

Thursday, 29 April 2021

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the fourth day of evidential hearings in Tranche 1 Phase 2 at the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

My name is Neil Fernandes and I am the hearings manager. For those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone, unless you're invited to speak by the Chairman, as Zoom will pick up on all noises and you will be on screen.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

For the first 20 minutes or so, we're going to hear Ms Monahan summarising the evidence of an undercover officer, and analysing the documents produced by another undercover officer who has not produced a witness statement.

Ms Monahan.

Summary of evidence of HN299/HN342 & HN344

MS MONAHAN: Thank you, Sir.

Good morning.

HN299, HN342, "David Hughes".

HN299 served on the SDS from 1971 to 1976. He

1 reported on the International Marxist Group throughout
2 his deployment but also on various other left-wing
3 groups linked to the IMG and groups campaigning on Irish
4 matters. Publication of his real name is restricted.

5 HN299 served in Special Branch before his posting to
6 the SDS. Unusually for a police officer, he used to
7 wear a beard, and he recalls that on a visit to
8 Scotland Yard in 1968, this led to a senior
9 Special Branch officer tasking him to attend Vietnam
10 Solidarity Campaign, or VSC, meetings to get information
11 on forthcoming London demonstrations and
12 the planned march from Aldermaston.

13 Wearing casual clothes, and he thinks using a fake
14 name, he attended a number of meetings between February
15 and April 1968, where he was able to gather a lot of
16 information about upcoming protests, including
17 the 17 March 1968 VSC demonstration.

18 He further recalls reporting to senior management
19 that VSC members were planning to throw stones at
20 the Daily Mirror building, in response to perceived
21 negative coverage of anti-Vietnam War protesters in its
22 sister paper in Germany. When activists turned up, they
23 were surprised by a large police presence.

24 HN299 recalls that senior management were very
25 pleased with these reports, which earned him

1 a commendation. He believes that the success of this
2 reporting may have contributed to the genesis of
3 the SDS.

4 Other than his reporting on the VSC in 1968, HN299
5 states that he did no further undercover work in
6 Special Branch before joining the SDS.

7 In 1971, the chief inspector of the SDS,
8 Phil Saunders, recruited HN299. He believes that
9 Phil Saunders considered him suitable for the job
10 because of his earlier reporting on the VSC.

11 While he has no recollection of the content of his
12 initial conversation with Phil Saunders, he thinks it
13 likely that he told him about SDS work, and he remembers
14 it as quite informal in tone. He joined the SDS fairly
15 soon afterwards.

16 Married at the time, he thinks that no managers
17 spoke to his spouse about his new role and the possible
18 impact on his family life.

19 He had no training, formal or informal, for the role
20 of an undercover officer, and believes he was deployed
21 soon after joining the SDS. Despite the lack of formal
22 training, he states that as Special Branch officers,
23 they knew, or should have known, how appropriately to
24 conduct themselves once deployed, and that he
25 understands that SDS management tried to select officers

1 who could be trusted to exercise good common sense and
2 sound judgment.

3 His cover name, "David Hughes", he thinks he made
4 up. It was not the identity of a deceased child. His
5 cover background was that he'd come down from Glasgow
6 looking for work.

7 HN299 recalls that he went up to Glasgow soon after
8 joining the SDS and knocked on the door of well known
9 Glaswegian left wing activist Tony Southall. He
10 introduced himself and said he was interested in getting
11 involved in left wing politics. Tony Southall was
12 friendly and encouraging. And in the field, HN299 then
13 alluded to his friendship with Tony Southall as a way of
14 burnishing his credentials. It helped his cover when
15 Tony Southall came down to London for meetings and
16 demonstrations and HN299 was able to be seen talking to
17 him.

18 He had a driving licence in his cover name but no
19 other cover documentation. Within six months of being
20 deployed, HN299 obtained cover employment as a van
21 driver for a carpet supply and fitting business, an
22 arrangement which was approved by the SDS office.

23 HN299 had a number of cover flats throughout London,
24 moving from one to the next when the groups on which he
25 reported changed the locations of their meetings. He

1 got his first cover flat soon after entering the field
2 and spent six to eight weeks visiting places in
3 the local area, such as pubs, shops and the library, to
4 establish his cover background. Once this was done, he
5 started attending meetings.

6 When he joined the SDS, HN299 recalls that he was
7 not tasked to infiltrate specific groups but was
8 instructed to attend meetings. He found information on
9 left wing meetings in the "Agit Prop" section of
10 Time Out. And as he had the autonomy to choose which
11 ones to attend, he went to whichever looked most
12 interesting.

13 He asserts that, to a large extent, he was left to
14 his own devices.

15 HN299 claims that the IMG is the group most likely
16 to have regarded him an informal member, and he reported
17 on it throughout his deployment. He describes falling
18 in with the IMG after meeting people at publicly
19 advertised meetings, who then invited him to other
20 meetings.

21 He thinks that the North London Claimant's Union
22 might also have considered him an informal member, as
23 was involved with them for two to three years, and he
24 recalls involvement with the International Socialists.

25 The documents show that he reported on several

1 different groups: International Solidarity Campaign, or
2 ISC, the Anti-Internment League, or AIL, Tottenham
3 Red Circle, Fight On, the Troops Out Movement, or TOM,
4 and on members of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and
5 People's Democracy. He also reported on Marxist and
6 Marxist-Leninist discussion groups, held in private
7 addresses. He recalls that the groups he infiltrated
8 were not very organised with no formal membership
9 registers and with people constantly drifting in and
10 out. The reports show that the groups had aims,
11 activities and members in common.

12 HN299 recalls hearing about most meetings he
13 attended through word of mouth.

14 He remembers very limited verbal participation in
15 meetings, and he held no positions of responsibility.
16 After meetings, he would sometimes go for a drink with
17 group members.

18 Throughout his deployment, HN299 believes he
19 attended between one and six meetings per week, and
20 quite often a demonstration on the weekend.

21 As he would report on every meeting and most
22 demonstrations he attended, he is certain that many of
23 his reports are missing, such as those on a Marxist
24 Class in Streatham, most on the North London
25 Claimant's Union, most from the year 1973, and a number

1 on forthcoming demonstrations and future meetings. He
2 notes that none of his telephone reports, in which he
3 would impart urgent information, appear in his pack.

4 HN299 would submit his handwritten reports, which
5 were similar in style and content to his Special Branch
6 reports on groups or events, to the SDS office, who
7 would type them up and make additions, such as file
8 references.

9 HN299 states that his previous experience of
10 Special Branch reporting meant that when he joined
11 the SDS, he knew the kind of information that would be
12 of interest. He understood that he was expected to find
13 out whatever information he could on the groups with
14 which he came into contact.

15 In particular, the SDS office were interested in any
16 advanced notification of an event which might present
17 a public order issue, any information material to public
18 order policing at forthcoming events, the identity of
19 attendees at meetings and demonstrations, particularly
20 those considered active, rather than occasional
21 participants, any major changes within a group and
22 the identities of those in charge of the groups and
23 those who decided policy.

24 In his reports on meetings and attendees, he would
25 include the names of people he had not encountered

1 previously, in case they became prominent in future, and
2 he acknowledges that they would sometimes have no
3 further involvement with the group.

4 In relation to upcoming demonstrations, he would
5 report whatever information he came across, and
6 understood that it would be used as part of a broader
7 Special Branch assessment of how best to police that
8 demonstration.

9 HN299 believes that his reports on upcoming events
10 assisted in making sure uniformed officers were present
11 in the right numbers, and that they were ready to deal
12 with potential issues when HN299 knew they might arise,
13 such as groups splintering off from the main body of the
14 protest. In this way, he believes his reporting helped
15 uniformed police effectively to manage demonstrations.

16 A possible example is a report on a Fight On film
17 show before a TOM demonstration. HN299 recalls that it
18 included a film of left wing demonstrators breaking up
19 a large fascist open-air meeting in Milan by routing
20 the 10,000 police officers present, and that
21 the intention of showing emotive films immediately prior
22 to political demonstrations was "clearly to whip up
23 a militant aggressive mood in demonstrators".

24 He states that he believed it was important to
25 impart to Special Branch that demonstrations arranged by

1 Fight On were more likely to turn violent and for
2 uniformed police to prepare appropriately.

3 The first report in HN299's pack is dated
4 11 November 1971, but he thinks it unlikely that this is
5 the first he submitted.

6 In it, HN299 records that one of the attendees at
7 the small Spartacus League/IMG meeting in an
8 individual's bedroom was a bank robber with a history of
9 violence.

10 In a report regarding meetings to discuss tactics
11 and policy for an upcoming students' demonstration, at
12 which Piers Corbyn is present, HN299 reports a request
13 for "three volunteers to take part in a special task
14 during the demonstration which would include breaking
15 the law".

16 HN299 also reports on members of the IMG being
17 instructed to join the Labour Party, in anticipation of
18 a split within it.

19 HN299 states that he was aware during his deployment
20 of IMG efforts to infiltrate the Labour Party as
21 a vehicle to achieve national prominence. He asserts
22 that while he was not specifically tasked by the SDS
23 office to obtain intelligence about subversion, he was
24 aware that the infiltration of the Labour Party and
25 trade unions by "extreme political groups" was of

1 concern to both Special Branch and the Security Service,
2 and so he reported on it when it arose. He believes
3 that his reporting helped the Security Service to
4 discharge their duties in relation to
5 counter-subversion.

6 He further states that while the IMG's entry into
7 the Labour Party was subversive, it was ultimately
8 unsuccessful and that generally the people on whom he
9 reported talked a lot about revolution and attended many
10 demonstrations, but did not actually engage in
11 subversive activities.

12 HN299 states that he also reported on the IMG
13 attempting to reach positions of prominence in TOM for
14 the reasons that some of its members advocated violence
15 to achieve its political aims; and as such, in his
16 opinion, an IMG-controlled TOM could present a serious
17 threat to public order.

18 There are additional reports on larger IMG
19 gatherings which feature core participants to
20 the Inquiry, such as Tariq Ali and Piers Corbyn.

21 HN299 submits in evidence that Piers Corbyn was
22 someone whom he recognised but to whom he does not
23 recall talking during his deployment, other than perhaps
24 in passing.

25 HN299 also reports on a Marxist study session

1 introduced by core participant Richard Chessum and
2 attended by "Mary".

3 The documents show that HN299 reported on the IMG's
4 attitudes towards the IRA, and he states that this was
5 because Special Branch closely monitored the IRA and
6 organisations that were supporting them, and passed
7 information on to the Security Service.

8 HN299 reports on plans by the ISC, which was linked
9 to the IMG, to carry out collections for the IRA around
10 building sites, and also on Peter Gowan's assertion at
11 a pre-conference meeting for London members of the IMG
12 that its political committee intended changing their
13 official slogan on Ireland from "Victory to the IRA" to
14 "Solidarity with the IRA". He asserts that the IMG's
15 support for the IRA during his deployment was limited to
16 verbal statements and to attending demonstrations
17 advocating Irish Republicanism.

18 Attitudes to the IRA are also a feature of HN299's
19 reports on groups campaigning on Irish matters. He
20 records the defection of an anarchist member of
21 the People's Democracy to the North London
22 Claimant's Union because of the former
23 group's "unconditional" support for the Provisionals'
24 bombing campaign in Northern Ireland.

25 He states in evidence that support for

1 indiscriminate violence by the IRA was not particularly
2 common in the groups he infiltrated. And while many
3 more supported targeted attacks against the state and
4 capitalist interests, more than half of those he met who
5 supported Irish Republicanism were opposed to the use of
6 lethal violence.

7 On occasion, HN299's reporting reflected his
8 personal views. In one report, on an occupation of
9 a section of Eton's playing fields by AIL members, HN299
10 describes the protesters' arguments as "always
11 pathetic". And the demonstrators as "a crowd of
12 argumentative, half-inebriated Irish labourers".

13 HN299 accepts that the tone of this report is
14 sarcastic, and states that the SDS office never told him
15 that this was inappropriate and/or not permitted.

16 In another report, HN299 describes a speech on
17 Women's Liberation as confining itself almost entirely
18 to an attack upon men at the conference, which
19 apparently elicited "squeals of delight" from female
20 members of the audience. He describes the female
21 members as completely dominating the session, as if to
22 emphasise their liberation using "obscenities to
23 punctuate their prose" and as running onto the stage as
24 often as possible for "maximum effect".

25 A report on a Marxist class records an attendee's

1 belief that come the socialist revolution in England,
2 2 million people who presented a permanent threat to its
3 continuance, including senior police officers,
4 particularly those in Special Branch, members of
5 the Security Service and all members of the Conservative
6 Party, would have to be liquidated.

7 HN299 notes in his statement that while some members
8 of this class shared this belief and that such views
9 were present to varying degrees in activist groups like
10 the IMG, a majority of the activists he met through his
11 deployment were not that extreme.

12 In a report on a discussion at a study class, HN299
13 reports an individual's assertion that unmasked police
14 spies present in left wing groups should get a "good
15 hiding". He does not recall that such comments made him
16 feel particularly threatened; and as he remembers,
17 the report prompted no extra measures from SDS
18 management to protect his welfare.

19 While HN299 believes he was trusted by group
20 members, he recalls that they quite often urged others
21 to be on the constant lookout for Special Branch spies.

22 Unlike most of his SDS colleagues, HN299 joined
23 a trade union while under cover, the Transport and
24 General Workers Union, to bolster his cover. He states
25 that he attended some meetings, but probably did not

1 report them because "those meetings would be covered by
2 an ordinary Special Branch officer".

3 HN299 states that at meetings at the SDS safe house,
4 which took place two to three times a week,
5 undercover officers would sometimes speak to managers
6 about activist meetings they had been to in front of
7 other officers. If involved in similar activities,
8 officers might discuss group-related matters with one
9 another, sometimes when managers were present.

10 He recalls that the chief inspector or inspector of
11 the SDS would usually come to safe house meetings and
12 would at times task officers to go to a particular
13 meeting or demonstration.

14 He also recalls very occasionally asking for and
15 being provided with a Special Branch file about a person
16 with whom he had come across while deployed.

17 Occasionally at the safe flat someone would cook a meal
18 and the UCOs and managers would eat together.

19 During his deployment, HN299 would speak to
20 the office daily to let managers know that he was okay.
21 While he believes that management were conscious and
22 aware of officers' welfare, HN299 states that it was
23 nonetheless incumbent on an officer to raise with
24 the SDS office any serious welfare issues experienced
25 while undercover.

1 During his deployment, HN299 recalls then
2 commissioner, Sir Robert Mark, visiting the SDS safe
3 flat, and saying something to the effect that, "You
4 realise that you could cause me tremendous problems
5 under certain circumstances."

6 His deployment, which lasted approximately 240
7 weeks, ended in 1976.

8 HN299 gradually went to fewer meetings, and then
9 stopped attending them entirely, telling people he was
10 returning to Glasgow. His withdrawal strategy was
11 planned and agreed with the SDS office.

12 HN299 does not recall witnessing any public disorder
13 whilst deployed, and states that he did not participate
14 in any. He asserts that he witnessed no violence to
15 people or property and was involved in none. He was not
16 arrested, charged or convicted of a criminal offence
17 while serving undercover, and he did not appear in
18 criminal proceedings as a witness. There is no evidence
19 that he engaged in sexual activity while in his cover
20 identity.

21 That concludes the summary of this officer.

22 In addition to the witness statement and documents
23 for this officer, the Inquiry is also publishing today
24 documents in relation to HN344, whose cover name was
25 "Ian Cameron", and who reported on

1 the Anti-Internment League and the Northern Minorities
2 Defence Force. And this analysis can be found at
3 pages 90 to 92 of Counsel to the Inquiry's written
4 opening statement.

5 Thank you.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. We will now, I think,
7 adjourn for approximately ten minutes, while
8 arrangements are made to resume ordinary evidential
9 hearings.

10 Thank you.

11 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take
12 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room
13 to join your break-out rooms, please. The time is now
14 10.20 am, so we shall resume at 10.30 am. Thank you.

15 (10.20 am)

16 (A short break)

17 (10.30 am)

18 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome back.

19 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
20 proceedings.

21 Chairman.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 As at the beginning of every live evidential
24 session, a recording made earlier is going to be played.
25 If you're listening to it for the first time, please

1 listen carefully.

2 I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,
3 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make
4 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including
5 its hearings.

6 In the exercise of that power, I have made a number
7 of orders which affect what you may and may not do in
8 the hearing rooms and after you leave them. Breach of
9 any of the orders is a serious matter and may have
10 serious consequences for you.

11 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an
12 order, I have the power to certify the matter to
13 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
14 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
15 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
16 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
17 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
18 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
19 sequestration of their assets.

20 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
21 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
22 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
23 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
24 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
25 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any

1 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
2 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
3 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing
4 room to any other person, but only once at least
5 ten minutes have elapsed since the event which you are
6 describing took place.

7 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
8 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public
9 disclosure of information, for example about
10 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
11 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,
12 whether by accident or design, information which I have
13 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
14 be disclosed in a hearing.

15 If and when that happens, I will immediately suspend
16 the hearing and make an order prohibiting further
17 disclosure of the information outside the hearing rooms.
18 The consequence will be that no further disclosure of
19 that information may be made by mobile telephone or
20 other portable electronic device from within the hearing
21 room, or by any means outside it.

22 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is
23 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
24 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
25 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to

1 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
2 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
3 evidence as I will hear, and to reach your own
4 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
5 best to ensure that you can.

6 If you have any doubt about the terms of this
7 message, or what you may or may not do, you should not
8 hesitate to ask one of them and, with my help if
9 necessary, they will provide you with the answer.

10 PROFESSOR JONATHAN ROSENHEAD (called)

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Professor Rosenhead, can you hear me?

12 Professor Rosenhead, can you hear me? It may be you
13 are still on mute, if, like me, you find the use of
14 these devices problematic to start with --

15 A. I'm there now.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: You were on mute.

17 A. Yes, I was, yes. Can you hear me?

18 THE CHAIRMAN: That is a mistake we all make repeatedly at
19 the start of the use of these machines.

20 A. Yes.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: You are about to give evidence. Do you wish
22 to affirm or to swear an oath?

23 A. To affirm.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Then may you please be affirmed.

25 (Witness affirmed)

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Ms Hummerstone.

2 Questions by MS HUMMERSTONE

3 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you, Sir.

4 Professor Rosenhead, your name appears in SDS
5 reports relating to activities in particular of
6 Stop the Seventy Tour. I'm going to ask you some
7 questions about that; and in particular of the reports
8 that have been attributed to three SDS officers,
9 Mike Ferguson, HN135, Jill Mosdell, HN346, and "Mike
10 Scott", HN298.

11 Before we begin, I just want to make it clear that
12 the Inquiry notes your concerns raised in your witness
13 statement and your requests for further information
14 about Special Branch interest in your activities. Of
15 course, this Inquiry is confined to looking into
16 the activities of the SDS, rather than a wider inquiry
17 into Special Branch as a whole. And so we're going to
18 confine our interest in the SDS for today's purposes.

19 With that said, can I just ask you a few sort of
20 contextual questions about Stop the Seventy Tour,
21 please.

22 Is it right it was formed in September 1969, with
23 the short-term aim of stopping the British tour of
24 the South African cricket team, which was due to
25 commence in June of the following year, but the wider

1 purpose was to isolate apartheid South Africa and
2 ultimately to bring an end to apartheid in South Africa?
3 Is that a sort of brief overview of the aims and
4 purposes of the Stop the Seventy Tour?

5 A. Yes, that is correct. A sporting boycott was one of
6 the mechanisms for bringing pressure to bear on
7 South Africa, and one of the more effective ones. It
8 had already started, but STST racked it up a notch,
9 I think.

10 Q. And they used the South African rugby team that was
11 touring in 1969 to 1970 to promote their aims, is that
12 right, that by direct action at matches of
13 the South African rugby touring team; is that right?

14 A. Yes, the focus was on cricket, and only after a little
15 while did we realise that there was a rugby tour about
16 to come up, and therefore we should probably try and, as
17 it were, develop our tactics and the pressure during
18 that.

19 Q. And in fact, the tactics proved to be successful,
20 because the invitation for the South African rugby team
21 was in fact withdrawn very shortly before they were due
22 to arrive in the UK; is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: The cricket team, I think.

25 MS HUMMERSTONE: Sorry, cricket team. I'm terribly sorry.

- 1 Of course.
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Dealing now, please, briefly, with the generality of
4 the activities that were undertaken by the
5 Stop the Seventy Tour, the target of the activism was
6 the rugby team, is that right -- that's what you said in
7 your witness statement -- by the STST, and they targeted
8 rugby grounds, the hotels used by the rugby team and
9 other venues used by the team; is that right?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And also cricket grounds where matches were to be played
12 by the visiting South African team in June 1970?
- 13 A. Yes, to a lesser extent, because the tour didn't take
14 place, but there was some preparatory activity.
- 15 Q. And the aim, you said in your witness statement, was to
16 disrupt the activities of the team through what you have
17 called "non-violent direct action"; is that right?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. And by that, you mean it was not part of any plan by
20 those that coordinated the activities of
21 the Stop the Seventy Tour for a plan to use violence
22 towards any person, and so it's not part of their plan
23 for demonstrators themselves to be violent towards any
24 person; is that right?
- 25 A. I would put it more strongly. It wasn't just that it

1 wasn't a part of our plan, it was a part of our plan
2 that there should be no violence.

3 Q. And you would use instead what you have called "peaceful
4 civil disobedient methods".

5 By "civil disobedience", you don't mean, do you,
6 entirely non-criminal behaviour? It could include some
7 criminal behaviour, for example obstructing the highway,
8 obstructing the police, matters of that nature?

9 A. This had already happened of course on quite a large
10 scale in the Committee of 100 demonstrations in
11 the early 60s, and we had the same philosophy of
12 actually, in a sense, offering ourself up -- up as
13 sacrifices to the law, to demonstrate that there were
14 things that we thought were outrageous, and this was one
15 way we could do it. So there were breaches of minor --
16 minor criminal law, like obstructing the highway.

17 Q. And the tactics were used to cause maximum inconvenience
18 or to actively prevent matches taking place, or players
19 from going about their business; is that right?

20 A. I wouldn't say maximal inconvenience, I think sufficient
21 inconvenience for it to be noticed, noticed not only by
22 the players and the management, but noticed by
23 the public, because obviously the -- we needed to get
24 the British public to be aware that a team which
25 was racially selected and representing an abhorrent

1 regime was visiting the country. And it wasn't just
2 that the people in the ground should know that, but
3 people more generally should, and be recruited to
4 the cause.

