

Thursday, 29 April 2021

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the fourth day of evidential hearings in Tranche 1 Phase 2 at the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

My name is Neil Fernandes and I am the hearings manager. For those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone, unless you're invited to speak by the Chairman, as Zoom will pick up on all noises and you will be on screen.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

For the first 20 minutes or so, we're going to hear Ms Monahan summarising the evidence of an undercover officer, and analysing the documents produced by another undercover officer who has not produced a witness statement.

Ms Monahan.

HN299/HN342 "David Hughes" & HN344

Summary by MS MONAHAN

MS MONAHAN: Thank you, Sir.

Good morning.

1 HN299, HN342, "David Hughes".

2 HN299 served on the SDS from 1971 to 1976. He
3 reported on the International Marxist Group throughout
4 his deployment but also on various other left-wing
5 groups linked to the IMG and groups campaigning on Irish
6 matters. Publication of his real name is restricted.

7 HN299 served in Special Branch before his posting to
8 the SDS. Unusually for a police officer, he used to
9 wear a beard, and he recalls that on a visit to
10 Scotland Yard in 1968, this led to a senior
11 Special Branch officer tasking him to attend Vietnam
12 Solidarity Campaign, or VSC, meetings to get information
13 on forthcoming London demonstrations and
14 the planned march from Aldermaston.

15 Wearing casual clothes, and he thinks using a fake
16 name, he attended a number of meetings between February
17 and April 1968, where he was able to gather a lot of
18 information about upcoming protests, including
19 the 17 March 1968 VSC demonstration.

20 He further recalls reporting to senior management
21 that VSC members were planning to throw stones at
22 the Daily Mirror building, in response to perceived
23 negative coverage of anti-Vietnam War protesters in its
24 sister paper in Germany. When activists turned up, they
25 were surprised by a large police presence.

1 HN299 recalls that senior management were very
2 pleased with these reports, which earned him
3 a commendation. He believes that the success of this
4 reporting may have contributed to the genesis of
5 the SDS.

6 Other than his reporting on the VSC in 1968, HN299
7 states that he did no further undercover work in
8 Special Branch before joining the SDS.

9 In 1971, the chief inspector of the SDS,
10 Phil Saunders, recruited HN299. He believes that
11 Phil Saunders considered him suitable for the job
12 because of his earlier reporting on the VSC.

13 While he has no recollection of the content of his
14 initial conversation with Phil Saunders, he thinks it
15 likely that he told him about SDS work, and he remembers
16 it as quite informal in tone. He joined the SDS fairly
17 soon afterwards.

18 Married at the time, he thinks that no managers
19 spoke to his spouse about his new role and the possible
20 impact on his family life.

21 He had no training, formal or informal, for the role
22 of an undercover officer, and believes he was deployed
23 soon after joining the SDS. Despite the lack of formal
24 training, he states that as Special Branch officers,
25 they knew, or should have known, how appropriately to

1 conduct themselves once deployed, and that he
2 understands that SDS management tried to select officers
3 who could be trusted to exercise good common sense and
4 sound judgment.

5 His cover name, "David Hughes", he thinks he made
6 up. It was not the identity of a deceased child. His
7 cover background was that he'd come down from Glasgow
8 looking for work.

9 HN299 recalls that he went up to Glasgow soon after
10 joining the SDS and knocked on the door of well known
11 Glaswegian left wing activist Tony Southall. He
12 introduced himself and said he was interested in getting
13 involved in left wing politics. Tony Southall was
14 friendly and encouraging. And in the field, HN299 then
15 alluded to his friendship with Tony Southall as a way of
16 burnishing his credentials. It helped his cover when
17 Tony Southall came down to London for meetings and
18 demonstrations and HN299 was able to be seen talking to
19 him.

20 He had a driving licence in his cover name but no
21 other cover documentation. Within six months of being
22 deployed, HN299 obtained cover employment as a van
23 driver for a carpet supply and fitting business, an
24 arrangement which was approved by the SDS office.

25 HN299 had a number of cover flats throughout London,

1 moving from one to the next when the groups on which he
2 reported changed the locations of their meetings. He
3 got his first cover flat soon after entering the field
4 and spent six to eight weeks visiting places in
5 the local area, such as pubs, shops and the library, to
6 establish his cover background. Once this was done, he
7 started attending meetings.

8 When he joined the SDS, HN299 recalls that he was
9 not tasked to infiltrate specific groups but was
10 instructed to attend meetings. He found information on
11 left wing meetings in the "Agit Prop" section of
12 Time Out. And as he had the autonomy to choose which
13 ones to attend, he went to whichever looked most
14 interesting.

15 He asserts that, to a large extent, he was left to
16 his own devices.

17 HN299 claims that the IMG is the group most likely
18 to have regarded him an informal member, and he reported
19 on it throughout his deployment. He describes falling
20 in with the IMG after meeting people at publicly
21 advertised meetings, who then invited him to other
22 meetings.

23 He thinks that the North London Claimant's Union
24 might also have considered him an informal member, as
25 was involved with them for two to three years, and he

1 recalls involvement with the International Socialists.

2 The documents show that he reported on several
3 different groups: International Solidarity Campaign, or
4 ISC, the Anti-Internment League, or AIL, Tottenham
5 Red Circle, Fight On, the Troops Out Movement, or TOM,
6 and on members of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and
7 People's Democracy. He also reported on Marxist and
8 Marxist-Leninist discussion groups, held in private
9 addresses. He recalls that the groups he infiltrated
10 were not very organised with no formal membership
11 registers and with people constantly drifting in and
12 out. The reports show that the groups had aims,
13 activities and members in common.

14 HN299 recalls hearing about most meetings he
15 attended through word of mouth.

16 He remembers very limited verbal participation in
17 meetings, and he held no positions of responsibility.
18 After meetings, he would sometimes go for a drink with
19 group members.

20 Throughout his deployment, HN299 believes he
21 attended between one and six meetings per week, and
22 quite often a demonstration on the weekend.

23 As he would report on every meeting and most
24 demonstrations he attended, he is certain that many of
25 his reports are missing, such as those on a Marxist

1 Class in Streatham, most on the North London
2 Claimant's Union, most from the year 1973, and a number
3 on forthcoming demonstrations and future meetings. He
4 notes that none of his telephone reports, in which he
5 would impart urgent information, appear in his pack.

6 HN299 would submit his handwritten reports, which
7 were similar in style and content to his Special Branch
8 reports on groups or events, to the SDS office, who
9 would type them up and make additions, such as file
10 references.

11 HN299 states that his previous experience of
12 Special Branch reporting meant that when he joined
13 the SDS, he knew the kind of information that would be
14 of interest. He understood that he was expected to find
15 out whatever information he could on the groups with
16 which he came into contact.

17 In particular, the SDS office were interested in any
18 advanced notification of an event which might present
19 a public order issue, any information material to public
20 order policing at forthcoming events, the identity of
21 attendees at meetings and demonstrations, particularly
22 those considered active, rather than occasional
23 participants, any major changes within a group and
24 the identities of those in charge of the groups and
25 those who decided policy.

1 In his reports on meetings and attendees, he would
2 include the names of people he had not encountered
3 previously, in case they became prominent in future, and
4 he acknowledges that they would sometimes have no
5 further involvement with the group.

6 In relation to upcoming demonstrations, he would
7 report whatever information he came across, and
8 understood that it would be used as part of a broader
9 Special Branch assessment of how best to police that
10 demonstration.

11 HN299 believes that his reports on upcoming events
12 assisted in making sure uniformed officers were present
13 in the right numbers, and that they were ready to deal
14 with potential issues when HN299 knew they might arise,
15 such as groups splintering off from the main body of the
16 protest. In this way, he believes his reporting helped
17 uniformed police effectively to manage demonstrations.

18 A possible example is a report on a Fight On film
19 show before a TOM demonstration. HN299 recalls that it
20 included a film of left wing demonstrators breaking up
21 a large fascist open-air meeting in Milan by routing
22 the 10,000 police officers present, and that
23 the intention of showing emotive films immediately prior
24 to political demonstrations was "clearly to whip up
25 a militant aggressive mood in demonstrators".

1 He states that he believed it was important to
2 impart to Special Branch that demonstrations arranged by
3 Fight On were more likely to turn violent and for
4 uniformed police to prepare appropriately.

5 The first report in HN299's pack is dated
6 11 November 1971, but he thinks it unlikely that this is
7 the first he submitted.

8 In it, HN299 records that one of the attendees at
9 the small Spartacus League/IMG meeting in an
10 individual's bedroom was a bank robber with a history of
11 violence.

12 In a report regarding meetings to discuss tactics
13 and policy for an upcoming students' demonstration, at
14 which Piers Corbyn is present, HN299 reports a request
15 for "three volunteers to take part in a special task
16 during the demonstration which would include breaking
17 the law".

18 HN299 also reports on members of the IMG being
19 instructed to join the Labour Party, in anticipation of
20 a split within it.

21 HN299 states that he was aware during his deployment
22 of IMG efforts to infiltrate the Labour Party as
23 a vehicle to achieve national prominence. He asserts
24 that while he was not specifically tasked by the SDS
25 office to obtain intelligence about subversion, he was

1 aware that the infiltration of the Labour Party and
2 trade unions by "extreme political groups" was of
3 concern to both Special Branch and the Security Service,
4 and so he reported on it when it arose. He believes
5 that his reporting helped the Security Service to
6 discharge their duties in relation to
7 counter-subversion.

8 He further states that while the IMG's entry into
9 the Labour Party was subversive, it was ultimately
10 unsuccessful and that generally the people on whom he
11 reported talked a lot about revolution and attended many
12 demonstrations, but did not actually engage in
13 subversive activities.

14 HN299 states that he also reported on the IMG
15 attempting to reach positions of prominence in TOM for
16 the reasons that some of its members advocated violence
17 to achieve its political aims; and as such, in his
18 opinion, an IMG-controlled TOM could present a serious
19 threat to public order.

20 There are additional reports on larger IMG
21 gatherings which feature core participants to
22 the Inquiry, such as Tariq Ali and Piers Corbyn.

23 HN299 submits in evidence that Piers Corbyn was
24 someone whom he recognised but to whom he does not
25 recall talking during his deployment, other than perhaps

1 in passing.

2 HN299 also reports on a Marxist study session
3 introduced by core participant Richard Chessum and
4 attended by "Mary".

5 The documents show that HN299 reported on the IMG's
6 attitudes towards the IRA, and he states that this was
7 because Special Branch closely monitored the IRA and
8 organisations that were supporting them, and passed
9 information on to the Security Service.

10 HN299 reports on plans by the ISC, which was linked
11 to the IMG, to carry out collections for the IRA around
12 building sites, and also on Peter Gowan's assertion at
13 a pre-conference meeting for London members of the IMG
14 that its political committee intended changing their
15 official slogan on Ireland from "Victory to the IRA" to
16 "Solidarity with the IRA". He asserts that the IMG's
17 support for the IRA during his deployment was limited to
18 verbal statements and to attending demonstrations
19 advocating Irish Republicanism.

20 Attitudes to the IRA are also a feature of HN299's
21 reports on groups campaigning on Irish matters. He
22 records the defection of an anarchist member of
23 the People's Democracy to the North London
24 Claimant's Union because of the former
25 group's "unconditional" support for the Provisionals'

1 bombing campaign in Northern Ireland.

2 He states in evidence that support for
3 indiscriminate violence by the IRA was not particularly
4 common in the groups he infiltrated. And while many
5 more supported targeted attacks against the state and
6 capitalist interests, more than half of those he met who
7 supported Irish Republicanism were opposed to the use of
8 lethal violence.

9 On occasion, HN299's reporting reflected his
10 personal views. In one report, on an occupation of
11 a section of Eton's playing fields by AIL members, HN299
12 describes the protesters' arguments as "always
13 pathetic". And the demonstrators as "a crowd of
14 argumentative, half-inebriated Irish labourers".

15 HN299 accepts that the tone of this report is
16 sarcastic, and states that the SDS office never told him
17 that this was inappropriate and/or not permitted.

18 In another report, HN299 describes a speech on
19 Women's Liberation as confining itself almost entirely
20 to an attack upon men at the conference, which
21 apparently elicited "squeals of delight" from female
22 members of the audience. He describes the female
23 members as completely dominating the session, as if to
24 emphasise their liberation using "obscenities to
25 punctuate their prose" and as running onto the stage as

1 often as possible for "maximum effect".

2 A report on a Marxist class records an attendee's
3 belief that come the socialist revolution in England,
4 2 million people who presented a permanent threat to its
5 continuance, including senior police officers,
6 particularly those in Special Branch, members of
7 the Security Service and all members of the Conservative
8 Party, would have to be liquidated.

9 HN299 notes in his statement that while some members
10 of this class shared this belief and that such views
11 were present to varying degrees in activist groups like
12 the IMG, a majority of the activists he met through his
13 deployment were not that extreme.

14 In a report on a discussion at a study class, HN299
15 reports an individual's assertion that unmasked police
16 spies present in left wing groups should get a "good
17 hiding". He does not recall that such comments made him
18 feel particularly threatened; and as he remembers,
19 the report prompted no extra measures from SDS
20 management to protect his welfare.

21 While HN299 believes he was trusted by group
22 members, he recalls that they quite often urged others
23 to be on the constant lookout for Special Branch spies.

24 Unlike most of his SDS colleagues, HN299 joined
25 a trade union while under cover, the Transport and

1 General Workers Union, to bolster his cover. He states
2 that he attended some meetings, but probably did not
3 report them because "those meetings would be covered by
4 an ordinary Special Branch officer".

5 HN299 states that at meetings at the SDS safe house,
6 which took place two to three times a week,
7 undercover officers would sometimes speak to managers
8 about activist meetings they had been to in front of
9 other officers. If involved in similar activities,
10 officers might discuss group-related matters with one
11 another, sometimes when managers were present.

12 He recalls that the chief inspector or inspector of
13 the SDS would usually come to safe house meetings and
14 would at times task officers to go to a particular
15 meeting or demonstration.

16 He also recalls very occasionally asking for and
17 being provided with a Special Branch file about a person
18 with whom he had come across while deployed.

19 Occasionally at the safe flat someone would cook a meal
20 and the UCOs and managers would eat together.

21 During his deployment, HN299 would speak to
22 the office daily to let managers know that he was okay.
23 While he believes that management were conscious and
24 aware of officers' welfare, HN299 states that it was
25 nonetheless incumbent on an officer to raise with

1 the SDS office any serious welfare issues experienced
2 while undercover.

