
22 something we should ask others about?

23 A. I -- I knew they had a filing system, but beyond how
24 the workings of it, there must be others who are able to
25 respond to that.

1 Q. Can I come now to the Security Service, please. You've
2 described knowing that the reports that you saw were
3 copied to MI5. How did you know that?

4 A. Because -- I don't know about the SDS time. I don't
5 know what happened to my reports from the time that
6 I offered a manuscript report. But in -- in normal
7 Special Branch activity, my reports would be submitted
8 to a supervising officer who would read it, determine
9 how it should be disseminated, and very often within
10 that dissemination would be a minute to copy it to
11 the Security Service.

12 Q. So would it be fair to say that your knowledge that your
13 SDS reporting would have been disseminated to
14 the Security Service comes from your wider understanding
15 of how Special Branch operated?

16 A. It's -- it's reasonable to assume that much of
17 the reports that I did submit through my time with
18 the SDS would have gone to the Security Service. But
19 I have no idea; I would have had no knowledge of -- of
20 the process of -- or progress of that report, or
21 the direction of it.

22 Q. You have described speaking to someone from MI5 once in
23 a pub?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. About the impact of protests in your field?

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Do you know whether any of your colleagues did the same?
3 Please don't name them if the answer is yes.

4 A. That was a totally chance meeting. It wasn't -- it
5 wasn't by design. I had not met the chap previously,
6 nor did I meet him subsequently. It just so happened
7 that I literally bumped into him whilst he was in
8 conversation with a Special Branch officer. And in
9 the process of that rather brief conversation I was
10 asked a question about the likely possible impact --

11 Q. Could I just stop you there. Please don't go into any
12 details.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. My question was: do you know whether any of your
15 colleagues did the same?

16 A. No, I've no idea. I -- no.

17 Q. Do you know whether MI5 were pleased with whatever it
18 was that you provided them with?

19 A. On that instance, you mean? In that instance?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. I've absolutely no idea. I can't imagine that
22 the conversation that we had would have been in any way
23 an eyebrow-raiser.

24 Q. Can you -- it's a different topic now. Involvement of
25 SDS officers in criminal prosecutions.

1 Can you recall whether any of your colleagues were
2 involved in prosecuting people as a result of their work
3 for the SDS?

4 A. No.

5 Q. No, you can't remember, or no, it didn't happen?

6 A. No, it didn't happen, in my recollection.

7 Q. Again, I don't want you to identify anybody in answer to
8 my next question, which is about informants. Was
9 the SDS as a unit using informants other than undercover
10 police officers whilst you were serving with the unit?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Welfare. You've described your undercover service as
13 a stressful experience and a huge sense of relief when
14 it was over. Do you think you were properly supported
15 from a welfare point of view?

16 A. Yes, I do. I -- I -- perhaps if I -- stress --
17 "stressful" is a dramatic word. It was -- it was -- if
18 I was feeling stress, it was because I felt it needed
19 concentration and it needed commitment. But that didn't
20 mean to say I was incapable of shouldering that
21 commitment. But it was -- it was a relief to me when it
22 stopped. It was like butting your head against a brick
23 wall. It was great when it stopped.

24 Q. Dummy files. Can you help us with what a dummy file is?

25 A. No, sorry.

1 Q. SDS reunions. Have you attended any SDS reunions?

2 A. I -- I went to one. I can't remember when or where that
3 was --

4 Q. Were sexual relationships with activists mentioned at
5 that reunion?

6 A. No. No. This is something that is -- is quite
7 abhorrent to me, I'm afraid, so no.

8 Q. When did you first learn about them?

9 A. I learned through the press, amazingly. But then I've
10 retired from the police service some long time ago, and
11 these things -- I -- I don't want to dwell upon it, sir.
12 It's something that is so alien to my understanding of
13 what we were there to do that I -- I'm afraid I don't
14 find myself in sympathy with any of these situations at
15 all.

16 MR BARR: 336, you've been very patient. I expect you'll be
17 pleased to hear that that was the last of my questions,
18 but if you will stay there.

19 I understand, sir, that there may be some
20 applications under rule 10?

21 THE CHAIRMAN: So do I.

22 Ms Brander, I think you have an application?

23 Application by MS BRANDER

24 MS BRANDER: Yes, thank you, sir. It's really just for
25 permission to ask a couple of questions in relation to

1 this officer's evidence about having had a couple of
2 drinks with a member of the Kentish Town branch of
3 the VSC.

4 This wasn't something that I'd fully had an
5 opportunity to submit questions in relation to in
6 advance. I did submit questions in relation to it, but
7 of course, because of the redaction, it's not clear on
8 the face of the witness statement whether it was a man
9 or a women.

10 Having now learned that it was a woman, and in light
11 of HN336's account that it was in order to bolster his
12 credibility, I would just ask for permission to be able
13 to ask just a couple of questions in relation to that.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I think, in fact, when the unredacted
15 documents were disclosed to relevant non-state parties,
16 the name of the individual would have been in it, but
17 these oversights are easily made.

18 MS BRANDER: I see. Thank you, sir. I wasn't privy to
19 the unredacted version, so thank you.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, you may.

21 Questions by MS BRANDER

22 MS BRANDER: Thank you, sir.

23 HN336, you'll recall in your evidence just now you
24 were asked by Mr Barr about an occasion when you had
25 a couple of drinks with a member of the Kentish Town

1 VSC. You'll have heard just now I've said that in
2 the version of your witness statement that I have,
3 the name's redacted, and I don't want you to say
4 the name, but is it right that you remember the name of
5 the person?

6 A. Yes, I do. I do.

7 Q. And how is it that you remember that name after all this
8 time?

9 A. I've no idea. I can remember an awful lot of things.
10 Life -- life has many signposts and that name for some
11 reason is on one of them, as I -- and it's -- it's
12 lasted. But I've no idea why. I had no relationship
13 with that lady beyond a couple of drinks.

14 Q. And a couple of drinks, you said, outside of
15 the meetings. So was this outside of the meetings on
16 a couple of occasions?

17 A. No, it was only on one occasion. If -- if -- yeah,
18 memory -- yeah, no, I didn't have any meetings beyond
19 the one.

20 Q. And you said it gave you credibility. Was that
21 a recognised tactic within the SDS, that having drinks
22 with a member of the opposite sex would give you a way
23 in with -- with credibility?

24 A. I was approached by this lady to have a drink; it wasn't
25 something that I was seeking. And how others would

1 react, I've no idea. It's -- it wasn't something that
2 I saw as a prerequisite on my part to progress my
3 credibility. But at the same time, it was -- it was
4 a -- it was just a drink, literally.

5 Q. Was it something that was ever discussed within the unit
6 as a good way of building credibility?

7 A. Not at all.

8 Q. And --

9 A. Not at all. Techniques were not something that we
10 discussed within the unit.

11 Q. Did you -- you never discussed techniques within
12 the unit?

13 A. Certainly not to the point of developing relationships
14 with women, no.

15 Q. Did you report to your managers that you went for
16 the drink?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Would it be included in your report at all?

19 A. I -- no, I doubt it, no. I might have included it in my
20 daily CID diary, but beyond that, no. There was --
21 there was -- I hate to say this, there was nothing
22 sinister in that meeting at all. And to have progressed
23 it beyond just a meeting to have a drink would -- would
24 be placing it at a different place all together.

25 Q. I see. So it wasn't ever something that you discussed

1 with your colleagues?

2 A. No.

3 MS BRANDER: Okay.

4 Thank you, sir. That's all I wanted to ask.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Greenhall, I believe you have an
6 application under rule 10 as well?

7 Application by MR GREENHALL

8 MR GREENHALL: Sir, I'm just changing places with
9 Ms Brander.

10 Sir, we have had some evidence today in relation to
11 events at Twickenham which goes a little beyond material
12 that we've had before; and I would ask if I can ask some
13 follow-up questions in relation to those matters.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: You're right, it does. You may.

15 Questions by MR GREENHALL

16 MR GREENHALL: I'm very grateful.

17 HN336, can I take it you can hear me?

18 A. I can, thank you.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 You said in your evidence today that it was as
21 a result of your experiences at Twickenham that led you
22 to leave your infiltration of the STST; is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Now, if I could have, please, shown on the screen
25 document {MPS-0736268}.

1 We can see here that the date of that document is
2 22 April 1970, and that is a report submitted by you.
3 If we scroll down to the bottom we can see that it has
4 your details at the bottom.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. If we move back up again to the top, we can see it
7 reports about the inaugural meeting of the North London
8 Stop the Seventy Tour being held on Friday,
9 17 April 1970. So you would accept that certainly in
10 April of 1970 you are still seeking to gather
11 information about the Stop the Seventy Tour?

12 A. Yes. Well, if I was at that meeting, yes, yes, correct.

13 Q. Well, the Twickenham matches, they all took place in
14 December of 1969, so in light of the fact that in April
15 of '70 you are still seeking to infiltrate new groups of
16 the Stop the Seventy Tour, would you accept that
17 the Twickenham matches did not in fact lead you to leave
18 the Stop the Seventy Tour?

19 A. I -- I do see the point you're making. I still would
20 contend that my attendance at that meeting was part of
21 my brief to glean what information I could. I didn't --
22 wasn't able to make a hard and fast ruling that I would
23 not ever entertain the idea of going to an STST meeting
24 again. I was just horrified at the amount of violence
25 people were prepared to use against policemen and it --

1 it turned a corner for me in terms of my projected or --
2 you know, protected -- projected involvement with that
3 organisation. The fact that you can show me something
4 that happened four or five months later doesn't preclude
5 me from extending the brief that I was already under to
6 report whatever I could whenever I could, without
7 getting involved in the way that I had been at
8 Twickenham.

9 Q. And in relation to matters at Twickenham, you said that
10 your first written record made of that was in your
11 witness statement that was made in May of last year; is
12 that correct?

13 A. Yes, yes.

14 Q. So presumably that explains why we don't have any record
15 from the records of the SDS about events at Twickenham;
16 is that correct?

17 A. I -- I don't know why the events at Twickenham are not
18 more thoroughly recorded.

19 Q. You accept that the events of Twickenham would have been
20 the sort of thing that the SDS would have been
21 interested to know about, yeah?

22 A. Well, I thought we did know, because certainly
23 the police would have -- would have known; they would
24 have received the same sort of information I was in
25 possession of prior to the game taking place, that

1 outbreaks of violence would be attempted at given
2 signals at various points around the ground. And if
3 I was party to that, it was not something that I would
4 sit upon, I would have passed that on. But whether
5 I picked that up or whether I --

6 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- you yourself didn't make any
7 written record of events at Twickenham?

8 A. No.

9 MR GREENHALL: Thank you. I have no further questions.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

11 Mr Sanders, do you have any questions arising out of
12 what -- the evidence that's been given today?

13 MR SANDERS: No questions. Thank you, sir.

14 Questions by THE CHAIRMAN

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 Would you bear with me, please, while I ask a couple
17 of questions of my own.

18 If I put to you an event which did occur and was
19 widely reported, could I ask you just to reflect
20 a moment.

21 On 19 July 1975, the cricket pitch at Headingley was
22 dug up by the Free George Davis campaign, a man who was
23 serving I think 20 years for a serious offence at the
24 time and some people thought that he was wrongly
25 convicted. Does that ring a bell?

1 A. I remember the George Davis incident, sir; I don't
2 remember the cricket pitch at Headingley being involved.
3 But -- but I remember the George Davis bank robbery
4 interest.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: None of us have been able to find any
6 instance on which the cricket pitch was dug up at Lords,
7 as you've said. And if that had happened, one would
8 have expected it to have appeared in the newspapers.

9 A. Indeed.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Is it possible you're muddling up the two
11 incidents?

12 A. I don't think I'm muddling up. I think, in retrospect,
13 when it's been pointed out by you, sir, and by Mr Barr,
14 that it hadn't appeared in the newspapers, it -- I'm
15 confused therefore in my mind that something had
16 occurred at a meeting prior to the -- the tour taking
17 place that -- that would have indicated that they were
18 the -- they were the intentions of the demonstrators,
19 and -- and clearly I'm mistaken and I accept that.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: These mistakes are very easy to make after
21 the distance in time that you're being asked to
22 remember.

23 A. Thank you.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: One final topic, if I may.

25 A. Sir.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: You did infiltrate and take the keys or an
2 impression of the keys of the IMG offices.

3 A. Yes.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you remember whether you were
5 infiltrating the IMG at the same time as you were
6 reporting on the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign?

7 A. I couldn't pass -- I don't know the timing now, so I --
8 I don't think so. The IMG incident was really quite at
9 the closing of my SDS involvement, so I can't
10 necessarily see an overlap with the STST. That --
11 the incident involving that meeting was -- was my last
12 commitment, if you like, to a meeting with the -- for
13 the SDS, and I told my management soon afterwards that
14 that was the case. So it wouldn't have been an overlap
15 with the STST, no.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: The last reports we have been able to
17 retrieve of your STST involvement are dated May 1970.
18 Can we therefore take it that your infiltration of
19 the IMG was after that date, and also the date on which
20 you left was after that date?

21 A. I have to accept that, yes. Yes.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed for helping us
23 with your recollection of events all those years ago.
24 Your evidence is now concluded. I'm grateful to you for
25 coming.

1 A. Thank you, sir.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: We will resume at 2.05 so that everybody has
3 their hour's lunch break. Thank you.

4 MS PURSER: Thank you very much, everyone. We will now take
5 a lunch break and we will be back at 2.05. You may now
6 go into your break-out rooms.

7 (1.02 pm)

8 (The short adjournment)

9 (2.05 pm)

10 MS PURSER: Good afternoon, everyone and welcome to
11 the afternoon session of today's evidential hearings.
12 For those of you in the virtual hearing room, please
13 remember to turn off both your camera and video, unless
14 you are invited to speak by the Chairman.