5 Q. And part of that way of publicising those aims was
6 the organisation of mass demonstrations; is that right?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. And I think you say in your witness statement
9 the Stop the Seventy Tour attracted tens of thousands to
10 their demonstrations?

11 A. Yes. I don't remember the exact number. Certainly
12 tens, perhaps even hundreds of thousands in aggregate.
13 I'm not sure what the biggest demonstration was.
14 I think possibly it was in Dublin, in fact, when
15 the team -- rugby team went there. But there were
16 certainly many thousands at a number of different
17 demonstrations.

18 Q. You have said there was no vetting in particular of
19 participants in those demonstrations. Perhaps it
20 follows that there couldn't be if there were tens of
21 thousands of participants?

22 A. I think I need to say that although I see in the record
23 that I attended all kinds of meetings that were taking
24 decisions about the Stop the Seventy Tour as a whole,
25 they don't -- I don't really recall those meetings.

1 I don't think I was central to the planning of those --
2 those demonstrations at all, because by that stage I was
3 more involved in the -- what were called the Special
4 Action Group.

5 Q. We'll come on to that in a moment. I just want to sort
6 of contextualise your activities --

7 A. Yes. I'm apologising for my lack of memory of those
8 other meetings that were organising the public
9 demonstrations.

10 Q. Quite understood, Professor Rosenhead.

11 It follows, though, doesn't it, if there are tens of
12 thousands of participants on a march, nobody could be
13 sure of the dispositions of the individual marchers?

14 A. There can be no vetting of -- going back to your
15 previous question -- of people who are told that there
16 is an event and they can turn up. I think we would have
17 published our intentions that it should be entirely
18 non-violent, and have done that in every way possible,
19 presumably with stewards and leaflets and things like
20 that. But there's no way you can control a lot of
21 individuals; they will do their own thing. But on
22 the whole, I think they did comply.

23 Q. One of the other tactics used was that of pitch
24 invasion; is that right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Demonstrators would get onto the pitch to prevent --
2 either to halt play, or to prevent players from coming
3 out onto the pitch.

4 And I think you say in your witness statement, on
5 one occasion you yourself invaded a pitch and were
6 removed by the police; is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And I think you've said removed by the police before
9 the rugby players succumbed to the temptation to beat
10 you up; is that right?

11 A. It was quite scary because I'm not very big and they
12 looked very angry.

13 Q. A match in a sizeable stadium like, for example,
14 Twickenham, or a match like that, could attract,
15 couldn't it, tens of thousands of spectators? If it was
16 a popular match, the stands would be full of tens of
17 thousands of people?

18 A. Yes, and the one that I got on the pitch for -- I tried
19 several, but I'm not very good at climbing fences.
20 So -- but I did succeed in Aldershot, and the spectators
21 there were very significantly drawn from the armed
22 forces. So it was not just the people on the pitch who
23 were a bit threatening, so -- so were the -- those in
24 the -- who were spectators.

25 Q. And I think you make that clear in your witness

1 statement, that the atmosphere or the threat of
2 violence, you felt, came from the direction of the rugby
3 supporters?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. But it's right to say, isn't it, that that sort of pitch
6 invasion, or that sort of disruption, creates a
7 potential, doesn't it, for public disorder on a rather
8 large scale; if you've got a lot of people in the stands
9 angry and upset about the disruption of their match,
10 there's a potential for a form of public disorder?

11 A. I suppose that depends upon the stewarding really.
12 I remember seeing the evidence that Ernest Rodker, whose
13 evidence was read out yesterday, that -- by his son,
14 that he was kicked by the spectators while being carried
15 out. That didn't happen to me. And the stewarding
16 seemed to work okay; the police took us off the field to
17 a room they had and then they photographed us.

18 By the way, those photographs should have been
19 destroyed, since we were charged with nothing. And it
20 was only years later that somebody pointed out to me --
21 I think it was in a local paper -- that the police had
22 held on to these. So presumably the police were guilty
23 of an offence at least as serious as mine. Perhaps more
24 so, because they're under some kind of duty to obey
25 the law more than me.

1 Q. Would it be fair to say that the potential for some form
2 of public disorder contributed, at least in part, to
3 the success of the campaign to withdraw the invitation
4 for the South African cricket team, that it would
5 perhaps be difficult to police and difficult to manage,
6 and therefore the invitation was withdrawn?

7 A. You'd need to ask the government of the day; and of
8 course most of those people are dead now. But it was --
9 the invitation was withdrawn at the very last minute,
10 you know, only about a week before the tour.

11 My impression was that it was the escalating size of
12 the demonstrations. Which were peaceful, but were very,
13 very large and getting bigger. I have the impression
14 that that was the main reason. If this was happening
15 with a rugby tour, rugby being a minority sport, and
16 cricket coming down the road, and already there was
17 a lot of disquiet about the exclusion of
18 Basil D'Oliveira, a player of colour, who had been
19 selected for the British test team and then
20 the South Africans said they wouldn't have him.

21 So there was a lot of animus already among
22 the British population, not only cricket lovers, about
23 this (inaudible) to cricket, so that was expected to
24 escalate, I think.

25 Q. The activities of the Stop the Seventy Tour, is this

1 right, depended on leaks regarding the itinerary of
2 the touring rugby team? I think you say in your witness
3 statement that Lord Peter Hain had a contact who had
4 leaked details of their itinerary, and so it was known
5 where they were going to be at any given time, and then
6 direct activities could be organised to coincide with
7 their arrivals at various destinations; is that right?

8 A. Yes, but to the best of my knowledge, that information
9 was not used in any way to organise the big
10 demonstrations. Those were only set pieces at the -- at
11 the grounds, not -- it wasn't using any prior
12 information.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 Does it follow that some of the smaller episodes of
15 direct action were activities arranged at the last
16 minute? When the details of the itinerary were leaked?

17 A. I don't know how last-minute -- we would -- I never
18 actually saw the details of this. The information would
19 get through. I was in a little subgroup called
20 the "Special Action Group", and we would receive that
21 information. And I was never the one that received it,
22 so I'm not quite sure when it was received. But
23 generally we had enough time to -- for example, on one
24 occasion, I went down to a hotel in Bristol where they
25 were going to stay. And we knew about that long enough

1 ahead of time to make a booking for a couple of us to
2 book into rooms in the hotel and make other
3 preparations. So, it wasn't last-minute, but -- and we
4 knew which hotel they were staying at in London, for
5 example, quite well ahead.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 I just want to ask you about a document very
8 briefly, that doesn't appear in your -- the bundle of
9 documents that have been sent to you.

10 Please could we have on screen {UCPI/34318}, please.

11 This is a Special Branch report, so not an SDS
12 report, regarding an AGM of the Anti-apartheid League
13 from 1969. You haven't seen this document before, so it
14 may be that you simply don't remember at all. But did
15 you -- were you in the habit of attending -- were you
16 a member of the AAM, of the Anti-Apartheid Movement?

17 A. Yes, in fact, in the year previous I had, for one year,
18 been on the executive committee of the Anti-Apartheid
19 Movement. And I think probably I had left that in part
20 because I got involved in Stop the Seventy Tour, which
21 seemed to me a more effective way of pursuing our aims.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 A. I think it's quite likely that I was at that AGM.

24 Q. I think, later on, there's mention of your name, so it
25 does look as if you were there, but I just wanted to

1 make sure whether you -- to sort of focus you on
2 the document a moment.

3 So can we -- sorry, can we turn on to page 2 of this
4 document, please, {UCPI/34318/2}.

5 There's some paragraphs in the middle that are
6 headed, "Stop the Seventy Tour". If we can just scroll
7 up slightly. Thank you very much. Just leave it there.

8 The document reads as follows:

9 "Dealing with the Anti-Apartheid's Movement's
10 activities in sport, Mr Paul Hodges, spoke of
11 the formation of the 'Stop the Seventy Tour' and said
12 that detailed plans had already been made to harass
13 the Springboks' rugby tour that was due to start at
14 Oxford a November 5. He said he appreciated that
15 the Anti-Apartheid Movement could not be linked
16 officially with the protesters because of
17 the possibility of its leaders being charged with
18 conspiracy to commit a public disorder."

19 Just pausing very briefly there. This document
20 reports a meeting that took place on 26 October 1969.
21 It appears that plans had already been made to, as it
22 says, harass the Springboks' rugby tour. Were you aware
23 of those plans? Would you have been privy to those
24 plans as part of the Stop the Seventy Tour?

25 A. What was the date of this meeting?

1 Q. 26 October 1969.

2 A. I can't remember when there was the first national
3 conference of the Stop the Seventy Tour, which must have
4 been then -- much around that time. Clearly, it already
5 existed. And since I know that I went to the first
6 national conference, I'm assuming that the information
7 was -- was public. I'm not sure what the question is.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 The paragraph goes on to say, later on in that
10 paragraph, that:

11 "... the Anti-Apartheid Movement could not be linked
12 officially with the protesters because of
13 the possibility of its leaders being charged with
14 conspiracy to commit a public disorder."

15 This was, is this right, anticipating criminal
16 offences being committed during the course of the direct
17 action that was being planned for the rugby matches; is
18 that right?

19 A. I -- first of all, I don't know who Mr Paul Hodges was.
20 Do we have any information on that? And who was he
21 speaking for? Was he speaking for
22 the Stop the Seventy Tour or for
23 the Anti-Apartheid Movement? It's not clear.

24 Q. It seems he was a member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

25 A. Yes. There was a general perception, I think, that

1 the Anti-Apartheid Movement, while playing a very
2 valuable role, was somewhat restricted and played
3 a particular kind of pressure-group role in British
4 politics, which had -- which was very effective, but
5 also had its limitations. And the Stop the Seventy Tour
6 was formed out of some sense of dissatisfaction that
7 the Anti-Apartheid Movement wasn't being sufficiently
8 militant. And I think throughout this whole period of
9 several months, there was a tension between the two
10 organisations, in which the Anti-Apartheid Movement was
11 often distancing itself from the Stop the Seventy Tour;
12 while at the same time, I think, benefiting from it,
13 because it kept the issue in the public eye, and also
14 made the Anti-Apartheid Movement seem relatively
15 moderate. So there was an interesting dynamic going on
16 there.

17 But I don't think that the Stop the Seventy Tour
18 felt it was being encouraged or supported by
19 the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 Can we just turn on to page 3, very briefly, please,
22 {UCPI/34318/3}.

23 Right at the top of the page -- thank you very
24 much -- the second paragraph down:

25 "Of the 74 who attended the meeting, it was obvious

1 that the following were the core of the coming protest
2 movement."

3 And you'll notice the names there,
4 Ms Christabel Gurney, and then your name appears next to
5 Mr Peter Hain.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. How does that assessment strike you? Would you have
8 agreed with that assessment, that you were the core of
9 the coming protest movement?

10 A. I'm quite surprised. I've seen my name at the top of --
11 or near the top of various lists that the police
12 collected, and I wasn't aware that I was particularly
13 central. There wasn't much of an organisation.

14 I suspect I must have spoken, and maybe volubly, I
15 don't know. But, therefore, having said something
16 about it and supported it, maybe they thought I must be
17 leading something. But I think it was a very informal
18 grouping. Probably people came together after events,
19 such as the AGM of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, to think
20 about how we could take this idea forward. It was an
21 idea that grew, it wasn't something that was already
22 pre-formed at the beginning of this period.

23 Q. Thank you very much.

24 We can take that document down now. Thank you very
25 much.

1 Can I now just ask you briefly about some context
2 about the Special Action Group that was the group that
3 you say you were involved with. This, you say in your
4 witness statement, was a subgroup of
5 the Stop the Seventy Tour; is that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And you said there was some overlap between that group
8 and the central direction of the Stop the Seventy Tour?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Do you mean by that you had the same broad aims?

11 A. Absolutely, yes. We -- we-- there was a -- it was, in
12 a sense (inaudible) as the Anti-Apartheid Movement could
13 benefit from the Stop the Seventy Tour, but while there
14 being no establishable connection between them. In
15 the same way, I think the Stop the Seventy Tour could
16 benefit from what the Special Action Group did, while it
17 was entirely deniable that we were acting, as it were,
18 under instruction. We were autonomous: we received
19 information; we decided what we wanted to do. But
20 because we were in sympathy with the general aims of
21 the Stop the Seventy Tour, there wasn't a -- there was
22 never any tension.

23 Q. And you say in your witness statement that the Special
24 Action Group had no public profile, didn't advertise its
25 existence, or claim responsibility for any action, and

1 as a result, the Stop the Seventy Tour didn't need to
2 own those actions --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- either.

5 Were you a sort of covert arm of
6 the Stop the Seventy Tour? Is that the effect of it?

7 A. Well, the "covert" makes it all sound a bit suspicious.
8 We were a bunch of very nice, well intentioned people,
9 who thought that to achieve their ends, they had to --
10 they needed the element of surprise, so you had to be
11 a little bit quiet about it. And we did take some
12 precautions, about trying not to phone, because we
13 assumed that if the Special Branch knew about us, they
14 would very likely be bugging our telephones. So things
15 like that.

16 Q. What was the -- what was the purpose of -- why was it
17 that you needed to have a smaller group that
18 the Stop the Seventy Tour didn't need to claim
19 responsibility for? What was the purpose of that?

20 A. Well, I imagine that, in terms of not claiming
21 responsibility, the objective was to get very large
22 numbers of people to these demonstrations, and some
23 people would have not wished to be associated with
24 people doing sort of almost undergraduate pranks. It
25 was nothing more serious than that. One member went

1 into, I think, a hotel room somewhere -- not in London,
2 somewhere outside -- gained access and sprayed
3 anti-apartheid messages in shaving cream on
4 the mirror -- on the mirrors in the players' bedrooms,
5 just to show that they'd been there. It was a sort of
6 disquieting tactic.

7 So we would do things like that, but it's not very
8 dignified, and it didn't really fit very well with the
9 serious image of the Stop the Seventy Tour generally.

10 Q. It undermined the sort of gravitas of the message, is
11 that --

12 A. I think so, yes. We did stuff that, while there was
13 nothing wrong with it -- indeed, I would say that it was
14 entirely appropriate -- it didn't fit with what
15 Stop the Seventy Tour -- how it wanted to be seen.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 You also operated a policy of non-violent direct
18 action and civil disobedience; is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Although, that included rather more specific and
21 targeted activities, such as painting slogans and gluing
22 locks, and getting access to hotels that the teams were
23 staying at; is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And your membership was rather more controlled because

1 you were all known to one another; is that right?

2 A. I think "controlled" is the wrong word, but it was
3 a sort of informal network, and I can't -- I really
4 don't know how it grew. I mean, I -- I knew
5 Ernest Rodker socially previously, but I think we
6 actually -- and then having known each other, we met in
7 the context of anti-apartheid. So it was natural we
8 would talk about things there.

9 But I don't know how other people came to be
10 involved. But it had no formal membership. It's people
11 at a meeting would -- would know about the next meeting.
12 Presumably we had phone numbers, and if anybody was
13 absent, we told them when we were getting together
14 again. I don't think meetings were that frequent,
15 because it was all -- this all happened in just a very
16 few months.

17 Q. Yes.

18 With that context in mind, can we look, please, at
19 the document which is the first national conference of
20 the Stop the Seventy Tour. This is {UCPI/8660}.

21 And it's behind tab 15, Sir, for the hard copy
22 bundle.

23 This is a slightly blurry document. Attended by
24 a number of people. And later on we'll have a look at
25 it. But you, Christabel Gurney and Lord Peter Hain are

1 all referenced in the document.

2 It seems to have taken the -- there was a morning
3 session and an afternoon session, we can see
4 the underlined type there "Morning Session"
5 and "Afternoon Session". The morning session "open to
6 the public as well as delegates", and the afternoon
7 session "open to delegates only".

8 Can we look, please, at paragraph 5 of this
9 document, which is on the second page, {UCPI/8660/2}.

10 Can we just make that a bit larger. Thank you very
11 much.

12 "Michael Brierley (ph) a northern university
13 lecturer and Middlesex cricketer, gave a well reasoned
14 speech in which he warned delegates against the use of
15 violence for violence sake in their demonstrations. He
16 spoke for the moderate within the STST who are against
17 all forms of violence. Unfortunately neither Brierley
18 nor any of the other speakers could satisfactorily
19 define 'violence', which complicated the arguments for
20 and against it."

21 First of all, Professor Rosenhead, does that
22 paragraph indicate that not all the participants in
23 the national conference were entirely ad idem on
24 the issue of the use of violence during the course of
25 Stop the Seventy Four demonstrations?

1 A. I think, based on that paragraph and on other documents,
2 I think it would be unwise to take these reports as
3 a neutral and objective statement of what was going in
4 the meeting. I think there's an element of
5 self-justification here for -- for police involvement.

6 There was -- I -- I am -- there's a possibility I'm
7 rewriting it with hindsight. But I'm pretty sure
8 I sensed no movement towards violence. The whole point
9 of the Stop the Seventy Tour was that it needed to bring
10 public opinion along, and violence would have
11 the opposite effect. And I don't recall at any stage,
12 not just at this conference but at any other, anyone
13 advocating violence.

14 Q. Can we look now, please, at paragraph 8. It's on
15 the same theme, and I just want to invite your comment
16 on it. It's on page 3, please, {UCPI/8660/3}. Thank
17 you very much:

18 "During the general discussion which followed it
19 became apparent that the only real ground for
20 disagreement amongst the delegates was on the questions
21 of whether or not violence should be used at
22 the demonstrations which would take place during
23 the cricket season, and indeed what constituted
24 violence. Some felt that violence could only be used
25 against the person, but others felt that property came

1 within the definition, and also the threat of violence
2 at a later date was in itself a violent demonstration.
3 Despite this difference, it was stressed that the STST
4 was not a monolithic organisation, and its avowed policy
5 was one of non-violent militant direct action, if
6 individuals or individual groups felt that violence was
7 called for then they must be the final judges of what
8 action was appropriate. This concluded the morning
9 session."

10 Professor Rosenhead, that -- is this right, that
11 indicates that whilst the sort of publicly stated case
12 for the Stop the Seventy Tour was one of non-violence,
13 in fact what was being sort of communicated at
14 the meeting was that each person must take their own
15 course, and whilst the Stop the Seventy Tour wouldn't
16 condone any violence, if people thought violence was
17 appropriate, that was up to them. Does that sound
18 a fair assessment?

19 A. Absolutely not, no. I think this is self-serving
20 nonsense, to be honest. I think this is somebody
21 writing a report, I can only think writing down what he
22 thinks his superiors would like to hear, used as
23 justification. There was absolutely no sense that
24 everybody could -- that it was a smorgasboard where
25 everybody could do what they wanted.

1 Stop the Seventy Tour was absolutely clear that anyone
2 that took part needed to be non-violent. And it's
3 possible that at this meeting a person or two may have
4 said that they disagreed with this, but there was no
5 take-up, no -- I don't believe that to be the case. But
6 if it was, there was certainly no take-up and no sense
7 that this was a strand which needed to be reported about
8 in one of the longer paragraphs.

9 Q. Thank you, Professor Rosenhead.

10 Can we just briefly look now, please, at
11 paragraph 7.

12 It's on the same page, if you just scroll up
13 slightly, please.

14 In fact, it's a paragraph that begins over the other
15 page, and it comes from a speech to the morning session
16 by Peter Hain. But the paragraph I want to just --
17 the part of it I want to just look at is on the top of
18 the third page, please, where Peter Hain says:

19 "The support which had been gained in such a short
20 time should not be allowed to dissipate at the end of
21 the Springboks tour. From attacking apartheid in sport
22 they must move into the wider field of racism both in
23 South Africa and in this country, and finally
24 the capitalist system which nurtured it."

25 An attack on the capitalist system which nurtured

1 racism in this country and in South Africa: was that
2 something that you contemplated, and something that
3 others agreed with at that meeting, can you recall?

4 A. I think that would have resonated, yes. Clearly --
5 I mean, I used to watch Lancashire play cricket in
6 Liverpool, which was my home town, but I wasn't exactly
7 a major cricket fan, and that had been some time
8 previously. I guess that some -- some people who were
9 involved in this cared about sport very deeply, but
10 I think we would all care about politics and racism in
11 politics much more so. So it was not about stopping
12 a tour from happening, it was about putting pressure on
13 the regime in South Africa to change. And in the end,
14 of course, it -- through international ramifications and
15 sanctions and so on, that became what happened.

16 I -- I think you also have to recall the very
17 substantial links between London as the centre of
18 capitalist finance and South Africa. There were major
19 campaigns going on about that. Barclays Bank was
20 the subject of a campaign for, I would have thought,
21 more than a decade -- I don't quite know how long it
22 went on -- support by the National Union Of Students,
23 and all sorts of others, but because of its complicity
24 at that period in the apartheid regime, and it was
25 perhaps the largest bank operating in South Africa. But

1 there was also all kinds of finance capital that was
2 supporting the continuation of the existing system. So,
3 that was seen as collaboration between basically
4 a fascist regime in South Africa and the capitalist
5 system which we were part of.

6 Q. Is that what you think -- is that how you would
7 interpret the expression "the capitalist system which
8 nurtured it", an attack on the banking regimes that
9 funded Southern African minority white rule? Is that
10 how you're interpreting that expression?

11 A. This is a -- this is a speech by Peter Hain, who was
12 then in the Young Liberals, and afterwards migrated to
13 the Labour Party. He was -- Peter will speak for
14 himself, no doubt, tomorrow. But he was by no means an
15 extreme leftist in the Labour Party; I would say
16 a centrist. I had great respect for what he did there.
17 But I would think it's unlikely that he's talking about
18 root and branch revolution; I don't think that was his
19 bag.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 Paragraph 10, please, towards the bottom of this
22 page.

23 I'm just going to finish off with this document and
24 then we're going to have a short break,
25 Professor Rosenhead, because it's near the time to have

1 our break.

2 Paragraph 10. This is a paragraph which deals with
3 the future plans of the Stop the Seventy Tour. And at
4 (1):

5 "A 'welcome' should be extended to the 'White'
6 South African cricket team when they are ..."

7 "Welcome" in inverted commas:

8 "... if this was at all possible to arrange.
9 The TU spokesman ..."

