Inquiry into Undercover Policing

Response to Rule 9 Request

FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF ERNEST RODKER
Date signed: 24 February 2020

1. Personal details

1. My full name is Ernest Rodker and I was born on 12th May 1937.

Preliminary points

2. On 20th December 2019 I was provided with a rule 9 request to provide evidence to the Inquiry.

3. It relates to some of my campaigning activities over a period of almost 30 years (late 1960s to late 1990s) and poses questions relating to my interaction with a number of undercover police officers ('UCO's) – including, 'Jim Pickford', 'Michael Scott', 'Phil Cooper', 'Jim Sutton', 'Andy Davey' and Mike Ferguson.

1 I understand that the Inquiry's terms of reference cover events from 1968. However I think that my political activism before that year (indeed from 1958) is relevant to this Inquiry. I say this because I think that intelligence gathered on me before 1968 informed the way undercover policing was directed towards me after 1968. See for example para 213, below.
4. I have been provided by the Inquiry with a bundle of about 53 documents ('disclosure'), with a 'rule 9' request posing 22 questions, most of which are narrow and closed.

5. I have no way of knowing if this disclosure is a complete set of all intelligence gathered on or about me by the police or the Inquiry. I think it is not, because I have been shown, by my solicitors, other, largely Special Branch ('SB'), material which is in the public domain, and which includes reference to me and my activism. I assume that some, if not all, of this intelligence must or may come from undercover police.

6. The material provided to me by the Inquiry is, I assume, just the material the Inquiry wishes me to see in order to assist me in answering its questions and to which I shall try to respond in this statement.

7. This statement should not, therefore, be considered my final word on the issue of how I have been affected by undercover policing.

8. I have been given a couple of months to provide a response. The police, in contrast, have known for decades what they or their officers did and have had control, presumably, of all relevant documents since then.

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2 See also below, 'documents', para 216 onwards, below.
9. I should add that my memory is poor and fading. I have done my best to
provide a response to the Inquiry’s questions, but I cannot be as confident as I
might have been in the past, that all of my answers are accurate, still less,
complete.

2. Intelligence reports and other documents

10. I am asked if the intelligence reports in my witness bundle are accurate.

11. It is difficult to say for some of the reasons I have given, above. In addition,
the legibility of some of the reports is very poor.

3. Aliases

12. Generally, I did not use any aliases in relation to my political activity.

13. However, I may have used an alias on specific occasions, less than a handful,
in relation to specific demonstrations. For example, I may have used a false
name when booking into hotels used by the white-only South African sports
teams as part of our campaign against apartheid South Africa.

14. I may also have used an alias in connection with one-off protests at military,
arms bases.

3 Para 34, below.
15. I cannot now recall what name(s) I may have used.

4. **Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign (‘STST’)**

16. I am asked what my ‘political activities’ as a member of the STST were, including my position(s) of responsibility and dates held.

17. I was active in STST throughout its existence. It started in 1969 until it was disbanded in May 1970 with the cancellation of the planned 1970 cricket tour of the UK by the white-only South African team. The campaign against sports connections with SA continued beyond the 1970s, in other forms, and I remained involved in those campaigns.

18. I did not have any formal position within STST so far as I recall.

19. I was active in a much smaller group of activists – a direct action group (‘DAG’) – which I also describe, below.

4.1 Aims

20. I am asked what were the aims of STST. Its immediate and principal aim was to stop the white-only South African cricket team from touring in the UK in 1970. More broadly, its aim was to make a very strong political point that people representing apartheid were not welcome in the UK.
4.2 Methods

21. I am asked about its methods. We sought to impress on the South African teams the fact that as an all-white team effectively promoting the apartheid regime they were not welcome. We wanted them to know the level of opposition there was to what they stood for and for them to reflect on whether it was the right thing, practically and ethically, to tour the UK.

22. We used all classic forms of non-violent direct action ('NVDA') – pitch invasions being the most prominent. We understood and sought to follow the well known principles of NVDA and civil disobedience learned from recent history such as the struggle for Indian independence by Mahatma Ghandi and for black civil rights by Dr Martin Luther King. I personally had already absorbed and applied these principles as a result of my earlier involvement in the Committee of 100 (referred to below). So, for STST, it was clearly understood by anyone who came across STST or participated in its demonstrations that we would only engage in peaceful campaigning.

23. This was made known openly and explicitly regularly at meetings. It was a common understanding for all those involved.

24. This comment applies to all other campaigns I was involved in – such as the direct action anti-apartheid group I was involved in (below) and the Committee of 100 (below).
25. There were of course fringe elements to STST and other campaigns I was involved in who held slightly divergent views. This was inevitable in one sense given how big, say, the STST, became – its supporters numbered in their tens of thousands.

