

Our ref:
588/UNREG/694

69/S
W
Accs
8

27th May, 1969.

Dear

You will recall writing to me on 16th December, 1968, about one of the Squads which operates in Special Branch. In giving Home Office blessing to our incurring certain expenditure in connection with the activities of the Squad until midsummer 1969, you asked that we look at the subject again about that time.

The past six months have of course seen a lessening of the violence which characterised political demonstrations last year, and you will no doubt agree that this is because the issue of Vietnam is no longer sufficiently emotive to draw the protesters on to the streets in the way it did last year. The Protest Movement is at present seeking some other catalyst to bring all shades of opinion together, but so far it has been unsuccessful. How long this state of affairs will continue we do not know, but certainly we do not feel we are out of the wood yet - the pattern of student disorder in the United States continues, and we feel that once our Protest Movement groups find the clarion call they are seeking they will be out on the streets in force once again.

In the past six months the Squad has continued to provide most valuable information to our uniformed colleagues about the intentions of the extremist groups, and, largely because of the patient work which has been done by its members since its inception, we are very favourably situated to continue to provide a good flow of intelligence. However, the extremist groups are now very much more security minded than they were last August when the Squad was formed. Were we to wind up our operations now when the situation is relatively quiet and then try to recreate the Squad, say in three months' time should circumstances so demand, we would find our task vastly more difficult and we doubt if we would be able to achieve the degree of success we have so far had. Certainly we would not be able to achieve our present patiently won position in a short space of time.

The Commissioner is firmly in favour of our continuing the Squad's operations, and Commander Smith tells me that the Security Service fully support our view that it be allowed

/to

J.H. Waddell, Esq., C.B.,
Deputy Under Secretary of State,
Home Office.

to continue. ^{AA} The product of the Squad is shared with them, of course, and ^{regular} consultation takes place between that Service and our own officers.

Should you wish further information on the matter, Commander Smith and I will be happy to come over to see you. If, however, you see fit to approve our request without this, then may I ask your blessing, as before, for the expenditure of a further £1,500 for the remainder of the year to promote the Squad's work. We have been able to keep just within the £1,500 allocated to us last December.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) by A. C. C.

Aims

Results

- | | |
|---|--|
| (c) Obtaining evidence and identifying suspects in relation to breaches of the law before, during and after demonstrations. | One successful prosecution has been obtained for incitement, four have been secured for offences allied to riot, etc., and four cases are still pending. |
| (d) Gathering and recording information for long-term intelligence purposes. | New entrants to the extreme left-wing political scene are being identified and recorded within weeks of their manifesting an interest in extremist affairs. Personal descriptions, addresses and occupations are obtained by officers working within groups, and this material is submitted personally or passed to officers engaged on normal enquiry work. A balanced view is thus obtained of these individuals from two aspects. New groups are being dealt with similarly. (Over 200 information reports have been submitted, and over 1,000 minor meetings attended, in addition to the coverage at major demonstrations.) |

4. Disorderly demonstrations are diminishing, due to some extent to superior intelligence supplied by the Squad. At the present time emphasis of the Squad's work is shifting somewhat in that more information is being obtained in relation to (c) and (d) above than heretofore.

5. Activities of the Squad received some press publicity immediately prior to the 27th October, but no solid facts emerged and publicity soon subsided. There has been no criticism of these undercover methods by the public, by extremists or by the civil liberties groups. No officer has been exposed as a "police spy" and the precautions taken are such that this is not now regarded as a likely contingency.

6. Members of the Squad are serving members of Special Branch and no extra manpower is employed. In money terms £3,000 a year is being spent on accommodation and telephones, and an uncomputed amount for three contract hire motor vehicles.

MEMORANDUMCommander

1. The Special Operations Squad is currently composed of one Chief Inspector, two Inspectors, one 1st Class Sergeant, two 2nd Class Sergeants, seven Detective Constables and one Woman Detective Constable.

2. The Squad was formed on 30th July, 1968, with the object of obtaining information relating to the demonstration held on 27th October, 1968. It was envisaged that information concerning that demonstration would be obtained from publications, informants, police sources, technical devices and undercover police officers.