15 I will now hand over to our Chairman,
16 Sir John Mitting, to continue proceedings.
17 Chairman.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. As at the beginning of every
19 session of evidential hearings, the recording made by me
20 earlier this year is going to be played. If you're
21 listening to it for the first time, please listen
22 carefully:

23 "I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,
24 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make
25 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including

1 its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have
2 made a number of orders which affect what you may and
3 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave
4 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter
5 and may have serious consequences for you.

6 "If I am satisfied that a person may have breached
7 an order, I have the power to certify the matter to
8 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
9 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
10 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
11 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
12 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
13 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
14 sequestration of their assets.

15 "Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
16 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
17 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
18 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
19 the hearings rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
20 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any
21 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
22 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
23 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing
24 room to any other person, but only once at least ten
25 minutes have elapsed since the event which you are

1 describing took place.

2 "This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
3 the Inquiry I have made orders prohibiting the public
4 disclosure of information, for example about
5 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
6 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,
7 whether by accident or design, information which I have
8 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
9 be disclosed in a hearing.

10 "If and when that happens, I will immediately
11 suspend the hearing and make an order prohibiting
12 further disclosure of the information outside
13 the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that no
14 further disclosure of that information may be made by
15 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device
16 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside
17 it.

18 "I am sorry if you find this message alarming; it is
19 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
20 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
21 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
22 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
23 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
24 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own
25 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their

1 best to ensure that you can.

2 "If you have any doubt about the terms of this
3 message, or what you may or may not do, you should not
4 hesitate to ask one of them and with my help, if
5 necessary, they will provide you with the answer."

6 May HN340 please identify himself and be sworn or
7 affirmed at his choice.

8 HN340

9 MS PURSER: Good afternoon, HN340. Can you see and hear me?

10 A. Yes.

11 MS PURSER: I understand that you would like to affirm?

12 A. Yes.

13 (Witness sworn)

14 MS PURSER: Thank you very much.

15 Chairman.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 There is a gentleman sitting behind you. Can you
18 confirm, please, that he is the only person in the room
19 with you.

20 A. He is the only person in the room, yes.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I think he's there to help with
22 the technology, should you need it.

23 A. I do need it with technology, yes.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Snap.

25 Ms Hummerstone.

1 Questions by MS HUMMERSTONE

2 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you, sir.

3 HN340, you provided the Inquiry with a witness
4 statement dated 10 July 2019. Are you familiar with
5 the contents of your witness statement?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And is the contents of that statement true to the best
8 of your knowledge and belief?

9 A. Yes, it is.

10 Q. I'm going to refer to you as "340" or "HN340" throughout
11 your evidence this afternoon. In the SDS, is it right
12 you used the cover name either "Alan Nixon"
13 or "Andy Bailey"? In fact, you think more likely, on
14 reflection, "Andy Bailey"; is that right?

15 A. Yes, that is.

16 Q. HN340, I'm going to begin with some questions about your
17 police training. You joined as a police cadet in
18 the [late 1950's], you became a uniformed officer in
19 the early 1960s, and then a Special Branch officer in
20 the mid-1960s; is that right?

21 A. Yes, that is right.

22 Q. Going back, please, to the beginning of your police
23 training, can you recall the length of your initial
24 police training at Hendon?

25 A. The first period, as a cadet, was for four weeks. That

1 was the [late 1950's]. And then in [late 1950's] it was
2 13 weeks, as a cadet still, which is the normal period
3 for people joining direct as a constable. And then
4 after that, it was a two-year probation period. After
5 -- after I joined as a constable.

6 Q. Thank you very much.

7 And what was included in that two-year training
8 period. Were you taught your duty to keep
9 the Queen's Peace?

10 A. I should imagine it was, yes. I can't remember details,
11 because what happened was you'd have one day a month,
12 probably, with an inspector going through various,
13 you know, bits of law and such. That's as much as I can
14 remember about it.

15 Q. And how about training on the ethics and standards that
16 should be adhered to as a police officer?

17 A. Well, again, specifically, I can't remember any details,
18 but I mean, at that -- in that era, one accepted it,
19 that as a, you know, police officer, you -- you did
20 things that weren't going to be against the law or such.

21 Q. So, you've told us you had a probationary period
22 initially of two years. Can I ask you now about your --
23 when you joined Special Branch. Was there an
24 application and selection process for joining
25 Special Branch?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And was there a written exam?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Did you also serve a probationary period for your
5 Special Branch role too?
- 6 A. Yes. I can't remember how long that was though.
- 7 Q. You can't remember how long, okay.
- 8 And in your Special Branch work prior to your
9 deployment with the SDS, had you been required to be
10 involved in any undercover policing work?
- 11 A. No.
- 12 Q. Had you, in that time, attended any meetings of
13 political activists?
- 14 A. No, not really. The only -- the nearest to that would
15 have been that it was usual, on a Sunday morning, to --
16 one or two officers to go to Speakers' Corner at
17 Hyde Park. But as -- but as regards closed meetings,
18 I -- I didn't.
- 19 Q. Did you attend any political -- any public political
20 meetings apart from those at Speakers' Corner, can you
21 recall --
- 22 A. Not that I can recall -- (overspeaking) --
- 23 Q. -- (inaudible) your special branch role?
- 24 A. Not that I can recall.
- 25 Q. Cannot recall.

1 A. No.

2 Q. And when you attended the Speakers' Corner meetings,
3 would you have attended in plain clothes?

4 A. Well, when you're in Special Branch, you were always in
5 plain clothes.

6 Q. And so you weren't obvious -- (overspeaking) --

7 A. You got rid of your uniform when you went in
8 Special Branch. You didn't have a uniform.

9 Q. Were you -- were you obviously a police officer to
10 the naked eye, if you attended at Speakers' Corner?

11 A. I would hope not.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 And did you obtain any training in any undercover
14 work prior to your role with the SDS?

15 A. No.

16 Q. You were invited to join the SDS by Phil Saunders; is
17 that right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And in your witness statement you say you had a chat
20 with him and he told you that the role of the SDS police
21 officer was getting advanced information on
22 demonstrations, including the time and locations, as
23 well as the groups that were likely to participate in
24 them, and that the hours would be irregular and would
25 include some weekend working.

1 Prior to joining the SDS, was that the extent of
2 the explanation you received about your forthcoming
3 role, or were you given any more information?

4 A. I can't remember there would be anything else, and that
5 would have been as it would have been. You know, he
6 would just outline briefly, and then -- because
7 basically, at that time, it wasn't well known too much
8 about the Special Demonstration Squad, so obviously he's
9 not going to go into great detail, I wouldn't have
10 thought. It wouldn't have been the way of doing things.

11 Q. Just picking up on that point, had you known very much
12 about the SDS prior to joining it?

13 A. No. Basically nothing.

14 Q. And when you joined it, were you asked to keep that
15 joining a secret?

16 A. No, not specifically, as I remember, but that was one of
17 the things about being in Special Branch, you
18 did -- you know, one of the big things they said
19 was "need to know"; and that's how the branch operated
20 in lots of areas. So they didn't need to spell it out
21 to us, no; we took it as fact.

22 Q. So it wasn't information that you shared, that you were
23 a member of the SDS?

24 A. No.

25 Q. But is this right, you weren't specifically asked not

- 1 to?
- 2 A. Not that I can recall. I mean, you might have been, but
3 I don't remember as such.
- 4 Q. Thank you.
- 5 In your witness statements you describe
6 a conversation with Mike Ferguson, who assisted you in
7 how to create your cover identity, for want of a better
8 expression; he told you to get a cover name, a cover
9 address and a cover job; is that right?
- 10 A. Yes, that would have been about it, yeah.
- 11 Q. Mike Ferguson either was or had been a field officer in
12 the SDS; is that right?
- 13 A. He was at the time that I joined, yes.
- 14 Q. When you had that conversation with him, was that when
15 you were in the back office, the SDS back office?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. And was the back office -- was that -- do you mean at
18 Scotland Yard?
- 19 A. Yes, yes.
- 20 Q. And Mike Ferguson, was he then in a back office role?
- 21 A. No, no, he was -- he was active in the field.
- 22 Q. He was active.
- 23 A. Oh yes.
- 24 Q. But you saw him at Scotland Yard?
- 25 A. Well, I can't remember exactly where it was I saw him,

- 1 but, you know --
- 2 Q. Okay --
- 3 A. -- probably -- probably unlikely at Scotland Yard,
- 4 because obviously he didn't go into there, as did other
- 5 officers didn't go into there. When you're in the field
- 6 you didn't go into Scotland Yard.
- 7 Q. I wanted to just ask you about that in a moment.
- 8 Just going back to what you were told by
- 9 Mike Ferguson, was that the extent of the guidance you
- 10 were given about preparing yourself for attending
- 11 political activist groups undercover?
- 12 A. As far as I can remember, yes. Yeah, nobody else was --
- 13 there was no set training routine, as it were, no.
- 14 Q. And it wasn't suggested to you, for example, to have any
- 15 sort of back story available or anything of that nature?
- 16 A. Again, not as I remember, no, no. Which is probably why
- 17 I didn't have one.
- 18 Q. And did it ever occur to you to create one?
- 19 A. Initially, no. Perhaps in, you know, ignorance or
- 20 naivety on my part, but no.
- 21 Q. And did there come a time when it might have been useful
- 22 to have had one?
- 23 A. Later on, yes, definitely.
- 24 Q. Just very, very briefly dealing with Mike Ferguson, you
- 25 say he was still actively deployed at the time, is that

1 right, when you had that conversation with him?

2 A. When I first spoke with him, yes.

3 Q. And were you aware whether he had any position of

4 authority within the Stop the Seventy Tour?

5 A. Not really, no. No -- (overspeaking) --

6 Q. (inaudible) -- interrupt you.

7 A. Sorry?

8 Q. Sorry, I don't want to interrupt you, carry on.

9 A. All I was going to say is, when you were active, you

10 didn't discuss other officers' activities, what they

11 were up to.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. You know, and what they were involved in. You know,

14 that was down to them, and you were busy with your own

15 goings on, you know?

16 Q. Does it follow, then, that if I were to ask you whether

17 he assumed any position of authority within

18 the Anti-Apartheid Movement, you'd give me the same

19 answer, you didn't know --

20 A. Well, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't have any idea, no.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 Whilst you were in back office, before you were

23 actively deployed, were there other officers there,

24 either officers waiting to be deployed or officers who

25 had been withdrawn from their active roles in the SDS

- 1 back office?
- 2 A. Well, again, as I -- as I can remember, I can't remember
3 anybody having come inside, as it were, you know, from
4 being in the field. I can't remember anybody. And as
5 regards waiting to go out, it wouldn't -- again, I can't
6 be a hundred per cent sure, but it wouldn't have made
7 a lot of sense to have more than one person, as it were,
8 waiting.
- 9 Q. Right.
- 10 A. Again --
- 11 Q. -- (overspeaking) --
- 12 A. -- I might not be accurate on that totally. But that's
13 how it would appear to be --
- 14 Q. So is this right: you can't recall anyone who had been
15 withdrawn who was in back office at the time who'd
16 already been --
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. And you think it's unlikely that there would have been
19 anyone waiting to go out?
- 20 A. More than one person at that time, and that one person
21 would have been me, so therefore, possibly after I went
22 out, there may have been. But again, I don't really
23 know.
- 24 Q. I ask you that because at one stage in your witness
25 statement you're dealing with the clerical roles that

1 were assumed by the SDS. And I think you said that
2 clerical roles would have been assumed by SDS officers
3 in the back office, either those awaiting their
4 deployment or having been withdrawn from their active
5 deployment. So I just wanted to explore who might have
6 been in the back office at the time?

7 A. Well, again, myself -- when I was there waiting to go
8 out, that would have been me, but not as an ex. And
9 the other people in there, as far as I'm aware, there
10 was a couple of inspectors and a chief inspector --
11 I can't remember his surname. Any more than that ...
12 they -- as far as -- I'm pretty certain, they hadn't
13 been active in the field.

14 Q. Right.

15 A. Again, it's possible, but I -- I don't think they did.

16 Q. How long were you in the back office before you were
17 deployed; can you remember?

18 A. Not exactly no, no. I mean, if I had to have a guess,
19 I would say give or take four/six months, something like
20 that, but I don't know.

21 Q. And what were you doing in the back office at that time;
22 can you recall?

23 A. Again, the details I don't know, but it would probably
24 have involved typing up reports and checking out various
25 bits and pieces that -- of information that had come in

1 from one, you know, source or another. Other than
2 that --

3 Q. But by "typing up reports", do you mean the reports that
4 had been sent in by --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- other SDS officers active in the field?

7 A. Yeah, yeah.

8 Q. And did that assist you in understanding your
9 forthcoming role to be -- to be looking at their reports
10 and the sorts of things that they were reporting on?

11 A. I suppose in a way it would have been, yes. Yeah, yeah.
12 Give more of an idea than it had before, anyway.

13 Q. And you said there were a couple of detective inspectors
14 I think in the back office as well, and a detective --
15 and a chief inspector also in the back office; is that
16 right?

17 A. Yes, yeah. They -- they were -- there might have been
18 more, but those are the only ones I can really think of.

19 Q. And were they people that you could ask for assistance
20 or guidance about your forthcoming deployment?

21 A. I would have thought so, yes, if need be. But at that
22 time, as I say, things weren't, you can say, you know,
23 structured to do that sort of thing, you know, to -- to,
24 as it were, train or, you know, prepare people in
25 detail.

1 Q. Whilst you were in the back office, did you undertake
2 any group or political research about the sorts of
3 groups that you might be rubbing shoulders with during
4 the course of your deployment?