4.3 Vetting

26. I am asked if the STST vetted its members.

27. I do remember STST being very cautious about who was involved, but I cannot remember any incidents where this was put into practice. Having said that STST did not formally have members. It comprised of people who were sympathetic to our aims and methods, and wanted to get involved.

28. There were informal mechanisms to prevent the campaign being taken over by violent elements. Those who were actively involved in the campaign were generally known personally to others and were therefore informally vetted as not being extreme radicals. And then, once someone was active, the generally accepted principles of NVDA would mean that anyone who began to propose more radical action would have effectively been rejected from the group and their ideas would not have been picked up.
29. This same point applies to all the campaigns I was involved in including those I answer questions about, below.

4.4 Other security precautions

30. I am asked whether STST used other security precautions to keep its plans, tactics or other matters confidential.

31. I cannot think of what these might have been, in the context of STST.

**Direct action group ‘DAG’**

32. My comments, above, relate principally to STST. But I was also involved in a smaller group involved in direct action. I cannot now remember what name the ‘direct action group’ was known by.

33. These activities included things like going to a team hotel to carry out demonstrations there.

34. For example, in the campaign against the white-only South African rugby team in 1969 I booked into a hotel, in an affluent part of central London, overnight where the team were staying. I sat among the players in the lounge eavesdropping on them and getting their room numbers. While they were still in the lounge or having supper, I may myself have glued their door locks and certainly shared the room numbers with other campaigners, who did so.
a couple of doors were affected in this way but I understand it had an impact on South Africans. They were unhappy about this, I learned later from a journalist-connection of Peter Hain.

35. On other occasions we waited outside the team’s hotels, for them to get on their coaches. We then got on the coaches as well and refused to leave. We had to be carried out. This both delayed the team and caused them inconvenience.

36. There was little need to ‘vet members’ of the DAG. We were a small group of activists who knew each other well and trusted each other.

37. We did, of course, take other security precautions to keep our plans, tactics or other matters confidential. When we were planning some of the direct action activities we kept that discussion to a small group. We did not discuss it with others outside the group. As a result, some of the planned activities were only known by a few people – a handful – who needed to know and / or were involved in the action.

38. It is worth underlining that we were effective in the sense that, in the short term, the rugby team was, we learned, keen to stop the tour and wanted to go home, as a result of our actions. In the medium term we contributed towards the decision to abandon the 1970 cricket tour plans. And in the long terms we contributed to the isolation of apartheid South African from international sport, a factor in its eventual downfall.
5. Intelligence reports

39. The disclosure provided to me includes 3 intelligence reports relating to STST bearing the name 'M Ferguson' (presumably Mike Ferguson). These relate to reports and events in March [Doc 2: UCPI0000008660], April [Doc 4: UCPI00000014398] and May 1970 [Doc 5: UCPI0000008635].

40. I note I am not asked about my knowledge or interaction with Mike Ferguson. I can say that I don't remember this person. I understand, in any event, that this is this officer's real name, as opposed to his cover name, the name I might have known him by. If I am said to have come across him, it would obviously help to know his cover name. If I were asked to comment on him, I would also be assisted by seeing a contemporaneous photograph of him and other information about what he looked like and what his involvement with me was.

6. STST meeting on 7.3.70

41. I am asked about the STST First National Conference on 7.3.70, and a report on it dated 9.3.70 [Doc 2: UCPI0000008660]. Specifically I am asked if this meeting was open to the public in the morning and private (delegates only) in the afternoon. I cannot remember if this was public in the morning and private in the afternoon. Indeed I do not have a specific memory of this event. I note
that I am said to have been present at the meeting. I don't disagree with this – if something like this was happening, I would have been involved in it.

6.1 Violence

42. I am asked, by reference to para 8 at p3 of the report, about STST’s attitude to violence.

43. I agree that we were committed to ‘non-violent ....direct action’. I would not accept that it was right or accurate to describe our tactics, as the report does, as ‘militant’ (particularly given the connotations of that word in that era).

44. Yes we were committed to disrupting the apartheid South African sports teams. But it was always very clear and, frequently said, that our opposition to them would not include acts of personal violence toward them – eg punching them. It involved peaceful civil disobedience. It also included relatively minor damage to property – eg gluing door locks – but nothing more significant than that. For example, it was understood that we would not use sledgehammers to knock down doors or use explosives. Anyone attending any of the meetings or participating in the campaign generally would be made aware of this and, by continuing to be involved, would be understood to have committed to these principles. STST was not ‘a monolithic organization’ (as described in the report) and it had autonomous groups, but the common and fundamental principle it kept to was NVDA - no violence to people and only minor proportionate damage to property.
6.2 Infiltrators

45. I am asked, by reference to para 12 at p5 of this report, whether warnings about ‘infiltrators’ within our campaign were commonplace.

