

Thursday, 19 November 2020

(11.00 am)

MS PURSER: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the final day of evidential hearings in Tranche 1, Phase 1 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Jacqueline Purser and I am the Hearings Manager.

As a reminder to those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone unless you are invited to speak by the Chairman.

I will now hand over to our Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. For the next 25 minutes or so, Ms Campbell is going to summarise the evidence of a number of officers who are not being called to give live evidence. We will then have a ten-minute break and resume our evidential hearings.

Ms Campbell.

Summary of evidence of HN333, HN339, HN349 & HN343 by MS

CAMPBELL

MS CAMPBELL: Thank you, sir. I'll begin with the summary of HN333.

HN333 served on the SDS for nine months from late 1968 to 1969. He has co-operated with the Inquiry to provide a written witness statement.

1 There is a restriction order in force preventing
2 the publication of both the real and cover names of this
3 officer. In light of this, the specific group targeted
4 by this officer has also not been published.

5 Prior to joining the SDS, HN333 worked in
6 Special Branch. While in Special Branch, he attended
7 the 27 October 1968 Grosvenor Square demonstration as
8 a plain-clothes officer, sent to mingle with the crowds
9 and help establish the intention of activists on
10 the day. HN333 states that he had not worked in an
11 undercover identity prior to joining the SDS.

12 HN333 was recruited to the SDS subsequent to
13 the October demonstration. He states in his witness
14 statement that the subject was first proposed informally
15 by more senior colleagues, although he cannot recall
16 who. At the time, there was talk within Special Branch
17 of the need for improved intelligence to help assess
18 future protest and unrest. There was no formal joining
19 process for the SDS.

20 HN333 describes his cover background
21 as "rudimentary". He adopted a cover name, cover
22 employment and lived in cover accommodation. Unusually
23 for officers at the time, HN333 states that he spent
24 most evenings at his cover address. He was single when
25 he joined the SDS.

1 HN333 was deployed against a left-wing group that no
2 longer exists. He found this group by answering
3 a public advertisement that had been suggested to him by
4 someone in SDS management. He would provide verbal
5 reports on the group's activities, most often during
6 regular meetings at the SDS safe house.

7 HN333 did not assume any roles of responsibility
8 within the group and describes it as a "loose
9 association". His tasking did not change during his
10 deployment.

11 HN333's deployment was interrupted by illness
12 causing him to pause his undercover duties for a few
13 weeks. He states in his witness statement that he
14 believes that this made his deployment less effective.

15 Ultimately, it was decided to withdraw this officer
16 due to health reasons. The withdrawal was planned and
17 HN333 states that he was able to give his excuses to
18 the -- to his target group, although he cannot remember
19 the specific reason he gave.

20 Following withdrawal, HN333 undertook several
21 training courses and ultimately returned to
22 Special Branch in an unrelated field. He recalls
23 undertaking a written debrief following deployment,
24 which addressed welfare issues. In general, HN333
25 describes the welfare arrangements at the time

1 as "ad hoc but effective".

2 There is no evidence to suggest that HN333 used
3 the name of a deceased child, engaged in sexual
4 activity, or formed any close personal relationships
5 while in his cover identity.

6 Sir, that concludes the summary for HN333. I will
7 now move on to HN339.

8 HN339 served on the SDS from 1970 to 1971 using
9 the cover name "Stewart Goodman". There is
10 a restriction order in force preventing the publication
11 of the real name of this officer.

12 HN339 joined Special Branch in the late 1960s. He
13 dealt with Special Branch enquiries before being tasked
14 to investigate the Campaign Against Racial
15 Discrimination. HN339 states in his witness statement
16 that during this time he did attend meetings of
17 the activist group but never in an undercover identity.

18 HN339 held the rank of detective sergeant when he
19 was approached to join the SDS. The earliest reporting
20 from this officer held by the Inquiry is from early
21 October 1970. However, a memorandum concerning SDS
22 expenditure indicates that HN339 was renting a cover
23 flat from at least April of that year.

24 HN339 was married when he joined the SDS. No
25 managers discussed the effect his recruitment might have

1 with his spouse.

2 HN339 adopted the cover identity of an unemployed
3 musician, and as such had no cover employment. He
4 rented a cover flat in the Streatham area, but only
5 stayed overnight occasionally.

6 HN339 states in his witness statement that he was
7 originally directed to infiltrate the Anti-Apartheid
8 Movement. Early reporting held by the Inquiry shows
9 that HN339 reported largely on the activities of
10 the Dambusters Mobilisation Committee, a sister group to
11 the Anti-Apartheid Movement, aimed at protesting
12 the construction of the Cahora Bassa Dam intended to
13 supply electricity to South Africa.

14 He appears to have remained in this group until
15 February 1971, reporting on planned protest activities.

16 HN339 also reported during this time on an upcoming
17 conference by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, where
18 Michael Barnes MP was due to speak.

19 HN339 was subsequently directed to infiltrate
20 the International Socialists. He replied to a newspaper
21 advert from the group seeking volunteers, and started
22 attending meetings at the Lambeth branch from late
23 February 1971. Eventually, he was appointed to the role
24 of branch treasurer.

25 HN339 recalls in his witness statement that this

1 brought him close to the branch secretary at the time,
2 and describes himself as "effectively his right-hand
3 man".

4 The Inquiry holds reporting from HN339 on
5 the International Socialists from February to
6 November 1971. During this time, he reported on a mix
7 of public and private meetings, including the 1971
8 IS Easter conference and the annual IS rally in
9 Skegness.

10 Much of his later reporting deals with an internal
11 party rift that arose between the main leadership of
12 the International Socialists and members of
13 the so-called "Trotskyist Tendency".

14 Coverage of this particular issue was continued by
15 HN343, "John Clinton", from within IS after HN339's
16 reporting ends.

17 HN339 recalls being involved in some flyposting
18 while in his cover identity, but no other criminal
19 activity. Near the end of his deployment, HN339 was
20 involved in a road traffic accident while driving an
21 unmarked police car, which necessitated the involvement
22 of his supervisors on the SDS. HN339 states that he
23 does not remember much about his withdrawal from
24 the field, but suspects that this event may have been
25 a catalyst for the end of his deployment.

1 There is no evidence to suggest that HN339 used
2 the name of a deceased child, or engaged in sexual
3 activity while in his cover identity.

4 Sir, that includes the summary for HN339. I'll move
5 on to HN349.

6 HN349 joined the SDS in the early 1970s. He was in
7 the squad for approximately one year, targeting
8 anarchist groups in Central London. There is
9 a restriction order in force preventing the publication
10 of both the real and cover names of this officer. In
11 light of this, the specific groups targeted by this
12 officer have also not been published.

13 The Inquiry has no contemporaneous reporting from
14 HN349's deployment. However, he has co-operated with
15 the Inquiry to provide a written witness statement.

16 HN349 joined the SDS after a relatively short time
17 on Special Branch. He was recruited after meeting with
18 an undercover officer, who explained the nature of
19 the role. There was no formal training.

20 HN349 spent some time in the SDS back office before
21 deployment, where he was able to read reports and gain
22 a feel for the information that was collected. During
23 this time, he also met on two or three occasions with
24 active UCOs in the SDS cover flat.

25 HN349 was married when he joined the SDS. No

1 manager spoke to his wife, or discussed the impact that
2 a deployment might have on his family life.

3 At the start of his deployment, HN349 was not asked
4 to target a particular group. He was simply tasked with
5 attending any demonstrations taking place in Central
6 London and getting to know the regular activists.
7 Ultimately, he was tasked with attempting to get
8 involved with various loose-knit anarchist groups.

9 HN349 describes his cover identity as being not
10 as "developed" as that of his colleagues. He had
11 a cover name and a cover flat, though he never actually
12 slept there. He did not have a cover employer.

13 HN349's deployment was ultimately unsuccessful. He
14 describes in his witness statement how he was unable to
15 strike up any real relationships with the activists in
16 his group or gain their trust, as they were highly
17 suspicious of strangers. Approximately nine months into
18 his deployment, HN349 met with his managers and
19 the decision was made to withdraw him from the field.
20 No method of exfiltration was required as HN349 had not
21 managed to sufficiently assimilate within his group.

22 After his withdrawal, HN349 spent some time again in
23 the SDS back office before ultimately returning to
24 Special Branch. While working in Special Branch, HN349
25 did work with intelligence that was gathered by the SDS,

1 although that material would not have been specifically
2 identified as such.

3 He states in his witness statement that after some
4 time, most Special Branch officers were "aware of
5 the SDS and had an idea of the kinds of groups that they
6 had infiltrated".

7 HN349 also states that he would have occasionally
8 made requests for specific information from the SDS
9 while in Special Branch.

10 There is no evidence to suggest that HN349 used
11 the name of a deceased child, engaged in sexual
12 activity, or formed any close personal relationships
13 while in his cover identity.

14 Sir, that concludes the summary for HN349. I will
15 now move on to my final summary for HN343.

16 HN343 served on the SDS from early 1971 to
17 September 1974 using the cover name "John Clinton". He
18 infiltrated the International Socialists, the IS -- in
19 particular the Hammersmith and Fulham branch. There is
20 a restriction order in force preventing the publication
21 of the real name of this officer. He has co-operated
22 with the Inquiry to provide a written witness statement.

23 HN343 joined Special Branch in the late 1960s,
24 a process which he remembers in his witness statement as
25 involving "lots of interview and testing". HN343 states

1 that during this time, he would attend public meetings
2 of various groups of interest to Special Branch, as was
3 common practice, and would give a fake name if asked.
4 He had not, however, worked in a formal undercover
5 identity before joining the SDS.

6 He states that he was not aware of the SDS before
7 joining but that there were "vague whispers" in
8 Special Branch of the existence of a secret unit.

9 HN343 joined the SDS in early 1971 after being
10 approached by the chief inspector at the time,
11 Phil Saunders. There was no formal training provided.
12 He was single at the time of joining the SDS and no one
13 spoke to him or his family about the potential impact
14 that an undercover deployment might have on him
15 personally.

16 Shortly after joining the unit, HN343 fell ill,
17 causing a delay of several months in his preparation for
18 deployment. HN343 also recalls spending three to four
19 months in the SDS back office prior to deployment,
20 reading reports and "getting up to speed with
21 the political landscape".

22 HN343 describes his undercover legend as "basic"
23 and without "any elaborate detail". He adopted
24 the cover name "John Clinton "and gave his cover
25 employment as that of a van driver, which he states was

1 chosen as it would have provided an excuse if members of
2 his group saw him in an unexpected area of London.

3 He rented cover accommodation in the Fulham area and
4 was provided with a cover vehicle. Although he cannot
5 remember any details, HN343 states that he would have
6 discussed his cover name and legend with his managers
7 before being deployed.

8 HN343 was tasked by his managers to infiltrate
9 the International Socialists. The earliest reporting
10 from this officer held by the Inquiry dates from
11 October 1971. Although the majority of the reporting
12 from this officer held by the Inquiry from between
13 October 1971 and March 1972 relates to the Croydon
14 branch of the IS, HN343 has explained in his witness
15 statement that this is likely due to the held documents
16 not reflecting the totality of his reporting during this
17 period.

18 HN343 states that he began his deployment by
19 attending various meetings and demonstrations of
20 the IS across London, before ultimately focusing on
21 the Hammersmith and Fulham branch. He chose this branch
22 because there was "a lot of Irish activity discussed",
23 a subject that he knew would be of great interest to
24 the MPS.

25 HN343 notes that it was easy to join the IS, as

1 the group was keen for members. While in his cover
2 identity, HN343 states that he deliberately avoided
3 forming any close relationships and cultivated
4 the persona of someone who was unreliable and a bit
5 "flaky" to avoid being given any responsibility within
6 the group.

7 HN343 states that he understood the SDS to be
8 interested in both issues of public order and counter
9 subversion at the time of his deployment. HN343 notes
10 that at the time, the IS was "a large group that would
11 attend lots of demonstrations" and were a "Trotskyist
12 subversive group with links into Irish groups".

13 Although violence was witnessed at these events,
14 HN343 states that it would "rarely come directly from
15 IS members", but rather a minority of other groups.

16 HN343 likewise states that he did consider the group
17 to be subversive, explaining that "IS were constantly
18 trying to exploit whatever industrial or political
19 situation that existed in the aim of getting
20 the proletariat to rise up".

21 HN343 attended a wide range of events, both public
22 and private, ranging from very small meetings attended
23 by a handful of people, to very large events attended by
24 thousands. His reporting provides significant coverage
25 of the internal affairs of the IS, including elections

1 and appointments made, campaigns and talks, recruitment,
2 preparations for the 1972 annual conference, and
3 the split with the "Trotskyist Tendency", an internal
4 rift previously covered by HN339.

5 HN343's reporting also touches upon union membership
6 and industrial action taken by members of the IS. HN343
7 himself was not a member of a trade union.

8 There is also coverage in the reporting of
9 IS involvement in numerous campaigns supported by
10 the group, including Irish matters, Women's Liberation,
11 tenants' rights and the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

12 HN343 states in his witness statement that he had
13 considerable discretion as to what he reported on during
14 his deployment. However, he would have been guided by
15 what he knew would have been of interest to
16 Special Branch at the time. His general tasking and
17 ongoing updates from his deployment would have been
18 discussed regularly with his managers, Chief Inspector
19 Saunders or Detective Inspector HN294, at weekly
20 meetings in the SDS safe house.

21 HN343's personnel file suggests that he left the SDS
22 in September 1974, although the Inquiry only holds
23 reporting from this officer up to December 1973.

24 HN343 states that he made the decision that his
25 deployment should end, as he had had enough of the life

1 of an undercover officer. His managers were supportive
2 of this decision.

3 HN343 undertook what he describes as a "phased
4 withdrawal" from his group, telling members that he was
5 going travelling.

6 HN343 does not recall any formal debrief following
7 his withdrawal. He was not offered any post-deployment
8 support. HN343 states that his time as an
9 undercover officer "definitely changed him as a person",
10 although he states that he has not had any psychological
11 issues as a result.

12 He describes himself as very private in his personal
13 affairs, something he attributes to his deployment.

14 HN343 was posted to Special Branch C Squad for a few
15 months in the late 1980s. In his witness statement he
16 notes that he would have received intelligence from
17 the SDS in this role, but it would be sanitised and not
18 identifiable as such. He would not have known at the
19 time what the unit was doing, or which groups were
20 currently infiltrated.

21 HN343 required from the MPS after 30 years' service.
22 There is no evidence to suggest that HN343 used the name
23 of a deceased child, engaged in sexual activity, or
24 formed any close personal relationships while in his
25 cover identity.

1 Sir, that concludes the summary for those officers.

2 In addition to publishing the documents and witness
3 statements relating to those officers, the Inquiry today
4 will be publishing, as well, documents in relation to
5 five former members of the SDS who have not provided
6 witness statements.