5 A. Again, not as I can remember, no. No.

6 Q. How did you prepare yourself for going out into
7 the field?

8 A. Good question. I'm not really sure, I think, of
9 the answer to that one. I don't know. Nothing. As far
10 as I can remember, basically nothing, really.

11 Q. You say in your witness statement that Mike Ferguson's
12 only real advice was to simply play it by ear. Was that
13 the advice that you by and large followed?

14 A. There wasn't much else to follow really. Yeah,
15 basically that's it --

16 Q. So was it -- (overspeaking) --

17 A. -- (inaudible).

18 Q. -- really a question of learning on the job, as it were?

19 A. Yeah. I was hoping he might have given me some pearls
20 of wisdom that would have made life -- you know? But as
21 you said, once you're out there, nobody knows exactly
22 what's going to turn up next, and you've got to be
23 prepared for anything.

24 Q. In your witness statement you say that you were -- as
25 Special Branch officers, you were trusted to use your

1 common sense and good judgment, reinforced by your
2 previous police training, particularly the instruction
3 manual that you'd received during the initial training,
4 to act correctly and avoid getting into trouble.

5 Did that training inform your approach to, firstly,
6 participation in crime and, secondly, any intimate
7 relationships with other -- with activists whilst you
8 were undercover, do you think?

9 A. I don't really understand quite what you're getting at
10 really.

11 Q. You said that you -- you were trusted to use your common
12 sense and good judgment. You had had police training to
13 act correctly and avoid getting into trouble. And did
14 that help you in your approach to -- for example, if you
15 were -- there was an opportunity to -- you were in
16 a position where a crime might have been committed, did
17 that assist you having had that police training and that
18 training in the ethos and the -- and the -- sorry, let
19 me just wait a moment. I've just forgotten the word --
20 the standards to be upheld as a police officer? Did
21 that assist you, that training, that basic training?

22 A. Well, yes, I mean, as I say, that was basic training as
23 a police officer as (inaudible) before I joined
24 the Branch and uniform. And then when you're -- after
25 joining Special Branch, again, these things -- well, for

1 most people, I'm sure, were taken for granted, you know,
2 know what I mean? It wasn't something that people made
3 a big issue of, you know, on a day-to-day basis, you
4 just took it as fact: you're a policeman so therefore
5 you, you know, act accordingly.

6 And as regards the other thing about getting
7 involved in crime things and that with other people, as
8 I say, they -- what regularly cropped up was
9 the phrase "agent provocateur". So therefore you didn't
10 do something which could then be interpreted as you
11 having, you know, fallen into that, as it were, trap, if
12 that makes sense.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 I'm going to now ask you about the writing of
15 reports and the contents of those reports. As
16 a Special Branch officer, I think you'd been
17 a Special Branch officer for nearly five years by
18 the time you became an SDS officer. Had you had
19 previous experience writing reports?

20 A. Yes, that was -- that was, you know, a regular feature.

21 Q. What sort of details would you routinely include in
22 a Special Branch report?

23 A. Well -- (overspeaking) --

24 Q. Would you include, for example, personal details of
25 individuals reported on?

1 A. If that was what the reason for the report was, then
2 yes. In fact, it nearly always would involve personal
3 details.

4 Q. Thank you very much.

5 Let's -- let's make it more specific. So, looking
6 at your role as an SDS officer attending a meeting,
7 a political meeting, the sorts of things that you would
8 have routinely reported on: personal details of those
9 people in attendance? Would that be something you'd
10 routinely report on?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. How about identifying features of people in attendance?
13 Is that something you'd routinely report on?

14 A. Not necessarily routinely, no. But, I mean, if -- if it
15 was thought necessary, then -- you know, for
16 identification purposes, then yes.

17 Q. So we reported on if it was necessary for identification
18 purposes?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. How about reporting on the future plans and events of
21 the groups whose meetings you were attending? Was that
22 something you'd routinely report or include in a report?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. How about reports on group activities, discussions or
25 interests?

1 A. Again, same thing: if it was likely to be of interest,
2 yes.

3 Q. Is there anything else you can think of that would be
4 routinely reported?

5 A. Not really, no. I don't know what you have in mind, but
6 no, not really.

7 Q. Were you directed to not report certain matters, or was
8 that not something that happened?

9 A. Again, not that I can recall, no. I mean, as far as
10 I was concerned, what I saw, heard and whatever, I'd
11 record it and then leave it to the, you know --

12 Q. So your approach was to -- (overspeaking) --

13 A. -- (inaudible).

14 Q. Sorry, (inaudible) interrupt you -- (overspeaking) --

15 A. -- (overspeaking) -- for them to filter it or whatever,
16 you know, to use it. I didn't see that as my task to --
17 to, you know, censor things or not, you know, just
18 report as -- as happened.

19 Q. So you would put everything into a report unfiltered,
20 other people may or may not filter it; is that your --

21 A. That's my impression, yeah.

22 Q. The process of writing a report, you would attend
23 a meeting. And then, is this right, you would go to
24 the SDS headquarters flat on the following day, if
25 the meeting was in the evening, and write up your notes;

- 1 is that right?
- 2 A. That was generally the way it was done, yes.
- 3 Q. And those were then submitted up the chain of command;
- 4 is that right?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. They were then typed up by back office. You didn't type
- 7 your own reports; is that right?
- 8 A. No.
- 9 Q. And other bits of information were then incorporated
- 10 into those reports, file references and matters of that
- 11 nature?
- 12 A. (inaudible) things, yeah.
- 13 Q. Were the files, the Special Branch files available to
- 14 you as an SDS officer on deployment?
- 15 A. I would imagine, if -- if necessary. But again, I can't
- 16 remember specifically, but if for some reason, which
- 17 I can't think basically why, it could have been. But
- 18 again, the problem with that, you know, possibly would
- 19 have been then the files would have been -- had to be
- 20 taken out of Scotland Yard, which, you know, is not
- 21 a recommended thing -- or wasn't recommended.
- 22 Q. And I think you told us earlier you weren't attending
- 23 Scotland Yard at that stage; is that right?
- 24 A. Well, when you're in the field, no, you didn't.
- 25 Q. Did you see a report after it had been typed up?

- 1 A. Not that I can recall, no. No.
- 2 Q. I think you said in your witness statement if you had
3 seen it, you would sign it; is that right?
- 4 A. Well, that would have been the reason for seeing it,
5 you know, to send it to you to -- you know, for
6 a signature.
- 7 Q. But in fact, you think you rarely saw them, if at all?
- 8 A. No. No, I don't -- I don't recall that we did.
- 9 Q. You say in your witness statement that you think
10 the reporting that the inquiry has been able to locate
11 is incomplete; is that right?
- 12 A. The reports with my -- (overspeaking) --
- 13 Q. (inaudible) -- haven't got the full extent of your
14 reports -- (overspeaking) --
- 15 A. -- (overspeaking) -- even from, you know, limited,
16 you know, not remembering everything, yes, I would say
17 that certain little incidents that I do have vague
18 recollection of, which aren't contained in that bundle
19 of reports with my name at the bottom.
- 20 Q. That was going to be my next question: why do you think
21 we're lacking some of your reports? What is it that
22 makes you think that?
- 23 A. I have got no idea whatsoever, because again, that was
24 not something that I had any contact or influence on at
25 all. The only thing that surprises me in a way is

1 the fact that, you know, after 50 years nearly even some
2 of the reports are still in existence.

3 Q. How much do you think is missing? Is it a lot more
4 reporting we're missing; or do you think it's just
5 a small amount?

6 A. I can't really hazard a guess. It wouldn't -- it could
7 be near or it could be way out, if I'd made a guess,
8 because it would be a guess because I don't know.

9 Q. And what sorts of things are you surprised not to see in
10 that reporting. What are the -- what are the reports
11 that you think we're missing? What sort of occasions do
12 you think we're lacking reports on that you can
13 remember?

14 A. Can I just make a -- the reference to behind me, please?

15 Q. Sorry?

16 A. Can I refer to the colleague behind?

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me. For what purpose do you want to
18 refer to your colleague?

19 A. Well, just to -- to whether what we said earlier is --
20 is -- is what is being asked of me at the minute in
21 relation to an incident.

22 Anyway, yeah, I'll take it as -- I'll take it as it
23 is all right then.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Could you do your best, and then if you do
25 need assistance, then of course you may have it.

1 A. Yeah, okay. Sorry about that.

2 MS HUMMERSTONE: What -- you said --

3 A. The only one -- the only one incident that I do recall
4 -- and again, I don't remember much detail about it,
5 only the very, very basics -- is that I went to a -- it
6 wasn't a meeting as such, a political meeting, it was
7 a function in Tottenham Court Road on a Saturday
8 evening. And subsequent to that, after we left the,
9 you know, place there, an explosion happened in the Post
10 Office Tower.

11 Now, that, I must have made a report. Obviously
12 I would have made a report because of the fact that
13 I went to the function. I didn't know anything about
14 the -- the explosion until the next morning when I --
15 I don't know, I can't recall it. But I almost certainly
16 would have got a phone call from one of the, you know,
17 inspectors or chief inspector, because they would have
18 known I would have been going to the function. And as
19 it happened so close, the Post Office Tower, they
20 obviously would have contacted me as to if I had any
21 inkling that that was happening, or had happened.

22 But of course, whatever time -- I don't know -- it
23 went off, but it was, in those days, pubs and that
24 closed at 11, and I would have left at the latest round
25 about then, and it must have occurred after that. But

1 as I say, I can't -- there wasn't anything in there
2 about a report that I obviously would have put in
3 regarding that.

4 Q. You refer to that incident in your witness statement.

5 You were at a function with members of the Irish
6 Solidarity Campaign that evening; is that right?

7 A. Yes, amongst others, yes.

8 Q. Okay. We will touch on that in a little while, okay?

9 A. As I say, I don't see -- I didn't see anything with my
10 name on as a report relating to my attendance at that
11 function, which I would have done, you know? That would
12 have been standard.

13 Q. Thank you. Thank you.

14 I'm just going to ask you very briefly about your
15 approach to your work as an SDS officer. You say in
16 your witness statement that the primary focus of your
17 undercover role was to gather information about
18 forthcoming events, demonstrations and pickets to
19 prevent public order problems; is that right? That's,
20 as you saw it, is your primary function?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You also say in your statement that you were not aware
23 that Special Branch had any formal role in countering
24 subversion but you were aware that the SDS gathered
25 information on individuals and organisations which were

1 unfriendly towards the state and its institutions, and
2 might use criminal methods to achieve their aims; is
3 that right?

4 A. Yeah, so, as I say, that was basically what
5 Special Branch, as I understood it, was partly involved
6 with.

7 Q. And how did you become aware of this secondary role that
8 you had? So the first role you had was in -- a public
9 order one. The second role you had was in gathering
10 information on individuals or institutions who might --
11 who were unfriendly towards the state and might use
12 criminal methods to undermine it. How did you become
13 aware of that secondary role?

14 A. Well, again, as far as -- basically concerned, that's
15 one of the main functions of Special Branch full stop.
16 Not necessarily confining it to the activities of
17 the SDS but -- you know?

18 Q. So did that form part of your training for your
19 Special Branch role as a whole?

20 A. Yes, could be said, yes.

21 Q. Were you ever given any explanation or training or
22 instruction on what "subversion" meant?

23 A. At the moment I can't recall, but almost certainly
24 something must have been said on those lines. But
25 I can't recall anything specific. But that doesn't mean

1 to say it didn't happen.

2 Q. And how about "extremism"? Any explanation or any
3 instruction as to what "extremism" meant?

4 A. Again, same answer as just, but not -- again, I can't
5 remember anything specific coming out.

6 Q. I want to ask you briefly about the extent to which you
7 lived your life undercover. You say you were married
8 when you became an SDS officer; is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And that there was not much difference in the number of
11 the working hours between your Special Branch role and
12 your SDS role, it was just a slightly less regular
13 pattern of work; is that right?

14 A. Basically, yes. Yeah, the hours -- the total hours
15 would have been not much different, yes.

16 Q. And there was a certain amount of weekend work with your
17 SDS role because you went to demonstrations and you sold
18 Red Mole occasionally at the tube station?

19 A. Yes, yes.

20 Q. How much time -- you had cover accommodation; is that
21 right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And how much time did you spend at your cover
24 accommodation during the course of your deployment, do
25 you think, on average?

1 A. I was there two/three times a week, perhaps. Certainly
2 at least once a week to pay the rent.

3 Q. And when you say "visit", do you mean stay overnight,
4 or --

5 A. Very rarely. Very rarely did I stay overnight.

6 Q. And so does it follow, then, that your -- you'd return
7 to your own address at night-time?

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. Did that help you, do you think, to perform your role
10 undercover that you had that balance between your
11 working life and your home life?

12 A. I reckon it did, yeah, because obviously you've got to,
13 to put it bluntly, a certain amount of normality, as
14 opposed to the -- which, after all, whichever way you
15 look at it, doing the undercover work wasn't normally
16 [sic] life really. So yes, it was -- it was a good
17 foil, as it were, to the stress of doing the undercover
18 work.

19 Q. I want to ask you now about a few questions about
20 the SDS HQ flat. You say you visited there every
21 weekday afternoon almost without exception, to complete
22 and put in your notes; is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. When you attended, were there other SDS officers there?