3 During his deployment, HN299 recalls then
4 commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, visiting the SDS safe
5 flat, and saying something to the effect that, "You
6 realise that you could cause me tremendous problems
7 under certain circumstances."

8 His deployment, which lasted approximately 240
9 weeks, ended in 1976.

10 HN299 gradually went to fewer meetings, and then
11 stopped attending them entirely, telling people he was
12 returning to Glasgow. His withdrawal strategy was
13 planned and agreed with the SDS office.

14 HN299 does not recall witnessing any public disorder
15 whilst deployed, and states that he did not participate
16 in any. He asserts that he witnessed no violence to
17 people or property and was involved in none. He was not
18 arrested, charged or convicted of a criminal offence
19 while serving undercover, and he did not appear in
20 criminal proceedings as a witness. There is no evidence
21 that he engaged in sexual activity while in his cover
22 identity.

23 That concludes the summary of this officer.

24 In addition to the witness statement and documents
25 for this officer, the Inquiry is also publishing today

1 documents in relation to HN344, whose cover name was
2 "Ian Cameron", and who reported on
3 the Anti-Internment League and the Northern Minorities
4 Defence Force. And this analysis can be found at
5 pages 90 to 92 of Counsel to the Inquiry's written
6 opening statement.

7 Thank you.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. We will now, I think,
9 adjourn for approximately ten minutes, while
10 arrangements are made to resume ordinary evidential
11 hearings.

12 Thank you.

13 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take
14 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room
15 to join your break-out rooms, please. The time is now
16 10.20 am, so we shall resume at 10.30 am. Thank you.

17 (10.20 am)

18 (A short break)

19 (10.30 am)

20 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome back.

21 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
22 proceedings.

23 Chairman.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

25 As at the beginning of every live evidential

1 session, a recording made earlier is going to be played.
2 If you're listening to it for the first time, please
3 listen carefully.

4 I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,
5 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make
6 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including
7 its hearings.

8 In the exercise of that power, I have made a number
9 of orders which affect what you may and may not do in
10 the hearing rooms and after you leave them. Breach of
11 any of the orders is a serious matter and may have
12 serious consequences for you.

13 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an
14 order, I have the power to certify the matter to
15 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
16 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
17 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
18 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
19 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
20 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
21 sequestration of their assets.

22 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
23 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
24 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
25 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in

1 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
2 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any
3 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
4 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
5 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing
6 room to any other person, but only once at least
7 ten minutes have elapsed since the event which you are
8 describing took place.

9 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
10 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public
11 disclosure of information, for example about
12 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
13 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,
14 whether by accident or design, information which I have
15 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
16 be disclosed in a hearing.

17 If and when that happens, I will immediately suspend
18 the hearing and make an order prohibiting further
19 disclosure of the information outside the hearing rooms.
20 The consequence will be that no further disclosure of
21 that information may be made by mobile telephone or
22 other portable electronic device from within the hearing
23 room, or by any means outside it.

24 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is
25 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure

1 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
2 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
3 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
4 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
5 evidence as I will hear, and to reach your own
6 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
7 best to ensure that you can.

8 If you have any doubt about the terms of this
9 message, or what you may or may not do, you should not
10 hesitate to ask one of them and, with my help if
11 necessary, they will provide you with the answer.

12 PROFESSOR JONATHAN ROSENHEAD (called)

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Professor Rosenhead, can you hear me?

14 Professor Rosenhead, can you hear me? It may be you
15 are still on mute, if, like me, you find the use of
16 these devices problematic to start with --

17 A. I'm there now.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: You were on mute.

19 A. Yes, I was, yes. Can you hear me?

20 THE CHAIRMAN: That is a mistake we all make repeatedly at
21 the start of the use of these machines.

22 A. Yes.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: You are about to give evidence. Do you wish
24 to affirm or to swear an oath?

25 A. To affirm.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Then may you please be affirmed.

2 (Witness affirmed)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Ms Hummerstone.

4 Questions by MS HUMMERSTONE

5 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you, Sir.

6 Professor Rosenhead, your name appears in SDS
7 reports relating to activities in particular of
8 Stop the Seventy Tour. I'm going to ask you some
9 questions about that; and in particular of the reports
10 that have been attributed to three SDS officers,
11 DAPHNE Mike Ferguson, HN135, Jill Mosdell, HN346, and
12 Mike Scott, HN298.

13 Before we begin, I just want to make it clear that
14 the Inquiry notes your concerns raised in your witness
15 statement and your requests for further information
16 about Special Branch interest in your activities. Of
17 course, this Inquiry is confined to looking into
18 the activities of the SDS, rather than a wider inquiry
19 into Special Branch as a whole. And so we're going to
20 confine our interest in the SDS for today's purposes.

21 With that said, can I just ask you a few sort of
22 contextual questions about Stop the Seventy Tour,
23 please.

24 Is it right it was formed in September 1969, with
25 the short-term aim of stopping the British tour of

1 the South African cricket team, which was due to
2 commence in June of the following year, but the wider
3 purpose was to isolate apartheid South Africa and
4 ultimately to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa?
5 Is that a sort of brief overview of the aims and
6 purposes of the Stop the Seventy Tour?

7 A. Yes, that is correct. A sporting boycott was one of
8 the mechanisms for bringing pressure to bear on
9 South Africa, and one of the more effective ones. It
10 had already started, but STST racked it up a notch,
11 I think.

12 Q. And they used the South African rugby team that was
13 touring in 1969 to 1970 to promote their aims, is that
14 right, that by direct action at matches of
15 the South African rugby touring team; is that right?

16 A. Yes, the focus was on cricket, and only after a little
17 while did we realise that there was a rugby tour about
18 to come up, and therefore we should probably try and, as
19 it were, develop our tactics and the pressure during
20 that.

21 Q. And in fact, the tactics proved to be successful,
22 because the invitation for the South African rugby team
23 was in fact withdrawn very shortly before they were due
24 to arrive in the UK; is that right?

25 A. Yes.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: The cricket team, I think.

2 MS HUMMERSTONE: Sorry, cricket team. I'm terribly sorry.

3 Of course.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Dealing now, please, briefly, with the generality of

6 the activities that were undertaken by the

7 Stop the Seventy Tour, the target of the activism was

8 the rugby team, is that right -- that's what you said in

9 your witness statement -- by the STST, and they targeted

10 rugby grounds, the hotels used by the rugby team and

11 other venues used by the team; is that right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And also cricket grounds where matches were to be played

14 by the visiting South African team in June 1970?

15 A. Yes, to a lesser extent, because the tour didn't take

16 place, but there was some preparatory activity.

17 Q. And the aim, you said in your witness statement, was to

18 disrupt the activities of the team through what you have

19 called "non-violent direct action"; is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And by that, you mean it was not part of any plan by

22 those that coordinated the activities of

23 the Stop the Seventy Tour for a plan to use violence

24 towards any person, and so it's not part of their plan

25 for demonstrators themselves to be violent towards any

1 person; is that right?

2 A. I would put it more strongly. It wasn't just that it
3 wasn't a part of our plan, it was a part of our plan
4 that there should be no violence.

5 Q. And you would use instead what you have called "peaceful
6 civil disobedient methods".

7 By "civil disobedience", you don't mean, do you,
8 entirely non-criminal behaviour? It could include some
9 criminal behaviour, for example obstructing the highway,
10 obstructing the police, matters of that nature?

11 A. This had already happened of course on quite a large
12 scale in the Committee of 100 demonstrations in
13 the early 60s, and we had the same philosophy of
14 actually, in a sense, offering ourselves up -- up as
15 sacrifices to the law, to demonstrate that there were
16 things that we thought were outrageous, and this was one
17 way we could do it. So there were breaches of minor --
18 minor criminal law, like obstructing the highway.

19 Q. And the tactics were used to cause maximum inconvenience
20 or to actively prevent matches taking place, or players
21 from going about their business; is that right?

22 A. I wouldn't say maximal inconvenience, I think sufficient
23 inconvenience for it to be noticed, noticed not only by
24 the players and the management, but noticed by
25 the public, because obviously the -- we needed to get

1 the British public to be aware that a team which
2 was racially selected and representing an abhorrent
3 regime was visiting the country. And it wasn't just
4 that the people in the ground should know that, but
5 people more generally should, and be recruited to
6 the cause.

7 Q. And part of that way of publicising those aims was
8 the organisation of mass demonstrations; is that right?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. And I think you say in your witness statement
11 the Stop the Seventy Tour attracted tens of thousands to
12 their demonstrations?

13 A. Yes. I don't remember the exact number. Certainly
14 tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands in aggregate.
15 I'm not sure what the biggest demonstration was.
16 I think possibly it was in Dublin, in fact, when
17 the team -- rugby team went there. But there were
18 certainly many thousands at a number of different
19 demonstrations.

20 Q. You have said there was no vetting in particular of
21 participants in those demonstrations. Perhaps it
22 follows that there couldn't be if there were tens of
23 thousands of participants?

24 A. I think I need to say that although I see in the record
25 that I attended all kinds of meetings that were taking

1 decisions about the Stop the Seventy Tour as a whole,
2 they don't -- I don't really recall those meetings.
3 I don't think I was central to the planning of those --
4 those demonstrations at all, because by that stage I was
5 more involved in the -- what were called the Special
6 Action Group.

7 Q. We'll come on to that in a moment. I just want to sort
8 of contextualise your activities --

9 A. Yes. I'm apologising for my lack of memory of those
10 other meetings that were organising the public
11 demonstrations.

12 Q. Quite understood, Professor Rosenhead.

13 It follows, though, doesn't it, if there are tens of
14 thousands of participants on a march, nobody could be
15 sure of the dispositions of the individual marchers?

16 A. There can be no vetting of -- going back to your
17 previous question -- of people who are told that there
18 is an event and they can turn up. I think we would have
19 published our intentions that it should be entirely
20 non-violent, and have done that in every way possible,
21 presumably with stewards and leaflets and things like
22 that. But there's no way you can control a lot of
23 individuals; they will do their own thing. But on
24 the whole, I think they did comply.

25 Q. One of the other tactics used was that of pitch

1 invasion; is that right?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Demonstrators would get onto the pitch to prevent --
4 either to halt play, or to prevent players from coming
5 out onto the pitch.

6 And I think you say in your witness statement, on
7 one occasion you yourself invaded a pitch and were
8 removed by the police; is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And I think you've said removed by the police before
11 the rugby players succumbed to the temptation to beat
12 you up; is that right?

13 A. It was quite scary because I'm not very big and they
14 looked very angry.

15 Q. A match in a sizeable stadium like, for example,
16 Twickenham, or a match like that, could attract,
17 couldn't it, tens of thousands of spectators? If it was
18 a popular match, the stands would be full of tens of
19 thousands of people?

20 A. Yes, and the one that I got on the pitch for -- I tried
21 several, but I'm not very good at climbing fences.
22 So -- but I did succeed in Aldershot, and the spectators
23 there were very significantly drawn from the armed
24 forces. So it was not just the people on the pitch who
25 were a bit threatening, so -- so were the -- those in

1 the -- who were spectators.

2 Q. And I think you make that clear in your witness
3 statement, that the atmosphere or the threat of
4 violence, you felt, came from the direction of the rugby
5 supporters?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But it's right to say, isn't it, that that sort of pitch
8 invasion, or that sort of disruption, creates a
9 potential, doesn't it, for public disorder on a rather
10 large scale; if you've got a lot of people in the stands
11 angry and upset about the disruption of their match,
12 there's a potential for a form of public disorder?

13 A. I suppose that depends upon the stewarding really.
14 I remember seeing the evidence that Ernest Rodker, whose
15 evidence was read out yesterday, that -- by his son,
16 that he was kicked by the spectators while being carried
17 out. That didn't happen to me. And the stewarding
18 seemed to work okay; the police took us off the field to
19 a room they had and then they photographed us.

20 By the way, those photographs should have been
21 destroyed, since we were charged with nothing. And it
22 was only years later that somebody pointed out to me --
23 I think it was in a local paper -- that the police had
24 held on to these. So presumably the police were guilty
25 of an offence at least as serious as mine. Perhaps more

1 so, because they're under some kind of duty to obey
2 the law more than me.

3 Q. Would it be fair to say that the potential for some form
4 of public disorder contributed, at least in part, to
5 the success of the campaign to withdraw the invitation
6 for the South African cricket team, that it would
7 perhaps be difficult to police and difficult to manage,
8 and therefore the invitation was withdrawn?

9 A. You'd need to ask the government of the day; and of
10 course most of those people are dead now. But it was --
11 the invitation was withdrawn at the very last minute,
12 you know, only about a week before the tour.

13 My impression was that it was the escalating size of
14 the demonstrations. Which were peaceful, but were very,
15 very large and getting bigger. I have the impression
16 that that was the main reason. If this was happening
17 with a rugby tour, rugby being a minority sport, and
18 cricket coming down the road, and already there was
19 a lot of disquiet about the exclusion of
20 Basil D'Oliveira, a player of colour, who had been
21 selected for the British test team and then
22 the South Africans said they wouldn't have him.

23 So there was a lot of animus already among
24 the British population, not only cricket lovers, about
25 this (inaudible) cricket. So that was expected to

1 escalate, I think.

2 Q. The activities of the Stop the Seventy Tour, is this
3 right, depended on leaks regarding the itinerary of
4 the touring rugby team? I think you say in your witness
5 statement that Lord Peter Hain had a contact who had
6 leaked details of their itinerary, and so it was known
7 where they were going to be at any given time, and then
8 direct activities could be organised to coincide with
9 their arrivals at various destinations; is that right?

10 A. Yes, but to the best of my knowledge, that information
11 was not used in any way to organise the big
12 demonstrations. Those were only set pieces at the -- at
13 the grounds, not -- it wasn't using any prior
14 information.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 Does it follow that some of the smaller episodes of
17 direct action were activities arranged at the last
18 minute? When the details of the itinerary were leaked?

19 A. I don't know how last-minute -- we would -- I never
20 actually saw the details of this. The information would
21 get through. I was in a little subgroup called
22 the "Special Action Group", and we would receive that
23 information. And I was never the one that received it,
24 so I'm not quite sure when it was received. But
25 generally we had enough time to -- for example, on one

1 occasion, I went down to a hotel in Bristol where they
2 were going to stay. And we knew about that long enough
3 ahead of time to make a booking for a couple of us to
4 book into rooms in the hotel and make other
5 preparations. So, it wasn't last-minute, but -- and we
6 knew which hotel they were staying at in London, for
7 example, quite well ahead.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 I just want to ask you about a document very
10 briefly, that doesn't appear in your -- the bundle of
11 documents that have been sent to you.