3. In the event, the last method proved to be the most successful. It was found that information from police officers was more comprehensive and more reliable than that from informants - probably because these officers were trained detectives and knew which particular items were important and which were irrelevant. Following the 27th October, it was agreed that the Squad should continue to operate, and it was then possible to look at the larger canvass of the political scene, to establish what the new aims should be and to see how these compared with the results being achieved, viz:

<u>Aims</u>	<u>Results</u>
(a) To supply information about the intentions of militant left-wing extremists on the occasions of public demonstrations.	Accurate forecasts of numbers, intentions and mood of the demonstrators was, and is, being supplied.
(b) Identification of those who engage in preliminary planning or who take part in such demonstrations.	Identifications at outdoor public demonstrations have ranged from 12% to 50% over the past nine months. At indoor meetings and conferences up to 100 of the participants have been identified.

7. Both by volume and worth the end product of the officers engaged on this type of work compares very favourably with that of officers engaged on normal enquiries. Moreover, in certain sensitive areas information is being obtained which could not be secured by the most skilful Special Branch officer using orthodox methods.

8. Such information is only made available to trusted members of groups with a checked history of commitment and activity, and members of the Squad have been able to build up reputations over the months and to be in a position to receive information when it is disseminated.

9. Undercover officers are currently supplying information concerning the following groups:-

Maoists
Anarchists
International Socialism
International Marxist Group
Vietnam Solidarity Campaign
Independent Labour Party
People's Democracy
Save Biafra.

10. In the next few months it is envisaged that Welsh and Irish republicanism, racialism, anti-Zionism and fascism will be used as issues to mobilise demonstrators on the London streets. At present coverage is being given to Irish Civil Rights activities, and similar coverage can be arranged on other "hot" issues as necessity arises.

11. The need for accurate intelligence in the field of public order so that the correct number of police shall be in the right place at the right time is indisputable, and if we are to be called upon to supply such intelligence, as we have done since the end of July, 1968, then the continued existence of the Special Operations Squad is vital. However, in addition, the extremely valuable information referred to in (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph 3 would, on its own, amply justify the continuance of the Squad.

12. To the present, the Squad has done an excellent job and I have no doubt it will be beneficial to the Service if it is allowed to continue.

S.B.
20th May, 1969.

A. Cunningham
Chief Superintendent


MEMORANDUMDeputy Assistant Commissioner

1. The Special Operations Squad (S.O.S.) currently comprises two Detective Inspectors, one 1st Class Sergeant, one 2nd Class Sergeant, six Detective Constables and one Woman Detective Constable. This shows a reduction since the situation was last reviewed in May, of one Chief Inspector, one 2nd Class Sergeant and one Detective Constable.

2. Following the October 27th Vietnam Demonstration it was decided that the Squad should continue to operate but within a broader spectrum of the political extremist left-wing. The difficulties were foreseeable and proved by events. The Vietnam issue which briefly united the extremist factions appears, temporarily at least, to have lost its appeal and to date no alternative unifying cause has been found. None of the potentially troublesome groups has been able to rally significant support for the various issues they have raised and a feeling of frustration and even lethargy is evident amongst them. It is known that the absence of serious public disorder is in part due to the increased efficiency of police, both in obtaining advanced information of potentially disorderly demonstrations and in handling them on the day.

3. Be that as it may, the task of anticipating which of the factions might well be successful in fermenting disorder, in sufficient time to penetrate them, has been the preoccupation of the Squad. The greater diversification of the Squad's activities has resulted in information now being obtained relative to the following:-

- * People's Democracy
- * Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign

A


Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association

- * Independent Labour Party
 - * Action Committee Against N.A.T.O.
 - * Tri-Continental Committee
- 

- * Britain Vietnam Solidarity Front
- * Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League
Maoists
- * Vietnam Solidarity Committee (under various guises)
- * Group '68
International Socialism Group
International Marxist Group
Students
- * Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation
Anarchists
National Convention of the Left

C

4. Those marked with an asterisk, which are considered to be the main threat to public order, are comprehensively covered by Squad Officers. Information concerning the remainder is obtained by affiliation with various groups, informants and contacts. The fact that it is possible to cover a larger number of organisations than when the Squad was last reviewed is partly due to the tendency of the extremists to belong to, and move amongst, several organisations enabling the undercover officers to do likewise.

5. Anarchists characteristically pose problems difficult to solve with limited facilities. The distasteful nature of the way of life of such people, which officers must assume, adds to the difficulties of penetration. Small groups can be and have been penetrated with some success by the S.O.S. but their tendency to act in isolation makes the value of full time coverage questionable. Nevertheless, indirect information through technical aids and informants is available on some of the more prominent ones. The main areas of political extremism not covered, for a variety of reasons, by the S.O.S. remain the Communist Party, Fascists, "Black Power", and ancillary coloured organisations, tenants and the youth sections of the major political parties.

