

GISTED WITNESS STATEMENT OF EN51

EN51 has provided the Inquiry with a witness statement comprising 49 paragraphs.

Italicised text in square brackets below represents where the contents of the witness statement have been gisted.

Non-italicised text in square brackets below represents where acronyms have been spelled out.

Witness: EN51

Occupation: [Description of EN51's current role]

Address: c/o Directorate of Legal Services, 10 Lamb's Conduit Street, London, WC1N 3NR

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed:EN51.....

Dated07.09.2017.....

Introduction

1. This statement has been drafted with a view to supporting a shorthand restriction order application to the Inquiry. The statement summarises the risks posed to me and others through the confirmation of my real or [National Public Order Intelligence Unit]-cover identities; it is not a comprehensive statement addressing all the risks posed to me or others.
2. In preparing this statement, I have had sight of 50 INFOS reports, each referring to an undercover operation in which I was involved. The INFOS system is described in the witness statement of Neil Hutchinson dated 29 July 2016 in response to the eight and twelfth Rule 9 requests. Mr Hutchinson stated at p.32, §48(v) that the INFOS system “contains records of Advanced level operations since 1999, Foundation level operations since 2007 and Covert Internet Investigator operations since 2008.” I have not been shown any other [Metropolitan Police Service] documents in the preparation of this statement.
3. The INFOS reports I reviewed contain a very brief summary, often only a few lines, of the [Metropolitan Police Service] undercover operations in which I was involved between [the 1990s and the year in which EN51 left the Metropolitan Police Service]. The reports are also not a comprehensive picture of all undercover work I undertook in those periods, as I was involved in other operations, for example, numerous [short term operations]. The INFOS reports for those operations do not necessarily refer to me. The contents of this statement are therefore largely based on my memory of events that occurred a significant time ago. Where I can recall or have been reminded of the operation name, I have included it.

4. *[EN51 refers to Exhibit EN51/1, which contains a list of deployments against organised crime groups that EN51 worked on during the periods before and after his/her time with the National Public Order Intelligence Unit]*
5. In summary, *[EN51 and other individuals]* would face a risk of death or serious physical harm from former targets in *[organised crime groups]* if my real or *[National Public Order Intelligence Unit]-cover identity* was confirmed and published by the Inquiry.

Brief career history

6. *[EN51 is now retired. S/he was a law enforcement officer for over thirty years, approximately two thirds of which were spent working undercover].*
7. *[For the first third of his/her career, EN51 worked in an overt role specialising in serious and organised crime].*
8. *[During the 1990s EN51 completed the national undercover training course, following which s/he worked on undercover operations both as a deployed undercover officer and a cover officer].* I was seconded from the MPS to the Special Operations Unit of the NPOIU *[in the last years of its existence]*. I acted as a cover officer only in the NPOIU; however, I continued to deploy in relation to crime operations in that period. Following that secondment, *[EN51 carried out further undercover work, including as a deployed undercover officer]*.

Cover identity

9. When I began undercover work, I developed a fictitious covert identity that was fully backstopped, for example, with cover documents. *[EN51 describes the cover identity]*. I am concerned that confirmation of my cover identity, coupled with research by focused individuals, could lead to the uncovering of my real identity. *[EN51 refers to a fact which s/he believes would make it easier for him/her to be found]*.
10. *[EN51 sets out further information regarding his/her use of a cover identity before joining the National Public Order Intelligence Unit]*. On several occasions, I gave witness statements and evidence using *[a cover identity]*, but I was always permitted to do so using my fictitious first name only.
11. *[EN51 explains why s/he believes that a risk may arise in the event that the Inquiry publishes details of his/her use of a cover identity when seconded to the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, given use during both his/her secondment to the National Public Order Intelligence Unit and non-National Public Order Intelligence Unit deployments]*.
12. *[EN51 explains why he/she used the same cover identity details when he/she was seconded to the National Public Order Intelligence Unit operations]*.
13. *[EN51 describes an assessment that was undertaken and which resulted in EN51 using the same cover name for the National Public Order Intelligence Unit deployment as had been used during the pre-National Public Order Intelligence Unit deployments.]* We therefore considered the risk of a link being drawn from my *[organised crime cover name]* to my *[National Public Order Intelligence Unit]* work was low. The overall assessment was that the benefits of using my same cover identity outweighed the risks.