7 They are, firstly, HN346, real name Jill Mosdell,
8 cover name unknown, who reported on the groups
9 Stop the Seventy Tour, the Anti-Apartheid Movement and
10 related groups. The Inquiry's analysis of those
11 documents can be found at page 136 to 138 of appendix 2
12 of Counsel to the Inquiry's written opening statement.

13 Secondly, documents will be published for HN338,
14 real name restricted, cover name unknown, who reported
15 on the groups the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign,
16 the International Marxist Group, in particular
17 the Notting Hill and West London branches, and
18 the Anti-Internment League. Our analysis can be found
19 at page 161 to 166 of our written opening statement.

20 Thirdly, documents will be published for HN1251/371,
21 real name Phil Saunders, cover name, if any, is unknown,
22 who was a detective inspector in the SDS. Our analysis
23 can be found at page 180 to 183 of
24 Counsel to the Inquiry's written opening statement,
25 appendix 2.

1 Chairman.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

3 As at the beginning, the start of every evidential
4 session, a recording made earlier is going to be played.
5 If you're listening to it for the first time, please
6 listen carefully:

7 "I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,
8 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make
9 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry including
10 its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have
11 made a number of orders which affect what you may and
12 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave
13 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter
14 and may have serious consequences for you.

15 "If I am satisfied that a person may have breached
16 an order, I have the power to certify the matter to
17 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
18 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
19 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
20 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
21 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
22 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
23 sequestration of their assets.

24 "Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
25 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to

1 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
2 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
3 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
4 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any
5 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
6 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
7 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing
8 room to any other person, but only once at least ten
9 minutes have elapsed since the event which you are
10 describing took place.

11 "This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
12 the Inquiry I have made orders prohibiting the public
13 disclosure of information, for example about
14 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
15 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,
16 whether by accident or design, information which I have
17 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
18 be disclosed in a hearing. If and when that happens,
19 I will immediately suspend the hearing and make an order
20 prohibiting further disclosure of the information
21 outside the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that
22 no further disclosure of that information may be made by
23 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device
24 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside
25 it.

1 "I am sorry if you find this message alarming; it is
2 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
3 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
4 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
5 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
6 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
7 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own
8 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
9 best to ensure that you can.

10 "If you have any doubt about the terms of this
11 message, or what you may or may not do, you should not
12 hesitate to ask one of them and, with my help if
13 necessary, they will provide you with the answer."

14 HN345, could you please be sworn or affirmed, at
15 your wish.

16 HN345

17 MS PURSER: Good morning, HN345, can you see and hear me?

18 A. I can, yes.

19 MS PURSER: I can't see you at the moment -- oh, I can see
20 you now.

21 I understand that you would like to affirm?

22 A. Yes, please.

23 (Witness affirmed)

24 MS PURSER: Thank you very much.

25 Chairman.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

2 We can see that behind you there is someone sitting
3 there, I think typing and there to assist you with
4 the technology, if you need it.

5 Is there anyone else in the room?

6 A. No.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

8 Questions by MR BARR

9 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

10 345, you have helpfully provided the Inquiry with
11 a witness statement dated 20 August 2019. Are you
12 familiar with the contents of that witness statement?

13 A. Slightly.

14 Q. Are the contents of the witness statement true and
15 correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?

16 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

17 Q. Can I start, please, by asking you about the time before
18 you joined Special Branch when you were serving as an
19 undercover police officer. In particular, did you
20 receive any training for the role of undercover police
21 officer?

22 A. No.

23 Q. And so did you -- does it follow that you learned on
24 the job, or from fellow undercover police officers, what
25 was required of you?

- 1 A. On the job would be more accurate, because I didn't
2 really operate (inaudible) for the most part.
- 3 Q. You have described providing some information about
4 Stop the Tour whilst you were working as what I might
5 call an "ordinary undercover police officer"; not
6 meaning to demean that role at all, just to distinguish
7 it from an SDS undercover police officer?
- 8 A. Fair enough.
- 9 Q. Was that the result of you infiltrating
10 the Stop the Tour campaign, or was it information that
11 you just happened to pick up in the course of targeting
12 somebody else?
- 13 A. It was information I picked up in the course of
14 targeting another operation.
- 15 Q. And, similarly, you tell us that you reported some
16 information on the Black Power Movement. Again, did you
17 directly target the Black Power Movement or was
18 the information information that you picked up ancillary
19 to your main tasking?
- 20 A. I don't recall being directed towards looking at the --
21 the Black Power movement, it's something just happened
22 while I was doing other things.
- 23 Q. I'm just going to pause there for a moment, 345, and ask
24 the person sitting behind you, who's helping with
25 technical matters, would it be possible to turn up

1 the volume for this witness very slightly, please?

2 (Pause)

3 Thank you. Let's see if the shorthand writers can
4 hear you now.

5 When you joined Special Branch, was there any
6 mention of the SDS at that stage?

7 A. I -- the term used when I joined
8 was "SOS/Special Operations Squad"; "SDS" is a term that
9 I've encountered quite recently.

10 Q. Okay. So I'll put that question again, then.

11 When you joined Special Branch, was there any
12 mention of the Special Operations Squad?

13 A. No. But that's perhaps not such a helpful question,
14 because Special Branch approached me because of the work
15 I'd been doing, and it was people from the -- there were
16 all sorts of people there, and some of them were in
17 the Special Operations Squad.

18 Q. Yes. We now know that one of the people you say
19 was there was the head of -- the then head of the SOS.
20 We'll come back to that a little later.

21 Now, once you had joined Special Branch, you tell
22 us, first of all, that you joined C Squad, and that you
23 joined the section of C Squad that dealt with
24 Trotskyists and anarchists?

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. You also tell us that you were sent to a demonstration
2 about Bangladesh?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. My first question about that is: can you help us as to
5 why, when you were in a section dealing with Trotskyists
6 and anarchists, you came to be at a demonstration about
7 Bangladesh?

8 A. I don't know. I was instructed to attend this
9 demonstration. I did as I was told.

10 Q. You give another example of being called back from your
11 work to Whitehall, where there was a demonstration in
12 Whitehall and Parliament Square, and where you witnessed
13 a female police officer jumping from, if I've understood
14 your evidence correctly, a burning vehicle; is that
15 correct?

16 A. I was -- I became aware of a vehicle that was on fire
17 and inside the vehicle there was a female officer who
18 was in distress.

19 Q. Can you help us, what was the demonstration about?

20 A. It was about the conflict between what was then
21 East Pakistan and West Pakistan, today it's Pakistan and
22 Bangladesh. They were one country about a thousand
23 miles apart.

24 Q. And what had caused the fire?

25 A. I don't know. I became aware of the fire some several

1 minutes after it had started. I just assumed someone
2 was being unhelpful(?).

3 Q. I see.

4 But that was an assumption on your part?

5 A. Yes. I witnessed -- I did not witness -- I did not see
6 who started the fire. I became aware of screaming from
7 the loud speakers on some motorcycles, I looked around
8 and saw the fire, I saw other officers there. As I was
9 in plain clothes, I stood back because they didn't need
10 me.

11 Q. Was the demonstration that you witnessed being conducted
12 in an orderly manner?

13 A. I don't know. What happened was I was on another -- on
14 another bit of work. A notice -- a message came through
15 the radio asking me and all SB units to return to
16 Scotland Yard. On my way back, I was diverted, I was
17 asked to go to this place near the war memorial, and
18 more than that, I do not remember too well.

19 Q. Can you remember whether you personally witnessed any
20 disorderly conduct?

21 A. Nothing that struck me. There were people there
22 behaving the way they do and, you know, running around
23 in all sorts of ways. But there was no violence,
24 nothing unpleasant going on. It was just lots of
25 activity, lots of energy. But I didn't notice anything

1 to be worried about. Having said that, of course, we
2 did have the fire.

3 Q. Yes. And the fire, if I've understood your witness
4 statement correctly, was in a police communications
5 vehicle?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. I see.

8 Coming back now to your general time on
9 Special Branch, were you given any training on
10 the definition of "extremism"?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Were you given any training on the definition
13 of "subversion"?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Did you form, from your work in Special Branch, an
16 understanding of what was "subversive"?

17 A. I had my -- probably my own private view on that term.
18 What is subversive to one group could be helpful to
19 another, or positive to another. I think each case has
20 to be taken on its own merits.

21 Q. I see.

22 I mean, really what I'm interested in is whether, if
23 you were not given any formal training, whether there
24 was a received understanding within Special Branch as to
25 what constituted subversive behaviour.

- 1 A. I can't remember any such instruction or guidance.
- 2 Q. Were you given any instruction on which groups -- which
3 Trotskyist and anarchist groups were of interest to
4 Special Branch?
- 5 A. After all this time, I can't really remember. I found
6 myself living out in an environment, and I would meet
7 people from all sorts of groups, all sorts of
8 backgrounds. I would do what I can to check them out
9 and make the reports as and when necessary.
- 10 Q. When you went to activist meetings and demonstrations
11 and so forth, were you given any briefings about their
12 politics before you attended their events?
- 13 A. No.
- 14 Q. We've got in the bundle some of your Special Branch
15 reports and some of your SDS reports. In terms of
16 the content, what it was you were expected to record,
17 was there any difference between Special Branch and
18 the SOS?
- 19 A. I have no memory of there -- of there being any
20 difference or any conflict there. I just felt that we
21 had to go out there and come back with whatever
22 information that we could lay our hands on.
- 23 Q. Were you given any instructions about what information
24 would be of interest and what information would not be
25 of interest?

1 A. Again, I have no memory, but I imagine -- just something
2 that makes me believe that I would have been told what
3 was of interest, and I don't recall ever being told what
4 was of no interest. If that answers the question.

5 Q. Yes, because it is quite interesting. You tell us that
6 one of the distinctions between your undercover work
7 before you joined the SOS and the work you did in
8 Special Branch and the SOS is that in non-SOS work,
9 pre-special Branch, you had been very selective in what
10 you reported. You were looking for things that were out
11 of the ordinary. Whereas you say, in the SOS, you
12 tended to report a great deal. Was that -- did you also
13 report a great deal in Special Branch?

14 A. I would report on encounters that took place as
15 a consequence of earlier instructions. So I would be
16 told to go somewhere; I would go there, do what needed
17 to be done, and come back with whatever information was
18 available.

19 Q. I see.

20 And where did you get -- and so where did you get
21 the understanding that what was required of you was to
22 report back whatever information was available?

23 A. I have no specific memory, no clear memory of that.
24 A lot of the guidance we had was not in a classroom or
25 anything, it was just chat in an office, across a desk

1 or whatever, talking with colleagues, that sort of
2 thing.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 I'm just going to ask for one of your Special Branch
5 pre-SOS reports to be called up.

6 Could we have, please, {UCPI0000005817}. Thank you.

7 This is a report, 345, dated 16 April 1971. It's
8 about the International Marxist Group and the Vietnam
9 Solidarity Campaign.

10 If we could go over the page, please,
11 {UCPI0000005817/2}, and if -- thank you very much.

12 In the main text it reads:

13 "Mr Ninh ... expounded upon the achievements of
14 the heroic North Vietnamese people in their struggle
15 against American imperialism. This was followed by
16 a discourse by Tariq Ali. He dealt at length with
17 the history of the war in Indo-China and urged
18 the solidarity movement in this country to support
19 the North Vietnamese. Ali stressed that if the North
20 Vietnamese people were defeated, it would be a defeat
21 for Marxism throughout the world. He concluded by
22 asking all present to support the demonstration on
23 Saturday, 24th April 1971 -- the International Day of
24 Solidarity with the Indo-Chinese revolution."

25 Was Mr Ali someone you can remember?

1 A. I remember the name very clearly, but no more. It's
2 just one of those strange things.

3 Q. Can you recall whether you were asked specifically to
4 report on Mr Ali?

5 A. No, I have no clear memory of that at all.

6 Q. Can you recall whether you were given any briefing about
7 Mr Ali at all?

8 A. I definitely was not.

9 Q. Thank you. Can that be taken down, please.

10 You refer to your Special Branch work as the sort of
11 work where you might be required to strike up
12 a conversation with someone for the first time. When
13 you were doing that, would you ever use a false name?

14 A. I had a false name, and when I was out and about I used
15 the name rather than my own name.

16 Q. And presumably you were seeking information from at
17 least some of the people you struck up conversation
18 with?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And is the distinction between doing that and what you
21 did in the SOS simply that in the SOS you took your
22 undercover persona to another level?

23 A. That would be fair, yes.

24 Q. You describe getting some contact details from a woman
25 who we're not going to name at the Bangladesh related

1 demonstration that you attended. Did that contact lead
2 you into your later work within the SOS in relation to
3 Operation Omega?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And was there any connection between having that lead
6 and being invited to join the SOS that you are aware of?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. Can you, without naming names other than if it's
9 necessary: Assistant Commander Pendered, could you
10 explain the connection?

11 A. I was called and -- I was called to his office, and
12 there was a letter on the desk. He looked down at
13 the letter and said it was from Box. And he said, "Not
14 a lot of people with your service get one of these
15 letters from Box," it was quite complimentary. And they
16 suggested -- there was a suggestion -- I don't remember
17 how much was in the letter and how much was said, but it
18 was at that meeting that I was told I was moving to
19 the Special Demonstration Squad, and I'd be given an
20 undercover name, and all of that.

21 Q. I certainly don't want you to name anybody from Box, and
22 by "Box" we are talking about MI5, the Security Service,
23 and I'll be careful about details. But can you tell us,
24 was your commendation anything to do with
25 the intelligence that you had provided on the Bangladesh

1 related group?

2 A. I got the impression it was there because they were
3 surprised I'd managed to make the contact and put myself
4 in the position where I was now part of this group.

5 Q. I see, thank you.

6 After the conversation with Assistant Commander
7 Pendered, I'd like to know what happened next to get you
8 into the SOS. Were you then introduced to SOS managers?
9 No names, please.

10 A. Yes. What followed was not something you're likely to
11 remember very sharply. I was told that I'd be going
12 out, I would meet people who I'd be working with,
13 including what you describe as "managers". I was also
14 introduced to what you might describe as "safe houses",
15 or secret offices where we would meet. And it just went
16 from there. There was no -- it just -- things just
17 happened, and I probably don't remember all of
18 the detail.

19 Q. I see.

20 You recall, at some stage, two members of the SOS
21 came to visit you: HN68 and HN326?

22 A. 326 ...

23 Q. It's page 10 of the internal pagination, paragraph 24 of
24 your witness statement.

25 A. Oh, I'm -- I'm looking at ...

1 Q. At the cipher list. Sorry, yes.

2 A. I'm looking at the cipher list.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. And it's HN326?

5 Q. Yes, 326 and 68. Neither name can be mentioned openly.

6 A. This -- ah, 32 ... ah, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, they

7 did.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. I can remember -- I remember the incident, and I'm just

10 reminding myself --

11 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

12 A. -- (inaudible).

13 Q. What I'd like to know is, can you remember when that

14 meeting -- when that visit occurred? Was it before or

15 after you had joined the SOS?