10 Something that's been redacted for privacy reasons:

11 "... (... of SOGAT) said he would endeavour to
12 arrange for everything concerned with the tour to
13 be 'blacked', which was considered an appropriate form
14 of action, and this would commence at the Airport
15 itself"

16 What does that mean? What did he mean by "blacked"?

17 A. Well, trade unions were much more -- had a much bigger
18 membership and more -- more heft, if you like, in those
19 days than they do now, where they've been reduced by
20 antitrade union legislation, etc. I'm trying to
21 remember what branch SOGAT organised. Does anybody
22 know?

23 Q. It was print.

24 A. Print, yes.

25 So they -- they couldn't actually interfere with

1 the workings of Heathrow Airport. And therefore,
2 I assume what they're talking about is trade union
3 solidarity, that they would call on other unions to
4 behave in that way. In the event, of course, it didn't
5 happen. So perhaps he was slightly -- he or she -- I
6 imagine he -- was overstating their ability to have
7 things -- "blacked" means that you -- basically you
8 don't cross a picket line, that sort of arrangement.
9 That if one union is taking action, others don't violate
10 their picket lines.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 Over the page, please, page 4 {UCPI/8660/4}, and
13 then the small paragraph at the top of the page:

14 "A national demonstration should be held at Lords on
15 Saturday June 6 1970, the opening day of the Tour, and
16 it should be of such proportions that it should
17 effectually finish the Tour."

18 Does that mean it was anticipated that it would be
19 such a large demonstration that the cricket team would
20 simply give up and go home because the possibility of
21 playing another match when confronted with that sheer
22 weight of numbers would be entirely pointless?

23 A. I'm not sure what this -- who is supposed to have said
24 this.

25 Q. These are simply the plans that have been put in place

1 by the Stop the Seventy Tour for action in the future
2 for the forthcoming summer.

3 A. And who said that? (inaudible) gave the authority
4 for it?

5 Q. These were group discussions held by various parts of
6 the Stop the Seventy Tour in group discussions during
7 the course of the conference during a delegates' --

8 A. It sounds like this is one of the bright ideas that was
9 performed in a break-out group, which -- as we call it
10 now. It doesn't mean it was necessarily brought in by
11 everybody, but that's the way it works. The ideas you
12 have generated are then fed in, and not necessarily
13 accepted or rejected but are there as a resource.

14 I don't -- I think it's quite a strong aspiration.
15 Maybe it could have worked. It didn't have to, because
16 the government pulled the plug. But I think
17 the government pulled the plug because of worries about
18 what would happen in terms of the scale
19 of demonstrations if they didn't. So I think, in
20 a sense, the statement is true, because the thought of
21 such demonstrations was probably sufficient to get
22 the tour cancelled.

23 Whether -- had it gone ahead, how it would have
24 played out, we don't know. But certainly, if there had
25 been many tens of thousands of people surrounding Lords

1 and bringing traffic to a stop, and stopping the match
2 from going ahead, I think that would have provoked
3 a crisis, certainly. But whether that would have
4 happened, I don't know.

5 Q. And perhaps the third idea that was mooted during these
6 break-out groups, which is set out there, plays into
7 that:

8 "As a preliminary to (2) ..."

9 Ie as a preliminary to the mass demonstration:

10 "... it was felt that local demonstrations should be
11 held outside all the grounds where the South Africans
12 would be playing at the earliest possible date after
13 the beginning of the Cricket Season. These
14 demonstrations should take the form of a propaganda
15 exercise consisting of leafletting and picketing
16 the grounds. The leaflets should contain a warning that
17 if the South Africans played at the grounds then
18 the matches would be disrupted. The date of these
19 demonstrations would be decided later ..."

20 That's all about the propaganda, is it, of this
21 potential mass demonstration should the tour come to
22 fruition?

23 A. This is a combination, I suspect, you know, inferring
24 from -- I don't remember this idea, or necessarily
25 the meeting in which it took place. But it's building

1 support. If you -- this is a form of advertisement.
2 You'd go to the grounds where the games would be played.
3 Therefore, people who are interested in cricket would be
4 going to those grounds. And it's a possibility of
5 informing them of what may happen. They may be
6 recruited to it. They may use their influence to say,
7 "Look, this is serious, we don't want this to happen,
8 can't we get the tour stopped," you know? There could
9 be a number of things that could happen from getting
10 the word around.

11 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you.

12 I think that's probably a convenient moment, Sir.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

14 Before we break, could you clear up two minor
15 matters for me, please. Can I take it that the Michael
16 Brierley referred to there is the man who went on to
17 become the captain of the England cricket team?

18 A. Yes.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: And the Special Action Group of which you
20 speak, is that the same as the Direct Action Group
21 spoken of by Mr Rodker?

22 A. I don't know the name "Direct Action Group", but there
23 was only one, so it may be different terminologies were
24 used.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

1 In paragraph 4, somebody whose name has been
2 redacted for privacy reasons spoke about the -- sorry,
3 if we can scroll down, please, to paragraph 4 on that
4 page. Thank you. A little bit further. Thank you very
5 much --:

6 "... spoke briefly about the subject of Apartheid
7 and expressed the hope that those present would not be
8 too disappointed if the coloured population seemed
9 somewhat wayward in supporting the Campaign. This was
10 due to two factors: firstly that many coloured people
11 felt cricket did not really affect them, and secondly
12 that for various reasons it was very hard to mobilise
13 them in any great numbers. He concluded by saying that
14 STST was a small organisation but with a hard core of
15 militants, who could help to destroy apartheid and
16 racialism."

17 The expression used there "a hard core of
18 militants", does that strike you as a fair or accurate
19 assessment of the Stop the Seventy Tour, "a small
20 organisation with a hard core of militants"?

21 A. First of all, I'm just curious as to who was saying
22 this. It says "[Privacy]". So this, presumably, is not
23 an undercover cop speaking, so I'm not quite clear why
24 the name has been removed. It would help to understand
25 whether we should -- what weight we should give to

1 the views expressed here. I don't know if anybody can
2 provide any clarification on in what role this person
3 was speaking.

4 Q. A number of names of private citizens have been removed
5 to protect their privacy. That's why that name has been
6 redacted. And no, that's right, it's not an
7 undercover officer speaking?

8 A. Could we just scroll up a bit, so I can see under which
9 item of the agenda this is coming, because that might
10 give me a clue as to whether this was --

11 Q. Could we go to paragraph 3, please.

12 A. So which part of the agenda is this?

13 Q. It appears to be the beginning of the agenda.

14 The agenda was somebody who was taking over from
15 somebody else who had been indisposed, "Apartheid in
16 Sport and Racism in Britain". It appears to be under
17 that item of the agenda.

18 A. It's hard to know. Sometimes people do make speeches
19 which represent their own views, and obviously it sounds
20 as if he was -- he or she was an invited speaker, and
21 presumably representing views from outside
22 the organisation. It doesn't mean he or she has got it
23 wrong.

24 I think the language is perhaps redolent of certain
25 militancy of the day. I think, as you say, instead of

1 saying "hard core", you said "small number of committed
2 individuals", I think that would be true. But to call
3 them a "hard core" -- there was no party line. I mean,
4 I -- I was not in any organisation with any of the other
5 people who were -- that I was working with, other than
6 Stop the Seventy Tour. So the idea of militants is
7 normally nowadays seen as a group with a line that it's
8 trying to push on everybody else, and this is simply not
9 a good description.

10 Stop the Seventy Tour was a nice, floppy, liberal,
11 alternative organisation, which many people could join
12 who had maybe different activities outside but agreed on
13 this one thing. So I don't think that's the normal
14 sense of "hard core" and "militants".

15 I think if you wanted to say there was a -- a --
16 a loose penumbra of feeling that South Africa was really
17 so unpleasant that many people who had different views
18 on other things would agree on South Africa, and that
19 some people were more committed to that than others, and
20 particularly, of course, in the Anti-Apartheid Movement,
21 a lot of those would be exiled South Africans. We were
22 mostly not -- Stop the Seventy Tour, we were mostly born
23 and bred Brits, rather than emigrés. And I guess
24 South Africans might have been a little bit more
25 committed, because it was their home that we were

1 talking. Whereas, for me, it was an option. If you
2 like, this is an expression of my values, it wasn't that
3 my life was on the line. And I think that might be true
4 of many others. So "hard core militants" doesn't sound
5 right at all.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. I can't comment on the extent to which what is described
8 there as "coloured people", because that was
9 the language of the day, I can't say whether that was
10 accurate or not.

11 Q. No, I'm not asking you to comment on that. Thank you.

12 Can we move on, please, to page 2. I want to look
13 at paragraph 6 {UCPI/14399/2}:

14 "It was agreed that in view of the possibility of
15 conspiracy charges arising from any activity which could
16 be construed as urging others to disrupt public events,
17 it would be wiser not to discuss detailed activities at
18 this stage, but that a 'Planning Committee' should be
19 set up which could advise branches on tactics which
20 might prove successful in disrupting cricket pitches.
21 The Planning Committee would consist of a small group
22 of 'known' (trusted) delegates and could meet at
23 a convenient date in the near future."

24 Is that a reference, do you think, to your group,
25 the Special Action Group, there, or is that something

1 different?

2 A. It -- I have no recollection of this, but it does seem
3 that that could have been the germ of the idea which led
4 to the Special Action Group.

5 What was the date of this document?

6 Q. The document is dated 7 April, and reflects a meeting on
7 5 April 1970.

8 A. Well, the Special Action Group had been in existence for
9 quite some time before that.

10 Q. Right.

11 A. So I don't think that can be it. That may have been
12 just -- that must be some other activity.

13 Q. Right, okay. Thank you.

14 We can take that document down now, please.

15 Can we now look at document {UCPI/8607}.

16 That's tab 9 of the hard copy bundle, Sir.

17 This is a meeting which with took place on
18 7 May 1970, so not very long after that previous
19 meeting, and it's a meeting of the Special Planning
20 Group of the Stop the Seventy Tour, held in a room at
21 the London School of Economics, attended by nine people.

22 In paragraph 3, the purpose of
23 the Special Planning Group is said to be:

24 "... to suggest, coordinate and implement activities
25 within the London Area from the time of the arrival of

1 the South African Cricket team until their departure."

2 I think in your witness statement you query whether
3 that in fact was a meeting of the Special Action Group;
4 is that right?

5 A. I find this -- is there a list of who attended at the
6 end? Because that would help to clarify that point.

7 Q. There is, but they have been redacted for privacy
8 reasons, and only your name appears, I'm afraid,
9 Professor Rosenhead. But there are nine people in
10 attendance, including yourself.

11 A. I would say first, just in passing, that S108 was my own
12 room at LSE; it was a lecturer's room. It was a small
13 lecturer's room. It's very thin and not very long. How
14 on earth there were nine people there ... I think this
15 policeman has invented that. How could there be nine
16 people in that room? It was hard to get four in.

17 So I -- I don't -- I don't know.

18 Also, if there are redactions, this suggests it
19 wasn't the Special Planning Group, because then there
20 would have been other names there which are the subject
21 matter of this Inquiry, and if those names are not
22 there, how can it have been the Special Planning Group?
23 Why is Ernest's name not there? Why is Mike Craft's
24 name not there? And so on? I find it hard to know what
25 this was, this meeting. Is there any evidence further

1 down that would --

2 Q. Yes, can we -- we're going to move down the report.

3 Can we look at paragraph 3, please.

4 Well, first of all, sorry -- sorry, just briefly
5 going back -- there's in fact two paragraph 3s in this
6 document. Can you just scroll up slightly, so that we
7 can see that what the points of discussion were likely
8 to be during this planning group:

9 "The group, therefore, had at this stage broad
10 discussions on the following points:-

11 "(i) Heathrow demonstration.

12 "(ii) Tickets.

13 "(iii) Demonstrations outside Lords June 6th ..."

14 Which is the first day of the cricket tour:

15 "(iv) Hotel demonstrations."

16 Just scroll up slightly so we can see the whole of
17 that paragraph 3:

18 "At this stage no definite plans have been made for
19 a demonstration at Heathrow, mainly because of the lack
20 of information about the time and place of arrival of
21 the teams. However, the general assumption was that
22 they would arrive at 8 am on June 1st by a scheduled
23 BOAC flight at Heathrow. To this end members of
24 the planning group agreed that a 'recce' should be made
25 of the Airport, with particular reference to the exits

1 therefrom. It was generally felt that it would be
2 impossible to prevent the team from leaving the Airport,
3 but that incidents could well be staged on the route
4 from the Airport to their hotel."

5 Does this sound like the sort of thing that your
6 Special Action Group would have discussed --

7 A. No.

8 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- direct action targeted at
9 the cricket team?

10 A. No. This is clearly much more public, not in any way
11 clandestine at all. The reference there to
12 the "planning group" suggests it could have been
13 the group that was mentioned --

14 Q. In the previous -- (overspeaking) --

15 A. -- (inaudible) -- didn't have in the last document you
16 had up.

17 So I guess I must have been a member of it. But of
18 course, it didn't last very long, because the tour got
19 cancelled and none of this was -- was required. So
20 I have no recollection of it. And presumably other
21 people whose names have been redacted were on
22 the planning group but not on the Special Action Group.
23 So I think this might be an entirely different activity.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 The reference to "incidents" being "staged"

1 en route -- so it says:

2 "... incidents could well be staged on the route
3 from the Airport to their hotel."

4 What sort of incidents might have been contemplated
5 by the Special Planning Group?

6 A. As I say, this wasn't the Special Planning Group, as far
7 as I can tell. And I have no idea what that could have
8 been. But certainly if there were incidents to be
9 carried out, then you'd have thought it would need to be
10 rather carefully organised, whatever they were.

11 I imagine they could have been some kind of traffic
12 interruption, but it's hardly likely. I can't think
13 what else it would be, but you could hardly do this
14 thing in an open public meeting, you know, plan how
15 you're going to block a road or something. And
16 certainly we did not do that in the Special
17 Planning Group. This -- it was never -- in the Special
18 Action Group, whatever you want to call it. It -- it
19 was never something that I recall even being on
20 the agenda, let alone agreed to.

21 Q. Right.

22 Can we turn on, please, to page 2 in this document
23 and look at paragraph 5 {UCPI/8607/2}. Thank you.

24 Somebody whose name has been redacted for privacy
25 reasons:

1 "... presented plans and aerial photographs of
2 Lords, and described the 'defences' as they existed at
3 present. He said that there would probably be two
4 points of attack open to demonstrators:-

5 "(a) From the raised stand (believed 'G' and 'H'
6 stands) there was a drop of approximately 5 feet ... to
7 the ground, and as there was no barbed wire or other
8 obstruction at this stage it seemed the most likely
9 place from which to launch an attack."

10 And (b):

11 "From the gates opposite the pavilion, from
12 where rollers etc were brought on the ground.

13 "Therefore, bearing these two places in mind,
14 demonstrators should be advised to purchase tickets for
15 these areas."

16 The expression used there "from which to launch an
17 attack", can you recall what might have been meant by
18 that? What attack would be launched?

- 19 A. I think this is like the hyperbolic language elsewhere.
20 It's not a language we would ever have used. You know,
21 I refer to it. I think this is the person writing.
22 This is, again, presumably a covert report we're seeing
23 here not a public document, and he's -- whoever's
24 writing it is -- can do that with the certainty they
25 will not be refuted or adjusted(?); and the terms seem

1 to be directed to make this seem more serious than
2 I think it can have been.

3 I -- this section of it does look more like the sort
4 of thing the Special Action Group might have got
5 involved in. So maybe this was some kind of hybrid that
6 was both planning demonstrations and the purchase of
7 tickets and so on, which would be a mainstream STST
8 activity. We didn't have any money. We didn't have any
9 mechanisms for acquiring tickets or distributing them to
10 other people. So this seems to be an odd mixture of
11 things going on here.

12 Assuming this meeting took place. I don't imagine
13 that meetings were invented, but I think the way it's
14 described is -- seems to me implausible that we would
15 have done. We -- there were -- I can remember odd
16 meetings where we talked about what we might do at
17 the beginning of the cricket season, if it happened.
18 And they were -- they weren't planning pitch invasions,
19 because that's not what we did. We didn't mobilise
20 large numbers of people. What we did was done with
21 a very small number of people, sometimes one or two,
22 sometimes six. You know, I don't remember.

23 But certainly we would not organise anything that
24 involved large numbers of people. The ideas we had for
25 cricket grounds were things like could we -- could we

1 find somebody who could fly a model aeroplane over
2 the cricket ground with a streamer with an
3 anti-apartheid message. It was that sort of thing, not
4 things involving large bodies of people. So whatever
5 this meeting was about, it wasn't Special Planning
6 Group. And I think it's been souped-up for the eyes and
7 ears of the senior officers, in terms of the language.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 Can we scroll towards the bottom of the page,
10 please.

11 That's great, thank you.

12 I just want to ask you about these series of points:

13 "In view of the different groups and organisations
14 which would be present on June 6th it was difficult to
15 make specific plans for any one type of action on
16 the ground, but the following points were felt to be
17 relevant:-

18 "(a) A mass attack on the ground was desirable, but
19 this should be delayed until near the lunch interval.
20 Before and after this, demonstrators should endeavour to
21 get onto the pitch in twos and threes, and once having
22 reached the playing area, the best advice was that each
23 should 'do their own thing'.

24 "(b) General distractions should be mounted
25 throughout the period of play in the form of shouting

1 and moving about so as to distract the players attention
2 as far as possible.

3 "(c) Newspapers should be brought in and allowed to
4 blow over the pitch wherever possible. The possibility
5 of using balloons was discussed, but it was felt that
6 they were not very effective.

7 "(d) The use of fireworks, flares and other
8 materials of a similar nature was advocated. It was
9 said that 'Blacks' (believed Black & Edgington LTD) 22
10 Grays Inn Road, WC1, apparently stock a 'mini-flare'
11 used by climbers and others as a form of distress
12 signal, which has a small launcher attachment little
13 bigger than a fountain pen, and could therefore be
14 easily smuggled into the ground."

15 And if you could just scroll down to the next page,
16 3, {UCPI/8607/3}, just to the top of that page, just to
17 finish that paragraph.

18 Somebody whose name has been redacted for privacy
19 reasons:

20 "... said that he was endeavouring to obtain the key
21 to a school Army training Unit in order that he
22 could 'make use' of its stock of thunder-flashes."

23 Can you just return to the previous page, please,
24 {UCPI/8607/2}, and little paragraph (a).

25 The advice that people "should endeavour to get onto

1 the pitch in twos and threes" and once there "do their
2 own thing". Can you remember what might have been meant
3 by that, by the expression "do their own thing"?

4 A. Where was this meeting taking place?

5 Q. It took place on 7 May 1970 at the LSE, and is said to
6 be a meeting of the Special Planning Group of
7 the Stop the Seventy Tour --

8 A. Is it supposed to be in my room or not?

9 Q. It was in room S108.

10 A. That was my room. I -- I imagine that that's not
11 invented and I was there. I have no recollection of it.
12 It's a different order of planning than we would
13 normally have been involved with.

14 So what was the specific question?

15 Q. Can you recall what might have been meant by the advice
16 that demonstrators on reaching the pitch in twos and
17 threes should "do their own thing"?

18 A. Well, the one time that I got onto the pitch, I got onto
19 the pitch and there was nothing to do, I just had to
20 wait there until someone came and removed me. And I
21 imagine -- there is no action to take once you're there.
22 You might, I suppose, try to elude the police, so as to
23 make the interruption longer. I didn't, I just waited
24 to be taken away. And I imagine that's what they mean.
25 There was no specific action, rather than that. That's

1 code for: do some terrible things.

2 Q. The points, the advice under (d), the use of fireworks,
3 flares and the possible use of "thunder-flashes", what
4 was the purpose of using fireworks and flares and other
5 sort of --

6 A. Well, note it says "was advocated". That means somebody
7 brought forward this bright idea. It doesn't really
8 mean that we decided to do it. And I think that was
9 probably somebody who was a little bit more adventurous
10 than most of us would have been happy with. I can't say
11 now because, as I say, I only went(?) to(?) a collection
12 of the meetings.

13 But people were casting around for things to do that
14 might interfere with the game. I remember the one --
15 one scheme -- we actually had a meeting in the flat of
16 a sympathiser, which I don't know that is reported on.
17 It was a flat that actually overlooked Lords. And we
18 were thinking about, would it be possible to have
19 a high-pressure hose that could sort of somehow project
20 a parabolic arc of liquid onto the pitch over the stands
21 and so on.

22 So there were all kinds of crazy ideas going on
23 which never went anywhere, as the model aeroplane never
24 went anywhere either. And I think this is probably just
25 one of those brainstorming ideas that -- that's why you

1 do the brainstorm: you try and get ideas out, and some
2 may get implemented, some may not. It doesn't look as
3 if this one had any take-up. But in any case, as we
4 know, the opportunity to use these ideas was removed
5 from us by HM Government, who stopped the tour -- got
6 the tour stopped, shall we say.

7 Q. And the use of fireworks, or "thunder-flashes", or
8 however they're referred to, presumably their use would
9 be to create anxiety and -- amongst the public watching,
10 who wouldn't necessarily know how to attribute the
11 noises they were hearing --

12 A. I don't think that idea was ever accepted. And had it
13 got near to implementation, we would have had to think
14 seriously about those aspects. But it didn't, so this
15 was just an idea lying on the table. And it wasn't
16 immediately negated, because it looks like we were
17 thinking about all sorts of ideas, trying to think of
18 things that we could do that would be effective. But
19 none of these things were decided on.

20 Q. We can take that document down now, please. And
21 the next document I want to look at is {MPS/736368}.

22 Which is behind tab 1 of the hard copy bundle, for
23 your note, Sir.

24 This is another meeting of the Special
25 Planning Group held on 13 May this time, a little later

1 than the previous one. Again, nine people appear to
2 have been present. The points of discussion are
3 the "Heathrow demonstration", the "hotel
4 demonstrations", the "June ... demonstrations", when
5 the tour was actually underway, and "future activities".

6 If we scroll down, please, slightly down the page,
7 so that we can look at the whole of paragraph 4, please.
8 Thank you very much.

