

Friday, 30 April 2021

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Day 8 of hearings in Tranche 1 Phase 2 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Neil Fernandes and I'm the hearings manager. For those of you in the virtual hearings rooms, please turn off both your microphone and camera unless you're invited to speak by the Chairman, as Zoom will pick up on all noises and you will be on screen.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. As at the start of every evidential live hearing, a recording will be played. If you're listening to it for the first time, please listen to it carefully.

I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute, the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have made a number of orders which affect what you may and may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter and may have serious consequences for you.

1           If I am satisfied that a person may have breached  
2           the order, I have the power to certify the matter to  
3           the High Court, which will investigate the matter and  
4           deal with it as if it had been a contempt of that court.  
5           If satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits  
6           the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose  
7           a severe sanction on the person in breach, including  
8           a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and  
9           sequestration of their assets.

10          Evidence is going to be given live over screens in  
11          the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to  
12          photograph or record what is shown on the screens or to  
13          record what is said by a witness or anyone else in  
14          the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone  
15          into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any  
16          of those purposes. You may use it silently for any  
17          other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your  
18          account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing  
19          room to any other person, but only once at least  
20          ten minutes have elapsed since the event which you are  
21          describing took place.

22          This restriction has a purpose. In the course of  
23          the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public  
24          disclosure of information, for example about  
25          the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.

1           These orders must be upheld.

2           It is inevitable that, whether by accident or  
3           design, information which I have ordered should not be  
4           publicly disclosed will sometimes be disclosed in  
5           a hearing. If and when that happens, I will immediately  
6           suspend the hearing and make an order prohibiting  
7           further disclosure of the information outside  
8           the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that no  
9           further disclosure of that information may be made by  
10          mobile telephone or other portable electronic device  
11          from within the hearing room, or by any means outside  
12          it.

13          I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is  
14          not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure  
15          that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am  
16          to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to  
17          the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of  
18          the public, are entitled to hear the same public  
19          evidence as I will hear and to reach your own  
20          conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their  
21          best to ensure that you can. If you have any doubt  
22          about the terms of this message, or what you may or may  
23          not do, you should not hesitate to ask one of them and  
24          with my help if necessary, they will provide you with  
25          the answer.

1 LORD PETER HAIN (called)

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Lord Hain, I'm afraid you have rather a long  
3 day ahead of you. Do you wish to swear or to affirm?

4 A. I'd like to affirm, Sir John.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. Then may the relevant words be  
6 read to you for you to repeat, please.

7 A. Thank you.

8 (Witness affirmed)

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

10 Questions by MR BARR

11 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

12 Lord Hain, could you first of all confirm your full  
13 name, please.

14 A. Peter Gerald Hain or The Right Honourable Lord Hain of  
15 Neath.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 You have provided the Inquiry with a comprehensive  
18 witness statement dated 3 March 2020. Are the contents  
19 of that statement true to the best of your knowledge and  
20 belief?

21 A. They are.

22 Q. Can we start, please, with an overview, insofar as it is  
23 relevant to our terms of reference, of your career as  
24 an activist and in politics. Is it right that you were  
25 active within the Anti-Apartheid Movement between 1967

1 and 1994, including serving on that movement's National  
2 Committee?

3 A. Yes, it is.

4 Q. Turning to the Young Liberals. Is it right that you  
5 were active with the Young Liberals from 1968, you were  
6 the publicity vice chair between 1969 and 1970, you were  
7 the national chair between 1971 and 1973, you were  
8 a national executive member between 1973 and 1975, and  
9 the national president between 1975 and 1977?

10 A. Yes, with one correction. I think I was publicity vice  
11 chair between 1970 and 1971. Otherwise, all those dates  
12 and positions are correct.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 So far as the Stop the Seventy Tour is concerned,  
15 you were the national chair of that organisation between  
16 September 1969 and May of 1970?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was that for the entire history of the organisation?

19 A. Pretty well, yes, it was, from the time it was launched  
20 publicly in September 1969 until we disbanded it in late  
21 May 1970.

22 Q. You were then active in the Action Committee Against  
23 Racism between 1970 and 1973, including as chair.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. You were a founder member and the national press officer

1           between 1977 and 1981 for the Anti-Nazi League.

2           A. I was.

3           Q. And you were the Parliamentary officer for that  
4           organisation from 1991 onwards.

5           A. Yes.

6           Q. You joined the Labour Party in September of 1977 and you  
7           were a Member of Parliament between 1991 and 2015,  
8           a government minister for five years and a cabinet  
9           minister for seven years.

10          A. Yes.

11          Q. One of your cabinet portfolios was as Secretary of State  
12          for Northern Ireland.

13          A. Yes.

14          Q. And that included signing off work of the utmost  
15          sensitivity.

16          A. Indeed. Signing warrants for surveillance and  
17          interception, and also seeing intelligence reports from  
18          GCHQ and the Security Service of the utmost sensitivity  
19          indeed. And when I was Minister of State in  
20          the Foreign Office, I saw similarly sensitive  
21          intelligence reports from both GCHQ and MI6, between  
22          1999 and 2003.

23          Q. And amongst the information crossing your desk would  
24          have been at least some about the activities of  
25          undercover police officers.

1 A. Yes, it would.

2 Q. You've been a Privy Councillor since 2001 and a member  
3 of the House of Lords since 2015.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Can I move now to some scene-setting, because we have to  
6 move ourselves from 2021 to 1969. Would it be right to  
7 say that the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the late 1960s  
8 and early 1970s could, on the one hand, command large  
9 numbers of active protesters, but, on the other hand,  
10 was a long way from being as mainstream as it is today?

11 A. Yes, Mr Barr. That's a very important point, because at  
12 that time, although today we regard apartheid as being  
13 part of history, at that time, and for many decades  
14 prior to Nelson Mandela's release in 1990 and  
15 the eventual negotiation to ending apartheid with his  
16 presidency in 1994, for 50 years or so it was a bitter,  
17 long, hard struggle, and we were in a minority, and  
18 people take it from granted that everybody was against  
19 apartheid because it was such a detestable  
20 institutionalised system of racism like the world has  
21 never seen.

22 People take it for granted that we were all, as it  
23 were, on the side of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, but  
24 that was not the case. I think you've quite correctly  
25 depicted it as being a movement that was in a minority,

1           albeit with a wide reservoir of public sympathy.

2       Q.   And is it right that an important part of  
3           the explanation for that was the Cold War and a fear  
4           that was held by Western government of South Africa  
5           coming under communist influence?

6       A.   Well, the Cold War prism through which  
7           the anti-apartheid struggle was seen was a very big part  
8           of the context in which we worked, but it was  
9           the South African apartheid state that presented itself  
10          as a bulwark against communism in its own language, and  
11          that was very convenient for us, because in fact it was  
12          responsible for one of the most vicious tyrannies that  
13          the world has ever seen where a minority, less than 10%  
14          of the population, oppressed the great majority on  
15          grounds of race.

16                 And it suited its purposes that Washington and  
17                 London and Berlin and Paris and Rome saw it as part of  
18                 a contest between the Soviet Union and the democratic  
19                 West, saw it as being on the side of the democratic  
20                 West, when in fact it wasn't a democratic regime,  
21                 the very opposite, and it was -- it -- it went against  
22                 all the principles of democracy, including not having  
23                 a democracy because the majority were not allowed to  
24                 participate or vote and were denied the most elementary  
25                 human rights.



1           So when you ask the question about the way  
2           the Anti-Apartheid Movement saw itself and was seen, it  
3           was through a distorted prism. We were on the side of  
4           justice and equality and human rights, and the apartheid  
5           regime was on the wrong side of all of those issues, and  
6           yet Washington and London in particular, but Paris and  
7           Berlin and Rome and other centres of a so-called Western  
8           democracy, were actually allied to the South African  
9           apartheid regime; supplying it with arms, continuing to  
10          trade with it, opposing sanctions and in particular  
11          campaigns that I was involved in opposing sporting  
12          boycotts.

13                 So it was very convenient for the apartheid regime  
14          that that prism was the way that we were seen, but very  
15          distorted as well of the true character of  
16          the anti-apartheid struggle or, for example,  
17          Nelson Mandela's true beliefs.

18          Q. And moving now to you personally, you grew up in  
19          South Africa in the apartheid regime. As a child, you  
20          came to this country in the 1960s with your family, and  
21          at the point at which we begin our exploration, in 1969,  
22          you were living with your family in Putney.

23          A. That's correct. My parents were very unusually, as  
24          young white South African born, conventional parents and  
25          a conventional family in many other respects, but very

1 unusually took a stand against the apartheid system and  
2 suffered continual harassment, jailing, issued with  
3 banning orders, and eventually, my father as  
4 an architect was forced -- was prevented from working.  
5 The government effectively issued an edict that nobody  
6 could employ him, so we were forced to come into exile  
7 and were accepted as British subjects, though my father  
8 attained his own citizenship through his father, who was  
9 from Glasgow, and we settled in London in 1966. Not out  
10 of choice, but because of the attacks that we suffered  
11 as a family from the apartheid regime.

12 Q. And I know this is a point which you have made very  
13 forcefully in your witness statement, but I think it  
14 bears drawing out here, and I will ask you it as an open  
15 question. Were you, or either of your parents,  
16 communists?

17 A. No. My parents were both members of the South African  
18 Liberal Party, whose president was Alan Paton of "Cry,  
19 the Beloved Country" and other renowned books. They  
20 joined in 1954. They were never members of  
21 the South African Communist Party, nor was I, even  
22 though undercover officers in the evidence that  
23 I've seen, to which you've alluded, specifically  
24 described them as communists in -- in the case of  
25 one report held by the Metropolitan Police, and appear

1 to give detail that could only have come from  
2 South African sources. And of course, the South African  
3 Security Service banned my parents, both of them, my  
4 mother in 1963, my father in 1964, under the Suppression  
5 of Communism Act even though there were members of  
6 the Liberal Party.

7 So yes, that was another distortion of the --  
8 through the prism of the Cold War; that everybody,  
9 almost, who supported the anti-apartheid case was seen  
10 and designated by the apartheid state and its allies in  
11 London and Washington in the main as communist  
12 sympathisers or actual communists. That was a straight  
13 lie, and it even said -- says about me -- I make a quote  
14 from it, actually -- it even says that I, although not  
15 a member of the CP, the South African Communist Party,  
16 because of my age was clearly associated with  
17 the South African Communist Party and "in spite of his  
18 youth was suspected to have taken part in  
19 Communist Party underground activities".

20 Well, those are all lies, but very typical of  
21 the kind of reports that undercover officers were making  
22 at the time about the Anti-Apartheid Movement and its  
23 members, including me.

24 Q. One final preliminary question before we move to your  
25 activism in this country. In 1969, how old were you?

1 A. I was 19.

2 Q. I'm going to start with -- on the topic of activism with  
3 the Wilf Issacs 11, and Wilf Isaacs was a businessman  
4 who sponsored a cricket tour to this country; is that  
5 right?

6 A. He was, and I think also an officer in the South African  
7 Army.

8 Q. We travel first to Basildon on 5 July 1969, and it's  
9 right, isn't it, that you were one of  
10 eight Young Liberals who staged a pitch invasion at  
11 Basildon?

12 A. Yes, I was, and I organised it and I'm proud to recall  
13 it. And we staged a pitch invasion. We ran on  
14 the pitch during play, sat down, unfurled banners and  
15 were carried off, perfectly non-violently, as was always  
16 my intention and was proved by that protest in  
17 particular.

18 It was, as far as I know, the first such  
19 anti-apartheid protest of a non-violent direct action  
20 character against a cricket team and presaged  
21 the subsequent Stop the Seventy Tour campaign.

22 Q. Just while we introduce non-violent direct action,  
23 I think it's important that we're clear about terms and  
24 definitions.

25 You make it abundantly clear in your witness

1 statement that "non-violent" meant exactly what it said.  
2 So you were not setting out -- it was your deliberate  
3 policy not to occasion violence to any person; is that  
4 right?

5 A. That is absolutely correct. It was shown by that  
6 Basildon incident. We didn't attempt to interfere with  
7 any individual. We ran on and stopped the play and we  
8 were carried off, and you'll probably come to this,  
9 a similar protest took place at a tennis court in  
10 Bristol as well, of the same character.

11 I see non-violent direct action of the kind that  
12 I advocated and participated in and led through  
13 the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign as having a long  
14 lineage going back to the Suffragettes, to early trade  
15 unionists, to the Chartists protesting for the vote, to  
16 Ghandi, Mahatma Ghandi in India protesting against  
17 British colonial rule for Indian independence. It's in  
18 a long line of non-violent direct action that's also  
19 carried out by Extinction Rebellion and other  
20 environmental protests today.

21 Q. And whilst it is unequivocally non-violent, it's also  
22 right to say that non-violent direct action does not  
23 mean it is lawful.

24 A. Well, nothing we did at the time -- that I did at the  
25 time ever invited a prosecution. I was not prosecuted

1 during these protests, either the Basildon one or  
2 the Bristol one where I ran on a tennis court, or during  
3 the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign. I was subsequently  
4 prosecuted for criminal conspiracy as a result of  
5 a private prosecution, but most of the things we did  
6 were not unlawful. Running on a cricket pitch was not  
7 a criminal act. It may have been a civil trespass, but  
8 that was not a criminal act in itself.

9 Q. Accepting what you've just said, that doesn't quite  
10 answer my question, though. It did -- the philosophy of  
11 non-violent direct action did leave room for protesters  
12 who felt very strongly about the issue to use tactics  
13 which would involve them committing minor criminal  
14 offences to advance their cause. That's correct,  
15 isn't it?

16 A. If it's part of your line of argument that you're  
17 seeking to suggest that non-violent direct action, as it  
18 were, has a -- if I could put it, a subversive  
19 periphery, I reject that. Non-violent direct action is  
20 also in the context of civil disobedience, that is to  
21 say like Mahatma Gandhi did under British rule. You  
22 accept the consequences if there is a transgression of  
23 the law, but you're not seeking to break the law; you're  
24 simply seeking to take action that you believe, as  
25 I believed and I'm still proud that I did, non-violent

1 direct action to change the course of history, and we  
2 did change the course of history.

3 That Stop the Seventy Tour campaign was fundamental,  
4 as Nelson Mandela subsequently told me, having seen it  
5 or heard about it from Robben Island where he was at the  
6 time, it was fundamental in changing the nature of  
7 the Anti-Apartheid Movement in galvanising it and in  
8 ultimately bringing about the downfall of apartheid.

9 Q. I can assure you, Lord Hain, I'm not in any way trying  
10 to detract from the achievements of  
11 the Stop the Seventy Tour or other NVDA actions. What  
12 I'm seeking to do is to draw the distinction between  
13 the way that a group that is using non-violent direct  
14 action achieves its aims and the way that a group which  
15 uses entirely conventional protesting techniques,  
16 perhaps such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement. That's  
17 the distinction I'm getting at.

18 A. Thank you. Thank you for that clarification, Mr Barr,  
19 and I'm happy to accept it.

20 The Anti-Apartheid Movement engaged in conventional,  
21 mainstream protest. To agree with your point, it  
22 organised rallies in Trafalgar Square, it organised  
23 peaceful demonstrations, including outside Twickenham  
24 when the Stop the Seventy Tour demonstrators were inside  
25 trying to invade the pitch. It organised petitions, it

1           organised non-violent pickets outside sporting grounds  
2           and it made representations to government and it sought  
3           to have issues raised in Parliament.

4           All mainstream pressure group activity, yes, whereas  
5           the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, in addition to doing  
6           some of those things, was also distinctive and unique up  
7           to that point in the anti-apartheid struggle, in Britain  
8           at least, of undertaking non-violent direct action of  
9           the kind I've described.

10          Q. We'll see more of that as we go through the chronology.

11           I've got a copy of your book  
12           "Don't Play with Apartheid" in front of me. You wrote  
13           that book in -- it was first published in 1971; is that  
14           right?

15          A. That's correct.

16          Q. And presumably, when you wrote it, the events were fresh  
17           in your memory and we can rely upon them?

18          A. I hope so.

19          Q. So far as the Basildon match is concerned, one of  
20           the things you write is, you say:

21           "The importance of the occasion was not, however,  
22           matched by any great competence on our part, but the  
23           authorities were taking it seriously and the whole area  
24           was teeming with police constables, squad cars,  
25           motorbikes and a mobile radio headquarters. It seemed



1           that they were expecting demonstrators to emerge  
2           phoenix-like from the surrounding countryside."

3                    What they got was you and certain of your  
4           Young Liberal colleagues.

5       A.   Exactly.

6       Q.   And is that sort of reaction what you were seeking?

7           I gather from the book you thought that was something of  
8           a success.

9       A.   Well, it was completely disproportionate and a complete  
10       waste of police resources, in my view.  They should have  
11       been spent catching criminals and other -- other  
12       mainstream policing activity, and that, frankly, is  
13       an example of an argument that you'll probably hear from  
14       me later on in my evidence, if there's scope for that.

15                   But undoubtedly, the non-violent direct action that  
16       I advocated and participated in did excite police  
17       interest, of course.  But we -- you know, if you look at  
18       actually what happened, what we intended, Mr Barr, and  
19       what -- and the police numbers, they are completely  
20       disproportionate and -- and all of the undercover  
21       officer work involved in the Anti-Apartheid Movement,  
22       including in the Stop the Seventy Tour, was completely  
23       disproportionate.  Those resources should have been  
24       deployed catching terrorists, catching drug traffickers,  
25       catching people traffickers and organised serious

1 criminals, not devoted to keeping an eye on and  
2 harassing in various ways legitimate anti-apartheid  
3 protests.

4 Q. Let's move from Basildon to Oxford, which is I think  
5 the next match in the Wilf Isaacs tour. I'm reading  
6 from your book:

7 "In their second match at Oxford, the Wilf Isaacs 11  
8 faced its most disruptive protest. In a well-drilled  
9 operation, over 70 protesters, members of Oxford  
10 anti-apartheid, students, trade unionists and others,  
11 ran onto the pitch at the sound of a whistle and stopped  
12 the match for over 40 minutes, causing play to be  
13 abandoned for the day. Three days before this,  
14 the pitch had been dug up in an attempt to force  
15 the abandonment of the match. The groundsmen were able  
16 to repair it in time."

17 Is that a reasonably typical example of the sort of  
18 tactics that were used?

19 A. Digging up the pitch was not something I ever advocated.  
20 In fact, I opposed it. I didn't agree with it. But  
21 that did happen.

22 Was it typical? It didn't happen at Basildon and it  
23 didn't happen, as I recall, at any other Wilf Isaacs  
24 matches, unless you can correct me from my book in 1971.  
25 For instance, when I led a group of Young Liberals,

1 including my sisters and brother to invade a pitch in  
2 Roehampton, the pitch wasn't dug up, but there was  
3 an effective protest.

4 Q. Just before with move onto the Stop the Seventy Tour and  
5 for the sake of completeness and so that we get tennis  
6 in as well as rugby and cricket, I think you had staged  
7 a sit-in protest with others on the tennis court at  
8 a Davis Cup match prior to the Stop the Seventy  
9 campaign, hadn't you?

10 A. Yes, I had. Again, a small group of us bought tickets,  
11 sat in the stands and ran onto this match between  
12 an all-white tennis team representing South Africa.  
13 Remember, of course, South African tennis players, rugby  
14 players, cricket players, any Olympics athletes, any  
15 representative of South Africa could only be white.  
16 That was the nature of apartheid at the time. And yes,  
17 we did interrupt the match and were carried out and  
18 I was detained in a police cell for a bit and then told  
19 to go home.

20 Q. And I think, to be clear, I think it's emerged from your  
21 evidence, but I'd just like to confirm it, although  
22 non-direct -- non-violent direct action was not a new  
23 tactic -- you can trace it all the way back to  
24 the Suffragettes at least -- it was novel in the context  
25 of campaigns in relation to supporting events and in

1 relation to the Anti-Apartheid Movement generally.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And part of its effectiveness was its novelty and  
4 the change of tactics that you brought to this field of  
5 campaigning.

6 A. Yes. Up until then, there had been pickets held,  
7 banners held up, rallies staged, letters written,  
8 petitions organised and speeches in Parliament against  
9 South African -- white South African sports tours to  
10 Britain, including led by, for example, the former  
11 England cricket captain David Sheppard, subsequently  
12 the Bishop of Woolwich and of Liverpool, who, almost  
13 uniquely in the cricketing world apart from the cricket  
14 commentator John Arlott, took a stand.

15 But up until that point, the protests had all been  
16 outside the stadia, as it were, rather than running on  
17 the pitch, and we'd made no progress. Apartheid in  
18 sport had been intensified. Anti-apartheid sportspeople  
19 who wished to play non-racial sport outside South Africa  
20 had been arrested and harassed. In other words,  
21 the situation was getting worse while the protests were  
22 conventional.

23 And some sports officials who wanted to play in  
24 non-racial sport and who advocated non-racial sports,  
25 such as members of the South African Non-Racial

1 Olympic Committee, individuals like Dennis Brutus and  
2 Chris de Broglio, were prevented, were harassed.  
3 Dennis Brutus was arrested, he was shot by the police,  
4 he was imprisoned on Robben Island.

5 All the time, more mainstream conventional pressure  
6 activity by anti-apartheid campaigners was continuing,  
7 the situation as getting worse, and I advocated  
8 non-violent direct action to change that, to make  
9 a fundamental rupture in the way that sports relations  
10 of a racist apartheid kind were -- were continuing  
11 between Britain and South Africa, and other countries  
12 such as New Zealand/Australia in the main, changed that.  
13 And we did succeed in changing that, because as a result  
14 of the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, as we'll no doubt  
15 come to, the South African cricketers and rugby players  
16 never toured again until after Nelson Mandela had come  
17 out of prison, until after negotiations had begun for  
18 a transition from a tyrannical apartheid regime to  
19 a non-racial democracy, and then South Africa was  
20 permitted to come back into international sport in a way  
21 that I welcomed.

22 So, my point is, until non-violent direct action was  
23 instigated, and I probably bear responsibility and  
24 proudly do so, if that's the case, for instigating it  
25 and leading it, until that happened, things

1 (no audio) -- forced into exile, imprisoned. Until that  
2 point, we had begun to get progress.

3 Q. Lord Hain, I don't know whether you can hear me, but  
4 your voice -- I'm afraid there was an interruption in  
5 the quality of the audio channel and we missed, I think,  
6 about the last 20 seconds of your answer.

7 A. Thank you, for -- I wasn't aware of that, but  
8 I'm grateful.

9 I was simply making the point that up until  
10 the phase of non-violent direct action, which I led  
11 through the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, but was  
12 participated in by tens of thousands of others, so  
13 I'm not alone responsible at all, nor would ever claim  
14 to be, up until that point, things in sport in  
15 South Africa were getting worse. It was becoming more  
16 racist. Sports officials who wanted an anti-apartheid  
17 sports system inside the country were being jailed and  
18 banned and imprisoned, including on Robben Island, and  
19 harassed and forced into exile.

20 After we stopped the 1970 cricket tour, that began  
21 to change.

22 Q. Thank you for that introduction, because I'm now going  
23 to move to the Stop the Seventy Tour, and to be crystal  
24 clear, the aim was to stop the Springbok rugby tour, to  
25 stop the South African cricket team touring and to

1 isolate white South African sport and therefore  
2 contribute to toppling the apartheid system.

3 A. Absolutely. To be more precise, the name reveals  
4 the objective. It was to stop the 1970 cricket tour,  
5 Stop the Seventy Tour campaign. But in the meantime,  
6 the Springbok rugby tour, which arrived in October 1969  
7 and played 20-odd matches until the end of January, then  
8 became the target to try and show that we could disrupt  
9 a rugby tour and therefore achieve our objective of  
10 stopping the cricket tour either if it came but  
11 preferably before it did. So that's just, as it were,  
12 a clarification of the otherwise accurate description  
13 you've given.

14 Q. Thank you for that.

15 And this operation was, if I've understood your  
16 witness statement correctly, essentially run from your  
17 parents' flat.

18 A. It was. My mother became the unofficial secretary,  
19 though the official secretary was Hugh Geach, a Reading  
20 University student who played an important part. But  
21 yes, it was run from our flat at 21A Gwendolen Avenue in  
22 Putney because there was no other headquarters for the  
23 organisation.

24 I think it's important just to understand, Mr Barr,  
25 without taking too much of your time or Sir John's time,

1           that this was a campaign that lifted off out of nowhere  
2           and suddenly became a massive, nationwide campaign. And  
3           it was very spontaneous, very decentralised. If  
4           the Springboks were going to Manchester, then Manchester  
5           anti-apartheid activists would organise there.  
6           I wouldn't do that. If they went to Swansea, then  
7           the Wales Anti-Apartheid Movement would do that, and so  
8           on in, I think, 25 matches around Britain and one in  
9           Dublin.