25 A. Yes, most -- most officers who were operating at the

- 1 time, yes.
- 2 Q. And were they all performing the same function.
- 3 Were they all writing up their notes and putting in
- 4 their reports?
- 5 A. Yes. As I say, again, I can't remember the details, but
- 6 that would have been the reason for going there, yes.
- 7 Q. Was another reason to go there to socialise with people
- 8 who were doing a similar job to you and have a bit of
- 9 sort of downtime, as it were?
- 10 A. I think that was probably, you know, an intention.
- 11 Although it wasn't spelt out that way, that sounded --
- 12 or seems, you know, reasonable to suggest that, yeah.
- 13 Q. And whilst you were at the SDS flat, did you discuss
- 14 the deployments of the other SDS officers?
- 15 A. Not -- not really, no. I mean, it was -- you see, when
- 16 we were undercover there, each one of us were in --
- 17 basically in different areas. Sometimes there would be
- 18 an overlap, but one thing you made sure of, that we
- 19 didn't operate together. Although, it didn't mean to
- 20 say that you wouldn't come across one of your
- 21 colleagues. But not acknowledge them, you know? They'd
- 22 be somebody just, you know, passing, as it were. So,
- 23 there was no great reason to -- to discuss what was
- 24 going on. And quite honestly, I -- with the exception
- 25 of a couple of people which are just mentioned in

1 reports in particular, I've got no idea who the others
2 were involved with, because I didn't need to know.

3 Q. So is this right, did you not share your experiences
4 even in a sort of sanitised way?

5 A. I can't remember so, no. As I say, again, because
6 there's no great reason to.

7 Q. Did your managers visit you in your -- in the SDS
8 headquarters flat?

9 A. Oh yes, yes, because that's when they would collect the
10 -- you know, the draft reports that we'd got ready for
11 them.

12 Q. And did they visit regularly?

13 A. Oh yes, yes.

14 Q. And did they --

15 A. You know, not necessarily every day, because after all,
16 if -- if none of us had got anything to be collected,
17 then they may not turn up that particular day. But it
18 would be several times a week.

19 Q. And did your managers speak to you about the nature of
20 your deployments about things that had arisen during
21 the week, matters of that nature?

22 A. Again, I can't remember in detail, but, I mean, there
23 would have been some bits of discussion. We would have
24 said, "Oh, about that meeting you went to, so and so, so
25 and so," and then perhaps asked questions like that.

1 But, again, I can't remember it as being a set routine,
2 as it were, you know. But it seems logical that that's
3 what they would have done, because they were obviously
4 interested in a bit of background to what was all --
5 you know, to what was written down.

6 Q. And during those meetings with your managers at the SDS
7 headquarters flat, were you ever given any -- were you
8 ever tasked to undertake any particular work or find out
9 any particular matter, or anything of that nature?

10 A. Again, I can't remember anything specific being --
11 detail like that. I mean, that doesn't mean to say
12 things didn't, you know, come up in that way. But
13 I can't remember anything being said, you know,
14 particularly.

15 Q. We know, for example, that there was -- there were
16 a couple of occasions on which your managers did step in
17 to give you some direction. One was in attending
18 the Red Europe Conference, and another in declining an
19 invitation to join the IMG. Would those instructions
20 have been received by you in the SDS headquarters flat?
21 Is that the venue that you would have obtained those
22 instructions?

23 A. Oh yes, yeah, because as I say, we didn't go to
24 Scotland Yard anyway, so that's the only place basically
25 where stuff like that would have been discussed.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 I'm now going to ask you some questions about your
3 tasking.

4 Is this right: it appears that you were not tasked
5 initially to infiltrate any particular group when you
6 joined the SDS. So you weren't told by officers to find
7 out about any particular group and join their group?

8 A. No, I don't -- as I say, as far as I remember, no, and
9 I -- I think that's right, yeah. It was -- it was -- in
10 the early days, it was vague and open, you know? Again,
11 following on the lines of what was discussed with
12 Mike Ferguson; you know, you play things by ear and go
13 along and see what -- what is -- what's happening and
14 basically what is available, as it were.

15 Q. You've told us that your previous Special Branch
16 experience had not given you any experience in attending
17 political meetings of any kind. How did you form an
18 idea about the types of groups which might be an
19 appropriate target for your reporting?

20 A. Well, again, I'm not a hundred per cent sure what or
21 how, but bearing in mind, as far as I was aware of what
22 we'd been told that the -- after the -- one of
23 the incidents in Grosvenor Square, where there was
24 public order activities which were not expected to be as
25 bad as they were by our uniform colleagues, it was then

1 thought that perhaps by finding out from groups that
2 were potentially going to be involved in such
3 demonstrations, you know, go and try and get information
4 closer, you know, to hand, as it were, rather than just
5 relying on hoping that we could guess as to who and what
6 is going to be involved in those sort of demonstrations,
7 you know, particularly violent ones.

8 Q. You say that you were given a strong suggestion from
9 the chain of command to attend a meeting at Conway Hall;
10 and that I think you think was linked to the IMG. When
11 you were given that -- what form did that "strong
12 suggestion" take? What do you mean by "strong
13 suggestion"; can you recall?

14 A. I don't know what -- again, all that I can recall and
15 think is that, for whatever reason -- again, obviously
16 building back -- or building up towards this thing,
17 I was -- I must have been told, because I wouldn't have
18 gone wandering off to Red Lion Square just off my own
19 initiative. That wouldn't have been the way things
20 worked -- at that time. So, it must have been mentioned
21 to me that that meeting was taking place, and therefore,
22 to get a feel of what was out there and about, go along.
23 Basically that was it: just to get the feel of it and
24 see how it -- how it played out.

25 Q. Can you recall how you prepared for that meeting?

1 A. No. No.

2 Q. Were you given any sort of briefing about left wing
3 ideologies or matters of that nature?

4 A. Not specific to that, but, I mean, as I said before,
5 that was part of what the overall -- nothing to do with
6 the SDS, that was what the overall function of
7 Special Branch, as I understood it, was.

8 Q. And you -- at that meeting, which was I think attended
9 by -- I think you say Tariq Ali and Vanessa Redgrave
10 spoke at that meeting; is that right?

11 A. Yeah, as I remember, yes.

12 Q. And you approached them and spoke to them?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And can you recall what the nature of that conversation
15 was?

16 A. Not really, no. The only reason -- well, as I say
17 the reason why I -- again, having been let out of
18 the office, as it were, "Go out, find out, see what you
19 can do," I thought, well, I better try and make it --
20 make some progress, as it were. And I didn't know
21 anybody there. I mean, I only vaguely knew of those
22 two. And after all, they were the speakers, so they
23 were involved to a greater or lesser extent than
24 the people who were in the audience. So I thought,
25 well, if I speak to them, who knows. And again,

1 following Mike Ferguson's, you know, advice, go in and
2 play it by here. And that's how it basically happened.

3 Q. And Tariq Ali suggested that you attend the next meeting
4 of the North London Red Circle; is that right?

5 A. It must have been him, yeah, because he -- he was more
6 closely connected with that than Vanessa Redgrave was,
7 so it would unlikely have been her.

8 Q. Was that a group you had heard of previously?

9 A. What, the Red Circle? I'm pretty certain not, but
10 again, I wouldn't, you know, a hundred per cent say.
11 But I would have thought not; because, as far as I'm
12 aware, it wasn't a big, you know, big grouping; it was
13 just small.

14 Q. And so, is it right to say that that was not a group you
15 were tasked to infiltrate by your chain of command?

16 A. Yes, no, it would -- it wouldn't. I can't see that it
17 would have been. I mean, they -- they were possibly
18 aware of its existence, but as far as I can remember,
19 I wasn't until -- until then.

20 Q. So it was a -- it happened by chance, in fact, that you
21 attended that meeting with the North London Red Circle;
22 is that right?

23 A. Well, the chance plus the fact that, as I'd shown a bit
24 of an interest in what was going on at that meeting.
25 Again, I don't remember the meeting in Red Lion Square,

1 who it was on behalf of, who the details were, I don't
2 remember. But the fact that Tariq Ali had suggested me
3 going along there, obviously thinking that I was
4 interested in that area of things, that's it.

5 Q. And was there anything secretive about the way that you
6 were invited along to that group?

7 A. No, no, no, no.

8 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- about it?

9 A. No, I wouldn't have thought so, no. It was just -- it
10 probably, as I say, was being helpful to somebody who
11 appeared to be taking an interest on -- in that kind of
12 thing.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 How did your chain of command view the North London
15 Red Circle, do you know?

16 A. Not specifically, no, but I can't -- I can't think that
17 they, you know -- so they must have known of
18 the existence of it before I mentioned that I had been
19 invited to go along there. But other than that, I don't
20 know what they knew or what they thought.

21 Q. Do you get the impressions that they thought that it was
22 a good use of your time to attend their meetings and
23 that the intelligence you provided had some utility?
24 Did you get that impression?

25 A. I can't remember that. But if they'd have thought it

1 was a waste of time, I'm pretty sure they would have
2 said, "Don't bother". But whether I'm being, you
3 know -- I don't know specifically.

4 Q. You say of the North London Red Circle in your witness
5 statement that whilst it had not been specifically
6 identified to you as a target by your chain of command,
7 it was sufficiently involved in supporting and arranging
8 left-wing demonstrations, pickets and other events that
9 you could provide useful reporting on potential
10 flashpoints; is that right?

11 A. Mm, basically, yes, that's --

12 Q. Was that the impression you got from your chain of
13 command?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. I wonder if we could just, please, bring up the witness
16 statement, please. It's {MPS-0740414}. It's going to
17 come up on the screen.

18 A. Sorry, sorry, sorry.

19 Q. I just want to refer you to a paragraph of it. It's
20 page 12 of that document, {MPS-0740414/12}. And if we
21 can zoom in, please, on paragraph 39.

22 A. That's not showing yet.

23 Q. {MPS-074014/13}. Can you see that, HN340? It says
24 there:

25 "I do not recall whether I checked with the chain of

1 command about the North London Red Circle, or received
2 any further formal direction from them. As far as I was
3 concerned, the deployment was open-ended from
4 the outset, although it was assumed that I could pull
5 out if it became necessary and that I might be
6 withdrawn, possibly with a view to being retasked, if
7 I was not providing useful information."

8 In that paragraph you talk about your deployment
9 being "open-ended". What do you mean by that?

10 A. Well, the fact that I was invited along -- or to go
11 there by Tariq Ali. So what it says at the top there,
12 "I do not recall whether I checked with the chain of
13 command", again, I can't remember exactly, but it's
14 pretty certain that having gone to the meeting in Red
15 Lion Square, I would have done some sort of report in
16 relation to that; because, again, you know, you didn't
17 go to something and then just forget about it. So,
18 you know, that's that bit of it.

19 And then, "As far as I was concerned, the deployment
20 was open-ended", well, it comes back to this thing
21 again, the Mike Ferguson philosophy: go and try it and
22 see what happens. If they'd have said -- if the back
23 office chain of command people had not wanted me to be
24 involved, then they would have -- would have said so.
25 So they must have thought that there was a possibility

1 of something -- as it says at the bottom -- being
2 useful. That's, again, not from pure memory exactly as
3 it happened, but it's assumption, and I think fairly
4 close to what would have been the case.

5 Q. So it was really a sort of "follow your nose" sort of
6 approach; is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you say that you could have been retasked if you
9 weren't providing useful information. But were you told
10 that you were providing useful information?

11 A. Rarely did that -- not being too cynical there, but
12 rarely did that sort of, in my experience, there, that
13 wasn't the way things worked. If you did something that
14 wasn't approved of, you would have been told. But if it
15 was something that was -- for want of a better
16 expression, what you were supposed to be doing, then
17 they didn't, you know, shower you with praise, as it
18 were. Just that's it; that's what you're there for; get
19 on with it.

20 Q. So it was the fact that you weren't, as it were, told
21 off that gave you the impression --

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. -- that you were doing something right?

24 A. It must have been, yeah. Yeah.

25 Q. Can you take that one down, please, because I just want

1 to look at one example where you do appear to have had
2 some feedback on the work that you did. It's -- can we
3 have up {MPS-0738137}, please. Page 13
4 {MPS-0738137/13}. Can you hone in on the bottom,
5 please.

6 This is in relation to a report --

7 A. Ah yeah, yeah.

8 Q. -- HN68 --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- gave of the founding conference of the Irish
11 Solidarity Campaign.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And on the following page you can see that this is
14 written by an assistant chief superintendent:

15 "This is an excellent and most comprehensive report
16 which reflects credit on DS HN340 and DC HN68 who, it is
17 known, worked under conditions of considerable
18 difficulty.

19 "The Conference was clearly not the success hoped
20 for by LAWLESS and ..."

21 Somebody whose name has been redacted for privacy
22 reasons:

23 "... and the very ready friction between IS and
24 the ..."

25 I think that's meant to be:

1 "... IMG supporters augers ill for the future of
2 the organisation."

3 Can we just turn over to the next page, please,
4 page 14 scroll down, {MPS-0738137/14}.

5 A. Right.

6 Q. And at the top there are instructions to send the copies
7 of the report to various others, including to Box 500.
8 That's the Security Service, isn't it, HN340; did you
9 know that?

10 A. That's what it was understood to be at the time, yes.

11 Q. Also to -- copies sent to the Home Office. And that's
12 signed by Assistant Chief Superintendent Roger Watson.

13 Towards the bottom of the page, please, we can see
14 a handwritten note from the Deputy Assistant
15 Commissioner:

16 "The very detailed and interesting effort at 6A ..."

17 Which is the reports:

18 "... [something] first class work by DS HN340 and
19 DC HN68. Their knowledge of the main personalities
20 [involved] and the organisations they ..."

21 I'm afraid I can't read that word:

22 "... stands out very clearly indeed. Please ensure
23 that the officers are [something] informed by
24 CI Saunders."

25 Thank you. You can take that down now, please.

1 I think you've probably answered this question
2 already, but was feedback about your reports common or
3 uncommon?

4 A. Having read that, again, all I can say is that my memory
5 doesn't sort of recall that I did get any -- that was
6 said there, praise, or whatever you like to call it, for
7 that report. It doesn't mean to say I didn't, but
8 I don't remember having been told that.

9 Q. Okay. Thank you.

10 In your witness statement you say that members of
11 the SDS were treated as experienced professionals and
12 given a significant discretion as to how you operated.