16 A. That's a difficult one to answer. It was -- if it was

17 after, it would have been in the very early days, but it

18 could quite easily have been before, because I did find

19 myself in touch with SB-- Special Branch -- they would

20 contact me because of the information I'd uncovered.

21 But I don't have any clear memory of whether that was

22 before or after the date of joining Special Branch.

23 Q. Was it about the SOS, or was it about something else?

24 A. I have no memory. My assumption is they were there for

25 a reason that had something to do with the job. But

1 because we had encountered each other so many times,
2 a sort of connection -- a friendly connection existed.
3 And it's quite possible that they came down to see me,
4 and my home was the most convenient place for the -- for
5 us to sit down and have a cup of tea and a chat about
6 whatever was going on. But I do remember the -- I
7 remember them coming to my home, I remember seeing them
8 there, but I can't remember why.

9 Q. I see. Maybe I'm trying to press you too far given
10 we're talking about half a century ago. But is there
11 anything else about that meeting and what took place
12 that you can recall that might help us?

13 A. I think the only thing I can really remember is
14 the feeling that I had that you were all part of
15 the same group, the Metropolitan Police; we were
16 different departments, but effectively we were
17 achieving -- we were -- we were on the same team, on
18 the same side. And so the sort of camaraderie
19 developed. But I can't remember what we spoke of at
20 this particular meeting.

21 Q. In the SOS, you've told us in your witness statement
22 that you received no formal training. I'd like to
23 explore with you how you found out what was expected of
24 you. Were your colleagues a source of information as to
25 what you should be doing?

1 A. There were times, I can't -- I couldn't give you
2 a specific example, but there were times
3 when conversations would occur, during which I would
4 learn something from them. They were longer in the job
5 than I am, so talking to them was quite interesting. It
6 didn't happen a lot. We were all isolated when you work
7 that way.

8 Q. Were these the sorts of conversations that would take
9 place at the SOS safe flat?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And to what extent did your managers tell you what was
12 expected of you and what you needed to do?

13 A. I think we were given broad -- very broad instructions,
14 not detailed instructions. There were suggestions
15 made -- what we needed to do. And, I don't know,
16 I think we were all on a bit of a learning curve.

17 Q. And to what extent had you picked up what was required
18 of you so far as reporting was concerned from your work
19 in Special Branch?

20 A. I think the method of reporting would have been
21 something that would have been, if you like, a hit and
22 miss operation. If I wrote a report that was lacking in
23 some way, someone would come to me and say, "Look, what
24 we need to do with this is that or the other." But
25 writing of the reports was not central to my

- 1 (inaudible), for want of a better term.
- 2 Q. I beg your pardon. I missed that.
- 3 A. It's basically the reports were something we would do,
4 and if I made a mistake, someone would correct it. Very
5 often, because I'm not a very good typist, my reports
6 would be written by hand, and there was a typing team
7 that would type out the reports on the official
8 documents.
- 9 Q. Operation Omega. Who tasked you to pursue infiltration
10 of Operation Omega?
- 11 A. I don't have a memory of this conversation, but my
12 assumption, if that is what you will accept, is
13 Ken Pendered. Having said that, he would have been
14 aware that I had worked undercover before; and my whole
15 point in joining the Branch was to work undercover, not
16 in the office. That was my --
- 17 Q. Did you have discussions with SOS managers before
18 deploying with that unit into Operation Omega?
- 19 A. I don't recall any significant conversations, no.
- 20 Q. Can you recall whether you were given any specific
21 instructions about what to try and find out in relation
22 to Operation Omega?
- 23 A. No.
- 24 Q. To what extent was what you did in the SOS in relation
25 to Operation Omega simply an extension of what you had

- 1 been doing in Special Branch?
- 2 A. I think, no. SOS, again a different name, you put
3 yourself out there and you didn't go back anywhere near
4 the office. You -- we just lived away from anything to
5 do with the Metropolitan Police.
- 6 Q. You used the cover name "Peter Fredericks", is that
7 right?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that in fact this
10 name was one that you had assumed before you joined
11 the SOS, whilst you were with Special Branch, at
12 the instruction of a sergeant, who we are not going to
13 name, and that it also had something to do with
14 Operation Omega; is that right?
- 15 A. I think it would be fair to say that I adopted that name
16 because it was a name already in the -- in the system,
17 and I needed to make a decision in a hurry. I was given
18 that name and asked to use that name, but later on
19 I kept that name.
- 20 Q. I see. So a conscious -- a conscious decision to keep
21 the name?
- 22 A. It was, yes, because it just -- I -- at this time
23 I thought changing my name at that stage of whatever it
24 is I was doing was not a good idea, and I couldn't
25 elaborate on that after all these years, but I just

1 thought it was not a good idea. I'd already chosen one
2 name and I thought "stick with it".

3 Q. I see.

4 A. I'd been asked to use one name, and I thought "stick
5 with it".

6 Q. You describe in your witness statement that various
7 groups were interested in the conflict in what was then
8 East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and that some had
9 a political interest, whereas others had a humanitarian
10 interest.

11 Can you recall the groups that you are talking
12 about?

13 A. Well, I know there were some people who were from
14 a group called the Young Haganah. Their interest seemed
15 to be humanitarian. It would be fair to say that most
16 of the people I encountered were interested in
17 the wellbeing of those who were suffering. There was
18 a programme there to go and build -- rebuild houses or
19 huts, or whatever it is, for those who had been evicted
20 from their homes, and stuff like that. I didn't come
21 across, if any -- I have no memory of any significant
22 conversation with anyone with a political -- simply
23 a political motive. It was -- it did tend to be
24 humanitarian.

25 Q. Can you recall discussing the motives of the groups with

1 your managers in the SOS?

2 A. No. Not in any detail. Too long ago.

3 Q. Were you steered by your SOS managers to or away from
4 any of these groups?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Now, you've described attending meetings at a -- what
7 I've understood to be a domestic dwelling in Camden,
8 part of a group that supported Operation Omega. Was any
9 formal permission required through the SOS before you
10 attended a private dwelling house in your undercover
11 identity?

12 A. No formal -- nothing formal, no. I was told where to
13 go, told where the meetings would be. I was asked if
14 I'd like to attend, and I said yes. I just turned up
15 and things carried on as normal.

16 Q. Does it remain the case that you can't remember the name
17 of this specific group?

18 A. I don't remember -- I remember the name
19 "Operation Omega", I don't remember any other names.

20 Q. I see.

21 Now, you tell us in your witness statement that one
22 of the group's member's family had donated £6,500 to
23 the Operation Omega cause.

24 A. This is what I was told, yes.

25 Q. That was a great deal of money in those days, wasn't it?

1 A. Yes, it was.

2 Q. Did the group appear to you to be well funded?

3 A. The way things worked, I was never -- I never found
4 myself thinking about the funding. It just -- it just
5 felt fine. To answer your question, it felt adequately
6 funded for what they were doing.

7 Q. Do you know how well resourced the humanitarian effort
8 that they were engaged in was?

9 A. They wanted to go there and build houses for people who
10 had been -- who had lost their homes, because --

11 Q. -- I beg your pardon?

12 A. Because -- sorry -- they lost their homes because of
13 the war between the two factions.

14 Q. It was a very serious humanitarian crisis, wasn't it?

15 A. Absolutely, yes.

16 Q. And did you get the impression that the humanitarian
17 effort of the group you had infiltrated matched
18 the funding that you had been told it had?

19 A. I didn't look into it that closely. We would need to
20 know the value of properties and things in a country
21 like Bangladesh, compared then with the value of
22 properties in London. It is not an exercise I went into
23 at the time. But I just got the impression that they
24 were spending a lot -- they were planning to spend a lot
25 of time, a lot of money, a lot of effort helping

1 the people who were being assaulted by an army.

2 Q. You tell us that the group did actually go to East
3 Pakistan to provide humanitarian relief?

4 A. I believe some of them did, yes.

5 Q. Was that whilst you were infiltrating the group?

6 A. I would have said no, it was something that was being
7 talked about and worked at when I was obliged to leave
8 the group. But I was told later on that they did go
9 there, but I don't know what they did.

10 Q. And who were you told by?

11 A. I can't remember that. I can't remember who told me,
12 but one of the people there actually had a baby while
13 she was in custody. She'd been arrested while she was
14 there.

15 Q. And was that the sort of thing that would have made
16 the news in those days?

17 A. I don't know. I can't -- I'd like to be able to answer
18 that, but ... it didn't seem to make the news. I found
19 out not by what I read in the papers. I can't remember
20 how I found out. But I just get the feeling that this
21 is information that came to me word of mouth.

22 Q. I see.

23 When they were planning the humanitarian relief
24 effort whilst you were infiltrating the group, did any
25 question arise of you being invited to go to

1 East Pakistan with them?

2 A. That didn't happen, no.

3 Q. How big were their meetings?

4 A. Typically 10 to 12 people. Sometimes fewer. And these

5 were not meetings where there was a lot of time was

6 spent discussing the problem. It was meetings that we

7 would do things. Like we'd put -- get envelopes

8 together, stuff the envelopes, the envelopes had to be

9 distributed, they were distributed, and their

10 message(?). So it was more admin than anything else.

11 Q. Were decisions made at these meetings?

12 A. If they were, they would have been made by -- outside of

13 my presence.

14 Q. I see.

15 Did you -- this may make the next question easy.

16 Were you involved in any decision-making for that group?

17 A. No. No.

18 Q. Did you attend demonstrations with the group?

19 A. I remember the first. And if there had been other

20 demonstrations, there's something inside me that tells

21 me I would have been there. Oh, yes I did. I went to

22 one in -- I think it was Slough.

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. And there would have been others, but a walk in the park

25 on a Sunday, sort of -- you know, there were -- I can't

- 1 remember anything special about those demonstrations.
- 2 Q. Well, you describe the event in Slough as being attended
3 by many thousands of people and being peaceful and
4 unpoliced. Would a meeting of several thousand people
5 that was unpoliced have been unusual?
- 6 A. The short answer to the question, I suppose yes. But
7 it's fair to say that if the police had been there, they
8 were very, very discreet. They weren't upsetting
9 anyone, they weren't getting in anyone's way. They were
10 hardly noticeable. You know, it's a long time ago,
11 I can't remember. But I got the impression it was --
12 the authorities and the demonstrators seemed to be
13 working smoothly together.
- 14 Q. I'm getting the impression that there was no public
15 order concerns at all so far as this was concerned; is
16 that fair?
- 17 A. That sums it up beautifully, yes.
- 18 Q. You've also mentioned Speakers' Corner. Did you attend
19 Speakers' Corner in relation to matters concerning
20 Operation Omega?
- 21 A. It's quite likely, but I don't have any specific memory
22 of that.
- 23 Q. You have also described some flyposting. Was that
24 conducted by Operation Omega?
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. And did you have prior knowledge that it was going to
2 happen?
- 3 A. After all this time, I have no memory of that.
4 I remember being there and I remember things -- some
5 things that happened on that -- that night.
- 6 Q. Can you recall how it came about?
- 7 A. No. I think I was just trying to be helpful. Someone
8 said -- someone had said -- I had a car, and it would
9 enable me to carry the glue and the paintbrushes and
10 everything else, and the -- and the -- the adverts. So
11 I was -- if you like, I was in a useful position, and
12 that I made myself available whenever I was needed.
- 13 Q. Did you have time to discuss doing that with your
14 managers in advance?
- 15 A. I don't have any such recollection and my feeling is
16 I didn't, because I thought: flyposting, no one gets
17 hurt, there's no need to get over-excited. My view;
18 others will disagree perhaps.
- 19 Q. Was there any formal requirement in the SOS to get prior
20 permission to do something like that?
- 21 A. I wouldn't be able to answer that question. I --
22 I don't know.
- 23 Q. Well, let's test it another way. Was anybody upset with
24 you for having done it?
- 25 A. No.

1 Q. And you say in your witness statement that you wouldn't
2 have reported something like flyposting. Why would that
3 have been?

4 A. I was involved -- okay, certain things -- I don't know.
5 I think my feeling would be, okay, they put some adverts
6 up on a lamppost, or something like that,
7 the authorities have got more important things to do.
8 This was huge -- I took the view this was hugely
9 peaceful. It was transmitting their message, their plea
10 to the people to help and support them. They weren't
11 hurting anyone, they weren't disturbing anyone. Okay,
12 you could argue that we don't like to see these things
13 posted on our lampposts, you know, stuff like that. But
14 I thought it was a relatively simple --

15 Q. I understand that we are talking about something at
16 the very, very bottom end of the scale of criminal
17 offending.

18 A. Absolutely.

19 Q. So if you didn't think it was significant enough to file
20 a formal report, is it something that you would have
21 told your managers that you had done when discussing
22 your work with them?

23 A. My -- I have no memory of that, but my guess would be
24 this would be part of a normal, relaxed conversation
25 that we would have at these meetings, talk about that

1 stuff.

2 Q. Now, you talk also about assisting with leafletting and
3 stuffing envelopes, and so forth. Did you have access
4 to the group's mailing list?

5 A. No.

6 Q. If you'd been able to get access to the group's mailing
7 list, do you think that would have been of interest to
8 the SOS?

9 A. It would have been of interest to the SOS, I suspect,
10 yes. And if I'd got -- if I had managed to get access
11 to it, I would have passed it along.

12 Q. In -- in addition to the campaigning activities that
13 we've already discussed, did you get involved in any
14 other activism with Action Bangla Desh?

15 A. Apart from campaigning, you know, as I say, leafletting,
16 delivering envelopes to people who'd deliver them
17 further, no, I wouldn't. There was no -- no ...

18 Q. How well did you get to know this group of 10 or 12
19 people that you were mixing with?

20 A. I had, if you like -- I viewed the different people in
21 different ways. There were others -- there were --
22 there were people there with whom I got on. We had cups
23 can of tea, we'd stuff envelopes, we'd go to
24 demonstrations etc. There were others who were more
25 closely involved with the hierarchy of this group, and

1 my plan was to sort of keep my hands clean, stay close
2 to them, and hope to be invited up to the next stage.
3 I'd made some progress out on the street; now I'm being
4 invited to these meetings on a regular basis. And
5 I felt if I behaved myself, the time would come and I'd
6 be able to take the next step.

7 Q. And to what extent did you participate in social
8 activities with members of Operation Omega?

9 A. Very occasionally -- there was a pub just down the road.
10 We'd go there for an hour or two on a nice summer's
11 evening for a drink. But outside of that I have no
12 memory of any social involvement. And not with all of
13 them, just some of them.