9 The start part of that paragraph says that
10 the demonstrations at the airport couldn't be finalised
11 because no one knew when -- quite when
12 the South Africans would have arrived. But the second
13 paragraph says:

14 "The Airport has been 'surveyed' and photographs
15 taken, and the general conclusion is that the Flight
16 will arrive at No. 3 Building, and that
17 the South Africans will be 'spirited away' through
18 a VIP Lounge into a waiting coach and thence to their
19 hotel. If advance information is received that they are
20 actually in transit, then an advance warning system to
21 demonstrators will be put into operation, to get them to
22 assemble at the Airport. It is considered feasible that
23 a 'commando group' of some 20 demonstrators could gain
24 access to the area where passengers from the 'plane
25 disembark to throw fireworks etc, thus giving

1 the South Africans a 'rousing' welcome."

2 Again, the reference to the use of fireworks, but
3 this time at the airport. Again, would the purpose of
4 using fireworks at the airport be to create panic
5 amongst those people arriving and other users of
6 the airport at that time?

7 A. First of all, discounting the hyperbolic language of
8 whoever this is -- it seems like the same person -- was
9 using, I think these were ideas that had not been
10 accepted, they're ideas that were floating around. We
11 were nowhere near implementing any of these things.
12 The fireworks weren't bought. There were no names.
13 This is not operational. This is, if you like, some
14 thoughts being put out that demonstrators could be
15 stationed in the car park. But there's nothing definite
16 here. This is thoughts about how one might go ahead
17 with something that was going to take place in
18 the following month, surrounded by uncertainty.

19 Almost certainly, very little of this would have
20 been put into action. And it's not been accepted that
21 we were going to go through the airport throwing
22 fireworks.

23 I'm assuming that I was there, because it's my room,
24 and that some discussion of fireworks was -- was in
25 place --

- 1 Q. Yes, your name appears at the end of the report as
2 somebody who was in attendance.
- 3 A. Yes, that's what I thought.
- 4 By the way, I noticed that at the beginning it says:
5 "From a reliable and delicate source."
- 6 Now, I know this is code, police code. Can somebody
7 tell me what that means?
- 8 Q. It's the way that the reports begin in this era. That's
9 how intelligence reports are written in this era,
10 Professor Rosenhead.
- 11 A. I don't think all of them have that, but maybe I'm
12 wrong. I thought that sometimes it meant that it was an
13 undercover policeman, and another form of words meant
14 that it was somebody who was a member of
15 the organisation that was supplying information. Was
16 that right?
- 17 Q. I simply don't know, Professor Rosenhead, I'm afraid.
- 18 A. Okay. Sorry, I'm not sure I answered your question
19 entirely.
- 20 Q. You did.
- 21 A. The idea of a commando group. Nobody would -- none of
22 us would have used that language. We
23 weren't militaristic. This is being translated into a
24 kind of jargon for something which was disorganised,
25 fluid, people interacting with each other. It wasn't

1 a board of directors with people taking instructions or
2 coming to (inaudible) conclusions. It was thinking
3 about what we might do in preparation for what might
4 happen later, perhaps.

5 Q. Can we turn over onto the second page, please, and look
6 at the top paragraph, paragraph 5, {MPS/736368/2}:

7 "As had been agreed, each of the London Groups will
8 be given a specific date and time when they are expected
9 to picket outside the team's hotel. It was suggested
10 that once the hotel was known individuals from each
11 group should familiarise themselves with its layout and
12 thus be in a position to gain access whenever possible
13 or necessary. It was also suggested that although there
14 would undoubtedly be police guards at the various
15 entrances and exits, there would perhaps be times when
16 this guard would be relaxed, and if there were
17 a sufficient number of demonstrators present, then that
18 would be the time to march boldly into the hotel and
19 stage some form of 'happening'; the most spectacular
20 would be the release of smoke bombs in the foyer or near
21 the South Africans if they could be located."

22 This is evidently a suggestion made by a member of
23 this nine group -- Special Planning Group.

24 Again, a reference to a "smoke bomb". Is that in
25 order to create sort of maximum anxiety and worry

1 amongst the South African team and other members of
2 the people using the hotel?

3 A. This is quite -- assuming this is accurate, roughly,
4 this is clearly wishful thinking by one person, sort of
5 brainstorming some ideal scenario that they hope they
6 might get it on (inaudible). None of this could
7 conceivably have happened. I'm sure none of us were
8 taking this at all seriously.

9 I mean, it's -- you can't take things that are said
10 at a meeting as a commitment of even those other people
11 at the meeting, unless it says that was decided. And
12 this -- this, obviously a policeman, or a policeman's
13 agent, or whoever it was that was the reliable and
14 delicate source, would have been looking for things like
15 this to report, regardless of whether they were agreed
16 or not. And it's quite clear that these -- no steps
17 were taken to implement these. Unless you can find me
18 other evidence that that was the case.

19 I have to say, I'm going entirely from documents not
20 from memory. My memory is limited to the sorts of
21 people who were there, the sorts of status of
22 the organisation, of discussions, that it was not
23 a dedicated cell, it was people -- there would have been
24 different people at each meeting, and so on. It was not
25 -- I'm afraid we weren't that disciplined.

1 Q. Just completing our look at this report. In
2 paragraph 6, it says:

3 "Apart from the obvious forms of demonstration
4 already discussed at length the following additional
5 points have arisen:-

6 "A meteorological balloon is to be purchased, also
7 a cylinder of hydrogen, with the intention of releasing
8 ticker tape or similar substances over Lords during
9 the match."

10 "A 'Free Radio' expert (not identified) has stated
11 that it should be possible to jam police communications
12 at crucial periods. It was stated that he has
13 the equipment which is necessary for this and is
14 prepared to assist."

15 Can you remember that suggestion being made?

16 A. No, it's -- the whole thing is littered with wishful
17 thinking and wild speculations, and I don't have any
18 recollection. The fact that it didn't register suggests
19 that it was never taken forward in any way; or possibly,
20 given that it doesn't fit with my -- my general politics
21 and my state of mind, I think it's -- I probably
22 dismissed it as bluster, as it -- well, we don't know
23 because we didn't get to the stage of the cricket tour,
24 but my doubt is that any of this would have happened.
25 And we would have stuck to stuff that we had been doing

1 already, which was like mass demonstrations and
2 occasional little forays of one or two people to try and
3 add a little bit of extra spice to the -- to the sauce.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 I think we can take that document down now, please.

6 Can we now look, please, at {UCPI/8635} behind tab 4
7 in the hard copy bundle, please.

8 Now, this is a meeting of the National Committee of
9 the Stop the Seventy Tour at which you were present,
10 which took place on 24 May 1970, so just after the time
11 that the invitation extended to the South African
12 cricket team had been withdrawn, and so the campaign had
13 been successful.

14 I just want to ask you a couple of questions
15 about it, please. Paragraph 1(ii), I think, there was
16 a -- I'll just make sure I've got the right document.

17 Sorry, yes:

18 "It was agreed that they participate in
19 the Ruskin-Kitson march over the weekend but that STST
20 should not meet at Lords as arranged but in
21 Regent's Park."

22 If you could just scroll up a little bit, please.

23 Thank you:

24 "The June 6th rally which was being organised by
25 the Anti-Apartheid Movement was going on as planned, but

1 the general feeling of those present was that the Rally
2 would be somewhat of an anti-climax, and that most STST
3 supporters would not be particularly interested in
4 participating. Under no circumstances should STST use
5 it as a 'Victory Rally'."

6 Does that indicate that the march was likely to be
7 a great deal smaller than had been anticipated?

8 A. I think it says so in terms.

9 Q. That the purpose of the Stop the Seventy Tour had been
10 achieved?

11 A. No, the rally was not the Stop the Seventy Tour's rally,
12 as I understand it, it was the Anti-Apartheid Movement,
13 and the only question was whether STST should
14 participate, and in what way.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 And finally this. Paragraph 3 -- if you could just
17 scroll down a little bit, please. Thank you. And maybe
18 just make it a little bit larger. Thank you very much:

19 "The general consensus of opinion was that although
20 STST had served its purpose, the organisation which had
21 been set up should not be disbanded but should remain as
22 a latent power in the event of any other 'apartheid
23 team' endeavouring to enter Great Britain. It was felt
24 also that the numbers of supporters who had been
25 mobilised so successfully over the past months should

1 not be left to dissipate their enthusiasm, and it was
2 essential that STST found another 'cause' as soon as
3 possible. Discussions would take place with group
4 leaders to seek their ideas of possible 'targets' but
5 the one which received the most ..."

6 If you can just scroll down:

7 "... general support was the Caborra Bassa Dam
8 project. It would therefore seem likely that those who
9 remain supporters of the STST now that the Tour has been
10 cancelled will have their thoughts directed towards this
11 scheme."

12 The Caborra Bassa Dam project, there was a group
13 called the "Dambusters Mobilising Committee". Is that
14 what's envisaged there, that the Stop the Seventy Tour
15 supporters would focus their attentions instead on
16 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee, or just causes or
17 other campaigning groups towards the aim of
18 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee, which was to stop
19 the building of that dam? Can you remember?

20 A. I don't remember the specific meeting or this specific
21 proposal, but there were clearly discussions that I do
22 remember, about what we do with Stop the Seventy Tour
23 now that it's achieved its objective, which is a very
24 unusual situation for a political group like this to be
25 in. And I was certainly someone who was arguing that

1 with all this mobilisation, we would know -- we'd have
2 the names and details of thousands of people round
3 the country who'd taken the time and trouble to get in
4 touch with us, and that a movement could be made or
5 reinforced out of this.

6 I don't remember the -- that there was ever an
7 agreement on a target or a focus for such a group. And
8 I don't -- and I'm pretty sure that there wasn't, and
9 that therefore the Caborra Bassa Dam development
10 happened, the mobilisation happened independently of any
11 influx from STST. Individuals may well have gone, and
12 I believe that Christabel Gurney, who's on this
13 afternoon, will be able to to give you better
14 information on that than I could.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 A. My -- my experience of that discussion was that the idea
17 of maintaining STST as a separate activity, obviously
18 with some change of name and focus, was not implemented.
19 And in a sense, the group was -- I don't know how
20 democratic it was. Obviously the people who turned up
21 to demonstrations had no vote on necessarily a new
22 voice. And so a relatively small number of people were
23 involved in organising. And, for whatever reason, by
24 whatever dynamic internal to that group, which I wasn't
25 central to, basically it was wound up; there was no

1 successful organisation. Which I found -- thought was
2 disappointing and a waste.

3 Q. Can we move on very quickly, please, to the -- sorry,
4 just look at -- (overspeaking) --

5 A. (inaudible).

6 Q. The next document is {MPS/736399}.

7 Thank you.

8 This is a report which you deal with in your witness
9 statement between paragraphs 7 and 10, about a meeting
10 said to have taken place in your room at the -- or
11 certainly at the LSE, about a plan to form a group
12 called Keep Politics Out of Cricket Committee, and to
13 circulate a petition and invite signatories to
14 the petition to attend the ground, which would have
15 resulted in a confrontation between demonstrators and
16 the police. And this report says that an advertisement
17 was placed in the Telegraph and in The Times with a box
18 number.

19 And if we scroll down, we can see the text that
20 appeared in the Telegraph advertisement, at paragraph 4
21 in the personal column of the Daily Telegraph:

22 "Cricket lovers help circulate a petition to save
23 t 70's Tour, Keep Politics Out of Cricket. Write to
24 CL 11182, Daily Telegraph, EC4."

25 And I think you say in your witness statement that

1 this was a complete fiction created by an acquaintance
2 of yours, who wanted to discredit you and your political
3 affiliations, to undermine you in the eyes of another,
4 and this was a complete fiction that has been reported
5 by the undercover police officer; is that right?

6 A. That's correct, yes --

7 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

8 A. Would you like me to expand on that? I could do so.

9 Q. Well, I don't want you to -- I don't want to trespass
10 into any matters that might be private to you, because
11 I note that -- of course you don't necessarily need to
12 give us the background, but I just wanted to ask you
13 this.

14 It's said to be a meeting that took place in your
15 room with a number of other people, including somebody
16 who'd not previously taken any part in any
17 Stop the Seventy Tour activity. I think that's in
18 paragraph 3. And the text that apparently appeared in
19 the Daily Telegraph gives a box number. And I just
20 wanted to ask you this. That box number, it would mean,
21 wouldn't it, that this advertisement couldn't on its
22 face be linked to you?

23 A. Had I put it in, it would not have been traceable, no,
24 no.

25 Q. No. And it appears that the report seems to say that on

1 11 May, this advertisement did appear in the Daily
2 Telegraph. Can you recall that? Do you know anything
3 about that?

4 A. No. I had nothing to do with any of this.

5 And it's interesting, if you go -- scroll up a bit,
6 you see this one says information acquired "from
7 a reliable source", it's not "from a reliable and
8 delicate source", so I guess it's coming from some
9 different source. It's not -- and evidently it's not
10 from a meeting, it's something that's been acquired
11 outside the meeting.

12 I'm -- I don't know by what mechanism this was
13 noticed and brought to the police's attention and linked
14 to me. It seems the advertisement doesn't mention me.
15 Possibly Special Branch approaching the newspaper to say
16 who put -- who put this advert in? I don't know. To
17 whom would it be sent?

18 My guess is -- this is not the only example of its
19 kind; there was another one at very much the same
20 period, inviting people to write in for pornographic
21 material to me by name, but this was in -- I think that
22 one, I think, was in either City Limits or Time Out,
23 I can't remember, and that one was spotted by a friend
24 of mine who happened to be doing the layout on
25 the magazine, that was --

1 Q. Presumably in order to link it to you, you were named in
2 that advertisement, were you?

3 A. I was named in that one. My guess is the other one
4 could only have been that all this stuff on people
5 writing to me from the box number, the box number would
6 come to me, and I would therefore be aware of the risk
7 that if I went on seeing the person that I was seeing,
8 that all this stuff could -- could -- could be
9 escalated. That's all I can think. But it is nothing
10 to do with politics, and everything to do with jealousy
11 and rage and upset.

12 Q. Thank you very much.

13 A. It's a bit shocking to see it here in a public inquiry.

14 Q. Thank you. We can take that document down now, please.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Hummerstone, I think it's right to say,
16 isn't it, that this document is not, we think, an SDS
17 document?

18 A. Ah --

19 MS HUMMERSTONE: That's right.

20 A. -- so it would (inaudible) Special Branch, yes.

21 MS HUMMERSTONE: That's right. I'm grateful.

22 Final document before we move on to the arrest and
23 prosecution at the Star & Garter. {UCPI/8245}, please.

24 I should say, this is a very poorly -- a very poor
25 quality document, and it's quite difficult to read.

1 This is a document -- a report about the meeting of
2 the London Action Committee Against Racialism, which
3 appears to have held at a private house on
4 10 September 1971.

5 The subject of the meeting is mainly a protest to be
6 arranged at the Miss World competition in 1971. And if
7 we scroll down to paragraph 4 and 5, please:

8 "The plan of action would be similar to that of
9 the previous year. After gaining admission, they hoped
10 to generally disrupt the contest. If, however, access
11 to the Albert Hall was [something] plans would be made
12 to sabotage the news broadcasting vehicle which were
13 usually parked in the vicinity."

14 In the previous year, it's right, isn't it, there
15 had been a disruption of the Miss World contest by
16 the Women's Liberation Movement; is that right? Or
17 the Women's Liberation Front; can you recall that?

18 A. Yeah, in the previous year, but (inaudible) make sense,
19 yes.

20 Q. And this was a plan to stage something similar.

21 A. So it seems, yes.

22 Q. But if not, to sabotage the news broadcasting vehicle.

23 How would that have been achieved, the sabotage of
24 the news broadcasting vehicle? Can you recall?

25 A. I have no recollection of this at all.

1 To what extent was this connected to STST? I see
2 Peter Hain's name is there, just visible at the bottom.
3 I don't know who was -- without the full document,
4 I don't know where this was or who was participating.

5 Q. If we just scroll down, we can see that you were
6 present, but other names present have been redacted for
7 privacy purposes. So you were present at this meeting,
8 but is your evidence that you've got no recollection of
9 it?

10 A. I'm afraid not, no.

11 Q. Okay.

12 Just in the paragraph that's visible there,
13 paragraph 7:

14 "On Tuesday 21 September 1971, Peter Hain was due
15 to ..."

16 I think it must say "appear":

17 "... at Bow Street Magistrates' Court."

18 Somebody who's redacted for privacy reasons:

19 "... at the earliest ..."

20 I think that must be "opportunity":

21 "... would liaise with the Young Liberals in
22 the hope that a combined effort could be made to disrupt
23 the court proceedings, together with a demonstration."

24 Can you recall any conversations of that nature?

25 A. Sorry, no. This -- this is -- I'm assuming that I was

1 actually there. I don't remember who else was there.
2 I can't imagine what the nature of the meeting was, or
3 that I would have been in any way involved with that
4 aspect, since it seemed to be a Young Liberals thing.

5 Q. So you can't recall what might have been envisaged for
6 the disruption of the court proceedings?

7 A. No. Absolutely not.

8 Q. Thank you. We can take that document down now, please.

9 I'm now going to move on to the final topic, which
10 is the demonstration at the Star & Garter hotel,
11 the subsequent arrest and conviction at the magistrates
12 court.

13 It seems to be -- I'm just looking at a purple
14 screen. I wonder if that document can be fully taken
15 down. Thank you.

16 We understand that the plan at the Star & Garter
17 Hotel where the English rugby team were staying prior to
18 their departure for South Africa was to attempt to
19 disrupt their departure to the airport, is that right,
20 to interfere with their taking an aeroplane to fly to
21 South Africa to begin their tour; is that right?

22 A. Ideally have them miss the plane, yes.

23 Q. And you say in your witness statement that the plan had
24 been to block their coach which was due to take them to
25 the airport in the car park, so block the passage of

1 the coach from the car park to the road to take them to
2 the airport, and the demonstration was staged in the car
3 park; is that right?

4 A. Mm-hm.

5 Q. That was a plan, it seems, that took shape at the house
6 of Ernest Rodker, and HN298, "Mike Scott",
7 the undercover police officer, was present at that
8 meeting, it seems.

9 Can you recall "Mike Scott", or somebody of that
10 name, being involved in anything about this matter?

11 A. No. Zero. And from the statement of HN298, who
12 I gather is "Mike Scott" -- we don't know what his real
13 name is, and I have had no photographs of him at the
14 time, which would enable me to identify him.

15 But from his own evidence -- and I accept some of
16 this is almost certainly true -- he appeared on that
17 afternoon -- or was it morning; I don't even know what
18 time of day it was -- having, he said, been told about
19 this meeting by Peter Hain's mother, whom he had phoned.
20 So he'd phoned up someone who was a dedicated and
21 experienced South African political activist who'd been
22 exiled to this country, who had been the subject of
23 amazing police intrusive behaviour in South Africa, and
24 she is supposed to have told him, "Oh, there's something
25 interesting going on this afternoon. Why not go to this

1 address in Fulham." I find this so implausible.

2 But the point is, this guy therefore shows up,
3 having had no contact whatsoever with the group, having
4 heard about this meeting somehow -- presumably they're
5 not obliged to tell the truth, but it does seem to me
6 more likely that they'd obtained their information in
7 some other way, possibly by a telephone tap or some
8 other thing, I don't know. But the result is he
9 parachutes into this meeting and is accepted, because we
10 were not security-conscious, we didn't worry. He said,
11 "I heard about this from your mum", or something.
12 I don't know what he may have said. And we were milling
13 around. In fact, I'm sure Peter wasn't there, so --
14 because Peter didn't get involved in these sorts of
15 activities.

16 So I -- I guess we took him for granted, because
17 the only people who knew about this were people who had
18 been told by people who were already involved in
19 the Special Action Group.

20 So you may say that was naive of us, but there we
21 are. I have no visual recollection of him.

22 Q. This -- the Special Action Group, having been formed in,
23 what, 1969 or thereabouts, was still ongoing, was it, in
24 May 1972?

25 A. This was a sort of loose social contacts and friendship

1 group, yes. So we knew some of the people. And I think
2 ACAR, which you mentioned a meeting of -- a document
3 just now, that was one of the attempts to maintain -- to
4 generate some kind of continuing activity from STST. We
5 were not part of ACAR, but we were an informal group who
6 thought we'd like to do some more stuff on the apartheid
7 question, which was our main preoccupation at the time.

8 I think you should realise that at the time,
9 South Africa was the dominant political activity for
10 those who were progressive. Just as, for some years
11 later, Vietnam became the central activity. As now, in
12 the same way Palestine is the centre of activity for
13 people who care about human rights. So you need to
14 understand its status, that we were not just -- not just
15 dilettantes saying, oh, let's have another go at
16 South Africa. This was a concern that had been going on
17 by then since the boycott of South African goods
18 started, which was ten to 15 years previously. It had
19 been a continuing thread of activity.

20 So we gathered together, and we did various actions
21 together. I can't remember all of them, but one of them
22 was around -- there was the publicity that we picked up
23 for a trade centre that was going to be -- South African
24 trade centre that was going to be located in St Martin's
25 Lane, in a big -- in an office building there. And we

1 did those activities to make it clear to the people that
2 might be letting it to them that this would cause
3 trouble, and we had demonstrations there.

4 So this was not a one-off activity, the hotel in --
5 in Richmond, but it was probably, I think, the last
6 activity that we did it in that way.

7 Q. Right, thank you.

8 Can we now look at some of the documents and try and
9 piece together a kind of -- an account from
10 the available documents, please.

11 Can we have up on screen {MPS/526782}.

12 This is a composite document, and so we're going to
13 be sort of dotting around a little bit, I'm afraid.

14 This is the officer's report about events of that
15 day. And he begins his report setting out that this was
16 a -- it started -- it was initiated by a meeting at
17 Ernest Rodker's home address, and goes on to say that
18 there were 21 people present.

19 At the bottom of paragraph 2 he says this:

20 "There appeared to be only a small group of three or
21 four who had actually been involved from the beginning
22 in the planning of what might correctly be described as
23 a military style operation. Rodker was the key figure
24 of this group which also included Jonathan Rosenhead."

25 Is that right? Were you and Ernest Rodker two of

1 the main instigators and organisers of the activities of
2 this group, in particular in the planning of this
3 particular event, which you say?

4 A. I think that's right. I am sure there were others, but
5 we were certainly deeply involved.

6 To call it a "military style operation" is
7 overestimating the chain of command that we had. It
8 was -- but we did try to think through what you might
9 call a deployment: how we might manage to make
10 that parking lot hard for the coach to get out of. It
11 would have been foolish to go there without thinking
12 that through.