13 What degree of oversight do you think was operating
14 about your deployment? What -- how much attention do
15 you think your managers were paying to your reporting?

16 A. I don't really know what -- what to say on that.

17 I don't know. Other than the fact that, again, all
18 I can say is, if you were doing something that they
19 disapproved of, then they would have told you.

20 Q. Right. So that was the --

21 A. That's all I can think. Other than that, I don't
22 really, you know, have anything to say on that really.

23 Q. Right.

24 So you just had to carry on until you were told to
25 do otherwise. Was that the approach?

1 A. As I remember it now, basically, yes, yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 I'm going to move on now to looking at your
4 reporting on the North London Red Circle. You describe
5 that as a recruiting round for the IMG, and in fact
6 attempts were eventually made to recruit you to the IMG;
7 is that right?

8 A. That's as I remember it, yes.

9 Q. As to the nature of the IMG -- sorry, not the IMG,
10 the North London Red Circle, can we please look at
11 the following documents {UCPI0000008183}. Thank you.

12 This is a report from 28 September 1970. I think
13 your first report for the North London Red Circle is on
14 24 July. So by this stage, you'd been in the group for
15 about two -- attending meetings of the group for about
16 two months. The central paragraph states that:

17 "There was a long discussion on the proposed series
18 of talks ... and it was decided that the first would be
19 on 13.10.70 when, it was hoped ..."

20 Somebody whose names have been redacted for privacy
21 reasons:

22 "... would talk on 'Israel'. The talks will be
23 fortnightly from 13.10.70 until 8.12.70 and the subjects
24 to be covered will include 'Black Power' (speaker not
25 yet known); 'Ireland' (Gery Lawless), 'trade

1 unions' ..."

2 That's someone whose name has been redacted for
3 privacy:

4 "... and 'Death of the New Left ..."

5 Again, the speaker's name has been redacted:

6 "... the order of the talks will be arranged later.

7 On 15.12.70 [privacy] will lecture on 'Why the 4th
8 International'."

9 Fourth paragraph:

10 "A short discussion followed on the current
11 Middle East situation."

12 Are those the sorts of topics that were of interest
13 to those that attended Red Circle?

14 A. Again, I can't remember stuff -- attending anything that
15 involved Israel. Obviously, Ireland, things happened,
16 and the new -- "Death of the New Left", that doesn't
17 ring any bells with me at all.

18 So I can't be specific, because I can't -- you know,
19 I can't remember most of the content of that -- well,
20 the content of that report there. It wouldn't have, as
21 it were, stood out. If it did, I've forgotten it now.
22 Sorry about that.

23 Q. Can we now look, please, at another document
24 {UCPI0000008920}. Thank you.

25 This is a report from a little later on during

1 the course of your deployment, June 1971. In the middle
2 of the page -- sorry, can you just scroll up slightly --
3 thank you:

4 "The principal topic was a talk by ..."

5 I'm sorry:

6 "... 'The Need of Women's Liberation in a Capitalist
7 Society'. Her talk, however, was clearly ill prepared
8 and was poorly presented. She briefly gave origins of
9 Women's Liberation and stated the four main demands of
10 the Socialist Women's Group:

11 "(1) Free contraception on demand.

12 "(2) Free abortion on demand.

13 "(3) Free 24 hour nurseries.

14 "(4) equal pay.

15 "She emphasised that the Socialist Women's Groups
16 were concentrating their efforts on working-class women
17 as opposed to middle class women, who were less
18 oppressed. To that end they were working closely with
19 unions and in particular they were attempting to form
20 a union to assist women night cleaners in their
21 struggle."

22 Are these -- these are clearly topics of interest to
23 the people who attended Red Circle meetings. Were these
24 also topics of interest to Special Branch: Women's
25 Liberation and the involvement of trades' unions?

1 A. Again, I can't remember going to meetings that were
2 discussing, it says there, Women's Liberation stuff and
3 possibly maybe stuff regarding trade unions; again,
4 because of the potential for demonstrations, maybe. But
5 I just cannot remember that -- most of, again, what is
6 in that report. I say most of it, I can't remember
7 actually any of it, but --

8 Q. You --

9 A. -- it doesn't make sense -- well, it wouldn't have been
10 something that I would have said happened regularly,
11 the Women's Liberation (inaudible). So I don't know;
12 can't say.

13 Q. So you're not able to help us with whether these topics
14 are specifically of interest to Special Branch?

15 A. I can't speak for Special Branch as a whole, but all
16 I can say is that in relation to my involvement with
17 the North London Red Circle, if -- if it hadn't been for
18 the North London Red Circle, for whatever reasons,
19 they'd got themselves these people -- you know,
20 the woman, as is mentioned there, giving a speech about
21 -- a talk about it, I don't see that -- certainly as far
22 as I was concerned, it wouldn't have been something that
23 I'd have been, you know, guided towards going along to.
24 But again, I'm not a hundred per cent sure of that.

25 Q. You told us previously that your approach to report

1 writing was to write down what had happened during
2 the course of a meeting and leave it to those in
3 the chain of command to filter out your information as
4 and when required. Is this an example of such a report?

5 A. I was just going to say, this is a good example there,
6 because obviously at the time, on that day, whatever it
7 was, in September, that happened, and therefore I put it
8 down. But then because, I assume, nothing of any
9 consequence, as far as I was concerned, was followed up
10 on that, that's why I -- partly why I can't, you know,
11 recall it, because, you know, it might have been of
12 interest to the back office, but I don't know.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 Elsewhere in your reporting on the North London Red
15 Circle you report on the support given by North London
16 Red Circle to industrial action, including
17 the National Union of Mineworkers, to a dockers' strike,
18 to the Upper Clyde Shipbuilder's work-in. And also you
19 provide reports about support for campaign groups
20 against racism, talks on unemployment and South Africa,
21 and also talks on the Russian Revolution. And this is
22 the last one of this sort of report that I want to very
23 briefly look at.

24 Can we look, please, at {UCPI0000008953}. A report
25 from 25 April 1972.

1 Scroll up just a little bit, please, so I can see
2 paragraph 3:

3 "The main part of the meeting was devoted to a talk
4 by Pat Jordan 'The Russian Revolution'. He gave
5 a historical account of the events up to
6 the October 1917 revolution. He then told how Stalin
7 had betrayed the revolution by moving away from
8 the original principles of Leninism which had resulted
9 in Russia becoming a bureaucratic state. The main
10 points in his talk were aimed in two predictable
11 directions -- condemnation of Stalin and praise of
12 Trotsky.

13 "4. Nothing of particular interest emerged from the
14 ensuing questions period."

15 Did you, can you recall, form the view that
16 the subject matter of the talk itself was, or may be of
17 interest to Special Branch? Can you recall?

18 A. Again, I can't recall anything of that meeting, even
19 down to the fact that -- I'm not even sure where --
20 where that pub is, or was. And as regards the rest of
21 it, it doesn't have any, you know, recollection at all
22 in my mind. So I can't say any more.

23 Q. In --

24 A. That last point, the main points about praising,
25 you know, Trotsky and, you know, condemning Stalin.

1 I mean, if -- that would obviously have been the gist of
2 it, to an extent.

3 Q. It says "nothing of particular interest emerged from
4 the ensuing questions period". Does that indicate that
5 you were making a judgment about what may or may not be
6 of interest to Special Branch in your report?

7 A. From reading that just as it's written there, yeah, it
8 would be.

9 Q. How did you assess what may or may not be of interest to
10 Special Branch?

11 A. As of now, I don't know. I can't -- I can't say. There
12 must have been -- there must have been a good reason for
13 me saying what's in paragraph 4 there, but now, I don't
14 know. I just don't know.

15 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you.

16 Sir, is that a convenient moment to break?

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly it is. We will resume in quarter
18 of an hour at 3.35.

19 A. Thank you.

20 MS PURSER: Thank you very much, everyone. We will now take
21 a 15-minute break and we will be back at 3.35. You may
22 now move to your break-out rooms.

23 Thank you.

24 (3.19 pm)

25 (A short break)

1 (3.35 pm)

2 MS PURSER: Welcome back, everyone. I will now hand over to
3 the Chairman to continue proceedings.

4 Chairman.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

6 Ms Hummerstone.

7 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you.

8 HN340, I want to take you to just three reports
9 which show a slightly different interest of the North
10 London Red Circle now, please.

11 Can we have up on the screen {UCPI0000008196},
12 please. If you could just scroll up a little bit so
13 I can see the third paragraph down a bit more clearly.

14 This is a report from 27 August 1971.

15 Sorry, just scroll up a little bit, please, I just
16 want to see the three paragraphs. That's the most
17 important. Thank you. Simultaneously.

18 It's a meeting which took place in July of 1971, 24
19 people present, a rather larger group than is normal of
20 the North London Red Circle.

21 The third paragraph down reads as follows:

22 "The only subject discussed was Ireland, and this
23 consisted mainly of a talk by [privacy] which was
24 followed by questions. [Privacy]'s talk revealed only
25 one point of interest. This was his praise for

1 Provisionals. This represented a change of attitude by
2 the IMG (of which [privacy] is a long-standing
3 member) who had hitherto favoured the Officials. In
4 answer to a question as to what help should be given to
5 the IRA should they begin terrorist activities in
6 England, [privacy] replied that the IRA had not yet
7 declared that they intended to start such activities
8 here, but if they did it would be the duty of all
9 revolutionaries to render whatever assistance was
10 asked."

11 Referring there, of course, to the Official and
12 Provisional sections of the IRA after the split from one
13 another.

14 Did it seem to you that that view expressed was not
15 simply an IMG view but a view held by a proportion of
16 Red Circle attendees, too, can you recall?

17 A. I can't remember.

18 Q. You can't remember.

19 A. I just don't know. I can't remember it. I can't
20 remember that meeting.

21 Q. Okay, thank you.

22 Next report -- you can take that one down, please.

23 The next report is {UCPI0000008944}. This report
24 from February 1972, this time 30 people present. Again,
25 a larger meeting of the North London Red Circle.

1 Can you focus, please, on the third paragraph
2 mainly, please -- third and fourth paragraph.

3 Thank you.

4 This reads as follows:

5 "The whole of the meeting was devoted to a talk by
6 Bob Purdie on Ireland, in place of a scheduled talk on
7 Spain. Although Purdie's talk was quite interesting he
8 only gave an outline of the history of Ireland with an
9 extra emphasis on the last 3/4 years. He also dealt
10 briefly with the Republican movement. (Later in
11 the meeting he pointed out that the split within that
12 movement had arisen not so much out of political
13 differences but more through the manner in which
14 the struggle should be waged). In the ensuing question
15 period the only question of note was one regarding
16 the prospect of violent action being taken by the IRA in
17 England. Purdie (who can be regarded as a non-violent
18 revolutionary) said he knew of no such plans and
19 recommended that anyone who heard of any such activities
20 to forget them as he most certainly would. To extend
21 the military struggle to England would be politically
22 wrong. However, if the leaders of the struggle in
23 Ireland considered it was advantageous to do so then it
24 would be the duty of all revolutionaries in this country
25 to support them (this has been the official IMG line

1 throughout the present struggle).

2 "Several times throughout his talk Purdie urged
3 anyone interested in the struggle to attend
4 the ISC meetings."

5 Again, can you recall whether there was general
6 support for that view that if the leaders of the IRA
7 thought it advantageous to start an armed struggle on
8 the mainland, that it was the duty of revolutionaries to
9 support them? Can you recall whether that was a view
10 held by other Red Circle attendees of that meeting?

11 A. Again, without appearing to be, you know, totally out of
12 sync with all that, again, I can't remember that
13 meeting. The name Bob Purdie does, now I've seen it
14 there, ring a vague bell. But as regards what is in
15 there, I can't remember any of that. But it -- it
16 probably would have made sense. I mean, that's why
17 I put it in there as I did. But from what I remember of
18 the members of the Red Circle, I can't think of any of
19 them now that I would consider to be tending toward any
20 kind of violence.

21 Q. On that note, can we put up a final report of the North
22 London Red Circle. It's {UCPI0000008949}.

23 A report from April 1972. It's rather faint.

24 A. Mm.

25 Q. But the third paragraph down reads:

1 "The subject for discussion should have been 'Cuba'
2 but the speaker did not arrive. Therefore [privacy],
3 who had simply walked into the 'General Picton' on his
4 way home, stood in and gave a brief talk on Ireland. As
5 he had nothing prepared, he only gave a sketchy outline
6 of the background to the present situation. A few
7 questions ensued but they were of no particular
8 interest. The proceedings soon lapsed into a cross-talk
9 in French between the French comrades present -- of
10 which there were about eight. The only point which
11 aroused any interest was a short discussion about
12 the 26.9.72 demonstration. Several of the French
13 comrades could not understand why an attack had not been
14 made against the police in order to enter
15 Trafalgar Square to hold a meeting there. It was
16 explained that there would have been insufficient
17 support for such action and as such it would have been
18 doomed to failure."

19 You can take that one down now, please.

20 In your statement you say this about that report:

21 "The North London Red Circle was not a violent
22 organisation or one which advocated violence. I have
23 read the report dated 4 April 1972 ..."

24 Which is that one:

25 "... and the tone the discussion seems entirely

1 consistent with what I recall, namely that it was
2 a talking shop."

3 Later in your statement you say:

4 "It did support a revolutionary agenda and was
5 subversive to an extent, that it advanced the overthrow
6 of the established political system in the United
7 Kingdom, albeit never took any concrete steps."

8 And finally this:

9 "The North London Red Circle, for all its
10 revolutionary posturing, was a talking shop which
11 passively supported revolution rather than contributing
12 to it actively. Violence would have been the last thing
13 on many of their minds. Sloganeering was about as far
14 as it went."