14 Q. And would you pick up useful information, at least
15 information that would have been regarded as useful by
16 the SOS, from those conversations?

17 A. No, because I saw my role -- I just felt I wasn't where
18 I needed to be. I needed to move up further. And
19 asking questions all the time draws unfavourable
20 attention to the question that -- I feel -- it was my
21 view to sit quiet, mix with people. If they trust you
22 enough, feel comfortable enough with you, they will say
23 things they wouldn't want to say anyway.

24 Q. I see.

25 So this was -- am I understanding you correctly: you

1 were doing this as part and parcel of a long-term
2 strategy to get more deeply involved with the group?

3 A. Absolutely, yes. That is -- that is -- yes.

4 Q. Apart from the flyposting, did any of these people
5 commit any criminal offences whilst you were
6 infiltrating them?

7 A. To my knowledge, no.

8 Q. Can you recall what your managers' attitude was to
9 the information that you were reporting back on
10 Operation Omega?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Can you recall whether they had any views about
13 Operation Omega?

14 A. No. No.

15 Q. That they were happy -- that they were aware of and
16 happy with your strategy, which was to stay there with
17 a view to ingratiating yourself more thoroughly with
18 them?

19 A. That -- that was my impression, yes.

20 Q. Young Haganah, please, if we may. How were you
21 introduced to Young Haganah?

22 A. There were two females who attended a couple of -- two
23 or three meetings; I can't remember how many. And they
24 discussed -- they told us a little bit about themselves.
25 Now, the term -- the group they were -- they described

1 as the Young Haganah, but the people I was talking to
2 were in their 50s, maybe early 60s. So I don't know
3 enough about that group. But I did get the impression
4 that they were not out to take unfair advantage of
5 the situation, cause damage, trouble; they just wanted
6 to help the people who were suffering. And that's
7 the impression I had.

8 Q. And what dealings did you have with this group?

9 A. I would meet a few of the members of the group whenever
10 I visited this place in Camden Town. Outside of that,
11 I didn't have any communication with them.

12 Q. I beg your pardon?

13 A. I was going to say, they seemed not to want to get more
14 closely involved. That's the impression I had at the
15 time. Whether I was right or wrong ...

16 Q. And to what extent were they supporting Operation Omega?

17 A. Apart from attending the meetings, I have no knowledge
18 of what was done. I got the impression that they just
19 wanted to attend the meetings. They may have made some
20 small donations, small donations, but I don't know.
21 It's just a feeling that I have. I felt that they were
22 okay.

23 Q. And when you went to their meetings, how big were they?

24 A. No, I didn't go to any meetings of Young Haganah.

25 The members of the Young Haganah would come to

1 the meetings held by Operation Omega.

2 Q. Forgive me. In that case, to what extent did you
3 participate in their activities?

4 A. The Young Haganah, none at all.

5 Q. I see.

6 Did you socialise with them?

7 A. No.

8 Q. You mention discussing them with Phil Saunders, whose
9 name we can use. Apart from the observations that he
10 made about the difference between their name and their
11 actual ages, what did he make of them?

12 A. He didn't say anything. Or nothing that I can remember.

13 Q. Did he discuss with you your decision -- I'm assuming it
14 was your decision not to pursue any further infiltration
15 of this group?

16 A. I hadn't made up my mind not to infiltrate further, but
17 I hadn't any plan to infiltrate further. I was in that
18 middle ground. If anything came up that gave me an
19 opportunity, I would have taken that opportunity. If --
20 in the absence of an opportunity, I didn't feel too
21 worried.

22 Q. Did he give you a steer one way or the other as to
23 whether he wanted you to go into that group or not?

24 A. I have no memory of such a conversation with him, and my
25 activity after that tells me that that was highly

1 unlikely.

2 Q. And would it be -- would I be right to think that

3 what -- such information as you did glean about

4 Young Haganah you would have shared with Phil Saunders?

5 A. I didn't glean any information from Young Haganah other

6 than -- I did some research away from the environment.

7 I discovered some things about them. But this is

8 something -- this is information that's available to

9 anyone who can use a library, or in today's -- the web.

10 But I -- I had no -- I think my interest in them was we

11 had Operation Omega, Bangladesh and Pakistan,

12 Young Haganah, Israel. It just widens the geography of

13 the events that were going on, you know? And that is

14 what I found interesting: why should someone in Israel

15 be interested in Bangladesh?

16 Q. Two questions. Did you discuss what you did find out

17 about Young Haganah with Phil Saunders?

18 A. No.

19 Q. And second question, was there a connection between

20 Young Haganah and Israel?

21 A. Young Haganah -- the Haganah was a group of people who

22 participated in the independence of Israel decades ago.

23 That is my understanding of the situation.

24 The Young Haganah, I don't know anything about them.

25 I just say this is -- it's one of those sociopolitical

1 organisations that comes into being for whatever reason.
2 And if they're not operating now, I wouldn't be
3 surprised.

4 Q. You describe in your witness statement an event -- your
5 recollection, it was a big house with marble floors,
6 where there were going to be some talks by Members of
7 Parliament, Bruce Douglas-Mann and John Stonehouse. And
8 you were, if I've understood your statement correctly,
9 diplomatically steered away from those speakers; and
10 that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, an East Pakistan/Bangladeshi
11 leader, was present, but you were not able to get close
12 to him. Was that at the same event?

13 A. This event took place in a hotel, opposite the Albert
14 Memorial -- I can't remember the name of the hotel now.
15 And I went there, and I wasn't able to go into the room
16 where the meeting was taking place. I was steered away.

17 Q. Would you -- you've described in your statement that you
18 weren't particularly interested in the Members of
19 Parliament. But would you have liked to have got close
20 to Sheikh Rahman?

21 A. I would have liked that very much. And if I can clarify
22 my position on the Members of Parliament, I felt that
23 I was not able to be there, but if we had two members of
24 our Parliament there, somehow or other, any information
25 that would be of interest to the nation would have been

1 made available by these two Members of Parliament.

2 I also had no reason to think that they were going to be
3 a problem.

4 Q. I see. So why would you have been interested in getting
5 close to Sheikh Rahman?

6 A. Am I allowed to answer that with the question: why not?
7 If he is the head of a country that is being brutalised
8 by another group, he's a useful person to get to know.
9 If only -- you know, sometimes you, by accident, come
10 across information that turns out to be vital. So it
11 would be very, very useful to make your presence -- make
12 yourself available, keep your eyes and ears open, and
13 just pass on any information that the authorities would
14 know how to use. There are people far better to
15 understand so much -- so much more than I do about
16 international affairs. And that -- that's all.

17 Q. Would it be fair to describe this as part of a way of
18 operating that was to cast a wide net?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Hoover up any information you thought might be of
21 interest?

22 A. For two reasons. One, hoover up information that might
23 be of interest; two, it -- I felt that I would not be
24 regarded as someone about whom no one knew anything. If
25 someone had said, "Look, do you know, Peter

1 Fredericks?", they'd say, "Well, yes, he's with these
2 people, he knows those people," and if over a period
3 time, I developed enough of a relationship, it would
4 secure my position; I would be less likely to be
5 discovered (inaudible).

6 Q. I understand.

7 Then, of course, you didn't get close to
8 Sheikh Rahman; you were being diplomatically steered
9 away, you felt.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did you sense, therefore, that the group had not fully
12 accepted you, at least at this stage?

13 A. It was -- there were a number of things -- a couple of
14 things happened, and I became aware that something was
15 not quite right, and I found out later on what it was.
16 But there was already -- I was steered away by
17 someone -- the person whose family contributed £6,500.
18 And it's -- I knew something was wrong.

19 Q. I see.

20 A. I knew something ...

21 Q. Did that have anything to do with you ceasing to report
22 on Operation Omega and moving to report on Black Power?

23 A. I cannot answer that question positively yes, because my
24 feeling out there was I would be involved with anything
25 that was around, partly to get the information that we

1 needed, but partly it gives me more -- I think the term
2 with antiques is "provenance": you have a story behind
3 what you're looking at. If I can be seen to be someone
4 who knows a lot of people, different organisations,
5 perhaps I would gain more trust.

6 Q. And the information that you were interested in getting,
7 could you describe your understanding of that?

8 A. I was aware that this is an environment where you've got
9 layer upon layer upon layer, and I am not fully aware of
10 everything that's important. So I would hand over
11 whatever information I received, and others would decide
12 whether or not it was relevant to what was going on at
13 the time.

14 Q. Now, you tell us in your witness statement that there
15 was a woman who you were convinced had a hidden agenda,
16 and that you went to a few restaurants with her.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you, first of all, help us with which group was she
19 associated with?

20 A. Operation Omega.

21 Q. What was it that made you think that she had a hidden
22 agenda?

23 A. Very difficult to answer this one. I couldn't relax, or
24 in normal circumstances I could say, "Look, something
25 was wrong," but you want more than that. She seemed --

1 I don't know. It's very, very difficult. It's very
2 difficult. She seemed to live differently from a number
3 of the people. I did meet a few of her friends.
4 I imagine she was sort of in her early to mid-30s. Most
5 of her friends seemed to be 20 to 30 years older than
6 she was. I did meet a few of them. And it was just
7 something about the conversations we had which somehow
8 amounted to absolutely nothing. I -- I've met many
9 people, and you meet people and over time you get to
10 know a little about them, their family and all the rest
11 of it. Nothing like that happened. I did find out
12 where she worked. I didn't have the exact address, but
13 somewhere in West End -- the West End. And she had
14 something to do with something or other ... It didn't
15 fit, can I just put it that way. There was just
16 something wrong; I can't explain it.

17 Q. And why was it that you wanted to find out more?

18 A. It was just interesting to know who else would be
19 interested in Operation Omega and for what reason. Am
20 I allowed to say which country she's from?

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. United States.

23 Q. I see.

24 A. And --

25 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

- 1 A. Carry on.
- 2 Q. Sorry, no, you carry on.
- 3 A. I was just saying, I thought it was just something
4 wrong. I didn't expect to see someone -- it was just
5 something about her, you know, just something there.
6 I could be totally wrong. All I'm saying is, it
7 attracted my attention, and not everything we chase
8 after is worth the effort at the end of the day, and ...
- 9 Q. And who -- who asked who out to a restaurant?
- 10 A. Oh, I -- this -- when I say went to a restaurant, it
11 would be somewhere when you need to eat, you pop into
12 a coffee shop or a restaurant. It wasn't -- it wasn't
13 an appointment, or anything like that, you know. We met
14 -- we met -- we would have gone to pubs and had a few
15 drinks in pubs, you know, eat somewhere.
- 16 Very often at the end of a meeting, people with cars
17 would help those without the cars, and it was a time
18 I was without a car, and I would get a lift. You know,
19 that sort of thing?
- 20 Q. And were these meetings always with other people, always
21 just the two of you, or a mixture of both?
- 22 A. The majority of the meetings -- I don't know, 98% of
23 them -- would have been at this particular flat where
24 Operation Omega was doing the stuff. We'd meet people,
25 you'd talk, go down the pub together, that would happen.

1 But did I spend time alone -- would we have? If we did,
2 it's not something I sort of remember. I suspect we
3 would have done, but I don't know.

4 Q. I beg your pardon?

5 A. I suspect we would have spent some time in a restaurant
6 or a pub on our own with nobody else, but I have no
7 particular memory.

8 Q. And what tactics did you use to try and get to
9 the bottom of what you wanted to find out about this
10 woman?

11 A. I was very careful here, because I -- something told
12 me -- I don't know what it was -- that this woman knew
13 what she was doing. And I thought, if I open my mouth
14 and say the wrong thing, she's going to put two and two
15 together. So I was very, very careful. I was there.
16 I'd do the listening; I'd do as little talking as
17 possible.

18 Q. And were you befriending her?

19 A. Not really, no. Well, we were all -- we enjoyed each
20 other's company, we laughed together and all the rest of
21 it. But I didn't meet her outside the environment.

22 Q. Were you befriending her to obtain information from her,
23 is what I'm asking?

24 A. I was hoping to obtain information from her, yes.

25 Q. And was she older -- older than you or about the same

- 1 age?
- 2 A. No, older. I was in my sort of 20s -- early 20s, and
- 3 she would have been -- I got the impression maybe
- 4 10 years older than me.
- 5 Q. Did you try and strike up any sort of romantic
- 6 relationship with her?
- 7 A. No.
- 8 Q. Do you think that anything you did might have been
- 9 perceived by her as romantic?
- 10 A. No. Well, I'd rather not comment, but no is the answer.
- 11 Q. And did you keep your manager in the loop about this
- 12 mysterious woman and what you were doing?
- 13 A. I would have mentioned her in one or two reports,
- 14 certainly. But she's -- she was -- I didn't know enough
- 15 about her for there to be any meaningful exchange of
- 16 information. I -- I would have mentioned her in
- 17 the reports, certainly, but I didn't have anything to
- 18 say.
- 19 Q. You've described going to the house of a woman after you
- 20 left the SDS because you had heard about a suicide.
- 21 A. Oh yes.
- 22 Q. Is there any connection between that event and
- 23 the American woman you've just been speaking about?
- 24 A. With that visit, no. That visit was an impromptu thing,
- 25 just something I did.

1 Q. Sticking with that later visit, how did you know where
2 to go?

3 A. I was in Camden Town and I had parked the car a short
4 walk from this particular house that I had visited many
5 times working undercover. And this might give you an
6 idea when we were talking about friendship: I thought,
7 drop in and have a cup of tea, have a cup of coffee, say
8 hello. I knocked on the door a couple of times; there
9 was no answer. But then the tenant upstairs noticed
10 I was there and invited me up and we chatted.

11 Q. I see. So when you say you knocked on the door to say
12 hello, presumably at that stage you weren't aware that
13 there had been a fatality? Or am I misunderstanding
14 the position?

15 A. I had no idea that there had been a fatality.

16 Q. And so would this -- you had got on well enough with
17 this woman that you were curious to catch up -- curious
18 enough to try and catch up with her?

19 A. I think, if I can put that, I was on -- I don't know
20 what business, what I was doing in Camden Town at the
21 time, but I parked the car very close to this car. And
22 while I was there, on the spur of the moment, I thought,
23 while I'm here why not say hello? No big deal. And so
24 I went to say hello, but there was no answer.

25 Q. Would that have been with a view to reporting back on

1 the meeting, or was that simply a legacy of
2 the relationship that you had formed with this person
3 whilst undercover?

4 A. I'd been out of the job for -- for quite a while then,
5 and this was just one of those things. Nothing to do
6 with the job. I didn't report it, I didn't -- you know,
7 I didn't say anything, because as far as I was
8 concerned, I was no longer involved and no one was
9 interested.