10                 So it was very decentralised, very autonomous.  
11           There was no central command and control and, to that  
12           extent, no central conspiratorial direction from me,  
13           though I provided leadership and leaflets and publicity  
14           of that kind.

15         Q. Thank you.

16                 Can you help us with then the role of the Putney  
17           flat. Who was it who was meeting in the Putney flat?

18         A. Meetings of the national Stop the Seventy Tour committee  
19           took place in my parents' living room whilst they  
20           retired to their bedrooms or the kitchen. It was quite  
21           a modest flat with four children of which -- of whom  
22           I was the eldest and my mother and father.

23                 The meetings were held there and our telephone was  
24           effectively the -- the telephone number for the national  
25           campaign of the STST movement, and letters arrived at



1 the flat, so it effectively was the campaign  
2 headquarters. It wasn't particularly intended that way,  
3 it wasn't planned that way, but my mother effectively  
4 became, as I say, the unofficial secretary. Completely  
5 all of her time, virtually, apart from family matters,  
6 was taken up with that voluntary role.

7 Q. It may become important later, so whilst we're  
8 scene-setting, can you give us some idea of how big  
9 the living room was?

10 A. In memory, I would think it was 20-odd feet by about  
11 10 feet. It might have been 21 feet. It was reasonably  
12 large, but not massive.

13 Q. Now, you've described a highly decentralised group with  
14 your small National Committee operating from the living  
15 room of your parents' flat. It's right to say that in  
16 addition to it being a rather -- I hope I'm not  
17 insulting you -- amorphous decentralised group, it also  
18 was affiliated to a number of organisations, and  
19 I'm taking a list from your witness statement.  
20 The affiliates included the Anti-Apartheid Movement --

21 A. They were affiliated to the Stop the Seventy Tour  
22 campaign, yes, rather than the other way around.

23 Q. Exactly.

24 The National Union of Students, the National League  
25 of Young Liberals, the Student Christian Movement,

1 the International Socialists and  
2 the Young Communist League.

3 A. Yes, I think that was the complete list.

4 Q. And so --

5 A. United Nations in that list? The United Nations Youth  
6 Student Association in that list? But it should be.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 And so, again, to come back to the smears that you  
9 talked about earlier. It's right you were not  
10 communist, the group, the STST, was not communist, but  
11 you did have amongst your affiliates  
12 the Young Communist League and a Trotskyist  
13 organisation, the International Socialists.

14 A. Yes. No -- no secret about that, along with Christians  
15 and vicars and priests and bishops and a variety of  
16 people. My philosophy, Mr Barr, always has been,  
17 whether tackling racism through the Anti-Nazi League as  
18 we'll discuss later, or through the anti-apartheid  
19 struggle, is you bring in the broadest spectrum of  
20 opinion that you can that shares in common a single  
21 objective of defeating apartheid or defeating racism and  
22 that all people of goodwill rally -- who believe in that  
23 objective can rally together, even though they may  
24 disagree about everything else.

25 I mean, the bishops involved supporting us would

1           have perhaps had a friendly argument with the atheists  
2           in the organisation. Similarly, a young liberal like me  
3           at the time, albeit a libertarian socialist, would have  
4           been strong disagreements with the Trotskyists or  
5           Young Communists, but that didn't stop us collaborating  
6           together.

7           Q. The connection is the common cause?

8           A. The common cause, which I think, you know, if you judge  
9           it historically, was a noble cause and we were on  
10          the right side of history and the people who were  
11          opposing us were on the wrong side of history.

12          Q. And how big was the National Committee?

13          A. It was around about 15, something like that. You had  
14          the representatives of each of the affiliates, not all  
15          of whom always attended, but meetings were round about  
16          15, maybe a dozen sometimes, maybe a little more if  
17          extra people came in who were invited to come in.

18          Q. And how did one get onto the National Committee?

19          A. You were affiliated -- you sent a representative through  
20          your affiliated organisation, or you were an activist  
21          who was doing a lot of work, voluntary work, and you  
22          were felt to be important to be there, and then  
23          I invited anybody in that position.

24          Q. And how often did you see the National Committee?

25          A. Not that often. Maybe monthly in the period from

1           September through til -- September 1969 through til  
2           May 1970. We didn't spend much time in committee  
3           bureaucracy. We spent our time focused on organising  
4           and -- and achieving what we wanted to achieve.

5       Q. How well did you know the committee members?

6       A. Reasonably well. Some of them better than others. For  
7           example, Alan Brooks from the Anti-Apartheid Movement  
8           I knew very well. He tended to attend, sometimes others  
9           on his behalf. I knew them reasonably well, but some of  
10          them I didn't know well.

11      Q. Just before we immerse ourselves further in the detail,  
12          as I understand it, we're dealing with a total of  
13          25 Springbok fixtures and a plan for 12 cricket matches?

14      A. Yes, the original intention was to have, I think,  
15          24 cricket matches, but that was halved in number to 12  
16          in February 1970 as a result of a recognition by  
17          the cricket authorities at Lord's Cricket Ground, where  
18          they were based, that they couldn't actually organise  
19          successfully that number of matches at grounds that  
20          couldn't as easily be defended, in their view, as the 12  
21          could be. So they chopped the tour in half before it  
22          was due to start, which was an early sign of our  
23          success. I think I joked that we should call it  
24          the "Stop the Seventy Half Tour Committee" at that time.

25      Q. I see.

1           And you were quite open about what your intentions  
2           were. I'm going to read from your book again, quoting  
3           from a letter that you wrote to The Guardian on  
4           22 August 1969. It reads:

5           "The consequences of another refusal by the MCC to  
6           cancel the tour should not be underestimated. The token  
7           disruptions during the recent tour of the Wilf Isaacs 11  
8           to Britain and the Davis Cup match at Bristol  
9           demonstrated the seriousness of threats to massively  
10          disrupt the 1970 tour. Next summer could see a season  
11          consisting of an endless series of protests and  
12          disruptions."

13         A. Absolutely. And remember that that tour was invited  
14          after the Basil D'Oliveira affair. You may remember  
15          that Basil D'Oliveira was a coloured in South African  
16          racial designation, mixed blood from Cape Town, so  
17          excellent a cricketer that he could easily have played  
18          for his own country, the country of his birth, but he  
19          had to come into exile to pursue his career in England  
20          and became an England test star by 1966 and by 1968 was  
21          an automatic -- one of the top few handful of cricketers  
22          that had an automatic selection.

23          He was then excluded from the England team due to  
24          tour in South Africa at the end of 1968 on orders of  
25          the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, who

1           banned the tour because it was too embarrassing to have  
2           D'Oliveira in. And he was important to this and  
3           important to my letter at the time and the level of  
4           intensity that I felt about it, because here,  
5           the English cricket authorities were, on the back of  
6           being so badly snubbed by the South African government  
7           to stop an England team coming, chosen on merit with  
8           Basil D'Oliveira in it, because he would have  
9           illustrated the whole oppression and farcical nature of  
10          apartheid; that here was an England team coming with  
11          a South African born cricketer who could not play for  
12          his own country, and that was stopped and nevertheless,  
13          a few months later, the English cricket authorities  
14          invited the South Africans -- the white South Africans  
15          to tour in 1970.

16                 So that was why there was -- I felt so strongly  
17                 about it and that's why it was reflected in that letter;  
18                 that they were clearly on the side of the apartheid,  
19                 the English cricket authorities, and the racist form of  
20                 cricket that operated under that system.

21          Q.    The thread I'm following at the moment is what it was  
22                 that you were making very clear the STST was going to  
23                 do. We've got the massive disruption that is promised  
24                 in The Guardian letter.

25                 I'm going to move next to the press conference --

1       A. But my point -- yes, absolutely, and I stand by that  
2           letter and I wouldn't write -- rewrite a word in it,  
3           from memory. But you need to understand why feelings  
4           had got to that point, why we were left with no  
5           alternative but to adopt that strategy of non-violent  
6           direct action, particularly after the Basil D'Oliveira  
7           affair.

8       Q. I can tell you the merits of the reasoning aren't in  
9           fact the Inquiry's focus, the rights and wrongs of it.  
10          We're looking at the undercover policing and so  
11          I'm going to follow the --

12      A. But you've got to understand the context that we were  
13          operating in.

14      Q. Yes, I quite take that point.

15      A. I mean, I'm sure you wouldn't be, nor would Sir John be  
16          on the side of apartheid or apartheid in sport. Of  
17          course you wouldn't be. But you would therefore be with  
18          us in sentiment, I hope.

19      Q. I take all of that point, and you've explained it very  
20          clearly.

21                I'm going to pick up now on 10 September and  
22                the press conference that the STST held and I'm going to  
23                quote again from your book what you said there:

24                "We will be organising mass demonstrations and  
25                disruptions throughout the tour. Next summer's cricket

1 season could collapse into chaos should the tour take  
2 place. We are fighting British collaboration with  
3 racialism in sport and this is a fight we are confident  
4 of winning. We are today issuing a clear warning to  
5 British sports authorities that their complicity in  
6 apartheid sport will no longer be tolerated. All future  
7 tours, including the rugby tour starting in November,  
8 will be severely disrupted."

9 Now, you can take it as a given, Lord Hain, that  
10 the fact that you were on the right side of history is  
11 completely accepted.

12 A. Thank you.

13 Q. What I'm following is the tactic, and the tactic is to  
14 make publicly very clear that what is coming is massive  
15 disruption.

16 A. Yes, non-violent direct action, indeed. I never hid  
17 that. I was very clear about it, public about it.  
18 Nobody could have been in any doubt about it, and  
19 the objective was to bring the cricket authorities to  
20 their senses. I all the way along wanted to stop that  
21 cricket tour from happening, from taking place.

22 I didn't want to have to organise those protests. That  
23 was not my preference. We'd been driven to the point  
24 and I'd been driven to the point of making those  
25 statements and making those threats, if you -- if you



1           like, to try and stop apartheid sports tours from  
2           happening, because no other tactics had been able to  
3           achieve those objectives.

4       Q.   And you had support in what you were doing from  
5           the Young Liberals, didn't you?

6       A.   Yes, for the most part.   For the most part.

7       Q.   I'll give a flavour of that by reading further from your  
8           book about what they said at around the same time.  
9           I believe that this was a quote from the chair of  
10          the Young Liberals, Louis Eakes.   I hope I've pronounced  
11          that correctly.   He said:

12                 "I believe that many people are prepared to risk  
13                 arrest and even imprisonment on this crucial issue of  
14                 principle.   We have asked the MCC on numerous occasions  
15                 to take a reasoned stand against apartheid in sport.   It  
16                 is they who will be responsible if Lord's becomes  
17                 the Ulster of the sporting world next summer."

18       A.   Louis Eakes had a tendency for a turn of phrase that was  
19           very flamboyant and very attention-seeking.   And I may  
20           add, Mr Barr, that although I was publicly  
21           a Young Liberal and a prominent one,  
22           the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign was not dominated by  
23           Young Liberals, it was a small -- we were a small part  
24           of the campaign.   It was -- it was a much broader  
25           spectrum, including members of the Anti-Apartheid

1 Movement, and I think a number of them felt that  
2 Louis Eakes' statements at the time were rather  
3 self-promoting. I simply put that in context.

4 I mean, he was not organising the campaign, I was.  
5 I would not have used those -- those words, but they  
6 undoubtedly captured attention.

7 Q. Yes, undoubtedly arresting words.

8 But it is right, isn't it, that a number of  
9 Young Liberals did participate in --

10 A. Oh, yes. Yes, indeed. I was a Young Liberal, and  
11 you've already described early parts of the early  
12 protests, Wilf Isaacs and the tennis match, for example,  
13 which were undertaken by Young Liberals.

14 Q. And one of the reasons that your campaign was so  
15 powerful is the importance of international sport to  
16 people and the profile of international sporting events;  
17 is that fair?

18 A. Yes, it was, because, if you like, in traditional paper  
19 terms, the story was not simply going to be tucked away  
20 in the news pages of a demonstration, it would be on  
21 the sports pages as well, and because sport was being  
22 focused upon because apartheid sports tours were  
23 happening in our own country, selected on a racist  
24 basis, of course that would attract extra attention,  
25 therefore extra pressure and extra mobilisation for

1 a successful campaign, which we were able to achieve.

2 Q. And you've explained very graphically, if I may say so,  
3 the strength of feeling amongst the anti-apartheid  
4 campaigners, including yourself, but it's fair to say  
5 also that interrupting high profile sporting matches  
6 evinces strong emotions from amongst the supporters, to  
7 which we will return.

8 A. Yes. Most -- most couldn't understand why we were doing  
9 it. They simply saw their rugby or their cricket being  
10 interrupted and -- and didn't understand it. It was  
11 a bit of a dialogue of the deaf in that respect. And in  
12 fact, I've had lots of people -- I won't take your time  
13 -- too much of your time, but I have had lots of people,  
14 after Nelson Mandela came out of prison, who would stop  
15 me in the street or in the underground in London or  
16 wherever, just quite unexpectedly, and say, "Look,  
17 I hated you at the time for what you did to rugby and  
18 cricket, but I now understand why you did it and  
19 I've changed my mind".

20 So -- but at the time, yes, it did undoubtedly  
21 provoke a great deal of criticism and opposition and  
22 indeed anger from -- from sports fans who were deprived  
23 of what they loved, and I understand that.

24 Q. Well, now let's descend into the detail of how your  
25 promise to massively disrupt things began to

1 materialise. We're going back to Oxford, this time  
2 23 October 1969, and again reading from your book:

3 "Suddenly the campaign exploded into action and into  
4 prominence. It was announced on 23 October that  
5 weedkiller had been sprayed on Oxford University's rugby  
6 ground just a week before the team was due to arrive.  
7 The words 'Oxford rejects apartheid' appeared in  
8 five-foot letters on the pitch. The next day  
9 the university rugby club officials called off  
10 the match. They said that they had taken this decision  
11 after consultations with the Thames Valley Police  
12 'because of the risk of violence'."

13 And does that fairly summarise what happened at  
14 Oxford?

15 A. What doesn't summarise it fairly is the risk of  
16 violence. The Oxford anti-apartheid group, which  
17 organised this quite independently of me, I might add,  
18 though to -- with my general approval, though I was  
19 never a fan of spraying weedkiller anywhere, but the  
20 Oxford Anti-Apartheid Movement was not intending  
21 violence; it was intending to adopt the same non-violent  
22 direct action tactics that it had adopted during  
23 the Wilf Isaacs tour, except on a much, much bigger  
24 scale, and that was why the game was cancelled and  
25 the venue was transferred.

1 Q. Accepting completely that the STST's line was very  
2 strongly and unequivocally anti-violence, there was --

3 A. When you say our "line", that was our -- our agenda and  
4 our objective. It was very public. It wasn't some kind  
5 of convenient, as it were, sophistry. It was a very  
6 publicly stated committed philosophy of the whole  
7 organisation from its outset.

8 Q. Principle. A principle, would you agree?

9 A. A principle, yes, yes.

10 Q. But accepting that, emotions running high on both sides,  
11 there is the potential for violence, isn't there?

12 A. Not -- not inevitably, no. If the response from  
13 the police and any stewarding of the ground is  
14 proportionate, no.

15 When, for example, two of my friends ran on  
16 the pitch at Twickenham in December 1969 and one of them  
17 managed to and the other tried unsuccessfully to chain  
18 themselves to the rugby posts, they were not seeking to  
19 provoke violence, they were indulging in classic  
20 non-violent direct action. When I jumped over, or tried  
21 to get over, the fence at Twickenham, the barrier onto  
22 the pitch between the spectator stand and the pitch,  
23 I wasn't trying to provoke violence; I was trying to get  
24 onto the pitch, and I wasn't trying to fight with  
25 anybody. And when the police grabbed me and carried me

1 out, I didn't resist it. I didn't seek to inflict any  
2 harm on the police officers who were doing their job.  
3 I was simply trying to get onto the pitch to stop  
4 an apartheid rugby match.

5 Q. I'm going to move now to 26 October and  
6 the Anti-Apartheid Movement's annual general meeting for  
7 1969.

8 Did you see Christabel Gurney's evidence yesterday?

9 A. I saw a summary of it.

10 Q. She was questioned on and described the links or, to be  
11 more precise, the lack of any formal link between  
12 the STST and -- the STST's non-violent direct action and  
13 the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Did you see that part of  
14 her evidence?

15 A. Yes, she was correct about that.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Can we now move then to the arrival of  
18 the Springboks on 30 October 196 --

19 A. By the way, that Anti-Apartheid Movement annual general  
20 meeting had intelligence operatives in it, I think  
21 South African security operatives, tape recording  
22 the whole thing and collaborating with British --  
23 the British Special Branch and other intelligence  
24 operations, including, presumably, by  
25 undercover officers. They were working together.

1 Q. I'm going to move to the arrival of the Springboks on  
2 30 October 1969, and there is an account in your book  
3 that I'm going read now. It reads:

4 "Early on the Thursday morning, the Reading group  
5 took the initiative when about 30 of them staged  
6 a protest at the team's arrival. They chanted slogans  
7 and paraded with banners as the players climbed into  
8 their coach. There were scuffles as a small group of  
9 South Africans who had come to welcome the team  
10 exchanged blows with an airport official. STST's  
11 secretary, Hugh Geach, who had organised  
12 the demonstration, afterwards made the statement which  
13 dogged the Springboks throughout the tour. He said 'we  
14 are going to hound them everywhere they go'. This  
15 airport protest will also be remembered for the slogan  
16 used by the demonstrators which caused so much mirth  
17 amongst non-white South Africans 'don't scrum with  
18 a racist bum'."

19 A. Yes, and I'd simply add to that accurate description  
20 that you'll notice that the Stop the Seventy Tour  
21 protests at Heathrow Airport were perfectly peaceful and  
22 were not engaged in any violent act at all.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 And it's right, isn't it, that the movement made  
25 good on its promise to hound the South Africans every

1 step of the way, because the very next day,  
2 Halloween 1969, there were protests at the first  
3 training session. Again I'll read from your book:

4 "At their first training session early the following  
5 morning, the Springboks were again greeted by STST  
6 demonstrators. The demonstration had in fact been  
7 organised on the spur of the moment by my family when  
8 they heard that the practice session was to take place  
9 near our home. The session was briefly interrupted by  
10 a small local STST group, receiving massive press and  
11 television coverage. In the evening, jeering and  
12 picketing demonstrators greeted the team as it arrived  
13 for a reception at the South African embassy in  
14 a protest organised by the Anti-Apartheid Movement.  
15 Both of these relatively minor protests received wide  
16 publicity, principally because of the unpredictable  
17 nature of our direct action threats."

18 Is that fair?

19 A. Yes, yes.

20 Q. I want to pick up on that thread of the unpredictable  
21 nature. It's a combination, isn't it, of  
22 the unpredictable nature of the threat and the fact that  
23 the tactics being used go beyond the conventional that  
24 make these protests so effective?

25 A. Yes, but it doesn't make them violence -- violent or



1           lead to violence. There's a very important distinction  
2           to be made there, which I hope you'll accept.

3       Q.   Indeed.

4           From the point of view of policing, though, it does  
5           make them very difficult to police.

6       A.   Well, if there had been cooperation from the police,  
7           that might not have been the case. But I accept that.  
8           I accept that. But I also accept, as I hope with --  
9           with historical hindsight will be accepted by this  
10          Inquiry, that these protests were necessary to change  
11          the course of history, which they did. I don't mean,  
12          you know, any means justifies the ends, otherwise  
13          I'd have a different philosophy about a lot things. But  
14          I don't believe that any means justifies the ends or  
15          I'd have advocated violence, for example, if I'd thought  
16          that that would have achieved the objective.

17          But, you know, the police have got to decide, when  
18          facing anti-apartheid protests of this kind, on whose  
19          side they are. Are they on the side of apartheid or are  
20          they on the side of the Anti-Apartheid Movement? And in  
21          many cases, in respect of undercover officers, they made  
22          the wrong choice. They sought to harass and infiltrate  
23          us rather than dealing with agents of apartheid in  
24          London who were bombing the headquarters of  
25          Nelson Mandela's African National Congress in 1982 and

1           who were also -- also a fire and arson attack on  
2           the Anti-Apartheid Movement's headquarters in 1985 and  
3           a number of other attacks, including on me by sending me  
4           a letter bomb. The police really, in targeting us and  
5           our protests, were putting themselves on the wrong side  
6           of history, in my view.

7           Q. I'm going to come back at the end to these very  
8           interesting themes about the relevance of the justice of  
9           the cause and so forth and proportionality. At  
10          the moment, I'd like to pick up on the thread of  
11          cooperation with the police.

12                 It's right, isn't it, that because  
13           the unpredictability of the action is part of its  
14           potency, that you weren't telling the police in advance  
15           what you were going to do, quite the contrary?

16          A. If we were organising a protest outside the ground of  
17          a conventional rally/march, then you would talk to  
18          the police about that so that it was policed  
19          effectively, it took place effectively and it took place  
20          peacefully.

21                 If we were seeking to run on the pitch, obviously  
22           I wouldn't ring up the police commander and tell him,  
23           though I had completely civil relations with  
24           Commander Gerard some of the time. So, no, absolutely  
25           fair point. The novelty, the surprise of

1 the non-violent direct action was its potency, and  
2 I make no secret of that. Indeed, that's why we adopted  
3 it.

4 Q. I'm going to move now to Swansea on 15 November 1969,  
5 and this is where things go wrong, isn't it?

6 A. Very wrong, but not because of our action at all, as no  
7 doubt I'll be given an opportunity to explain.

8 Q. Indeed. What I'm going to do is I'm going to -- I could  
9 cover it from your book. I'm going to give you  
10 an opportunity, though -- I know you weren't there in  
11 person, but you were close to events. Could you  
12 describe what happened?

13 A. There was a march outside St Helens stadium in Swansea  
14 on that Saturday against the match organised by  
15 the Wales Anti-Apartheid Movement. There were then some  
16 members of the Wales Anti-Apartheid Movement, but  
17 principally Stop the Seventy Tour student activists who  
18 travelled down to Swansea to run on the pitch in the way  
19 that we described and was our principal objective. They  
20 ran on, they sat down, they interrupted play for, as  
21 I recall, over ten minutes in -- as it was intended.

22 They were then carried off by the police and thrown  
23 to rugby stewards, rugby vigilantes, if you like,  
24 recruited for these purposes, and thoroughly beaten up.  
25 A friend of mine had his jaw broken, a young woman

1 demonstrator nearly lost an eye. There were serious  
2 injuries suffered by non-violent protesters that didn't  
3 need to happen. They could have been carried out of  
4 St Helens, but there was clearly a pre-planned attempt  
5 to beat the hell out of the protesters, and that's what  
6 happened.

7 And as a result of that, independent newspaper  
8 reports, for example in The Times, which was hostile to  
9 the tactics of non-violent direct action editorially,  
10 nevertheless said that the policing and the behaviour of  
11 the rugby stewards was completely out of control and  
12 unacceptable. And I led a delegation to the Home Office  
13 and met the Minister of State with a small delegation  
14 with a petition describing it in some graphic detail, as  
15 a result of which policing was changed and there was  
16 a -- nothing like that ever happened again, which I was  
17 pleased about.

18 Q. I'm going to read from the STST statement, in which you  
19 said the following:

20 "We are demanding a full public inquiry into  
21 the Swansea demonstration and particularly into the role  
22 played by the rugby vigilantes. This private army of  
23 rugby thugs was responsible for some of the most  
24 systemic and brutal mob violence ever seen on peaceful  
25 demonstrators in Britain. The introduction of

1 the vigilantes into the protest arena must now call into  
2 question the whole future of the tour. Unless something  
3 is done now, someone may get killed."

4 Was that hyperbole?

5 A. No, at the time, I really felt it. I was really worried  
6 about it and I wanted a response from the police and  
7 those responsible for organising the rugby matches on  
8 the tour to behave in a -- in a more civil way.

9 Q. And so, accepting what you say entirely, that, as we've  
10 been through, the STST had a principled objection to  
11 violence, the reality was, though, that the level of  
12 hostility that the STST was facing from rugby fans was  
13 such that it was evincing serious violence which led  
14 actually to serious injury and could have resulted in  
15 someone being killed.