46. There was a culture of awareness that there may be infiltration or monitoring by third parties – such as the police and UK authorities, and / or South African agents and / or the supporters of apartheid. Explicit warnings were therefore not needed or commonplace, but discussion of this risk often cropped up between individuals or in groups.

6.3 Undercover officers

47. I am asked how concerned we were generally about the risk of reporting by undercover officers.

48. There was an awareness that it would almost certainly be the case that there would be infiltrators within the movement and that, more generally, the authorities were trying to monitor what we were doing – by the use of phone tapping and suchlike, and the placing of people covertly at meetings. Our principal concern was that the UK police were the ones monitoring and infiltrating us and this included the possibility of there being the likes of undercover police officers in our midst. I assumed that the apartheid South African authorities and security services also had an interest in, may have monitored or infiltrated and may even have taken action against the anti-
apartheid movement. I assumed that they were particularly interested in the high profile organizers, those who were central to the national campaign.

49. Our overriding response to this was that none of this should deter us doing what we planned to do. And of course some actions were planned outside the wider group, to keep them secret and so guard against the risk of them being known to anyone monitoring us.

6.4 Surprise?

50. I am asked if I was surprised to learn that undercover officers reported on my or STST activities.

51. I am not surprised that they monitored my activities. This is partly because, before I was involved in the campaign against apartheid, I was involved in the Committee of 100. This was a British anti-nuclear group of the 1960s. It had come to the attention not only of the media, but also the police, prosecutors and the courts as a result of its high profile campaign and campaigning methods, involving NVDA.

52. For example, through my involvement in the Committee, I and many others in the Committee, including the philosopher Bertrand Russell, had been sent to prison as a result of our campaign of non-violent direct action against US nuclear bases. This came about when a number of us were prosecuted for planning disruptive demonstrations and civil disobedience. We appeared at, I think, Bow Street magistrates’ court and were found guilty of a breach of the
peace or some similar wrong. We were given the option of agreeing to be 'bound over' to keep the peace or to go to prison for 3 months or more. Most of us chose to go to prison. I seem to remember that some of the evidence used against us included evidence from the police of covert surveillance of our plans and discussions for action.

7. Conspiracy?

53. I am asked to what extent did STST break the law in order to further its aims. I am asked this question in the context of a report on a meeting of the London Region Conference of the STST, a meeting I am said to have chaired, on 5th April 1970 in St Pancras, London [Doc 4: UCPI00000014398 4] which mentions the possibility of conspiracy charges (at para 6, p2 of the report).

54. The paragraph in which the reference to possible 'conspiracy charges' is raised, is an accurate description of how STST campaigners operated in the sense that STST did not discuss plans for demonstrations at such a conference.

55. Planning for direct action took place in much smaller groups where we all knew each other. I cannot now recall if the 'Planning Committee' to which, according to the report, the activities apparently under consideration were to be referred, was the direct actions group in which I was involved. The DAG was about planning actions, rather than for organizing public events or

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4 See also my comments at para 227 onwards.
publicity in the conventional sense. Certainly the DAG could never be described as ‘delegates’ to the STST in the way the ‘Planning Committee’ were apparently seen, in this report. The DAG were self-appointed in the sense that we were volunteers and made our own decisions about what to do.

56. But, yes, we were aware that ‘conspiracy’ or other criminal offences might be used against us. I have no legal training, but I understand that at this time the now discredited ‘conspiracy’ charge could be used to prosecute, as a criminal offence, the planning of what might otherwise amount to civil wrongs, such as trespass. Further, in those days, the use of ‘conspiracy’ charges took on a political aspect.

57. The term ‘break the law’ in the question is ambiguous – does ‘the law’ I am asked about include the civil as well as criminal law? I am sure I received some civil injunctions during my time – eg stopping me from entering cricket grounds, not go to within a certain distance of the South African tourists. I think it may have been the police who obtained from the courts and then gave me the injunctions.

58. We were involved in civil disobedience. We were putting our bodies in the way of apartheid South African tourists. We were not planting bombs. We were not even carrying out wanton acts – like going into the South Africans’ rooms and trashing their belongings. We were doing nothing on the scale of what the South African State regime was doing to its majority black citizenship under apartheid, systematically and repeatedly, under cover of ‘the law’.
59. I note that at para 11, p3 of this report it is recorded that STST noted the 'necessity for ...the maintenance of strict discipline within these groups who would be participating in the demonstrations'. This is correct. What we did not want, was for people to get over-excited and, say, punch a South African cricketer or try to rip their clothes off or throw a bomb. We were keen to keep away from violent actions.

60. The main tactic of STST and the actions of the majority of those taking part in its demonstrations was to run onto cricket and rugby pitches to disrupt play. I think I am right in saying that this was seen as a trespass and trespass was not at that time a criminal offence. I don't know, for sure, if getting on a bus and stopping it from moving was a criminal offence. I think that it was not.

