

Cover Sheet

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This study paper is based on experience gained over the last four months: it does not pretend to explore all the problems posed when Police officers are utilised for the close infiltration of extremist organisations, but attempts to lay down basic principles for that type of operation. Appendix 'A' gives the suggested layout of an organisation to be set up for the purpose: Appendix 'B' describes in outline how officers currently employed in this way are deployed.

OBJECT

The primary object is to provide information in relation to public order problems; the secondary by-product is that our knowledge of extremist organisations, and individuals active in them, is considerably enhanced. The advantages to be gained by using Police officers rather than relying on traditional methods are:

- (a) The information gained in this way is more accurate because the information-gatherers are trained observers.
- (b) The delay occurring when the authorities have to wait for public announcements, or the reports of informants, is eliminated.
- (c) We are able to make much more accurate assessments of future trends and developments.

SIZE OF UNIT

The unit should consist of not less than twelve and not more than twenty officers. A lesser number than twelve will not give that spread of coverage required when dealing with the fragmented groups comprising the British left: a greater number than twenty means that there is difficulty in

supplying that personal guidance and daily detailed supervision necessary to ensure that officers are concentrating on the right areas of enquiry, and do not feel isolated from their fellows.

PERSONNEL

Recruitment should be by personal approach, bearing in mind the importance of selecting officers with the ability to act a part and mix with persons holding highly unorthodox views. Physical characteristics are less important than the attitude of mind and a full political vocabulary; a regional accent is an advantage. Constables of between two and eight years total Police service are best for this work for they have yet to acquire the bright-eyed inquisitive manner that betrays the veteran detective and, in many cases, can relate their cover-stories to their pre-service life. Supervision is best entrusted to detective-inspectors, who should be in a one to three ratio to the constables and have a special responsibility for their own three-man team. These supervising officers can also be employed on certain delicate assignments in groups where great experience is required, on general enquiry and assessment duties, and as liaison officers with the parallel organisation in the Security Service.

PERIOD OF SERVICE

It must be accepted as axiomatic that members of this type of unit are free to leave it at any time if they have doubts about their ability to continue deceiving the opposition. Similarly, it may prove necessary to dispense with an officer's services in short order if we get information from one of our many sources that he is suspected, or compromised, in any way. The nervous strains involved in this work are considerable, and it should be the rule that an officer serve for no longer than twelve months, unless there are special

circumstances why he should be retained for a longer period. A "natural break" will sometimes take place, as when an officer goes on a course, or has to appear in court, and a replacement officer can be recruited in his stead. When we are in a position to obtain evidence about a serious offence arrangements have to be made so that it is obtained by an "uncommitted" officer, and thus avoid compromising the undercover man. An "uncommitted" officer is an essential part of the unit; women officers fill the role extremely well and can be taken to public or private gatherings where the evidence is obtainable with little risk of denunciation.

PREMISES

Officers who are closely involved with extremists should not be expected to report to any Police establishment, except in emergency, and an unmarked office has to be set up in some anonymous, cosmopolitan area of the city. For example: in the present operation the office is a furnished flat in

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in West London;

Officers should also have cover addresses - generally small flats and bed-sitting rooms - to receive mail, back-up their cover-stories, and frustrate enquiries and observation by the opposition. An office is also maintained at New Scotland Yard; the officers engaged on clerical duties there record, sift and present the information obtained from reports, publications, telephone checks and the Security Service.

TRANSPORT

Officers should not use Police vehicles, or their own private motor cars. A contract-hire firm should provide vehicles, exchangeable at frequent intervals, for operational use. Motor-cycles have been used in recent months: these are the property of the officers riding them, but the

new identities of the owners.

IDENTITY AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL

On joining the squad an officer has to supply an autobiography covering his new identity, and after the various inconsistencies have been eradicated he obtains the necessary papers to confirm it. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Warrant cards are never carried, and contact with uniform officers is discouraged.

SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES

The incompetence of the British left is notorious, and officers must take care not to get into a position where they achieve prominence in an organisation through natural ability. A firm line must be drawn between activity as a follower and a leader, and members of the squad should be told in no uncertain terms that they must not take office in a group, chair meetings, draft leaflets, speak in public or initiate activity.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LARGER UNIT

An organisation of this type fulfills a pure intelligence role, and should not be used for tasks which can equally well be performed by the more orthodox unit. Great care is taken in creating a personality which is accepted by extremists without hesitation; the image should not be shattered to satisfy a mere temporary expedient, or to gain a petty propaganda victory over the left-wing in this country. The squad should be autonomous, independently-financed and flexible. The personnel should be free of extraneous duties, and given full scope for initiative. The relationship between the undercover unit and the parent


how should be that of a subsidiary of a larger unit.

servant and master, for success in this field depends on the unfettered enthusiasm of a small closely-knit group working in harmony for a common object, and possessing that high morale engendered in elite groups by the knowledge of their special and exclusive function.

Conrad Dixon
Chief Inspector

S.B.
26.11.68.

APPENDIX "A"



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[REDACTED]

APPENDIX "B"

<u>No.</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Duty</u>	<u>Joining date</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
	C.I. Dixon	i/c squad and Camden VSC	31.7.68	
	D.I. Saunders	2 i/c squad	31.7.68	To Bramshill on 5.1.69; back on 5.4.69. Due to leave squad after May demonstration.
	D.I. Wilson	Press and informants	31.7.68	Not involved operationally can be retained beyond 31.7.69.
19	D.I. HN332	Poster Workshop	31.7.68	[REDACTED]
	D.S. Creamer	Clerical	31.7.68	For release when promotion to D.S.(I) imminent, or 31.7.69, whichever is sooner.
21	D.C. HN68	Notting Hill Gate VSC	31.7.68	[REDACTED]
22	D.C. HN331	Notting Hill Gate VSC and anarchists	31.7.68	[REDACTED]
	D.C. Furner	Clerical	31.7.68	Not involved operationally could remain longer than one year.
24	D.C. HN329	Kilburn and Willesden VSC and the RSSF	12.8.68	[REDACTED]
	D.C. Tyrrell	Maoists and Earls Court VSC	18.9.68	Retain until 18.9.69.
26	D.C. HN321	Lambeth VSC and the IMG	18.9.68.	[REDACTED]
27	D.C. HN322	S.E.London VSC	30.9.68	[REDACTED]
28	D.C. HN326	anarchists	4.11.68	[REDACTED]
29	D.C. HN333	(awaiting training)	to join on 10.12.68.	
30	D.C. HN336	(first reserve)		
	W.D.C. Hillier	liaison with HQ flat and "uncommitted" officer for	31.7.68	Retain until required to appear in court, or 31.7.69, whichever is sooner.