15 During your time with the North London Red Circle,
16 did you witness any violence or serious public disorder
17 at any picket or demonstration organised or supported by
18 the North London Red Circle?

19 A. No. No, I didn't.

20 Q. And were you aware of any violence or serious public
21 disorder at any picket or demonstration organised or
22 supported by that group?

23 A. Not now. I can't remember if they did. But I'm fairly
24 certain if there had have been, it would have stuck in
25 my memory. At least part of it.

1 Q. You took over the role as tea club(?) secretary, is that
2 right, in that organisation?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you say in your statement, you did that so that you
5 could find out other members' surnames; is that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Were you urged to put yourself in that position by your
8 superiors or encouraged by them to do so?

9 A. No. It just seemed to me at the time a good idea.

10 Q. So it was your own idea to do that?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. But why did you need to report the names of a group
13 which was non-violent and had no criminal aspirations,
14 can you recall?

15 A. Again, going back to the very beginning of this, if they
16 were going to be involved in demonstrations, they
17 themselves may not have been involved in or instigating
18 violence, but it doesn't mean to say that other people
19 that, again, go along to the same demonstrations would
20 have had the same ideas and motives as they did; and by
21 knowing who's going to be involved, in case something
22 did happen later, then it could be useful information.

23 Q. I'm going to move on now to your reporting on the Irish
24 Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign, later the Irish
25 Solidarity Campaign.

1 In one of your Red Circle reports, you state that
2 there were plans for Red Circle to become affiliated
3 with the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign. And
4 the first report with your name on the bottom of it
5 relating to the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign
6 is dated 18 September 1970, so some two months after
7 your first report with Red Circle.

8 You say in your witness statement that you attended
9 the meetings of the ICRSC "almost as a co-opted member
10 from the North London Red Circle". What do you mean by
11 that "almost as a co-opted member"?

12 A. As of today, I can't remember the details of -- of what
13 you've just gone through. And all I can think of is
14 that, as I was at a North London Red Circle meeting,
15 what seems logical to me that happened was, it was
16 discussed that they would send, or certain members, or
17 whoever wanted to would go along, and therefore, as
18 I was at that meeting where they were deciding this,
19 respectively I was one of them, as a member of the Red
20 Circle. But again, I can't remember the details at all.

21 Q. So, do you think that you volunteered yourself? You put
22 your hand in the air and said, "Oh, I'll go to" --

23 A. Again, in all honesty, I can't say yes or no. But it
24 seems more likely that, again, just thinking of it as --
25 as of this minute there, they probably -- probably

1 wanted to send X number of people; and therefore it
2 was -- you know, I ended up being one of those X number.
3 But that isn't, for me, accurate memory, it's just
4 bearing in mind how, as I recall it, things happened
5 with -- with them, you know?

6 Q. So you can't recall how you became one of that number?

7 A. Not at all. No, I can't.

8 Q. Whether that was an active choice on your part?

9 A. I can't remember if it was or it wasn't. But that --
10 that, to me, seems the most logical as the way things
11 generally worked, that they would -- they would --
12 somebody would have the, you know, idea that we should
13 send -- I don't know -- say, six, eight, ten, twelve
14 people, and there would probably only be about that
15 number at the meeting. So therefore it's, "You, you and
16 you," as it were.

17 Q. Do you recall whether you were tasked by your chain of
18 command to attend those meetings, those Irish Civil
19 Rights Solidarity Campaign meetings?

20 A. Again, I can't remember exactly, but what -- if -- if --
21 if it happened as I think it -- as I've just said there,
22 that it was decided that so many people would go from
23 North London Red Circle, and I was one of them, then
24 what would have happened next would have been I would
25 have then reported that to the back office, and if they

1 had had any objections to it, then I would have made my
2 excuses to the Red Circle.

3 Q. So, in your view, it was a sort of -- remembering back
4 now, it was simply chance that you ended up attending
5 meetings of the Irish Civil Rights Campaign group; is
6 that right?

7 A. Yeah, effectively. I mean, if I hadn't have gone to
8 that -- you know, the Red Circle meeting on that
9 particular -- I didn't go to all of the meetings, but if
10 I hadn't have gone to that one, then the good chances
11 are that I wouldn't have gone to the ISC meeting.
12 I would -- you know, that's my, you know, way of
13 thinking how things worked.

14 Q. And put a slightly different way, was it your membership
15 of the North London Red Circle which allowed you access
16 to the Irish Solidarity Campaign? Was that your route
17 into that group, was through the Red Circle?

18 A. That's how it would have been, yes.

19 Q. You said you would have discussed your attendance at
20 the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign meetings to
21 your chain of command. Can you recall what their
22 attitude was towards that group?

23 A. No, I don't. I can't -- you know, I mean, there must
24 have been some interest there, otherwise, as I say, they
25 would have said, "Don't bother going." Other than that,

- 1 no, I can't remember anything specific.
- 2 Q. This was of course quite a torrid time in the history of
3 Ireland, wasn't it? Can you recall an interest in Irish
4 groups in general by your chain of command?
- 5 A. I think there was one who -- yeah, HN68 was obviously,
6 as far as I remember, the -- the main one who was
7 involved in -- in Irish --
- 8 Q. Are you aware that others were deployed into Irish
9 groups?
- 10 A. Not really, no, because, as I said earlier there, it
11 isn't something, unless there was a particularly good
12 reason, that we -- we discussed amongst ourselves,
13 you know, really.
- 14 Q. You say in your statement that you can't recall
15 attending the meetings of the Irish Civil Rights
16 Solidarity Campaign, later the Irish Solidarity
17 Campaign; is that right?
- 18 A. Basically, yes. I mean, I must have gone if --
19 you know, if I'm credited, as it were, with -- with
20 those meeting reports, but as individual events, no,
21 I can't.
- 22 Q. You -- is it simply that you have no memory of their
23 meetings, or that you don't think you went to their
24 meetings? Which --
- 25 A. Well, I've no doubt that if my name is at the bottom of

- 1 those reports, then I -- I was involved. But it's --
2 it's gone. It isn't ...
- 3 Q. You attended the founding conference of the Irish
4 Solidarity Campaign over the weekend of the 10 to
5 11 October 1970. I think that is something you can
6 recall; is that right?
- 7 A. Not in detail, but I -- I remember vaguely that I did
8 go. Obviously, it was -- it was -- by numbers, it was
9 one of the biggest, you know, indoor events that I --
10 I went to.
- 11 Q. And was that --
- 12 A. And it was the fact that it was out of London, again,
13 which is not something that I -- I regularly would have
14 been involved in. So --
- 15 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- in Birmingham; is that right?
- 16 A. Yes, in that -- from those couple of facts alone it
17 would have had some -- but details, I can't really
18 remember details of -- of what.
- 19 Q. Did you volunteer to go to that conference, can you
20 remember?
- 21 A. No, again, almost certainly it was the same. They
22 needed a certain number from Red Circle and I happened
23 to be there and available, as it were.
- 24 Q. So is it, again, just simply chance, you say?
- 25 A. Effectively, could well be -- yeah, yeah. As I say, if

- 1 I hadn't have been to the meeting where they decided
2 that so many of us would go, then yeah.
- 3 Q. Did you have to get approval for travel outside London
4 from your chain of command?
- 5 A. Again, I can't remember exact details, but yes, you
6 wouldn't go -- you couldn't go wandering off, off your
7 own bat. You would certainly, you know, tell them what
8 was on. And then, again, it would be down to them as to
9 whether they said yes, no or whatever.
- 10 Q. And the fact that they've evidently said yes, does that
11 give you some indication as to the level of support for
12 your reporting in that area that they were giving to
13 you?
- 14 A. Sorry, I don't quite ...
- 15 Q. Does the fact that they clearly approved that travel
16 indicate that they -- they were -- endorsed your
17 reporting into the ISC?
- 18 A. Yes. I mean, yeah.
- 19 Q. HN68 also attended that conference, as we've already
20 seen from the --
- 21 A. Yeah.
- 22 Q. -- commendation notes.
23 Did you attend together?
- 24 A. No. As I've said earlier there, we -- we avoided, as
25 far as possible, only if it was, you know, not possible

1 to avoid, any contact with colleagues. Whatever --
2 whatever their -- you know, whatever we were involved
3 in. But on this occasion, I mean, we didn't -- we
4 didn't make contact with each other when we were there,
5 because he'd gone from a different route to me. And so
6 there was no reason that we should know each other, so
7 we didn't.

8 Q. And you've explained in your witness statement that he
9 had an interest in Irish matters and your deployment was
10 more about left-wing matters; is that right?

11 A. Basically, yes.

12 Q. So they were two converging --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- interests brought together in the ISC?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Can you recall whether you were aware in advance that he
17 was going to be there?

18 A. I can't remember now, but I would say, the way things
19 worked, I probably was aware, yeah. But as I say,
20 I can't remember it as a fact, but it -- it makes sense
21 for it to have been so, and not for us both to be
22 unaware that the other was going.

23 Q. Your chain of command are clearly impressed by your
24 report that you and HN68 produced. Did you collaborate
25 over the writing of that report? Did you discuss it and

1 put in your notes together? How did it work,
2 the writing of that report?

3 A. Again, quite honestly, I have no idea. I can't remember
4 what -- what -- but, thinking -- trying to think
5 logically, it seems as if it would have been -- well,
6 inconceivable that we hadn't discussed when we were at
7 the headquarters flat. I mean, I can't imagine that we
8 wouldn't have done. But at the same time, I can't
9 remember anything specific.

10 Q. We're going to look extremely briefly at some aspects of
11 the report. Can I have on the screen, please,
12 {MPS-0738146}.

13 And paragraph 3 indicates that there were
14 approximately 60 delegates and 15 observers present. So
15 quite a large group of people. Can you just scroll
16 down, please, to paragraph 4.

17 Paragraph 4 gives an indication of the organisations
18 represented at the conference: the International Marxist
19 Group, the Spartacus League, the Vietnam Solidarity
20 Committee, Clann na h'Eireann, Independent Labour Party,
21 Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign,
22 International Socialism and observers from AGITPROP and
23 the Frank Keane Defence Committee.

24 The report goes on to list the fraternal delegates
25 from the Republican Movement, from the Civil Rights

1 Association, from People's Democracy, the CRA, and also
2 others present who were welcomed as VIPs by
3 the chairman, the family members of the person in
4 custody for throwing tear gas into the House of Commons.

5 Those details, are they details that are likely to
6 have been of interest to your chain of command and to
7 Special Branch more widely?

8 A. Possibly, yes. I mean, that's probably why I put them
9 in. But just -- just if I might, on that paragraph 2
10 there, the conference was on the Saturday and
11 the Sunday --

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. -- and as of now, I must have slept somewhere overnight.
14 But quite honestly, I can't remember where we -- where
15 we stayed. That's ... so, you know, I can't remember in
16 detail much about the thing. But in answer to your
17 question, yes, again, they were there so I reported it,
18 and it's then down to the back office to do their,
19 you know, filtering, vetting, or whatever you like to
20 call it.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 You can take that down now, please.

23 The report contained a number of appendices.
24 Appendix D is the Irish -- is the ISC Constitution,
25 which sets out in its preamble the main aims of the ISC.

1 Perhaps we can just briefly look at that, please. It's
2 {MPS-0738150}.

3 There seem to be six main aims:

4 "Support of the Irish's people's right to
5 self-determination.

6 "Support for popular movements in Ireland, North and
7 South, fighting political and economic domination by
8 British Imperialism.

9 "3. Release of all Irish political prisoners in
10 Irish and British jails.

11 "4. An end to British intervention in Ireland, and
12 the immediate withdrawal of British armed forces.

13 "5. Opposition to those fostering religious
14 sectarianism in Ireland, and preventing working class
15 unity.

16 "6. Support of the right of Irish workers to arm
17 and organise in self-defence of their homes from attacks
18 by sectarian gangs, the military and the police."

19 Again, in your view, is that information that was
20 likely to have been of interest to Special Branch?

21 A. Again, at the time, I may have thought so, but as now,
22 I don't know what ...

23 But again, the other thing, as -- as before. That
24 happened and I would assume that there was a --
25 a leaflet of some sort that was -- that had that printed

1 on and was distributed to those present, and therefore
2 -- (overspeaking) --

3 Q. This in fact --

4 A. -- (inaudible).

5 Q. -- such a leaflet; it was the constitution printed that
6 has been included in the report as an appendix.

7 A. Yeah, I would have thought.

8 Q. And another appendix, appendix A, is a document entitled
9 "Perspectives for the Irish Solidarity Campaign" -- you
10 can take that down now please -- which sets out
11 the actions the ISC should take to further their
12 objectives. I'm not going to ask this document to be
13 put on the screen, because, in summary, it includes:
14 mobilising all those who could be won to support for --
15 by the -- for the ISC aims by national demonstrations,
16 rallies, nationally-coordinated local activities,
17 speaking tours, and by garnering support from the
18 trades' unions, the Irish community, university students
19 and international organisations.

20 Again, HN340, is that information -- the ways in
21 which the ISC sought to realise their aims, is that
22 information likely to have been of interest to your
23 chain of command?

24 A. Well, again, as it -- if I remember what you were just
25 saying there. It was getting support for demonstrations

1 and such, then, you know, that would have been of
2 interest, I would have thought, in relation to numbers
3 that were going to be turning up.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 In respect of your reporting on the ISC generally,
6 I'm not going to take you to many of these reports for
7 a moment. But, for example, you report a picket of
8 a Leicester jail where Eamonn Smullen, a Sinn Fein
9 affiliate, is being held pending criminal proceedings
10 for possession of firearms. So that's a picket that's
11 being reported there.

12 Another report you report about a suggested
13 demonstration to show solidarity with a demonstration in
14 Northern Ireland by the civil rights organisation.

15 And another, a demonstration in the form of a march
16 from Speakers' Corner to the Home Office, to protest
17 the treatment of Irish (inaudible) prisoners in English
18 prisons.