10 Q. How close a relationship had you had with this woman
11 when you were undercover?

12 A. We would meet at her house because mainly the meetings
13 would take place there. I'd been there on a couple of
14 occasions and we'd go to the local pub for a drink, and
15 stuff like that, and we'd chat about all sorts of
16 things. But outside of that, no.

17 Q. Had there been any sort of spark between you?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Was there anything romantic about your relationship with
20 this woman?

21 A. (inaudible) or romantic, I can tell you, I was struck
22 by -- if I can use the term "Oxbridge", there was that
23 something about her: she seemed hugely well educated,
24 very high IQ, and all the rest of it. And I found that
25 interesting. There was no romantic involvement, I just

1 found her interesting as a human being.

2 Q. Had you been given any guidance or instruction by
3 the SOS about whether or not you should contact someone
4 you'd mixed with undercover after your deployment had
5 ended?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Now, just before we move on to Black Power, can I ask
8 you this. The answers you've given about
9 Operation Omega suggest that it was a humanitarian
10 organisation, that it wasn't committing any crime more
11 serious than flyposting, that they were protesting in an
12 orderly, peaceful way. Many might wonder why the SOS
13 was infiltrating such an organisation and what it was
14 expecting to gain from that.

15 Can you help us with that, please?

16 A. It is a question that went through my mind at the time.
17 When I was asked to join Operation Omega, I thought
18 maybe there's something going on that's going to be
19 hugely interesting. As time went by, I thought no. But
20 I am aware that on the international stage there's stuff
21 going on about which I knew nothing, so I just followed
22 orders and carried on.

23 Q. Did you raise these doubts with Phil Saunders or any
24 other manager while you were serving in the SOS?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Can we move now to Black Power.

2 First of all, perhaps you could help us with your
3 understanding of what the Black Power Movement was at
4 the time that you infiltrated it.

5 A. Very broadly, I think the Black Power Movement is
6 a consequence of a perceived mistreatment of black
7 people, and, as with all things, politics gets in
8 the way and there are hidden agendas that were not
9 something -- that were not very well hidden. It's
10 a huge subject.

11 Q. Was it a single group, or was it an umbrella for
12 a number of groups?

13 A. I was involved with, I think it was an out -- when
14 the question was put to me for the very first time,
15 I would say it -- they participated with other groups,
16 both here and in the States.

17 Q. When you say "participated with other groups", it may
18 have had links with other groups, but was it itself
19 a homogeneous group itself?

20 A. That's a very difficult one. I -- I think perhaps a mix
21 of both. But we're going back so far, it's very, very
22 difficult to get back the feelings that I had. I did
23 get the feeling that I did meet a number of -- a couple
24 of people from the States and we seemed to be getting on
25 quite well. I was of the opinion that it was a good

1 chance I'd be invited to go and join them in the States
2 and meet some of the people there. I -- I can't answer
3 your question; it's too technical, too involved.

4 Q. I understand.

5 How did it come about that you infiltrated
6 Black Power while serving with the SOS?

7 A. We're going back a while. I think it was an accident.
8 One of the things we were required to do was go to
9 Speakers' Corner and just report on what we saw or
10 heard. I got involved with someone, we hit it off and
11 we moved on from there. He was involved with
12 Black Power, and I used to go to his meetings and,
13 you know, he introduced me to these Americans and
14 various others.

15 Q. Was there any connection between your pre-Special Branch
16 undercover work and the reporting of information in
17 relation to Black Power that you had done then and your
18 infiltration of Black Power for the SOS?

19 A. The only connection I had with -- with Black Power was
20 the Stop the Tour.

21 Q. I beg your pardon?

22 A. The Stop the Tour campaign.

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. I became involved with that, very, very briefly, but to
25 no significant degree. Anything I did find out, I did

1 pass on to the Branch.

2 Q. Can you remember whether you were tasked by your
3 managers, or steered towards Black Power?

4 A. No, I wasn't steered towards Black Power, no.

5 Q. Were you given any briefings about Black Power?

6 A. None that I recall, no.

7 Q. Why did you think Black Power would be of interest to
8 the SOS?

9 A. I think I was just of the opinion that any group is --
10 is of interest. Why would they be of interest ...

11 There was stuff in the press at the time about some
12 uncertainty/trouble between, you know, the racists and
13 the -- there were problems, and I assume that somewhere
14 along the line there were people looking at this
15 seriously, trying to reduce the impact of the problem,
16 trying to solve the problem, but it was -- was no more
17 than that.

18 I was on the periphery, I was by no means at
19 the heart of this, although I did -- it does turn out
20 I met some pretty interesting people. But again, my
21 plan was, if you like, a long term plan. I'm firmly of
22 the belief that in this environment you've got to give
23 it a lot of time. I may be wrong, of course.

24 Q. What was your managers' reaction to infiltrating
25 Black Power?

1 A. I have no memory of anything being said, so I assume it
2 was just accepted, you know. I took the view: you're
3 out there, find what you can and bring it back, we'll
4 guide you if there's any specific -- of any urgency, but
5 I don't think I noticed anything really, I just went up
6 and (inaudible) them.

7 Q. Did you get any sense they were pleased that you had
8 infiltrated this group?

9 A. Not pleased, not displeased. The only occasion where
10 you could use the word "pleased" or "pleasure" was when
11 I was shown that letter from Box that we discussed
12 earlier. That's the only time I can say that anyone
13 sounded pleased. But no.

14 Q. Did anybody ever say anything to you about whether or
15 not Black Power was an organisation that the SOS
16 positively wanted to target?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Did you -- were you ever told that previous attempts had
19 been made, or anything like that?

20 A. No.

21 Q. You described, and you already have described, going to
22 Speakers' Corner. You also describe in your statement
23 having tea and coffee in the Marble Arch area, going to
24 meetings in the Notting Hill and Portobello Road area,
25 and going to pubs there too, and also going to be

- 1 a private house where there were meetings.
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. As with Operation Omega, did you go through any prior
4 formalities before attending meetings at a private
5 house?
- 6 A. No. If I did, I wouldn't have been aware that it was
7 going on. Everything was done socially, and we chatted.
- 8 Q. Were there any other activities that you pursued with
9 Black Power?
- 10 A. No.
- 11 Q. Did you go to demonstrations?
- 12 A. If I did I can't remember after all this time.
- 13 Q. How well did you get to know the members of this group?
- 14 A. To say hugely well would be wrong. I got on pretty well
15 with some of them. We'd, as I say, go out to these
16 restaurants, and got -- seemed to be getting on quite
17 well with the Americans. We played pool and things like
18 that. We met socially, and there were times we'd spend
19 hours together and not discuss politics, or anything
20 like that, it was just a social interaction, and my
21 feeling was that this was a good way to proceed.
- 22 Q. Was there a link between Black Power and
23 the Black Defence Committee, so far as you can remember?
- 24 A. I can't remember that.
- 25 Q. There are two reports in the bundle about

1 the Black Defence Committee which bear your name. Did
2 you attend the two events which are covered by those
3 reports?

4 A. Do I -- if I can see the report, it might help jog my
5 memory, but I have no ...

6 It's possible you -- you meet people and you don't
7 really remember the title that they use because there's
8 such a lot going on.

9 Q. Well, let's call them up then. We can do that.

10 The first one is {UCPI0000026455}.

11 You'll see, 345, that this is a report dated
12 16 September 1971. The subject is
13 the Black Defence Committee. It says:

14 "The following information has been received from
15 a reliable source:-

16 "'On Friday, 10 September 1971, at the George
17 IV [public house], Pentonville Road, N1, a meeting was
18 held by the Black Defence Committee. The meeting, which
19 was attended by 2012 persons, began at 8 pm and ended at
20 10 pm. The only speaker was Carl Brecker, a coloured
21 South African student.

22 "Brecker recounted his experiences under apartheid.
23 He was bitterly exposed to the South African regime and
24 called for solidarity in the fight against that 'hideous
25 system'. If the workers of the world, both black and

1 white, united, then apartheid must surely tumble for
2 that system was only propped up by the capitalist
3 interests of the western world."

4 Does that ring any bells?

5 A. I don't remember, but I'm not uncomfortable with this.
6 This is -- what I'm looking at here reminds me of
7 the way I felt and what people were talking about in
8 those days.

9 Q. It was a meeting of 12 people. Did you ever find
10 yourself in small meetings making decisions with either
11 Black Power or the Black Defence Committee?

12 A. No, no, no.

13 Q. At the bottom of paragraph 2, which I've just read out,
14 you've used the word "coloured" to describe
15 the South African student who was the speaker.

16 A. Mm-hm.

17 Q. Why did you use that word?

18 A. I don't know. This is a hugely nuanced environment.
19 I think "coloured" was the general term, at the time,
20 acceptable. I don't know.

21 Q. Can we take that document down, please, and can we now
22 have up {UCPI0000026456}.

23 345, this is a report dated 30 September 1971.
24 Again, the subject is the Black Defence Committee. It
25 reads:

1 "The following information has been received from
2 a reliable source:-

3 "A meeting of the 'Black Defence Committee' was held
4 on 24.9.71 at the George IV public house
5 Pentonville Road, N1. The object of the meeting, which
6 commenced at 8 pm was to inform people of
7 the 'difficulties confronting black people in
8 a capitalist society'. There were thirteen people
9 present.

10 "The speaker was Michael Seifert, a solicitor and
11 a member of the Angela Davis Defence Committee, who
12 spoke about Davis' struggle. He outlined [privacy]
13 [privacy] and added that the Angela Davis Committee had
14 26 members, six of whom (himself included) were all
15 members of the Communist Party of Great Britain."

16 I can stop there.

17 Was membership of the Communist Party of Great
18 Britain, in the context of being a member of the Angela
19 Davis Defence Committee, something which you thought was
20 of interest to the SOS?

21 A. At the time. Today, I'm sorry, I just don't remember.

22 Q. Can you recall your -- any managerial reaction to
23 reporting?

24 A. No.

25 Q. "The Angela Davis Defence Committee" refers to a justice

1 campaign in relation to an American woman, doesn't it?

2 A. I don't remember this. I have no memory of this, but is
3 there something I can read here, perhaps?

4 Q. No, that's -- that's not on the face of the document.

5 Can you remember anything at all about the Angela
6 Davis Defence Committee?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Can you remember whether you were given any guidance
9 about whether or not it was acceptable to report on
10 justice campaigns, and if so, in what circumstances?

11 A. Definitely not.

12 Q. Could we take that down, please.

13 You -- moving on now to a lecture you've given
14 evidence about in your witness statement, a Black Power
15 lecture on violent protest, at which you've described
16 the speaker saying something to the effect at some point
17 that he thought that there was a member of MI5 in
18 the audience.

19 Was the speaker for or against violent protest?

20 A. After all this time, I don't really remember that bit.

21 Q. You've --

22 A. I -- sorry. What I can say, that the meeting -- I know
23 there was a -- I was very disturbed for a few seconds,
24 very, very worried, but when that passed, I don't recall
25 feeling stressed, either before the introduction or

1 after. I -- I seem to recall feeling that not a lot
2 information -- a lot of information came out of that
3 meeting, which was a bit disappointing, but not
4 surprising because I had the feeling what they were
5 doing was -- what they were hoping to plan to do was
6 perhaps contrary to the law.

7 Q. You described in your witness statement thinking you
8 were going to be kicked to death; is that right?

9 A. That is one way of expressing the feeling that just
10 takes over you when you know you're outnumbered and
11 you're in deep difficulties.

12 Q. What made you worry about these people?

13 A. After all these years, it's very, very difficult to
14 describe that. But when he went up to the lectern, and
15 in order -- I've discovered -- I've -- it's my opinion
16 that it was just a tactic he used to draw attention to
17 himself and, you know, wake up his audience. But he
18 pointed directly me at me and accused me, and it sounded
19 as if he was accusing me at least, but then it turned
20 out that he was only joking and everyone knew he was
21 joking; they were all laughing. But for a brief moment
22 it was a strange experience. I'd been through it a few
23 times.

24 Q. Had you experienced any of the people you were with
25 being violent before that occasion?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Had you heard any of the people you were with expressing
3 violent thoughts or intentions?

4 A. This is something I know I have, but I couldn't give you
5 day, date, time or place, and I don't know if it
6 happened here. But I was aware I was involved with
7 people who had access to and were prepared to use
8 violence as and when necessary, but I don't remember
9 the details any more.

10 MR BARR: Thank you.

11 Sir, would that be a convenient moment to pause for
12 lunch?

13 Sir, I think you're still on mute.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Sorry, I thought I had de-muted myself but
15 I now have. We're slightly past 1 o'clock.
16 The shorthand writers, I know, need a full hour. We
17 will start again at 5 past.

18 MS PURSER: Thank you very much, everyone. We will now
19 break for lunch. We will resume at 2.05, and you may
20 now move into your break-out rooms, thank you.

21 (1.02 pm)

22 (The short adjournment)

23 (2.05 pm)

24 MS PURSER: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to
25 the afternoon session of today's hearings.

1 As a reminder to those of you in the virtual hearing
2 room, please turn off both your camera and microphone,
3 unless you are invited to speak by the Chairman. I will
4 now hand over to our Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to
5 continue proceedings.

6 Chairman.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

8 For the last time in this session of evidential
9 hearings, the recording made earlier this year is going
10 to be played. If there is anybody who is hearing it for
11 the first time, please listen carefully.

12 "I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,
13 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make
14 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including
15 its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have
16 made a number of orders which affect what you may and
17 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave
18 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter
19 and may have serious consequences for you.

20 "If I am satisfied that a person may have breached
21 an order, I have the power to certify the matter to
22 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
23 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
24 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
25 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose

1 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
2 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
3 sequestration of their assets.

4 "Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
5 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
6 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
7 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
8 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
9 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any
10 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
11 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
12 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing
13 room to any other person, but only once at least ten
14 minutes have elapsed since the event which you are
15 describing took place.

16 "This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
17 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public
18 disclosure of information, for example about
19 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
20 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,
21 whether by accident or design, information which I have
22 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
23 be disclosed in a hearing. If and when that happens,
24 I will immediately suspend the hearing and make an order
25 prohibiting further disclosure of the information

1 outside the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that
2 no further disclosure of that information may be made by
3 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device
4 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside
5 it.

6 "I am sorry if you find this message alarming; it is
7 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
8 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
9 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
10 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
11 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
12 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own
13 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
14 best to ensure that you can.

15 "If you have any doubt about the terms of this
16 message, or what you may or may not do, you should not
17 hesitate to ask one of them and, with my help if
18 necessary, they will provide you with the answer."