6. There was a marked absence during the summer months of large-scale disturbances and it soon became obvious that the situation in Northern Ireland would attract the attention of extreme

elements in this country. Within weeks of their participation, the principal groups concerned, i.e. I.C.R.S.C., P.D. [REDACTED] [D] [REDACTED] were penetrated by undercover officers, thus providing information, not only of activities in this country but also, to a degree, in Northern Ireland and the Republic.

7. A by-product of infiltration into these Irish organisations has been that the leading revolutionaries and other personalities here, together with their activities have been catalogued in detail. Equally effective was the penetration of the I.M.G. earlier this year, to such an extent that every person present at one of their summer camps was photographed and identified. It has also sometimes been possible to glean useful intelligence, at times relevant to the M.P.D., by attendance at functions organised by extremists outside the Metropolis which would not have been obtainable by other means e.g. at recent R.S.S.F. conferences in Birmingham and Leicester; a V.S.C. gathering in Sheffield, and Irish meetings in the Home Counties.

8. The benefits of the entrenchment of trained officers in these fields have been proved to be accumulative; they not only can more easily provide information on imminent public disorder but their facility in identifying leading troublemakers, before and after the event, improves. The recently re-organised Photographic Section of Special Branch particularly benefits from this aspect and the rate of positive identifications can rarely have been higher. Officers engaged on routine enquiries on extremists are regularly and increasingly assisted not only in "background" but in hard information concerning their activities.

9. During the period under review, the 'Aims' of the Squad, as outlined in the previous memorandum, have continued to be its terms of reference. In the five month period, June to October inclusive, when the strength of the Squad varied from nine to eleven, approximately 360 informations of various kinds have been submitted; additionally, attendance at meetings and major demonstrations, identification of participants and involvement in the work of target

organisations have continued at a very high level. The current output of intelligence information by officers of the Squad is accelerating as evidenced by the fact that 84 items of information were submitted during the month of October.

ACCOMMODATION

10. The use of a nondescript, detached, office for the undercover officers has been found to be indispensable. Its vulnerability to exposure is realised but extreme caution is exercised and nothing has occurred to suggest that it has attracted undue attention; alternatives to this aspect have been discussed but discounted as being less secure.

11. Although the total number of officers on the Squad is less than it was, more are sensitively placed in extremist organisations making it vital that their cover is adequate. Experience has proved that such officers need individual cover addresses which will withstand searching enquiry; such addresses present little hazard to security. In the early days of the Squad, when the Vietnam demonstration was the sole objective, it was feasible for officers who purported to be fellow members of organisations to share addresses or use accommodation addresses. The diversification of targets has made this imprudent and the £3,000 budget allocated for accommodation has proved somewhat inhibiting. The number of officers who can be employed is restricted by the money available for their accommodation and any increase would necessitate a commensurate addition to the budget.

CARS

12. The use of nondescript hire cars has proved invaluable in enabling the officers to carry out their tasks. After the last review, Home Office authority was given for only two cars to be retained until the end of November, 1969 and for a third car to be hired as and when necessary. This has been complied with but the occasions when a third car is needed are increasing and it seems

probable that at least three cars will soon be required on a permanent basis. One or more of the cars can always be returned to the hirers when not in use.

FUTURE ACTIVITIES

13. Predicting developments in this complex field is hazardous but it is anticipated that, until a political solution is found for the situation in Northern Ireland, the opportunities it offers for disruption will continue to attract extremists in this country and, consequently, provide fruitful grounds for public order intelligence.

14. As mentioned earlier, the Vietnam issue is not currently unifying the 'Left' but the recent Moratorium in the U.S.A. reflected by American nationals here will probably lead to a resurgence of interest amongst sympathetic groups in this country. It is known that attempts are already being made to organise support for imminent demonstrations in America with simultaneous activity here.

15. It is possible, too, that Anti-Apartheid may provide a rallying point for the extremists. The current visit by the Springboks' Rugby Touring side is regarded by them as an opportunity to rally opposition to the policies of the South African government in preparation for full-scale demonstrations against the South African cricket tour next year. There seems little doubt that all the well-known extremists will join the 'bandwaggon' and exploit the situation to the full, guaranteed as they are of maximum publicity by the mass media. With limited strength, the S.O.S. cannot hope to cover all participating groups but it is hoped that sufficient coverage - by virtue of the presence of officers already in various organisations - will ensure that information of the larger demonstrations is obtained.