19 And in another report, a picket of the Home Office
20 to support the Civil Rights Association in Northern
21 Ireland.

22 Can I ask you this about your reporting on
23 demonstrations and pickets and the like. Did you make
24 -- before you put in those reports, did you make any
25 assessment as to the likelihood of any public disorder

1 arising during the course of those pickets or
2 demonstrations before you reported on them?

3 A. Again, I can't recall, but I don't see how -- well,
4 other than what I've said there, that for the most part,
5 I wouldn't have anticipated that people that I had
6 contact with were going to be themselves instigators at
7 least of any -- any violence or disorder of -- you know,
8 of a physical nature, other than just being present.

9 Q. Right.

10 So, your reporting about demonstrations and pickets
11 was simply that. There was no assessment involved. You
12 didn't personally think this might lead to public order,
13 you simply reported it as it was; is that right?

14 A. As I can't remember the details, that's almost certainly
15 how it would have been, I would have just, you know,
16 given the fact that I knew at the time, and -- and
17 that's it. Let the -- you know, let the back-office
18 staff ...

19 Q. Was there any other means available to you for obtaining
20 information about pickets or demonstrations other than
21 attending meetings of these political groups? Could you
22 not have sought leaflets or matters of that nature,
23 rather than having to attend meetings?

24 A. I can't think so, no. That's -- leaflets are obviously
25 one thing which would be distributed and such. But

1 I would have thought -- again, not recalling exactly --
2 but to -- to be present when these things are discussed
3 by people who are likely to be there and likely to
4 encourage other people to go would be a good way of
5 getting some idea as to what's likely to happen.

6 Q. I think in your witness statement you've also said that
7 having an undercover officer at an ISC meeting where
8 pickets and demonstrations was being discussed was
9 important in case the ISC stopped publicising their
10 events. Was that an anxiety that the ISC may adopt
11 a more secretive approach and stop publicising
12 demonstrations and protests and the like?

13 A. Again, I can't remember now that. All I would say is
14 that if that's what came out then, and I said that then,
15 that must have been based on how I saw it then. And
16 bearing in mind that, again, the impression I got
17 occasionally, some of these groups did become a little
18 bit, for want of a better word, paranoid and worried
19 about, you know, people finding out things that they
20 hoped they wouldn't, but I can't remember details now.

21 Q. We're just going to look at a few reports now of
22 a slightly different nature relating to the ISC. Please
23 can we have on the screen {MPS-0738209}, please.

24 This is a report of the Central London branch of
25 the ISC on 19 January 1971. And if you can -- please

1 can you scroll down to paragraph 6, which reads as
2 follows:

3 "[privacy] then spoke on the events of the last
4 three months."

5 In Ireland, that is:

6 "The 'tarring and feathering' incidents last weekend
7 were carried out by both the 'official'
8 and 'provisional' branches of the Republican Movement.
9 He did not think there was anything political to be
10 gained from such actions, although it was obviously done
11 to prove that the Republicans were in control of
12 the area. (This also appeared to be the view of
13 the others present when contributions were made later).
14 [privacy] was unimpressed by the lead being given to
15 the people by the Republicans and felt their continued
16 strong support was due solely to the lack of an
17 alternative. He was very critical of the Republican
18 leadership and blamed them almost entirely for
19 the failure to achieve more during the struggles of 1969
20 when they failed to make the arms, held by them,
21 available to all those who could use them."

22 Can we look now, please, at another report
23 {MPS-0738216}. This report is a couple of weeks later,
24 on 2 February 1971.

25 Can you scroll down, please, to paragraphs 4 and 5.

1 There was a talk on "People's Democracy and the Civil
2 Rights Movement in Northern Ireland".

3 Paragraph 5 is the one I'm interested in, please:

4 "[privacy] raised several points which were later
5 taken up in part by Gery Lawless ..."

6 Just pausing there a moment. Gery Lawless was an
7 active figure in the ISC; is that right?

8 A. As I remember, yes.

9 Q. In fact, in a variety of different political groups at
10 this time. He was also --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- a some time attender at the Red Circle --

13 A. Yes, he's one of the very few names that I remember from
14 then, because he was so active. I mean, he came to
15 the Red Circle meetings from IMG, as it were, and not as
16 a regular member of the Red Circle.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 ".... later taken up in part by Gery Lawless and
19 [privacy]. The main one was whether there should be
20 a military 'arm' to political organisations. He thought
21 there should not be any military 'arm' since this would
22 inevitably lead to very close surveillance and
23 infiltration by the police and security organisations as
24 for example in the case of the IRA, which was completely
25 infiltrated. However, that did not mean that

1 the revolutionaries should not have 'a few arms for use
2 at the appropriate time'. Although Lawless did not say
3 much he nevertheless made it quite clear he felt there
4 should be a military 'arm'. [privacy] agreed with
5 Lawless and added that the military must always be
6 subordinate to the political."

7 Another report in this vein, please, {MPS-0738269}.
8 A little bit later in time, 22 June 1971, a talk on
9 the subject, "Why the Provisionals?", and in
10 the central -- second paragraph down:

11 "[privacy] explained that the split which had
12 occurred within the Republican Movement about 12 months
13 ago had been the result of the communist domination of
14 the Movement. It was due to that influence that when
15 the need had arisen to use arms there had been none
16 available since communist policy was that it was better
17 to use peaceful and parliamentary means to achieve
18 Sinn Fein's objects. [privacy] was bitterly opposed to
19 such a policy as the experience of the previous 50 years
20 was that nothing had been achieved by such methods.
21 Force was the only answer. Although he was very
22 scathing in his attack on the 'Communists' he made it
23 clear that he was referring only to the 'Moscow
24 dominated Communists' and suggested that 'a good place
25 for a bomb would be King Street'."

1 King Street, the headquarters the Communist Party of
2 Great Britain; is that right?

3 A. As I remember it was at that time, yes.

4 Q. And you say in your witness statement to the Inquiry
5 that you cannot recall now whether those remarks
6 attracted support or criticism from the other -- from
7 the members of the ISC listening to it; is that right?

8 A. Yes. Yeah.

9 Q. Finally on this theme, please, can we look at the report
10 at {UCPI0000008500}.

11 This is a report on 3 March 1972. Can you look,
12 please, on the second page, paragraph 8
13 {UCPI0000008500/2}. Again, it's very poorly -- it's of
14 very poor quality:

15 "There then ensued a fairly long debate on the bomb
16 explosion at Aldershot. Most of the contributions
17 supported the action taken by the IRA and
18 the ISC slogan 'Victory to the IRA' was repeated several
19 times as 'the only correct line to be taken by
20 revolutionaries'."

21 The Aldershot bombing took place on
22 22 February 1972 -- so very shortly before this
23 meeting -- killing, I think, seven civilians; is that
24 right?

25 A. If you're asking me, I don't know.

1 Q. Can't remember, okay.

2 So you can take that report down, because I just
3 want to ask you just a little bit about that.

4 Before the Aldershot bombing, did you have any
5 contact with the detective branch of the police, can you
6 recall?

7 A. I can't recall, but I'm -- I'm almost absolutely
8 certain, no, because I can't recall at any time,
9 particularly when I was doing the undercover work, that
10 I had contact with non-Special Branch, you know,
11 CID officers.

12 Q. And you didn't make contact yourself, alert them to
13 the presence at the ISC meetings, or anything of that
14 nature, saying, "Here I am at the ISC, I'm here to able
15 to give this information about their view on
16 the Aldershot bombing", or anything of that nature?

17 A. I'm not quite sure of the question, but if you're asking
18 me if I had contact with the detectives who were
19 investigating the Aldershot, then they of course
20 wouldn't -- well, there might have been some Met
21 officers involved, but obviously that is -- is another
22 police force, and off our own bat, there's no way that
23 any of us would have had contact with a --
24 a non-Met Police force.

25 Q. How about B Squad in Special Branch? What was the remit

1 of B Squad; can you recall?

2 A. Only to the extent that they dealt with Irish matters.

3 Other than that, at the time, I had no contact with

4 any -- as I know of anyway, any officers directly

5 involved with -- with B Squad.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 Can we have this document on screen, please

8 {UCPI0000008501}. This is a report from 22 March, so

9 about three weeks after the previous report which dealt

10 with the reaction of ISC attendees to the Aldershot

11 bombing. The third paragraph down reads as follows:

12 "The first item was the recent raids by police on
13 the homes of members of the ISC and IS members who had
14 previously been members of ISC. [Privacy] gave
15 the names of some of those raided and there followed
16 general discussion on these 'terrible actions' and
17 the need for strengthening the internal security of
18 the ISC."

19 Do you know of any connection between your report on

20 the ISC, and the nature of what went on in any other

21 ISC meeting and those police raids on ISC attendees or

22 members?

23 A. Again, as of now, I can't remember, but I -- I'm fairly

24 certain that I wouldn't have had, as I said, you know, a

25 minute ago, any contact with anyone outside of basically

1 the back room staff of the SDS.

2 Q. In your witness statement you describe, as you told us
3 earlier, an occasion where there was suspicion, perhaps,
4 of ISC involvement in violence when you'd been drinking
5 with ISC activists, or been to a function, I think you
6 said, with ISC activists on Tottenham Court Road and
7 after you'd left a bomb went off at the Post Office
8 Tower. I think that was on 31 October 1971, and you had
9 understood that bomb to have Irish -- an Irish
10 connection. And you were then telephoned, were you, by
11 your chain of command and asked about who was present at
12 that function; is that right?

13 A. Yes. That -- again, that wouldn't have been my --
14 necessarily my assessment, that it was -- the incident
15 had involved Irish. All I was aware of, as I say,
16 was I went to the function -- as I say, it wasn't a --
17 as I remember, a proper meeting, it was a function --
18 and then the explosion, relatively shortly after that
19 function had finished, took place. So it wasn't my
20 assessment or assumption that it was Irish involvement,
21 but other people, by the sounds of it, did come to that
22 conclusion.

23 Q. Right.

24 And you say, I think, in your witness statement that
25 it may simply have been a coincidence that there was an

- 1 ISC function quite nearby?
- 2 A. Again, following on from what I just said, very
3 possible, but I don't know.
- 4 Q. With that possible proviso, were you aware of any
5 concrete steps taken by the ISC to assist any armed
6 struggle in Ireland or on the mainland --
- 7 A. No.
- 8 Q. -- through your connection with the ISC?
- 9 A. No, other than the stuff that I -- that's in these
10 reports, which, as I say, I can't remember the details
11 of now, there's no reason why I -- I should have,
12 I don't think.
- 13 Q. And can you recall the ISC participating in any acts of
14 violence?
- 15 A. Not -- not directly, no.
- 16 Q. And were you ever involved in any demonstration
17 organised -- or picket organised or supported by
18 the ISC where you witnessed any serious public disorder
19 or violence?
- 20 A. No. I mean, again, if -- if I had have been, I'm sure
21 something like that would have stuck in my memory and it
22 definitely doesn't, so I'm absolutely -- well, almost
23 absolutely certain that it -- I wasn't, or they --
24 nothing like that happened when I was thereabouts.
- 25 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.

1 I'm now moving on to a hotchpotch of slightly
2 different topics. The first involves reporting touching
3 on Bernadette Devlin MP. Within your reporting, there
4 are eight reports which touch on her connection with
5 the ISC, largely, it's right to say, reference to
6 prospective appearances by her at events, or her lack of
7 appearance at events. I'm not going to take you to
8 those.

9 What was the purpose, can you tell us, of reporting
10 the prospective presence or absence of a politician at
11 public events?

12 A. I can't say that there was a specific purpose, but
13 the point of my mentioning her name is the same -- or
14 was the same -- or would have been the same in relation
15 to anybody else that was either at, or connected with
16 meetings that I was involved in, to the extent that
17 I reported what happened when I was there, and what
18 happened to that information afterwards was -- was not
19 my concern, as it were, so that I just put down what
20 I -- I saw and heard. Not that I was targeting her or
21 anyone else particularly, it was just a case of being
22 reported.

23 Q. And so does that -- does your answer equally apply to
24 your reporting her resignation as the joint president of
25 the ISC? Is that the -- would you give the same

1 answer --

2 A. Yes, yes, yes.

3 Q. And would her presence at an event increase the risk of
4 any public disorder, in your view?

5 A. Again, I can't, you know, go back and say exactly, but
6 bearing in mind that at that time she was a very well
7 known figure in, you know, politics and various circles,
8 and as such, if she was known to be going to attend any
9 meeting, or demonstration or whatever, then of course
10 that would increase the likelihood of more people
11 arriving at the demonstration and whatever. And the way
12 these things often worked, the more people there are
13 there, the more likelihood there is of -- of, you know,
14 activity -- you know, not necessarily violence, but
15 disturbances of some sort.

16 Q. And conversely, would her absence have decreased
17 the risk of public disorder?

18 A. I wouldn't say it decreased it, but it would almost
19 certainly have decreased the number of people likely to
20 be attending.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 There's one report I just want to look at a little
23 more closely regarding Bernadette Devlin.

24 Can we please have {MPS-0738244}, please.

25 It's a report dated 30 March 1971.

1 If you scroll down to the bottom of the page,
2 please, paragraph 6:

3 "After the meeting, when most of the members had
4 retired to the ..."

5 If you scroll on, please:

6 "... to the bar, Eamonn McCann arrived at about
7 10.45 pm, accompanied by Bernadette Devlin ... They
8 spent a considerable time in conversation with ..."

9 Somebody's name who's been redacted:

10 "... who had earlier been extremely critical of
11 McCann especially in respect of an article written by
12 McCann which had appeared in 'The Irish Times' ..."