16 A. That was my fear. It didn't happen, because policing,  
17 from that point onward, was better organised and  
18 the rugby authorities didn't indulge in that kind of  
19 violent behaviour. The violence, I repeat, didn't come  
20 from the Stop the Seventy Tour protesters, they suffered  
21 violence because of their -- their non-violent direct  
22 action tactics. They -- they offered no resistance to  
23 being carried off the pitch, they didn't fight with  
24 the police, they didn't seek to pick a fight with  
25 the rugby stewards. If they'd been carried and

1           unceremoniously dumped on the pavement outside  
2           the ground, as happened to me on several occasions at  
3           Twickenham, that would have been a good outcome all  
4           round, from a policing point of view, from a rugby  
5           organiser point of view and from the protesters' point  
6           of view.

7           Q. I'm going to move now back to the living room at  
8           21A Gwendolen Avenue and to 5 December 1969 and  
9           a meeting of the Stop the Seventy Tour Ad Hoc Committee  
10          that was held for the purposes of planning ahead for  
11          the Twickenham rugby match on 20 -- due to occur on  
12          20 December 1969. I'm going to start by reading your  
13          account of that meeting from your book:

14                 "At planning meetings before the match, it was  
15                 decided to stage a sit down protest in front of  
16                 the team's coach as it left for Twickenham and a group  
17                 was delegated to take responsibility for this. By this  
18                 stage we had established an inner group working behind  
19                 the scenes on one or two special activities. This group  
20                 came up with a plan to have someone chain himself to  
21                 the team's coach, to waylay the coach in the London  
22                 traffic and to get a few demonstrators to handcuff  
23                 themselves to the goal posts. This last was made  
24                 possible when we suddenly acquired four special tickets,  
25                 normally available only to rugby clubs, for the ringside

1           seats in front of the surrounding fence and virtually on  
2           the touchline. Two people were booked into the team's  
3           Park Lane hotel the day before the match and they spent  
4           a busy night on activities designed to delay the team,  
5           which included gumming up the players' bedroom door  
6           locks with a solidifying agent."

7           A. That's fair.

8           Q. It's a fair description, isn't it?

9           A. It's a fair description and it's what happened. All  
10          non-violent activity.

11          Q. Absolutely.

12                    Can I come back to the inner group working behind  
13          the scenes? Can you distinguish this group, please,  
14          from the National Committee?

15          A. Yes, apart from -- I don't think that there were  
16          actually any National Committee members involved in --  
17          in that group, apart from me, and I was kept in close  
18          touch with its activities and helped plan many of them,  
19          and it was designed to do novel, imaginative non-violent  
20          direct action tactics of precisely the kind that you've  
21          just described in the pre-Christmas international  
22          between the Springboks and England.

23          Q. And so how big was the inner group?

24          A. Less than six. Probably four or five. Maybe half  
25          a dozen, I would -- I would think, but certainly not

1 bigger than that.

2 Q. And what were the entrance qualifications?

3 A. People I trusted.

4 Q. Did you know them all?

5 A. I did. There was not a single undercover officer on  
6 them, involved.

7 Q. I don't want to make you paranoid, but how did you know  
8 that?

9 A. Because none of its activities were ever reported on in  
10 any of the documentation, the voluminous documentation,  
11 I've been provided with kindly by -- by the Inquiry, and  
12 nor did anything that it planned ever leak out, as it  
13 were, and nor was it ever thwarted, so that's why I take  
14 that view.

15 The only planned activity that it did instigate was  
16 to organise a -- pretend to organise a protest outside  
17 South African Airways' offices in London's West End and  
18 talk about that on our own telephone and surprise,  
19 surprise, there were police outside the building even  
20 though the people involved in allegedly organising that  
21 protest, which was never due to happen. It was designed  
22 to expose that.

23 So the people involved were very trustworthy.

24 Ernest Rodker was one, a witness before the Inquiry, and  
25 so was Jonathan Rosenhead.



1 Q. Can you help me with the meeting on 5 December. Was  
2 that a meeting of the inner group or was that a meeting  
3 of the National Committee or some other composition of  
4 people?

5 A. You're asking me to be as precise as that?

6 Q. If you can't remember, just say so.

7 A. I think, from memory, that that was a meeting -- a more  
8 informal meeting of the National -- of the National  
9 Committee, I think, but it was designed specifically to  
10 plan the Twickenham protest, is what I think. I don't  
11 have the book in front of me, so I can't confirm that,  
12 but that's what I -- I recollect.

13 Q. And coming back to the inner group, why was it felt  
14 necessary to have the inner group?

15 A. Because we suspected we might be infiltrated.

16 Q. And was it also because of the risk of prosecution for  
17 conspiracy?

18 A. No, not really. It was more to -- to do these  
19 imaginative acts of non-violent direct action and make  
20 sure that they happened.

21 MR BARR: Thank you.

22 Sir, would now be a convenient moment for our  
23 morning break?

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly it would be.

25 Lord Hain, we have to give the shorthand writers

1 15 minutes off in the middle of each session.

2 A. I'm very happy to comply with that. Thank you.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Could you be back in 15 minutes.

4 A. Thanks very much.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

6 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take

7 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room

8 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

9 The time is now 11.15 am, so we shall reconvene at

10 11.30 am. Thank you.

11 (11.16 am)

12 (A short break)

13 (11.30 am)

14 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. Welcome back.

15 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue

16 proceedings.

17 Chairman.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

19 Mr Barr.

20 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

21 Lord Hain, before the break we were looking at

22 the account in your book of the planning meeting for

23 the December Twickenham match. We're now going to move

24 to the second account that we have got of that match.

25 Sir, it's at tab 1 of the hard copy bundle.

1           If we could have up, please, on the screen  
2           {UCPI/8656/1}, please.

3           Lord Hain, this is the report of  
4           the undercover police officer Mike Ferguson, who we know  
5           by the Herne nominal HN135. It's dated 9 December 1969.  
6           It says it's about a meeting of  
7           the Stop the Seventy Tour Ad Hoc Committee held on  
8           5 December 1969 at 21A Gwendolen Avenue, and it says  
9           that it was attended by six persons among whom was  
10          Peter Hain and then we have redacted for privacy reasons  
11          the other names.

12          First of all, Lord Hain, you have been provided in  
13          confidence with the restricted cover name of  
14          Michael Ferguson. Has that helped you to recall that  
15          undercover police officer?

16        A. No, and I've not seen a photograph of him either to be  
17          able to identify him, though I did read an article by  
18          his daughter in The Guardian a few years ago which gave  
19          me some inkling, or memory of 50 years ago as to who he  
20          might have been. From her description of him, you know,  
21          that he used to wear a coat and scarf and drive  
22          a battered old van, then I began to think who he might  
23          be.

24        Q. Our policy with photographs is if we've got a photograph  
25          of the undercover officer as he or she appeared in their

1           undercover identity then we provide it, but we don't  
2           have one.

3           A. Presumably the Metropolitan Police do, though.

4           Q. Probably that's a matter to take up separately, but we  
5           don't have a photograph of him in his undercover police  
6           identity.

7                     Now, does the record of there being six people at  
8           this meeting sound right to you?

9           A. Yeah, about right, though there are many other aspects  
10          of his report which we'll no doubt come to that  
11          I fundamentally dispute.

12          Q. Indeed, and we'll go through it.

13                     Looking down the left-hand margin, we see "box 500"  
14          stamped on the side of the page. That means it's gone  
15          to the Security Service, and we'll come back to that  
16          later on.

17                     For the moment, looking at paragraph 3, it says:

18                     "The meeting was called to discuss basic tactics for  
19          the International Match at Twickenham on  
20          20th December 1969, and they agreed on three separate  
21          activities:

22                     "(1) a mass demonstration outside the ground, in  
23          which people from all walks are expected to participate.  
24          No particular 'incidents' ... as yet planned for this  
25          demonstration, but there is a possibility that

1 a 'sit down' will be encouraged somewhere along  
2 the route, in an attempt to disrupt the flow of  
3 spectators or possibly the teams to the ground."

4 Do you take issue with any of that?

5 A. Not from my recollection, no.

6 Q. Paragraph 2:

7 "Action within the ground itself: Hain is letting it  
8 be known generally that to hold a demonstration within  
9 the ground would be impracticable for several reasons -  
10 the security precautions, lack of tickets and  
11 the general crush of spectators. In fact three hundred  
12 5 [shilling] stand tickets have now been obtained, and  
13 it is felt that if a concentrated effort is made  
14 a successful 'incident' may be staged."

15 And if we could scroll down a bit, please:

16 "The target is the goal posts, where at least  
17 two demonstrators are to handcuff themselves to  
18 the posts in vicinity of the cross-bar. (Whilst this  
19 was being discussed Ernest Rodker rang to say that he  
20 had obtained six pairs of handcuffs). The exact  
21 mechanics of this plan have yet to be worked out."

22 Do you agree with that?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And 3:

25 "It is generally understood that the Springboks will

1 be using the Park Lane Hotel, Park Lane, W1 from about  
2 13th December until after the International Match, and  
3 there is general agreement that some action should be  
4 taken against the Springboks themselves - in an effort  
5 to prevent them from taking part in the ..."

6 And if we could have that -- scroll down over to  
7 the next page, please, {UCPI/8656/2} -- thank you:

8 "... match. To this end, [Privacy] is going to  
9 attempt to obtain employment into the Park Lane Hotel,  
10 in order to obtain inside information (as to their  
11 movements. At the same time [Privacy] using a false  
12 name) is to book accommodation at the hotel for at least  
13 the night of Friday, 19th December."

14 Do you agree with that?

15 A. Broadly, but if the implication is that action against  
16 the Springboks would be to somehow attack them as  
17 individuals, then no, that was definitely not  
18 the intention. As long as that gloss is not interpreted  
19 from this report. The things we were intending were to  
20 do exactly what we described before the break in respect  
21 of the team's bus and -- coach, and in terms of gumming  
22 up the door locks of the players' bedrooms.

23 Q. Understood.

24 Going back subparagraph 2, when a distinction was  
25 made between what you were saying publicly about action

1           within the ground and what you were doing privately to  
2           prepare for people to handcuff themselves to the goal  
3           posts, is that an example of deliberate misinformation  
4           in order to maximise the surprise value of your tactics?

5       A.   It's an example of precisely the kind of non-violent  
6           direct action that we were planning, to run onto  
7           the pitch and chain ourselves to the -- the goal posts.  
8           There was no misinformation.  The Anti-Apartheid  
9           Movement, with the support of the Stop the Seventy Tour  
10          campaign, was organising a public demonstration outside.  
11          We were not intending a demonstration inside in  
12          the sense of a massive gathering of people, we were  
13          intending to try and get on the pitch and stop  
14          the match.

15       Q.   But you were giving the impression that it was all going  
16           to happen outside, where in fact you were planning  
17           a stunt for the inside.

18       A.   I don't think that was ever -- people -- people knew all  
19           along that it was our intention to get inside.  I never  
20           said in a misleading way, "We're only going to organise  
21           it outside".  We did announce -- and the Anti-Apartheid  
22           Movement organised a big peaceful rally outside.  That  
23           was a declared public event.  We didn't pre-announce our  
24           non-violent direct tactics inside the ground, or they  
25           wouldn't have happened, would they?

- 1 Q. Well, exactly. Exactly.
- 2 A. But we were not misleading people. I was not -- I was  
3 not lying about the situation. I couldn't have been,  
4 publicly, more clear about our attempt to stop  
5 the matches if we got a chance.
- 6 Q. Let's move now, please, Lord Hain, to what actually  
7 happened. It's right, isn't it, that at the hotel that  
8 some of the players' door locks were glued?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. It's right, isn't it, that an activist got onto  
11 the Springboks' coach and chained himself to  
12 the steering wheel?
- 13 A. Yes, he persuaded the driver to go and talk to  
14 the management in the hotel. He was dressed in a suit,  
15 which was untypical for us at the time, and the driver  
16 accepted his credentials, went into the hotel and he  
17 took his place and drove the coach away and chained  
18 himself to the steering wheel, as -- as was intended.
- 19 Q. And found it rather difficult to drive a coach whilst  
20 chained to the steering wheel to the point where he had  
21 a minor road traffic accident.
- 22 A. Yes, and also he was grappled with by some of  
23 the Springbok players who were on the coach already, not  
24 the entire team. They -- they kind of collectively  
25 forced the coach to -- to slew into the side and



1 effectively have a mini crash.

2 Q. And he was assaulted, wasn't he, the activist?

3 A. Yeah, he was quite badly assaulted.

4 Q. You have mentioned the large demonstration outside  
5 the ground that was organised by  
6 the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Within the ground, your  
7 two colleagues did make a dash for the goal posts. One  
8 made it, the other didn't.

9 A. No, the other was rugby tackled to the ground by  
10 a police officer, so unfortunately never did make it.  
11 But one of them did.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 Can we move now to Bristol on New Year's Eve 1969,  
14 and this is a matter which you have I think dealt with  
15 in your witness statement, but you also deal with it in  
16 your book at page 143. The way you deal with it in your  
17 book is to say:

18 "The next match at Bristol on New Year's Eve was  
19 interrupted for nearly ten minutes after a demonstrator  
20 ran onto the pitch and scattered tacks. A demonstration  
21 of over 500 had marched to the ground and spectators  
22 were leafleted. In the early hours of that morning,  
23 demonstrators rigged up two crow scarers and a smoke  
24 flare in the corridor outside the team's bedrooms with  
25 the idea of keeping the Springboks awake. The plan was

1           thwarted when the hotel manager discovered the device,  
2           but the hotel's fire alarm was set off."

3           First of all, as best as you can recall, was that  
4           factually accurate?

5       A. Yes, but I want to explain, because it's pertinent to  
6           something that -- I think it was Mike Ferguson,  
7           the undercover officer, infiltrating  
8           the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign. He -- he  
9           specifically says in one of the reports, the many  
10          reports with which the Inquiry has supplied me, that we  
11          were planning to sprinkle tin tacks. The only example  
12          of tin tacks being spread on the -- on any of the --  
13          during any of the matches was at this Bristol incident,  
14          but by a teacher -- I think his name was  
15          Michael Jordan -- who I had never met and it was  
16          an entirely spontaneous event, as he subsequently  
17          explained, and he did it as a one-off thing.

18          We -- I was expressly opposed always to tactics like  
19          that, because I love the game of rugby, like I do  
20          cricket, and rugby players roll on the ground a lot and  
21          if they'd -- if they'd encountered tin tacks, they would  
22          have been badly injured. So this was something  
23          I deplored and opposed, and it was a one-off event.

24          That isn't actually explained in that passage, but  
25          I think it was Mike Ferguson, in subsequent --

1 subsequent documentation that you may -- we may or may  
2 not be discussing, alleged that it was planned to do  
3 this at a subsequent match of the -- of -- by  
4 the Stop the Seventy Tour demonstrators at Twickenham,  
5 and that was expressly a lie, like a lot of his other  
6 claims were lies and exaggerations.

7 Q. It's a feature, isn't it, of a group which is as loosely  
8 organised as the STST was that whatever the central line  
9 or central principle is, you cannot control precisely  
10 what everybody does. On the contrary, you are  
11 encouraging them to go away, make their own plans and to  
12 disrupt the matches using their local knowledge in their  
13 own way; is that fair?

14 A. I explained, I think, at the outset, there was no  
15 central command and -- and structure to  
16 the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign. There was  
17 a leadership, but there were no members who could be  
18 disciplined or ordered about, and people were doing  
19 their own thing. But that -- that was not part of  
20 a plan in the sense that I was not encouraging people to  
21 be violent, as it were, adopting one public posture and  
22 privately giving a nod and a wink to people, for  
23 example, to sprinkle tin tacks.

24 On the contrary, I was publicly always disavowing  
25 such tactics if they occurred, and very few did. They

1           were -- that was an isolated case. Nothing else like  
2           that happened on the tour, and there was very little  
3           instances of planned violence that I knew of. I don't  
4           remember any instance of a planned violent act, although  
5           obviously this tin tacks one could have led to that.

6           But if you're making the point that this was  
7           a massive movement and there were lots of people  
8           organising spontaneously, yes, there were. But does  
9           that justify Mike Ferguson deploying special --  
10          you know, extraordinary police resources to take part in  
11          meetings in my living room or my parents' living room,  
12          and in Young Liberal meetings, another  
13          undercover officer going by the name of "Mike Scott",  
14          who I again don't recognise -- you know, one of my  
15          points that we may or may not come to about the work of  
16          undercover officers during the Stop the Seventy Tour  
17          campaign is why were they not targeting the agents of  
18          apartheid bombing and killing and acting illegally and  
19          violently in London at the time?

20          Why were they not concentrating Metropolitan Police  
21          resources on drug traffickers and criminals and  
22          organised crime? Why were they diverting precious and  
23          limited resources into meetings in my living room, some  
24          of which were half a dozen people of a Putney  
25          Young Liberal meeting, three of whom were members of my

1 family and one of whom on one occasion was  
2 a representative of the Putney Society, which is a very,  
3 very respectable organisation in part of  
4 the Putney Civil Society, briefing us about what was  
5 happening to the greenery around Putney?

6 I mean, this was a completely disproportionate waste  
7 of police resources, and it was on the wrong side of  
8 history, because the Mike Fergusons and the Mike Scotts  
9 were actually -- what they should have been doing was  
10 helping bring down the apartheid system and deploying  
11 British security and policing resources to track down  
12 apartheid agents acting illegally in London; instead of  
13 which, they were spying on us.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 I'm going to move now into 1970 and to Dublin,  
16 because the Springboks went to Dublin, and you cover  
17 this at page 144 of your book. I'm reading from towards  
18 the bottom of the page:

19 "From the moment the team arrived at Dublin Airport,  
20 they were assailed with protests which continued  
21 wherever they went, hotels and training sessions  
22 included. There were petitions and bomb scares,  
23 conventional pickets and militant sit downs and at  
24 the International Match on Saturday, 12 January came  
25 the biggest and best demonstration of the whole tour.

1           10,000 people marched on the Lansdowne Road Ground, led  
2           by Bernadette Devlin MP and prominent Irish public  
3           figures. The march was the largest public assembly in  
4           Dublin since The Troubles of 50 years back. There were  
5           various attempts to get into the ground and at one  
6           stage, it was touch and go whether a gate would fall  
7           under the weight of the demonstration, letting through  
8           the whole mass. Inside the ground there were only  
9           sporadic outbursts of opposition and the match went  
10          unhindered, but this was hardly surprising. The pitch  
11          was encircled by barbed wire with hundreds of policemen  
12          stationed behind it."

13                 First of all, is that a fair summary of what  
14                 happened?

15          A. I think so. I thought it was very appropriate to be  
16          surrounded by barbed wire because that symbolised  
17          the concentration camp conditions in which these matches  
18          were being played, apartheid rugby matches were being  
19          played, with all the resources of the state, whether in  
20          Britain or in that case Ireland, deployed to protect  
21          them.

22          Q. There are two points I want to draw out from that  
23          description. The first is the reference  
24          to "bomb scares". Was that or was that not something  
25          that the National Committee would have condoned?

1           A. No, we would have never even considered it. Not only  
2           would we not have condoned it, we would have expressly  
3           condemned anything like that. I don't know whether that  
4           happened in the context of -- because I was not involved  
5           in -- in that demonstration, nor did I organise it, it  
6           was in Ireland, but I don't know whether that bomb scare  
7           was part of the -- the escalating atmosphere of  
8           terrorism on the island of Ireland, which by then had  
9           begun, and that may have -- you know, somebody may have  
10          phoned a telephone warning, for all I know. I simply  
11          reported in my book, which you've very fairly read out,  
12          what I understand happened.

13         Q. And the other bit I want to pick up on is the weight of  
14         the demonstration almost bringing the gate down, or that  
15         concern about the weight of the demonstration bringing  
16         the gate down. That suggests a weight of numbers of  
17         people that would give rise to policing concerns, and we  
18         know what happened at Hillsborough in very different  
19         circumstances, but very large numbers of people do  
20         generate policing issues, don't they?

21         A. Yes, I totally understand that. I was reporting what  
22         I understood to be happening accurately and to the best  
23         of my -- my ability at the time, and it's recorded in --  
24         in the book. It was, I think, the biggest demonstration  
25         of the entire tour organised by the Irish Anti-Apartheid

1 Movement, led by two South African exiles, Kader Asmal,  
2 who subsequently became a minister in Nelson Mandela's  
3 government, and his wife Louise Asmal.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 I'm going to move now back to Great Britain and in  
6 particular to Worcester and the outfield on 7 January,  
7 where you tell us at paragraph 48 of your witness  
8 statement that weedkiller was applied to the outfield;  
9 is that right?

10 A. Was that 7 January, did you say?

11 Q. I think so.

12 A. I think it's later than that.

13 Q. Is it?

14 A. Yes, yes, that was -- that was certainly -- I think  
15 I reported that. I think it was actually later.  
16 I think it was more like the 20th, but ...

17 Q. I got that from your book. I'm reading page 165, where  
18 it reads:

19 "Then on 7 January came the news that the cricket  
20 world must have been expecting in one form or another.  
21 Demonstrators had applied weedkiller to the outfield of  
22 the Worcester ground 'as a warning of things to come'."

23 A. Ah, right, yes. Well, if it was in my book, it must  
24 have been correct, Mr Barr.

25 Q. Thank you.



1           It may be that it was a precursor to what I'm moving  
2           onto next, which was 19 January, when --

3           A. That's what I thought you were talking about, yes.

4           Q. -- the 14 out of the 17 cricket clubs were raided, and  
5           that involved the pointing of slogans, in one case  
6           the digging up of part of the pitch and in another case  
7           some weedkiller being applied. Is that a fair summary  
8           of what happened?

9           A. Yes.

10          Q. Having been through these events -- and we haven't quite  
11          finished because we've got the last match at Twickenham  
12          coming up, but viewed from a policing perspective, faced  
13          with these novel and rather effective tactics with  
14          the violence that had occurred and with large crowds,  
15          bomb scares in Dublin, would you accept that someone in  
16          charge of the policing of public order at these matches  
17          would have wanted to have as much intelligence as  
18          possible about the intentions of the STST?

19          A. Well, they knew what our intentions were, because we  
20          stated it publicly.

21          Q. Well, you know what I'm really driving at is about  
22          the behind the scenes plans for the non-violent --

23          A. I know what you're trying to insinuate, but -- and  
24          I don't know to misrepresent you. But our plans were  
25          quite public. We wanted to disrupt the tour by

1 non-violent direct action, bomb scares and weedkiller  
2 and digging up cricket pitches, and certainly sprinkling  
3 tin tacks were no part of those plans, and indeed, when  
4 that happened, I condemned it, as you will know,  
5 publicly and is recorded in my book.

6 So, you know, it's not as if the  
7 Stop the Seventy Tour was a secret conspiratorial  
8 organisation that nobody knew anything about,  
9 a cell-like structure like a paramilitary organisation  
10 or of that ilk. We were publicly -- we were  
11 transparently public, some might say unwisely honest,  
12 about what our intentions were, which was to stop  
13 the tour by non-violent direct action.

14 And, you know, that leads me to where I think you're  
15 taking me. Why was an undercover officer in virtually  
16 every meeting that I attended when they could have found  
17 out what I was planning to do by what I'd publicly  
18 stated, which was to try and stop the matches by  
19 non-violent action?

20 Q. Would it be fair to say they would have known your broad  
21 intent? That, as we went through earlier, had been made  
22 abundantly clear. They would have known the sort of  
23 tactics that the STST was going to use. They'd had  
24 plenty of experience of that and you'd made it  
25 abundantly clear. But what they did not have was

1           precise information about who was going to do what when.

2           A. No, that's fair enough. If their intention was to  
3           support the apartheid Springbok tour and protect it  
4           going ahead, as seems to be the case, then no doubt they  
5           were carrying out their duties. But, again, I come back  
6           to why were they doing that rather than targeting people  
7           undertaking violent illegal murders and bombings in  
8           London on behalf of the South African state?

9           Q. I see. Thank you.

10                   I'm going to move finally now to the last match,  
11           the Twickenham match, 31 January 1970, between  
12           Springboks and the Barbarians. I'm going to start by  
13           reading your account. It starts at the bottom of  
14           page 146 and runs to the top of page 147:

15                   "Soon after the start, the demonstrators began  
16           throwing the dye onto the pitch. Immediately, fighting  
17           broke out on the terraces as plain clothed detectives,  
18           determined no doubt to uphold the tough reputation  
19           the police had established at the Twickenham matches,  
20           set upon the dye throwers. For good measure, orange and  
21           grey smoke bombs were also tossed, billowing onto  
22           the field, and a constant barrage of chanting was kept  
23           up. We were determined to give the Springboks, as I had  
24           put it in a press interview, a rousing send off, but  
25           although there were one or two minor interruptions,

1 the game went on. On its own, the demonstration would  
2 have provided a spectacular finish to the tour, but  
3 there was still more in store for the Springboks before  
4 they finally and wearily left for home. Protesters  
5 shouted and chanted at the reception after the match.