12 Please could we have on screen {UCPI/34318}, please.

13 This is a Special Branch report, so not an SDS
14 report, regarding an AGM of the Anti-apartheid League
15 from 1969. You haven't seen this document before, so it
16 may be that you simply don't remember at all. But did
17 you -- were you in the habit of attending -- were you
18 a member of the AAM, of the Anti-Apartheid Movement?

19 A. Yes, in fact, in the year previous I had, for one year,
20 been on the executive committee of the Anti-Apartheid
21 Movement. And I think probably I had left that in part
22 because I got involved in Stop the Seventy Tour, which
23 seemed to me a more effective way of pursuing our aims.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 A. I think it's quite likely that I was at that AGM.

1 Q. I think, later on, there's mention of your name, so it
2 does look as if you were there, but I just wanted to
3 make sure whether you -- to sort of focus you on
4 the document a moment.

5 So can we -- sorry, can we turn on to page 2 of this
6 document, please, {UCPI/34318/2}.

7 There's some paragraphs in the middle that are
8 headed, "Stop the Seventy Tour". If we can just scroll
9 up slightly. Thank you very much. Just leave it there.

10 The document reads as follows:

11 "Dealing with the Anti-Apartheid's Movement's
12 activities in sport, Mr Paul Hodges, spoke of
13 the formation of the 'Stop the Seventy Tour' and said
14 that detailed plans had already been made to harass
15 the Springboks' rugby tour that was due to start at
16 Oxford a November 5. He said he appreciated that
17 the Anti-Apartheid Movement could not be linked
18 officially with the protesters because of
19 the possibility of its leaders being charged with
20 conspiracy to commit a public disorder."

21 Just pausing very briefly there. This document
22 reports a meeting that took place on 26 October 1969.
23 It appears that plans had already been made to, as it
24 says, harass the Springboks' rugby tour. Were you aware
25 of those plans? Would you have been privy to those

1 plans as part of the Stop the Seventy Tour?

2 A. What was the date of this meeting?

3 Q. 26 October 1969.

4 A. I can't remember when there was the first national
5 conference of the Stop the Seventy Tour, which must have
6 been then -- much around that time. Clearly, it already
7 existed. And since I know that I went to the first
8 national conference, I'm assuming that the information
9 was -- was public. I'm not sure what the question is.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 The paragraph goes on to say, later on in that
12 paragraph, that:

13 "... the Anti-Apartheid Movement could not be linked
14 officially with the protesters because of
15 the possibility of its leaders being charged with
16 conspiracy to commit a public disorder."

17 This was, is this right, anticipating criminal
18 offences being committed during the course of the direct
19 action that was being planned for the rugby matches; is
20 that right?

21 A. I -- first of all, I don't know who Mr Paul Hodges was.
22 Do we have any information on that? And who was he
23 speaking for? Was he speaking for
24 the Stop the Seventy Tour or for
25 the Anti-Apartheid Movement? It's not clear.

1 Q. It seems he was a member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

2 A. Yes. There was a general perception, I think, that
3 the Anti-Apartheid Movement, while playing a very
4 valuable role, was somewhat restricted and played
5 a particular kind of pressure-group role in British
6 politics, which had -- which was very effective, but
7 also had its limitations. And the Stop the Seventy Tour
8 was formed out of some sense of dissatisfaction that
9 the Anti-Apartheid Movement wasn't being sufficiently
10 militant. And I think throughout this whole period of
11 several months, there was a tension between the two
12 organisations, in which the Anti-Apartheid Movement was
13 often distancing itself from the Stop the Seventy Tour;
14 while at the same time, I think, benefiting from it,
15 because it kept the issue in the public eye, and also
16 made the Anti-Apartheid Movement seem relatively
17 moderate. So there was an interesting dynamic going on
18 there.

19 But I don't think that the Stop the Seventy Tour
20 felt it was being encouraged or supported by
21 the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 Can we just turn on to page 3, very briefly, please,
24 {UCPI/34318/3}.

25 Right at the top of the page -- thank you very

1 much -- the second paragraph down:

2 "Of the 74 who attended the meeting, it was obvious
3 that the following were the core of the coming protest
4 movement."

5 And you'll notice the names there,
6 Ms Christabel Gurney, and then your name appears next to
7 Mr Peter Hain.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. How does that assessment strike you? Would you have
10 agreed with that assessment, that you were the core of
11 the coming protest movement?

12 A. I'm quite surprised. I've seen my name at the top of --
13 or near the top of various lists that the police
14 collected, and I wasn't aware that I was particularly
15 central. There wasn't much of an organisation.

16 I suspect I must have spoken, and maybe volubly, I
17 don't know. But, therefore, having said something
18 about it and supported it, maybe they thought I must be
19 leading something. But I think it was a very informal
20 grouping. Probably people came together after events,
21 such as the AGM of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, to think
22 about how we could take this idea forward. It was an
23 idea that grew, it wasn't something that was already
24 pre-formed at the beginning of this period.

25 Q. Thank you very much.

1 We can take that document down now. Thank you very
2 much.

3 Can I now just ask you briefly about some context
4 about the Special Action Group that was the group that
5 you say you were involved with. This, you say in your
6 witness statement, was a subgroup of
7 the Stop the Seventy Tour; is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you said there was some overlap between that group
10 and the central direction of the Stop the Seventy Tour?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you mean by that you had the same broad aims?

13 A. Absolutely, yes. We -- there was a -- it was, in
14 a sense (inaudible) as the Anti-Apartheid Movement
15 could benefit from the Stop the Seventy Tour, but while
16 there being no establishable connection between them.
17 In the same way, I think the Stop the Seventy Tour could
18 benefit from what the Special Action Group did, while it
19 was entirely deniable that we were acting, as it were,
20 under instruction. We were autonomous: we received
21 information; we decided what we wanted to do. But
22 because we were in sympathy with the general aims of
23 the Stop the Seventy Tour, there wasn't a -- there was
24 never any tension.

25 Q. And you say in your witness statement that the Special

1 Action Group had no public profile, didn't advertise its
2 existence, or claim responsibility for any action, and
3 as a result, the Stop the Seventy Tour didn't need to
4 own those actions --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- either.

7 Were you a sort of covert arm of
8 the Stop the Seventy Tour? Is that the effect of it?

9 A. Well, the "covert" makes it all sound a bit suspicious.
10 We were a bunch of very nice, well intentioned people,
11 who thought that to achieve their ends, they had to --
12 they needed the element of surprise, so you had to be
13 a little bit quiet about it. And we did take some
14 precautions, about trying not to phone, because we
15 assumed that if the Special Branch knew about us, they
16 would very likely be bugging our telephones. So things
17 like that.

18 Q. What was the -- what was the purpose of -- why was it
19 that you needed to have a smaller group that
20 the Stop the Seventy Tour didn't need to claim
21 responsibility for? What was the purpose of that?

22 A. Well, I imagine that, in terms of not claiming
23 responsibility, the objective was to get very large
24 numbers of people to these demonstrations, and some
25 people would have not wished to be associated with

1 people doing sort of almost undergraduate pranks. It
2 was nothing more serious than that. One member went
3 into, I think, a hotel room somewhere -- not in London,
4 somewhere outside -- gained access and sprayed
5 anti-apartheid messages in shaving cream on
6 the mirror -- on the mirrors in the players' bedrooms,
7 just to show that they'd been there. It was a sort of
8 disquieting tactic.

9 So we would do things like that, but it's not very
10 dignified, and it didn't really fit very well with the
11 serious image of the Stop the Seventy Tour generally.

12 Q. It undermined the sort of gravitas of the message, is
13 that --

14 A. I think so, yes. We did stuff that, while there was
15 nothing wrong with it -- indeed, I would say that it was
16 entirely appropriate -- it didn't fit with what
17 Stop the Seventy Tour -- how it wanted to be seen.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 You also operated a policy of non-violent direct
20 action and civil disobedience; is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Although, that included rather more specific and
23 targeted activities, such as painting slogans and gluing
24 locks, and getting access to hotels that the teams were
25 staying at; is that right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And your membership was rather more controlled because
3 you were all known to one another; is that right?

4 A. I think "controlled" is the wrong word, but it was
5 a sort of informal network, and I can't -- I really
6 don't know how it grew. I mean, I -- I knew
7 Ernest Rodker socially previously, but I think we
8 actually -- and then having known each other, we met in
9 the context of anti-apartheid. So it was natural we
10 would talk about things there.

11 But I don't know how other people came to be
12 involved. But it had no formal membership. It's people
13 at a meeting would -- would know about the next meeting.
14 Presumably we had phone numbers, and if anybody was
15 absent, we told them when we were getting together
16 again. I don't think meetings were that frequent,
17 because it was all -- this all happened in just a very
18 few months.

19 Q. Yes.

20 With that context in mind, can we look, please, at
21 the document which is the first national conference of
22 the Stop the Seventy Tour. This is {UCPI/8660}.

23 And it's behind tab 15, Sir, for the hard copy
24 bundle.

25 This is a slightly blurry document. Attended by

1 a number of people. And later on we'll have a look at
2 it. But you, Christabel Gurney and Lord Peter Hain are
3 all referenced in the document.

4 It seems to have taken the -- there was a morning
5 session and an afternoon session, we can see
6 the underlined type there "Morning Session"
7 and "Afternoon Session". The morning session "open to
8 the public as well as delegates", and the afternoon
9 session "open to delegates only".

10 Can we look, please, at paragraph 5 of this
11 document, which is on the second page, {UCPI/8660/2}.

12 Can we just make that a bit larger. Thank you very
13 much.

14 "Michael Brierley (ph) a northern university
15 lecturer and Middlesex cricketer, gave a well reasoned
16 speech in which he warned delegates against the use of
17 violence for violence sake in their demonstrations. He
18 spoke for the moderate within the STST who are against
19 all forms of violence. Unfortunately neither Brierley
20 nor any of the other speakers could satisfactorily
21 define 'violence', which complicated the arguments for
22 and against it."

23 First of all, Professor Rosenhead, does that
24 paragraph indicate that not all the participants in
25 the national conference were entirely ad idem on

1 the issue of the use of violence during the course of
2 Stop the Seventy Tour demonstrations?

3 A. I think, based on that paragraph and on other documents,
4 I think it would be unwise to take these reports as
5 a neutral and objective statement of what was going in
6 the meeting. I think there's an element of
7 self-justification here for -- for police involvement.

8 There was -- I -- I am -- there's a possibility I'm
9 rewriting it with hindsight. But I'm pretty sure
10 I sensed no movement towards violence. The whole point
11 of the Stop the Seventy Tour was that it needed to bring
12 public opinion along, and violence would have
13 the opposite effect. And I don't recall at any stage,
14 not just at this conference but at any other, anyone
15 advocating violence.

16 Q. Can we look now, please, at paragraph 8. It's on
17 the same theme, and I just want to invite your comment
18 on it. It's on page 3, please, {UCPI/8660/3}. Thank
19 you very much:

20 "During the general discussion which followed it
21 became apparent that the only real ground for
22 disagreement amongst the delegates was on the questions
23 of whether or not violence should be used at
24 the demonstrations which would take place during
25 the cricket season, and indeed what constituted

1 violence. Some felt that violence could only be used
2 against the person, but others felt that property came
3 within the definition, and also the threat of violence
4 at a later date was in itself a violent demonstration.
5 Despite this difference, it was stressed that the STST
6 was not a monolithic organisation, and its avowed policy
7 was one of non-violent militant direct action, if
8 individuals or individual groups felt that violence was
9 called for then they must be the final judges of what
10 action was appropriate. This concluded the morning
11 session."

12 Professor Rosenhead, that -- is this right, that
13 indicates that whilst the sort of publicly stated case
14 for the Stop the Seventy Tour was one of non-violence,
15 in fact what was being sort of communicated at
16 the meeting was that each person must take their own
17 course, and whilst the Stop the Seventy Tour wouldn't
18 condone any violence, if people thought violence was
19 appropriate, that was up to them. Does that sound
20 a fair assessment?

21 A. Absolutely not, no. I think this is self-serving
22 nonsense, to be honest. I think this is somebody
23 writing a report, I can only think writing down what he
24 thinks his superiors would like to hear, used as
25 justification. There was absolutely no sense that

1 everybody could -- that it was a smorgasboard where
2 everybody could do what they wanted.

3 Stop the Seventy Tour was absolutely clear that anyone
4 that took part needed to be non-violent. And it's
5 possible that at this meeting a person or two may have
6 said that they disagreed with this, but there was no
7 take-up, no -- I don't believe that to be the case. But
8 if it was, there was certainly no take-up and no sense
9 that this was a strand which needed to be reported about
10 in one of the longer paragraphs.

11 Q. Thank you, Professor Rosenhead.

12 Can we just briefly look now, please, at
13 paragraph 7.

14 It's on the same page, if you just scroll up
15 slightly, please.

16 In fact, it's a paragraph that begins over the other
17 page, and it comes from a speech to the morning session
18 by Peter Hain. But the paragraph I want to just --
19 the part of it I want to just look at is on the top of
20 the third page, please, where Peter Hain says:

21 "The support which had been gained in such a short
22 time should not be allowed to dissipate at the end of
23 the Springboks tour. From attacking apartheid in sport
24 they must move into the wider field of racism both in
25 South Africa and in this country, and finally

1 the capitalist system which nurtured it."

2 An attack on the capitalist system which nurtured
3 racism in this country and in South Africa: was that
4 something that you contemplated, and something that
5 others agreed with at that meeting, can you recall?

6 A. I think that would have resonated, yes. Clearly --
7 I mean, I used to watch Lancashire play cricket in
8 Liverpool, which was my home town, but I wasn't exactly
9 a major cricket fan, and that had been some time
10 previously. I guess that some -- some people who were
11 involved in this cared about sport very deeply, but
12 I think we would all care about politics and racism in
13 politics much more so. So it was not about stopping
14 a tour from happening, it was about putting pressure on
15 the regime in South Africa to change. And in the end,
16 of course, it -- through international ramifications and
17 sanctions and so on, that became what happened.