16. The situation in the Middle East, the Anti-N.A.T.O. movement, student disorders, etc., could at any time escalate into issues


attractive to troublemakers. Should this occur, the foothold
the S.O.S. has in their ranks could be developed.

Jamies
Inspector

S.B.

7.11.69.


MEMORANDUMDeputy Assistant Commissioner

1. Further to my memorandum of the 7th November, 1969, reviewing recent activities of the Special Operations Squad, as directed by you I am submitting details of our finances during the 13-month period from November, 1968 to date and an estimate of future needs.
 2. Statements of accounts are attached. The fluctuations in monthly expenditure are due to the fact that certain of the rents were payable monthly, others three monthly; also the strength of the Squad varied during the year. We were able to keep within the allotted budget of £3,000 only by restricted operations during the summer months when the Squad was reduced to four under-cover officers who needed cover addresses. This was due to certain officers leaving the Squad for various reasons and it not being possible by Branch restrictions on manpower, to replace all of them. If the ten officers who had been so engaged prior to the summer had continued to operate the budget would have been exceeded by about £250 in respect of accommodation needs alone.
 3. At present six officers need cover addresses at an annual rent, including the H.Q. flat of £2,661.10s.0d. This is of course a basic estimate which makes no allowance for rent rises, the need to pay agents fees, advances of rent which might have to be sacrificed if the security of an address is threatened or the "float" which is essential not only to make the administration feasible but also to allow us to take advantage of opportunities which arise to further the work of the Squad. I must confess that I do not know what proportion of the budget was intended purely for accommodation and what proportion was intended for other uses.
 4. It is clear therefore that £3,000 is barely adequate to maintain the present team which in my opinion is too small for the work expected of it. The inherent danger of limiting the strength of the Squad is that it is not possible to allow for annual leave, sickness, family difficulties or exposure, without leaving a hole in the intelligence coverage considered necessary. Most of the sensitively placed officers reached their positions only after several months of association with the extremists and participation in their events. They are accorded
- 


a trust by their associates which is not easily achieved. Some have become involved in several organisations which, although productive, is not entirely satisfactory either for the officer whose work load is proportionately increased or from the stand-point of his security. They cannot be expected indefinitely, to maintain their high standards of work and enthusiasm in what is always a tense and is usually an unsavoury field. If continuity of intelligence coverage is to be maintained their replacement must be anticipated, which of course means putting other officers into their organisations well in advance.

5. It is appreciated that to achieve the ideal it would be necessary to "double up" penetration of the principal targets, which is probably not feasible owing to the limited number of suitable officers. However, a reserve of one or two officers under training, ready to infiltrate the relevant organisations is in my view imperative. This could not be done on a budget of less than £3,500.

6. If it is to be possible to extend our coverage by taking advantage of opportunities which periodically arise for infiltration in organisations which are not at present penetrated then additional officers would be required, necessitating, of course a commensurately increased budget.


J. J. J.
Inspector

S.B.
12.11.69.



STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT

	£	s	d		£	s	d
RECEIVED:	3,000	0	0	To. RENT	2,847	13	9
REFUNDS:	65	19	4	ELECTRICITY	31	15	1
				TELEPHONE	49	17	8
				INCIDENTALS	<u>1</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>0</u>
					2,931	2	6
				CASH IN HAND	<u>134</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>10</u>
					3,065	19	4
	<u>3,065</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>4</u>		<u>3,065</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>4</u>




DECEMBER
 NOVEMBER
 OCTOBER
 SEPTEMBER
 AUGUST
 JULY
 JUNE
 MAY
 APRIL
 MARCH
 FEBRUARY
 JANUARY

	<u>RENT</u>			<u>ELECTRICITY</u>			<u>TELEPHONE</u>			<u>INCIDENTALS.</u>		
DECEMBER	356.	10.	2.							1.	16.	0.
NOVEMBER	196.	1.	0.									
OCTOBER	185.	5.	6.									
SEPTEMBER	150.	18.	0.									
AUGUST	409.	2.	0.	15.	0.	0.						
JULY	159.	9.	0.				15.	17.	4.			
JUNE	210.	7.	0.	6.	19.	9.						
MAY	311.	5.	0.									
APRIL	226.	8.	0.				17.	12.	6.			
MARCH	77.	8.	0.	5.	4.	4.						
FEBRUARY	313.	1.	1.									
JANUARY	221.	19.	0.				16.	7.	10.			
	30.	0.	0.	4.	11.	0.						
	2847.	13.	9.	31.	15.	1.	49.	17.	8.	1.	16.	0.