6 "In the evening, STST held a party, which was geared  
7 towards one final project; an attempt to talk to  
8 the team members. One of our girl supporters had  
9 deliberately struck up a friendship with a Springbok  
10 player at the team's Bristol hotel a month before.

11 After the groundwork had been prepared, the aim was to  
12 get him and some of his colleagues to our party with  
13 her. Everything went smoothly and she arranged to fetch  
14 him later that night after the reception, but when she  
15 arrived at the hotel, her man was completely drunk and  
16 so STST's Mata Hari came back alone, thwarted by beer."

17 A. That's exactly -- if I may just clarify, on the dye,  
18 the intention was to -- it was a form of dye that if it  
19 got damp, it went black. Although it was white dye  
20 carried in transparency -- in plastic packets, it was to  
21 go black, rolled -- if the Springboks rolled on the turf  
22 in a maul or a ruck, their legs would then go black, and  
23 their arms, so the idea was to paint them black and send  
24 them back to make a kind of a graphic sort of portrayal  
25 of the absurdities of apartheid in sport.

1           And the smoke flares were designed -- they were not  
2           in any sense threatening to anybody. They were designed  
3           to create the kind of visual impact of a rugby match  
4           under siege, which is what it was.

5           By that stage, I should add, it was much more  
6           difficult to run onto the pitch because the policing of  
7           the stadia around the barriers between spectators and  
8           the pitch was such that it was very difficult to climb  
9           over and get on -- get onto the pitch without being  
10          nabbed, as I found myself.

11         Q. I see.

12           I would like to move now to the aftermath of that,  
13           and in particular, there was some comment in the  
14           "True Spies" programme about this.

15           This is in the bundle. It's at tab 71, Sir, of  
16           the hard copy, and the page that we want up on  
17           the screen, please, is {UCPI/31845/1}.

18           And if you've got the copy with a lot of pages,  
19           please could we have page 12 up, please {UCPI/31845/12}.  
20           And the bottom half of that page, please.

21           Can we just go over the page, please  
22           {UCPI/31845/13}. That's it, lovely, thank you.

23           Now, Lord Hain, this is a transcript from  
24           the "True Spies" programme, and you will see that you  
25           are recorded as saying:

1            "This is a campaign against the cricket tour and the  
2            rugby tour and apartheid in sport in general - our  
3            organising tactic will be one of non-violent direct  
4            action - that is run on to the pitch and disrupt  
5            matches."

6            Then we get a former undercover police officer using  
7            a pseudonym "Dan":

8            "I remember meeting with a senior officer at  
9            Scotland Yard and I said there would be an awful lot of  
10           blood spilled on the streets of London, and that wasn't  
11           the view that was held in some circles at that time  
12           within the police service."

13           And can we take it, Lord Hain, after everything  
14           you've told us this morning, that was most certainly not  
15           your view either?

16           A. Well, it was not only not my view, it was not factually  
17           correct. There's another example of a sort of  
18           self-promoting exaggeration by the undercover officers  
19           involved in the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign that they  
20           sometimes told the truth but often they told lies,  
21           including about the Twickenham match that we've just  
22           discussed, that we were going to spread tin tacks on  
23           the -- on the pitch, which was never anybody's intention  
24           and didn't happen.

25           So, I think their intention was really to

1 self-promote themselves, really, by exaggerating  
2 the threat and the risk of violence, and that quote is  
3 an example, about "blood spilt on the streets of  
4 London", so that they became so important, or perceived  
5 as so important to their superiors in  
6 the Metropolitan Police, that they had to be kept going  
7 deeper and deeper and continuing to make all sorts of  
8 devious and completely factually incorrect allegations  
9 about what was intended.

10 It was, as it were, to reinforce their own  
11 undercover policing role when they should have been --  
12 at the risk of boring everybody, they should have been  
13 concentrating their resources on violent illegal acts  
14 carried out by the apartheid state in London at the  
15 time. They should have been concentrating  
16 Metropolitan Police resources on -- on tackling serious  
17 organised criminality and terrorism, because those were  
18 the early days of the IRA's bombing campaign in London.

19 Q. Can we go over the page, please {UCPI/31845/13}, and  
20 I'm going to pick up -- I'm looking for a passage that  
21 begins "in general", which is I think just a little bit  
22 higher up. Thank you. Sorry, it's at the bottom of  
23 this page on the copy we're using:

24 "In general, the Hairies aim was to rise within  
25 an organisation but not to end up running it.

1            "In the case of the Stop the Seventy Tour,  
2            the 'Hairy' who got very close to the top was called  
3            Mike. Hairies had handlers and Mike's handler was  
4            [called] Wilf."

5            If we could go over the page, please  
6            {UCPI/31845/14}:

7            "Mike worked his way into the organisation by  
8            his ... shall I say his enthusiasm, his dedication, his  
9            skill, his intelligence, worked his way up to being  
10           Peter Hain's number two. I don't think Peter Hain ever,  
11           ever realised that he had a police officer as his  
12           number two."

13           And then you are recorded being asked:

14           "Were you aware of the attentions of Special Branch  
15           and MI5?"

16           "I was not directly aware in the sense that somebody  
17           tapped me on the shoulder and said 'Hey, we're keeping  
18           a watch on you', but we had good reason to believe that  
19           this was happening and a number of events occurred  
20           during the Stop the Tour campaign which confirmed that."

21           I know you've answered this before in your witness  
22           statement, but I'm going to ask it you again after  
23           everything we've been through this morning. Does it  
24           remain your recollection that you did not have  
25           a number two?



1       A. Yes, I didn't have a number two, so that's another,  
2       you know, false statement by the undercover officer  
3       involved, and there was no number two. There were  
4       a number of senior people around me and he wasn't one of  
5       them, certainly, but there was no number two.

6               And if I may say so, this underlines my point that  
7       I don't think you can rely on Mike Ferguson's reports of  
8       the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, because his reports  
9       to his seniors were so factually incorrect and so  
10      self-promotingly exaggerated and sometimes straight lies  
11      that I think he was completely unreliable.

12      Q. Can we scroll down a little bit, please, so that we have  
13      the paragraph which is penultimate at the moment near  
14      the top of the page. The commentator says:

15               "The Hairies' finest hour came at the climax of  
16      the tour - during the match between the Springboks and  
17      Barbarians at Twickenham.

18               "Wilf: The intention was for demonstrators, just  
19      prior to half time, to throw flare bombs, smoke bombs  
20      and metal tacks onto the pitch.

21               "Mike passed that information on, it was passed on  
22      to the uniform, and at the appointed time officers were  
23      there with sand buckets and metal magnets and although  
24      they threw as many as they could onto the pitch they  
25      were snuffed out, taken away and the players didn't know

1           that it had taken place and when they came out after  
2           half time the game carried on."

3           I think you've referred to this already and you've  
4           pointed out that tacks were not used at Twickenham at  
5           that match.

6           A. They were not used, and this is a very clear example of  
7           a lie by "Mike", a straight lie. We didn't intend to  
8           spread tin tacks and I've explained why not, because  
9           they'd have injured the players. There were no  
10          tin tacks spread, there were no reports of tin tacks  
11          being perhaps intercepted, and there were certainly no  
12          reports of any tin tacks anywhere around that match in  
13          Twickenham.

14          If there had been, they would have created  
15          headlines, as I'm sure you will understand, that it  
16          represented a very serious development in the whole  
17          anti-apartheid campaign around that tour. But there  
18          weren't any such reports because there were no such  
19          tin tacks.

20          Q. Lord Hain, this is not Mike speaking; it's Wilf speaking  
21          and it's Wilf speaking 30 years after the event.

22          Although, as you suggest, a lie might be  
23          one explanation, might some confusion 30 years later be  
24          another one?

25          A. "Some confusion" would be a very charitable description

1 of it, if I may say so, Mr Barr, because it was typical  
2 of the behaviour of undercover officers, as I've seen in  
3 the documentation provided to me by the Inquiry, that  
4 they very rarely told the truth about what was going on.  
5 I knew what was going on and I knew what was not going  
6 on, and that was certainly not going on. So whether  
7 it's, you know, exaggerated in hindsight or whether it  
8 was reported at the time, I don't know, but it was  
9 a lie.

10 Q. Can we pick up at the bottom of the page:

11 "Later on at a meeting Peter Hain felt that there  
12 quite rightly was a spy in their midst and there was  
13 one poor devil that Mike Ferguson looked down the room  
14 and said I think it's him, and he got thrown out, and  
15 Ferguson survived - bless him."

16 Can we go over the page, please {UCPI/31845/15}.

17 You are recorded as saying:

18 "Well quite possibly."

19 A commentator -- I'll stop there.

20 You say "quite possibly" at that stage.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. I think now you don't have any recollection of that at  
23 all; is that right?

24 A. Yes, I don't know -- quite know how that's come up.

25 They must have put the programme together, I don't mean

1 in a malevolent way, but somehow out of context, because  
2 I cannot recall that incident at all. None of  
3 the people who were involved can recall that incident at  
4 all -- those that are still alive -- and I think it was  
5 -- it was manufactured, frankly, again, to -- I don't  
6 know, in some theatrical way.

7 But what possibly could have caused some confusion  
8 in terms of the programme that we're seeing  
9 the transcript from is that we were concerned about  
10 infiltrators and we did get rid of somebody who -- and  
11 I think I refer to this in my statement, from --  
12 claiming to be from the Surrey Anti-Apartheid Movement  
13 and claiming to be a member of the Communist Party, that  
14 we were very suspicious of, so we stopped him coming to  
15 meetings.

16 But obviously, the Mike Ferguson, who was playing  
17 this UCO role, who continued to be at the meetings,  
18 clearly, because he's reporting some aspects of them as  
19 happening, he was still there. But I don't -- I don't  
20 remember that dramatic incident of anybody being thrown  
21 out of a meeting because a finger had been pointed at  
22 him. So that's another example of something that was  
23 just false.

24 Q. Now, the reason I hesitated earlier is there's  
25 a difference between the transcript I've got and the

1 transcript you've got on the screen. Can we just go up  
2 further, please {UCPI31845/14}. Yes, that's the bit we  
3 want.

4 Sorry, there's a bit of the transcript that we  
5 missed out there. We picked up at "bless him", which  
6 I think you can see halfway down the screen:

7 "Interviewer: do you recall that?"

8 Then you say:

9 "I do recall that, yes.

10 "Interviewer: just tell us about that, what did you  
11 do? Did you suspect the spy?"

12 Then you say:

13 "There was lots of suspicions at the time, but  
14 I just took the view that what we were doing was  
15 correct, and I wasn't going to be deflected by fringe  
16 sort of pressures of that kind."

17 Then interviewer:

18 "But you got the wrong spy."

19 Then back to the bit of the transcript we had up  
20 before where you say "quite possibly, yes".

21 You've explained that you don't have a recollection  
22 of that now happening, but you do seem, when interviewed  
23 for the "True Spies" programme, to have said at that  
24 stage that you did recall it.

25 A. Well, I think -- I think, to be fair, Mr Barr, I think,

1           since I don't recall it and I'm simply telling you that  
2           honestly and nobody still alive at the time recalls it  
3           either, I think if you read a fair reading of that  
4           transcript, I'm saying, "Well quite possibly", and then  
5           there were a lot of -- we had a lot of suspicions at the  
6           time.

7           And I think, though it is a while ago, during  
8           the programme I think it was put together -- and I'm not  
9           saying malevolently, but I do not say at any time in  
10          that transcript, "Yes, that guy was -- you know, that  
11          that description by the undercover officer was  
12          absolutely correct". I don't say that, do I?

13         Q. I think what you say is -- in relation to the deflected  
14          accusation, you are recorded as saying, "I do recall  
15          that, yes".

16          My question to you is: do you think that, in  
17          the early noughties when you were interviewed, you might  
18          still have a recollection of that happening even if it  
19          is one which has now faded away?

20         A. No, because we were -- we were worried about a number of  
21          people and some of these worries were proved to be  
22          wrong. I mean, when you -- you know, there's a certain  
23          paranoia develops if you are concerned about being  
24          infiltrated, and that was what I was trying to convey.

25          I'm trying to read the transcript as fairly and

1           honestly as I can, but for the life of me, Mr Barr,  
2           I cannot recall that incident ever happening. And since  
3           he also claims to be number two and I didn't have  
4           a number two, I rather doubt the provenance or  
5           the accuracy or the veracity of that particular  
6           incident, but I do say quite possibly things like that  
7           happened, but certainly not that incident as it is  
8           explained in those very direct terms.

9           Q. Thank you.

10                  Could we take that down now, please, and could we  
11                  have up in its place {UCPI/8660/1}.

12                  Sir, that's at tab 4 of the hard copy bundle.

13                  Lord Hain, this is a report on the STST's annual  
14                  general meeting, which was held on 7 March 1970. It's  
15                  again a report of Mike Ferguson's and there are a couple  
16                  of things that I want to pick up in this report with  
17                  you.

18                  The first is some references to violence. If we  
19                  could go to page 2, please {UCPI/8660/2} and look at  
20                  paragraph 5, paragraph 5 reads:

21                  "Michael Brierley, a northern university lecturer  
22                  and a Middlesex cricketer, gave a well reasoned speech  
23                  in which he warned delegates against the use of violence  
24                  for violence sake in their demonstrations. He spoke for  
25                  the moderates within STST who are against all forms of

1 violence. Unfortunately, neither Brierley nor any of  
2 the other speakers could satisfactorily define  
3 'violence', which complicated the arguments for and  
4 against it."

5 If we could hold that in mind and go to paragraph 8  
6 on the next page, please, {UCPI/8660/3}, and  
7 I'm interested in the bottom of paragraph 8 where it  
8 reads:

9 "Despite this difference it was stressed that STST  
10 was not a monolithic organisation, and its avowed policy  
11 was one of non-violent militant direct action, if  
12 individual or individual groups felt that violence was  
13 called for then they must be final judges of what action  
14 was appropriate. This concluded the morning session."

15 So from those two passages we see Mike Ferguson  
16 doing two things. He's first of all portraying the STST  
17 as a group within which there were two schools of  
18 thought on violence, one firmly against violence and one  
19 a little more tolerant of it. Does that fairly reflect  
20 the realities of the STST?

21 A. I don't think so. First of all, Mike Brierley, of  
22 course, subsequently was the England cricket captain and  
23 alone, like John Taylor, the Welsh rugby international  
24 during the rugby tour campaign, was the only rugby  
25 international to speak up on our side and against



1 the tour, so Mike Brierley was the only cricketer to do  
2 so and it was very courageous of him to come to our  
3 conference in 1970 because we were a very controversial  
4 organisation and there was a lot of hostility to us and  
5 our tactics and seeking to stop that cricket tour.

6 And he was making it very clear, and I cheered him  
7 on at the time and certainly would do so now again, that  
8 he did not support violence, because a lot of our  
9 critics tried to portray us as unlawful and violent when  
10 we were neither, and especially we were committed to  
11 non-violence, which is actually referred to in  
12 paragraph 8.

13 I don't know. I mean, what the undercover officer  
14 is trying to portray there is that there was a double  
15 side to the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign. There was  
16 the open advocacy which I -- which I explained of  
17 non-violent direct action and then there were elements  
18 who were committed to violence. I don't think that's  
19 true at all. I don't think anybody wanted to hurt any  
20 of the Springboks, nobody wanted to injure them during  
21 a rugby match. I don't think anybody wanted to commit  
22 violence of that kind. There might or might not have  
23 been groups seeking to get in on the act, and there  
24 were, but then they could have been targeted by  
25 the police if the police were concerned about them.

1           There's a reference in one of the undercover officer  
2 reports, from my recollection, in my large bundle, to  
3 anarchists advocating violence. Well, you know, there  
4 were no doubt a few anarchists around who were doing  
5 that, but they were not part of the  
6 Stop the Seventy Tour movement, and nor would  
7 Mike Ferguson attending meetings in my parents' living  
8 room have gained any intelligence which might have  
9 assisted the police to stop them doing what they might  
10 or might not have intended.

11       Q. The second thing that comes out of those paragraphs is  
12 that at least one speaker appears to have expressed  
13 the view that ultimately whether violence was called for  
14 was a matter for an individual to decide. Might it have  
15 been that a speaker at that conference expressed that  
16 view?

17       A. I don't recall that. I honestly do not recall that, and  
18 it would have surprised me. Look, there were a variety  
19 of people, a great spectrum of people, at that  
20 conference, from vicars to -- to Young Communists.  
21 I don't recall anybody advocating violence at all, or  
22 anybody saying, "Well, look, it's a matter for you if  
23 you want to do that".

24           Our general view was to try and bring people of  
25 whatever opinion on the progressive and left side and

1 liberal side of politics, who backed the  
2 Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, to rally around  
3 the non-violent direct action objective, which is what  
4 people did.

5 Q. The technician has very efficiently taken that document  
6 down, but unfortunately I haven't finished with it.  
7 Could we have {UCPI/8660} back, please.

8 Just two more points. If we go to the paragraph  
9 above, please {UCPI/8660/3}, I'm interested in the end  
10 of this paragraph, which reads:

11 "The support which had been gained in such a short  
12 time should not be allowed to dissipate at the end of  
13 the Springboks tour. From attacking apartheid in sport  
14 they must move into the wider field of racism both in  
15 South Africa and in this country, and finally  
16 the capitalist system which nurtured it."

17 This is recorded as you speaking, and you've  
18 addressed it in your witness statement and you've made  
19 abundantly clear that you were not a communist at any  
20 time. But I am interested, please, in why it was that  
21 you were using the words "capitalist system" in this  
22 context. Could you explain that, please?

23 A. Yes, I'm very happy to, because it was the -- in this  
24 instance, the British capitalist system that was trading  
25 with the apartheid regime, that was sending arms to

1 the apartheid regime, enabling them to exterminate  
2 anti-apartheid activists in Nelson Mandela's  
3 African National Congress, terrorising black townships  
4 and attacking African National Congress freedom fighters  
5 operating in frontline states in Sub-Saharan Africa.

6 So actually, what was happening was the capitalist  
7 system of the kind that was operating in Britain at the  
8 time was arming the most brutal racist system that  
9 the world has ever known. That was the point that I was  
10 making, and that we were -- we as an economic system in  
11 Britain, and same is true of America and most of Europe  
12 with the exception, to their great credit, of  
13 the Scandinavian countries, were trading with  
14 the apartheid regime and giving it all the wealth that  
15 it needed to continue to monopolise, control, empower  
16 and suppress the black African majority. That was what  
17 I was saying.

18 The Stop the Seventy Tour was not some sort of  
19 revolutionary organisation. It was a disarmingly  
20 non-violent direct action-committed Anti-Apartheid  
21 Movement.

22 Q. I mean, there are two ways, really, of expressing  
23 the concerns that you've just articulated. One would be  
24 to say that you wanted finally to attack the countries  
25 and companies which trade with the apartheid regime.

1           The other is to describe it through a more theoretical  
2           prism and talk about the capitalist system.

3           Did you refer to it as "capitalist" because it might  
4           play to some of the elements in the broad church that  
5           you were preaching to on that occasion?

6           A. No, I referred to it for the reason I've explained. But  
7           let me be frank with you and Sir John. I'm a democratic  
8           socialist. I think that capitalism run in its -- in its  
9           more extreme way is -- is designed to create a rich  
10          elite at the top and -- and great impoverishment down  
11          below, instead of to spread wealth and ownership more  
12          widely and to allow people to participate more equitably  
13          in the running of their economy.

14          So I want a fairer, more just economic system, and  
15          I make no bones about that. I was a socialist at the  
16          time I was in the Young Liberals and I remain one, and  
17          if that's the discussion we want to have, I'm very happy  
18          to have it.

19          But the point I was making at the time was that  
20          the British capitalist system was more interested in  
21          profits and in trade than in decency and human rights  
22          and justice and non-racism because, actually, its trade  
23          of arms and its supplying of arms was perpetuating  
24          apartheid, entrenching it and strengthening it.

25          Q. Thank you, that's very clear.

1           Can we move in this document, please, over the page  
2 to paragraph 12 {UCPI/8660/5}. It says:

3           "The conference was ended by a short address from  
4 Peter Hain, in which he thanked all those present for  
5 their assistance over the past months and urged them to  
6 even greater activity during the forthcoming weeks. He  
7 warned however that they must beware of infiltrators,  
8 without becoming neurotic, as the STST was undoubtedly  
9 of great interest to the authorities and Special Branch.  
10 Unknown faces and strange 'volunteers' should be treated  
11 with suspicion. The conference was then concluded."

12           You've already explained in the context of  
13 the "True Spies" transcript some elements of  
14 the security concerns that you had, but this type of  
15 record of how you spoke at meetings, this is not  
16 the only example. Is it fair to say that you preached  
17 the message of security-consciousness to the STST and  
18 indeed some of the other non-violent direct action  
19 groups you were involved in?

20       A. Yes, for one very good reason, apart from others,  
21 Mr Barr, and that is that the South African  
22 Security Services were infiltrating us. It was  
23 a South African agent, to my knowledge, that recorded  
24 the annual general meeting of  
25 the Anti-Apartheid Movement in October 1969 to which we

1 referred earlier in this session, and they were trying  
2 to disrupt the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, working  
3 in collaboration with British intelligence organisations  
4 and working in collaboration, obviously, with  
5 the South African security services as well.

6 So we were very concerned about the apartheid state  
7 particularly infiltrating it, and since the apartheid  
8 state Security Services were working hand in glove with  
9 the British Security Services at the time, presumably  
10 also including the Special Branch and no doubt  
11 undercover officers such as Mike Ferguson and  
12 "Mike Scott" who, you know -- figure in this part of  
13 the Inquiry, we were concerned about that as well,  
14 because they -- the South African Security Services had  
15 been responsible for a great deal of illegal violent  
16 activity and attacks on anti-apartheid activists,  
17 including, as I said earlier, the headquarters of  
18 the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the headquarters in  
19 London of the African National Congress.

20 So we were concerned about infiltration, there's no  
21 question about it, but it was that as well that we were  
22 concerned about.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 Could we take that document down now, please, and  
25 could we have {UCPI/14399/1} up next.

1           That's tab 5 in your bundle, Sir.

2           Now, this is 7 April 1970. The cricket tour at that  
3 stage had not quite been cancelled. Your campaign had  
4 a little longer to run, and this is a report on  
5 the London regional conference of the STST held in  
6 ST Pancras Town Hall on 5 April.

7           Can we go, please, to paragraph 5, first of all. At  
8 paragraph 5:

9           "It was generally agreed that the organisation of  
10 STST was too small, if that it did not  
11 comprehensively ..."

12           If we go over the page {UCPI/14399/2}, thank you:

13           "... cover London; delegates were urged to set up  
14 local groups as soon as possible and to commence fund  
15 raising and political activities. The formation of  
16 these groups should be given the widest publicity in  
17 an endeavour to bring the aims of the campaign 'to  
18 the man in the street'. This would best be achieved by  
19 distributing leaflets in the most appropriate areas."

20           And I've picked this paragraph, Lord Hain, as a hook  
21 to hang this point on. It's right, isn't it, that your  
22 organisation was expanding right up to the end of  
23 the campaign and cancellation of the cricket tour?

24           A. Yes, it was, and I don't see what's wrong with that.

25           Trying to form more groups in different local



1 communities to try to achieve our objective of stopping  
2 the 1970 racist cricket tour, I'm not sure what could be  
3 seen as being objectionable about that.

4 Q. I'm not suggesting there was anything objectionable  
5 about it at all.

6 A. Good, good.

7 Q. What it did leave you, though, was a nice problem to  
8 have, which is what do you do with all these committed  
9 activists who have been mobilised after the cricket tour  
10 has ended. And is it right that the answer to that was  
11 to keep them mobilised on a different campaign and  
12 that's how we get into the campaigns against racialism?

13 A. Yes, in part, though I specifically urged  
14 Stop the Seventy Tour activists, not all of whom were  
15 members of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, which is  
16 the largest movement anywhere in the world, here in  
17 Britain, to join the Anti-Apartheid Movement and get  
18 involved in its wider activities, and from my  
19 recollection, its membership trebled as a result of  
20 the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign and partly during it.

21 So that was what I wanted to see. I wanted to see  
22 the sports campaign spread more generally into the wider  
23 anti-apartheid struggle against economic links against  
24 arming South Africa, for freeing Nelson Mandela and  
25 imposing sanctions.

1           So, yes, setting up the Action Committee Against  
2           Racialism was part of it, but that was a very small part  
3           of it, to be frank. The wider -- the momentum was  
4           really carried on into the Anti-Apartheid Movement  
5           itself.

6           Q. And just to complete the story of the STST,  
7           demonstrations were organised for 2 May 1970 and went  
8           ahead outside cricket grounds and those were  
9           essentially -- were they largely of a conventional  
10          nature?