18 I -- I think you also have to recall the very
19 substantial links between London as the centre of
20 capitalist finance and South Africa. There were major
21 campaigns going on about that. Barclays Bank was
22 the subject of a campaign for, I would have thought,
23 more than a decade -- I don't quite know how long it
24 went on -- support by the National Union Of Students,
25 and all sorts of others, but because of its complicity

1 at that period in the apartheid regime, and it was
2 perhaps the largest bank operating in South Africa. But
3 there was also all kinds of finance capital that was
4 supporting the continuation of the existing system. So,
5 that was seen as collaboration between basically
6 a fascist regime in South Africa and the capitalist
7 system which we were part of.

8 Q. Is that what you think -- is that how you would
9 interpret the expression "the capitalist system which
10 nurtured it", an attack on the banking regimes that
11 funded Southern African minority white rule? Is that
12 how you're interpreting that expression?

13 A. This is a -- this is a speech by Peter Hain, who was
14 then in the Young Liberals, and afterwards migrated to
15 the Labour Party. He was -- Peter will speak for
16 himself, no doubt, tomorrow. But he was by no means an
17 extreme leftist in the Labour Party; I would say
18 a centrist. I had great respect for what he did there.
19 But I would think it's unlikely that he's talking about
20 root and branch revolution; I don't think that was his
21 bag.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 Paragraph 10, please, towards the bottom of this
24 page.

25 I'm just going to finish off with this document and

1 then we're going to have a short break,
2 Professor Rosenhead, because it's near the time to have
3 our break.

4 Paragraph 10. This is a paragraph which deals with
5 the future plans of the Stop the Seventy Tour. And at
6 (1):

7 "A 'welcome' should be extended to the 'White'
8 South African cricket team when they are ..."

9 "Welcome" in inverted commas:

10 "... if this was at all possible to arrange.

11 The TU spokesman ..."

12 Something that's been redacted for privacy reasons:

13 "... (... of SOGAT) said he would endeavour to
14 arrange for everything concerned with the tour to
15 be 'blacked', which was considered an appropriate form
16 of action, and this would commence at the Airport
17 itself"

18 What does that mean? What did he mean by "blacked"?

19 A. Well, trade unions were much more -- had a much bigger
20 membership and more -- more heft, if you like, in those
21 days than they do now, where they've been reduced by
22 antitrade union legislation, etc. I'm trying to
23 remember what branch SOGAT organised. Does anybody
24 know?

25 Q. It was print.

1 A. Print, yes.

2 So they -- they couldn't actually interfere with
3 the workings of Heathrow Airport. And therefore,
4 I assume what they're talking about is trade union
5 solidarity, that they would call on other unions to
6 behave in that way. In the event, of course, it didn't
7 happen. So perhaps he was slightly -- he or she -- I
8 imagine he -- was overstating their ability to have
9 things -- "blacked" means that you -- basically you
10 don't cross a picket line, that sort of arrangement.
11 That if one union is taking action, others don't violate
12 their picket lines.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 Over the page, please, page 4 {UCPI/8660/4}, and
15 then the small paragraph at the top of the page:

16 "A national demonstration should be held at Lords on
17 Saturday June 6 1970, the opening day of the Tour, and
18 it should be of such proportions that it should
19 effectually finish the Tour."

20 Does that mean it was anticipated that it would be
21 such a large demonstration that the cricket team would
22 simply give up and go home because the possibility of
23 playing another match when confronted with that sheer
24 weight of numbers would be entirely pointless?

25 A. I'm not sure what this -- who is supposed to have said

1 this.

2 Q. These are simply the plans that have been put in place
3 by the Stop the Seventy Tour for action in the future
4 for the forthcoming summer.

5 A. And who said that? (inaudible) gave the authority
6 for it?

7 Q. These were group discussions held by various parts of
8 the Stop the Seventy Tour in group discussions during
9 the course of the conference during a delegates' --

10 A. It sounds like this is one of the bright ideas that was
11 performed in a break-out group, which -- as we call it
12 now. It doesn't mean it was necessarily brought in by
13 everybody, but that's the way it works. The ideas you
14 have generated are then fed in, and not necessarily
15 accepted or rejected but are there as a resource.

16 I don't -- I think it's quite a strong aspiration.
17 Maybe it could have worked. It didn't have to, because
18 the government pulled the plug. But I think
19 the government pulled the plug because of worries about
20 what would happen in terms of the scale
21 of demonstrations if they didn't. So I think, in
22 a sense, the statement is true, because the thought of
23 such demonstrations was probably sufficient to get
24 the tour cancelled.

25 Whether -- had it gone ahead, how it would have

1 played out, we don't know. But certainly, if there had
2 been many tens of thousands of people surrounding Lords
3 and bringing traffic to a stop, and stopping the match
4 from going ahead, I think that would have provoked
5 a crisis, certainly. But whether that would have
6 happened, I don't know.

7 Q. And perhaps the third idea that was mooted during these
8 break-out groups, which is set out there, plays into
9 that:

10 "As a preliminary to (2) ..."

11 Ie as a preliminary to the mass demonstration:

12 "... it was felt that local demonstrations should be
13 held outside all the grounds where the South Africans
14 would be playing at the earliest possible date after
15 the beginning of the Cricket Season. These
16 demonstrations should take the form of a propaganda
17 exercise consisting of leafletting and picketing
18 the grounds. The leaflets should contain a warning that
19 if the South Africans played at the grounds then
20 the matches would be disrupted. The date of these
21 demonstrations would be decided later ..."

22 That's all about the propaganda, is it, of this
23 potential mass demonstration should the tour come to
24 fruition?

25 A. This is a combination, I suspect, you know, inferring

1 from -- I don't remember this idea, or necessarily
2 the meeting in which it took place. But it's building
3 support. If you -- this is a form of advertisement.
4 You'd go to the grounds where the games would be played.
5 Therefore, people who are interested in cricket would be
6 going to those grounds. And it's a possibility of
7 informing them of what may happen. They may be
8 recruited to it. They may use their influence to say,
9 "Look, this is serious, we don't want this to happen,
10 can't we get the tour stopped," you know? There could
11 be a number of things that could happen from getting
12 the word around.

13 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you.

14 I think that's probably a convenient moment, Sir.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

16 Before we break, could you clear up two minor
17 matters for me, please. Can I take it that the Michael
18 Brierley referred to there is the man who went on to
19 become the captain of the England cricket team?

20 A. Yes.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: And the Special Action Group of which you
22 speak, is that the same as the Direct Action Group
23 spoken of by Mr Rodker?

24 A. I don't know the name "Direct Action Group", but there
25 was only one, so it may be different terminologies were

1 the Stop the Seventy Tour, held on 5 April 1970. 50
2 delegates present, and the chairman Ernest Rodker.

3 In paragraph 4, somebody whose name has been
4 redacted for privacy reasons spoke about the -- sorry,
5 if we can scroll down, please, to paragraph 4 on that
6 page. Thank you. A little bit further. Thank you very
7 much --:

8 "... spoke briefly about the subject of Apartheid
9 and expressed the hope that those present would not be
10 too disappointed if the coloured population seemed
11 somewhat wayward in supporting the Campaign. This was
12 due to two factors: firstly that many coloured people
13 felt cricket did not really affect them, and secondly
14 that for various reasons it was very hard to mobilise
15 them in any great numbers. He concluded by saying that
16 STST was a small organisation but with a hard core of
17 militants, who could help to destroy apartheid and
18 racialism."

19 The expression used there "a hard core of
20 militants", does that strike you as a fair or accurate
21 assessment of the Stop the Seventy Tour, "a small
22 organisation with a hard core of militants"?

23 A. First of all, I'm just curious as to who was saying
24 this. It says "[Privacy]". So this, presumably, is not
25 an undercover cop speaking, so I'm not quite clear why

1 the name has been removed. It would help to understand
2 whether we should -- what weight we should give to
3 the views expressed here. I don't know if anybody can
4 provide any clarification on in what role this person
5 was speaking.

6 Q. A number of names of private citizens have been removed
7 to protect their privacy. That's why that name has been
8 redacted. And no, that's right, it's not an
9 undercover officer speaking?

10 A. Could we just scroll up a bit, so I can see under which
11 item of the agenda this is coming, because that might
12 give me a clue as to whether this was --

13 Q. Could we go to paragraph 3, please.

14 A. So which part of the agenda is this?

15 Q. It appears to be the beginning of the agenda.

16 The agenda was somebody who was taking over from
17 somebody else who had been indisposed, "Apartheid in
18 Sport and Racism in Britain". It appears to be under
19 that item of the agenda.

20 A. It's hard to know. Sometimes people do make speeches
21 which represent their own views, and obviously it sounds
22 as if he was -- he or she was an invited speaker, and
23 presumably representing views from outside
24 the organisation. It doesn't mean he or she has got it
25 wrong.

1 I think the language is perhaps redolent of certain
2 militancy of the day. I think, as you say, instead of
3 saying "hard core", you said "small number of committed
4 individuals", I think that would be true. But to call
5 them a "hard core" -- there was no party line. I mean,
6 I -- I was not in any organisation with any of the other
7 people who were -- that I was working with, other than
8 Stop the Seventy Tour. So the idea of militants is
9 normally nowadays seen as a group with a line that it's
10 trying to push on everybody else, and this is simply not
11 a good description.

12 Stop the Seventy Tour was a nice, floppy, liberal,
13 alternative organisation, which many people could join
14 who had maybe different activities outside but agreed on
15 this one thing. So I don't think that's the normal
16 sense of "hard core" and "militants".

17 I think if you wanted to say there was a -- a --
18 a loose penumbra of feeling that South Africa was really
19 so unpleasant that many people who had different views
20 on other things would agree on South Africa, and that
21 some people were more committed to that than others, and
22 particularly, of course, in the Anti-Apartheid Movement,
23 a lot of those would be exiled South Africans. We were
24 mostly not -- Stop the Seventy Tour, we were mostly born
25 and bred Brits, rather than emigrés. And I guess

1 South Africans might have been a little bit more
2 committed, because it was their home that we were
3 talking. Whereas, for me, it was an option. If you
4 like, this is an expression of my values, it wasn't that
5 my life was on the line. And I think that might be true
6 of many others. So "hard core militants" doesn't sound
7 right at all.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 A. I can't comment on the extent to which what is described
10 there as "coloured people", because that was
11 the language of the day, I can't say whether that was
12 accurate or not.

13 Q. No, I'm not asking you to comment on that. Thank you.

14 Can we move on, please, to page 2. I want to look
15 at paragraph 6 {UCPI/14399/2}:

16 "It was agreed that in view of the possibility of
17 conspiracy charges arising from any activity which could
18 be construed as urging others to disrupt public events,
19 it would be wiser not to discuss detailed activities at
20 this stage, but that a 'Planning Committee' should be
21 set up which could advise branches on tactics which
22 might prove successful in disrupting cricket pitches.
23 The Planning Committee would consist of a small group
24 of 'known' (trusted) delegates and could meet at
25 a convenient date in the near future."

1 Is that a reference, do you think, to your group,
2 the Special Action Group, there, or is that something
3 different?

4 A. It -- I have no recollection of this, but it does seem
5 that that could have been the germ of the idea which led
6 to the Special Action Group.

7 What was the date of this document?

8 Q. The document is dated 7 April, and reflects a meeting on
9 5 April 1970.

10 A. Well, the Special Action Group had been in existence for
11 quite some time before that.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. So I don't think that can be it. That may have been
14 just -- that must be some other activity.

15 Q. Right, okay. Thank you.

16 We can take that document down now, please.

17 Can we now look at document {UCPI/8607}.

18 That's tab 9 of the hard copy bundle, Sir.

19 This is a meeting which with took place on
20 7 May 1970, so not very long after that previous
21 meeting, and it's a meeting of the Special Planning
22 Group of the Stop the Seventy Tour, held in a room at
23 the London School of Economics, attended by nine people.

24 In paragraph 3, the purpose of
25 the Special Planning Group is said to be:

1 "... to suggest, coordinate and implement activities
2 within the London Area from the time of the arrival of
3 the South African Cricket team until their departure."

4 I think in your witness statement you query whether
5 that in fact was a meeting of the Special Action Group;
6 is that right?

7 A. I find this -- is there a list of who attended at the
8 end? Because that would help to clarify that point.

9 Q. There is, but they have been redacted for privacy
10 reasons, and only your name appears, I'm afraid,
11 Professor Rosenhead. But there are nine people in
12 attendance, including yourself.

13 A. I would say first, just in passing, that S108 was my own
14 room at LSE; it was a lecturer's room. It was a small
15 lecturer's room. It's very thin and not very long. How
16 on earth there were nine people there ... I think this
17 policeman has invented that. How could there be nine
18 people in that room? It was hard to get four in.

19 So I -- I don't -- I don't know.

20 Also, if there are redactions, this suggests it
21 wasn't the Special Planning Group, because then there
22 would have been other names there which are the subject
23 matter of this Inquiry, and if those names are not
24 there, how can it have been the Special Planning Group?
25 Why is Ernest's name not there? Why is Mike Craft's

1 name not there? And so on? I find it hard to know what
2 this was, this meeting. Is there any evidence further
3 down that would --

4 Q. Yes, can we -- we're going to move down the report.

5 Can we look at paragraph 3, please.

6 Well, first of all, sorry -- sorry, just briefly
7 going back -- there's in fact two paragraph 3s in this
8 document. Can you just scroll up slightly, so that we
9 can see that what the points of discussion were likely
10 to be during this planning group:

11 "The group, therefore, had at this stage broad
12 discussions on the following points:-

13 "(i) Heathrow demonstration.

14 "(ii) Tickets.

15 "(iii) Demonstrations outside Lords June 6th ..."

16 Which is the first day of the cricket tour:

17 "(iv) Hotel demonstrations."

18 Just scroll up slightly so we can see the whole of
19 that paragraph 3:

20 "At this stage no definite plans have been made for
21 a demonstration at Heathrow, mainly because of the lack
22 of information about the time and place of arrival of
23 the teams. However, the general assumption was that
24 they would arrive at 8 am on June 1st by a scheduled
25 BOAC flight at Heathrow. To this end members of

1 the planning group agreed that a 'recce' should be made
2 of the Airport, with particular reference to the exits
3 therefrom. It was generally felt that it would be
4 impossible to prevent the team from leaving the Airport,
5 but that incidents could well be staged on the route
6 from the Airport to their hotel."

7 Does this sound like the sort of thing that your
8 Special Action Group would have discussed --

9 A. No.

10 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- direct action targeted at
11 the cricket team?