61. I did all these things.

62. I sat on a cricket pitch at least once – at Lords (and may have attempted something similar at the Oval). I cannot remember what happened to me in terms of the law, though I do remember being carried out by security or police and being kicked by spectators.

63. I also painted slogans on Lords, on the walls outside along St John's Road. I wrote a message like 'stop the tour', 'go home', something along those lines. We did not write offensive, swearing messages.
64. I did not put tik-taks on pitches. I would have considered that as ‘violence’. I think other people may have done that. I do not now remember the details of who did this or when. Certainly, though, this was not part of STST or my direct action group. We disapproved of this sort of action and this was well known.

65. I do not recall digging up pitches myself. Others may have done this. I may have put weedkiller on a pitch. All this, though, I would have considered marginal, in terms of justification within NVDA – as it was non-harmful of people - so I may have considered it.

66. The test against we measured our actions was not whether it ‘broke the law’. It was whether it was consistent with non-violent direct action principles. These were observed by those involved in the campaigns I was involved in. It was understood by those taking part. It was frequently discussed. It was implicitly understood as a core value of those engaging in the campaign against the apartheid South African sports team and regime. We did not want our principled message to be confused by adverse publicity about violence. One factor in our thinking was that we wanted to set ourselves apart from the extreme of violence which the apartheid South African regime was showing to its black citizens.

8. Pavement

67. I am asked to summarise my ‘political activities as a member of the Pavement Collective’.
68. The Pavement Collective ran from about 1970 for about 20 years, certainly for many, many years.

69. I was one of the main motivators behind setting it up and running it throughout. There were others involved too, though they may not have been involved throughout. Their names appear in the reports the Inquiry have disclosed to me.

70. Some of the meetings were held at my house. I think I was still living in Fulham (an address on Rumbold Road), at the beginning of Pavement’s lifespan. I later moved to an address in Wandsworth. Most meetings were at the People’s Aid and Action Centre. Meetings were also held at the home address of one of the others who were active.

8.1 Editorial committee

71. I was on the Pavement Collective’s editorial committee, throughout its existence.

8.2 Aims

72. I am asked about its aims.

73. Its aim was to report on local activity and the actions of local community groups. We sought to publicise the actions of those who defended their local community and to encourage campaigns by local communities on issues like
housing, race, jobs and similar. We also sought to challenge the council on some of its policies eg on housing and redevelopment. This brought us into opposition with developers.

74. We also received support. For example, on its 18th birthday we received letters of support from the likes of Michael Foot MP (former Labour party leader), Donald Trelford (editor of the Observer) and the team at the Wandsworth Law Centre.

8.3 Methods

75. I am asked about its methods.

76. The Pavement Collective was a grassroots, community initiative, based mainly around its publication – ‘Pavement’. This was circulated on the streets, in sympathetic newsagents outlets, in local housing estates and in community centres. We sold it. It came out once per month.

77. We also took action – for example by having a presence outside Wandsworth Town Hall on the evenings of council meetings and similar. The demonstrations were organized by other campaigns. I am sure that we, Pavement, did not organize any of these demonstrations. The numbers attending ranged between just a handful and 100s - depending on what the council was discussing.
78. On one or two occasions, we also intervened in council meetings, either full council meetings or committee meetings. We did so by standing up in the public gallery and putting questions to the councillors.

79. In one or two cases we held a demonstration near a councillor’s home address. The demonstration would take place on the road outside and we would not seek to enter their homes, which were all set back from the road. If, as part of the demonstration, a letter was delivered to the house, it was only delivered by a single person. The numbers involved reached a maximum of 20-30 people, but it was normally very much smaller than that. We sought to make our presence known and felt. Everyone involved knew that the aim of the demonstration was to be non-violent.

80. We wrote letters to the local (and sometimes the national) papers with our concerns about the issues we thought important.

81. Where there were issues affecting the local community, we also leafletted and organized public meetings, challenging what the council was doing. We had one or two very big meetings — attended by well over 100 people, considered quite a big attendance in a local area. These meetings were on issues like the development of Battersea Power station (there were one or two very big meeting on that), the sale of council houses and the cuts in council services.

8.4 Vetting

82. I am asked if Pavement vetted its members.
83. I think this question misunderstands the nature of the group. We did not need to go through the kind of ‘vetting’ process a large group would need. The core group was roughly 10 of us – I wouldn’t call them ‘members’ – and we knew each other. It changed only slightly over the years.

84. There were also people on our mailing list, who bought the newspaper from us by subscription or on the street. This couldn’t really be described as a ‘membership’ – they were just ordinary people interested in what we were writing for their own purposes. Some may have been supportive and agreed with our politics, some may not.

8.5 Security precautions

85. I am asked whether Pavement took any other security precautions to keep its plans, tactics or other matters confidential.