11          A. They were. There was no -- no match to disrupt because  
12          it hadn't happened, but it was a sign of mobilising  
13          activity to campaign against the tour, and we were  
14          making our argument.

15          Q. If we could have one final document up in relation to  
16          the STST. It's {UCPI/8606/1}.

17                 It's tab 9 of your bundle, Sir.

18                 Paragraph 3, please. Thank you.

19                 Not an easy document to read, but towards the bottom  
20          of paragraph 3, this is a meeting of the national STST  
21          committee, again at 21A Gwendolen Avenue, and the report  
22          reads:

23                 "There could be no doubt that the next two weeks  
24          would be crucial as far as getting the tour cancelled  
25          was concerned and the trump cards which STST had to play

1 in connection with the Commonwealth Games and racial  
2 disorder which would occur in the event of the tour  
3 taking place ..."

4 Was racial disorder one of your trump cards,  
5 Lord Hain?

6 A. No, of course not, but what -- that's a rather slanted  
7 description of what was happening and, you know,  
8 a biased, if I may say so, presentation of reality.

9 If you remember from reading my book, Frank Cousins,  
10 the Chair, I think it was, of the Community Relations  
11 Commission, which was dedicated to improving race  
12 relations in Britain, had called for the tour to be  
13 cancelled because he was concerned about the interaction  
14 of apartheid -- pro-apartheid activity and pro-tour  
15 activity with racist groups such as the National Front  
16 and Nazi groups around them, such as the National Front,  
17 attacking the black community.

18 And Jeff Crawford, for example, who is referred to  
19 in some of these documents, the leader of  
20 the West Indian Standing Conference and a keen cricket  
21 fan himself, a British Caribbean citizen, he joined  
22 the Stop the Seventy Tour Committee and linked our  
23 two organisations together because he was concerned that  
24 racist elements in Britain were attacking the black  
25 community as they were attacking the Anti-Apartheid

1 Movement.

2 So there was a concern about race relations, yes,  
3 indeed, but it was not that the Stop the Seventy Tour  
4 campaign's activities had stirred up racial disorder.  
5 It was that pro-apartheid racist organisations were --  
6 were actually attacking us as an organisation,  
7 demonstrating against us and also promoting their racist  
8 beliefs.

9 And on the Commonwealth Games,  
10 the Commonwealth Games, at that stage in proceedings,  
11 was on the point of collapse, because African countries  
12 had withdrawn, the games were due to be staged in -- in  
13 Edinburgh in July 1970 and would have taken place  
14 the same time as the cricket tour, had it gone head.  
15 The Commonwealth Games faced a progressive boycott in  
16 protest against the cricket tour happening. So African  
17 countries withdrew initially, South Asian countries,  
18 India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka withdrew, Caribbean countries  
19 withdrew. So you would have had an all-white  
20 Commonwealth Games running alongside an all-white racist  
21 South African cricket tour, and that was a big factor.

22 And to that extent, even though the wording is --  
23 you know, I would take issue with, it is the case that  
24 the concern about race relations, for the reasons  
25 I've explained, and concerns about the future of

1 the Commonwealth Games, for the reasons I've explained,  
2 had escalated the issue of stopping the 70 cricket tour  
3 from an idea in the hands of a small number of us a year  
4 previously to basically an international political  
5 confrontation as well as concern about domestic racial  
6 harmony in Britain.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 And as we all know, the next thing that happens is  
9 the tour is cancelled. Just to ask a hypothetical  
10 question, if it had not been, is it fair to say that  
11 the STST would have continued with its determined  
12 attempts to disrupt the matches?

13 A. Oh, yes. No question about that. We had all sorts of  
14 plans. For example, the first match, which I think we'd  
15 called a demonstration which we called "D Day" for  
16 6 June, demo day, at which 100,000 were expected in  
17 London, and in addition, there were all sorts of novel  
18 tactics planned for cricket matches. We discovered  
19 an underground -- disused underground tunnel of,  
20 I think, the Bakerloo line and an air vent coming up  
21 from it into Lord's Cricket Ground, actually within  
22 the ground, and planned to infiltrate hundreds and  
23 potentially thousands of demonstrators through that  
24 avenue and invade the pitch.

25 So there was lots of things going on like that.

1 People had brought mirrors to flash in the -- in  
2 the batsman's eyes. Some were planning to fly model  
3 aircraft off their aunt's flat overlooking Lord's and  
4 things like that. So there was a great deal of activity  
5 going on, indeed.

6 Q. And so from your point of view, there was the certainty  
7 of disruption. But might there also have been the risk  
8 of evincing the sort of violent reaction that we saw at  
9 Swansea?

10 A. Well, if the stewarding of the cricket matches and  
11 behaviour of the police had been replicated from  
12 Swansea, undoubtedly there would have been that danger,  
13 which is why I was anxious that that didn't happen and  
14 why, for all sorts of reasons, I was so pleased when we  
15 stopped the tour, because we were one of the very few  
16 protest movements using non-violent direct action to  
17 achieve our objectives completely, and it was an  
18 enormous boost for the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

19 I mean, I think it's important to say, without  
20 taking liberties with your time in this Inquiry,  
21 Sir John, that at that period, the resistance to  
22 apartheid inside South Africa had been closed down.  
23 The entire leadership of the African National Congress  
24 was with Robben Island -- was on Robben Island with  
25 Nelson Mandela. Activists like my parents had been

1 driven into exile, others had been tortured, imprisoned,  
2 arrested, attacked. The entire resistance had been  
3 suppressed.

4 So this campaign came at a time and achieved  
5 a victory which was very, very important for  
6 the momentum of the international  
7 Anti-Apartheid Movement. So I was thrilled when  
8 the tour was cancelled. But I was also relieved,  
9 because I -- I didn't look forward to the confrontations  
10 that would have undoubtedly have occurred.

11 Q. We can move now from STST to the Young Liberals. As  
12 you've explained, the Young Liberals did use NVDA and  
13 that throws up an interesting curiosity, doesn't it, and  
14 that is that we have the youth wing of a mainstream  
15 political party which is prepared to commit minor  
16 criminal offences to advance its aims?

17 A. Like what criminal offence? Could you be specific?

18 Q. Well, they may be things like minor criminal damage, or  
19 there might be minor public order offences, that sort of  
20 thing.

21 A. You mean like occurred at the Sarah Everard  
22 demonstration at Clapham Common? Would you describe  
23 that as a minor ...

24 Q. I'm afraid I have to ask you the questions.

25 A. I'm just trying to understand the meaning of your

1 question.

2 Q. I'm trying to gauge from you whether you accept that  
3 what was going on was that the youth wing of  
4 the Liberal Party in the early 1970s did involve people  
5 who were prepared to commit non-violent offences at  
6 the very bottom end of the scale of offending?

7 A. Well, in that sense, if you -- you're talking about me,  
8 because I was chair of the Stop the Seventy Tour  
9 campaign and I became a very prominent Young Liberal as  
10 a result, and I've explained my philosophy on that and  
11 I've explained how, if I was committing offences at the  
12 time, of the minor kind that you're describing, criminal  
13 offences, presumably I would have been apprehended  
14 and -- and arrested and I wasn't.

15 Q. Well, I think things like sitting down on a zebra  
16 crossing and I think at one point you were --

17 A. That was a year later in 1971, indeed, yes.

18 Q. That's the sort of thing I'm talking about.

19 A. Oh, okay. Well, I plead guilty to that, because I did.

20 Q. And, again, all because of -- driven by a passion in  
21 the cause.

22 A. Yes, yes, and in a long line of non-violent direct  
23 action, some of it civil disobedience, if you like, that  
24 has achieved the progress that this country has seen,  
25 whether on votes for women or votes for everybody or



1 rights for trade unionists or, in this case, advancing  
2 the anti-racist cause.

3 Q. And really the point I was making was that this is  
4 pretty unusual for a mainstream political party,  
5 isn't it?

6 A. It is, and it did cause a lot of tension within  
7 the Liberal Party, though I don't think that that's  
8 the focus of this Inquiry of Sir John.

9 Q. No, it isn't.

10 Now, what I want to put to you now is a paradox.  
11 The paradox is that we know that the Young Liberals were  
12 committing some minor criminal offences in the course of  
13 non-violent direct action. We've got quite a lot of  
14 reports in the bundle about the meetings that were being  
15 reported by HN298.

16 I'm going to -- if you want me to turn any of these  
17 up, I will do, but I am just going to summarise the sort  
18 of topics that were being discussed and then I'm going  
19 to take you to one report in particular.

20 We've got, at tab 19, a meeting on 6 January 1972  
21 discussing the problems of drugs and a possible sit-in  
22 at local council chambers.

23 We've got, at tab 20, a meeting of 13 January 1972  
24 discussing homelessness.

25 We've got, at tab 22, a meeting on 1 February.

1           You're presenting a report with a colleague about  
2           Ireland, the thrust of which is a plea to end  
3           sectarianism.

4           At tab 23, we've got the National Council of  
5           Young Liberals meeting.

6           We've got, at tab 24, a meeting discussing, in your  
7           front living room again, I think, but this time  
8           94 Park Road, low income groups, old age pensioners and  
9           population control.

10          At tab 28, the theme of the meeting appears to be  
11          pollution occasioned by motorcars and the pollution of  
12          water.

13          I could go on, but I think you get the drift.

14          A. Yes, but what I'm not clear about is where this line of  
15          questioning is leading. You started off with minor  
16          criminality and then you go on to talk about  
17          homelessness and old age pensions and, you know, getting  
18          rid of pollution in London and so on and other cities.

19          Q. The paradox is --

20          A. What's the point?

21          Q. The paradox is this: to what extent, in meetings of  
22          the Young Liberals, was non-violent direct action being  
23          discussed?

24          A. Oh, it was, and there's no question about that, but  
25          what's wrong with it? What is wrong with non-violent

1 direct action?

2 Q. Lord Hain, I am not taking issue with that at all.

3 A. Except that you preceded -- you gave it the label  
4 "criminal" and then, when I pressed you, "minor  
5 criminal".

6 Q. What I'm getting at is I'm trying to gauge how extensive  
7 was non-violent direct action within the Young Liberals?

8 A. Well, amongst a section of the Young Liberals, you know,  
9 it was. I mean, the Young Liberals themselves were --  
10 consisted of junior liberals of the more -- of the more  
11 conventional kind, and then the Young Liberals of  
12 the late 60s that were a more radical force, of which  
13 I was part.

14 But what I -- what you can tell I object to about  
15 this line of questioning is when it comes to progressive  
16 radical movements, whether it's environmentalists today,  
17 whether it's anti-racists, Black Lives Matter, whether  
18 it's Greenpeace or Extinction Rebellion or  
19 the Anti-Apartheid Movement of its era, we are all  
20 presented as somehow subversive or semi-criminal or  
21 objectionable or disrupting England's clean and  
22 pleasant -- green and pleasant land, and actually, that  
23 pejorative prism through which radical politics is  
24 presented is, in my view, completely unacceptable,  
25 reprehensible and partisan, and that is the sort of

1 perspective of undercover policing and ideology that was  
2 driving it. That's -- that's my major concern, and  
3 I think -- you know, I'm not accusing you personally,  
4 but I think you're reflecting that state of mind, if  
5 I may say so.

6 Q. What I'm coming to is this. If we've got a group which  
7 is discussing non-violent direct action which includes  
8 some minor criminality, if they don't use  
9 an undercover police officer, how else do they find out  
10 about it and stop it?

11 A. Well, you've got to decide on -- you know, what is  
12 the point of the police here? The point of  
13 the police -- and I've worked with the police as  
14 a cabinet minister, as a local MP for a quarter of  
15 a century. Indeed, as a member of the House of Lords  
16 for two years when I was Secretary of State for  
17 Northern Ireland, I was protected by armed officers of  
18 the Metropolitan Police, so I'm a supporter of  
19 the function of good policing in maintaining a civilised  
20 society.

21 But are you really saying that police resources were  
22 best deployed in virtually every meeting of Putney  
23 Young Liberals, sometimes, you know, less than half  
24 a dozen people discussing all manner of worthy issues,  
25 I would think, like old age pensions and environmental

1 pollution, are you really saying that that's a sensible  
2 policy for undercover policing to do that kind of thing?

3 Because you then get into the world of  
4 undercover police officers -- and this is something that  
5 I'd like to return to, if I may, at the end of today's  
6 evidence, Sir John -- undercover policing then gets to  
7 the point where instead of catching the racists  
8 responsible for Stephen Lawrence's murder, they  
9 infiltrate the Lawrence campaign and the family  
10 campaign.

11 So instead of dealing with a lot of the issues of  
12 injustice in society, what they're doing is attending  
13 meetings of Putney Young Liberals when no doubt thieves  
14 were going about Putney robbing houses at the time.  
15 That's what they should have been doing; combating  
16 proper -- proper crime and drug trafficking and  
17 terrorism, not harassing legitimate radical opinion.

18 Q. Thank you, Lord Hain.

19 Now, I did say I would show you one report. Could  
20 we have up, please, {UCPI/8240/1}.

21 Sir, this is at tab 21 of your bundle.

22 This is a report on the Putney Young Liberals.  
23 The meeting is 20 January 1972. It's at 90 Fawe Park  
24 Road. This is a different address, but I think it's  
25 right, isn't it, this is still your parents' home; they

1 had just moved?

2 A. Yeah, they'd moved there in the meantime.

3 Q. Was I right to assume the meetings were still happening  
4 in the front room?

5 A. They are, yes, a rather overused front room.

6 Q. 14 people, according to this report, in the front room.

7 Now, this is -- the subject of the report, you can  
8 take it from me, is environmental matters, including  
9 a proposed assault on the Battersea smell. And we see,  
10 towards the bottom of the page, what I'm interested in,  
11 if you could scroll down, please:

12 "Nominations were taken for the executive posts of  
13 Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and Membership Secretary  
14 and following persons were elected to those positions."

15 The Membership Secretary goes to "Mike Scott". That  
16 is HN298, an undercover police officer. Can you recall  
17 any of this?

18 A. I don't recall the name "Mike Scott". Certainly, if --  
19 there was a Reverend Mike Scott involved in  
20 the Anti-Apartheid Movement, a very respected figure,  
21 but I don't recall a name "Mike Scott", so he must have  
22 operated under another name for the purposes of becoming  
23 -- if that's what he did -- the membership secretary.  
24 To be frank, I can't remember the membership secretary's  
25 name all these years later.

- 1 Q. And this is of the Putney branch of the Young Liberals.
- 2 A. Yeah.
- 3 Q. We've got plenty of evidence of SDS undercover officers  
4 assuming positions within the groups they're  
5 infiltrating, but I value your view as an experienced  
6 politician about whether or not there are any particular  
7 dangers arising from an undercover police officer  
8 assuming a position within a mainstream political  
9 organisation.
- 10 A. Yes, I do think that should be of real concern to this  
11 Inquiry, because what we were discussing, according to  
12 this note, and presumably that's -- that's the case,  
13 a brief discussion followed about representatives to  
14 the annual conference of the Young Liberals. Perfectly  
15 democratic, perfectly mainstream.
- 16 So I do think your question -- and I'm grateful  
17 for it -- invites the -- invites the issue about what  
18 was an undercover policing officer doing in the youth  
19 branch of a major political party? Indeed, that  
20 underlines the point I've made throughout; this is  
21 a misuse of police resources.
- 22 Q. Could we go over the page, please, to see who was at  
23 the meeting {UCPI/8240/2}. I'll just remind you of  
24 the date, Lord Hain, which you'll need for the purposes  
25 of my next questions; 27 January 1972.

1           Jo-Ann Hain is one of your sisters?

2       A.   She is.

3       Q.   How old was Jo-Ann Hain on 26 January 1972?

4       A.   She was born in 1956, so she would have been -- she  
5           would have been 15 at the time because her 16th birthday  
6           hadn't happened.

7       Q.   Sally Hain; another of your siblings?

8       A.   She was born in 1958, so she would have been 13 at the  
9           time because her birthday hadn't happened. So they were  
10          young teenagers.

11      Q.   Do you have any concerns -- putting to one side whether  
12          or not there was any justification for infiltrating  
13          the Young Liberals at all, do you have any concerns  
14          about reporting on children?

15      A.   I do. I'm not sure, to be fair, that my sisters, as  
16          young teenagers, would have seen themselves as children,  
17          but I do have concerns indeed about precisely that. It  
18          has come up elsewhere in this Inquiry.

19      Q.   Indeed it has.

20                 Would you like to articulate what those concerns  
21                 might be?

22      A.   Well, it -- it -- it comes to my constant theme, and  
23          I hope I'm not boring the Inquiry, because that's not my  
24          intention, about disproportionate, politically biased  
25          policing here. And in the case of young people, these



1           were -- these were schoolgirls attending  
2           Mayfield Comprehensive School at the time in Putney,  
3           and, you know, they were following their elder brother  
4           and their own wishes in -- in -- in being part of  
5           a progressive youth organisation, and they'd been  
6           involved in Stop the Seventy Tour activity as well.

7           So I really don't understand why "Mike Scott" was --  
8           was in this meeting at all, how it could be justified by  
9           his superiors and what he was doing with particularly  
10          two young women teenagers. Sorry, I'm not, by that,  
11          casting any aspersions at any -- at any of his -- at  
12          what his behaviour might have been towards my sisters,  
13          because I don't recall any misbehaviour in that respect.  
14          I didn't want to -- to leave a smear.

15         Q. Thank you.

16                 Could we take that down now, please.

17                 I'm going to move on now to the Campaign for  
18                 the Repeal of the Immigration Act, and you've made clear  
19                 that you don't recall the campaign and don't think you  
20                 spoke at a meeting that the documents say you were  
21                 invited to go to. But what I'd like to do is call up  
22                 the document at tab 44, please, which is {UCPI/7658/1},  
23                 please. Thank you very much.

24                 Now, this, Lord Hain, is an SDS report, as we can  
25                 see from the stamp at the top right of the page, about

1 the Campaign for the Repeal of the Immigration Act, as  
2 we can see from the acronym on the left-hand margin.  
3 It's a form of report that we're familiar with. It's  
4 a report about an individual, and it says:

5 "[Privacy] of [Privacy] who is an active member of  
6 the Campaign for the Repeal of the Immigration Act 1971  
7 ... is employed in an administrative capacity by  
8 the British Gas Corporation, Michael Street, London  
9 SW6 ..."

10 And then we have his telephone number:

11 "[Privacy] and his wife, [Privacy], devote  
12 a considerable amount of time to the running and  
13 building of CRIA. [Privacy] recently asked Peter Hain,  
14 of the Young Liberals, to speak at future CRIA public  
15 meetings and encourage the Young Liberals to actively  
16 support the campaign.

17 "[Privacy] and [Privacy] have previously come to our  
18 notice in connection with CRIA. Peter Hain is  
19 the subject of ..."

20 And then there is a reference number for  
21 the registry file relating to you.

22 First of all, insofar as you know anything about  
23 the CRIA, was it involved in any serious criminality?

24 A. I don't recall it as being, or any, by your earlier  
25 definition, minor public disorder. I don't recall it,

1 but I don't recall the organisation with great detail.  
2 What I do recall is a great deal of opposition to what  
3 many of us thought was a racist Immigration Act of 1971  
4 brought in by the Conservative government, which is  
5 presumably what is -- what is concerned here.

6 Q. I've got two further points I'd like your reaction on.  
7 The first is, you are reported -- your name appears in  
8 this report because you'd been asked -- simply been  
9 asked to speak at a public meeting. Do you have any  
10 reaction to reporting you for that level of contact?

11 A. Thank you, yes, I do, because this is again an example  
12 of biased -- bias in policing and in the deployment of  
13 undercover officers. If you have a file on you, which  
14 is presumably what that reference is, a Special Branch  
15 file that's held on me at the time, then quite  
16 gratuitously you'd get involved and it sort of creates  
17 an atmosphere, especially through undercover officers,  
18 of some kind of murky subversion going on here, whereas  
19 this is a perfectly legitimate public meeting, publicly  
20 advertised, as far as I can tell, to protest about  
21 a legitimate cause, which is the operation of what a lot  
22 of people felt at the time, including me, was a racist  
23 form of immigration legislation.

24 So I do -- I do object to it, and it's another  
25 example along a long list of biased, disproportionate

1 deployment of police undercover officers.

2 Q. The second and final question on this document is  
3 the husband and wife couple reported here appear to be  
4 reported upon for two reasons, one, their involvement in  
5 the Campaign for the Repeal of Immigration Act and, two,  
6 because they've asked you to speak. Do you have any  
7 comment on reporting them for asking you to speak at  
8 a public meeting?

9 A. Well, yes, I do, really. I mean, I don't know the names  
10 and I don't know whether they were of, in themselves,  
11 interest to the police. But if they weren't, as seems  
12 possible, if not likely, then they get dragged into this  
13 simply because I'm a name that the police have  
14 an interest in for entirely nefarious motives, in my  
15 view, and because of my anti-apartheid, anti-racist  
16 activity in the main -- or overwhelmingly -- and simply  
17 because I'm invited to a meeting, suddenly a police file  
18 is opened on them. It's this kind of octopus-like form  
19 of activity that really drags the police and undercover  
20 policing in particular, undercover officers, into areas  
21 which I think are completely illegitimate.

22 Q. We get part of an answer to the question you posed  
23 a moment ago at paragraph 4. It says:

24 "[Privacy] and [Privacy] have previously come to our  
25 notice in connection with CRIA."

1           So it seems that was their own previous connection,  
2           as far as we can tell, from this report.

3       A. But again, what is wrong with an organisation  
4           campaigning against immigration legislation? You might  
5           not agree with them. You or I might not or might agree  
6           with them, but why are the police interested in them?  
7           I mean, that's the question I had continuously.

8           There's evidence, I think, given to this Inquiry  
9           earlier on, reported in the media, of  
10          an undercover officer involved in the -- attending  
11          meetings of the Women's Liberation organisation around  
12          this kind of time, between 1971 and 1973. Her  
13          undercover name was "Sandra" and she told the Inquiry,  
14          I think on 18 May, "I could have been doing much more  
15          valuable things with my time". She attended meetings  
16          where there were two or three activists there.

17          But then she said this, and I think it's very  
18          important, that, "There was a very different view  
19          towards women's -- the women's movement then compared to  
20          today", and I'm quoting, and she said I don't think --  
21          that her work really yielded any good intelligence, and  
22          I suspect this was true here again. Attending meetings  
23          of Putney Young Liberals, you know, discussing  
24          environmental pollution or meetings of the Campaign for  
25          the Repeal of the Immigration Act or meetings of

1 the Women's Liberation organisation, what on earth are  
2 undercover officers doing?

3 It's a precious resource of great skill.  
4 I've worked with undercover officers in my time in  
5 Northern Ireland, combating terrorism and paramilitary  
6 violence and bombings and assassinations, and they're  
7 brave people, but what on earth are they doing involved  
8 in this kind of -- these kinds of organisations about  
9 arguments about racism, immigration or women's rights or  
10 environmental pollution?

11 MR BARR: Thank you, Lord Hain.

12 Sir, would that be a convenient moment to break for  
13 lunch?

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it would.

15 Before we do, may I just raise two matters with  
16 Lord Hain. First of all, can I explain to you Mr Barr's  
17 task. It is not merely to elicit your evidence and to  
18 put it to proper test where it's necessary, but he is  
19 also told by representatives of other core participants,  
20 including the police, what topics they would like raised  
21 with you. Consequently, some of the time, it rather  
22 sounds as if he's advancing a line that the Inquiry has.  
23 That's a misconception.

24 A. I'm glad to hear it.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Secondly, this. I take this opportunity to

1 ask, with apologies for spoiling your lunch break, for  
2 you to check briefly through the documents produced by  
3 Mike Ferguson about the Stop the Seventy Tour.

4 You have frequently and vehemently disputed  
5 the assertion made on the "True Spies" programme that it  
6 was ever suggested that tacks be put on the pitch at  
7 a rugby match. Now, there is, I think, no written  
8 record of any such suggestion. The suggestion comes  
9 from a man who is also now dead, Wilf, on a programme  
10 where he was, I think, trying to put the SDS in a good  
11 light and to tell it as entertainingly as it could be  
12 for the benefit of the television programme, and  
13 therefore we simply do not have any reliable first-hand  
14 evidence about what Mike Ferguson reported and did,  
15 beyond the written reports that we have.

16 And I wanted to ask you, if I may, briefly to go  
17 over again the written reporting that he's produced and  
18 to identify in it those bits which you say are  
19 inaccurate.

20 A. I'll happily do that.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: You have, I think, already done it, but  
22 I want to ensure that I've got it right.