12 A. No. This is clearly much more public, not in any way
13 clandestine at all. The reference there to
14 the "planning group" suggests it could have been
15 the group that was mentioned --

16 Q. In the previous -- (overspeaking) --

17 A. -- (inaudible) -- didn't have in the last document you
18 had up.

19 So I guess I must have been a member of it. But of
20 course, it didn't last very long, because the tour got
21 cancelled and none of this was -- was required. So
22 I have no recollection of it. And presumably other
23 people whose names have been redacted were on
24 the planning group but not on the Special Action Group.
25 So I think this might be an entirely different activity.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 The reference to "incidents" being "staged"
3 en route -- so it says:

4 "... incidents could well be staged on the route
5 from the Airport to their hotel."

6 What sort of incidents might have been contemplated
7 by the Special Planning Group?

8 A. As I say, this wasn't the Special Planning Group, as far
9 as I can tell. And I have no idea what that could have
10 been. But certainly if there were incidents to be
11 carried out, then you'd have thought it would need to be
12 rather carefully organised, whatever they were.

13 I imagine they could have been some kind of traffic
14 interruption, but it's hardly likely. I can't think
15 what else it would be, but you could hardly do this
16 thing in an open public meeting, you know, plan how
17 you're going to block a road or something. And
18 certainly we did not do that in the Special
19 Planning Group. This -- it was never -- in the Special
20 Action Group, whatever you want to call it. It -- it
21 was never something that I recall even being on
22 the agenda, let alone agreed to.

23 Q. Right.

24 Can we turn on, please, to page 2 in this document
25 and look at paragraph 5 {UCPI/8607/2}. Thank you.

1 Somebody whose name has been redacted for privacy
2 reasons:

3 "... presented plans and aerial photographs of
4 Lords, and described the 'defences' as they existed at
5 present. He said that there would probably be two
6 points of attack open to demonstrators:-

7 "(a) From the raised stand (believed 'G' and 'H'
8 stands) there was a drop of approximately 5 feet ... to
9 the ground, and as there was no barbed wire or other
10 obstruction at this stage it seemed the most likely
11 place from which to launch an attack."

12 And (b):

13 "From the gates opposite the pavilion, from
14 where rollers etc were brought on the ground.

15 "Therefore, bearing these two places in mind,
16 demonstrators should be advised to purchase tickets for
17 these areas."

18 The expression used there "from which to launch an
19 attack", can you recall what might have been meant by
20 that? What attack would be launched?

21 A. I think this is like the hyperbolic language elsewhere.
22 It's not a language we would ever have used. You know,
23 I refer to it. I think this is the person writing.
24 This is, again, presumably a covert report we're seeing
25 here not a public document, and he's -- whoever's

1 writing it can do that with the certainty they will not
2 be refuted or adjusted ^; and the terms seem to be
3 directed to make this seem more serious than I think it
4 can have been.

5 I -- this section of it does look more like the sort
6 of thing the Special Action Group might have got
7 involved in. So maybe this was some kind of hybrid that
8 was both planning demonstrations and the purchase of
9 tickets and so on, which would be a mainstream STST
10 activity. We didn't have any money. We didn't have any
11 mechanisms for acquiring tickets or distributing them to
12 other people. So this seems to be an odd mixture of
13 things going on here.

14 Assuming this meeting took place. I don't imagine
15 that meetings were invented, but I think the way it's
16 described is -- seems to me implausible that we would
17 have done. We -- there were -- I can remember odd
18 meetings where we talked about what we might do at
19 the beginning of the cricket season, if it happened.
20 And they were -- they weren't planning pitch invasions,
21 because that's not what we did. We didn't mobilise
22 large numbers of people. What we did was done with
23 a very small number of people, sometimes one or two,
24 sometimes six. You know, I don't remember.

25 But certainly we would not organise anything that

1 involved large numbers of people. The ideas we had for
2 cricket grounds were things like could we -- could we
3 find somebody who could fly a model aeroplane over
4 the cricket ground with a streamer with an
5 anti-apartheid message. It was that sort of thing, not
6 things involving large bodies of people. So whatever
7 this meeting was about, it wasn't Special Planning
8 Group. And I think it's been souped-up for the eyes and
9 ears of the senior officers, in terms of the language.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 Can we scroll towards the bottom of the page,
12 please.

13 That's great, thank you.

14 I just want to ask you about these series of points:

15 "In view of the different groups and organisations
16 which would be present on June 6th it was difficult to
17 make specific plans for any one type of action on
18 the ground, but the following points were felt to be
19 relevant:-

20 "(a) A mass attack on the ground was desirable, but
21 this should be delayed until near the lunch interval.
22 Before and after this, demonstrators should endeavour to
23 get onto the pitch in twos and threes, and once having
24 reached the playing area, the best advice was that each
25 should 'do their own thing'.

1 "(b) General distractions should be mounted
2 throughout the period of play in the form of shouting
3 and moving about so as to distract the players attention
4 as far as possible.

5 "(c) Newspapers should be brought in and allowed to
6 blow over the pitch wherever possible. The possibility
7 of using balloons was discussed, but it was felt that
8 they were not very effective.

9 "(d) The use of fireworks, flares and other
10 materials of a similar nature was advocated. It was
11 said that 'Blacks' (believed Black & Edgington LTD) 22
12 Grays Inn Road, WC1, apparently stock a 'mini-flare'
13 used by climbers and others as a form of distress
14 signal, which has a small launcher attachment little
15 bigger than a fountain pen, and could therefore be
16 easily smuggled into the ground."

17 And if you could just scroll down to the next page,
18 3, {UCPI/8607/3}, just to the top of that page, just to
19 finish that paragraph.

20 Somebody whose name has been redacted for privacy
21 reasons:

22 "... said that he was endeavouring to obtain the key
23 to a school Army training Unit in order that he
24 could 'make use' of its stock of thunder-flashes."

25 Can you just return to the previous page, please,

1 {UCPI/8607/2}, and little paragraph (a).

2 The advice that people "should endeavour to get onto
3 the pitch in twos and threes" and once there "do their
4 own thing". Can you remember what might have been meant
5 by that, by the expression "do their own thing"?

6 A. Where was this meeting taking place?

7 Q. It took place on 7 May 1970 at the LSE, and is said to
8 be a meeting of the Special Planning Group of
9 the Stop the Seventy Tour --

10 A. Is it supposed to be in my room or not?

11 Q. It was in room S108.

12 A. That was my room. I -- I imagine that that's not
13 invented and I was there. I have no recollection of it.
14 It's a different order of planning than we would
15 normally have been involved with.

16 So what was the specific question?

17 Q. Can you recall what might have been meant by the advice
18 that demonstrators on reaching the pitch in twos and
19 threes should "do their own thing"?

20 A. Well, the one time that I got onto the pitch, I got onto
21 the pitch and there was nothing to do, I just had to
22 wait there until someone came and removed me. And I
23 imagine -- there is no action to take once you're there.
24 You might, I suppose, try to elude the police, so as to
25 make the interruption longer. I didn't, I just waited

1 to be taken away. And I imagine that's what they mean.
2 There was no specific action, rather than that. That's
3 code for: do some terrible things.

4 Q. The points, the advice under (d), the use of fireworks,
5 flares and the possible use of "thunder-flashes", what
6 was the purpose of using fireworks and flares and other
7 sort of --

8 A. Well, note it says "was advocated". That means somebody
9 brought forward this bright idea. It doesn't really
10 mean that we decided to do it. And I think that was
11 probably somebody who was a little bit more adventurous
12 than most of us would have been happy with. I can't say
13 now because, as I say, I know a collection of
14 the meeting.

15 But people were casting around for things to do that
16 might interfere with the game. I remember the one --
17 one scheme -- we actually had a meeting in the flat of
18 a sympathiser, which I don't know that is reported on.
19 It was a flat that actually overlooked Lords. And we
20 were thinking about, would it be possible to have
21 a high-pressure hose that could sort of somehow project
22 a parabolic arc of liquid onto the pitch over the stands
23 and so on.

24 So there were all kinds of crazy ideas going on
25 which never went anywhere, as the model aeroplane never

1 went anywhere either. And I think this is probably just
2 one of those brainstorming ideas that -- that's why you
3 do the brainstorm: you try and get ideas out, and some
4 may get implemented, some may not. It doesn't look as
5 if this one had any take-up. But in any case, as we
6 know, the opportunity to use these ideas was removed
7 from us by HM Government, who stopped the tour -- got
8 the tour stopped, shall we say.

9 Q. And the use of fireworks, or "thunder-flashes", or
10 however they're referred to, presumably their use would
11 be to create anxiety and -- amongst the public watching,
12 who wouldn't necessarily know how to attribute the
13 noises they were hearing --

14 A. I don't think that idea was ever accepted. And had it
15 got near to implementation, we would have had to think
16 seriously about those aspects. But it didn't, so this
17 was just an idea lying on the table. And it wasn't
18 immediately negated, because it looks like we were
19 thinking about all sorts of ideas, trying to think of
20 things that we could do that would be effective. But
21 none of these things were decided on.

22 Q. We can take that document down now, please. And
23 the next document I want to look at is {MPS/736368}.

24 Which is behind tab 1 of the hard copy bundle, for
25 your note, Sir.

1 This is another meeting of the Special
2 Planning Group held on 13 May this time, a little later
3 than the previous one. Again, nine people appear to
4 have been present. The points of discussion are
5 the "Heathrow demonstration", the "hotel
6 demonstrations", the "June ... demonstrations", when
7 the tour was actually underway, and "future activities".

8 If we scroll down, please, slightly down the page,
9 so that we can look at the whole of paragraph 4, please.
10 Thank you very much.

11 The start part of that paragraph says that
12 the demonstrations at the airport couldn't be finalised
13 because no one knew when -- quite when
14 the South Africans would have arrived. But the second
15 paragraph says:

16 "The Airport has been 'surveyed' and photographs
17 taken, and the general conclusion is that the Flight
18 will arrive at No. 3 Building, and that
19 the South Africans will be 'spirited away' through
20 a VIP Lounge into a waiting coach and thence to their
21 hotel. If advance information is received that they are
22 actually in transit, then an advance warning system to
23 demonstrators will be put into operation, to get them to
24 assemble at the Airport. It is considered feasible that
25 a 'commando group' of some 20 demonstrators could gain

1 access to the area where passengers from the 'plane
2 disembark to throw fireworks etc, thus giving
3 the South Africans a 'rousing' welcome."

4 Again, the reference to the use of fireworks, but
5 this time at the airport. Again, would the purpose of
6 using fireworks at the airport be to create panic
7 amongst those people arriving and other users of
8 the airport at that time?

9 A. First of all, discounting the hyperbolic language of
10 whoever this is -- it seems like the same person -- was
11 using, I think these were ideas that had not been
12 accepted, they're ideas that were floating around. We
13 were nowhere near implementing any of these things.
14 The fireworks weren't bought. There were no names.
15 This is not operational. This is, if you like, some
16 thoughts being put out that demonstrators could be
17 stationed in the car park. But there's nothing definite
18 here. This is thoughts about how one might go ahead
19 with something that was going to take place in
20 the following month, surrounded by uncertainty.

21 Almost certainly, very little of this would have
22 been put into action. And it's not been accepted that
23 we were going to go through the airport throwing
24 fireworks. I'm assuming that I was there, because it's
25 my room, and that some discussion of fireworks was --

- 1 was in place --
- 2 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- name appears at the end of
- 3 the report as somebody who was in attendance.
- 4 A. Yes, that's what I thought.
- 5 By the way, I noticed that at the beginning it says:
- 6 "From a reliable and delicate source."
- 7 Now, I know this is code, police code. Can somebody
- 8 tell me what that means?
- 9 Q. It's the way that the reports begin in this era. That's
- 10 how intelligence reports are written in this era,
- 11 Professor Rosenhead.
- 12 A. I don't think all of them have that, but maybe I'm
- 13 wrong. I thought that sometimes it meant that it was an
- 14 undercover policeman and another form of words meant
- 15 that it was somebody who was a member of
- 16 the organisation that was supplying information. Is
- 17 that right?
- 18 Q. I simply don't know, Professor Rosenhead, I'm afraid.
- 19 A. Okay. sorry, I'm not sure I answered your question
- 20 entirely.
- 21 Q. You did.
- 22 A. The idea of a commando group. No one used that word, we
- 23 were not a militaristic group. This is being translated
- 24 into some kind of jargon for something which was
- 25 disorganised, fluid, people interacting with each other.

1 It wasn't a board of directors with people taking
2 instructions or coming to (inaudible) a conclusions, it
3 was thinking about what we might do in preparation for
4 what might happen later, perhaps.

5 Q. Can we turn over onto the second page, please, and look
6 at the top paragraph, paragraph 5 {MPS/736368/2}:

7 "As had been agreed, each of the London Groups will
8 be given a specific date and time when they are expected
9 to picket outside the team's hotel. It was suggested
10 that once the hotel was known individuals from each
11 group should familiarise themselves with its layout and
12 thus be in a position to gain access whenever possible
13 or necessary. It was also suggested that although there
14 would undoubtedly be police guards at the various
15 entrances and exits, there would perhaps be times had
16 this guard would be relaxed, and if there were
17 a sufficient number of demonstrators present, then that
18 would be the time to march boldly into the hotel and
19 stage some sort of 'happening'; the most spectacular
20 would be the release of smoke bombs in the foyer or near
21 the South Africans if they could be located."

22 This is evidently a suggestion made by a member of
23 this nine group Special Planning Group.

24 Again, a reference to a "smoke bomb". Is that in
25 order to create sort of maximum anxiety and worry

1 amongst the South African team and other members of
2 the people using the hotel?

3 A. This is quite -- assuming this is accurate, roughly,
4 this is clearly wishful thinking by one person, sort of
5 brainstorming some ideal scenario that they hope they
6 might get (inaudible). None of this could conceivably
7 happen and I'm sure none of us were taking this at all
8 seriously. I mean, it's -- you can't take things that
9 are said at a meeting as a commitment of even those
10 other people at the meeting unless it says that was
11 decided, and this -- this, obviously a policeman or
12 a policeman's agents, or whoever it was, that was
13 the reliable and delicate source, would be looking for
14 things like this to report regardless of whether or not
15 they were agreed or not, and it's quite clear that
16 these -- no steps were taken to implement these, unless
17 you can find me other evidence that that was the case.

18 I have to say, (inaudible) documents not from
19 memory. My memory is limited to the sorts of people who
20 were there, the sorts of status of the organisation, of
21 discussions, that it was not a dedicated cell, it was
22 people -- there would have been different people at each
23 meeting and so on. It was not -- I'm afraid we weren't
24 that disciplined.