86. Again, I think this misunderstands our group and the context in which we operated. It was about producing a paper for sale and promoting it and the issues we sought to campaign on. We were by and large reporting on actions, those taken by other groups, after the event.

8.6 Infiltration

87. I am asked if we were concerned about infiltration by police or others.
88. We were concerned in principle. But we were also a small group of people, most of whom had known each other over a long period of time and therefore trusted each other. It would have been quite difficult for someone, with the wrong motives, to be involved, without suspicion. Also, although our views were radical, we were not doing anything unlawful of interest to or a threat to the State or the authorities. That’s what I thought at the time.

89. Although I am not told this by the Inquiry or asked questions about it or him in relation to Pavement, I believe that ‘Jim Pickford’, the UCO, had infiltrated Pavement, the editorial committee by late 1976. I refer to minutes I have of the Pavement editorial committee meeting in November 1976

[Doc 54: UCP10000033629]. I would like to know more about what ‘Jim Pickford’ did within Pavement and when and why.

90. Similarly, although I am not told this by the Inquiry or asked questions about it or him in relation to Pavement, it appears that another UCO, ‘Michael Scott’ was also active in Pavement. I refer to a box file entry of mine ‘M Scott’ (‘Michael Scott’ 5) [Doc 55: UCP10000033631]. On that entry I record that he is connected with ‘Pavement Sales’ (as well as ‘Y Libs’). This suggests to me that the UCO ‘Michael Scott’ was involved in selling Pavement.

91. I would like to know whether ‘Jim Pickford’ or ‘M Scott’ or another UCO was responsible for the ‘intelligence’ on Pavement provided to SB in June 1975

[Doc 28: UCP10000007285]. More broadly, I would like to understand why

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5 See also para 153 onwards, ‘Michael Scott’s’ role in the hotel demonstration on 12.5.72.
Pavement was, seemingly, targeted by a number of UCOs, for example whether it was used as a way of building UCOs' credibility within other movements and campaigns.

9. The International Marxist Group ('IMG') and Pavement

92. I am asked to comment on a report dated 4.6.75 about a Pavement meeting in May 1975 [Doc 28: UCPI0000007285-CLF] about the interest the IMG was apparently taking in Pavement. I am asked what, if any, interaction or overlap there was between the two groups.

93. There were one or two people involved in the IMG who were also involved in Pavement, within the core group of 10 or so.

94. Other than that we were very different types of groups. We were a local paper. The IMG was an organization which was active across the country. They had a different political philosophy to Pavement's. I cannot now recall or articulate their views or their differences to ours.

95. Pavement was able to organize relatively big meetings, locally on radical grassroots issues of concern to many local people. I presume that is one of the reasons IMG, like many other groups, were interested in us. Anyone organizing at a community level at that time had to be aware that a number of groups like IMG or International Socialists may be interested in some of the
same issues. But we were wary of them and I think it was clear to everyone that our politics and interests were not the same as theirs.

10. Battersea Redevelopment Action Group ('BRAG')

96. I am asked to summarise my 'political activities as a member of' BRAG, including position(s) of responsibility and the dates of my involvement with BRAG.

97. I was active in setting up BRAG in about 1972 and remained active until it was disbanded, many years, at least a decade, later.

98. I would not give myself a formal title within BRAG and others did not have formal positions either. I was one of the group of people taking decisions. That group fluctuated in numbers. The core group was no more than 10 in number. It was even smaller than that at times. A few others were active, like me, throughout.

99. There was no formal structure. We had meetings. We called ourselves a 'committee' which met regularly, and its regularity depended on what was going on at Battersea Power Station, the target of our campaign. We tried to meet every month at least, ideally more often. There was no chair. Different people in the group chaired different meetings. This included me. Minutes were prepared and sent out.
10.1 Aims

100. I am asked what BRAG's aims were and whether they were accurately reflected in a report I have been shown 'dated 23 December 1974' [Doc 15: UCPI0000015040].

101. The report I am referred to does not accurately reflect BRAG's aims. I see that at page 2 of that document there is an 'appendix to Special Branch report of 23 December 1974'. But the actual report I have been shown appears to be dated 31st December 1974, refers to BRAG campaigners going to Wandsworth Town Hall on 16 December 1974 and seeking to distribute a leaflet, also part of this report, apparently produced by BRAG and entitled an 'open letter to Ellis Hillman'. I cannot now remember who this person is or what our concern about them was.

102. The BRAG campaign was much broader than this. Our main activity revolved around what was happening at Battersea power station. The council and developers wanted to transform it into luxury housing. If the power station was to be developed, BRAG wanted there to be affordable council housing and community projects and facilities. This was BRAG's overarching objective. We also campaigned against the council selling off other property, council houses in the area. These were the sorts of general concerns we had and campaigned on.
10.2 Political doctrine

103. I am asked if BRAG subscribed to a particular political doctrine.

104. There was no party political doctrine. The politics we espoused were based on the principle that council developments and initiatives should be public and for the community, rather than private and for commercial interests. It was a typical community project / campaign founded on localism.