23 A. Thank you.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

25 I think it's now 1.05, so we'll break until 2.05 and

1 Mr Fernandes will announce that.

2 MR FERNANDES: We will now take a break for lunch. May  
3 I remind those in the virtual hearing room to remember  
4 to join your break-out rooms. The time is now 1.05 pm,  
5 so we shall resume at 2.05 pm. Thank you.

6 (1.05 pm)

7 (The short adjournment)

8 (2.05 pm)

9 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to  
10 the afternoon session of today's evidential hearings.  
11 For those in the virtual hearing room, please remember  
12 to turn off both your camera and microphone.

13 I will now hand over to the Chairman,  
14 Sir John Mitting, to continue proceedings.  
15 Chairman.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 As at the beginning of every live evidential  
18 session, a recording is going to be played.

19 I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,  
20 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make  
21 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including  
22 its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have  
23 made a number of orders which affect what you may and  
24 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave  
25 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter



1 and may have serious consequences for you.

2 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached  
3 an order, I have the power to certify the matter to  
4 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it  
5 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If  
6 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits  
7 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose  
8 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including  
9 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and  
10 sequestration of their assets.

11 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in  
12 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to  
13 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to  
14 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in  
15 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone  
16 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any  
17 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any  
18 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your  
19 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing  
20 room to any other person, but only once at least  
21 ten minutes have elapsed since the event which you are  
22 describing took place.

23 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of  
24 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public  
25 disclosure of information, for example about

1 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.  
2 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,  
3 whether by accident or design, information which I have  
4 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes  
5 be disclosed in a hearing. If and when that happens,  
6 I will immediately suspend the hearing and make an order  
7 prohibiting further disclosure of the information  
8 outside the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that  
9 no further disclosure of that information may be made by  
10 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device  
11 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside  
12 it.

13 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is  
14 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure  
15 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am  
16 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to  
17 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of  
18 the public, are entitled to hear the same public  
19 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own  
20 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their  
21 best to ensure that you can. If you have any doubt  
22 about the terms of this message or what you may or may  
23 not do, you should not hesitate to ask one of them and  
24 with my help, if necessary, they will provide you with  
25 the answer.

1           Lord Hain, I understand that arrangements have been  
2           made for the task that I asked you to perform over lunch  
3           to be done at slightly greater leisure and the answer to  
4           be given to me next week. I'm perfectly happy with  
5           that.

6           A. I'm very grateful. Thank you.

7           THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

8           MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

9           Lord Hain, can we focus for a moment on  
10          the telephone line to your parents' addresses. You told  
11          us this morning that it served as a telephone number for  
12          the STST. Does it also follow that it was used for some  
13          of the other campaigns that were based from the front  
14          room of your parents' flat and then your parents' house?

15          A. Yes, indeed.

16          Q. And I'd understood your evidence to be that you  
17          suspected that it was tapped.

18          A. Yes.

19          Q. So would it follow that you were very careful what was  
20          said over the telephone?

21          A. Yes.

22          Q. But that you would still use it?

23          A. Yes, and my mother was particularly careful about it,  
24          having experienced surveillance by the South African  
25          Security Services in Pretoria under apartheid, including

1           our telephone being tapped.

2           Q. Thank you.

3                    Could we have up, please {UCPI/34091/44}.

4                    This is a paragraph from your witness statement,  
5           Lord Hain, about -- it's your comment on  
6           "Michael Scott's" -- the UCO "Michael Scott's" --  
7           evidence that he had occasion to telephone your home and  
8           spoke to your mother, and his written account is that  
9           she told him that if he were interested in doing  
10          something positive, he should go forthwith to an address  
11          which was Ernest Rodker's home address.

12                   And your reaction was to say that there's no way she  
13          would have alerted anyone about that protest, and as  
14          you've just explained, because of her experiences in  
15          particular in South Africa.

16                   I just want to explore with you this. What  
17          298's statement says doesn't in fact disclose the plan,  
18          does it?

19          A. Not explicitly, no.

20          Q. And so, may there be room for 298, having spoken to your  
21          mother as he recalls and having a somewhat coded  
22          conversation which gave nothing away, it did mean that  
23          he went and made his way to Ernest Rodker's address and  
24          then found out the details of what was planned?

25          A. I find that so unlikely as to be inconceivable. My

1 mother was incredibly careful about what she said on  
2 the phone, and since both my parents and us as a family  
3 had lived under apartheid and under constant  
4 surveillance by the apartheid police, with  
5 Special Branch cars parked at the bottom of our drive  
6 following us wherever we went, including me to school,  
7 occasionally, on my bike, she was ultra careful, to  
8 the point of almost being too careful.

9 And I find it astonishing that this statement has  
10 been made and another example of where  
11 an undercover officer is concealing the truth or not  
12 telling the truth; for what reason, I'm not sure, except  
13 that maybe he had a reason to give to being at  
14 the meeting that he landed up in.

15 Q. But her asking him to go to Rumbold Road gives nothing  
16 away, does it?

17 A. No, it doesn't, but I think she would have known about  
18 the Star & Garter process, which is what this is about,  
19 the protest over the England team going to South Africa  
20 and staying at the Star & Garter Hotel in Richmond and  
21 a protest that was planned against that. I think you  
22 heard something about this yesterday from  
23 Christabel Gurney and Jonathan Rosenhead, who  
24 participated in it.

25 So, she -- she would have known that that was

1           happening, as I did, and helped plan it, but -- although  
2           I didn't take part. For that reason, it just seems to  
3           me to be fantasy that she would have said over an open  
4           telephone line, knowing that this was going on, for him  
5           to get involved.

6           Q. Thank you.

7                     I'm going to move now to much later in the 1970s.  
8           We're about to move on to the Anti-Nazi League.

9           A. Could I just -- before we do that, may I, if I can,  
10          just, in a sense, complete the anti-apartheid point.  
11          There's a couple of extra points, because there were --  
12          there was a -- in my statement, I refer to a report from  
13          police documents about undercover policing not in  
14          the public domain -- in the public domain, but not in  
15          front of the Inquiry, as I understand it, where there  
16          was an undercover officer who said the Anti-Apartheid  
17          Movement is Stalinist controlled, which openly supports  
18          the African National Congress, that's the ANC that  
19          Nelson Mandela was -- became president of the country  
20          representing, and a number of Labour MPs are active in  
21          the AAM.

22                     And this report, talking about it being a Stalinist  
23          organisation, which it definitely wasn't -- it had  
24          archbishops and former leader of the Liberal Party, now  
25          Lord David Steel -- it dates from 1993, and this -- if

1 the Security Service is thinking, in 1993, three years  
2 after Nelson Mandela was released, partly because of  
3 the Anti-Apartheid Movement's campaigning, and just  
4 a year before he took over as president and while he was  
5 involved in negotiations to achieve that, if that is  
6 the kind of thinking involved in undercover policing, as  
7 I submit it was in respect of the Anti-Apartheid  
8 Movement, then we have a particular ideology of  
9 undercover policing which frankly cannot be defended.

10 And there are two other incidents I haven't  
11 mentioned so far in my evidence to this Inquiry which  
12 underline this. I've talked about bias in the reaction  
13 of the -- of -- of policing generally, undercover  
14 policing in particular, and the Security Services, to  
15 targeting the apartheid movement, but not apartheid  
16 forces bombing offices in London of the AAM and the ANC.

17 But there were two other incidents, in 1970, they  
18 did not investigate -- that's to say the British police  
19 or the Security Services -- or seem interested in  
20 finding out who, in the South African Security Services,  
21 murdered the journalist Keith Wallington --  
22 Keith Wallace who was about to reveal South African  
23 Security Service operations in London. And why didn't  
24 they show any interest in investigating the letter bomb  
25 sent to me in June 1972, at the 4 Park Road Putney home

1           that I was living in, my parents' home then, sent -- the  
2           same type sent to anti-apartheid leaders right across  
3           the world which killed them? Fortunately, there was  
4           a trigger mechanism fault in the one sent to me, or  
5           otherwise I wouldn't be giving evidence to this Inquiry.

6           We were told by Scotland Yard it could have blown up  
7           the house, could have blown me and my family up, but  
8           they never investigated it. They never tried to find  
9           out which South African agency had sent it to me.

10          So that, coupled with this quote I've just  
11          mentioned, I do hope the Inquiry looks carefully at  
12          the ideology of underground -- of underground officers  
13          that was driving this biased policing.

14          And there's one other matter that I think you know  
15          that I wish to bring up which is relevant to this point,  
16          and that is, in addition to my written statement,  
17          I've only recently been made aware of an important,  
18          hitherto undisclosed police record that described me as  
19          a "South African terrorist", a description given by  
20          undercover officer Mark Kennedy, who was -- formed  
21          a close relationship with the environmental activist  
22          Kate Wilson, who, by the way, went to school with my  
23          children in Putney.

24          And it was documented, this statement, that he made  
25          at the National Police Order Intelligence Unit and the



1 records date from November 2003, where he's calling me  
2 a "South African terrorist", at time when I was a member  
3 of the British cabinet, Secretary of State for Wales,  
4 the leader of the House of Commons and the  
5 Lord Privy Seal and a member of Her Majesty's  
6 Privy Councillor.

7 I mean, what is it in the DNA of undercover policing  
8 that allows its officers to get such a biased and  
9 reactionary view of the world that they make these kind  
10 of biased and completely unrepresentative and libelist  
11 and defamatory statements about me in this instance, but  
12 not about others?

13 Q. Thank you, Lord Hain, and in Tranche 4 of the Inquiry's  
14 work, we'll be hearing from Mark Kennedy and we'll be  
15 able to explore that particular report with him.

16 In the meantime, as I said, we're going in  
17 the chronology to the late 1970s to the formation of  
18 the Anti-Nazi League. And just before we start that, to  
19 set the scene, as it were, it's right, isn't it, that  
20 the Anti-Nazi League was formed following the event that  
21 came to be known as the Battle of Lewisham?

22 A. It was, though it was also against a background of  
23 the National Front pushing the Liberal Party into  
24 fourth position in Parliamentary by-elections and in  
25 the Greater London Council elections in May 1970 and I,

1           amongst others who formed the Anti-Nazi League, was  
2           very, very worried about the rise of an overtly Nazi  
3           organisation, the National Front, deeply racist and  
4           fascist in its operations, and its leaders worshipping  
5           Nazi figures and Nazi ideology, and yet they were doing  
6           so well in elections, and that was part of  
7           the background to the formation of the Anti-Nazi League,  
8           and also, yes, the Lewisham events were too, because  
9           there was a feeling that we had to do things in  
10          combating the National Front in a different way from  
11          what had happened in Lewisham, where there was a great  
12          deal of violence.

13        Q. I'm going to ask the team to display a news report from  
14          the Battle of Lewisham so you'll be reminded of  
15          the level of public disorder and events on the day  
16          before we continue.

17                Could we have, please, {DOC043/1}.

18                    (Video footage played to the Inquiry)

19                Thank you, if that could be taken down, please.

20                Lord Hain, obviously some disturbing scenes there,  
21          and disturbing at a number of levels. Perhaps, first of  
22          all, we see the National Front marching through, as it  
23          turned out, Deptford, and I think in your witness  
24          statement you describe it as "swaggering" through areas  
25          like this where they are liable to stoke tensions, and

1 as I understand it, the concern is, if they were allowed  
2 to do that, things would spiral out of control, and  
3 ultimately, we all know where that can lead.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Is that fair?

6 A. Indeed. Not lead only to the kind of terrible scenes we  
7 saw in that footage, but also attacks on black citizens  
8 in Deptford and elsewhere, wherever they operated or  
9 marched. Violence would follow their activities as --  
10 as night follows day. And so there was a -- a real  
11 concern about their power and their strength at that  
12 time, not only expressed in elections, conventional,  
13 Parliamentary and local council elections, but also in  
14 the attacks that followed their activity, from excrement  
15 put through letterboxes, to physical beatings up, to  
16 racist murders that would always follow their activity.  
17 That was our concern.

18 Q. The other side of the coin though is -- the concern at  
19 another level is the violence and the public disorder on  
20 that occasion, and what is noteworthy about that  
21 occasion is that it was violence that was caused by  
22 anti-fascists attacking the demonstration and then,  
23 later on, serious disturbances between anti-fascist  
24 protesters and police. That is a fair comment,  
25 isn't it?

1           A. It's fair up to a point, but the police were also  
2           allowing the National Front to march. As you can see in  
3           that footage, they were protecting them and permitting  
4           to them, as I, I think, correctly describe it, swagger  
5           through those predominantly black inhabited areas,  
6           threatening them, and violence followed those threats  
7           always for weeks and months afterwards.

8           So yes, I accept that's what happened, but I also  
9           accept that that was inflamed by the way that the police  
10          seemed to be protecting the National Front on that  
11          occasion, and I cannot see why the police should be  
12          protecting a group whose avowed purpose is to stir up  
13          and promote racial hatred, which is now an offence  
14          brought in by our government, the government in which  
15          I served, but wasn't then. I don't know what they were  
16          doing to a group that's Nazi, racist and fascist.

17          So that inflamed the situation, which is not to  
18          justify at all, as I do not and I would not, any attacks  
19          on the police or the injury to that officer we saw being  
20          carried away.

21         Q. And so it's fair to say, isn't it, that the ANL was born  
22          at a time of high racial tension and in an atmosphere  
23          where there had been serious public disorder and  
24          violence?

25         A. Yes, and the purpose of -- as I mentioned earlier, was

1 to try a different -- to tread a different path, to try  
2 and confront the National Front in a way that was  
3 successful and promoted anti-racist ideas and destroyed  
4 theirs, but also didn't result in the kind of violence  
5 that happened at Lewisham.

6 Q. And to now explore the nature of the ANL a little bit,  
7 you tell us that its structure was in fact similar to  
8 that of the STST in that it had a National Committee but  
9 otherwise was rather loosely organised.

10 A. Yes, in the sense that there were local Anti-Nazi League  
11 groups, there was no central membership list. There  
12 were all sorts of groups connected -- ANL,  
13 Anti-Nazi League components, such as Vegetarians Against  
14 the Nazis, Miners Against the Nazis, Teachers Against  
15 the Nazis, Skateboarders Against the Nazis, Students  
16 Against the Nazis, were all organised in their own  
17 areas, their own communities, their other professions,  
18 but they were not under some central Anti-Nazi League  
19 command and control structure.

20 And in that sense, it was very similar to  
21 the Stop the Seventy Tour movement. But they mobilised  
22 in their own areas. And, of course, we were also allied  
23 to Rock Against Racism, an analogous group that had  
24 promoted rock music, gigs and events around the country  
25 to draw an audience in to hear an anti-racist message

1 from some of their favourite bands, whether these  
2 were -- with a national profile or a local one.

3 Q. The aim of the ANL, if I've understood it correctly, was  
4 to confront, challenge and prevent the far-right,  
5 especially the National Front, organising or having  
6 a platform; is that right?

7 A. Yes. Yes, and so when they stood in elections, as they  
8 did, we put out leaflets and we campaigned against them,  
9 parliamentary by-elections or local elections. When  
10 they tried to organise an event of the Lewisham type,  
11 then we mobilised to try and stop them. When they tried  
12 to organise meetings to promote their racist filth, we  
13 did the same.

14 But at the same time, it was a very imaginative  
15 campaign, because there was a worrying rise in -- in  
16 youth, a sort of rather trendy tendency amongst working  
17 class youngsters, often without hope of a job at that  
18 time, or a future, and particularly the skinhead --  
19 skinhead phenomenon of that time of Doc Martin jack --  
20 Doc Martin-booted young, often working class, lads who  
21 sported Nazi regalia and many of whom joined  
22 the National Front, and we were very worried about  
23 the spread of racist and Nazi ideas amongst young  
24 people, particularly the working class young people.

25 And we thought that if we could promote carnivals

1           against the Nazis, local music events against the Nazis  
2           and try to get them to come and hear some of their  
3           favourite punk bands, because punk music was a big trend  
4           at the time and a lot of those very same youngsters were  
5           followers of those punk bands, and we got them to play  
6           on our platforms, Rock Against Racism, Anti-Nazi League  
7           platforms, to encourage them to hear a different  
8           message.

9           And many of them did, and that whole phenomenon of  
10          skinhead Nazis died away, and I even met one of -- one  
11          of those who was a member of the National Front who got  
12          so persuaded by our message that he joined  
13          the Anti-Nazi League.

14         Q.   And the organisation was avowedly non-violent.

15         A.   It was avowedly non-violent, yes, but it was also  
16          determined to ensure, by physically mobilising and being  
17          there, that if they tried to repeat a Deptford and  
18          swagger through and inflict hatred and spread violence  
19          amongst local Muslim or black communities, black British  
20          or Muslim British citizens, or Jewish citizens, because  
21          they were attacking Jewish citizens as well, then our  
22          objective was to defend those communities and stand in  
23          between these marauding fascist forces and those  
24          communities; that we would physically do that as well  
25          as, as a way, operating in these other more imaginative

1           ways.

2           Q.   And rather like the Stop the Seventy Tour, very, very  
3           upfront and public about what you were going to do and  
4           why you were going to do it.

5           A.   Yes.  Yes, there was no -- no secret about it.  It was  
6           not a conspiratorial subversive organisation in any  
7           sense.

8           Q.   But perhaps two differences here.  First of all,  
9           the capacity for violence on the far-right was greater  
10          than that of even the most irate rugby fan.

11          A.   Indeed.  It was of a completely different order.  This  
12          was serious, organised, sometimes almost paramilitary  
13          violence inflicted or attempted to be inflicted on  
14          black, Muslim or Jewish citizens.

15          Q.   And as we've seen from the footage from  
16          the Battle of Lewisham, those amongst the ranks of  
17          the anti-fascists included very many who were not averse  
18          to getting involved in violence themselves --

19          A.   Yes.

20          Q.   -- whatever the house line.

21          A.   Well, sorry, what do you mean "whatever the house line"?

22          Q.   I'm not taking issue at all with the fact the ANL was  
23          avowedly non-violent, but I'm saying that there were  
24          people amongst the anti-fascist movement who, as they  
25          showed at Lewisham, were not averse to participating in



1 violence.

2 A. Well, yes, in the sense that I mentioned in my  
3 statement. For example, at a protest we organised  
4 against the National Front in the Ilford North  
5 by-election in the early part of 1978, we'd organised  
6 and agreed with the police in advance, not least because  
7 it was in the middle of a Parliamentary by-election, to  
8 organise a Anti-Nazi League demonstration, and we had  
9 negotiated with the police. And it was all going fine  
10 and then a group of Maoists on an open-platformed truck  
11 came in from behind us and drove straight through and  
12 did confront the police and violence broke out as  
13 a result.

14 So there was always a danger that a group like that  
15 that was not part of the Anti-Nazi League, in this case  
16 these Maoists, would create trouble, but our intention  
17 was to stop the National Front controlling an area,  
18 which is what they tried to do and what on that occasion  
19 they certainly sought to do and we prevented them doing.

20 Q. I'm going to read a passage from your book "Outside In",  
21 Lord Hain. It's at page 119, and it's about the  
22 controversy that arises from the line that the ANL was  
23 taking. I'm going to start from the last paragraph at  
24 the bottom of that page:

25 "Wherever the National Front tried to demonstrate or

1 leaflet, they were opposed by the ANL and also denied  
2 platforms to spread their hate ..."

3 A. Sorry, page 199?

4 Q. 119.

5 A. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Apologies for interrupting.

6 Q. Not at all.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. "This confrontation strategy was highly controversial,  
9 a denial of free speech, critics argued. Sometimes,  
10 though by no means always, it resulted in violent  
11 clashes, the most terrible when the ANL activist  
12 Blair Peach was killed by a police officer in Southall,  
13 West London, in April 1979. I attracted some criticism  
14 for the policy of confrontation even though when I was  
15 present or able to do so, I always used my influence to  
16 urge restraint. Our position was that we would mass to  
17 prevent the National Front swaggering through black or  
18 Jewish communities and causing violence as a result. It  
19 was up to the police or local councils to prevent  
20 the National Front marching and meeting, then there  
21 would be no opportunity for confrontations either with  
22 opposing ANL demonstrators or with local residents  
23 fearful of the presence of Nazis in their  
24 neighbourhoods. Lessons had been drawn from when  
25 the Blackshirts, led by Oswald Mosley and targeting

1 Jewish communities, were physically stopped by left wing  
2 activists in Cable Street in London's East End in  
3 October 1936."

4 Can we take it from that passage, Lord Hain, that  
5 despite best efforts to prevent and discourage violence,  
6 the atmosphere in which you were operating was such that  
7 on occasions it broke out?

8 A. Yes. I'll be perfectly frank about that. The issue  
9 that I would put before you, however, is what should be  
10 done? Should the National Front just be allowed to  
11 continue to march unchecked or should somebody try to do  
12 something about it, as we did, and was done in 1936?  
13 Now, in 1936, Mosley's Blackshirts were attacking Jewish  
14 communities very predominant in that part of  
15 East London. In the modern age, it's been black or  
16 Muslim communities that the National Front have  
17 targeted. Who else was protecting them?

18 So I accept that given the National Front are  
19 a violent organisation and make no -- were and made no  
20 secret about it, the violent methods -- many of their  
21 leaders and members having been convicted for violent  
22 acts and acts of racial hatred, yes, there was a danger  
23 that something bad might happen, though we would try to  
24 prevent it. But what was the alternative? That we just  
25 allow them to continue to march?

1           Should those who opposed Mosley's Blackshirts have  
2           allowed him to continue to march in 1936 when Hitler was  
3           on the march in Nazi Germany and was running  
4           Nazi Germany at the time when Mosley's Blackshirts were  
5           openly allied with the Nazis in Germany? I mean, there  
6           was a particular historic precedent which I think  
7           justifies the strategy that the Anti-Nazi League  
8           adopted.

9           Q. Well, when I said earlier in one of my questions "we all  
10          know where that led", I was meaning rather further than  
11          attacks on individual people in totalitarian  
12          governments.

13          A. Yes.

14          Q. That point is completely accepted, Lord Hain, and I see  
15          in your book you are positing that these were  
16          demonstrations that, in your opinion, ought to have been  
17          banned anyway. But they weren't banned, they went  
18          ahead, there was counterprotest inevitably. And for  
19          the purposes of this Inquiry, where that takes us,  
20          doesn't it, is that the police had a difficult public  
21          order challenge to meet?

22          A. Yes, I accept that. But if the corollary of that is  
23          that they should infiltrate the Anti-Nazi League, as  
24          they clearly did, with undercover officers rather than  
25          target the racist groups like the National Front and

1 other Nazi groups, then I don't agree with that at all.  
2 I think, again, the police found themselves, in  
3 targeting the Anti-Nazi League, on the wrong side of  
4 history and the wrong side of the argument --

5 Q. Would you accept -- sorry.

6 A. You know -- thank you. So, my -- my answer to your  
7 question is the police and undercover officer policing  
8 in general -- and I'll come back to this at the end, if  
9 I may, in any concluding comments that Judge Mitting  
10 might permit me to make -- that it's a question of what  
11 is the ideology of undercover officer policing in this  
12 respect?

13 There's also the question of what is legitimate and  
14 what is not legitimate? Now, I have any own strong  
15 views on that, as I've already indicated. I think some  
16 undercover officer policing is not only legitimate, it's  
17 absolutely essential for the peace and security of all  
18 of us; to stop Jihadi bombers or, in past years,  
19 IRA bombers, for instance.

20 But infiltrating the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign  
21 fighting apartheid or infiltrating the Anti-Nazi League  
22 seeking to stop Naziism spreading in Britain, I don't  
23 think that's legitimate.

24 Q. You would accept, would you, that the police would want  
25 the best intelligence that they could obtain about

1 the likelihood of public disorder at demonstrations and  
2 counterdemonstrations involving the far-right and  
3 anti-Nazis?

4 A. Well, yes, and indeed the Anti-Nazi League liaised with  
5 the police when we knew that a National Front  
6 demonstration was going to happen somewhere, as at  
7 Ilford North, for example, and elsewhere. We sought to  
8 agree arrangements with the police. Often that wasn't  
9 possible because the police seemed determined to allow  
10 the Nazis to march, which was where the root of  
11 the problem arose and therefore, there was -- there was  
12 a lack of confidence on the part of Anti-Nazi League,  
13 including myself, not in policing as such -- it goes  
14 without saying I've worked with the police and see their  
15 role as vital -- but with the -- a form of policing that  
16 is protecting Nazi groups and finds itself, in doing so,  
17 actually opposing the Anti-Nazi League.