19 Thank you, Mr Barr.

20 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

21 345, before lunch, we were discussing the lecture at
22 which you were momentarily concerned; and I was asking
23 you about the people you were mixing with on that
24 occasion. Can I now widen the question and ask you
25 about the people within the Black Power Movement

- 1 overall. Did you ever witness any violence?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. Did you ever see or come to know of any criminal
4 activity by members of Black Power?
- 5 A. I have no memory of that -- receiving that sort of
6 information.
- 7 Q. Did you ever witness them becoming involved in any
8 public disorder?
- 9 A. No.
- 10 Q. Did you hear them promote or encourage public disorder?
- 11 A. That's a difficult one to answer, because a lot of
12 organisations recommend demonstrations and activity that
13 would bring their cause to the attention of the press
14 and thereby to the rest of the population. I'm not in
15 a position to isolate this group and say yes, they did,
16 or (inaudible) they didn't either.
- 17 Q. By the end of your deployment, what was your managers'
18 view of the group that you had infiltrated?
- 19 A. I have no idea. We didn't have that sort of
20 conversation.
- 21 Q. Was there any reaction -- visible reaction from them?
- 22 A. None that I remember.
- 23 Q. What was your own view of the utility of your
24 infiltration of Black Power?
- 25 A. I felt it was useful -- or potentially useful, to have

1 an eye on what was going on, to prevent the sort of
2 excessive behaviour that -- that sometimes accompanies
3 these -- these projects. But that's about it.

4 Q. And was that a view you formed at the time or later?

5 A. At the time.

6 Q. And has your view remained the same or changed?

7 A. It's not something I think about a lot, but I would say
8 it's probably the same.

9 Q. You've explained in your witness statement that you
10 would report on every significant meeting; and it
11 follows that the reporting the Inquiry has been able to
12 obtain is but a small fraction of your overall
13 reporting; is that fair?

14 A. It's not for me to judge, is the way I see things at
15 the moment. You're doing your -- the system is doing
16 its best. If that's all you've got, that's all you've
17 got.

18 Q. I'm really only asking, is it right that we haven't got
19 anything like all of your reporting?

20 A. I find it very, very surprising.

21 Q. Were you busy throughout your few months with the SDS?

22 A. "Busy" ... fully occupied, yes.

23 Q. I know that you've been very careful in your statement
24 to explain where you can and cannot remember the names
25 of groups, but I'd just like to explore that a little

1 bit further with you, please.

2 Could we have up on the screen, please
3 {MPS-0728971/4}, please.

4 This is a document, a memorandum produced by the SDS
5 in November 1971. It was produced by chief -- the then
6 chief inspector we call "HN332", and it is about
7 the year's activity.

8 There is a list of groups which starts on the page
9 before, but we don't need to look at, runs over the page
10 to the top of the page we are looking at. It doesn't
11 have Operation Omega on it, but it does have
12 Action Bangla Desh.

13 The question for you, without naming any names, is,
14 as far as you are aware, was there any other SOS officer
15 at the time infiltrating Action Bangla Desh or anything
16 like it?

17 A. If there were someone in that position, I wasn't aware
18 of it. I wasn't made aware of it.

19 Q. Might that therefore be a reference to your work?

20 A. It might, yes.

21 Q. Beneath that is the Afro Asian American Association.

22 Again, without naming names, are you aware which SOS
23 officer reported on the Afro Asian American Association?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Did you?

1 A. I can't remember.

2 Q. Paragraph 5 reads:

3 "Information has also been forthcoming on
4 the Black Defence Committee, Black Unity and Freedom
5 Party, Schools Action Union and the Palestine Solidarity
6 Campaign."

7 Obviously we've seen two of your reports on
8 the Black Defence Committee. Can you recall whether you
9 reported at all on the Black Unity and Freedom Party?

10 A. I have no memory of that.

11 Q. Without naming names, do you know whether any of your
12 colleagues did so?

13 A. No, I don't know.

14 Q. Moving now to -- we can take that document down, please.

15 Moving now to how you came to leave your undercover
16 deployment. You tell us in your witness statement that
17 you simply left the field. Was there any discussion
18 about whether simply stopping attending the group would
19 give rise to any safety concerns?

20 A. When I left -- when you mentioned the "group", you
21 mentioned the Special Operations Squad; is that what you
22 mean?

23 Q. Yes. When you stopped deploying undercover with
24 the Special Operations Squad?

25 A. Well, it happened. I was told that I would be removed.

1 I went through a process of positive vetting, and
2 without any sort of explanation I was just kicked out.

3 Q. What I'm getting at just at the moment is how you
4 exfiltrated from your undercover activities. And as
5 I understand your statement, you just stopped attending
6 their activities?

7 A. That is correct, yes.

8 Q. Was any discussion had with your managers before you did
9 that in relation to whether it would be safe for you to
10 do that?

11 A. Not at that time. When I joined the Special Operations
12 Squad, I was told that I would be provided with adequate
13 cover and protection so no one would know my identity.
14 When I left, there was no such conversation that
15 I recall.

16 Q. Did you think that just stopping attending the group you
17 were infiltrating gave rise to any safety concerns or
18 not?

19 A. It's not something that touched my mind at the time.
20 I was thinking of other things. The way I felt was, if
21 I was no longer part of the system, then my existence
22 doesn't matter, my opinion doesn't matter, get on with
23 the rest of your life.

24 Q. On the subject of why your service in the SOS came to an
25 end, have I understood correctly that there was

1 a concern that one of the referees you had identified
2 when positively vetted turned out to be a Russian spy?

3 A. I don't know, but I feel that probably has something to
4 do with it. But this is not the sort of thing they're
5 going to discuss with me.

6 Q. Yes, I see. Thank you.

7 You say in your witness statement that you saw
8 a psychiatrist as a matter of course. Was that after
9 leaving the SOS, or was at that a different juncture in
10 your career?

11 A. It was after leaving the SOS. I was told it was
12 a requirement that I see a psychiatrist, at the end of
13 my term of office.

14 Q. Can you recall who referred you?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Can you recall who you saw?

17 A. I don't remember the name. I seem to remember an office
18 close to Vauxhall Bridge. I went there and I met
19 the psychiatrist. I was introduced to a female.
20 I don't remember her name.

21 Q. Do you know whether any of your colleagues
22 saw psychiatrists at the end of their deployments?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Then you say in your witness statement that you didn't
25 think the psychiatrist really understood undercover

1 policing and that it was not helpful.

2 A. I thought the -- that that project was a bit of a waste
3 of time.

4 Q. Had you expressed any welfare concerns to your managers
5 to prompt your referral to a psychiatrist?

6 A. None at all, no.

7 Q. You've explained in your witness statement that the work
8 you did for the SOS was fairly continuous with your
9 Special Branch work. I'd like to explore some of
10 the differences, because you go on in your statement to
11 say that you thought that finding out about activist
12 meetings through the grapevine was a better way of
13 finding out what they were doing than the way in which
14 ordinary Special Branch did it, relying on public --
15 publications and so forth.

16 Were there other ways in which your work as an
17 undercover officer for the SOS gave you better access to
18 the activists when compared to your work with
19 Special Branch?

20 A. I have my views, but I'm ready to admit that I could be
21 wrong.

22 Q. And your view?

23 A. The way they were going about it was problematic because
24 it would be possible for someone to advertise an event
25 simply to attract people from the security services and

1 we'd then be -- we'd be clearly identified. And this
2 has happened to me.

3 Q. I see.

4 In terms of what you were able to do as an
5 undercover officer, presumably you got to know people
6 better than when you were conducting ordinary
7 Special Branch work?

8 A. Yes, indeed.

9 Q. And you were able to be with them at times when they
10 would be more forthcoming about what they were doing?

11 A. This was the hope, certainly, yes.

12 Q. Was it the reality?

13 A. I believe so.

14 Q. You describe having a road traffic accident when someone
15 ran into you, and you say that afterwards you went to
16 a police station. Had you been given any instructions
17 by the SOS as to what to do in the event of having
18 a road accident whilst on SOS duty?

19 A. Definitely not, no.

20 Q. Why did you go to a police station?

21 A. It was -- I was merely following instructions that were,
22 if you like, applied -- that had applied to me before,
23 when I was in uniform: you have an accident, you report
24 it to a police station. Now I was undercover, I had an
25 accident. I didn't think there was any danger of my

1 identity being revealed. I took care of that. No one
2 was injured, but I just thought it might be a nice idea
3 to go with what is required as citizens when you're
4 involved in an accident.

5 Q. Why didn't you go to your SOS managers instead?

6 A. You're in the street, you're in an accident, you go to
7 the nearest police station. I can't remember what
8 I did. I do know the information was passed on to SOS
9 managers, and I do remember there was a slight, shall we
10 say, bump in the road: the police officer there told
11 them that I refused to give them my identity, which is
12 not true, I did tell them I was in the job. I told --
13 I wasn't -- they wanted to see my warrant card, and
14 I told them, "I don't carry a warrant card, the job
15 I do, you don't do that, but I can give you all
16 the numbers, you can get in touch with Scotland Yard,
17 the CO, and, you know, get all the information you need
18 on me." I was able to do that. But there was a muddle,
19 I think --

20 Q. Do you think -- do you think it would have been helpful
21 if you'd been instructed that in the event of a road
22 traffic accident, you should contact your SOS managers
23 first?

24 A. I'm not comfortable with that idea. You make a decision
25 at the time depending on the circumstances. And here

1 you are, out there somewhere, and you bump into someone
2 or someone bumps into you -- well, he bumped into me.
3 You've then got to get in touch with -- this could be --
4 it could happen on the weekends, it could happen in
5 the middle of the night. Who are you going to phone?
6 I do know I did keep one number concealed on my person
7 in case of a very serious situation. I didn't regard
8 this as serious enough. I thought, fairly simple: go to
9 the local police station, report it; and then we could
10 go behind the scenes and do what is necessary to put
11 everything in perspective.

12 Q. Can I ask you now some questions about the comparison
13 between your undercover work in the SDS and your
14 undercover work before then. I know we touched on it
15 right at the start of my questioning, but can I ask you,
16 without going into specifics, were there any differences
17 in the tradecraft you used?

18 A. No. I was aware that I was dealing with people with
19 a different agenda, but I think the way I operated,
20 the way I presented myself was pretty much the same.

21 Q. Again, at least to start with, without going into any
22 specifics, were there any differences in the standards
23 to which you were adhering?

24 A. No, and this is -- this is a response to my personal
25 response to what I was involved with. I saw -- I saw no

1 difference.

2 Q. And do you think that was the same for your colleagues,
3 or do you know that any of them viewed it differently?

4 A. I don't recall having this sort of conversation with
5 anyone.

6 Q. We discussed earlier the utility of your infiltration of
7 Operation Omega. I'd like to ask you a little bit more
8 in relation to Black Power.

9 Did you think that your infiltration of Black Power
10 was the best use of you as a police resource?

11 A. I took the view that there were people up there who had
12 a better view of the entire landscape and were better
13 able to judge that. There were times when I thought --
14 yes, there were times when I thought I was wasting my
15 time, but I thought there were people up there, senior
16 people, who knew a lot more about the landscape, and
17 I would be best -- it would be best for me to comply
18 with their requests, their guidance.

19 Q. Is that a judgment that you are able to review from
20 the present? Do you know any more about matters that
21 would change your view?

22 A. I haven't given it any thought in recent years.

23 Q. I want to ask you now about racism.

24 When you joined the police force -- you describe
25 yourself as being of mixed heritage: were there many

- 1 other officers of mixed heritage in the Metropolitan
2 Police Service?
- 3 A. I suspect there were, but I didn't -- I don't remember
4 meeting -- meeting them.
- 5 Q. And in Special Branch?
- 6 A. I don't remember meeting anyone there like me.
- 7 Q. Did you encounter any racism whilst you were serving in
8 the SOS?
- 9 A. No.
- 10 Q. Did you hear any racist comments in relation to
11 reporting on people from ethnic minorities whilst
12 serving with the SOS?
- 13 A. No.
- 14 Q. Did you hear any racist comments in relation to the need
15 to report on groups campaigning for racial equality?
- 16 A. No.
- 17 Q. I'm going to move now to the evening reception that you
18 describe in your witness statement. You describe
19 a reception at which partners were invited. Was this
20 connected with the SOS or not?
- 21 A. Oh, this is at the office, Scotland Yard. No.
- 22 Q. Did you go to any SOS or SDS social events either whilst
23 you were serving or afterwards?
- 24 A. I don't recall SOS holding any social events.
- 25 Q. Have you been to any reunions since then?

1 A. No.

2 Q. I want to stick with the word "union" but in
3 a completely different context.

4 In your statement you talk about a colleague who had
5 infiltrated the Claimants' Union and obtained some
6 social security benefits which, if I have understood you
7 correctly, he wished to return?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Am I understanding your evidence correctly that that is
10 because he will have obtained those benefits under his
11 false undercover identity on the basis of false facts?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you know what happened?

14 A. I don't know what happened, but I can tell you what
15 the feeling was. I understand that the -- the dole
16 office were contacted and they were told, "We can give
17 money out, we don't have the mechanism for taking money
18 back in." I don't know what happened, but it is
19 possible there was some sort of adjustment made on
20 expenses and everything else, so that at least the --
21 the taxpayer would be not unduly disadvantaged by this
22 process.

23 Q. I now want to ask you about a couple of your colleagues.
24 First of all, did you know HN135, who I can name as
25 Mike Ferguson?

1 A. At the moment, that name doesn't mean anything to me.

2 Q. Our understanding is that Mike Ferguson infiltrated
3 the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign and then
4 the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Does that ring any bells?

5 A. I'm aware of these two movements, and I was brief --
6 barely involved. You know, things got out of hand, so
7 I just stayed out.

8 Q. Are you -- did you know whether or not the SOS had
9 someone placed in the STST and the Anti-Apartheid
10 Movement?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Can I ask you next about HN294, whose name we cannot
13 use, so you may need to use the cipher list.

14 A. Okay. HN294.

15 Q. 294.

16 A. Again, no.

17 Q. My question was whether -- when you say "no": no, you
18 don't know that person?

19 A. I don't -- I don't have any memory of meeting that
20 person.

21 Q. Can I ask you now a little bit about where the SOS sat
22 in the Special Branch organisation. Was it a part of
23 any of the Special Branch squads?

24 A. My understanding was it was just another squad.
25 The difference was that this squad worked away from

1 the office and the other squads worked from the office.
2 And we worked undercover where their undercover activity
3 did exist but to a lesser degree.

4 Q. We all know now that some former members of the SDS --
5 and I'm using that term to cover the unit's entire
6 existence -- engaged in sexual relationships in their
7 undercover identity. When did you first learn of that?

8 A. Quite recently. Within the last two years. Since
9 the beginning -- I discovered this after I received
10 a letter telling me that this investigation was in
11 progress and asking me to participate.