10.3 Methods.

105. I am asked what methods BRAG used to advance its aims.

106. We were committed to conventional campaigning methods and of course the principle of non-violence.

107. Within that framework we considered any appropriate action — leafletting an area, organizing public meetings in local areas, door-knocking on certain issues.

108. In a wider sense we would go to council meetings, and put questions to the council — intervening from the public gallery if that's what was needed to ensure our questions were asked and answers given.

109. Some council meetings took place in rooms within the Town Hall, the councillors sitting around a table. Unless it was a closed council meeting, in
most cases, there may have been seating for the public, at the other end of
the room. We attended the meeting, in that public area. But sometimes we
went to the meetings and sat at the councillors’ table to make our point.
We’d do that if for example they had not addressed issues we felt they
needed to answer. That, and going to councillors’ houses (above, once or
twice) was the most confrontational tactic we used.

110. We also were active in public inquiries and planning applications
around the development of Battersea power station and the area around it,
particularly along the river front.

10.4. Vetting

111. I am asked if BRAG vetted its ‘members’.

112. We did not ‘vet’ and there were no ‘members’ in any formal sense.

113. There were times when we had suspicions about people – but that was
more about people who attended the public meetings, than those active at
BRAG’s core. The core group of activists within BRAG consisted of a
relatively small number of people, most of whom had known each other over a
long period of time and so trusted one another.

114. We felt that we did not need to vet anyone. But suspicions concerning
one person did lead us to a confrontation at one of our committee meetings
and that person was excluded. I recall it was quite an unsettling incident.
Our concern may have been whether that person was an undercover police officer. I would like to know from this Inquiry whether that person was an undercover police officer, or similar.

115. More broadly, I would like answers from this Inquiry on the following issues. I would like to know if any other undercover police officer, beyond those already disclosed to me, was involved in any of the campaigns I have been involved in. I would like to know what information UCOs obtained from those campaigns and what was done with that information. I would also like to know whether and if so how, any UCO sought to disrupt the campaigns. Did any UCO seek to have a genuine campaigner ejected from the campaign, for example? I am concerned about UCOs interfering in the organizing of political groups, such as the ones I was involved in. It is worth bearing in mind that these were often small groups, run by their members, all of whom were volunteers, and I would be very concerned to learn if UCOs were participating in the political decision-making of those groups. I hope that the Inquiry will address these issues.

10.5 Other security precautions

116. I am asked what other security precautions we may have taken to keep our plans, tactics or other matters confidential.
117. Where there was some NVDA, of the nature I describe, above, we kept discussions and decision makings to a smaller group. People were informed on a need to know basis – for example if they were to be involved in a demonstration. Having set up a demonstration, we would then seek to involve the public and so would publicise the event, to get more people there.

10.6 Infiltration

118. I am asked if were concerned about infiltration by the police or others.

119. We were concerned about infiltration. Certainly we were concerned about infiltration in the wider group, of those who attended BRAG events. We were concerned that someone might be monitoring what we were doing.

120. I had fewer concerns about the inner group, as we had all known each other over many years. It would have been difficult to infiltrate our group or so I would have said, if asked, at the time.

11. Meeting on 24.4.75

121. I am asked to comment on a report dated 30.4.75 [Doc 26: UCPI0000007107-CLF] about a meeting on 24.4.75 when an attack, which had taken place on a community centre, was discussed. I note that I am not said to have been at this meeting. It was a meeting of the Battersea and Wandsworth Trades Council Anti-Fascist Committee at the People Aid and Action Centre.
11.1 Attendance

122. I am asked if low attendance at this meeting is typical of the group meeting. I was not at this meeting or active in this Committee and it was not directly connected with BRAG. So I cannot answer this question.

11.2 Violence

123. I am asked how frequently I experienced violence during my time at BRAG ('or any other group').

124. The centre, the subject of the attack and discussed at the meeting reported on, was one where BRAG held meetings, so I was affected in that sense. Indeed I may have helped put the centre together, physically, using my woodwork skills when it was established.

125. There was an occasion when someone tried to trash the front door of another person involved in BRAG, Brian Barnes, presumably as a result of his activism.

126. I recall some people trying to trash a BRAG or People Aid and Action Centre public stall. I have a distant memory of this, perhaps because I built the wooden displays and it was attacked.
127. As to other campaign groups I have been involved in, there was police
violence against the Committee of 100. When there were demonstrations at
the American embassy or a nuclear base, we were knocked about by the
police when we were arrested or even moved from the base. Sometimes their
physicality was quite severe. They dragged people by the hair, 'accidentally'
stamping on people when trying to move them. I was occasionally stamped
on. I witnessed others being stamped on or pulled by their hair. All of our
actions were passive forms of civil disobedience, such as laying on the road.