13 Q. Yes.

14 Scrolling on down the document, please:

15 "Rodker, with the help of a fairly accurate hand
16 drawn map of the relevant part of Richmond, indicated
17 where people and cars should be positioned according to
18 the turn of events, and outlined a variety of manoeuvres
19 designed to cope with most eventualities."

20 And paragraph 4 sets out the detailed plan that was
21 to be put into place:

22 "After some discussion about who should fill what
23 roles, which was governed to a large extent by whether
24 or not they had a car which could be used, it was agreed
25 that [Privacy] would be the 'strikers'. It was their

1 job to turn off the fuel supply to the England rugby
2 team's coach or otherwise immobilise it, and then to
3 indicate to [Privacy], who would be playing football in
4 a nearby field, that it had been done. They in turn
5 would wait until the players begun to board the coach
6 and then indicate to ..."

7 Someone who has been transcribed as "PT":

8 "... who would be stationed on Richmond Hill looking
9 down upon them. It was his job to inform Rodker and
10 [Privacy] that the players were boarding the coach, and
11 that they should block the Petersham Road side of the
12 car park with their cars. After a time lapse of 1½
13 minutes, the other three cars, also parked on
14 Richmond Hill, were to block the Nightingale Lane car
15 park exit. The drivers of the vehicles were then to
16 lock them up and block the path of the coach with their
17 bodies. To complicate matters further, Rodker had
18 ordered two 'skips' to arrive at the upper car park at
19 4 pm."

20 You say in your witness statement that you think
21 that sounds broadly accurate, is that right, that that
22 was the plan?

23 A. I think it's actually rather impressive. Remember,
24 we're doing all this without mobile phones, so I'm not
25 quite clear how the signalling was going on. I imagine

1 people up on the hill waving to somebody down below who
2 could see them, or vice versa. But yes, I'm -- I think
3 Ernest was probably more involved in that than --
4 the organisation than I was, but it looked quite a well
5 thought out plan.

6 Q. You have submitted to the Inquiry a series of printouts
7 of the area. And I don't know quite how this is going
8 to work remotely, but perhaps we can just try and just
9 have a little look to see whether we can make it clearer
10 as to the geography.

11 They are at {UCPI/34071}, please. If I can just
12 have that up. If this is simply not going to work, then
13 perhaps we'll abandon it, but we'll have a go.

14 Is this right, this shows the outside of what was
15 then the Star & Garter hotel; is that right?

16 A. Yes, I think -- I'm guessing this is -- I don't think
17 this is the part of the car park that I was in. This
18 is, I think, a lane that's leading from the main road to
19 the hotel, and then there's another -- sorry, you can't
20 see me. But looking at the picture, off to the left,
21 I think there was another car park, another entrance.
22 I think you come in one way and out the other, or
23 vice versa.

24 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

25 A. -- I think the coach was on the other side.

1 Q. We've got an aerial view coming up, so perhaps we can
2 scroll on to the next page, please. And I think you'll
3 have to turn the image of that.

4 A. It's a very nice hotel, by the way. My brother had his
5 60th birthday party there, as it happens, so I was able
6 to revisit.

7 Q. It looks delightful.

8 This shows a slightly different view of the hotel
9 and car park. And you see -- did you say round to
10 the left?

11 A. I think so. This is going from memory.

12 Q. And that appears to be a road leading up -- if you look
13 at the extreme left of that image, a road leading up
14 past the hotel on a slight incline; is that right?

15 A. Going down the side -- that is, I think, the public road
16 probably. But I'm not quite -- I may have got the car
17 parks in the wrong order, but there was a -- one --
18 I think there's a way in and out from that lane into
19 different parts of the car park.

20 Q. The next image may make it a little bit clearer, because
21 it's a Google Maps image. It may not, but we'll just
22 look at it briefly. If you can just help me with this
23 as someone who evidently knows the geography.

24 We can see the little sort of hotel sign in
25 the middle of the image there, the kind of little bed

1 sign, with a road, Nightingale Lane, leading from there
2 to the Petersham Road, and then running a little further
3 up the page, Richmond Hill running down the page past
4 the words "The Wick".

5 The parts in white there, that's the hotel premises;
6 is that right? That's the car parks and the hotel
7 itself, and the roads are then in white: Nightingale,
8 Petersham Road and Richmond Hill, which are the roads
9 that we're concerned with; does that sound right?

10 A. Yes, it doesn't actually look at all like how I remember
11 it. But Nightingale Lane is something -- I guess that's
12 probably about a few hundred yards long, I'm not sure.
13 It's not quite as short maybe as it looks there. And
14 it's -- and it's almost a country lane.

15 Q. And a part of the plan was that the -- there are
16 evidently two exits to the car park, the Petersham Road
17 exit and the Nightingale Lane exit. So it looks as if
18 there's an exit at the top of Petersham Road going down
19 from the hotel, and then one leading out from the other
20 part of the car park; is that right? I mean, it's very
21 difficult to see from -- (overspeaking) --

22 A. I'm sorry, I should obviously have gone back and had
23 a look at it before -- they may have changed the
24 arrangements by now.

25 Q. Don't worry.

1 Let's just move on, please. Next page, please,
2 page 4 {UCPI/34071/4}. Actually, I'm not really sure
3 this is going to assist, but I want you to have an
4 opportunity to look at it, since you've provided it.

5 What we can see there is in fact that's the other
6 part of the Star & Garter, isn't it, rather than
7 the hotel?

8 A. That's the wrong building.

9 Q. Yes. The Star & Garter hotel --

10 A. That was for ex-servicemen and so on. It's now been
11 converted into luxury flats, I believe. But that's not
12 it.

13 Q. The Star & Garter Hotel in fact is at the top left,
14 isn't it, where we can see very faintly
15 written "Nightingale Lane", it's just up there,
16 and "The Wick"?

17 A. I don't think you can see the Star & Garter Hotel from
18 there, as far as I'm aware. I think it's further away
19 than that. It's up on the top of the hill where it's --
20 the Petersham Hotel is further down towards the river.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 Over the page, please, {UCPI/34071/5}, page 5 gives
23 a rather more extreme sort of zoom out.

24 A. You can see there, the distance is much greater.

25 Q. Yes. So we can see the Wick is right up next to

1 Richmond Hill, and the restaurant at the Petersham, the
2 Petersham Hotel, is down towards Petersham Road, right
3 at the bottom of that -- towards the bottom of that
4 stretch?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And then Nightingale Lane leading from
7 the Petersham Hotel to the Petersham Road there.

8 And finally, please, the final one of your documents
9 that you have provided to the Inquiry, which has
10 probably maybe the clearest, next page, please, page 6,
11 {UCPI/34071/6}, which shows, doesn't it, the car park in
12 a little bit more detail perhaps, and the positioning of
13 the Petersham Road and Nightingale Lane.

14 Do you know where the individual cars were parked
15 and what entrances were supposed to be blocked? Can you
16 help us with that?

17 A. I can't even remember for sure where the -- where
18 the coach was. I'm pretty sure -- my car was one of
19 the ones which was used to block, and I'm pretty sure
20 it's in that car park that's going up the hill towards
21 Nightingale Lane. That's my guess, that's where it was.
22 Because I think there was an exit there, and we put
23 a couple of cars there to stop the coach getting out too
24 easily.

25 Q. Right.

1 A. And I think there was another exit onto Petersham Road.
2 But I'm not sure. It doesn't look as if there is
3 necessarily an exit there.

4 I think that the coach was probably located in
5 the shadow that's just behind the hotel, the shadow that
6 the hotel is casting. That would be my best guess.

7 Q. Thank you. Thank you.

8 Can we return, please, now to {MPS/526782}, and this
9 time to page 10 of that document, {MPS/526782/10}, and
10 just enlarge it a little, please.

11 This is going back to the report by HN298 of
12 the events of that day. And just looking at
13 paragraph 6:

14 "Before departing for Richmond, Rodker gave out
15 the telephone numbers of several solicitors and
16 the NCCL. He destroyed all the notes he had made about
17 the days activities and told the others that if they
18 were arrested it was essential that they should deny
19 having met together previously and should say that they
20 had received a note through the post, outlining
21 the action which had been planned. He added that this
22 was to squash any possibility of a charge for
23 conspiracy."

24 Was it anticipated, therefore, that you may be
25 arrested for the action that you took on that day?

1 A. I don't think there was any -- I don't remember
2 discussion about conspiracy. It wasn't a major part.
3 This was maybe, like, a little -- little warning that
4 you give to people. You know, like, if -- when people
5 were going out on demonstrations, they sometimes --
6 people used to hand out leaflets saying, "If you are
7 arrested, this is what -- this is what your rights are,
8 this is what you should do."

9 I think this was more a low-key precautionary
10 statement. I don't think -- I don't remember being
11 aware of it, I don't remember destroying any -- any
12 notes. I don't think I knew what the law on conspiracy
13 was.

14 Q. It wasn't in anticipation of the commission of any
15 criminal offence, you don't think?

16 A. No, it's just that I think we were vaguely aware that --
17 that things that were not themselves crimes could become
18 a crime if they were -- if you -- if there was
19 conspiracy to do them. And so we didn't want to run
20 that risk. Something in that area, anyhow.

21 Q. And can you recall -- you may not -- did you go straight
22 from Mr Rodker's house to the Star & Garter Hotel; can
23 you recall that?

24 A. I must have done. I cannot remember -- I can't remember
25 the meeting at Ernest's house or the journey, I just

1 remember being in the car park. But there's been lots
2 of time for the memories to go.

3 Q. Paragraph 8 in this report describes the movement of
4 the cars into the position and the arrival of
5 the police:

6 "By 3.55 pm all were in their allotted positions and
7 almost immediately the signal was received for Rodker
8 and [Privacy] to leave. After 1½ minutes the other cars
9 departed from the Nightingale Lane exit. As they did
10 so, a lorry containing an empty 'skip' turned in front
11 of them and drove into the car park. The three cars
12 followed and were confronted by a police officer, who
13 made no attempt to stop them blocking the coaches exit.
14 They positioned the cars, locked them and left, later to
15 join other demonstrators standing by the coaches with
16 placards. It would appear that the officers' presence
17 in the car park had deterred [Privacy] from making any
18 attempt at immobilising the coach."

19 Does that roughly accord with your memory of
20 the episode?

21 A. It's not inconsistent. Certainly I don't remember the
22 detail, but there's nothing there that I would see to be
23 wrong.

24 Q. Can we move on to paragraph 10, please. Paragraph 9
25 sets out the attempts to move the vehicles to block

1 the -- that were blocking the passage of the coach, and
2 paragraph 10 says:

3 "A melee ensued with the demonstrators sitting on
4 and in front of the vehicles while they were being
5 lifted. One of the hotel staff succeeded in ripping off
6 half the front bumper of one car from its mounting."

7 I think that was in fact your car, and the police
8 took responsibility for that damage.

9 Can you recall a melee? Would you have described it
10 as a "melee"?

11 A. No. No, there was a -- there -- a group of people all
12 clustered round the coach, and I imagine sitting down.
13 But there was no -- no fisticuffs; nobody was trying to
14 restrain us in any way.

15 By the way, I don't think it was the bumper,
16 I thought it was the roof rack that got damaged. But
17 who knows; it doesn't matter now. The officer may have
18 accepted responsibility for it, but I never got any
19 money.

20 Q. Can we just very briefly return to paragraph 5, just
21 slightly up the page. Paragraph 5, the final two
22 sentences of that paragraph:

23 "Rosenhead volunteered the use of three flares which
24 he had with him but there was not much support for this.
25 (Later, at the car park he lit and threw a flare)."

1 Can you recall doing that?

2 A. Absolutely not. I think this is possibly mistaken
3 identity. (inaudible) likely. Most of this report
4 seems reasonably accurate apart from a slight inflation
5 of language. I -- I wouldn't have even had anything to
6 light the flare with. I have no recollection of ever
7 owning a flare in my life. It seems possibly somebody
8 else. But I don't remember any smoke in the -- or -- or
9 -- or light, or anything of that kind, in the whole
10 event. It was all a beautiful sunny day, and I don't
11 remember anything consistent with that. That doesn't
12 necessarily mean me I didn't do it, but I
13 certainly don't think I did.

14 Q. Let's just look very briefly at another report, please,
15 {MPS/737087}.

16 This is tab 6 of your bundle, Sir.

17 Thank you.

18 Paragraphs -- the second paragraph and the third
19 paragraph. This is the report from the officer -- one
20 of the officers that attended this incident, and
21 the second and third paragraph set out what they found
22 there:

23 "The patrolling officer, SPS [redacted] attended at
24 once. Just after 4.10 pm about 30 persons arrived and
25 mingled with a crowd of hotel staff and residents and

1 some building workers in the car park of the hotel. Two
2 of them left Morris mini motor vehicles in the car park
3 entrance at Nightingale Lane, blocking the way out for
4 the rugby team's coach which was about to leave.

5 "With help from members of the public and police
6 whom he had called to the scene, the SPS tried to move
7 one of the vehicles. Then some of the thirty people who
8 had just arrived started sitting down in the road
9 outside the same entrance and completely blocked
10 the way. They did so in groups of three or four at
11 a time. As each group sat, SPS [redacted] asked them to
12 move. They refused, and they were arrested, whereupon
13 a fresh group replaced them.

14 "Fourteen persons acted in this way, and they were
15 taken in two vans to this station and charged."

16 Does that accord with your memory of how this
17 episode played out?

18 A. I don't remember it in that detail. I don't remember
19 this idea of people sitting down one by -- you know, in
20 small groups, rather than all together. It could well
21 have happened. I wouldn't substantiate that or deny it.
22 It's -- it's -- it wouldn't make that much difference if
23 we'd all sat down together or done it in groups. And
24 I can't think quite why we would have done it in groups,
25 but maybe we did.

1 Q. It's right, I think -- from your witness statement, it's
2 right to say you've got little independent recollection
3 of the court proceedings that followed your arrest.
4 Your first appearance, it seems, was on 14 May -- sorry,
5 we can take that document down now, please -- when it
6 appears that not guilty pleas were entered to
7 obstructing a highway and to a new charge of
8 obstructing -- you were charged with obstructing
9 the police on that occasion as well, and a not guilty
10 plea entered to that as well.

11 Thereafter, you were bailed, it seems, until
12 14 June, and then two meetings took place of your group
13 at private houses. I'm just going to look very briefly
14 at those meetings, please.

15 Can we have up {MPS/737109}.

16 This is a meeting which took place on 21 May, so six
17 or seven days after that first court appearance, at your
18 house, and 13 people were in attendance, including, as
19 we now know, HN298, "Mike Scott", and also including
20 Ernest Rodker and Christabel Gurney.

21 This was a meeting, was it not, where you discussed
22 your forthcoming court appearances and how you were
23 proposing to deal with the case in hand; is that right?

24 A. So it seems, yes.

25 Q. Paragraph 2, it's set out there that you had obtained

1 a number of press photographs. And in fact, you've
2 submitted a number of photographs with your witness
3 statement. Are those the same photographs that are
4 referred to in that paragraph?

5 A. They must be, yes.

6 Q. Thank you. I'm not going to take you through those, but
7 those have been now published.

8 At paragraph 6, please, if we just scroll down
9 the page slightly.

10 A. Can I just say on that that the stuff about photographs
11 showing people in the road. I was never in the road,
12 and yet I was -- I was accused of being in the road. So
13 I don't know whether there was -- as -- as -- Ernest is
14 reported as saying that he was photographed in the road.
15 I just can't say. But if so, he was the exception. We
16 were in the car park, and it's quite a large car park,
17 as you saw. We were near the hotel and not at the road
18 end.

19 Q. And that formed, I think, the basis of your defence for
20 your trial; is that right?

21 A. And there were photographs.

22 Q. At paragraph 6 -- yes:

23 "Rosenhead next began to compile a list of those who
24 had witnessed the arrest of any of the others, but most
25 could not recollect the more important details that had

1 occurred."

2 And then over the page, please, {MPS/737109/2}:

3 "Finally it was agreed that a small group including
4 Rosenhead, Rodker [and two others] ... would arrange an
5 interview with Ben Birnberg ... in about 10 days time.
6 Rodker suggested that all concerned should prepare a
7 statement of what had happened ..."

8 And in fact, you did, I think, speak to a solicitor
9 and arrange for the solicitor to represent the group as
10 a whole; is that right?

11 A. Not just a solicitor; Ben Birnberg is a highly esteemed
12 human rights lawyer of an older generation(?). He's
13 still alive, I have to say. He's a wonderful guy.
14 I don't -- I don't think -- he did become my own
15 solicitor many years later, but I don't know who
16 contacted him on this occasion.

17 Q. And the request for notes about what had happened. In
18 fact, we have one such set of notes, do we not? I think
19 you have submitted it. Perhaps we can have an extremely
20 brief look at it. {UCPI/33628}, please.

21 That just sets out the sort of covering letter, as
22 it were:

23 "Herewith my rather uninformative account of
24 the events of that fateful Friday afternoon ..."

25 If we can turn on to page 2, please, {UCPI/33628/2}.

1 This is at tab 17, Sir, of the hard copy bundle.
2 It's not terribly easy to read. The top paragraph sets
3 out the movement of the cars that this individual
4 witnessed, and the movement of -- the arrival of
5 a delivery van and a skip at the car park, the skip of
6 course having been organised by Ernest Rodker, and
7 the people in the car park.

8 The second paragraph says this:

9 "A smoke flare was set off about 10 minutes after
10 the start of the blocking attempt but well away from
11 the scene of the action."

12 That's probably a reference, isn't it, to the flare
13 that was mentioned in "Mike Scott's" report, but you say
14 don't think that was set off by --

15 A. Well, it might have been me, but I just don't remember
16 it. I'm not -- I'm not in a position to deny something
17 I can't remember.

18 Q. The next paragraph reads:

19 "After about twenty minutes most of
20 the demonstrators had disappeared. I could only see
21 Mike Scott and a girl whose name I believe [Privacy]
22 trying to prevent the police from moving a red mini too
23 roughly from the car park entrance."

24 And then in the fourth paragraph this writer says he
25 then saw:

1 "Four demonstrators, including Mike Scott and
2 Ernest Rodker sitting on the grass verge of the road in
3 police custody."

4 You say you weren't aware of the presence of "Mike
5 Scott". Does it follow then you can't really recall who
6 was doing what and whether he might have been actively
7 involved in the --

8 A. I didn't -- I didn't know he existed until these --
9 these papers started to emerge.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 Can we move on, please, to the next document. I'm
12 going to take this quite shortly, {MPS/737108}.

13 This is a report of a second meeting of some of
14 those arrested after that demonstration at
15 the Star & Garter, held very shortly before your second
16 appearance at court. This is on 11 June.

17 Again, "Mike Scott", the undercover officer, was
18 present at this meeting. It appears that at this
19 meeting you gave an account about your meeting with
20 the solicitor Ben Birnberg. Can you recall giving such
21 an account? Perhaps you can't.

22 A. The account being what, sorry?

23 Q. An account of your meeting with Ben Birnberg.

24 A. I can't see that in the text. "Rosenhead reported" --
25 no, who knows what I --

1 Q. It may not much matter.

2 Perhaps we can just move on to paragraph 7, please?

3 A. Because it's all deleted that I can't -- I've got really
4 no recollection of what it might have been that -- that
5 I was reporting. That might have helped, but ...

6 Q. Some matters have been redacted from this document
7 because they contain matters of legal professional
8 privilege, which is why they can't be --

9 A. Yeah, I wasn't objecting, I was just explaining why
10 I couldn't, yeah --

11 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

12 A. -- (inaudible).

13 Q. Paragraph 7, can I just ask this:

14 "There was some concern over the costs of the case
15 and there was unanimous agreement that these should be
16 defrayed equally regardless of individual fines and
17 costs. Rodker suggested forming a defence fund as
18 a means of raising a proportion of the expenses and it
19 was decided to set up 'The Richmond Defence Fund'.
20 [Privacy] agreed to insert an appeal in 'Peace News 'and
21 Rosenhead added 'And Christabel Gurney can do the same
22 with AAM.'"

23 Was it anticipated that the Anti-Apartheid Movement
24 might be able to meet some of your defence costs?

25 A. There was no expectation, but it was an exploration that

1 since Christabel has been involved from then until now
2 with anti-apartheid matters that she would be well
3 placed to find out if they would do it.

4 Q. Just moving on very briefly, please, to paragraph 8:

5 "The only fundamental difference to be resolved was,
6 that at least three of the number ..."

7 And it sets out the names there:

8 "... wanted to try to establish what they described
9 as 'a precedent of furthering Mackensie representation'.
10 Not only did they want, as is traditionally permitted,
11 a layman in the court who could suggest lines of
12 questioning for the defendant to pursue but furthermore
13 a layman who was able to represent them in the same way
14 that a solicitor might. They anticipated that
15 the Magistrate would not permit this and that they would
16 be granted a further remand of one month for their case
17 to be presented to the Queen's Bench Division."

18 Do you have any recollection of a further remand?

19 After your case was heard on 14 -- you appeared in court
20 on 14 June -- it doesn't appear that you were convicted
21 on that day, unlike others. Might you have been part of
22 this group that sought the furthering of McKenzie
23 representation? If you don't remember --

24 A. I didn't understand why I was -- I think Ernest was
25 remanded as well, for a further period. And I didn't

1 know why I wasn't dealt with. Some people were dealt
2 with summarily on the occasion and others were not. And
3 I noticed I got a bigger fine. Some people got £2 fine,
4 and I got a £10 fine. I don't know why I was privileged
5 in that way. I didn't do more than the others; it was
6 the same offence.

7 MS HUMMERSTONE: Sir, I notice the time. I've only got two
8 more reports left to look at. It's likely to take about
9 ten minutes. I don't know whether it's more sensible to
10 complete this now before breaking, or whether to adjourn
11 for lunch and come back at -- ah, sorry, I'm told
12 the shorthand writer requires a break. I'm awfully
13 sorry. But I've literally got ten minutes more, so it
14 won't be very long after lunch.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: May I just ask the shorthand writer through
16 you, please, to reconsider? You've got ten minutes
17 left. We then have to have a quarter of an hour break,
18 to permit anyone who has any questions to put them to
19 you. It may well be that Mr Ryder wants to re-examine,
20 and all of that is going to take us well into the lunch
21 break if we run until we finish it.

22 It seemed to me to be sensible for you to finish
23 your ten minutes now, and for us then to break for lunch
24 when all of those things can take place without
25 interrupting proceedings further. Otherwise, Ms Gurney

1 is going to be, I think, unreasonably delay.