25 Q. Just completing our look at this report. In

1 paragraph 6, it says:

2 "Apart from the obvious forms of demonstration
3 already discussed at length the following additional
4 points have arisen:-

5 "A meteorological balloon is to be purchased, also
6 a cylinder of hydrogen, with the intention of releasing
7 ticker tape or similar substances over Lords during
8 the match."

9 "A 'Free Radio' expert (not identified) has stated
10 that it should be possible to jam police communications
11 at crucial periods. It was stated that he has
12 the equipment which is necessary for this and is
13 prepared to assist."

14 Can you remember that suggestion being made?

- 15 A. No, it's -- the whole thing is littered with wishful
16 thinking and wild speculations and I don't have any
17 recollection. The fact that it didn't register suggests
18 that it was never taken forward in any way, or possibly,
19 given that it doesn't fit with my -- my general politics
20 and my state of mind, I think it's -- I probably
21 dismissed it as bluster as it -- well, we don't know
22 because we didn't get to the stated cricket tour, but my
23 doubt is any of this happened and we would have stuck to
24 stuff that we would have been doing already like
25 demonstrations and occasionally little forays of one or

1 two people to try and add a little bit of extra spice to
2 the -- to the sauce.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 I think we can take that document down now, please.

5 Can we now look, please, at {UCPI/8635} behind tab 4
6 in the hard copy bundle, please. Now, this is a meeting
7 of the National Committee of the Stop the Seventy Tour
8 at which you were present which took place on
9 24 May 1970, so just after the time that the invitation
10 extended to the South African cricket team had been
11 withdrawn and so the campaign had been successful.

12 I just want to ask you a couple of questions
13 about it, please. Paragraph 1 (ii), I think, there was
14 a -- I'll just make sure I've got the right document.

15 Sorry, yes:

16 "It was agreed that they participate in
17 the Ruskin-Kitson march over the weekend but that STST
18 should not meet at Lords as arranged but at region
19 entities park."

20 If you could just scroll up a little bit, please.

21 Thank you:

22 "The June 6th rally which was being organised by
23 the Anti-Apartheid Movement was going on as planned, but
24 the general feeling of those present was that the Rally
25 would be somewhat of an anti-climax, and that most STST

1 supporters would not be particularly interested in
2 participating. Under no circumstances should STST use
3 it as a 'Victory Rally'."

4 Does that indicate that the march was likely to be
5 a great deal smaller than had been anticipated?

6 A. I think it says so in terms.

7 Q. The purpose of the Stop the Seventy Tour had been
8 achieved?

9 A. No, the rally was not the Stop the Seventy Tour's rally,
10 as I understand it, it was the Anti-Apartheid Movement,
11 and the only question was whether STST should
12 participate and in what way.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 And finally this. Paragraph 3 -- if you could just
15 scroll down a little bit, please. Thank you. And maybe
16 just make it a little bit larger. Thank you very much:

17 "The general consensus of opinion was that although
18 STST had served its purpose, the organisation which had
19 been set up should not be disbanded but should remain as
20 a latent power in the event of any other 'apartheid
21 team' endeavouring to enter Great Britain. It was felt
22 also that the numbers of supporters who had been
23 mobilised so successfully over the past months should
24 not be left to dissipate their enthusiasm, and it was
25 essential that STST found another 'cause' as soon as

1 possible. Discussions would take place with group
2 leaders to seek their ideas of possible 'targets' but
3 you the one which received the most ..."

4 If you can just scroll down:

5 "... general support was the Caborra Bassa Dam
6 project. It would therefore seem likely that those who
7 remain supporters of the STST now that the Tour has been
8 cancelled will have that you are thoughts directed
9 towards this scheme."

10 The Caborra Bassa Dam project, there was a group
11 called the Dambusters Mobilising Committee. Is that
12 what's envisaged there, that the Stop the Seventy Tour
13 supporters would focus their attentions instead on
14 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee, or just causes or
15 other campaigning groups towards the I am of
16 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee which was to stop
17 the building of that dam? Can you remember?

18 A. I don't remember the specific meeting or this specific
19 proposal, but there were clearly discussions that I do
20 remember about what we do with Stop the Seventy Tour now
21 that it's achieved its objective, which is a very
22 unusual situation for a political group like this to be
23 in, and I was certainly someone who was arguing that
24 with all this mobilisation, we'll know -- we'd have
25 the names and details of thousands of people round

1 the country who'd taken the time and trouble to get in
2 touch with us and that a movement could be made or
3 reinforced out of this. I don't remember the -- that
4 there was ever an agreement on a target or a focus for
5 such a group, and I don't -- and I'm pretty sure that
6 there wasn't and that therefore the Caborra Bassa Dam
7 development happened, the mobilisation happened
8 independently of any influx from STST. Individuals may
9 well have gone, and I believe that Christabel Gurney,
10 who's on this afternoon, will be able to to give you
11 better information on that than I could.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 A. My -- my experience of that discussion was that the idea
14 of maintaining STST as a separate activity, obviously
15 with some change of name and focus, was not implemented,
16 and in a sense, the group was -- I don't know how
17 democratic it was. Obviously the people who turned up
18 to demonstrations had no vote on necessarily a new voice
19 and so a relatively small number of people were involved
20 in organising, and for whatever reason, by whatever
21 dynamic (inaudible) of that group which I wasn't central
22 to, basically it was wound up, there was no successful
23 organisation, which I found -- thought was disappointing
24 and a waste.

25 Q. Can we move on very quickly, please, to the -- sorry,

1 just --

2 A. (inaudible).

3 Q. The next document is {MPS/736399}.

4 Thank you.

5 This is a report which you deal with in your witness
6 statement between paragraphs 7 and 10 about a meeting
7 said to have taken place in your room at the -- or
8 certainly at the LSE about a plan to form a group called
9 Keep Politics Out of Cricket Committee and to circulate
10 a petition and invite signatories to the petition to
11 attend the ground which would have resulted in
12 a confrontation between demonstrators and [the] police."

13 And this report says that an advertisement was
14 placed in the telegraph and in the times with a box
15 number.

16 And if we scroll down we can see the text that
17 appeared in the Telegraph advertisement. At paragraph 4
18 in the personal column of the Daily Telegraph:

19 "Cricket lovers help circulate a petition to save
20 t 70's Tour, Keep Politics Out of Cricket Committee.
21 Write to CL 1182, Daily Telegraph, EC4."

22 And I think you say in your witness statement that
23 this was a complete fiction created by an acquaintance
24 of yours who wanted to discredit you and your political
25 affiliations to undermine you in the eyes of another,

1 and this was a complete fiction that has been reported
2 by the undercover officer; is that right?

3 A. That's correct, yes --

4 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

5 A. Do you want me to expand on that? I could do so.

6 Q. Well, I don't want you to -- I don't want to trespass
7 into any other matters that might be private to you,
8 because I note that -- of course you don't necessarily
9 need to give us the background, but I just wanted to ask
10 you this. It's said to be a meeting that took place in
11 your room with a number of other people, including
12 somebody who'd not previously taken any part in any
13 Stop the Seventy Tour activity. I think that's in
14 paragraph 3. And the text that apparently appeared in
15 the Daily Telegraph gives a box number, and I just
16 wanted to ask you this.

17 That box number, it would mean, wouldn't it, that
18 this advertisement couldn't on its face be linked to
19 you?

20 A. Had I put it in, it would not have been traceable, no,
21 no.

22 Q. No. And it appears that the report seems to say that on
23 11 May, this advertisement did appear in the Daily
24 Telegraph. Can you recall that? Do you know anything
25 about that?

1 A. No. I had nothing to do with any of this, and it's
2 interesting, if you go -- scroll up a bit, you see this
3 one says "information acquired from a reliable source",
4 it's not "from a reliable and delicate source", so
5 guess it's coming from some different source. It's not
6 -- and evidently it's not from a meeting, it's something
7 that's been acquired outside the meeting. I'm --
8 I don't know by what mechanism this was noticed and
9 brought to the police's attention and linked to me. It
10 seems the advertisement doesn't mention me. Possibly
11 Special Branch approaching the newspaper to say, "Who
12 put -- who put this advert in"? I don't know. To whom
13 would it be sent?

14 My best is -- this is not the only example of its
15 kind. There was another one in very much the same
16 period, inviting people to write in for pornographic
17 material to me by name, but this was in -- I think that
18 one, I think, was in either City Limits or Time Out,
19 I can't remember, and that one was spotted by a friend
20 of mine who happened to be doing the layout on
21 the magazine, that was --

22 Q. Presumably in order to link it to you turn named in that
23 advertisement, were you?

24 A. I was named.

25 This other one could only have been that all this

1 stuff on people writing to me from the box number,
2 the box number would come to me and I would therefore be
3 aware of the risk that if I went on seeing a person that
4 I was seeing, that all this stuff could -- could --
5 could be escalated. That's all I can think. But it is
6 nothing to do with politics and everything to do with
7 jealousy and rage and upset.

8 Q. Thank you very much.

9 A. It's -- I'm just a bit shocked to see it here in
10 a public inquiry.

11 Q. Thank you. We can take that document down now, please.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Chessam, I think it's right to say,
13 isn't it, that this document is not, we think, an SDS
14 document?

15 A. Ah, .

16 MS HUMMERSTONE: That's right.

17 A. (inaudible) Special Branch, yes.

18 MS HUMMERSTONE: That's right. I'm grateful.

19 Final document before we move on to the arrest and
20 prosecution at the Star & Garter. {UCPI/8245}, please.

21 I should say, this is a very poorly -- a very poor
22 quality document and it's quite difficult to read.

23 This is a document -- a report about the meeting of
24 the London Action Committee Against Racialism, which
25 appears to have held at a private house on

1 10 September 1971.

2 The subject of the meeting is mainly a protest to be
3 arranged at the Miss World competition in 1971, and if
4 we scroll down to paragraph 4 and 5, please, the plan of
5 action was similar to that of the previous year. After
6 gaining admission, they hoped to general disrupt
7 the contest. If, however, access to the Albert Hall was
8 [something] plans would be made to sabotage the news
9 broadcasting vehicles which were usually parked in
10 the vicinity."

11 In the previous year, it's right, isn't it, there
12 had been a disruption of the Miss World contest by
13 the Women's Liberation Movement; is that right --
14 the Women's Liberation Front; can you recall that?

15 A. Yeah, in the previous year, but (inaudible), yes.

16 Q. And this was a plan to stage something similar.

17 A. So it seems, yes.

18 Q. But if not, to sabotage the news broadcasting vehicle.

19 How would that have been achieved, the sabotage of
20 the news broadcasting vehicle? Can you recall?

21 A. I have no recollection of this at all.

22 To what extent was this connected to STST? I see
23 Peter Hain's name is there, just visible at the bottom.
24 I don't know who was -- without the full document,
25 I don't know where this was or who was participating.

1 Q. If we just scroll down, we can see that you were present
2 but other names present have been redacted for privacy
3 purposes. So you were present at this meeting, but is
4 your evidence that you've got no recollection of it?

5 A. I'm afraid not, no.

6 Q. Okay.

7 Just in the paragraph that's visible there,
8 paragraph 7:

9 "On Tuesday 21 September 1971, Peter Hain was due
10 to ..."

11 I think it must say "appear":

12 "... at Bow Street Magistrates Court."

13 Somebody who's redacted for privacy reasons:

14 "... at the earliest ..."

15 I think that must be "opportunity":

16 "... would liaise with the Young Liberals in
17 the hope that a combined effort could be made to disrupt
18 the court proceedings, together with a demonstration."

19 Can you recall any conversations of that nature?

20 A. Sorry, no. This -- this is -- I'm assuming that I was
21 actually there. I don't remember who else was there.

22 I can't imagine what the nature of the meeting was, or
23 that I would have been in any way involved with that
24 aspect since it seemed to be a Young Liberals thing.

25 Q. So you can't recall what might have been envisaged for

1 the disruption of the court proceedings?

2 A. No. Absolutely not.

3 Q. Thank you. We can take that document down now, please.

4 I'm now going to move on to the final topic, which
5 is the demonstration at the Star & Garter hotel,
6 the subsequent arrest and conviction at the magistrates
7 court. It just seems -- I'm just looking at a purple
8 screen. I wonder if that document can be fully taken
9 down. Thank you.

10 We understand that the plan at the Star & Garter
11 hotel where the English rugby team were staying prior to
12 their departure for South Africa was to attempt to
13 disrupt their departure to the airport, is that right,
14 to interfere with their taking an aeroplane to fly to
15 South Africa to begin their tour; is that right?

16 A. Ideally have them miss the plane, yes.

17 Q. And you say in your witness statement that the plan had
18 been to block their coach which was due to take them to
19 the airport in the car park, so block the passage of
20 the coach from the car park to the road to take them to
21 the airport, and the demonstration was staged in the car
22 park; is that right?

23 A. Mm-hm.

24 Q. That was a plan, it seems, that took shape at the house
25 of Ernest Rodker, and HN298, Mike Scott,

1 the undercover police officer, was present at that
2 meeting, it seems.

3 Can you recall Mike Scott, or somebody of that name,
4 being involved in anything about this matter?

5 A. No. Zero. And from the statement of HN298, who
6 I gather is Mike Scott -- we don't know what his real
7 name is and I have had no photographs of him at the time
8 which would enable me to identify him -- but from some
9 of his evidence -- and I accept some of this is almost
10 certainly true -- he appeared on that afternoon -- or
11 was it morning -- I don't even know what time of day it
12 was -- he said, having been told by this meeting by
13 Peter Hain's mother, whom he had phoned. So he'd phoned
14 up someone who was a dedicated and experienced
15 South African political activist who'd been exiled to
16 the country who had been the subject of amazing police
17 intrusive behaviour in South Africa and she is supposed
18 to have told him, "Oh, there's something interesting
19 going on this afternoon, why not go to this address in
20 Fulham".

21 I find this should implausible. But the point is
22 this guy therefore shows up, having had no contact
23 whatsoever with the group, having heard about this
24 meeting somehow -- presumably they're not obliged to
25 tell the truth, but it does seem to me more likely that

1 they'd obtained their information some other way,
2 possibly by a telephone tap or some other thing, I don't
3 know. But the result is he parachutes into this meeting
4 and is accepted, because we were not security-conscious,
5 we didn't worry. He said, "I heard about this from your
6 mum "or something. I don't know what he said. And we
7 were milling around. In fact I'm sure Peter wasn't
8 there, so -- because Peter didn't get involved in these
9 sorts of activities.