14. To date, I am not aware of any information being posted online by undercover research groups about me. If my [National Public Order Intelligence Unit] cover name was confirmed, then my former [*organised crime*] targets would also recognise the name, including those who were never aware that they were the subject of undercover policing.
15. [EN51 describes the risk if photographs emerge of him/her while deployed which includes the risk that all previous undercover operations would potentially be compromised as well as steps taken to locate EN51].
16. [EN51 gives an example of how s/he believes this could happen as a consequence of non-National Public Order Intelligence Unit work].
17. [EN51 explains how s/he could be located by a person who knows his/her real name.]
18. I should emphasise from the outset of this statement that I was deployed as an [undercover officer] in hundreds of operations, in some of which my role was never revealed to anyone outside law enforcement. It is very difficult to articulate fully the risk that is posed to me if my real or [National Public Order Intelligence Unit] cover name is disclosed and/or published by the Inquiry. The following are [9 detailed examples of some of the non-National Public Order Intelligence Unit operations in which I have been deployed as an undercover officer during the period beginning in the 1990s and ending with my retirement]. They provide a representative example of the level of risk posed from the individual operations, but the totality of the risk from the volume of my deployments should also be borne in mind. In each of these examples, I was deployed using the [*organised crime identity*] that I used when working as a cover officer on the [National Public Order Intelligence Unit].
 - (i) [Operation #1]
19. [EN51 describes his/her role in an undercover operation against an organised crime group that was carried out pre-2000. EN51 identifies the key players.]
20. [EN51 describes the purpose of the operation. EN51 acted as an undercover officer.]
21. [EN51 describes the outcome of the operation. There was a criminal trial.] I gave evidence in the trial, but I was granted anonymity. I was deployed in my [cover identity], but I only gave evidence using the first name only. Documents mentioning my surname were subject to Public Interest Immunity. It was not necessary for my targets to know my surname. This [organised crime group], like many [organised crime groups], would not require my surname. Instead, they would hold the person who introduced me to the group accountable for my actions, rather than investigating me themselves.
22. The criminals involved in this operation are career criminals involved in offences of utmost seriousness and with histories of extreme violence. [EN51 gives two examples of links that have arisen between his/her undercover work and the overt role s/he had carried out previously.] This shows how easily the connections can be made between overt and covert policing. [EN51 gives further information about one of the individual targets of the operation.] I have no doubt that if they knew my real identity they might take retribution against me for my role in their arrest and conviction.

23. [EN51 sets out further information regarding the extent to which there has been publication of this operation.]
- (ii) [Operation #2]
24. [EN51 describes another undercover operation that was carried out pre-2000. EN51 describes the target and that it was suspected that the target was involved in offences of the utmost seriousness and his/her associates were dangerous criminals.]
25. [EN51 describes his/her role in the operation.]
26. [EN51 gives further details about the operation. EN51's full cover name was known to the target of the operation.]
27. [EN51 details other risks associated with this deployment.] If my cover name was confirmed by the Inquiry and publicised in the mainstream media, [the target] or [his/her] associates would recognise the name. This would not only compromise other [undercover officers] and the operation, but could lead to photographs of me being published online, which would in turn unravel my involvement in other operations as former targets would recognise me.
- (iii) [Operation #3]
28. [EN51 describes his/her role in another undercover operation that was carried out pre-2000. EN51 refers to a violent incident that one of the targets was subsequently involved in.] This is a good example of the seriousness of the criminality involved in some of my operations.
- (iv) [Operation #4]
29. [EN51 describes his/her part in an undercover operation that was carried out post-2000. The target was an individual known to have connections with an organised crime group.]
30. [EN51 gives further details about the deployment. EN51 gave evidence at a subsequent criminal trial using the forename of his/her pseudonym. EN51 does not believe that his/her cover surname is known to the targets of this operation.]
31. [EN51 explains why s/he believes the target of the operation may feel particularly betrayed by EN51's actions. EN51 believes that although the target of the operation was not particularly violent him/herself, s/he may well take personal retribution against EN51 (or arrange for others to do so) on account of that sense of betrayal.]
- (v) [Operation #5]
32. [EN51 describes his/her role in an undercover operation against an organised crime group that was carried out post-2000. EN51 states that the targets of the operation have histories of violence. EN51 gives an example of a violent incident which members of the group were involved in.]
33. [EN51 provides further information about the deployment.]
34. [Following the deployment, a number of individuals were arrested. EN51 believes that those individuals were subsequently convicted. EN51's role was not revealed to them as the evidence