13 And in fact there is a copy of that article. I'm
14 not going to ask you to look at it, because it's got
15 such minuscule print that we won't be able to read it.
16 But it can be summarised, perhaps, in this way. It was
17 an unflattering portrait of Irish solidarity groups and
18 a criticism of them for their failure to attract
19 the Irish working classes to the ranks.

20 That conversation between Eamonn McCann,
21 a journalist, and an MP, can you recall why you reported
22 that?

23 A. Obviously I didn't hear the conversation, and I can't
24 now remember, other than the fact that, as it said
25 there, Eamonn McCann arrived after the meeting had

1 finished. And Eamonn McCann was a well known -- even
2 I can remember now his name as being active in
3 whatever -- did you say he was a -- did you say he was
4 a reporter of some sort, did you say? I can't remember
5 what exactly he did, but I know his name, you know,
6 cropped up regularly. So therefore, working on
7 the principle that he turned up, and also the fact that
8 he turned up late -- for whatever reason; I don't
9 know -- again, I reported it, and left it then to -- to
10 be either put in or left out.

11 Q. So it was simply the fact that he turned up late and had
12 a conversation --

13 A. Well, that was -- could have been -- I don't know, could
14 have been relevant in some ways, I don't know. But it
15 -- it was a fact, and it must have been a fact, because
16 I -- you know, I put it there then -- I don't remember
17 now. But as I say, it wasn't as if he was an unknown
18 person, so therefore, you know ...

19 Q. Was it the fact that he, Eamonn McCann, a well known
20 republican, was in conversation with
21 Bernadette Devlin MP, another well known republican MP?
22 Is that the fact that's interesting, you think, to
23 Special Branch?

24 A. As of now, I can't -- I can't say that. I don't know.
25 I can't remember what -- what his, you know,

1 affiliations were, other than the fact, as I say, he
2 turned up at various meetings and functions, some of
3 which I was at over the time and some that I wasn't.
4 But as I say, he was well known.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 Can you just scroll down, please, to the third page.
7 {MPS-0738244/3}.

8 This is going to be an exercise of demonstrating by
9 absence, but it's -- the appendix, the parts of it that
10 haven't been redacted, indicate the presence of
11 Gery Lawless, with his police file reference,
12 Bob Purdie, with his police file reference. There is
13 not a reference to Bernadette Devlin. There is no
14 police file reference for her, and that's something
15 that's common with all the reports that refer to her, so
16 it appears she did not have a police file on her, and
17 perhaps that's just worth pointing that out.

18 Thank you. Moving on, please -- you can take that
19 down now, please.

20 Another set of disparate topics, please. First of
21 all, the VSC. There is a report with your name on
22 the bottom of it referring to the VSC. I'm not going to
23 ask you to look at it. It is a report at which
24 Tariq Ali made a speech about Vietnam, emphasising
25 the need for all left-wing groups, regardless of their

1 personal and ideological differences, to unite in
2 the struggle against imperialism.

3 Can you recall attending meetings of the VSC, or at
4 least one meeting of the VSC?

5 A. No.

6 Q. No.

7 A. I can't now. If there are reports there with my name at
8 the bottom, then I have to accept that I did, but
9 I cannot remember at all. Bearing in mind, of course,
10 that they -- as with the Grosvenor Square demonstration,
11 the VSC were active in organising demonstrations around
12 about that time and earlier.

13 Q. Tariq Ali was in attendance at that meeting. Would
14 attendance have made a difference as to whether
15 the meeting was also attended by the member of the SDS?
16 Is it more likely there would be an SDS officer at
17 a meeting where Tariq Ali was, or did his presence not
18 make any difference at all?

19 A. Again, I can't -- I can't comment on that at all.
20 I don't know.

21 Q. There are a number of your reports which refer to
22 Tariq Ali. Can you recall why you -- why you recorded
23 his presence at meetings that you were attended -- you
24 attended?

25 A. The same answer as I've given before. He was there,

1 I was there, at the meeting, so I reported who was
2 there.

3 Q. So he wasn't anyone specifically targeted by you?

4 A. Again, anybody who was there was -- was reported on.

5 What -- what happened to what I reported, whether it
6 was, you know, printed out into a report, was down to
7 the back office, not myself.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 Moving on, there's one report regarding a meeting of
10 the Irish Solidarity Campaign from September 1971 at
11 which it's noted that Piers Corbyn was in attendance.
12 Was that name, Piers Corbyn, a name that was known to
13 you at the time, in 1971?

14 A. Again, as far as I can remember, probably not, but
15 there's an outside possibility it might have been, but
16 I can't -- I can't say that it was of any particular ...
17 Again, he was there, I was there, the name goes down.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 I now want to ask you a question about your
20 reporting on anti-racist campaign groups. There are
21 a number of reports which reference anti-racist campaign
22 groups, the Black Peoples' Defence,
23 the Black Defence Committee and Black Power. In your
24 witness statement provided to the Inquiry you say that
25 you refer to those groups because they were involved in

1 demonstrations, and so there was a public order interest
2 in reporting the names of those organisations.

3 Were you tasked to report on any anti-racist
4 organisations by your chain of command that you recall?

5 A. As I can remember now, no. But again, if these things
6 cropped up during whatever, then it would have been put
7 down and left to, you know, the back office to make of
8 it, you know, what they deemed necessary.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 There's a report dated 18 September 1970 which is
11 a report of a meeting to discuss the forthcoming
12 national founding conference for the ISC and it was held
13 at a private address. Were you given any training at
14 any time about the circumstances in which you might
15 enter a private address as a police officer that you
16 recall?

17 A. As I recall, when I saw the reports with my name on
18 with -- I think it's the -- probably the address that
19 you're referring to, I must say that that address does
20 not register, or didn't then, or now, at all. In fact,
21 not even do I remember going to meetings in that area,
22 you know, the north -- that's the north London area,
23 isn't it?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. It's down there. I don't remember even going to an

1 address in that area. But again, my name is at
2 the bottom of the report, so at the time, it must have
3 been as it's reported.

4 But to answer your question, the other aspect of it,
5 no, no.

6 Q. Okay, thank you.

7 In another report your name appears on the bottom of
8 a report identifying four individuals who had attended
9 an ISC meeting, identifying them from photographs, and
10 it seems the photographs have come from Nottinghamshire
11 combined constabulary. Was it a common event, SDS
12 officers being asked to identify individuals from
13 photographs? Was that something that happened
14 regularly?

15 A. It did happen, as I recall, yes, it did.

16 Q. And were requests such as that from other police
17 branches common?

18 A. By "other police branches", you mean outside of the Met?

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. As far as I'm aware, I don't recall others -- I mean,
21 again, that one that you're referring to that I have
22 seen something about it, and again, it doesn't -- it
23 doesn't register with me now at all. I'm sorry about
24 that.

25 Q. The Red Europe conference, that was a conference that

- 1 both you and HN326 attended; is that right?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. And you had to leave the country in order to attend that
4 conference; is that right?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. You attended at the request of your chain of command; is
7 that right?
- 8 A. Again, the exact details I can't remember, but that
9 would appear to be -- I mean, I wouldn't have gone
10 without -- without their approval, obviously, for
11 several reasons. Not only was it outside the Met, but
12 it was outside the country.
- 13 Q. Were you aware that there was another officer in
14 attendance at that conference?
- 15 A. I did, as I remember now, yes. It was known that both
16 of us knew that the other was going. But as before, no
17 direct contact between us, because that was the way of
18 things -- we didn't have.
- 19 Q. And were you aware of the reason for two SDS officers to
20 attend that conference?
- 21 A. Other than the fact that he -- again, I don't know what
22 organisation or organisations he was connected with --
23 I don't know whether I knew then, but I can't remember
24 now -- and so he would have been going from some -- from
25 a different angle than myself. So presumably

1 the back-office staff would have thought that possibly
2 two different angles would have been, you know, better
3 than just one. That's the best I can say. I don't know
4 exactly.

5 Q. In your statement you say that you were asked to go to
6 find out who else was attending and whether there were
7 any plans for significant demonstrations in the UK
8 involving groups from abroad. Can you recall that?

9 A. I can't recall it, but if that's what -- that's what is
10 said, then obviously that, at the time, was as it was.

11 Q. Is it right then, if I were to ask you who asked you to
12 go, would you be able to remember that?

13 A. No, no.

14 Q. Your deployment came to an end after possible compromise
15 of your identity, which may have been caused in part by
16 you repeatedly declining to join the IMG. Your witness
17 statement indicates that it was your managers who
18 directed you to decline that invitation; is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And why did they direct you to decline the invitation to
21 join the IMG? Can you remember?

22 A. As of now, again, I can't remember exactly the wording,
23 but I would have -- I would assume now that it was
24 because, other than -- as opposed to the Red Circle
25 which was -- as I say, was a loose organisation, for

1 want of a better word, IMG was recognised as more of
2 a political party, and I can -- as my, now, assessment
3 and assumption, that is why. They didn't want
4 Special Branch officers joining political parties. But
5 maybe -- maybe -- but that seems to me the most logical
6 reason. I can't think of any other reason.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 The length of your deployment. You were deployed
9 for a little more than two years or so with the SDS. We
10 know that the original idea for SDS deployment formed by
11 its founder was that the SDS officers would be deployed
12 for no longer than 12 months. What's your attitude to
13 that? What effect do you think that would have had on
14 the utility of the SDS, a deployment of 12 months?

15 A. I only found out about that proposed time period when
16 I did the witness statement. Prior to that, I had no
17 idea that that had been suggested. But as soon as I saw
18 that, I thought, well, having my experience, quite
19 honestly, 12 months, you know, you're not going to get
20 very far, or very much information in 12 months. That
21 was my -- that was my immediate reaction on seeing that
22 as a proposal. I mean, the guy who did it must have had
23 his reasons for suggesting that, but to me, it didn't --
24 when I first saw it, and even now, it wouldn't appear to
25 be that logical. I don't know how many officers did

1 only do 12 months, but I can't imagine that there were
2 very, very many, unless something dramatic happened.

3 Q. You were withdrawn from the field in -- midway through
4 1972, and I think in your witness statement you say you
5 went to work in the back office from March to
6 April 1973. Whilst you were in back office, did you
7 have contact with those that were waiting to be actively
8 deployed that you can recall?

9 A. I can't remember, but if -- if they were in there,
10 then -- and I was in there, then obviously yes. But
11 I -- I can't remember as such any -- any particular --
12 any, you know, specific officers.

13 Q. And it may then be of no use to ask this question.
14 I was going to ask you whether you were able to provide
15 or -- any sort of guidance or assistance to those that
16 were awaiting their deployment to give them an idea what
17 to expect and how to carry out their duties? Is that
18 something you simply can't remember?

19 A. As I was going to say, I can't remember but, I mean, if
20 it had been, then -- if I'd been asked or whatever, then
21 I may well have done, but I can't remember now.

22 Q. As someone working in back office, were you -- were you
23 doing -- carrying out clerical roles again? Was it
24 a return to writing up reports, checking
25 -- (overspeaking) --

1 A. Mm, typewriting(?) up and getting stuff
2 -- (overspeaking) --
3 Q. -- (inaudible)?
4 A. -- background stuff and getting it all together, yeah.
5 Q. Did you visit the SDS HQ flat to --
6 A. No.
7 Q. -- collect reports, or anything like that?
8 A. No. Not after -- not after I -- I went back into
9 the back office, I didn't go to the flat.
10 Q. So did you have any contact then with any field
11 officers, officers who were still in the field? When
12 you were in back office, any contact with the officers
13 in the field?
14 A. I can't remember, but it would have been highly
15 unlikely. Highly unlikely.
16 Q. Finally this, 340. You say in your witness statement
17 that during the course of your deployment you
18 experienced headaches and nosebleeds, and you attribute
19 those to the stress of your position. Did you feel
20 supported properly by your managers from a welfare point
21 of view whilst you were an SDS officer?
22 A. Add migraines to that as well, on a regular basis. But
23 in answer to your question, at that time, it -- I don't
24 know. It might sound, I don't know, macho or whatever,
25 but it isn't something that you -- that you really

1 discussed. Again, you got on with it. And probably
2 initially, I didn't, you know, directly contribute it to
3 whatever, but it obviously was due to the pressure. But
4 following the Mike Ferguson line of things, get on
5 with it, basically. So, yeah.

6 Q. So you simply didn't question it, is that your --

7 A. You got on with it. You got on with it.

8 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you very much, 340. I've got no
9 further questions for you, but if you just wait there,
10 others may.

11 A. Thank you.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

13 Mr Sanders?

14 MR SANDERS: No questions, thank you, sir.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 HN340, a long afternoon, I'm afraid, but I'm
17 grateful to you for coming and giving the evidence that
18 you have and for assisting me to try and find out what
19 happened all those years ago. Thank you.

20 A. Thank you.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: We will now adjourn until tomorrow at
22 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. Slightly out of sequence
23 because of the trouble that he had with COVID,
24 Dave Smith is going to make his opening statement.
25 There were going to be other witnesses, but for

1 a variety of reasons they are not able to attend
2 tomorrow and so there will be a procedural hearing,
3 which will be held in public, I think, at which I will
4 hear submissions from various sides. Thank you for your
5 help.

6 A. Can I ask a quick question, sir?

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, you may.

8 A. Is Dave Smith better now then, do I take from that?

9 THE CHAIRMAN: I believe so, but I will find out positively
10 tomorrow morning whether or not that is so.

11 A. Yes, hopefully. Thank you.

12 MS PURSER: Thank you, everyone. The hearings have now
13 finished for the day. We will resume at 10.00 am
14 tomorrow online where the proceedings will be
15 live-streamed, therefore the hearing centre will not be
16 open tomorrow. Our website has been updated with
17 the changes to the timetable. Thank you very much. You
18 may now leave or move to your break-out rooms.

19 (4.50 pm)

20 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Wednesday,

21 17 November 2020)

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