18 I cannot see how anybody can really defend that and  
19 yet that was what was happening.

20 Q. The police view at the time appears to have been that  
21 an undercover officer placed in a group like  
22 the Socialist Workers Party and reporting on  
23 the Anti-Nazi League could obtain timely, accurate  
24 intelligence about the intentions of ANL groups,  
25 branches and so forth which was helpful to

1 the appropriate allocation of resources to public order  
2 policing.

3 A. Well, I don't accept that. If the police have a concern  
4 about -- had a concern about the Socialist Workers  
5 Party, either then or now, then they would presumably  
6 take what steps they felt were necessary to keep an eye  
7 on them. But what I don't accept -- you know,  
8 the Anti-Nazi League, like the Stop the Seventy Tour  
9 campaign, we had the actress, the Jewish actress,  
10 Miriam Karlin on our steering committee. We had  
11 holocaust survivors, actual holocaust survivors who had  
12 actually been in Nazi concentration camps, speaking on  
13 our platform. We had senior Christians. We had all  
14 sorts of people of some left wing politics, some liberal  
15 politics, some centre politics, some of no political  
16 affiliations, right across the spectrum.

17 Why were the police spying on us? If they felt  
18 there were some particular groups that they were  
19 concerned about that might in some way exploit  
20 the situation, well, then keep an eye on those groups.  
21 Don't keep -- don't use it as an excuse to spy on the  
22 Anti-Nazi League or, for that matter, the  
23 Anti-Apartheid Movement. It should not have been their  
24 purpose. Their purpose should have been combating  
25 racism and Nazism and its menacing rise at that time.

1 Q. Can we look, please, at some of the specific reports.

2 Can we start with the one at tab 48. That's

3 {UCPI/11673/1}.

4 This is a 1978 report, Lord Hain, and it's about  
5 a rally at -- an intention on the behalf of the  
6 National Front to hold a rally on 27 April at Islington  
7 Town Hall, and at paragraph 3 it reads:

8 "The Anti-Nazi League (which operates from premises  
9 at [Privacy]) is fully aware of the above event and its  
10 leading members - ie [Privacy], Peter Hain,  
11 Ernie Roberts, [Privacy] and [Privacy] - are already  
12 drawing up plans to cause disruption and a confrontation  
13 situation outside the Town Hall in the hope that  
14 the rally will be prevented from taking place."

15 In your witness statement, Lord Hain, you take issue  
16 with that description. What is it that you find  
17 problematic?

18 A. Well, we were not drawing up plans to cause disruption.

19 I mean, that's a pejorative way of expressing  
20 anti-racist activity which I think, frankly, is typical  
21 and runs through undercover policing, as I said earlier,  
22 like -- like it's in its DNA.

23 What we were hoping to do is ensure that the  
24 National Front were not able to hold that event, a mass  
25 rally, designed, as in the past and always, to



1           intimidate local black, Muslim and Jewish citizens.  
2           That was their -- their -- that was their raison d'etre.  
3           That was what they were about, and spread their Nazi  
4           ideas. We didn't want it to take place. We didn't want  
5           that to happen. We didn't want those important British  
6           citizens in our -- in our society to feel intimidated by  
7           the National Front, which, if they'd organised freely,  
8           would have happened. And that's why we wanted to  
9           prevent it taking place rather than to plan disruption.

10           You know, it's interesting, because it's seen  
11           through a prism where we are the bad guys and the  
12           racists and the Nazis are not, and I cannot accept that  
13           as a legitimate objective of -- of policing at that  
14           time.

15       Q. Your interpretation relies on a -- to distinguish --  
16           your wish to disrupt the National Front you are  
17           distinguishing from causing disruption.

18       A. What I'm saying is that we wanted to stop them being  
19           able to do what they intended to do, which is to attack  
20           and spread racist ideas in local communities. They  
21           didn't choose these -- they didn't demonstrate in  
22           Mayfair. They didn't demonstrate in, you know, leafy  
23           suburbs in Surrey or Sussex. They demonstrated in areas  
24           where there were black and ethnic minorities and Jewish  
25           citizens, and they attacked synagogues and they attacked

1 mosques and they attacked centres where there were black  
2 gospel church events and so on, and that's the way they  
3 operated.

4 And so I think we were right to oppose them.

5 I think the police should have been on our side in  
6 opposing them and not protecting them, instead of which  
7 they were putting undercover officers to -- to make  
8 these kind of pejorative reports.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 Could you take that down, please, and could we have  
11 up in its stead the document which is at tab 50. That's  
12 {UCPI/11887/1}. Could we have paragraph 4, please.

13 This is a report from 15 March 1978 and paragraph 4  
14 reads:

15 "The political line of the Anti-Nazi League is much  
16 broader than that of the Socialist Workers Party.  
17 The ANL, for example, has no line with regard to  
18 immigration controls and is relatively non-sectarian in  
19 its attitude, welcoming support from many quarters."

20 Just stopping there, is that a fair reflection of  
21 the broad church that was the Anti-Nazi League?

22 A. It is a fair reflection and it's fair to say and  
23 I'm pleased to see it. Unusually accurate.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 Could we take that down, please, and could we look

1 at the document which is at tab 62 {UCPI/16579/1}.

2 This is a report dated 31 March 1981 and it is  
3 reporting on the Anti-Nazi League's 1981 national  
4 conference.

5 Can we turn, please, to page 9, which is  
6 {UCPI/16579/9} a page from the conference declaration.  
7 I know you've already touched upon this, Lord Hain, but  
8 it might well be a good idea to see it in print.

9 Under the heading, "Violence" at 2, if we could --  
10 that's it, thank you very much -- the second paragraph  
11 underneath that heading reads:

12 "There is still a lethargy in some areas in  
13 responding to racist attacks. Every time an attack  
14 occurs, ANL supporters should immediately be available  
15 to offer assistance. This may mean financial  
16 assistance, with collections among workmates, neighbours  
17 and on the streets. It may entail physical support,  
18 possibly 'sleeping in' or resisting the culprits. Legal  
19 assistance may be required or it may be necessary to  
20 draw attention to those police who are unhelpful or  
21 racist. Certainly racist and other Nazi violence should  
22 be publicised in leaflets and the press to isolate those  
23 responsible. Where black people are involved in  
24 establishing self-defence organisations every possible  
25 assistance should be [I think it says] offered, at

1 the same time black people should be encouraged to join  
2 the ANL.

3 "In engaging in 'defence' activity it is important  
4 to remember two things. Firstly, all activity should be  
5 located within the general framework of going on the  
6 offensive against the Nazis, isolating them publicly and  
7 developing mass opposition on the streets.

8 Secondly, 'tit-for-tat' exercises should be avoided, as  
9 they are rarely effective, often increase the spiral of  
10 violence, and always make it more difficult to wage open  
11 public activity with mass mobilisation."

12 Stopping there and picking up three points, the last  
13 first. We appear here to see written confirmation that  
14 the ANL is expressly against "tit-for-tat" violence.

15 A. Exactly.

16 Q. And we see also that it is advocating a very wide range  
17 of non-violent ways of supporting the victims of racism.

18 A. Exactly.

19 Q. And thirdly, do these two paragraphs taken together  
20 fairly represent the ANL response to violence from  
21 the far-right?

22 A. Yes, and I'm grateful that you've read them out, because  
23 they are -- they're quoting from -- from a conference  
24 document and they are exactly as I believed in the ANL  
25 and recollect its agenda.

1 Q. Can we take that down, please, and can we have up next  
2 {MPS/726913/3}, and can we go to page 3. Is there  
3 a page 3 on this? That is page 3, thank you.

4 In that case, this is quite difficult to read.

5 This is an internal document. It's from, as it  
6 happens, Mike Ferguson, but much later, 1978. By this  
7 time, he is a manager within the SDS. It reads at  
8 paragraph 1:

9 "With regard to the various demonstrations which  
10 took place over the weekend, it is apparent that  
11 Deputy Assistant Commissioner Helm (A Dept) ..."

12 And that's the department that dealt with public  
13 order:

14 "... has voiced certain criticisms about  
15 the information which has been forthcoming from  
16 Special Branch with particular reference to the numbers  
17 taking part in the ANL rally on 30 April and left wing  
18 plans for the May Day march."

19 Lord Hain, you won't need me to tell you that  
20 30 April was the Rock Against Racism event in  
21 Victoria Park.

22 A. Yes, a giant carnival and it's actually -- today's  
23 the anniversary of it.

24 Q. So we're seeing here criticism from the Public Order --  
25 uniformed Public Order Branch about the SDS'

1 intelligence about that event.

2 If we could scroll up and look at paragraph 2,  
3 please. Thank you:

4 "In relation to the ANL march, it was always made  
5 perfectly clear from our sources that a total in  
6 the region of 30,000 was anticipated, but that there was  
7 no indication that disorder was planned or envisaged.  
8 In the event, considerably more than 30,000 took part in  
9 this Rally, but there can be no doubt that many  
10 thousands of these were Punk Rock fans, whose attendance  
11 could hardly have been forecasted by the SDS. There was  
12 no disorder."

13 And that, of course, accords with your recollection  
14 and philosophy of the --

15 A. Exactly, exactly.

16 Q. If we could go to paragraph 3, please:

17 "In view of the large number of demonstrators who  
18 were present in London on 30 April 1978 for the  
19 ANL Rally, DAC Helm expressed fears that they would  
20 remain in London overnight with the express purpose of  
21 attacking the National Front who were holding a march  
22 from Grosvenor Square to Hoxton on 1 May 1978. Constant  
23 contact with our sources indicated that the majority of  
24 those who had travelled from outside London for the  
25 ANL Rally would in fact be leaving on Sunday evening and

1           that although the Left were aware of the NF's plans for  
2           a march on May Day, there was no intention to oppose  
3           them. This information was passed to DAC Helm."

4           So, what appears to come from that is the head of  
5           the SDS, as he then was, asserting that the constant  
6           flow of intelligence from the SDS had confirmed  
7           a negative. It had confirmed that the people who  
8           travelled to the Rock Against Racism concert weren't  
9           going to include hotheads who would attack  
10          the National Front the next day, and that, it appears,  
11          was regarded as valuable intelligence.

12          Would you accept that intelligence of that nature  
13          has a value to police officers charged with policing  
14          public order?

15        A. Well, look, if that intelligence, so-called, that  
16          information, I would prefer to call it, would have been  
17          no surprise to anybody and could have been obtained very  
18          easily by the police talking to us and finding out what  
19          our intentions were, and we'd have told them, and we  
20          did, because the rally which was held in  
21          Trafalgar Square and then marched to -- to Victoria Park  
22          in London's East End, obviously we needed stewarding  
23          arrangements with the police to ensure that that  
24          proceeded -- proceeded properly in terms of traffic and  
25          all of that, because our intention was not to disrupt,

1 it was to -- to rally against Nazism and racism.

2 And my only quarrel with the description is not that  
3 it isn't accurate; it is, and that's -- that's good and  
4 to be welcomed, but that that information didn't require  
5 undercover policing officers. It would readily be  
6 available by normal contact with the police, between  
7 the police and ANL organisers, of which there were  
8 regular communications and meetings and so forth.

9 Q. But would you accept that within the ranks of the broad  
10 church of anti-fascists, there were hotheads of the kind  
11 we saw venting their frustrations at Lewisham?

12 A. Well, quite possibly, but, you know, what you have to  
13 do, surely, as an undercover police officer is -- is  
14 focus "on the hotheads", however you might define them,  
15 the people you think might -- are about to commit  
16 violence or something. And since the Anti-Nazi League  
17 was a broad movement committed -- not committed to that  
18 objective, why was so much time -- it comes back to one  
19 of my constant themes in -- in this evidence to you, and  
20 I'm grateful to be able to present it, as to why  
21 undercover policing resources are devoted, to a massive  
22 and disproportionate extent, to finding out the obvious,  
23 which was in this event, in this example, what was  
24 intended all along and would have been known by  
25 the Metropolitan Police officers liaising with



1 Anti-Nazi League organisers.

2 Q. Staying with the Victoria Park Rock Against Racism  
3 concert for a moment. In the "True Spies" programme,  
4 the former undercover officer who we know as HN21 used  
5 a pseudonym "Jeff" and there's an anecdote about sitting  
6 on sacks of money near to you. Do you have any  
7 recollection of that?

8 A. I do. I don't have a recollection clearly in my mind of  
9 he -- who he was or what he looked like,  
10 disappointingly, but, yes, because we collected cash  
11 from attendees of what was a free carnival, with some  
12 fantastic groups playing like The Clash and Tom Robinson  
13 and Steel Pulse and others, that attracted over  
14 100,000 people, much bigger than we ever expected. It  
15 was free, but obviously we spent money organising it,  
16 putting up the stage and so on with all the proper sound  
17 systems, and that needed to be paid for. And so we had  
18 ANL volunteers with buckets as people streamed away and  
19 they -- they tossed in quite a lot of cash, thankfully,  
20 that helped fund it.

21 So yes, I do remember that particular event, and we  
22 were all worried frankly about the security around the  
23 money, to be frank.

24 Q. Thank you. Can we take that down, please, and we're  
25 going to fast-forward in time to 1994, and could we have

1 up, please, a document which is at tab 69  
2 {MPS-0742234/1}.

3 It's now Saturday, 11 June 1994 and we're at  
4 the Camden Centre in Bidborough Street, WC1 for a large  
5 ANC delegate meeting. It says 320 delegates from over  
6 200 separate organisations attended this conference.

7 A. ANL, I assume, not ANC.

8 Q. ANL. Of the ANL.

9 If we've got the minute sheet for a document up at  
10 the moment. Could we go to page 3, please  
11 {MPS-0742234/3}. This is toward the back of the report  
12 and what is being reported here is:

13 "The ANL Steering Committee was appointed and  
14 approved by vote [it says] (an old SWP practice). It is  
15 made up as follows."

16 A. What, the vote? Is that an old SWP practice or what?

17 Q. I'm reading the same report as you, Lord Hain.

18 A. Okay, I'm just puzzled by it.

19 Q. We've, to protect the privacy of the political opinions  
20 of those who are listed with you, redacted their names,  
21 but your name remains on the sheet.

22 This is, to remind you of the date, 11 June 1994.

23 Were you a Member of Parliament by then?

24 A. I was. I had been since 1991.

25 Q. Does it bother you that as an elected member of, at that

1 time, the House of Commons, your activities being  
2 elected to the ANL's steering committee are the subject  
3 of reporting by an undercover police officer?

4 A. Yes, it does. I think it's wholly wrong, and I suspect  
5 close to being illegal, that undercover officers were  
6 reporting on me. If you remember, there was the Wilson  
7 doctrine that meant that -- by Prime Minister  
8 Harold Wilson that he announced, I think, to the House  
9 of Commons, that if any MP was ever put under  
10 surveillance, then that should be disclosed.

11 Now, I don't know whether I was under surveillance  
12 as an MP or whether I was mentioned as attending, but  
13 nevertheless I'm identified there at a wholly open,  
14 public event, and I personally think that's  
15 reprehensible. Why am I particularly picked out as if,  
16 you know -- I mean, I have had undercover officers, as  
17 is very evident by all the evidence the Inquiry's given  
18 me and documents that I've been shown,  
19 Metropolitan Police undercover officer documents and  
20 others that the Inquiry's kindly provided to me for  
21 the purpose of me giving evidence today. It's obvious  
22 that undercover officers were keeping an eye on me  
23 for -- not just during anti-apartheid days, but right  
24 the way through into at least my early days as an MP  
25 and, as will become evident later on, even when I was

1 a cabinet minister I was mentioned in dispatches.

2 Q. If we could go back a page to page 2 of this file. Can  
3 we look at the middle paragraph, please {MPS-0742234/2}.  
4 I'm picking up reading from about four or five lines  
5 down:

6 "The organisation is in reality under the complete  
7 control of the Socialist Workers Party ... and its  
8 omnipotent Central Committee. The ANL is of great  
9 financial benefit to the SWP, the League contributing  
10 several thousand pounds a year to the party's coffers  
11 for printing alone. The SWP also benefits politically  
12 by controlling such a broad based organisation, and  
13 numerically by recruiting from the rich pool of  
14 potential members offered by the ANL."

15 A very different summary, Lord Hain, to the one we  
16 read earlier of -- of it being a broad -- a broad  
17 organisation, and had the ANL changed by 1994 such that  
18 it fitted this description or not?

19 A. Not at all. The former report is accurate; this one  
20 isn't. Let me take each major point in turn.

21 The Socialist Workers Party was prominent in  
22 the Anti-Nazi League. There's never been any secret  
23 about that. I've certainly not ever sought to deny  
24 that; it's a fact. But it was not -- it was not under  
25 the complete control of the SWP and its so-called

1           omnipotent Central Committee. That's an interesting  
2           phrase. It wasn't.

3           It was too big. The Anti-Nazi League was too big  
4           and omnipotent to be controlled by anybody, certainly  
5           not the SWP, which although a very well organised party,  
6           as far as I know it, is actually quite small.

7           Then the next statement "the ANL is of great  
8           financial benefit to the SWP", and the only evidence  
9           seems to be that the printing was done by the SWP's  
10          printers. Well, the SWP's printers, for a start, tended  
11          to produce things much more efficiently and quickly than  
12          any other printers commercially -- of a commercial kind,  
13          and actually not as expensive as them either.

14          So I can't -- you know, it was not a -- I can't --  
15          I cannot see how that was a source of income to the  
16          SWP's printers. It was -- you know, they could produce  
17          leaflets almost overnight that we couldn't get done on  
18          a commercial basis in the same way and certainly not for  
19          the same cost. So that's wrong.

20          And politically, and in terms of potential members,  
21          that may have been its objective, one of its objectives,  
22          but actually, as members of the ANL who happened also to  
23          be members of the SWP told me, frankly, actually, it was  
24          Labour Party that benefited overwhelmingly from  
25          membership recruitment in the 1970s and 1990s from

1 people who became involved in the Anti-Nazi League for  
2 the first time in any -- in any political way, often  
3 very young, and tended to end up in the Labour Party.  
4 Maybe one or two did end up in the SWP, but  
5 overwhelmingly it was the Labour Party that benefited,  
6 though -- though my support for it as a Labour Party MP  
7 and member was nothing to do with recruitment; it was  
8 all in order to confront Nazism and racism and fascism  
9 as, to my certain knowledge, was the major objective of  
10 the SWP.

11 Q. Thank you. Can you take that down, please. I'd took  
12 an excursion into the 90s. We're going to wind back to  
13 1980. We have finished with the ANL now. We're moving  
14 on to the Labour Coordinating Committee.

15 Could we have up, please, {UCPI/13868/1}. Thank  
16 you.

17 This is an SDS report dated 24 March 1980 and it  
18 reads:

19 "On Monday, 17th March 1980 at 7 pm at the Methodist  
20 Central Hall, Westminster, SW1, the Labour Co-ordinating  
21 Committee, held a 'Debate of the Decade' on the subject  
22 'The Crisis and the Future of the Left', chaired by  
23 Peter Hain. About 2,500 persons were present.

24 The debate never materialised as a discussion and  
25 comprised six speakers explaining their personal

1 politics and dissecting the politics of their fellow  
2 speakers."

3 Lord Hain, for those who are following and who are  
4 not Londoners, Methodist Central Hall is a building  
5 directly opposite the Houses of Parliament; is that  
6 right?

7 A. It is, and it was a debate, and portrayed as that,  
8 between the six speakers. They -- most of them had  
9 different politics, and that was the purpose of  
10 exploring the different views about the future of the  
11 left and future of Britain. There was a debate in that  
12 sense.

13 Q. Well, insofar as we have not had to protect their  
14 privacy, let's have a look at who some of these speakers  
15 were: Mr Tariq Ali, who has already given evidence to  
16 the Inquiry, the late Tony Benn MP, and if we could  
17 scroll down -- thank you -- Tony Cliff, Paul Foot,  
18 two very prominent personalities from the left -- then  
19 if we could scroll down further, please -- yourself in  
20 the chair, Duncan Hallas, Chris Harman and  
21 Stuart Holland MP.

22 A. Yeah, that's not actually correct. Duncan Hallas and  
23 Chris Harman didn't speak. I'm not sure that Tony Cliff  
24 spoke either. Audrey Wise -- Audrey Wise spoke.

25 Q. Lord Hain, thank you very much. It's my mistake.

1 Paragraph 2 is listing peoples identified as present.

2 A. Ah, right, okay.

3 Q. It's Tony Benn, Tariq Ali, Paul Foot and Stuart Holland  
4 who are identified as the speakers. Forgive me.

5 A. Audrey Wise was certainly a speaker.

6 Q. And then, over the page, Audrey Wise is indeed listed as  
7 well.

8 So this is a broad range of speakers from the left  
9 wing, included -- including an elected Member of  
10 Parliament, and so far as you are concerned, by that  
11 stage, you were a member of the Labour Party.

12 A. Yes, actually three elected Members of Parliament.

13 Audrey Wise was and so was Stuart Holland, and so was  
14 Tony Benn, obviously.

15 Q. Does it concern you that the SDS was reporting on this  
16 type of event?

17 A. It does, because it was a publicly advertised event. It  
18 was hugely successful; a meeting in Methodist Central  
19 Hall, as you say, the other side of Parliament Square  
20 from the Palace of Westminster. For the life of me,  
21 I don't know why they were there except that they were  
22 obsessed with spying on left wing events, and it comes  
23 back to my concern that the progressive radical side of  
24 British politics seemed to be their targets.

25 And when I look back over the years, 50-plus years



1 in politics and bring it up to date, it seems that  
2 the constant targeting of progressive radicals of  
3 various description, from those explicitly on the left  
4 or on the so-called far left, or those on the  
5 centre-left, seems to be the focus of attention rather  
6 than the right and the far-right or the alt-right or  
7 the fascist or Nazi right.

8 And that comes right up to date with the --  
9 the revelation that Greenpeace and Extinction Rebellion,  
10 both notable and respectable environmentalists  
11 campaigning against the biggest threat to humanity,  
12 climate change, found themselves on a list of terrorist  
13 groups; official -- official list of terrorist groups.

14 Now, it's the thinking that allows that to happen  
15 that seems to be on a continuum that is reflected in  
16 attendance of undercover officers at this particular  
17 debate, which was of great interest to those who  
18 attended but of very little consequence to the  
19 Metropolitan Police and certainly not to law and order  
20 or security of the state in Britain.

21 Q. I'm going to tell you one fact, Lord Hain, and then  
22 I'm going to ask the Chairman if now is a convenient  
23 time for the afternoon break. What I have to tell you,  
24 in case it changes the answers you've been given on  
25 this, is that the Inquiry knows that the SDS did

1 infiltrate the far-right from the 1980s.

2 We won't be hearing very much -- hearing or seeing  
3 very much evidence of that because the risks from  
4 far-right groups are such that we've had to make  
5 restriction orders to protect the identity of former  
6 undercover police officers, but that may be an important  
7 fact given the points that you're making.

8 A. I'm pleased to hear that. I don't think it detracts  
9 from my general argument on the Anti-Apartheid Movement  
10 or -- or that I've made in respect to the ANL, but  
11 I'm pleased to -- to hear that and reassured, frankly,  
12 to hear that, because I'm not disputing, and never have,  
13 as a former Secretary of State who's worked with  
14 undercover officers in Northern Ireland, I'm not  
15 disputing the need for undercover officers to protect us  
16 from terrorism or -- or serious organised crime or drug  
17 trafficking or human trafficking or anything like that.  
18 What I am disputing is the -- is the way it was deployed  
19 particularly in those things that I know about or was  
20 involved.

21 MR BARR: Thank you.

22 Sir, is now a convenient time for the afternoon  
23 break?

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it is.

25 A. Thank you.

1 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take  
2 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
3 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

4 The time is now 3.20 pm, so we shall reconvene at  
5 3.35 pm. Thank you.

6 (3.18 pm)

7 (A short break)

8 (3.35 pm)

9 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

10 I will now hand the Chairman to continue proceedings.

11 Chairman.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

13 Mr Barr.

14 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

15 Lord Hain, can we now turn to the Labour Party  
16 special conference.

17 This is at tab 59, Sir, and can we have up on  
18 the screen please, {UCPI/14020/1}.

19 A. Before we do that, may I just briefly add to your last  
20 and very welcome point on undercover work in the  
21 far-right groups?

22 Q. Of course.

23 A. I am not sure whether I can be seen, but shall I wait  
24 until this episode's finished?

25 Q. By all means. This is a very short point. Fine, fire

1 away, Lord Hain.

2 A. Okay, I won't be long.

3 Q. All right, shall we deal with the document first,  
4 please?

5 A. Indeed.

6 Q. It's very straightforward.

7 The Labour Party special conference. This is  
8 a report dated 11 June 1980 and it's an SDS report, as  
9 you can see from the top right, subject matter, it says  
10 in block capitals, underlined "Labour Party".