2 MS HUMMERSTONE: I'm told that the shorthand writer is
3 agreeable to that course, so we can complete this now,
4 I'm grateful.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: May I just confirm with Professor Rosenhead
6 that that does not inconvenience him?

7 A. That's fine.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Good.

9 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you very much.

10 The penultimate report, please {MPS/526782}, which
11 is the composite that we've already looked at, but
12 I want to just look at a different page of it, please.

13 And can we go to page 4, please. {MPS/526782/4}.
14 Paragraph 6 of that. This is about your appearance in
15 court on 14 June of 1972. Paragraph 6 indicates at
16 the conclusion of the proceedings Christabel Gurney
17 Privacy and Mike Scott, HN298, were found guilty and
18 fined and conditionally discharged.

19 But at paragraph 5, it appears that your case and
20 that of Ernest Rodker were adjourned until 28 June.
21 Have you got any recollection of why that happened?

22 A. No, and apparently there were two other people as well
23 with us, and I have no idea why we were selected for
24 this treatment. Sorry.

25 Q. Can we go back, please, to page 3 of this document, just

1 to see if this sheds any light on it. It may not, but
2 I just want to ask you. {MPS/526782/3}.

3 This is the SDS management report on this incident,
4 reporting back as to what had happened from HN294, who
5 was the DI of the SDS at the time, who says that, in
6 the third paragraph down, having said that various
7 appeared on 14 June:

8 "The remaining seven asked for these cases to be
9 heard at a higher court and have been further remanded
10 until 28.6.72."

11 Can you recall requesting that your case was heard
12 by the Crown Court?

13 A. I assume this was part of the advice by Ben Birnberg,
14 and I assume that he was saying there was an advantage
15 to going to a higher court. Maybe you can express your
16 arguments in a fuller way, I don't know. And I guess
17 that the people -- the seven who didn't do that were
18 ones who just wanted to get it disposed of now and not
19 have to come back again another time. So I assume it
20 was that sort of self-selection, rather than anything
21 else.

22 Q. We can take that document down now, please.

23 The point at issue during your trial, you say in
24 your witness statement, was the location of
25 the demonstration and whether or not you were

1 obstructing a highway or simply impeding the progress of
2 the coach in the car park; is that right? That was
3 the main --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- force(?) of that issue.

6 A. Well, that was the issue about whether we were guilty as
7 charged. Obviously the main issue was about apartheid
8 South Africa, but that was not --

9 Q. Sorry, that was the main issue -- that was the main
10 point at issue during the course of the court
11 proceedings.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you say that whilst you have no independent
14 recollection of the court proceedings, you assume you
15 pleaded guilty and had a trial on that issue?

16 A. Pleading not guilty.

17 Q. Not guilty, and had a trial?

18 A. Yes. I remember that must have been 28 June.

19 Q. And you say that you seem to remember -- that you gave
20 evidence that you were in the car park, and you seem to
21 remember others saying the same; is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 I'd just like to say, my mother -- my late mother
24 was a magistrate up in Liverpool, and she knows that
25 I tell the truth, and she also knew that police officers

1 tell the truth. So when I told her what had happened
2 with police officers basically lying through their teeth
3 about where we were, she found this really -- a lot of
4 cognitive dissonance; she didn't know how to handle
5 this. She had to believe that police officers could lie
6 or that I did. So I recall this issue very acutely
7 because of that.

8 Q. Yes, yes.

9 The final document I want to just very briefly look
10 at is {MPS/737126}, please. And whilst that's just
11 being obtained, you say that you seem to remember giving
12 evidence, you seem to remember others giving evidence.
13 Can you recall -- does it follow, since you can't recall
14 "Mike Scott" at all, you can't recall whether he would
15 have given evidence during the course of the trial?

16 A. No, no.

17 Q. Or in fact whether he was in the same court proceedings
18 at that stage as you were?

19 A. He -- he was remanded to the higher court as well, was
20 he?

21 Q. No, it doesn't appear so.

22 A. So, the proceedings in the first court were extremely
23 abbreviated, as I recall, because they processed it all
24 very quickly.

25 I think the fact that he was there is outrageous,

1 that he sat in on our meetings with Ben Birnberg,
2 because Ben came to the court, I think, on that
3 occasion. So he would have been privy not just to
4 reports of the interaction with the lawyer, but actually
5 there, and then clearly reporting that to the police, so
6 they would know that we were going to be making a case
7 about being in the wrong place. All of that is, it
8 seems to me, a total miscarriage of justice, and speaks
9 very badly for the police ethics of that time, or of
10 that place.

11 Q. This final document just sort of perhaps completes this
12 episode.

13 Can we turn on to page 3, please, of this document
14 {MPS/737126/3}.

15 Towards the bottom of the page, the bottom two
16 entries, we can see that Ernest Rodker appears to have
17 been convicted of obstructing a highway and obstructing
18 the police, and he was fined £2 with £10 costs, and
19 a conditional discharge, on 12 July 1972.

20 Your name appears thereafter, also charged with
21 obstructing the highway and obstructing the police, also
22 on the same date, but fined £10 with costs, but no
23 evidence offered on the second charge, that of
24 obstructing the police. Can you recall that?

25 A. Well, I didn't obstruct the police. But it's

1 interesting that I -- I was -- that charge was
2 dismissed. Ernest was not dismissed. He was
3 conditionally discharged and bound over, or whatever,
4 for two years. Yet he gets only a £2 fine and I get
5 a £10 fine. I'm not quite sure what I did to annoy
6 the magistrate. Really weird.

7 Q. Does it follow, since you had no awareness of "Mike
8 Scott" in your group, that you had no awareness during
9 the course of those criminal proceedings that there was
10 an undercover officer in your midst, you weren't
11 informed of that?

12 A. No, and reading the document, it seems that nobody in
13 the court was informed. Indeed, I think the -- well,
14 I'd be interested to hear "Mike Scott's" evidence.
15 I think he's talking on Tuesday. But in his written
16 evidence, he doesn't say that anybody in the court was
17 involved, which is extreme.

18 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you, Professor Rosenhead.

19 And you've set out in your witness statement
20 the consequence that you see as having flowed from that
21 lack of disclosure, and those are all going to be taken
22 into account by the Chairman when he considers what
23 information to pass on to those that might need to see
24 it.

25 That completes the questions I have for --

1 A. Can I say one more thing? Are you going to give me
2 a chance? I didn't interrupt you, did I?

3 MS HUMMERSTONE: No, not at all, professor. That was going
4 to be my final question, Professor Rosenhead.

5 We have your very helpful and complete witness
6 statement that will be taken into account. But I wanted
7 to ask you whether there was anything that you wanted to
8 add that you haven't perhaps set out in that document,
9 that you wish the Chairman to take into account.

10 A. Clearly, I mean, this Inquiry is about what happened
11 then, but it's also clearly supposed to inform
12 decision-making now. And I do think that the --
13 the emphasis then entirely on radical -- liberal or
14 radical and trade union organisations, to the virtually
15 complete neglect of any danger from the right, which
16 arguably was much greater, is striking. And I'm worried
17 -- I think we should think about this in terms of what's
18 going on now.

19 I am concerned, in terms of the behaviour of our --
20 my very own undercover officer, about the current
21 legislation about making it actually -- changing
22 the legal basis for covert human intelligence sources
23 activities. So I do think that the -- I hope that this
24 Inquiry will perhaps retrospectively get those powers
25 reconsidered.

1 And the general picture that's going on at
2 the moment of reinforcing police powers is worrying
3 given the evidence that we have in this case. And there
4 is a continuing police culture, if you like, of
5 the abuse of power. And I don't think -- I think people
6 are doing this valuable service for the community, which
7 is raising issues which are uncomfortable. They were
8 uncomfortable for the powers that be in 1972, even
9 though we now think that opposition to apartheid is --
10 everybody's against it, but they weren't then.
11 And people who are pushing against the established view
12 should not be subjected to these kinds of intrusive
13 powers unnecessarily.

14 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you, Professor Rosenhead.

15 Sir, those are all the questions I have
16 for Professor Rosenhead.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

18 May I ask Mr Ryder, if he is listening, whether he's
19 likely to have any re-examination?

20 MR RYDER: Thank you, Sir. At the moment, I don't
21 anticipate any questions.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I ask mainly to help with timing
23 so that Ms Gurney is not told to appear when -- or
24 requested to appear when she's not actually needed.

25 MR RYDER: Yes, of course.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. We will adjourn now until 2.15,
2 when, if there are any further questions of
3 Professor Rosenhead, they will have been forwarded to
4 Ms Hummerstone, and she will, if she thinks it right,
5 ask them. Otherwise, we will then proceed to hear
6 the evidence of Ms Gurney.

7 A. Thank you.

8 MR FERNANDES: We will now take a break for lunch. May
9 I remind those in the virtual hearing room to remember
10 to join their break-out rooms, please.

11 Hearings will resume at 2.15 pm. Thank you.

12 (1.18 pm)

13 (The short adjournment)

14 (2.15 pm)

15 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to
16 the afternoon session of today's evidential hearings.
17 For those in the virtual hearing room, please remember
18 to turn off both your camera and microphone.

19 I will now hand over to the Chairman,
20 Sir John Mitting, to continue proceedings.
21 Chairman.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 As at the beginning of every live evidential
24 session, a recording is going to be played.

25 I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,

1 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make
2 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including
3 its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have
4 made a number of orders which affect what you may and
5 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave
6 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter
7 and may have serious consequences for you.

8 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an
9 order, I have the power to certify the matter to
10 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
11 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
12 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
13 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
14 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
15 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
16 sequestration of their assets.

17 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
18 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
19 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
20 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
21 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
22 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any
23 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
24 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
25 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing

1 room to any other person, but only once at least
2 ten minutes have elapsed since the event which you are
3 describing took place.

4 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
5 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public
6 disclosure of information, for example about
7 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
8 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,
9 whether by accident or design, information which I have
10 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
11 be disclosed in a hearing.

12 If and when that happens, I will immediately suspend
13 the hearing and make an order prohibiting further
14 disclosure of the information outside the hearing rooms.
15 The consequence will be that no further disclosure of
16 that information may be made by mobile telephone or
17 other portable electronic device from within the hearing
18 room, or by any means outside it.

19 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is
20 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
21 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
22 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
23 the truth about undercover policing.

24 You, as members of the public, are entitled to hear
25 the same public evidence as I will hear and to reach

1 your own conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do
2 their best to ensure that you can.

3 If you have any doubt about the terms of this
4 message or what you may or may not do, you should not
5 hesitate to ask one of them and with my help if
6 necessary they will provide you with the answer.

7 Good afternoon.

8 Ms Hummerstone, are there any questions which may be
9 asked of Professor Rosenhead now?

10 MS HUMMERSTONE: I have been told that there are no
11 questions from the parties to ask Professor Rosenhead.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

13 Professor Rosenhead, two things, if I may.

14 First, I don't think you were asked formally to
15 confirm that the witness statement that you made on
16 21 February 2020 was true to the best of your knowledge
17 and belief?

18 A. It was -- it is.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

20 I know that you are concerned, as am I, about
21 the conviction that you, sustained all those years ago,
22 and would, if I am satisfied that there may have been
23 a miscarriage of justice, want me to refer it to a panel
24 which is to consider these things. May I take it that
25 you would like me to do that promptly, rather than right

1 at the end of the Inquiry?

2 A. That would be good, thank you.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: I will do my best to do that.

4 A. Shall I disconnect from this now?

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I was going to say, if your grasp of

6 technology is as bad as mine was when I started on this

7 exercise, then I hope you don't have too much

8 difficulty, but thank you very much.

9 A. Perhaps they will do it for me. And thank you.

10 (The witness withdrew)

11 MS CHRISTABEL GURNEY (called)

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Christabel Gurney, can you hear me?

13 A. Yes, I can. Can you hear me?

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Indeed. And you are not muted. I understand

15 your technical competence is greater than that of

16 Professor Rosenhead or myself.

17 A. I doubt it, but on this occasion it's the excellent

18 technical staff who have coached me.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Splendid.

20 Then Ms Hummerstone will have some questions for

21 you.

22 Ms Hummerstone.

23 I'm so sorry. First of all, you must say whether

24 you wish to be sworn or affirmed.

25 A. Affirm.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Affirm, then may the words be spoken to you,
2 please.

3 (Witness affirmed)

4 Thank you.

5 Ms Hummerstone.

6 Questions by MS HUMMERSTONE

7 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you, Sir.

8 You were active in the Anti-Apartheid Movement
9 between 1969 and 1994. You were a member of the AAM
10 executive committee and editor of the AAM monthly
11 newspaper; is that right?

12 A. Yes. For part of the time the editor of the paper.

13 Q. I'm grateful.

14 And you received an OBE for your political service,
15 in particular in the field of human rights in connection
16 with your work with the AAM; is that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You have provided a statement to the Inquiry setting out
19 not only your response to the questions posed to you by
20 the Inquiry based on the documents which you name, but
21 also the political context both in the UK and southern
22 Africa in which you were politically active with
23 anti-apartheid campaigning groups in the 1970s; is that
24 right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Can you -- have you had an opportunity to review that
2 statement prior to giving evidence today?

3 A. Yes, I have.

4 Q. And can you confirm that it's true to the best of your
5 knowledge and belief?

6 A. Yes, I can.

7 Q. Just so that you understand, the Inquiry has noted your
8 concerns about wider investigations to be made.

9 The Inquiry has no remit to investigate wider
10 Special Branch activities or police activities, but is
11 simply looking at the activities of
12 the Special Demonstration Squad in its various
13 incarnations. I just want to make that clear before
14 I ask you any further questions.

15 You appear in reports that have been attributed to
16 HN135, Mike Ferguson, HN346, Jill Mosdell, HN339,
17 "Stewart Goodman", HN329, "Douglas Edwards", and HN298,
18 "Mike Scott".

19 I'm going to ask you first, please, about your
20 activities with the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

21 You set out in your witness statement the origin of
22 the AAM as the boycott movement in 1959, and that its
23 purpose was to campaign against apartheid in
24 South Africa, more broadly white-minority regimes in
25 southern Africa; is that right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You have said in your witness statement that to be
3 a member of the AAM, you paid a subscription, you filled
4 in a membership application form, and you were then in
5 possession of a membership card; is that right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. But that anybody could become a member of
8 the organisation?

9 A. Yes. The Anti-Apartheid Movement wanted to recruit as
10 many members as it can. It was totally above ground and
11 open.

12 Q. I understand.

13 You have set out in your witness statement that
14 the group used conventional campaigning tactics which
15 were lawful and open, and you give us examples:
16 the presentation of petitions to Downing Street and to
17 Parliament, public meetings, pickets, demonstrations,
18 vigils, letter-writing campaigns and the putting on of
19 cultural events to popularise your cause; is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you also organise mass demonstrations as part of
22 the AAM? Was that part of the -- (overspeaking) --

23 A. Yes. I don't know if I should say at this point, but
24 the whole point of the Anti-Apartheid Movement was to --
25 well, the Anti-Apartheid Movement never thought that it

1 could effect change in southern Africa and South Africa,
2 which it was primarily concerned with, on its own. It
3 was very much supporting people inside South Africa who
4 were struggling against the system. But to do that, it
5 realised that Britain in many ways, through trade and
6 investments and through diplomacy, supported
7 the apartheid regime, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement
8 saw its role as trying to stop that support.

9 So the whole point was to help the people inside
10 the country by preventing assistance to the apartheid
11 government coming from our country, because we thought
12 that, you know, our business was the policies of our
13 government. And to do that, it wanted to create as wide
14 a movement as it could, to effect that change.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 Can you give -- when you refer to "mass
17 demonstrations" in your witness statement, can you give
18 an idea of the sort of numbers involved in a sort of
19 typical AAM demonstration?

20 A. It changed very much over the years. At the very
21 beginning, counter-intuitively, after Sharpeville, the
22 massacre at Sharpeville, there was a very large
23 demonstration, where I think -- well, comparatively
24 large. And I think -- I think we said 20,000 -- well,
25 all these estimates are rather problematical. And then

1 in the 70s support fell off a bit, because nothing very
2 much was happening inside South Africa. Then in
3 the 80s, which was the heyday of the Anti-Apartheid
4 Movement, there were a quarter of a million people at
5 Clapham Common at a rock festival, in effect. And then
6 many more in 1988 at the big demonstration about -- to
7 mark Mandela's birthday, calling for the release of
8 Nelson Mandela, where I think there were a million
9 people in Hyde Park.

10 So it varied enormously over the years.

11 Q. And the demonstrations that were organised, were they
12 organised in cooperation with the police? Or how
13 were they -- how was the sort of security arrangement
14 managed?

15 A. Yes, I was never -- I was never involved on that side of
16 it, but I do know, yes, they were involved in
17 collaboration with the police.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. The routes were always agreed with the police, yes.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 I just want to look briefly, please, at document
22 {MPS/742860}.

23 Sir, for the hard copy bundle, that's behind tab 10.

24 This is in fact an SDS report; it's a Special Branch
25 report.

1 It is a report about a demonstration that took
2 place, organised by the AAM, on 25 October in 1970. And
3 paragraph 2 sets out that there was a -- it was:

4 "... preceded by a small march, organised by
5 the Streatham Labour and Liberal Parties ..."

6 Of some 20 people, that walked up Brixton Hill and
7 over the bridge to the Victoria Embankment, accompanied
8 by uniformed police throughout, with no incidents taking
9 place.

10 But can we move on, please, to paragraph 3, which
11 concerns the main demonstration:

12 "The main demonstration commenced as expected with
13 a march which assembled on the Victoria Embankment
14 outside Charing Cross Tube Station. By the time
15 the march moved off, at about 2.40 pm, some 3,500 to
16 4,000 persons were involved, mainly students, including
17 contingents from many of the universities in this
18 country, and other organisations representing the broad
19 spectrum of political bodies sympathetic to
20 the Anti-Apartheid Movement."

21 And we'll see in a moment that broad spectrum. But
22 is it right to say this was a politically democratic
23 group, there was no particular political -- sort of
24 political -- I'll put this in a different way.

25 This wasn't party political -- wasn't of the left or

1 the right, this was a kind of broad coalition of
2 different political groups that may have been involved
3 in anti-apartheid -- the Anti-Apartheid Movement; is
4 that right?

5 A. Yes, that is right. I mean, from the very beginning
6 the Anti-Apartheid Movement is -- one of its early
7 manifestos said it wanted to be a party -- a movement of
8 people who belonged to all political parties and none;
9 and the "none" component was very important.

10 Q. Yes.

11 Paragraph 4 says that the meeting was a meeting
12 after the march had come to its end, but:

13 "... commenced at 3.30 and ended at 4.50 by which
14 time some 8,000 persons were present in and around
15 Trafalgar Square. A summary of the speeches made is
16 included later in this report. In general the crowd was
17 peaceful and no incidents occurred, at this stage,
18 connected with the Anti-Apartheid demonstration. There
19 were however, small contingents of anarchists, obviously
20 intent on 'trouble' but lacking the necessary leadership
21 and influence to be able to arouse support."

22 And then it goes on to talk about a small contingent
23 of 60 Maoists who had arrived with the intention of
24 protesting at Canada House over the treatment of
25 the FLQ, a separatist movement in Quebec.

1 And over the page, {MPS/742860/2}, it sets out
2 difficulties experienced during the demonstration, with
3 the small groups of demonstrators, who may or may not
4 have been political allied to the AAM.

5 Is this right to say, that whilst the demonstrations
6 were organised as peaceful marches, on occasion they
7 could attract those -- those with less peaceful
8 intentions? Would that be a fair assessment of any of
9 the mass demonstrations that were organised by the AAM?

10 A. It certainly wasn't what the AAM wanted, because the AAM
11 was very -- very keen, obviously, to get press publicity
12 on the issues. And I remember how, you know, disturbing
13 it was that as soon as there was any trouble, you know,
14 and any conflict, the press always seized on that and
15 the issues got lost.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Later on in this report -- I don't think we need to
18 turn to it -- but those addressing the demonstrators
19 included the Right Reverend David Sheppard, Bishop of
20 Woolwich, and Reg Prentice MP, amongst other people,
21 just to give a flavour of those people supporting
22 the AAM at that stage.

23 Can we look now, please, at another document
24 {MPS/742861}.

25 Your tab 12, Sir, in the hard copy bundle.

1 This appears to be a report of the AGM of
2 the Anti-Apartheid Movement held at the National Liberal
3 Club. Who would have had access to the AAM's AGM?
4 Would it just be members, or would there be public
5 access?

6 A. It was just members, and there was no -- and the press
7 were excluded.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 The bottom of that first page, please, sets out
10 a list of people who were elected to the major principal
11 offices and the national committee of the AAM. And we
12 can see set out there the president, Right
13 Rev Ambrose Reeves, the vice-president, Sir Dingle Foot
14 QC, Trevor Huddleston and Jeremy Thorpe.

15 And over the page {MPS/742861/2}, sponsors,
16 Reg Prentice MP and David Steel.

17 The National Committee, still on that page, just
18 a little bit further down -- a little bit further down,
19 please. Thank you.

20 You can see that elected onto the National Committee
21 were Joan Lestor MP and you and Peter Hain.

22 Does that give a flavour of the type of movement
23 the AAM was? It appears to be supported by MPs and
24 establishment figures from a variety of different
25 political backgrounds.

1 A. Yes, I think so. Joan Lestor was a Labour MP,
2 David Steel of course was a liberal MP. And actually,
3 the Anti-Apartheid Movement was always very -- was keen
4 to attract Conservative members. In the early years,
5 there was John Grigg, who was Lord Altrincham, who
6 wasn't a very central member of the Conservative Party
7 but had tried.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 And then perhaps just to complete that point, can we
10 turn to page -- turn to page 16 {MPS/742861/16}, please,
11 of this document, if we can scroll forward to page 16,
12 which gives a list of organisations affiliated to
13 the Anti-Apartheid Movement: the Africa Bureau,
14 the Association of Scientific, Technical & Managerial
15 Staff, etc -- I'm not going read them all out:
16 the Fabian Society, the Student Christian Movement, the
17 Union of Liberal Students, United Nations Association
18 and organisations of that nature. And the same point
19 probably goes for over the page, organisations with
20 observer status, which I'm not going to trouble you
21 with.

22 Can we go back then, please, in this document to
23 paragraph 14, which is at page 4, please, bottom of
24 page 4. {MPS/742861/4}.