at trial came from other sources. EN51 believes that s/he could be at risk of violent retribution in the event that the targets of this operation became aware of EN51's role.]

(vi) Operation #6

35. *[EN51 describes his/her role in an undercover operation against an organised crime group that was carried out post-2000. EN51 describes the main target as extremely violent.]*
36. *[The operation was terminated on account of a compromise. EN51 does not know whether the targets knew or suspected that they were the subject of undercover policing, but in any case the group's operation was thwarted. The group's members are likely to feel aggrieved by this. EN51 considers that risks to other individuals (including civilians) may arise in the event that EN51's cover name is confirmed.] This is a good example of where confirmation of my [cover identity] could lead to the exposure of serving [undercover officers] and compromise any operations on which they are currently deployed.*

(vii) Operation #7

37. *[EN51 describes his/her role in an undercover operation against an organised crime group that was carried out post-2000.]*
38. *[The operation led to arrests and prosecutions. EN51 gave evidence at trial. EN51 was permitted to do so using only the forename of his/her cover identity. EN51 states that the targets of the operation had histories of violence. EN51 gives an example of threats of serious violence that were made by the main target and which EN51 witnessed.] If the targets became aware of my real identity, then there is a real risk that they would seek retribution.*

(viii) Operation #8

39. *[EN51 describes his/her role in an undercover operation against domestic extremists that was carried out post-2000.]*
40. *[EN51 played a very short but significant role in the operation. There was a subsequent prosecution during which EN51's role was not revealed. EN51 did not give evidence. The prosecution led to convictions.]*
41. *[EN51 explains why s/he believes that the targets of that operation may take retribution in the event that they learn of EN51's status. The targets were capable of serious violence. EN51 believes that determined efforts will be made to find out his/her real name in the event that his/her cover name is published.]*

(ix) Operation #9

42. *[EN51 describes the roles s/he undertook in the undercover operations that s/he worked on after the end of his/her secondment to the National Public Order Intelligence Unit].*
43. *[EN51 describes his/her role in an undercover operation against an organised crime group that was carried out post-2012.]*

44. *[EN51 provides further information about the deployment. EN51 describes the targets as extremely dangerous including engaging in retaliatory acts of violence.]* If they learned that they had been the subject of undercover policing, I would be fearful for my life.

45. This operation is also another good example of the risk potentially posed to serving [undercover officers] from confirmation of my real and/or cover names.

(x) Cover officer deployments

46. *[Outside his/her National Public Order Intelligence Unit role, EN51 has also acted as a cover officer in hundreds of operations. One of those was a counter-terrorism operation. EN51 describes that operation].* The undercover officer's role was revealed to the suspects, but they were granted anonymity. *[EN51 describes two other undercover operations where s/he acted as cover officer.]*

47. If photographs of me are posted online following the confirmation of my real or cover name, then this could jeopardise [undercover officers] who I acted as the cover officer for and their current operations. This is because former targets or their associates might recognise me as someone who met with deployed [undercover officers] in public in my capacity as their cover officer.

48. Finally, it is important to note that there is also a risk to entirely innocent third-parties. For example, on many operations I befriended innocent third-parties who may unwittingly have referenced me to the ultimate targets. If the targets become aware of my role and try to work out how I infiltrated them, they may incorrectly identify those innocent third-parties as being responsible.

49. I believe the content of this statement to be true.