128. As to STST and the DAG, I also experienced or witnessed violence.
When I was involved in a demonstration in the centre of Lords cricket ground,
I remember the stewards (or even members of the public) roughed us up
unnecessarily when dragging us off the pitch. They also surreptitiously
punched us. I remember being dragged past the seated spectators and the
crowd kicking me on the way, causing me bruising. I witnessed similar things
happening to other campaigners.

129. During the anti-nuclear campaign, in the late 1960s onwards, we
occupied Grosvenor Square, Trafalgar Square, Whitehall and other sites in
central London on various occasions. These were mass demonstrations,
peaceful sit-downs with some campaigners linking arms and others using
padlocks and chains to attach themselves to each other. It was clear to me
that the police, frustrated by the task of having to remove us, lost control and
used unnecessary force towards us. They punched, often surreptitiously;
dragged people violently out of the way; stamped on people who were in the
way of another person they sought to remove. This happened to me – on several occasions I was pretty violently removed from peaceful protests, including being stamped on.

130. Similar things happened at weapons bases. I recall being stamped on, dragged across fields, generally knocked about by the police who were removing me. It was unnecessary violence because I was passive and peaceful.

131. I do not recall the police ever taking action against those responsible for violence against me or against other campaigners. I don’t recall them taking action against stewards, members of the public or fellow police officers.

132. I would like to know if undercover officers ever experienced such violence while posing as activists; whether they witnessed violence against other genuine activists; whether there was any incentive to record or report this and whether they ever did so; and whether they could have given (or indeed ever did give) evidence against those responsible for violence against activists. I am sure that undercover officers could have done all of these things. Looking back, on the basis of what we know now, it seems logical to conclude that there was a policy of allowing aggressive and violent behavior towards activists to go unchecked. Undercover officers would have known what we were experiencing and probably reported it to their handlers, yet it was still being allowed to happen.
11.3. ‘Jim Pickford’

133. I am asked if I recall ‘Jim Pickford’ / HN300, the relevant undercover officer at this meeting on 24.4.75.

134. I have no recollection of him. His name does not ring a bell. A contemporaneous photo of him may or may not help me. So too might some other information about his description or the ways in which I may have come across him. I have not been supplied with this information by the Inquiry.

11.4 Reaction.

135. I am asked about my reaction to learning that ‘Jim Pickford’ was an undercover police officer.

136. As I did not really know him (or, rather, cannot on the information currently available to me recollect who he might have been or how we may have interacted) I cannot say I have any reaction.

137. I was not at the meeting which prompted this question. I would like to know if there were any meetings or events at which he and I were present and, if so, I would like to be provided with details of these events so I can respond to this question about him, and indeed about any other undercover officer (see above, Pavement above 6).

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6 Esp para 87 – 91 above.
138. I was not surprised that I was monitored in respect of any of the campaigns I was involved in. That is not to say that I think undercover activity was justifiable towards me. I would be surprised if there was someone integral to BRAG who was an undercover officer. I feel and felt I knew all the core people really well. None of them was called ‘Jim Pickford’ so far as I recall.

12 ‘Jim Pickford’ and a report on the Wandsworth branch of the Anarchist Workers’ Association (‘AWA’) [Doc 33: UCPI0000009516-CLF].

139. I am asked about this group, in the light of this report of a meeting of that association on 8.1.76.

140. I cannot comment on that association’s aims and objectives as I was never involved in it. I see I was only ‘mentioned’ in the report. It was not suggested that I was present at the meeting.

12.1 ‘Jim Pickford’ in AWA

141. I therefore cannot respond to the request that I shed light on the prominence of ‘Jim Pickford’ in this group. I have no idea about that.

142. The only comment I can make is that it appears that in November 1976 he used his role in Pavement, and in the circulation of its publication, as a
bridge to being involved in and perhaps gaining credibility within the AWA. I do not know if this, my own understanding of what may have happened, accords with what the Inquiry knows from its own records and investigations.

12.2

143. Similarly, I cannot respond to the request that I comment on the use to which ‘Jim Pickford’ might have put any position of prominence he acquired in this AWA. I cannot comment on that.

13. Personal information on me obtained by UCOs

144. I am asked about two Special Branch reports [Doc 35: UCPI0000012246CLF and Doc 39: UCPI0000010719-CLF] dated 1976 and containing very personal information about the birth of one of my children and a health condition of mine.

145. The first thing to say is that the information, in the first report, about the birth of my son is accurate. I did have a health problem of the sort described in the second report at the time reported. However, I cannot be confident that it was as serious as is reported and the name of the hospital treating me may be wrong too.