11 Paragraph 1:

12 "The undermentioned persons were identified as being  
13 present on 31.5.80 outside the Conference Centre,  
14 Wembley, Middlesex, where the Labour Party was holding  
15 a 'Special Conference'."

16 And then there are a number of names that we are  
17 able to publish. Your name is amongst them, along with  
18 Bob Cox, Roger Cox and Paul Holborow.

19 And if we scroll down, please, there are two more  
20 names, Don Trudell and Andy Zebrowski.

21 Can you help us, Lord Hain. Was there anything  
22 disorderly about the group of people who are reported on  
23 there as being outside the Conference Centre in Wembley  
24 that morning?

25 A. Not at all. This was a conference of Her Majesty's

1           Opposition, the Labour Party, and we were in opposition  
2           at the time. A perfectly normal Parliamentary  
3           party-type conference, and I've no idea why there was  
4           an undercover officer reporting on it. I think  
5           I dishing out a few Anti-Nazi League leaflets there,  
6           which might have attracted his interest. As it  
7           happened, I was a delegate from Putney Labour Party and  
8           I took my two young sons to the crèche at the  
9           conference. So, just normal activity of a democratic  
10          kind.

11        Q. Thank you.

12                 Can we take that down now, please, and please do  
13                 take this opportunity to respond to what I said before  
14                 the break.

15        A. I'm grateful. It's just that I was able to check and  
16                 was -- identified a report in The Guardian on  
17                 15 October 2018 which showed that of around 1,000 groups  
18                 that undercover officers were deployed in, just 1% or so  
19                 were far-right groups. The rest were environmentalists,  
20                 the Stephen Lawrence Campaign, national trade unions,  
21                 mostly of a progressive kind, that should have attracted  
22                 absolutely no interest, legitimate interest, at all from  
23                 undercover officers.

24                 I mean, I welcomed your -- your statement about  
25                 those far-right groups, but I think it's important that

1           it's put into perspective. And what is needed here is  
2           full transparency, and if that's something the Inquiry  
3           can help with, I'd be grateful.

4       Q. Thank you.

5           Can we move now to Voices for Withdrawal, sometimes  
6           also referred to as Labour Committee on Ireland.

7           Can we go to tab 60 {UCPI/14080/1}.

8           Lord Hain, are you able to help us with what  
9           Voices for Withdrawal was?

10       A. I think it was -- it was an argument saying that Britain  
11       should withdraw from Northern Ireland and British forces  
12       should withdraw from Northern Ireland. I'm not sure of  
13       the -- to be frank, I'm not sure of the exact provenance  
14       of the group now, but I think that's what its purpose  
15       was.

16       Q. And the Committee for Withdrawal from Ireland, I think  
17       you've made clear in your witness statement that  
18       contrary to this report, it had nothing to do with  
19       the Liberal Party.

20       A. Yes, indeed, and I was not a member of the Liberal Party  
21       at that point, so I don't understand the -- the  
22       statement "organised by the Liberal Party".

23       Q. And this was an event involving debate about the vexed  
24       issue of Ireland. Your contribution is on page 3 at  
25       paragraph 12 {UCPI/14080/3}.

1 Thank you.

2 It says:

3 "The second of the afternoon sessions commenced at  
4 3.15 pm with the Chair of the forum reverting back to  
5 its morning occupant Mick Martin, who introduced  
6 the session called 'Why We Call for Withdrawal from  
7 Northern Ireland' and introduced Peter Hain from the  
8 Labour Party to speak on the subject. Hain, in a very  
9 cautious mood and much to the disapproval of the  
10 majority of the audience, urged that the conference move  
11 slowly towards attempting to get the Parliamentary  
12 Labour Party to take up a withdrawal position. He  
13 concluded by suggesting that the conference should aim  
14 for the next Labour Government to give a clear  
15 undertaking to withdraw from Northern Ireland without  
16 specifically demanding a date."

17 Now, very obviously what you are recorded as saying  
18 is utter mainstream politics. What I'm interested in,  
19 given the disapproval that it met with, is this  
20 a meeting at which there were extremists or not?

21 A. There would have been far-left groups and some, frankly,  
22 allied to -- to the Republican movement and some  
23 sympathetic to the Provisional IRA, which I was not, and  
24 that's in part why what I said was, and to that extent,  
25 he described it as very cautious, as if I was normally

1           flirting that kind of politics, which I never did. When  
2           I made it clear that I was opposed to violence, that  
3           I was opposed to the activities of the IRA in -- in --  
4           on the island of Ireland, there was some -- some booing  
5           and unrest.

6           So, yes, you're correct in -- in interpreting and in  
7           your observations about -- about my participation there.

8       Q. That.

9       A. By the way, you see a number of other Labour --  
10       Labour MPs, including Clive Soley, who I think from  
11       memory was the opposition Shadow Secretary of State on  
12       Northern Ireland at the time, or at least a Shadow  
13       Minister on Northern Ireland. He may not have been, but  
14       that's what I think he might have been.

15      Q. Yes, I think we can see, yes, he's mentioned in  
16       the paragraph below along with Ernie Roberts, also  
17       an MP.

18           Thank you, can we take that down, please, and can we  
19       go next to tab 66, which is {UCPI/17175/1}.

20           We're now in February 1982, and this is a report  
21       about the Right to Work march of that year, and I think  
22       it's in London.

23           Could we go over the page, please {UCPI/17175/2} and  
24       then look at the entry for Wednesday, 24 February.

25           This report is recording, amongst other things, that



1 on Wednesday, 24 February:

2 "The march will continue as previously reported to  
3 Borough Community Centre where the speakers will be ...  
4 [I think that's either Dick or Rick] North,  
5 Harriet Harman, [you] and Yolanda Bystham."

6 Did you speak at the Borough Community Centre?

7 A. I may well have done. I don't know why it was of any  
8 interest at all to an undercover officer and why the  
9 resources were deployed to record that. It's not clear  
10 to me at all, but I may well have done.

11 Q. The reason I'm asking is that if you can recall at all,  
12 I would value some impression of whether or not what was  
13 being said was in any way provoking disorder or  
14 encouraging unlawful conduct or anything like that.

15 A. Not at all, and as I recollect, what it was, was there  
16 was a great deal of concern at the time -- this is 1982,  
17 I think --

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. -- and there was very large and escalating mass  
20 unemployment in Britain at the time, the closure of  
21 mines and heavy industry under Margaret Thatcher's  
22 Premiership. And without getting into all of that,  
23 there were marches going on against unemployment and for  
24 alternative economic policies of the kind that  
25 John Maynard Keynes and others had advocated, to use

1 public investment to drive economic growth and provide  
2 jobs for people.

3 And there were marches all over the place and this  
4 was -- the Right to Work march was one and I -- I was --  
5 would have been a speaker, including Harriet Harman.  
6 I don't think she'd been elected an MP yet, but she was  
7 on the point of being or may already have been,  
8 depending on the dates, but I don't think she quite had  
9 been, and of course, she, like me, was subsequently  
10 a cabinet minister.

11 I don't know why this report was being made at all.  
12 What's wrong with a Right to Work march?

13 Q. Thank you. Can we take that down, please.

14 Now, in just a moment I'm going to move to some of  
15 the themes that have come out from your statement and  
16 your evidence, but before we do that, it's right that  
17 I should make clear that this is an ongoing  
18 investigation. We've called you as part of Tranche 1 of  
19 our evidence hearings and we have got some more  
20 documents which refer to you and which we'll be  
21 disclosing to you in the future and we are likely to be  
22 returning to you for further assistance --

23 A. That's very kind of you.

24 Q. -- in due course.

25 You mentioned just after lunch a particular report

1 that we are aware of, but which is not fully processed.  
2 Just for the transcript, I should read in that that is  
3 dated 18 November 2003 and I think the material passage  
4 reads:

5 "Katja father is a good friend of South African  
6 [sic] who was an activist terrorist but who now works at  
7 the UK Home Office."

8 That's the passage that's caused you particular  
9 concern?

10 A. Yes, it's the one I think I mentioned out of sequence  
11 earlier on, and I mention it because to be described by  
12 Mark Kennedy, the undercover officer concerned who used  
13 that phrase, as a "South African terrorist", people said  
14 lots of things about me in my time in politics, but  
15 being described as a terrorist has never been one of  
16 them because I'm not a terrorist and have never  
17 supported terrorism.

18 And it troubles me that a senior undercover officer  
19 involved in infiltrating environmentalist groups and who  
20 formed a liaison with, actually, a family friend,  
21 Kate Wilson, who went to school with my boys, and  
22 the fact that he has called me a terrorist and  
23 a South African terrorist, you know, years after  
24 Nelson Mandela, who had been described by the apartheid  
25 state as a terrorist and indeed even by

1 Margaret Thatcher, who had been president of the country  
2 and already stood down, I just -- it -- it reflects a --  
3 a state of mind that I find very troubling about  
4 undercover policing work.

5 And I do hope that, Sir John, your Inquiry will  
6 address this matter when you eventually come to your  
7 conclusions about it and make recommendations,  
8 presumably, for the future of undercover policing, as  
9 I trust you will.

10 Q. Moving now to some broader themes. First of all, the  
11 dissemination of intelligence. You've seen that  
12 the reports are often marked with "box 500", which shows  
13 that they were sent to the Security Service. Does it  
14 concern you that material of the kind we've been looking  
15 at today was being passed to the Security Service and,  
16 if so, why?

17 A. It concerns me for two reasons. First of all, what  
18 I was involved in was legitimate democratic protest and,  
19 in some cases, Parliamentary activity, and I don't think  
20 that should be of any interest to the Security Services.  
21 But it may have been during the times of Anti-Apartheid  
22 Movement, because the British Security Services were  
23 working hand in glove with the South African apartheid  
24 Security Services and they were trading information  
25 between them.

1           I think my colleague anti-apartheid activist,  
2           leading anti-apartheid activist, Christabel Gurney might  
3           have mentioned this yesterday, and that does trouble me,  
4           because the Security Services of South Africa were  
5           engaged in waging terror on all opposition, including --  
6           including my parents when they were in Pretoria and on  
7           Nelson Mandela's supporters while he was in prison, and  
8           our Security Services should not have been doing that.

9           They were on the wrong side of the history, on  
10          the wrong side of the argument. They should have been  
11          standing up -- if they have any agenda, it should have  
12          been standing up for human rights and justice and the  
13          rule of law, and that's expressly what did not operate  
14          in South Africa.

15          So, yeah, I am very concerned that they were trading  
16          information with the South African Security Services,  
17          who were themselves engaged in illegal bombings and  
18          arson attacks and murder and sending letter bombs to --  
19          or a letter bomb to anti-apartheid activists.

20        Q. And the next topic I want to move to is retention,  
21          because, of course, some of the documents we've been  
22          looking at today are half a century old but have been  
23          retrieved by the Inquiry from various files. Do you  
24          have concerns about how long material has been stored  
25          for?

1           A. I do, because I was told by the head of --  
2           the Director General of MI5, Stephen Lander, who came to  
3           see me in my ministerial office in the Foreign Office  
4           in, I think it was, July 2000, told that there were  
5           no -- there had been files, Security Service files, on  
6           me but that they'd been destroyed.

7           I am concerned about Special Branch files on me,  
8           whether they've been retained. Obviously they're in  
9           existence, so they must have been retrieved, but are  
10          they -- have they in any way been acted, including  
11          whilst I was -- I know the Special Branch doesn't exist  
12          any more, but I don't know where they've gone in the  
13          Metropolitan Police or Security Service world, and I am  
14          concerned about that, because, of course, before I --  
15          before I became a -- on becoming and being appointed  
16          a Minister first by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in  
17          1997, May 1997, like all other Ministers, I would have  
18          been vetted, and certainly I was security vetted --  
19          would have been security vetted before I saw the secret  
20          intelligence that I told you I did as a Foreign Office  
21          Minister and the Secretary of State for  
22          Northern Ireland.

23          So I am -- I am troubled by this and I'd like to  
24          know what the situation is, if it's possible, for the --  
25          Sir John's Inquiry to find out.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 Boundaries. We've heard evidence from a number of  
3 the officers who have used words such as "unfiltered" to  
4 explain how they understood their role as to what they  
5 should record, leaving it for others to filter further  
6 down the line, and we've seen reporting on all sorts of  
7 activities today, as we've gone through your documents,  
8 including reporting on you as a Member of Parliament and  
9 so forth.

10 You mention in your witness statement boundaries.  
11 Could you expand on precisely what your concerns are in  
12 that regard, please?

13 A. Well, first of all, what I regard as legitimate  
14 undercover officer work, and I say that as somebody who,  
15 as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, to repeat  
16 myself, worked with undercover officers and met some of  
17 them doing very sensitive work, especially with  
18 dissidents, infiltrating dissident IRA groups and  
19 loyalist paramilitary groups and drug gangs and so on  
20 active in Belfast.

21 I mean, they do very dangerous work and I always  
22 admire their bravery and applauded the work that they  
23 were doing, because we don't want bombs going off  
24 anywhere, whether from Irish sources or Jihadi sources.  
25 And I've been involved in signing warrants that stopped

1           that kind of thing happening, both in London and in  
2           Northern Ireland.

3           So, you know, I think there's legitimate undercover  
4           policing and there's illegitimate undercover policing,  
5           and I think the undercover policing that concerned my  
6           activities is wholly illegitimate.

7           And I understand one of the -- the undercover  
8           officers whose -- whose name has appeared before  
9           the Inquiry was also involved in -- in anti-terrorist  
10          work, and I applaud that officer's role in  
11          anti-terrorist work as legitimate and important, to  
12          protect all of us. But I deprecate his role in -- in  
13          the kind of activities which we've heard about in this  
14          Inquiry and have affected me.

15          So that's -- that's the kind of boundaries I'm --  
16          I'm -- I'm seeking to draw and I hope that Sir John will  
17          draw those at the end of the Inquiry. I think it's  
18          really important to the legitimacy and consent that  
19          there is for undercover policing that that boundary is  
20          clearly established and that we don't find every other  
21          environmentalist group, that every other anti-racist  
22          group, that in the past anti-apartheid groups and  
23          national trade unions today are -- are the subject of  
24          undercover work, because they're not subversive  
25          organisations. They're part of the democracy of this



1 country, or should be.

2 So I think that's the kind of boundary I'd like to  
3 see drawn, and also, boundaries in undercover work as  
4 well. I cannot see any justification for undercover  
5 officers forming close and intimate sexual relationships  
6 with environmental activists such as our family friend  
7 Kate Wilson. I cannot see the justification for that.  
8 You may or may not approve of what she stands for in  
9 alerting the world to climate change or in her  
10 environmental activism, but she's not a criminal.

11 And undercover policing should be directed at  
12 stopping crime and stopping terrorism and stopping drug  
13 trafficking and human trafficking and that kind of  
14 thing, not at repressing progressive political activity.

15 So the boundaries are those kind of boundaries that  
16 we've got to establish for the future health of our  
17 democracy.

18 There's also a boundary that I think you're inviting  
19 me to comment on specifically, and that is the kind of  
20 reporting. There's a lot of gratuitous reporting going  
21 on of no interest to anybody, but presumably it provides  
22 -- you know, is indication that an undercover officer is  
23 not round the pub having a pint but is in a meeting  
24 somewhere, and I just cannot see how that's justified.

25 I know for a fact how limited police resources are.

1           We've seen huge cuts in police numbers in -- in recent  
2           years, and it is a question of prioritising resources,  
3           and they have been prioritised in the areas we've been  
4           discussing on the wrong -- in the wrong areas.

5           Q. You've expressed some surprise in your witness statement  
6           about the scale of reporting that you've seen on the  
7           groups that you were involved in. Is there anything  
8           further that you would like to say on that topic?

9           A. I think I've pretty well covered it. I mentioned  
10          just -- I mentioned in passing this morning just  
11          an example of a -- an undercover officer report from my  
12          parents' front room in Putney, again, about a meeting of  
13          the Young Liberals which was attended by only a few  
14          people, I think less than a dozen or around that number,  
15          and had a representative whose name was John Horrocks  
16          representing the Putney Society, which is a very  
17          respected mainstream conservation group, you know, of  
18          the kind in British politics that are in every  
19          community, like the Women's Institute are. What on  
20          earth was he doing there?

21          Q. A theme throughout your answers to me today has been  
22          the righteousness of the causes that you've supported  
23          and being on the right side of history. When the police  
24          have to make decisions about applying the law, are you  
25          saying that they should take into account the merits of

1 a cause when policing public order, or are you not going  
2 that far?

3 A. I'm saying that if there is an intent to commit violent  
4 criminal acts on behalf of an organisation, then  
5 obviously that's a legitimate target for the police,  
6 obviously. So, I have no quarrel with that. But  
7 I cannot see how it can be justified that the  
8 Anti-Apartheid Movement should have been the subject of  
9 such widespread and intrusive undercover work. I cannot  
10 see how that can be justified.

11 And I just observe that on the whole, it is  
12 the progressive to left, sometimes to liberal-ish side  
13 of the politics and protest and pressure group activity  
14 that undercover policing seems to be focused upon rather  
15 than dangerous far-right activity.

16 Q. Would you agree that it's a role of the police to apply  
17 the law to everyone equally?

18 A. Of course.

19 Q. And would you agree that if the court is to have any  
20 role at all in decision-making, that would give rise to  
21 difficult questions about who decides what a good cause  
22 is and what is not a good cause?

23 A. Yes, but as you will know from being in your profession,  
24 the decisions to mount prosecutions, the decisions to  
25 prioritise police resources, the decisions of the police

1 to focus on this rather than that are all a matter of  
2 operational police discretion and there's considerable  
3 scope for choice there within the rule of law. That's  
4 always been the case for policing. And what is in the  
5 public interest and what is not in the public interest  
6 to pursue, and it was not in the public interest to  
7 infiltrate the Anti-Apartheid Movement, a respectable  
8 mainstream pressure group in British society. There's  
9 no justification for it, so why were they doing it?  
10 There was no rule of the law justification at all.

11 Q. Lord Hain, I think I've covered everything, but there's  
12 a risk I haven't, so I'm going to give the opportunity,  
13 if there's anything else that you would like to add, now  
14 is your chance.

15 A. Well, thank you, and can I thank you for the way that  
16 you've handled this matter and dealt with my evidence.  
17 You've given me considerable leeway and I'm grateful for  
18 that, and I think I can't complain about the way that  
19 it's come out, so I'm grateful for that.

20 First of all, I repeat that I hope that Sir John and  
21 the Inquiry and, to the extent that you're involved,  
22 yourself, Mr Barr, will focus on the legitimacy and  
23 illegitimacy boundaries, because it seems to me that  
24 this is at the heart of it.

25 The other side of it that I hope you'll focus on is

1 the role of undercover officer work that seems to be  
2 written for secret documents that were never expected to  
3 appear in front of an official public inquiry and to be  
4 publicly dissected in the way that they have been today  
5 and in previous days and no doubt in subsequent days.

6 And they seem to be very self-serving and  
7 self-promoting to me. They use terms like, in the  
8 Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, "spreading panic",  
9 "attacking", "subversive", the use of tin tacks example,  
10 which was a straight lie. So I think that there needs  
11 to be some scrutiny of the state of mind of  
12 undercover officers when they're doing this.

13 As I say, I think there's vitally important  
14 undercover officer work, and when that's done, for  
15 the reasons I've expressed, it can be dangerous to their  
16 own safety, and they're very brave people, but, you  
17 know, all of what we've been discussing today hasn't  
18 fallen into that category.

19 I think there's -- also, I worry, and it goes to  
20 your point about boundaries, there's a tendency to spy  
21 on everybody on the off chance that it might lead to you  
22 somebody, and that's the kind of approach that would  
23 encourage you to spy on the whole of the Muslim  
24 community in the case that you might catch the odd  
25 Jihadi, who are in a tiny minority, and that's not

1 acceptable.

2 Undercover policing, difficult though it is, and  
3 police intelligence, difficult though it is to glean,  
4 and I know that from personal experience because  
5 I've worked with the intelligence services,  
6 I've known -- on first name terms and count as friends  
7 former heads of MI5 and MI6 and GCHQ and have worked  
8 closely with them, but, you know, you do not -- you do  
9 not see a successful end product by a kind of omnibus  
10 scattergun approach to undercover policing work. And,  
11 you know, some of the professionals watching this may  
12 say, "Who's he to pronounce it in this way?" But that's  
13 my view and I hope the Inquiry will address that.

14 I also think a lot of this went wrong from the very  
15 beginning. There seemed to be open season on  
16 progressive or left wing ideas and movements to see if  
17 there are -- any subversives are about, and that's  
18 classically portrayed in the political choice to spy on  
19 the Stephen Lawrence Campaign, the family's campaign to  
20 bring justice to their murdered son, rather than  
21 the racists who murdered him, it took a long time to be  
22 brought to justice.

23 And I don't think I've mentioned, but -- yes, I may  
24 well have done. Have I mentioned the -- because it  
25 falls into -- into this category. Have I mentioned

1 the report that the Anti-Apartheid Movement was  
2 a Stalinist outfit by an undercover police officer?  
3 I think I have, yes. So that's an example of that frame  
4 of mind.

5 So I'd like to -- the Inquiry to address the lack of  
6 proportionality involved in undercover officers,  
7 you know, really going deeply into our -- our lives.

8 I'd like also you to address what was right and  
9 wrong about history. Was it right to infiltrate women's  
10 rights groups in the early 1970s? Was it correct to  
11 infiltrate the Anti-Apartheid Movement, which was -- had  
12 the objective of stopping apartheid? I know it's not  
13 the Inquiry's purposes to get involved in politics, but  
14 you can't avoid making a choice here. Either it was  
15 wrong or it was -- it was not wrong. And I don't think  
16 it's acceptable to target environmentalists who are  
17 alerting us to the climate change catastrophe and put  
18 them on terrorist lists.

19 And I also reinforce the point about limited  
20 resources and the massive waste of resources that is  
21 involved in here for no clear outcome to the security of  
22 -- or peace of our society.

23 And finally, if I can just add that, you know,  
24 I'm not some starry-eyed romantic about all of this.  
25 I support the rule of law. I want to see effective

1           policing. We all depend on effective policing to  
2           underpin the rule of law in a non-discriminatory  
3           fashion. And there are bad people about, and some of  
4           them are involved in politics and some of them are not  
5           always on -- on the far-right, where most of them are.

6           So, you know, I see the need for that. But if you  
7           look back at this record that the Inquiry's covering, it  
8           is a pretty sorry record of undercover policing and  
9           I hope that the recommendations from Sir John will make  
10          sure that it never happens again and it isn't happening  
11          now; that it isn't happening in legitimate environmental  
12          groups like Greenpeace or Extinction Rebellion.

13          Whatever you think of Extinction Rebellion's tactics  
14          on a particular day, it's an admirable movement with  
15          admirable objectives and I hope it doesn't have  
16          undercover officers all over the place within it  
17          distorting and reporting back on what it is doing in  
18          a way that happened to me in the Anti-Apartheid Movement  
19          and Anti-Nazi League.

20          Thank you very much for the opportunity to add those  
21          points.

22       MR BARR: Lord Hain, no, thank you for answering my  
23          questions so patiently all day.

24          The procedure now is we have a 15-minute break which  
25          is time for other advocates to contact us if they want



1 anything else pursued, so you'll have to, I'm afraid,  
2 bear with us a little while longer.

3 A. It will be a pleasure.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for doing so.

5 A. Thank you.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Fernandes.

7 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take  
8 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
9 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

10 The time is now 16.10 pm, so we shall reconvene at  
11 16.25 pm. Thank you.

12 (4.08 pm)

13 (A short break)

14 (4.25 pm)

15 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

16 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
17 proceedings.

18 Chairman.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr, are there any further questions for  
20 Lord Hain?

21 MR BARR: No, sir.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Ryder -- your counsel, Lord Hain -- do you  
23 have any questions in re-examination now?

24 MR RYDER: No, thank you, Sir.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Then, Lord Hain, all that remains is for

1 me to say thank you for the obvious care and thought  
2 that you have put into your written evidence and into  
3 your oral evidence today. The questions that you posed  
4 at the end when you concluded your remarks to Mr Barr  
5 I have always thought were absolutely central to this  
6 Inquiry, and once I have found out what happened, I most  
7 certainly will address them. Thank you.

8 A. I'm very grateful, Sir John, for this opportunity, and  
9 also to Mr Barr for the courtesy and professionalism he  
10 displayed in questioning me. Thank you.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

12 Mr Fernandes.

13 MR FERNANDES: Thank you, everyone. The hearings have now  
14 finished for the week. Hearings will resume at 10.00 am  
15 on Tuesday, 4 May. Thank you.

16 (4.26 pm)

17 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Tuesday,

18 4 May 2021)

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