GRAND TOTAL: 2,931. 2. 6.
 BALANCE IN HAND 134. 16. 10.
3,065. 19. 4.




MEMORANDUM.

Commander Cunningham.

13.10.69

1. With further reference to the Special Operations Squad expenditure:-

2. The balance in hand remaining from the £400 received on 19th August, 1969 is £34. 5. 8d. and £300 remains to our credit of the budget of £3,000.

3. With variations in Squad personnel since the date of my previous memorandum it has been necessary to increase the number of flats and at the present time the total is six, i.e. 5 plus H.Q. flat. The rents for all the accommodation have been paid until the end of October and our estimated monthly expenditure for the remainder of the year, i.e. November and December, on current spending is about £184, a figure which will exceed our allotted budget for the thirteen month period ending December, 1969. A more accurate assessment will be available towards the end of November and, if necessary, I will then apply for additional expenses.

16

4. I ask that  be asked to provide the remaining £300 due. The cash book, docketts and cash balance are submitted for your examination.

13.10.69.

Jamies
Detective Inspector.



MEMORANDUM

Commander Cunningham.

[E]

15.8.

1. With reference to the Special Operations Squad expenditure:-

2. £400 was received from the Receiver on 12.6.69. and the current balance is £35.6.5d. Since receipt of the initial payment by the Receiver on 25.11.68. we have been paid a total of £2,300 leaving a balance of £700, out of the allotted budget of £3,000, to cover expenditure over the period ending 31.12.69. Our estimated monthly expenditure, at present rates, for the remainder of the year is £130 making a total outgoing for the remaining four month period of £520, thus leaving an estimated credit balance of £180.

3. I should stress that the estimated monthly expenditure is based on a number of flats which will be occupied by us as from 1.9.69, i.e. 3 plus H.Q. flat, which will be a reduction on the current number under occupation, i.e. 5 plus H.Q. flat, and it makes no allowance for any increase in this number. You will be aware that the budget of £3,000, while allotted for a 12 month period, may have to cover a thirteen month period November, 1968 to December, 1969. If, however, our annual budget is insufficient to cover the extended period I will, as directed, apply for an additional one month's expenses on the basis of the estimated monthly expenditure.

[17]

[17]

4. I ask, therefore, that [redacted], vice [redacted], be asked to provide a further sum of £400. The cash book, dockets and cash balance are submitted for your examination.

Special Branch
15th August, 1969.

Jamies
Detective Inspector.



Your ref:
QPE/66 1/8/5

4th December, 1969.

Our ref:
SB.588/UNREG/694

1. In your absence last June David Stotesbury wrote to me on the 6th of that month concerning the expenditure we were incurring through the activities of one of our Squads in Special Branch. Permission to continue this expenditure was granted until the end of this year.
2. Stotesbury then asked if, in reviewing the matter towards the end of the year, we would bear in mind the reservations expressed in your letter on the same subject of 16th December, 1968. This I can assure you we have done.
3. The Commissioner has been fully consulted over the question of the need to continue the Squad and he is most anxious to maintain it in its present form. He recognises the very important part it plays in providing the Uniform Branch with the kind of information they need to deal with demonstrations. The intensity of these demonstrations varies, of course, and although we have had a quieter time on the whole in 1969 than we had in 1968, there is a constant need for vigilance about the activities of the main extremist groups whose actions frequently lead to public disorder. The sudden development of events in Northern Ireland, seem to have taken the authorities there unaware last year and this, is a solemn reminder to us all of the need to have the best information possible about revolutionary and subversive organisations in our midst. I consider that this is best achieved through this particular Squad.
4. Bearing in mind your concern about the nature of the premises used, I have myself recently had a look at the main detached office. It could not be situated in a more ideal place and the security precautions taken by the officers of the Squad are very stringent indeed. The danger of it being identified for what it is by some outside source is remote.
5. For the next twelve months expenditure to meet the needs of the Squad is likely to be in the region of £3,500. The Receiver has raised no objection to this sum, subject to your approval, which I now formally seek.

Mr Waddell, Esq., C.B.,
 Deputy Under Secretary of State,
 Home Office,
 Horseferry House,
 Dean Ryle Street,
 London, S.W.1.