25 This reads that somebody whose name has been

1 redacted for privacy reasons, who appears to have been
2 from Bournemouth:

3 "... was very critical of the left wing image of
4 that the AAM was now associated with and he was firm in
5 his opinion that it would never obtain the mass support
6 from ..."

7 And it reads over the page {MPS/742861/5}:

8 "... the British public until this image was
9 changed."

10 Was there a difficulty with the AAM achieving a sort
11 of left wing image as time went on?

12 A. I think this -- the AAM didn't want to have a left wing
13 image. I think the early 70s were the most difficult
14 time in terms of getting a kind of widespread public
15 support. This was partly because of the issue of
16 the ANC and the struggle in South Africa, because
17 the Anti-Apartheid Movement was known to support
18 the ANC, and -- and actually, the whole business of
19 saying -- of opposing trade and investments -- British
20 trade and investment in South Africa, because of that,
21 the Anti-Apartheid Movement was seen also to be publicly
22 criticising government policy and company investments in
23 South Africa.

24 Q. In your witness statement, you make a reference to being
25 -- the AAM being portrayed by its opponents as being

1 dominated by communists as a means to discredit it. Is
2 this part of -- is this an articulation of the same sort
3 of concern, do you think, by this individual from
4 Bournemouth?

5 A. The Anti-Apartheid Movement was -- it certainly wasn't
6 dominated by communists, but there were, to their
7 credit, I think, people who were in the Communist Party
8 who were very committed members of the AAM. But there
9 were many other people as well, many, you know,
10 Labour Party, Liberal Party, and as I said, people of no
11 political party. And again, I think part of the problem
12 was the Cold War was very dominating at the time.
13 The ANC was seen to have support from the Soviet Union,
14 and that kind of reflected on the Anti-Apartheid
15 Movement. You know, incorrectly, I think, because
16 the Anti-Apartheid Movement supported the ANC, but they
17 did support everyone within South Africa, including
18 the South African Liberal Party of course, who was
19 opposing apartheid from within the country.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 Can we move on, please, to paragraph 27 in this
22 document, which is at page 7 {MPS/742861/7}. And it's
23 at the bottom of the page. And it's a resolution
24 proposed by you to the AGM, concerning the building of
25 the Caborra Bassa dam. And in a little while we'll get

1 on to looking at the documents about
2 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee, which I know you
3 were also involved with.

4 You, in the course of this resolution, the -- let me
5 just find the right part:

6 " ... condemns the building of the Caborra Bassa Dam
7 in the Tete province of Mozambique since it will ...
8 strengthen the Portuguese colonists in their war against
9 the people of Mozambique ... assist Rhodesian
10 businessmen to erode sanctions, thereby contravening the
11 United Nations sanctions against the illegal Smith
12 regime ... [and] increase South Africa's influence in
13 the region ..."

14 And if we go over the page, please, {MPS/742861/8}.

15 Sort of a third of the way down that first
16 paragraph, with a "(3)" next to it:

17 "... therefore instructs the Executive and National
18 Committees (a) to intensify pressure upon [Her Majesty's
19 Government] to ensure British compliance with
20 the UN Security Council sanctions resolutions ... [and
21 then] to continue full support for the
22 Dambusters Mobilising Committee ..."

23 Which we'll come on to in a moment.

24 How would such pressure be applied to Her Majesty's
25 Government? How were you anticipating such pressure

1 would be brought to bear?

2 A. By raising questions in the House of Commons, by
3 petitioning, by getting people to write letters to their
4 MPs. Yeah.

5 Q. Thank you. We can take that document down now, please.

6 A. The UN Security Council resolution was in relation to
7 Rhodesia, and of course, at the time, Britain was still
8 the de jure kind of power in Rhodesia, because there had
9 been an illegal declaration of independence in 1965.
10 The sanctions are in relation to Rhodesia and not South
11 Africa.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 Can we look now, please, at this document,
14 {UCPI/8442}; tab 22 in the hard copy bundle.

15 This is a meeting which took place at a private
16 address. A meeting of 15 people, all believed to be
17 active members of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, is noted
18 there. At this meeting, one of the 15 apparently is
19 the undercover officer.

20 I think you comment in your witness statement that
21 this was not in fact an AAM sponsored activity, because
22 it involved individual direct action, because the point
23 of the discussion is a sit-in at South Africa House, is
24 that right? And that wasn't something that the AAM
25 particularly engaged in, that sort of activity?

1 A. That's right.

2 The background to this was that Ahmed Timol was --
3 had been arrested in South Africa, and he had in effect
4 been -- he had been murdered by the South African
5 security police as a detainee. He was a good friend of
6 many of the South African exiles. He had lived in
7 London previously. And actually, information had been
8 collected on him and sent back to South Africa from
9 here.

10 He was a good friend of some of the South African
11 exiles, who were extremely distressed and very angry
12 about his murder, as you can imagine. And so it was
13 felt that they just had to do something that was kind
14 of, you know, more than just standing outside
15 South Africa House, which is what
16 the Anti-Apartheid Movement normally, if anyone died in
17 detention, would mount a picket to get publicity, and
18 stand on the pavement outside South Africa House and
19 shout slogans. And people were so upset that they
20 wanted to do something more.

21 And so this meeting -- Herbie Pillay was
22 a South African exile; he was a friend of mine. And so
23 this meeting was mostly of South Africans living in
24 London, with a few people like me, who by that time were
25 very involved, you know, as friends and -- and as

1 colleagues, who were drawn into it. So it was an
2 exceptional occasion.

3 Q. If we can just scroll up very slightly, I just want to
4 focus on paragraph 6 for a moment, please.

5 Paragraph 5 says:

6 "... it was agreed for security reasons, the persons
7 organising the sit-in would approach reliable and
8 sympathetic members by word of mouth only for their
9 support in this campaign."

10 A. We'd rather missed the boat there, hadn't we, because
11 we'd already been infiltrated.

12 Q. And paragraph 6:

13 "It was generally agreed, having gained access to
14 South Africa House, the sit-in would be quite militant
15 and it would be necessary for the security guards to use
16 force to eject the demonstrators. In view of this,
17 members who were under suspended sentences or are not in
18 possession of a British passport were not encouraged to
19 avail their support."

20 The use of the word "militant" there, can you cast
21 any light on what that might mean in this context,
22 a militant sit-in at the South Africa House?

23 A. I think that's very much a gloss of the undercover
24 policeman who was writing his report. It's his
25 interpretation. I can't -- I can -- I remember

1 the sit-in, I don't remember the meeting. But I'm quite
2 sure that the fear was that the security guards would --
3 would in fact be, you know, as violent as they could get
4 away with being in removing us, and there was no
5 intention on our part to provoke them.

6 In fact, I remember sitting -- there's a kind of --
7 a gallery above the entrance lobby in South Africa House
8 and people threw water on us and then we were carried
9 out. But all we did was sit there, and all we ever
10 intended to do was sit there, you know, go as limp as we
11 could and be carried out.

12 Q. The reference there to people who had suspended
13 sentences, was it envisaged that there may be arrests
14 from this activity?

15 A. Yes, there may have been. But again, that's
16 a reflection on the attitude of the -- the police
17 towards the -- towards us, rather than our, you know,
18 intentions.

19 Q. We can take that document down now, thank you.

20 Other documents relating to the AAM concern a picket
21 of South Africa House and a petition presented to
22 the British Government to make International Day for the
23 Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and a mass
24 demonstration to accompany the presentation of that
25 petition.

1 Can you recall the sort of numbers that might
2 have -- might have participated in a mass demonstration
3 to present that petition? Can you recall
4 the presentation of that petition?

5 A. I can't. We do have a photo of it. I don't know if we
6 submitted that -- if our barrister submitted that?
7 The photo just shows the MP, who included Joan Lestor, I
8 remember, (inaudible) and some people standing behind.
9 But it was a weekday, and I don't think -- I wouldn't
10 have thought it was a very large number.

11 Q. No. There are a number of reports that deal with
12 the presentation of that petition. Can we just turn
13 briefly, please, to this document, {MPS/737006}.

14 This deals with the times of the picket which were
15 going to mark International Day for the Elimination of
16 Racial Discrimination, and the second paragraph reads:

17 "As March 21 is a normal working day it is
18 anticipated support will be diminished, although it is
19 expected that publicity shortly in 'AA News'
20 [Anti-Apartheid News] will raise some 200 supporters.
21 The organisers are anxious that picketing should be
22 peaceful so as to avoid adverse publicity."

23 Is that typical of the sort of messaging that came
24 out from the AAM at this time relating to pickets and
25 demonstrations?

1 A. Yes, very much so, for the reason that I already said,
2 that if there was any trouble on demonstrations,
3 the message, the kind of purpose for which
4 the demonstration has been called just got lost, and all
5 the reporting was about the -- the problems.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 Next report I want to very briefly look at, please,
8 {UCPI/8448}, please.

9 This is a report about a vigil to be held outside
10 wherever the -- I think that should be
11 "Pearce Commission", rather than "peace commission" was
12 sitting.

13 Pearce Commission, I think you've mentioned this in
14 your statement: it was a commission set up by
15 the government to test the acceptability to
16 the Rhodesian African majority of the constitutional
17 agreement in the British Government with the white
18 minority regime; is that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And it was anticipated that a vigil would be held
21 outside. What would -- holding of a vigil: what would
22 that actually mean in practice? What would you do
23 during a vigil?

24 A. It would be a group -- not usually a very large group of
25 people, usually holding placards, saying, "listen to

1 the Rhodesian majority democracy", "one person one vote
2 in Rhodesia".

3 Q. Right.

4 A. If -- if it was the evening, there might be -- or later,
5 there were vigils outside South Africa House when people
6 were going to be hanged. If it was dark, there might be
7 torches or quite (inaudible) safe (inaudible).

8 Q. And did vigils held by the AAM, did they attract any
9 violence or public disorder, or anything of that nature?

10 A. No, never, ever, because they were relatively small
11 numbers of people, you know, and they were supposed to
12 be fairly solemn affairs.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 And the next report, please, and one of the last
15 I want to refer to about the AAM {MPS/737656}.

16 This is a report about a Christmas party at your
17 home address held on 9 September 1972 that 40 people
18 attended. 75 pence admission, which included a curry
19 meal, and you could pay an extra 12 pence for drinks,
20 and we can see a number of people set out there who
21 attended that Christmas party.

22 Did that Christmas party have -- did that have
23 a fund-raising aspect to it, or was it simply
24 a celebration?

25 A. No, it was -- would have been a fundraising party.

1 Those amounts seem very small now, but at the time they
2 amounted to something.

3 I still feel -- I still feel disturbed about this
4 and really surprised that it was considered -- that
5 the undercover police thought it was worth coming to
6 what would have been a very -- you know, a small
7 Christmas party in my flat. There was absolutely
8 nothing subversive in any way about it.

9 Q. I was going ask you that. At the party, would any
10 future protests have been discussed or anything of that
11 nature?

12 A. No, it would have been a purely -- it was just before
13 Christmas; it would have been a purely social occasion.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 You can take that document down now, please.

16 Can you recall any serious public disorder at any
17 demonstrations organised by the AAM?

18 A. No, I can't.

19 Q. You say in your witness statement that you were not
20 surprised that the AAM was a target of undercover
21 policing. Why were you not surprised by that?

22 A. Well, I think it was the spirit of the age. You know,
23 it was known that the police were -- were involved in
24 most kind of, I'm afraid, attempts to change government
25 policy, you know, in other respects, and I was -- I am

1 surprised now at the extent of it. I never realised at
2 the time that there were undercover policemen, certainly
3 at the meetings that you have -- that we have seen
4 the documentation about now. I'm very surprised that
5 they attended Anti-Apartheid Movement AGMs, because they
6 were -- although the press were -- were excluded, there
7 was always a press statement afterwards.

8 But what we were aware of was that our telephones
9 were tapped because, you could -- you know, you could
10 hear the clicking on the line, so -- so we always knew
11 that the police were interested in what we were about to
12 do. But -- but why, you know, I can't imagine.

13 Q. I want to move on now, please, to ask you some short
14 questions about the Stop the Seventy Tour.

15 In your witness statement you say that you were not
16 involved in the central organisation of that group but
17 you took part in the campaign against the rugby or
18 cricket tours as a grassroots anti-apartheid activist;
19 is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I wonder if we could just have a quick look, please, at
22 document {UCPI/34318}, which is a document, I think,
23 that you supplied to the Inquiry. It's not an SDS
24 document, it's a Special Branch document.

25 It's behind tab 4, Sir, of the hard copy bundle, in

1 the section that has got Ms Gurney's documents in it
2 rather than the Inquiry exhibits.

3 This is a reference -- this is a report about
4 the annual general meeting of
5 the Anti-Apartheid Movement in December 1969, and on
6 page 2 of that document, if we can just turn over
7 the page, please {UCPI/34318/2}, there's a passage about
8 the Stop the Seventy Tour in the centre of that page, if
9 we can just have a quick look at that:

10 "Dealing with the Anti-Apartheid Movement's
11 activities in sport, Mr Paul Hodges spoke of
12 the formation of the 'Stop the Seventy Tour' and said
13 that detailed plans had already been made to harass
14 the Springbok's Rugby Tour that was due to start at
15 Oxford on November 5."

16 Were you aware of those plans, the detailed plans
17 made to, as it says here, "harass the Springboks rugby
18 tour"? Would you have been aware of those plans?

19 A. Not -- not at that moment -- not precisely what was
20 planned in Oxford. I am -- I now know that there was
21 a group called the Fireworks -- Fireworks Committee --
22 Fireworks Day Committee in Oxford, and so they were
23 planning it, on a local level, with Oxford students.
24 But we didn't at the time know, no, what was going on
25 happen.

1 Q. Mr Paul Hodges goes on to say that:

2 "... he appreciated that the Anti-Apartheid Movement
3 could not be linked officially with the protestors
4 because of the possibility of its leaders being charged
5 with conspiracy to commit a public disorder."

6 In the next paragraph he says that:

7 "... while he would welcome them serving a prison
8 sentence for a sit-down strike, or some other peaceful
9 form of protest, he would not expect them to face
10 similar penalties for being engaged officially in
11 the sort of protest he and his friends were organising.
12 But, he emphasised, the officers of the AAM were aware
13 of their plans and, later in the debate, in answer to
14 a question from the floor, the Chairman ... stated that
15 they were aware of the planned activities to stop
16 the Rugby Tour, but it was important that there was no
17 publicity on the issue from the meeting, involving
18 the AAM."

19 What was the connection between the AAM and
20 the Stop the Seventy Tour? Can you recall?

21 A. Yes, I can. The Stop the Seventy Tour, as we heard from
22 Jonathan this morning, it's -- well, its main -- main
23 activity was to organise non-violent direct action and
24 try and get onto the pitch.

25 The AAM was very -- very aware that if it engaged in

1 anything like that, it could be done -- be prosecuted
2 for conspiracy. It had many other issues that it wanted
3 to act on. It was, you know, certainly not going to be
4 very eager -- not -- very anxious not to be closed down
5 in that way. And also, quite separately, because of its
6 desire to have a really broad base of support, it did
7 not want to be identified with non-violent direct action
8 because it was afraid that that would restrict its base
9 because it was afraid it would alienate some of its
10 potential supporters.

11 I mean, at the same time, I think it is true that it
12 could see, as Jonathan, again, said this morning, that
13 the non-violent direct action, you know, would have
14 a positive -- would have -- would make it more difficult
15 for the tour to be completed. So, you know, it was not
16 against it happening, but it just didn't -- it wasn't
17 itself going to organise it.

18 So --

19 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

20 A. -- there were younger people like me in
21 the Anti-Apartheid Movement who, as individuals, wanted
22 to be involved in the non-violent direct action, which
23 indeed I and other young members of
24 the Anti-Apartheid Movement were, but not under
25 the auspices of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

1 And what the Anti-Apartheid Movement did, which
2 Jonathan referred to this morning but didn't make clear,
3 was that the Anti-Apartheid Movement organised the mass
4 marches outside the grounds. So it had had a big part
5 in the campaign against the tour, but a slightly
6 different area of activity.

7 Q. And the relationship between the two --
8 the Anti-Apartheid Movement and
9 the Stop the Seventy Tour was not a public one
10 necessarily; is that right?

11 A. Yes. There were actually tensions, because
12 Stop the Seventy Tour got a lot of the press publicity,
13 but broadly, both sides -- both groups recognised that
14 they were working towards the same end, which was
15 the cancellation of the tour. So they worked together
16 in that way.

17 Q. Just turning over the page, please, page 3 of this
18 document. I just want to ask you, as I asked
19 Professor Rosenhead this morning {UCPI/34318/3} --
20 I think you may have heard -- at the top of that page,
21 the writer of this report says:

22 "... it was obvious that the following were the core
23 of the coming protest movement."

24 And you mentioned there along with a number of
25 others, including Professor Rosenhead and

1 Lord Peter Hain. Do you agree with that description,
2 that you were the "core of the coming protest movement"?

3 A. No, again, I think that reflects a sort of
4 misunderstanding, or lack of understanding by
5 the undercover police officer who -- whoever it was who
6 was reporting on the meeting, because in fact, I mean,
7 I was not -- Peter Hain obviously was at the core of --
8 of the movement, the leader of the movement. I -- I was
9 not at the core of the overall movement in STST, but
10 within the Anti-Apartheid Movement I would have been one
11 of the people who was most keen that
12 the Anti-Apartheid Movement should be playing a very
13 active role in the Stop the Seventy Tour, in the overall
14 campaign against the -- these sports tours.

15 Q. Thank you. You can take that document down now, please.

16 And in fact, you yourself, individually, played
17 a role in some of the non-violent direct action, as you
18 describe it, leading up to the arrival of
19 the South African cricket team, or not, as it happened?

20 A. Yes, I wasn't involved in any of the -- the sort of
21 Special Group activities that were discussed earlier
22 this morning, but I did, certainly on the first
23 occasion, the Oxford -- the scheduled Oxford match had
24 to be moved to Twickenham, and I was certainly inside
25 the ground then trying to get -- trying, ineffectually,

1 to get onto the pitch.

2 Q. Right, thank you.

3 You say in your witness statement you took part in
4 discussions with those involved in
5 the Stop the Seventy Tour about how to campaign against
6 the forthcoming Springboks tour as part of your role on
7 the National Committee of the AAM. How frequently were
8 those discussions? Did they happen at intervals, or
9 just before a demonstration? What -- just help us with
10 how often you had those conversations between you.

11 A. I can't remember -- I really can't remember exactly.
12 The National Committee meetings were held every
13 three months, so it didn't happen then. And I --
14 although I was, you know, one of the more active
15 grassroots members, I -- I was not a staff member of
16 the Anti-Apartheid Movement. In fact, there was a staff
17 member, Alan Brooks, who, sadly, now is no longer with
18 us, who would have been the kind of -- the official
19 responsible person on the AAM staff on the sports
20 campaign.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 And during the course of discussions with
23 the Stop the Seventy Tour, would their plans be
24 disclosed to the AAM and --

25 A. No, I would have thought the AAM didn't actually want to

1 know. No, they ...

2 Q. Thank you.

3 Can I now look, please, at document {UCPI/8635},
4 please.

5 Sorry, excuse me. I'm just going to get my hard
6 copy for this, because it's a lot easier.

7 This is a meeting of the National Committee of
8 the Stop the Seventy Tour. This is not included in your
9 bundle because you weren't present at it, but I just
10 want to ask you about one detail that appears in it.
11 This is a meeting that took place once the tour had been
12 cancelled, when the Stop the Seventy Tour had achieved
13 its aim and were looking for another focus for their
14 activism.

15 At the bottom of the page, the -- scroll down,
16 please, to (iii) at the bottom of the page. Thank you
17 very much:

18 "The general consensus of opinion was that although
19 the STST had served its purpose, the organisation which
20 had been set up should not be disbanded but should
21 remain as a latent power in the event of any
22 other 'apartheid team' endeavouring to enter
23 Great Britain. It was felt also that the numbers of
24 supporters who had been mobilised so successfully over
25 the past months should not be left to dissipate their

1 enthusiasm, and it was essential that the STST found in
2 our 'cause' as soon as possible. Discussions would take
3 place with group leaders to seek their ideas of
4 possible 'targets' but the one which received
5 the most ..."

6 And over the page {UCPI/8635/2}:

7 "... general support was the Caborra Bassa Dam
8 project. It would therefore seem likely that those who
9 remain supporters of STST now that the Tour has been
10 cancelled will have their thoughts directed towards this
11 scheme."

12 You were a member of
13 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee, which was
14 campaigning against the building of
15 the Caborra Bassa Dam. Was there an influx of STST
16 support for campaigning groups against
17 the Caborra Bassa Dam project that you can recall at
18 this time?

19 A. No, there wasn't. Not that I can remember, at all.

20 Q. Was there any link between

21 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee and the STST that
22 you can recall?

23 A. No, there wasn't.

24 Q. No, okay. Thank you very much.

25 I'm going to move on then now, please, to asking you

1 a few questions about
2 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee, and I'm going to be
3 tripping over my words endlessly if I continue to call
4 it that, so I'm going could call it "the DMC", because
5 it just makes it a little easier.

6 You were, is this right, the Secretary of the DMC
7 between 1970 and 1972, in fact throughout its existence;
8 is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And you became involved through your membership of
11 the AAM.

12 It was a movement -- a campaigning group set up by
13 the ANC to provide a focus for protest about
14 the building of the Caborra Bassa Dam, which -- and you
15 have explained the difficulties with the building of
16 that dam in your witness statement -- a joint project
17 between Mozambique, South Africa and Rhodesia,
18 Mozambique, of course, then being under Portuguese
19 colonial rule, and, as we've seen, a project which both
20 undermined UN sanctions against Rhodesia and bolstered
21 apartheid in South Africa.

22 And this organisation, is this right, campaigned to
23 ensure that British companies did not get involved in
24 that project; is that right?