10 So I -- I guess we took him for granted, because
11 the only people who knew about this were people who had
12 been told by people who were already involved in
13 the Special Action Group. So you may say that was naive
14 of us but there we are. I have no visual recollection
15 of him.

16 Q. This -- the Special Action Group, having been formed in,
17 what, 1969 or thereabouts, was still ongoing, was it, in
18 May 1972?

19 A. This was a sort of loose social (inaudible) friendship
20 group, yes, so we knew some of the people. And I think
21 ACA R, which you mentioned a meeting of -- a document
22 just now, that was one of the attempts to maintain -- to
23 generate some kind of continuing activity from STST. We
24 were not part of ACA R, but we were an informal group
25 who thought we'd like to do some more stuff on

1 the apartheid question, which was our main preoccupation
2 at the time.

3 I think you should realise that at the time
4 South Africa was the dominant political activity for
5 those who were progressive, just as for some years
6 later, Vietnam became the central activity, as now in
7 the same way Palestine is the centre of activity for
8 people who care about human rights. So you need to
9 understand its status, that we were not just -- not just
10 dilitantes saying let's have a go at South Africa. This
11 was a concern that by then had been going on since
12 the boycott of South African goods started which was ten
13 to 15 years previously. It had been a continuing thread
14 of activity. So we gathered together and we did various
15 actions together. I can't remember all of them, but one
16 of them was around -- there was the publicity we picked
17 up for the trade centre that was going to be --
18 the South African trade centre that was going to be
19 located in St Martin's Lane in a big building there and
20 we did activities to make it clear to people that might
21 be letting it to them that this might cause trouble and
22 we'd demonstrations there.

23 So this was not a one-off activity, the hotel in --
24 in Richmond, but it was probably, I think, the last
25 activity that we did in that way.

1 Q. Right, thank you.

2 Can we now look at some of the documents and try and
3 piece together a kind of -- an account from
4 the available documents, please.

5 Can we have up on screen {MPS/526782}.

6 This is a composite document and so we're going to
7 be sort of do thing around a little bit, I'm afraid.

8 This is the officer's report about events of that
9 day, and he begins his report setting out that this was
10 a -- it started -- it was initiated by a meeting at
11 Ernest Rodker's home address and goes on to say that
12 there were 21 people present.

13 At the bottom of paragraph 2 he says this:

14 "There appeared to be only a small group of three or
15 four who had actually been involved from the beginning
16 in the planning of what might correctly be described as
17 a military style operation. Rodker was the key figure
18 of this group which also included Jonathan Rosenhead."

19 Is that right? Were you and Ernest Rodker two of
20 the main instigators and organisers of the activities of
21 this group, in particular in the planning of this
22 particular event, which you say?

23 A. That's right. I am sure there were others, but we were
24 certainly deeply involved. To call it a military style
25 operation is overestimating the chain of command that we

1 had. It was -- but we did try to think through what you
2 might call a deployment, how we might manage to make
3 the parking lot hard for the coach to get out of. It
4 would have been foolish to go there without thinking
5 that through.

6 Q. Yes.

7 Scrolling on down the document, please.:

8 "Rodkew, with the help of a fairly accurate hand
9 drawn map of the relevant part of Richmond, indicated
10 where people and cars should be positioned according to
11 the ...(Reading to the words)... most eventualities."

12 And paragraph 4 sets out the detailed plan that was
13 to be put in place. (inaudible) who was to do what
14 roles which was governed to a large extent by who had
15 cars. ...(Reading to the words)... it was their job to
16 turn off the fuel supply it to the England ream's coach
17 or otherwise immobilise it, and then to indicate to
18 [Privacy] who would be playing football in a nearly
19 field, that it had been ...(Reading to the words)... and
20 then indicate to ..."

21 Someone who has been transcribed as "PT":

22 "... who would be stationed on Richmond hill looking
23 down upon ...(Reading to the words)... with their cars.
24 After a time lapse of 1 and a half minutes the other
25 three cars, also parked on Richmond hill, were to block

1 the Nightingale Lane car park exit. The drivers of
2 the vehicles were then to lock them up and block
3 the path of the coach with their bodies. To complicate
4 matters further, Rodker had ordered two 'skips' to
5 arrive at the upper car park at 4 pm."

6 You say in your witness statement that you think
7 that sound broadly accurate; is that right, that that
8 was the plan?

9 A. I think it's actually rather impressive. Remember we're
10 doing all this without mobile phones so I'm not quite
11 sure how the signalling was going on. I imagine people
12 up on the hill waving to people down below who could see
13 them all or vice versa. But yes, I'm -- I think Ernest
14 was probably more involved in that than --
15 the organisation than I was, but it looked quite a well
16 thought out plan.

17 Q. You have submitted to the Inquiry a series of printouts
18 of the area. And I don't know quite how this is going
19 to work. Perhaps we could just try to look and see
20 whether we can make it clearer as to the geography.

21 They are at {UCPI/34071}, please. If I can just
22 have that up. If this is simply not going to work then
23 we'll abandon it, but we'll have a go.

24 Is this right, this shows the outside of what was
25 then the Star & Garter hotel; is that right?

1 A. Yes, I think -- I'm guessing this is -- I don't think
2 this is the part of the car park that I was in. This
3 is, I think, a lane that's leading from the main road to
4 the hotel, and then there's another -- sorry, you can't
5 see me. But looking at the picture, off to the left,
6 I think there was another car park, another entrance.
7 I think you come in one way and the other and
8 vice versa.

9 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

10 A. -- I think (inaudible) was on the other side.

11 Q. We've got an aerial view coming up, so perhaps we can
12 scroll on to the next page, please, and I think you'll
13 have to turn the image of that?

14 A. It's a very nice hotel, by the way. My brother had his
15 60th birthday party there as it happens so I was able to
16 revisit.

17 Q. It looks delightful.

18 This shows a slightly different view of the hotel
19 and car park, and you see -- did you say round to
20 the left?

21 A. I think so, this is again from memory.

22 Q. And that appears to be a road leading up if you look at
23 the extreme left of that image, a road leading up past
24 the hotel on a slight incline; is that right?

25 A. Going down -- that I think is the public road, probably.

1 I'm not quite -- I may have got the car parks in
2 the wrong order, but there was a -- one -- I think
3 there's a way in and out from that lane into different
4 parts of the car park.

5 Q. The next image may make it a little bit clearer, because
6 it's a Google Maps image. It may not but we'll just
7 look at it briefly, if you can just help me with this as
8 someone who evidently knows the geography.

9 We can see the little sort of hotel sign in
10 the middle of the image there, the kind of little bed
11 sign, with a road Nightingale Lane leading from there to
12 the Petersham Road and then running a little further up
13 the page, Richmond hill running down the page past
14 the words "the Wick". The parts in white there, that's
15 the hotel premises; is that right? That's the car parks
16 and the hotel itself, and the roads are then in white,
17 Nightingale Lane, Peter sham road and Richmond which
18 will which are the roads we're concerned with, does that
19 sound right?

20 A. Yes, it doesn't actually look at all like how I remember
21 it, but Nightingale Lane is something -- I guess that's
22 probably about a few hundred yards long, I'm not sure.
23 It's not quite as short maybe as it looks there. And
24 it's -- and it's almost a country lane.

25 Q. And a part of the plan was that the -- there are

1 evidently two exits to the car park, the Petersham Road
2 exit and the Nightingale Lane exit. So it looks like
3 there's an exit at the top of Petersham Road going down
4 from the hotel and then the other one leading -- I'm
5 sorry it's very difficult to see?

6 A. I'm sorry, I obviously should have gone back and had
7 a look at it before. They may have changed their
8 arrangements by now.

9 Q. Don't worry.

10 Let's just move on. Next page, please, page 4.
11 Actually, I'm not really sure this is going to assist,
12 but I want you to have an opportunity to look at it
13 since you've provided it.

14 What we can see there is that's in fact the other
15 part of the Star & Garter, isn't it, rather than
16 the hotel?

17 A. That's the (inaudible) building.

18 Q. The Star & Garter hotel --

19 A. That was for ex-servicemen and so Oit's now been
20 converted into luxury flats, I believe, but that's not
21 it.

22 Q. The Star & Garter hotel in fact is at the top left,
23 isn't it, where we can see very faintly
24 written "Nightingale Lane" is just up there
25 and "the Wick"?

1 A. I don't think you can see the Star & Garter hotel from
2 there, as far as I'm aware. I think it's further away
3 than that. It's up at the top of the hill and it's --
4 I think the Petersham Hotel is further down towards
5 the river.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 Over the page, please, {UCPI/34071/5}, page 5 gives
8 a rather more extreme sort of zoom out?

9 A. You can see there the distance is much greater.

10 Q. Yes. So we can see the Wick is right up next to
11 Richmond hill and the restaurant at the Petersham Hotel
12 is down towards Petersham Road right at the bottom of
13 that -- towards the bottom of that stretch?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And then Nightingale Lane leading from
16 the Petersham Hotel to the Petersham Road there.

17 And finally, please, the final one of your documents
18 that you have provided to the Inquiry, which has
19 probably made it the clearest, next page, please, page 6
20 {UCPI/34071/6}, which shows, doesn't it, the car park in
21 a little bit nor detail perhaps, and the positioning of
22 the Petersham Road and Nightingale Lane. Do you know
23 where the individual cars were parked and what entrances
24 were supposed to be blocked? Can you help us with that?

25 A. I can't even remember for sure where the -- where

1 the coach was. I'm pretty sure -- my car was one of
2 the ones which was used to block and I think pretty sure
3 in that car park that's going up the road towards
4 Nightingale Lane. That's my guess, that's where it was.
5 Because I think there was an exit there and we put
6 a couple of cars there to stop the cars getting out too
7 easily.

8 Q. Right.

9 A. And I think there was another exit onto Petersham Road,
10 but it doesn't look as if there is necessarily an exit
11 there. I think the coach was probably located in
12 the shadow that's just behind the hotel, the shadow that
13 the hotel is casting. That would be my best guess.

14 Q. Thank you. Thank you.

15 Can we return please now to {MPS/526782}. And can
16 we turn to page 10 of that document {MPS/526782/10} and
17 just enlarge it a little, please.

18 This is going back to the report by HN298 of
19 the events of that day, and just looking at paragraph 6:

20 "Before departing for Richmond, Rodker gave out
21 the telephone numbers of several solicitors and
22 the NCCL. He destroyed all the notes he had made about
23 the days activities and told the others that if they
24 were arrested it was essential that they should deny
25 having met together previously and should say that they

1 had received a note through the post, outlining
2 the action which had been planned. He added that this
3 was to squash any possibility of a charge for
4 conspiracy."

5 Was it anticipated that, therefore, that you may be
6 arrested for the action that you took on that day?

7 A. I don't think there was any -- I don't remember
8 discussion about conspiracy. It wasn't a major part.
9 This was maybe, like, a little -- little warning that
10 you give to people, you know, like, if -- when people
11 were going out on demonstrations they sometimes --
12 people used to hand out leaflets saying, "If you are
13 arrested, this is what -- this is what your rights are
14 and what you should do". I think this was more a low
15 key precautionary statement. I don't think -- I don't
16 remember being aware of it, I don't remember destroying
17 any -- any notes. I don't think I knew what the law on
18 conspiracy was.

19 Q. It wasn't in anticipation of the commission of any
20 criminal offence, you don't think?

21 A. No, it's just that I think we were vaguely aware that --
22 that things that were not themselves crimes could become
23 a crime if they were -- if you -- if there was
24 conspiracy to do them, and so we didn't want to run that
25 risk. Something in that area anyhow.

1 Q. And can you recall -- you may not -- did you go straight
2 from Mr Rodker's house to the Star & Garter hotel?

3 A. I think I must done. I can't remember -- I don't
4 remember the meeting at Ernest's house or the journey,
5 I just remember being in the car park. But there's been
6 lot of time between the memories to go.

7 Q. Paragraph 8 in this report describes the movement of
8 the cars into the position and the arrival of
9 the police:

10 "By 3.55 pm all were in their allotted positions and
11 almost pleadly the signal was received for Rodker and
12 [Privacy] to leave. After 1 and a half minutes
13 the others departed from the Nightingale Lane exit. As
14 they did so a lorry containing an empty 'skip' turned in
15 front of them and drove into the car park. The three
16 cars followed and were confronted by a police officer,
17 who made no attempt to stop them blocking the coaches
18 exit. They positioned the cars, locked them and left,
19 later to join either demonstrators standing by
20 the coaches with plaque cards. It would appear that
21 the officers presence in the car park had deterred
22 [Privacy] from making any attempt at
23 immobilising the coach."

24 Does that roughly accord with your memory of
25 the episode?

1 A. It's not inconsistent. Certainly I don't remember any
2 detail but there's nothing there that I would see to be
3 wrong.

4 Q. Can we move on to paragraph 10, please. Paragraph 9
5 sets out the attempts to move the vehicles to block
6 the -- that were blocking the passage of the coach and
7 paragraph 10 says:

8 "A melee ensued with the demonstrators sitting on
9 and in front of the vehicles while they were being
10 lifted. One of the hotel staff succeeded in ripping off
11 half the front bumper of one car from its mounting."

12 I think that was in fact your car and the police
13 took responsibility for that damage.

14 Can you recall a melee? Would you have described it
15 as a "melee"?

16 A. No. No, there was a -- there -- a group of people all
17 clustered round the coach and I imagine sitting down,
18 but there was no -- no fisticuffs and nobody was trying
19 to restrain us in my way. By the way, I don't think it
20 was the bumper, I thought it was the roof rack that got
21 damaged, but who knows. It doesn't matter now.

22 The officer may have accepted responsibility for it but
23 I never got any money.

24 Q. Can we just very briefly return to paragraph 5, just
25 slightly up the page. Paragraph 5, the final two

1 sentences of that paragraph:

2 "Rosenhead volunteered the use of three flares which
3 he had with him but there was no much support for this.
4 (Later, at the car park he lit and through a flare)."

5 Can you recall doing that?

6 A. Absolutely not. I think this is possibly mistaken
7 identity. (inaudible) most of this report seems
8 reasonably accurate apart from a slight inflation of
9 language. I -- I wouldn't have even had anything to
10 light the flare with. I have no recollection of ever
11 owning a flare in my life. It seems possibly somebody
12 else, but I don't remember any smoke in the -- or -- or
13 -- or light or anything of that kind in the whole event.
14 It was all a beautiful sunny day and I don't remember
15 anything consistent with that. (inaudible) me I didn't
16 do it, (inaudible) I don't think I did.