12 Q. Were you surprised?

13 A. I was surprised that the matter had been raised.
14 I have -- if you like, it's a phrase in my head which
15 helps guide me here. If you ask me to infiltrate some
16 drug dealers, you can't point the finger at me if
17 I sample the product. If these people are in a certain
18 environment where it is necessary to engage that little
19 more deeply, then, shall we say, I find this acceptable,
20 but I do worry about the consequences for the female and
21 any children that may result from the relationship.
22 That would be dangerous. So yes, it shouldn't be done.

23 MR BARR: Those were all my questions, 345. If you stay
24 there a moment, there may be some more questions for you
25 and I know we're going to take a break to enable people

1 to consider your evidence.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: We're going to take a ten-minute break.

3 There may be some more questions for you after that
4 ten-minute break. But your evidence is, I think, almost
5 completed.

6 We will be back in ten minutes. Thank you.

7 MS PURSER: Thank you, everyone. We're now going to take
8 a ten-minute break. Please may you move to your
9 break-out rooms during this time.

10 Thank you very much.

11 (2.34 pm)

12 (A short break)

13 (3.05 pm)

14 MS PURSER: Welcome back, everyone. I will now hand over to
15 the Chairman to continue proceedings.

16 Chairman.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Ms Brander?

18 Mr Menon, sorry.

19 MR MENON: Sir, I should go first, if that's all right.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course it is. What is it you want to
21 ask?

22 MR MENON: Sir, under Rule 10, I apply for permission to ask
23 some follow-up questions on three topics. Firstly, race
24 and racism, particularly in the SOS.

25 Secondly, Operation Omega.

1 And, thirdly, the Black Power movement.

2 They're all matters that arise from the questions
3 asked already and the answers given by the witnesses.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: They've been fairly thoroughly explored by
5 Mr Barr.

6 MR MENON: I won't be repetitive, I promise.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. I'll take you at your word.

8 Questions by MR MENON

9 MR MENON: Thank you.

10 Good afternoon, 345. Can you hear and see me?

11 A. Yes, I can. Thank you.

12 Q. In your witness statement, you describe yourself as
13 "mixed heritage". Would it be fair to say that in 1971,
14 when you were in the SOS, your mixed heritage was
15 perhaps more visibly apparent than it is now?

16 A. It's not for me to judge. I don't know. I don't spend
17 that much time looking at myself in the mirror.

18 Q. Fair enough. Fair enough.

19 You've said that you didn't experience, either in
20 your time for uniform branch of the Met or in
21 Special Branch, any racism; is that right?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. And that includes the SOS, doesn't it?

24 A. Yes, it does, yes.

25 Q. Would you agree that racism was a serious and widespread

1 problem in the country at the relevant time, the late
2 60s/early 1970s?

3 A. I am of the view that racism has been a problem since
4 we, as a species, separated into different races. We
5 see ourselves(?) as different, and we assume that
6 because they're different, they are either less worthy,
7 or whatever. So this is nothing new. We've had
8 problems.

9 Perhaps if I think of the question in another way,
10 was I concerned in any way. The answer to that was no,
11 I was never concerned or worried.

12 Q. So you didn't hear at any time during your time in
13 the Met any racist banter or any racist views expressed,
14 or any speech about black people that was either
15 stereotypical or disparaging in any way?

16 A. I would -- I would -- I would move back from
17 the term "disparaging". We're going back a long time.
18 I don't remember all of it. I think it would be fair to
19 say, yes, I did. It was with humour. There are all
20 sorts of things we say about even our loved ones, our
21 children, our wives, you know, whatever. Sometimes we
22 say things that are not exactly complimentary but they
23 can be said with humour. I think it's called "irony".
24 We just like a laugh; we like to explore things.

25 I did not feel, if I can presume to try to

1 understand a little more of your question -- I didn't
2 feel any hurt. There was never -- I don't recall
3 a statement condemning black people or dark-skinned
4 people or anything like that. An acceptance that there
5 are cultural differences, yes. And on one occasion it
6 was put to me -- one of my colleagues didn't like some
7 of the work we were doing because, in his words, we
8 militated against the rights of people who were not
9 fully received by the wider society but try to operate
10 within their own type, following social conduct and
11 standards that perhaps had originated on another
12 continent. It wasn't criticism, it was just an
13 observation. And one felt, yes, this is something we
14 need to think about from time to time, it's very real.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 Could we look at the following document, please

17 {MPS-0 -- it will come up on the screen, 345 --

18 A. Okay.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Pause a moment. You are about, I think, to
20 ask a witness about a document that is nothing at all to
21 do with him.

22 MR MENON: Yes, but it's --

23 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm not conducting an inquiry into racism in
24 the Metropolitan Police for the last 50 years, I'm
25 looking at the SOS.

1 MR MENON: I understand that, but the document -- if you're
2 right about the document I'm about to ask to come on
3 the screen, sir, it's an SOS document from the relevant
4 time, in which a particular view is expressed. And
5 I just wanted to put that -- that view to the witness
6 and ask for his comments.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Because we have a little time, I will let you
8 do it. But this is not to be taken as a precedent for
9 what may happen in the future. I'm really not willing
10 to allow people to question other witnesses about
11 documents that are nothing to do with them.

12 MR MENON: No, I understand that. It's just that we have
13 very few witnesses who are mixed heritage or non-white,
14 and it seems an appropriate witness to ask the question
15 of. That's all.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand the purpose of it, and on this
17 occasion you may, but please don't take it as
18 a precedent.

19 MR MENON: I understand. Thank you very much.

20 I'll repeat the reference {MPS-0739148}. Thank you.
21 345, as the Chairman just indicated, this is not
22 your document, and in fact was almost certainly written
23 in early 1969, in other words before you joined either
24 Special Branch or the SOS. Do you understand?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. You'll see that it concerns an individual whose name has
2 been redacted, and under the heading, "Summary
3 of Convictions", it indicates that this individual was
4 convicted at the Central Criminal Court in
5 February 1969, and you see there the offences, including
6 inciting to riot, and the sentence of two years'
7 imprisonment; do you see that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And then you can see that prior to that he had no
10 previous convictions.

11 Can you scroll down, please.

12 A comment there about the fact that he was regarded
13 as an honest man of good character.

14 Can we scroll down further, please.

15 {MPS-0739148/2}. We can skip this bit and go further
16 down, please. Pausing there.

17 So the first paragraph is just a comment on
18 the individual in the case. It's the next paragraph
19 that I want to ask you about it. It says that the man
20 was:

21 "... active in the affairs of the Vietnam Solidarity
22 Campaign and Black Power."

23 And then there's this comment:

24 "He has the usual attitude of coloured people
25 towards police and authority."

1 And we can see that it was signed by a detective
2 inspector in Special Branch some time after
3 February 1969, when -- which is when this man was
4 convicted.

5 It's that comment I want to ask you about, 345:

6 "He has the usual attitude of coloured people
7 towards police and authority."

8 What do you read into that comment? Is that just
9 casual banter or is that something perhaps a little bit
10 more sinister?

11 A. What I read could be described as an overly wide brush
12 stroke. There are black people out there who are
13 excellent and there are others who are not. The same
14 can be said of white people, black people, yellow
15 people, you name it. We are all human beings, and no
16 group occupies one sort of social or moral space. There
17 is a divergence, and it's up to us to learn to live
18 together.

19 In view of this, there's a statement that is
20 attributed to Umal Muthar(?): these people are our
21 tormentors, they are not our tutors; so we tolerate
22 them, we learn to live with them, and hope they will
23 change for the better.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 During your time in the police, did you ever sense

1 a perception amongst your colleagues that black people,
2 or, as this officer describes black people "coloured
3 people", had a sort of general hostility towards
4 the police. Was that a perception that you experienced?

5 A. Not at all.

6 Q. Finally on this topic. As far as your specific
7 deployments whilst you were in SOS, were -- were any of
8 them, do you believe, created specifically because of
9 your race? In other words, were you target -- were you
10 asked to target Operation Omega or the Black Power
11 Movement because of your race?

12 A. No. I never came across anything vaguely associated
13 with that statement.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 Turning, then, very briefly to Operation Omega --
16 I entirely agree, this has been dealt with quite
17 extensively. Can we agree, because it wasn't made
18 absolutely clear, what Operation Omega was.

19 Is this right: Operation Omega was a small,
20 London-based group that was involved in taking
21 humanitarian aid from India into Bangladesh, which was
22 formerly East Pakistan, during the war between India and
23 Pakistan in 1971, in which it's estimated over a million
24 people were killed? Is that a fair summary?

25 A. -- (overspeaking) --

- 1 Q. -- Operation Omega --
- 2 A. -- India and Pakistan, it was a war between Pakistan --
- 3 West Pakistan and East Pakistan --
- 4 Q. -- (overspeaking) --
- 5 A. Yes, sorry. Could you repeat that, please?
- 6 Q. That this was a small, London-based group that was
- 7 involved in taking humanitarian aid into what is now
- 8 Bangladesh, what was formerly East Pakistan?
- 9 A. That would be a very fair assessment, yes.
- 10 Q. And can you -- you can't remember, is this right, who it
- 11 was within SOS who asked you to infiltrate this group?
- 12 A. They didn't ask me to infiltrate this group, I found
- 13 myself in this group. I reported the matter, and then
- 14 the -- basically services, whatever they were able to
- 15 do, were made available to me so I could do the job more
- 16 fully.
- 17 Q. But did anybody in SOS, after you told them that you
- 18 were involved in this group and obtaining information
- 19 about this group, did anybody in SOS specifically tell
- 20 you to continue to pursue that endeavour?
- 21 A. Not in so many words, but as -- as I have said, we had
- 22 this letter from Box. And it was decided that this was
- 23 a good thing to pursue, so we just carried on with what
- 24 I had already started doing.
- 25 Q. What was your understanding of the nature of the groups

1 that SOS was targeting during the time that you were
2 deployed? What were the aims and objectives of
3 the squad?

4 A. I think my view was that there was basically an attempt
5 to reduce or eliminate unhelpful behaviour on the part
6 of certain individuals within these various groups. Any
7 group would have its good, its bad and its ugly, and
8 it's just a question of keeping an eye on things and
9 making sure that -- we were worried that they achieved
10 their objections to -- objectives to help the people of
11 Bangladesh, but we didn't want to see any violence or
12 damage, any malicious damage on the streets, or any harm
13 to citizens, regardless of their colour, ethnicity or
14 national standing.

15 Q. Finally, on Operation Omega, there don't seem to be any
16 SOS reports at all, in your name or in anybody else's
17 name, that mention Operation Omega. Thinking back --
18 and I appreciate this is more than 50 years ago -- how
19 many reports do you think that you wrote about
20 Operation Omega during the time that you were spying on
21 them?

22 A. I don't know, and that is the truth. I'd like to know,
23 but I don't. If I can put it this way, writing
24 the report is the least exciting part of my day.

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. You get to the end of the day, I don't know how many
2 coffees I drank after, I don't know how many reports.
3 But there were quite a few. I imagine two or three
4 a week would probably be right, or maybe one or two.
5 But if the reports aren't there now, if they can't find
6 them, there's nothing I can do about it.

7 Q. I understand that. No blame attached.

8 I mean, in terms of these reports, you say one or
9 two or maybe three a week. For how long a period?

10 A. I think it would have been about six months or so.
11 Again, we're going back so far.

12 There would be -- I'm surprised to be told that
13 there are no reports available. But I can't comment
14 more than that.

15 Q. Moving, then, to my final topic, 345: the Black Power
16 Movement.

17 Again, did this just come about accidentally, or did
18 somebody in SOS specifically ask you to target this --
19 this movement?

20 A. No, I think I just fell into that movement. I was doing
21 other things, and you meet people and you just go.

22 Q. During the time that you were in SOS, or in
23 Special Branch more generally, was there a Black Power
24 desk specifically dealing with the Black Power Movement?

25 A. Not to my knowledge.

1 Q. In your witness statement you identify a man who was
2 your main link to this movement. Let me make it clear,
3 I don't know his name, and I'm not entitled to know his
4 name and I'm not going to ask you anything about his
5 name. His name has been blacked out in the copy of your
6 statement I have. But I do wish to ask you this, did
7 that man -- whatever his name was -- did he belong to
8 a particular organisation within the wider Black Power
9 Movement?

10 A. I'm not in a position to answer that simply because
11 I would need to know the name if it would help jog my
12 memory.

13 Q. So you don't remember his name either?

14 A. Well, I don't -- I can't -- from what you've told me,
15 I can't identify this individual. It could be because
16 so much time has passed, or it --

17 Q. Sir, it's entirely my fault. I didn't make myself
18 clear. You've named him in your witness statement; it's
19 just that the copy of your witness statement that I have
20 has his name blacked out. So I'm not entitled to know
21 his name. But he's somebody whose name you provided
22 the Inquiry, 345.

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. Shall I take you to the relevant paragraph of your
25 statement?

1 A. Yes, please.

2 Q. Would that help? Just give me a minute, please. And
3 I repeat, please don't mention his name aloud. All I'm
4 asking is whether you can remember whether this man was
5 linked to any particular organisation.

6 A. Is that going to come up on the screen, or ...?

7 Q. Yes, it will. I'm just going to find the reference for
8 you. One minute.

9 The statement reference is {MPS-0741109}. If you
10 could turn to page 26 of that witness statement, please,
11 {MPS-0741109/26}, paragraph 67. {MPS-0741109/27}.

12 Again, this copy also has it redacted, but I'm
13 hoping that if you read the top of paragraph 67, it may
14 trigger a memory as to who you were speaking about.

15 (Pause)

16 Does that assist?

17 A. Okay this -- am I allowed to give the name?

18 Q. No, you're not allowed to give the name, because
19 the Inquiry has redacted his name for privacy reasons.
20 That's why I'm not asking you who he is. All I'm asking
21 is whether he was associated with any particular
22 Black Power organisation?

23 A. I am not able to answer that. He was involved, as
24 I say, with Black Power, and there were connections with
25 Americans. But more than that I couldn't answer you

1 right now.

2 Q. Very well.

3 Do you remember earlier you were shown two reports,
4 both of which had your name at the bottom of them, which
5 concerned meetings of the Black Defence Committee? Do
6 you remember that?

7 A. Was this earlier today?

8 Q. Yes, earlier today.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. You didn't actually remember either of those meetings,
11 do you remember? Those are the meetings I'm talking
12 about.

13 A. Fair enough. I did go to so many meetings that to go
14 back 50 years and say this particular meeting at this
15 place, that place, is sometimes -- it's sometimes
16 difficult.

17 Q. I understand. No criticism.

18 Can you confirm the following, if you remember this:
19 that the Black Defence Committee was an organisation
20 that had been set up to raise funds in defence of black
21 people who were facing trial as a result of police
22 oppression. Do you remember that? That's why it had
23 been set up.