25 A. Yes, it is.

- 1 Q. Was it affiliated to any particular political party,
2 the DMC?
- 3 A. No, it wasn't. It was a liaison body, a sort of
4 coordinating committee, of different various
5 organisations, none of which were political parties,
6 except maybe Young Liberals may have been affiliated.
7 The UN Students Association, the Committee for Freedom
8 in Mozambique, Angola and Guiné, the UN(?) Union Youth,
9 plus the NUS, I mean the students, and I can't
10 remember -- yeah, I can't remember (inaudible). Oh, and
11 Portugal. There were Portuguese students who were very
12 active, because the Salazar -- there was still
13 a fascist, Salazar, and Caetano, at the time, was
14 the dictator in Portugal. So there was quite a large
15 body of Portuguese democratic activists exiled in
16 London.
- 17 Q. And also a group called The Haslemere Group. That's
18 referenced quite often in the documents. That was
19 a group campaigning to highlight the causes of poverty,
20 is that right -- international poverty?
- 21 A. (Inaudible).
- 22 Q. Thank you very much.
- 23 You're referred to in a number of the reports,
24 perhaps unsurprisingly given your position in the group.
25 Was it a sort of bi-weekly meeting -- or, sorry,

- 1 bi-monthly meeting that you had once every two weeks?
- 2 A. I can't remember, but that sounds about right. It was
3 quite intensive, you know, for the brief period,
4 the couple of years, or the very long period it existed.
- 5 Q. The reports seem to show relatively small numbers at
6 the meetings. I think in your witness statement you say
7 that only the representatives of the member organisation
8 attended. Does that indicate that that didn't represent
9 the total numbers of supporters, that was simply
10 the representative bodies who sent along, as it were,
11 a delegate to those meetings?
- 12 A. That's the person who represented, say, the NUS would go
13 back to their organisation and say, you know, "This is
14 the plan; can we contribute to this activity"
15 -- (overspeaking) --
- 16 Can I add something here, because I did find some
17 minutes, as opposed to an undercover police report, in
18 one meeting and saw that "Douglas Edwards", who is one
19 of the -- I don't recall "Douglas Edwards", but he is
20 recorded as sending reports of the meetings, and he was
21 down as representing an organisation called
22 the Action Committee Against NATO.
- 23 Q. Yes.
- 24 A. I have no recollection of that or, you know, knowledge
25 of that organisation. But the reason -- it probably was

1 a bona fide organisation, because Portugal was a member
2 of NATO, and so one of the concerns of the people who
3 were -- well, of the Dambusters Committee was that
4 Portugal was using NATO equipment in its colonial -- in
5 its war on Mozambique.

6 Q. Yes, and these meetings were infiltrated by, as you say,
7 "Douglas Edwards", HN326, who attended -- whose name
8 appears on the bottom of all these reports about
9 the Dambusters.

10 A. I don't know how he managed to be there, because he did
11 represent -- he was a representative of a bona fide
12 organisation.

13 Q. Was there concern amongst
14 the Dambusters Mobilising Committee that the movement,
15 or the campaigning group would be subject to
16 infiltration or surveillance?

17 A. No. I mean, I think we were -- looking back, we were
18 naive. I don't think it ever occurred to me as
19 the Secretary that anyone who actually attended
20 the meetings, you know, would be an
21 undercover police officer.

22 Q. Again, can you just highlight for us the sort of
23 campaigning, the sort of ways in which your campaigning
24 will manifest? What did you do as a group? How did you
25 publicise your cause?

1 A. Well, the main thing I remember doing -- the whole --
2 the purpose of the committee was to -- was to campaign,
3 and try and do what we could to stop British companies
4 being (inaudible), and the rumour was there were plans,
5 I think, for -- the Swedish -- the main component of
6 the consortium putting the dam together originally was
7 a Swedish company called ASEA, and ASEA had to pull out
8 because of the strength of public opinion in Sweden and
9 probably because of the Swedish government's position.
10 And then the rumour was that General -- GEC here would
11 step in and take over, so we were very concerned to make
12 sure that didn't happen.

13 But as I remember it, the most -- what we mostly
14 did, we endlessly talked about doing research on
15 companies. There was another small company called
16 United Transport that was based in Gloucestershire that
17 was -- had a -- rumoured to be -- I think it did have
18 a contract to move equipment around for the dam and so
19 we were looking for ways to bring pressure on these
20 companies.

21 All I can remember is -- that we did is research,
22 and then we bought shares in the companies, you know,
23 individual shares. And certainly I didn't attend
24 the United Transport AGM, but I'm sure -- I remember
25 that someone did. It was in Lydney in Gloucestershire.

1 And the -- as I remember very clearly, the most
2 successful activity that we mounted was to go along to
3 Barclays Bank's AGM, because Barclays' DCO was -- had a,
4 quite minor actually, role in supplying finance --
5 guaranteeing finance to some other company for the dam,
6 and we had a very successful attendance -- successful in
7 the sense that we got a lot of press coverage, including
8 in the Financial Times. We went along to
9 Barclays Bank's AGM in 1971 and we asked questions, and
10 the Chair -- the undercover police hadn't done their
11 work then, because they clearly hadn't warned Barclays
12 that we were coming. We asked lots of questions, and
13 the Chair, you know, couldn't cope with the meeting. It
14 was perfectly good humoured and certainly not violent,
15 but we did, you know, raise a lot of questions and
16 make --

17 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

18 A. -- (inaudible).

19 Q. -- there were a number of reports that deal with
20 the planning of the buying of the shares, and matters of
21 that nature, that we'll come to very briefly.

22 Can I then take you to just a few of these reports,
23 just to highlight some of the activities that you were
24 undertaking.

25 First one, please {UCPI/8111}.

1 That's behind tab 1, Sir, of your hard copy bundle.

2 This appears to be in fact the discussion of some
3 minutes of a meeting that have been received, minutes of
4 a meeting of the DMC when a demonstration is planned:

5 "... [a] suggestion for a 'major event' ..."

6 In the second paragraph:

7 "... at Easter was not accepted ..."

8 And it was going to be moved to Whitsun as "a more
9 acceptable date".

10 A "major event", what sort of form would a major
11 event take in the -- in this -- for this sort of group?
12 What would a major event look like?

13 A. I can't -- I really can't remember what that referred
14 to, because we didn't -- the Dambusters Committee never
15 organised large scale demonstrations in the sense of,
16 you know, trying to convene a lot of people in one
17 place.

18 What we did do is kind of educational work, and
19 the next paragraph refers to a "teach-in", which I think
20 would be much more the kind of major event we would have
21 been looking at. There was a lot of student support,
22 and certainly student support for the Barclays campaign,
23 and students were -- you know, teaching seemed
24 appropriate for --

25 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- was a teaching organisation --

1 A. -- (inaudible) -- students. So I don't know what that
2 referred to.

3 Q. Okay, thank you.

4 And reference there also with the teaching organised
5 by the Haslemere Group is that a number of people have
6 agreed to buy the Barclays shares --

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. -- in order that they could attend the bank's AGM, and
9 that's the protest you were just talking of where you
10 all asked -- stood up and asked a question during
11 the course of the AGM.

12 A. That was in the April of that year -- no, April of
13 the next year. That year, we didn't manage to
14 distribute the shares. You know, the legal hurdles you
15 had to jump over to actually transfer the shares didn't
16 sort of -- that didn't materialise.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 And a number of the reports refer to the coordinated
19 sit-ins of branches of Barclays and other British firms
20 involved in the Caborra Bassa Dam building. Is that
21 the sort of activity that the DMC would engage in?

22 A. I think it was the sort of activity we discussed, but
23 I don't recall because I don't remember that ever
24 happening. I think we were a group of, you know,
25 aspiring and energetic young people who had sometimes

1 planned things that we couldn't carry out. It was -- we
2 had quite a small base.

3 Q. Well, perhaps this report will illustrate that.

4 Can you take that one down please and replace it
5 with {UCPI/8114}, please.

6 Behind tab 13 in the hard copy bundle, Sir.

7 A meeting which took place on 12 November 1970, 13
8 people present. A discussion of the targets of
9 a proposed sit-in to take place on 26 November.
10 Barclays Bank; ICI, Millbank; GKN House on Kingsway; and
11 United Transport in Berkeley Square.

12 And the report goes on to say -- if you just scroll
13 down slightly, please:

14 "Buildings (b) and (c) ..."

15 That is ICI and United Transport at Berkeley Square
16 House -- no, sorry, GKN -- ICI and GKN:

17 "... were not allotted to any particular group and
18 this was left in abeyance. It was felt that lunchtime
19 was the most opportune time, since this ensured the best
20 support. However, it was acknowledged that support
21 would be small and not entirely enthusiastic."

22 Does that accord with your memory of some of
23 the activities of the DMC and their approach to sit-ins
24 in general?

25 A. I can't -- I don't -- I can't remember that. But on

1 the other hand, I also can't remember any of those
2 sit-ins -- sit-ins taking place. I think if I had been
3 involved -- if I, personally, had been involved in any
4 of them -- I would have, I think, if they had taken
5 place -- I probably would have remembered something
6 as -- something like a sit-in.

7 Q. Okay, thank you.

8 One final report about the DMC before we move on to
9 talk about the Star & Garter incident. {UCPI/8116},
10 please.

11 This a meeting of the DMC at a public house this
12 time rather than at the AAM premises at
13 Charlotte Street, attended by nine people, a meeting
14 apparently called to discuss an article that had
15 appeared in the Daily Telegraph which had concerned
16 the group:

17 "The article seemed to have frightened a few members
18 of the Committee, and they decided that in future they
19 should check the wording of their mailing more
20 thoroughly. Christabel Gurney said she had helped to
21 draft the leaflet in question with several other members
22 of the Committee. It had apparently found the way into
23 the hands of the York Police, 'presumably through an MP
24 having been given a copy' ..."

25 And the decision was made to issue a press release

1 in the Morning Star:

2 "The Dambusters Mobilising Committee states that it
3 knows nothing of Mr Ian Colvin's article in
4 the Daily Telegraph ... and that none of what was said
5 in that article has ever been approved by the Committee
6 for circulation in their official mailing list'."

7 Then someone whose name has been redacted for
8 privacy purposes:

9 "... said that whilst they didn't wish to denounce
10 the ideas put forward in the leaflet, they obviously
11 couldn't endorse them because of the legal dangers."

12 Apparently a leaflet that you assisted in producing.

13 Can you recall what it was that worried the other
14 members of the committee that was contained in that
15 leaflet?

16 A. I'm afraid I can't. It's intriguing. I imagine it was
17 something that, you know, was a bit too -- stepped over
18 the mark that people drew back from, but I really can't
19 remember.

20 Q. And the reference to "legal dangers" there, does that
21 encourage you in that assumption?

22 A. It does, yes.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 Right, I'm now going to -- you can take that down,
25 please, now.

1 I'm now going to move on to asking you some
2 questions about the Star & Garter.

3 I'm not going to be very long, but, Sir, I notice
4 that we -- I notice the time and it might be that
5 the shorthand writer would like a brief break since
6 we've come to a total change of topic. I'm not going to
7 take very long with Ms Gurney on this topic.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: I think they had quite a long morning this
9 morning and, in fairness to them, we must give them
10 a break.

11 Ms Gurney, I have to break for the shorthand writers
12 to have a brief rest. Can you be back in quarter of an
13 hour?

14 A. Yes.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take
17 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room
18 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

19 The time is now 3.25 pm, so we shall reconvene at
20 3.40 pm. Thank you.

21 (3.26 pm)

22 (A short break)

23 (3.40 pm)

24 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

25 I will now hand the Chairman to continue proceedings.

1 Chairman.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

3 Ms Hummerstone.

4 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you, Sir.

5 Ms Gurney, can you hear me?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Can you hear me?

8 A. Yes, I can.

9 Q. Thank you very much.

10 I'm going to ask you just a few questions, please,
11 about your activity and the arrest outside
12 the Star & Garter Hotel and followed by the court
13 proceedings.

14 We note your concern about the paucity of
15 the documents in relation to that matter. I think you
16 were particularly concerned that your documents
17 contained no inclusion of any material that indicated
18 the degree to which prosecutors and the court were made
19 aware of the presence of an undercover officer during
20 the course of those proceedings. You have been sent all
21 the material that we are in possession of, okay? I just
22 wanted to make that clear.

23 You were involved in a protest outside
24 the Star & Garter Hotel, which aim was to disrupt
25 the departure of the British Lions team coach; is that

- 1 right?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. The plan appears to have taken shape at the house of
4 Ernest Rodker. Is it right to say that you have got
5 really no recollection of the planning of this event?
- 6 A. No, I don't.
- 7 Q. Do you have any recollection of the part that you played
8 during that demonstration?
- 9 A. No, I don't. I just have a recollection of being in
10 court. For many years, I knew I had been -- gone to
11 court and I knew I'd -- I remembered Ben Birnberg being
12 involved and I knew I'd been fined, but I couldn't
13 actually -- for very many years, I had no recollection.
14 And I knew it was something to do with the sports
15 campaign, and then subsequently, in 2013, with my
16 historian's hat on, I did an oral history interview with
17 Ernest Rodker, who had press cuttings, and, you know,
18 I was listed in those charged and so then I realised
19 what it was all about, but I still couldn't remember it.
- 20 Q. So, does it follow that it would be really of no value
21 whatsoever for me to ask you any questions really about
22 your activities during the course of that demonstration?
- 23 A. No, I'm afraid not, except I could explain one little
24 point that came up this morning about paying the fines.
25 There's a document that says that Peace News --

1 Q. Yes, thank you. I was going to ask you about that.

2 That would be helpful.

3 Do you want to do that now, because then we'll get
4 that out of the way and I can just ask my few remaining
5 very small number of questions?

6 A. I'm sure the point there was, at the time, I was
7 the editor of Anti-Apartheid News, and so what was in --
8 what the -- what I being asked to do was to put
9 something -- there would be something in Peace News
10 which would appeal to their readers to contribute to
11 a fund, and I was being asked to put a similar notice in
12 Anti-Apartheid News to appeal to the readers of AA News,
13 and --

14 Q. And can you recall whether that happened?

15 A. No, I can't.

16 Q. No, okay.

17 A. I've got to check in a copy of Anti-Apartheid News, but
18 I haven't done that.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 You attended court on 14 May, it appears you pleaded
21 not guilty, and thereafter you attended court on
22 14 June. It seems that you had -- can you recall
23 whether you had a trial?

24 A. No, I can't.

25 Q. No. So you can't recall whether you gave evidence or

1 not?

2 A. No.

3 Q. No.

4 A. I just recall that I was fined.

5 Q. And you were, thereafter, convicted of obstructing
6 the highway and obstructing the police; a fine of £2 and
7 a conditional discharge for 12 months.

8 Just this then. Did you have any knowledge at
9 the time that in your midst was an
10 undercover police officer who both participated in
11 the demonstration and thereafter in the court
12 proceedings? Was that fact ever disclosed to you?

13 A. No, it wasn't. I am very surprised, you know, and
14 concerned.

15 Q. You say in your witness statement that you were not
16 surprised that the police tried to infiltrate this small
17 group involved in protests of this nature, even though
18 you thought it was wrong for them to do so. Why were
19 you not surprised that the police would have had some
20 interest in that sort of group?

21 A. I suppose because we -- we did assume, you know, back in
22 the day, that the police were pretty hostile to what we
23 were trying to do. But although I say that in my
24 statement, I am surprised they succeeded in infiltrating
25 some.

1 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you. I've got no further questions
2 for.

3 Sir, those are my questions for Ms Gurney.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

5 Questions by THE CHAIRMAN

6 Ms Gurney, I wonder if I could possibly press you
7 a little -- press your memory a little on what took
8 place in the Magistrates' Court. I know your
9 recollection of it is imperfect, but if I ask you number
10 of specific questions, you may or may not be able to
11 help me. Can I try?

12 A. Of course.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: The record shows that you -- that after
14 a trial on 14 June 1972, you and a number of others were
15 convicted and fined and conditionally discharged.

16 A. Yes.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: I wonder if the technicians could arrange so
18 that I can see Ms Gurney, please. I hope she can see
19 me. I can only see a very small shot of her and I would
20 like, if I may, to be able to see her fully.

21 I'll carry on while they're trying to arrange that.

22 A. I can see you.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Good. Ah, and I can now see you. Excellent.
24 Splendid.

25 Do you remember whether you were represented by

1 Benedict Birnberg or by someone from his firm?

2 A. I'm sure -- by -- I can't remember whether it was
3 someone from his firm or by -- or by him.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: But you were legally represented?

5 A. Yes, I'm sure. That's what -- for some reason I do
6 remember that we went to Ben Birnberg and ...

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

8 Do you know whether you paid for the legal
9 representation?

10 A. I very much -- I -- I'm not sure, but I very much doubt
11 it. I don't -- I don't remember any -- I think I would
12 remember. I -- I had no money at the time. I think if
13 I had been, you know, required to pay something --
14 I certainly remember I was fined -- I probably would
15 remember. That's (inaudible).

16 THE CHAIRMAN: To this question you may not be able to give
17 an answer from your recollection. Do you remember
18 whether or not you, or any of you, applied for legal
19 aid, or whether this was done by Benedict Birnberg on
20 what we now call a "pro bono basis"?

21 A. I don't know. I mean, if I'd been required to fill in
22 extensive forms, I probably would remember. But if
23 someone had done it for us, then I wouldn't. I don't
24 know.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: I think, even in those days, if you had

1 applied for legal aid, you would have had to have filled
2 in a form yourself, personally.

3 A. I really am not sure.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

5 You don't remember yourself giving evidence; am
6 I right about that?

7 A. No. And again, I think if I had to give evidence -- if
8 I had given evidence -- because I remember being in
9 court -- you know, I probably would have remembered it.
10 It would have been more taxing and more of an effort.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

12 As I understand it, the defence case was that
13 the obstruction, such as it was, took place in
14 the car park and therefore could not amount to
15 the offence of obstructing the highway.

16 A. Mm.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Does that jog a memory with you?

18 A. That -- I have no memory of that, I'm afraid.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: But there was some line of defence being
20 advanced, you weren't simply sitting there passively
21 seeing what the police said and then saying nothing and
22 then the magistrate deciding?

23 A. I don't know.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: No, all right.

25 Do you remember whether anybody on your side gave

1 evidence?

2 A. No, I don't.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: You mean you simply don't remember?

4 A. No. I mean, the fact that I can -- I remember being in
5 court and remember so little about it I think suggests
6 that it was over very quickly, but that's as far as
7 I would be able to go.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.

9 And finally on this topic, I have been told by both
10 Ernest Rodker's son and by Professor Rosenhead that they
11 would like this question of whether there has been
12 a miscarriage of justice to be referred to the panel
13 quickly rather than at the end of the Inquiry. Am
14 I right in assuming that's your wish as well?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 A. I do have a few -- a couple of other points I would like
18 to make.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

20 A. Is that in order?

21 I mean, the first one is that I do feel that it was
22 wholly inappropriate for the undercover policeman,
23 especially -- police officers to be spying, especially
24 on members -- on meetings of
25 the Anti-Apartheid Movement, you know, which did act --

1 which was -- its only rationale was to call for
2 democracy in South Africa and it was not in any way
3 a subversive organisation. So I think it was a misuse
4 of time and public funding, and inappropriate.

5 And the other point is that I do regret that there
6 is no -- there has been no investigation into
7 the activities of the network of -- of undercover
8 operations that was coming out of the South African
9 embassy, because they were so much more serious than
10 anything that we, or any of the organisations I was
11 involved in did. For example, there were burglaries of
12 the Anti-Apartheid office and nobody did very much about
13 them. And then, much more seriously, in 1982 there was
14 a very serious bomb attack on the ANC office in
15 Central London, in Penton Street, where
16 the Anti-Terrorist Squad of course sprang into action
17 after the event. The back of the building was
18 completely demolished. But the police apparently had no
19 knowledge that that was going to happen because they
20 hadn't been investigating that -- the network. And then
21 later there was a serious arson attack, in 1985, on
22 the Anti-Apartheid Movement office, and it seems to me
23 that it would have been much more appropriate for
24 undercover police officers to be investigating what
25 the South Africans and their sort of semi-criminal

1 network here were up to than investigating
2 the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

3 And then the last point is one that I think has
4 already been made, that I do hope that this Inquiry --
5 one of the results of this Inquiry will be that history
6 does not repeat itself and that people who are
7 justifiably protesting now about various aspects of
8 government policy -- I mean, well, maybe who think
9 they're doing it justifiably and are behaving -- kind of
10 acting within the law, aren't subject to the same
11 obstructions and undercover surveillance that we were,
12 and I'm afraid that current legislation, the courts --
13 the Police Crime and Courts Bill that's going through
14 and the Covert Human Intelligence Bill that's going
15 through will make that more likely.

16 So I do hope that this Inquiry has the positive
17 outcome that it makes things more equitable and just in
18 the future. Thank you.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Your last point is some way down the road,
20 I'm afraid, and by the time I get to consider
21 recommendations, I hope to be assisted by a panel.

22 As far as your first point goes, why were groups
23 like the Anti-Apartheid Movement infiltrated, unhappily,
24 the female undercover officer, Jill Mosdell, who
25 produced the reports that we have, died and so we're not

1 able to ask her.

2 As far as why the undercover police did not
3 infiltrate South African units, all I can say is I know
4 they didn't and I would have been surprised if they had
5 thought that was within their remit. But there is
6 absolutely no reason to believe that any South African
7 entity was infiltrated by an undercover officer.

8 Would you mind waiting for 15 minutes, because
9 questions may be asked, which will be put to you at
10 the end of that time, although on past form, I don't
11 expect they will be?

12 A. Yes, okay.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

14 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take
15 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room
16 to remember to join your break-out rooms.

17 The time is now 3.55 pm, so we shall resume at
18 4.10 pm. Thank you.

19 (3.54 pm)

20 (A short break)

21 (4.10 pm)

22 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone and welcome back.

23 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
24 proceedings.

25 Chairman.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

2 Mr Ryder, do you have any questions in
3 re-examination, there being none -- no questions from
4 any other person?

5 MR RYDER: No, thank you, Sir.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

7 Ms Gurney, in that case, your evidence concludes.
8 Thank you for your assistance. As always, it is
9 fascinating to hear those who have participated in
10 the events into which I am inquiring, personally and
11 first-hand. Thank you.

12 A. Thank you.

13 MR FERNANDES: Thank you, everyone. The hearings have now
14 finished for the day. We shall resume at 10.00 am
15 tomorrow.

16 (4.11 pm)

17 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Friday,
18 30 April 2021)

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23

24

25

INDEX

PAGE

Summary of evidence of HN299/HN342 &1

HN344

PROFESSOR JONATHAN ROSENHEAD19

(called)

Questions by MS HUMMERSTONE20

MS CHRISTABEL GURNEY (called)121

Questions by MS HUMMERSTONE122

Questions by THE CHAIRMAN168

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1

2