17 Q. Let's just look very briefly at another report, please,
18 {MPS/737087}.

19 This is tab 6 of your bundle, Sir.

20 Thank you.

21 Paragraphs -- the second paragraph and the third
22 paragraph. This is the report from the officer -- one
23 of the officers that attended this incident, and
24 the second and third paragraph set out what they found
25 there:

1 "The patrolling officer, SPS attended at once. Just
2 after 4.10 pm about 30 persons arrived and mingled with
3 a crowd of hotel staff and residents and some building
4 workers in this the car park of the hotel. Two of them
5 left More miss mini motor vehicles in the car park
6 entrance at Nightingale Lane, blocking the way ought for
7 the rugby team's coach which was about to leave.

8 "With help from members of the public and police
9 whom he called to the scene, the SPS tried to move one
10 of the vehicles. Then some of the thirty people who had
11 just arrived started sitting down in the road outside
12 the same entrance and completely blocked the way. They
13 did so in groups of three or four at a time. As each
14 group sat, SPS asked them to move. They refused, and
15 they were arrested, whereupon a fresh group replaced
16 them.

17 "fourteen persons ...(Reading to the words)... taken
18 in two advance to this station and charged."

19 Does that accord with your memory of how this
20 episode played out?

21 A. I don't remember it in that detail. I don't remember
22 this idea of people sitting down one by -- you know
23 small groups rather than all together. It could well
24 have happened. I wouldn't substantiate that or deny it.
25 It's -- it's -- it wouldn't make that much difference if

1 we'd all sat down together or done it in groups and
2 I can't quite think why we would have done it in groups
3 but maybe we did.

4 Q. It's right, I think -- from your witness statement it's
5 right I think to say you've got little independent
6 recollection of the court proceedings that followed your
7 arrest. Your first appearance, it seems, was on 14 May.

8 Sorry, we can take that document down now, please.

9 When it appears that not guilty pleas were entered
10 to obstructing a highway and to a new charge of
11 obstructing -- you were charged with obstructing
12 the police on that occasion as well and a not guilty
13 plea entered to that as well.

14 Thereafter you were bailed, it seems, until 14 June
15 and then two meetings took place of your group at
16 private houses. I'm just going to look very briefly at
17 those meetings, please.

18 Can we have up {MPS/737109}.

19 This is a meeting which took place on 21 May, so six
20 or seven days after that first court appearance, at your
21 house, and 13 people were in attendance, including, as
22 we now know, HN298, Mike Scott, and also including
23 Ernest Rodker and Christabel Gurney.

24 This was a meeting, was it not, where you discussed
25 your forthcoming court appearances and how you were

1 proposing to deal with the case in hand; is that right?

2 A. So it seems, yes.

3 Q. Paragraph 2 it's set out there that you had obtained
4 a number of press photographs, and in fact you've
5 submitted a number of photographs with your witness
6 statement. Are those the same photographs that are
7 referred to in that paragraph?

8 A. They must be, yes.

9 Q. Thank you. I'm not going to take you through those, but
10 those have been now published.

11 At paragraph 6, please, if we just scroll down
12 the page slightly.

13 A. Can I just say on that that the stuff about photographs
14 showing people in the road, I was never in the road and
15 yet I was -- I was accused of being in the road. So
16 I don't know whether that was -- as -- as Ernest is
17 reported as saying that he was photographed in the road,
18 I just can't say, but if so, he was the exception. We
19 were not car park. I know it's quite a large car park,
20 as you saw. We were near the hotel and not at the road
21 end.

22 Q. And that formed, I think, the basis of your defence for
23 your trial; is that right?

24 A. And there were photographs.

25 Q. At paragraph 6 -- yes:

1 "Rosenhead next began to compile a list of those who
2 had witnessed the arrest of any of the others, but most
3 could not recollect the more important details that had
4 occurred."

5 And then over the page, please {MPS/737109/2}:

6 "Finally it was agreed that a small group including
7 Rosenhead, Rodker and ... would arrange an interview
8 with Ben Birnberg ... in about 10 days time ...(Reading
9 to the words)... of what had happened."

10 And in fact, you did, I think, speak to a solicitor
11 and arrange for the solicitor to represent the group as
12 a whole; is that right?

13 A. Not just a solicitor, Ben Birnberg is a highly esteemed
14 human rights lawyer (inaudible). He's still alive,
15 I have to say. He's a wonderful guy. I don't --
16 I don't think -- he did become my own solicitor some
17 years later but I don't know who contacted him on this
18 occasion.

19 Q. And the request for notes about what had happened, in
20 fact we have one such set of notes, do we not? I think
21 you have submitted it. Perhaps we can have an extremely
22 brief look at it. {UCPI/33628}, please.

23 That just sets out the sort of covering letter, as
24 it were,:

25 "Herewith my rather uninformative account of

1 the events of that fateful Friday afternoon ..."

2 If we can turn on to page 2, please {UCPI/33628/2}.

3 This is at tab 17, Sir, of the hard copy bundle.

4 It's not terribly easy to read. The top paragraph sets
5 out the movement of the cars that this individual
6 witnessed and the movement of -- the arrival of
7 a delivery van and a skip at the car park, a skip of
8 course having been organised by Ernest Rodker, and
9 the people in the car park.

10 The second paragraph says this:

11 "A smoke flare was set off about 10 minutes after
12 the start of the blocking attempt but well away from
13 the scene of the action."

14 That's probably a reference, isn't it, to the flare
15 that was mentioned in Mike Scott's report but you say
16 don't think that was set off by --

17 A. Well, it might have been me but I just don't remember
18 it. I'm not -- I'm not in a position to deny something
19 I can't remember.

20 Q. The next paragraph reads:

21 "After about twenty minutes most of
22 the demonstrators had disappeared. I could only see
23 Mike Scott and a girl whose name I believe [Privacy]
24 trying to prevent the police from moving a red mini too
25 roughly from the car park entrance."

1 And then in the fourth paragraph this writer says he
2 then saw:

3 "Four demonstrators, including Mike Scott and
4 Ernest Rodker sitting on the grass verge of the road in
5 police custody."

6 You say you weren't aware of the presence of Mike
7 Scott. Does it follow then you can't really recall who
8 was doing what and whether he might have been actively
9 involved in the --

10 A. I didn't -- I didn't know he existed until these --
11 these papers started to emerge.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 Can we move on, please, to the next document. I'm
14 going to take this quite shortly {MPS/737108}. This is
15 a report of the second meeting of some of those arrested
16 after that demonstration at the Star & Garter held very
17 shortly before your second appearance at court. This is
18 on 11 June.

19 Again, Mike Scott, the undercover officer, was
20 present at this meeting. It appears at that this
21 meeting you gave an account about your meeting with
22 the solicitor Ben Birnberg. Can you recall giving such
23 an account? Perhaps you can't.

24 A. The account being what, sorry?

25 Q. An account of your meeting with Ben Birnberg.

1 A. I can't see that in the text. Rosenhead (inaudible) who
2 knows what I --

3 Q. It may not much matter.

4 Perhaps we can just move on to paragraph 7, please?

5 A. Because it's all deleted that I can't -- I've got really
6 no recollection of what it might have been that -- that
7 I was reporting. That might have helped, but ...

8 Q. Some matters have been redacted from this document
9 because they contain matters of legal professional
10 privilege, which is why they can't be --

11 A. Yeah, I wasn't objecting, I was just explaining why
12 I couldn't, yeah --

13 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

14 A. -- (inaudible).

15 Q. Paragraph 7, can I just ask this:

16 "There was some concern over the costs of the case
17 and there was unanimous agreement that these should be
18 defrayed equally regardless of individual fines and
19 cost. Rodker suggested forming a defence fund as
20 a means of raising a proportion of the expenses and it
21 was decided to set up 'The Richmond Defence Fund'.
22 [Privacy] agreed to impart an appeal in 'Peace News 'and
23 Rosenhead added ...(Reading to the words)... AAM."

24 Was it anticipated that the Anti-Apartheid Movement
25 might be able to meet some of your defence costs?

1 A. There was no expectation but it was an exploration that
2 since Cristabel has been very involved from then until
3 now with anti-apartheid matters that she would be able
4 to find out if they would do it.

5 Q. Just moving on very briefly, please to, paragraph 8:

6 "The only fundamental difference to be resolved was
7 that at least three of the number ..."

8 A sets out the names there:

9 "... wanted to try to establish what they described
10 as 'a precedent' for furthering Mackensie
11 representation'. Not only did that he want, as is
12 traditionally permitted, a layman in the court who could
13 suggest lines of questioning for the defendant to pursue
14 but furthermore a lay month who was able to represent
15 them in the same way that a solicitor might. They
16 anticipated that the magistrate would not permit this
17 and that they would be granted a further remand of one
18 month for their case to be presented to the Queen's
19 bench division."

20 Do you recollect a further demand, after your case
21 was heard on 14 June it doesn't appear you were
22 convicted on that day unlike others. Might you have
23 been part of this group that sort of the furthering of
24 Mackensie representation? if you don't remember --

25 A. I didn't understand why I was -- I think Ernest was

1 remanded as well for a further period and I didn't know
2 why I wasn't out with -- some people went out summarily
3 on the occasion and others were not ^, and I noticed
4 others got a bigger fine. Some people got £2 fine and
5 I got a £10 fine and I don't know why I was privileged
6 in that way. I didn't do more than of others, it was
7 the same offence.

8 MS HUMMERSTONE: Sir, I notice the time. I've only got two
9 more reports left to look at. It's likely to take about
10 ten minutes. I don't know whether it's more sensible to
11 complete this now before breaking or whether to adjourn
12 for lunch and come back at -- sorry, I'm told
13 the shorthand writer requires a break: I'm awfully
14 sorry. But I've literally got ten minutes more.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: May I just ask the shorthand writer through
16 you, please, to reconsider? You've got ten minutes
17 left. We then have to have a quarter of an hour break
18 to permit anyone who has any questions to put them to
19 you. It may well be that Mr Ryder wants to re-examine
20 and all of that is going to take just well into
21 the lunch break if we run until we finish.

22 It would seem to me to be sensible for you to finish
23 your ten minutes now and for us to break for lunch when
24 all of those things can take place without interrupting
25 proceedings further, otherwise Ms Gurney is going to be,

1 I think, unreasonably delay.

2 MS HUMMERSTONE: I'm told that the shorthand writer is
3 agreeable to that course, so we can complete this now,
4 I'm grateful.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: May I just confirm with Professor Rosenhead
6 that that doesn't inconvenience him?

7 A. That's fine.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Good.

9 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you very much.

10 The penultimate report, please {MPS/526782}, which
11 is the composite that we've already looked at but I want
12 to just look at a different page of it, please.

13 And can we go to page 4, please. {MPS/526782/4}.
14 Paragraph 6 of that. This is about your appearance in
15 court on 14 June of 1972. Paragraph 6 indicates:

16 "At the conclusion of the proceedings
17 Christabel Gurney and Mike Scott HN298 were ... found
18 guilty [and] find and conditionally discharged."

19 Not quote.

20 But at paragraph 5 it appears that your case and
21 that of Ernest Rodker were adjourned until 28 June.
22 Have you got any recollection of why that happened?

23 A. No, and apparently there were two other people as well
24 us and I have no idea why we were selected for this
25 treatment. Sorry.

1 Q. Can we go back, please, to page 3 of this document just
2 to see if this sheds any light on it. It may not, but
3 I just want to ask you. {MPS/526782/3}.

4 This is the SDS management report on this incident
5 reporting back as to what had happened from HN294, who
6 was the DI of the SDS at the time, who says that, in
7 the third paragraph down, having said that various
8 appeared on 14 June:

9 "The remaining seven asked for these cases to be
10 heard at a higher court and have been further remanded
11 until 28.6.72."

12 Can you recall requesting that your case was heard
13 by the Crown Court?

14 A. I assume this was part of the advice by Ben Birnberg and
15 I assume that he was saying there was an advantage to
16 going to a higher court. Maybe you can express your
17 arguments in a fuller way, I don't know. And I guess
18 that the people -- the seven who didn't do that were
19 ones who just wanted to get it disposed of now and not
20 have to come back again another time. So I assume it
21 was that sort of self selection rather than anything
22 else.

23 Q. We can take that document down now, please.

24 The point at issue during your trial, you say in
25 your witness statement, was the location of

1 the demonstration and whether or not you were
2 obstructing a highway or simply impeding the progress of
3 the coach in the car park; is that right? That was
4 the main --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- force ^ of that issue.

7 A. That was the issue about whether we were guilty as
8 charged. Obviously the main issue was about apartheid
9 South Africa, but that was not --

10 Q. No, that was the main issue -- that was the main point
11 at issue during the course of the court proceedings.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you say that whilst you have no independent
14 recollection of the court proceedings, you assume you
15 pleaded guilty and had a trial on that issue?

16 A. Plead not guilty.

17 Q. Not guilty and had a trial?

18 A. Yes. I remember that must have been 28 June.

19 Q. And you say you seem to remember that you gave evidence
20 that you were in the car park and you seem to remember
21 others saying the same; is that right?

22 A. Yes. I'd just like to say my mother -- my late mother
23 was a magistrate up in Liverpool and she knows that
24 I tell the truth and she also knew that police officers
25 tell the truth. So what I told her what happened with

1 police officers basically lying through their teeth
2 about where we were she found this rather -- a lot of
3 cognitive dissonance. She didn't know how to handle it.
4 She couldn't believe that police officers would lie or
5 that I did. So I recall this issue very acutely because
6 of that.

7 Q. Yes, yes.

8 The final document I want to just very briefly look
9 at is {MPS/737126}, please. And whilst that's just
10 being obtained, you say that you seem to remember giving
11 evidence you seem to remember others giving evidence.
12 Can you recall, does it follow, since you can't recall
13 Mike Scott at all, you can't recall whether he would
14 have given evidence during the course of the trial?

15 A. No, no.

16 Q. Or in fact whether he was in the same court proceedings
17 at that stage as you were?

18 A. He -- he was remanded to the higher court as well, was
19 he?

20 Q. No, it doesn't appear so.

21 A. So, the proceedings in the first court were extremely
22 abbreviated as I recall, because they processed it all
23 very quickly.

24 I think the fact that he was there is outrageous
25