24 A. I don't know.

25 Q. You can't remember?

- 1 A. No. It -- it sounds right, but I don't have any
2 specific memory.
- 3 Q. Now, I appreciate that you don't remember these
4 meetings, but given your name appears at the bottom of
5 these reports, can we be sure, therefore, that you must
6 have attended these meetings, given your name is on
7 these reports?
- 8 A. If my -- if the report says that I was at the meeting
9 and my name is at the bottom, then I would have been at
10 that meeting, yes.
- 11 Q. To be clear -- to be fair to you, the reports don't say
12 that you were at the meeting, but they have your name at
13 the bottom of the reports.
- 14 A. Oh.
- 15 Q. I suppose what I'm asking you is this. Is it possible
16 that your name would appear at the bottom of a report
17 about a meeting that you in fact did not attend? Is
18 that possible or not?
- 19 A. If -- it doesn't defy any of the laws of physics, so
20 it's possible. But it would be hugely disappointing if
21 there was an ulterior motive behind it. I can't answer.
22 That's as mush as --
- 23 Q. Very good.
- 24 During the time, 1971, that you were working within
25 the SOS, the major Black Power campaign in the country

1 was the campaign in the defence of the Mangrove 9. Do
2 you remember the case of the Mangrove 9?

3 A. Not clearly, no.

4 Q. It doesn't ring any bells at all? Let me see if I can
5 help you.

6 There was a demonstration in Notting Hill in West
7 London on 9 August 1970, so a few months before you
8 joined SOS. And as a result of that demonstration,
9 which was about the alleged police harassment of
10 a restaurant on the All Saints Road called the "Mangrove
11 Restaurant". And as a result of that demonstration,
12 nine black activists in London were arrested and
13 eventually prosecuted for riot. And there was a defence
14 campaign set up in relation to them, and their trial
15 commenced at the Old Bailey in October 1971; in other
16 words, whilst you were working for SOS.

17 Does that ring any bells at all?

18 A. I was not involved closely with them. I would have read
19 about it in the papers; I would have known something,
20 perhaps. But I wasn't closely involved.

21 Q. You say "closely involved"; were you involved at all,
22 even indirectly, in the policing of that campaign, or
23 anything to do with that?

24 A. I don't recall that at all, no.

25 Q. And you don't remember any conversations with any of

1 your SOS colleagues, or anybody else in Special Branch,
2 about this seminal event in the history of
3 the Black Power Movement?

4 A. Definitely not. Definitely not.

5 Q. In addition to -- you mention three Black Power meetings
6 in your statement. Two of them I've taken you to
7 already. The third was the meeting in West London,
8 where the speaker made a mention about there being
9 somebody from MI5 in the room.

10 In addition to those three meetings, how many other
11 Black Power-related meetings or events do you think you
12 attended during your deployment in SOS?

13 A. Oh, there would have been several. I would attend one,
14 maybe two Black Power meetings on the Sunday alone, and
15 there may have been other meetings at other times of
16 the week. But after all these years -- if -- I couldn't
17 give you a number --

18 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

19 A. -- (inaudible).

20 Q. Sorry to interrupt. Go ahead, sorry.

21 A. No, please.

22 Q. I was just going to say, again, over what length of
23 period are we talking about? Are we talking over a
24 period of six months, or less?

25 A. That sort of thing.

1 Q. Do you, by any chance -- just answer this "yes" or "no"
2 first, please.

3 Do you, by any chance, remember the name of
4 the speaker who made that comment at the meeting about
5 there's somebody from MI5 in the room? Do you remember
6 the name of that speaker?

7 A. I definitely don't remember his name.

8 MR MENON: You definitely don't remember him.

9 Thank you, 345. That's all I ask.

10 Sir, those are my questions.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

12 MR MENON: Can I indicate that Ms Brander does have some
13 questions that she wishes to ask for permission to ask.
14 So I'll just move away and allow her to occupy this
15 seat, if I may.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 MS BRANDER: Good afternoon.

18 The difficulty is that Mr Menon and I share
19 a computer terminal for these purposes, so he has to get
20 out of the way so that I can sit there.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Don't worry in the slightest bit about
22 the technology. It has caused us some surmountable
23 problems; it's going to do so in future.

24 Questions by MS BRANDER

25 MS BRANDER: Thank you, sir.

1 There are two areas on which I would seek your
2 permission to ask questions. I think you will have been
3 told, sir, that there seems to have been a slight
4 problem with the transmission of the transcript of this
5 afternoon's evidence. And I have been --

6 THE CHAIRMAN: I have heard of that, and I was in part
7 referring to that in what I've just said.

8 MS BRANDER: I see, okay. Thank you, sir.

9 So, yes, I've been asked by the recognised legal
10 representative on behalf of Peter Hain and others if
11 I might be permitted to ask some of the questions that
12 they have been submitted in advance which I don't think
13 have been fully covered in Mr Barr's questioning. And
14 then, on behalf of the non-state group, I have some
15 questions for 345 in relation to relationships.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, as this is in the nature of an
17 experiment, you may do so.

18 MS BRANDER: Thank you, sir.

19 Perhaps it would assist, in respect of my first
20 questions, if we could have 345's witness statement up
21 on screen; and it's {MPS-0741109}, and it's page 4 of
22 that document {MPS-0741109/4}.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Is it page 4 on the computer printout or in
24 the printed page 4, because the MPS put a cover sheet on
25 the front of every document which throws out

1 the numbering by at least one?

2 MS BRANDER: This is the correct page on screen. So it's
3 page 3 of 45, but it's number 4 on the electronic
4 document.

5 Do you have it, sir?

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I do.

7 MS BRANDER: Thank you.

8 So, 345, we can see at paragraph 8 there you're
9 talking about your undercover work, and I believe that
10 this is your undercover work prior to joining the SOS.
11 You're explaining you'd find out things by the by about
12 Black Power groups and Stop the Tour movement, just from
13 the kind of people that you were associating with; can
14 you see that?

15 A. Can I ask you to ask that question again, it's ...

16 Q. Yes, of course. I'm just trying to establish the time
17 period that you're referring to at this section of your
18 witness statement. So, you're talking about your
19 undercover work and it's been redacted there. But it
20 was the time at which you were finding out things about
21 the Black Power groups and Stop the Tour movement, just
22 from the sort of people you were associating with; and
23 I'm just checking with you that this period was prior to
24 you being recruited to the Special Operations Squad?

25 A. Correct, yes.

1 Q. And if we could scroll down to the next paragraph,
2 please. There.

3 So we see at paragraph 9 you've said your
4 association with Stop the Tour had ended by the time you
5 were in the SDS?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. And we can see a passage there that's been redacted, but
8 we've been provided with a summary of the text that's
9 been redacted, saying it gives:

10 "Details of an incident during [your] non-SDS street
11 crime undercover work where activists from Stop the Tour
12 do not want to associate with [you]."

13 Did they not want to associate with you because you
14 were posing as being involved in street crime at the
15 time?

16 A. I have no way of knowing why they chose not to be
17 involved with me. I didn't pursue the matter when they
18 told me they didn't want to have anything to do with me.
19 And they didn't give any specific reason; I just
20 thought, you know, there's no point in carrying on.
21 I had other things to do.

22 Q. It's right, is it, that your deployment at the time was
23 in detecting street crime?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And so, in that context, given that that was your role,

1 why was it that you were passing on information about
2 Stop the Tour and about Black Power groups?

3 A. At the time, I don't recall passing on any information.
4 The Black Power groups came later. At this time I was
5 involved in other things. I met all sorts of people
6 from all sorts of walks -- walks of life. Amongst them
7 there were the people who were involved with
8 Stop the Tour. They wanted some help; I agreed to help
9 them.

10 I suspect they heard from somewhere about --
11 a little bit more about me and they decided they didn't
12 want to associate with me. That is my understanding,
13 but I didn't have a long conversation with them. I was
14 out there in the street mixing with people, mixing in
15 all sorts of environments, and if people didn't want to
16 have anything to do with me, I just thought leave them,
17 you know, there are others out there, there's more work
18 to be done.

19 Q. I see. But if we could just go back up to paragraph 8.

20 A. Yes. There it is.

21 Q. So we can see there you said:

22 "I would find things out by-the-by about Black Power
23 groups and the Stop the Tour movement just from the kind
24 of people that I was associating with. Stop the Tour
25 wanted to ..."

1 And then details of an instance of direct action
2 planned by Stop the Tour. And you said:

3 "I would have passed on this information as a matter
4 of course."

5 Why would you have passed that information on as
6 a matter of course?

7 A. If the -- if the -- if I considered the information to
8 be relevant, I would have passed it on.

9 I'd like to make one thing clear about this
10 interesting little passage I've got here, "a sociable
11 person". I tried to meet people, and I would spend my
12 time listening to what they had to say. And a pub is
13 always a very nice place, people have a little more to
14 drink than they know, and perhaps they -- they say
15 things they didn't -- would prefer not to have said in
16 public. And my position was, if it was of interest, I'd
17 pass it on; if it's not of interest, I'd just forget it.

18 Q. And how would you determine if something was of
19 interest?

20 A. By whatever was going on in the environment at the time,
21 you know, and I think everything that's going on --
22 well, most things going on in society are in the --
23 someone's interests somewhere along the line. I am
24 aware -- I always was aware that I couldn't see
25 the whole ship. I pass information on; there were

1 senior people who decided whether it was worthy of
2 pursuance, or could best -- best be ignored. I just did
3 my bit.

4 Q. But this was even at a time before you were in the SOS.
5 This was a time when you were just on street crime.

6 A. Absolutely.

7 Q. And we've seen in the papers earlier you were commended.
8 Was that in relation to the information that you were
9 passing on?

10 A. Okay, that commendation or that -- that compliment
11 was there. It was a commentary on something I achieved
12 that weekend. I had met some people for the first time,
13 I'd engaged with them, and they had invited me to join
14 them and given me the address of their office and
15 various other -- and I got to meet them all, and
16 therefore there was a compliment there. I wouldn't go
17 so far as to call it a commendation --

18 Q. I see, and the -- (overspeaking) --

19 A. -- that's for other people to decide.

20 Q. Sorry, go ahead.

21 A. No, I said that's for other people to decide but it was
22 -- it was a "thank you, well done" and so I was pleased.

23 Q. And I think that was from MI5; is that right? From
24 the Security Service?

25 A. That's what I was told, yes.

1 Q. And the information that you were passing on about
2 the Stop the Tour, did you know who that information was
3 going to?

4 A. After all these years, I -- I -- I can't remember, but
5 there were a few names that would -- that were in
6 contact with me, and I'd send information up by whatever
7 means, and if they found it was of interest, they would
8 get back in touch with me. On a number of occasions
9 they visited me and we had meetings and chats.

10 Q. And did you think it was going to the Security Service?

11 A. I don't know -- yes, I think I did. I didn't think
12 about it that deeply. It was stuff going on, the system
13 needed to know about it and I was pushing
14 the information up. And it would have been going to
15 the security services, I imagine, yes.

16 Q. And what about the South African security services? Do
17 you think it was being passed on to them?

18 A. No. (Pause)

19 Sorry, did you hear me?

20 Q. Yes, I could, sorry. I was just looking on my computer
21 screen to check that I'd asked all the questions on that
22 topic that I had been asked to ask, so sorry for
23 the pause.

24 A. That's perfectly okay.

25 Q. So, I want to come on to a different topic now and it

1 was you were asked by Mr Barr when you had first come to
2 learn about members of the SDS having engaged in sexual
3 relationships, and you said, I think, that you'd just
4 learnt in very recent years.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you were asked whether you were surprised, and
7 I think you said you were surprised that the matter had
8 been raised. And, sorry, I'm just now looking at
9 a different device where I've the [draft] transcript of
10 what you said. So you said:

11 "I was surprised the matter had been raised.
12 I have -- if you like, it's a phrase in my head which
13 helps guide me here. If you ask me to infiltrate some
14 drug dealers, you can't point the finger at me if
15 I sample the product. If these people are in a certain
16 environment where it's necessary to engage that little
17 bit more deeply, then, shall we say, I find this
18 acceptable, but I do worry about the consequences."

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is that right?

21 So, you said you were surprised that the matter had
22 been raised. Do I take from that you were surprised
23 that it had come out into the public domain?

24 A. I was surprised that there was any suggestion that it
25 had taken place.

1 Q. Oh, I see. So you were surprised -- you were surprised
2 that it had taken place?

3 A. I was surprised -- well, there was an allegation --
4 I don't know enough about what's going on, but I was
5 a bit surprised, if I could sort of just -- yes,
6 surprised and disappointed and all of that.

7 But at the end of the day, the bottom line is, we
8 are in a hugely convoluted environment, as -- and it's a
9 phrase -- it's one of these expressions I'm very fond
10 of; I have Dave Allen to thank for it: you're gazing
11 into a darkened room, you're looking for a black cat
12 that may not be there. That's the way we lived.

13 So to be certain is to -- I don't know, it's up to
14 you. I -- you've got very little certainty. You do
15 your best.

16 Q. So you were in very difficult circumstances, or you
17 would envisage colleagues being in very difficult
18 circumstances, and I think you mentioned drug dealers
19 sampling the product. You think there could be
20 circumstances in which you see that need arising?

21 A. I've only been given a few seconds to think about this;
22 the question was asked just a few minutes ago. But it's
23 hugely confusing. I -- I do have a particular regard
24 for the wellbeing of children particularly, and, yes,
25 for women, and everyone else, and to be -- to me,

1 the subject of an act of -- you could call it deception,
2 you could call it anything you like, it can't be nice
3 and I think we ought to find a better way than that.

4 But perhaps -- my view is perhaps they had no choice.

5 Q. And is this something that you think that others, when
6 you were deployed, would sympathise with?

7 A. I'm very confident we never discussed this. It never
8 came up. We weren't aware of this aspect of -- of
9 the process. Or at least I wasn't.

10 MS BRANDER: Okay.

11 Thank you, sir, I've no further questions.

12 A. Thank you.

13 MS BRANDER: I think you may be on mute, sir.

14 A. Oh, am I?

15 MS BRANDER: Sorry, not you, 345.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: It's my fault again. I've done it again, and
17 it's the second time today. I apologise for that.

18 Mr Sanders, do you have any questions arising out of
19 the evidence that's been given?

20 MR SANDERS: No, thank you, sir.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: HN345, thank you very much for assisting
22 the Inquiry with your memory of events all those years
23 ago. The one lesson I think you can safely draw from
24 today's proceedings is never trust a time estimate given
25 by a lawyer. Thank you.

1 MS PURSER: Thank you, everyone. The Tranche 1, Phase 1
2 hearings for the Undercover Policing Inquiry have now
3 concluded. The transcripts and associated publications
4 are available to download at ucpi.org.uk. Thank you
5 very much.

6 (3.43 pm)

7 (The hearing concluded)

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