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7 See above, para 89, also Doc 54 – minutes report this of ‘Jim P’: ‘Going to AWA meeting and will advocate they take more copies and increase sales’ of Pavement.
146. I am asked if this information was 'widely known'. The information about the birth of my son was of course known to close friends and family. But it was not reported formally, publicly anywhere or of wider interest. Similarly, my health condition would have been known among my friends and family and there would have been some concern but it was not more widely known than this or of wider interest.

13.1 My reaction

147. I am asked my reaction on learning that information of this nature was reported on by undercover officers.

148. This has surprised me. I find it sinister and invasive and it troubles me greatly to learn of it, even after all this time.

149. It is not a surprise to me that the police were monitoring some of the activities I was involved in. But it is a surprise to me that they were taking a note of the birth of my son and health. Those things were unconnected with political activity and were of a particularly personal nature.

150. Although I am not asked this, I am particularly surprised that these records have been kept for over 40 years. This is also quite sinister. It is not as if I was an international criminal. It is reminiscent of the behavior of authoritarian states. It has no legitimate justification.
151. It reinforces me in my view that I would like to have from the police, through the Inquiry, all information all UCOs and SB have recorded and stored about me, at any point. I would also like to know which officers were monitoring me at any time in my life and what they did in order to gain this information and what use they put this information to.

14. Surprise

152. I am asked if I am surprised that undercover police officers reported on the activities of the groups, above, presumably BRAG and the Anarchists Workers Association. I have already set out my views on both groups, above.

15. Events at a hotel in Richmond on 12.5.72 and subsequent prosecution.

153. I am asked to set out a factual account of my involvement at this demonstration (including planning in advance), my arrest and prosecution in the light of a number of reports [Doc 6: MPS-0526782, Doc 7: MPS-0737087, Doc 8: MPS-0737109 and Doc 9: MPS-0737108]. It was a demonstration at a Richmond hotel on the occasion of the British Lions’ rugby team’s departure to the airport for their tour of apartheid South Africa. At the time of the incident I understand that the hotel was called the ‘Star & Garter’. But as there was and is another building nearby also called the Star & Garter and as the hotel where the demonstration took place is now called ‘the Petersham
hotel', I shall refer, in this statement, to the location of the demonstration as the Petersham hotel.

The demonstration

154. I do not recall this incident or what followed very well but I have had my memory refreshed by reading the documents provided by the Inquiry.

155. The following broad points, which come out of the reports and documents, do seem broadly accurate.

156. I was a main organizer of the demonstration. We – those who were going to be involved in it - met on the day of the demonstration at my home before the demonstration to plan and prepare for the action.

157. I see that 'Michael Scott', an UCO, attended the planning meeting for the demonstration, having, supposedly, been told of it by Peter Hain's mother on the phone. This sounds unusual and out of the ordinary. She, 'Ad' is unlikely to have told someone she did not know about something so delicate on the phone. I knew her and what she was like. She would have been very careful about giving out this sort of information particularly given her experience of South Africa and surveillance. It is therefore possible 'Michael Scott' may have got involved in the planning for the demonstration in another way, other than the one described in the report.
158. In attending the meeting before the demonstration, the UCO may have added his voice to the decision to take direct action, before the action took place.

159. Our plan was to blockade the UK rugby team’s coach at the Petersham hotel in the hope that the players would miss their flight to apartheid South Africa for their forthcoming tour there. These plans included ordering skips to the hotel and cars being parked in the way of the coach and protesters getting in the way of the vehicle – all in order to block or delay the coach’s departure from the hotel to the airport.

160. I cannot now remember precisely what I did, where or the order of events. I do remember being arrested outside the hotel. Before that I may have parked my car (a maroon Renault 4, with a roof rack \(^8\)) in the car park at the entrance to Nightingale Lane to cause a blockage there. I may then have sat down to block the coach, possibly in the car park as the coach left the car park.

161. I cannot remember what others did. Some may only have taken action in the car park.

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\(^8\) Possibly the same vehicle referred to in a SB report from 1976 [Doc 37: UCPI0000009726].

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Photos

162. I have found and now produce 6 photographs which appear to date from the incident [Doc 56: ] I can be seen in three of these photos.

163. In one of the photos I have a notepad and pen. I had these on me as, from experience, we had learned that it was important to keep a note of events as they happened, including which police officers were involved in which incidents. They had a track record of making things up. I do not recall if I took notes that day. I certainly do not have them now.

164. In another photo I can be seen with a camera. Again, this was a precaution I took so that I could have a record of anything untoward that might have happened during the demonstration, such as police misconduct and in order to challenge anything that turned out to be untrue in police statements. I do not now recall if I took photos that day. I certainly do not have them now.

165. There is a third photo of me on the left of the photo, apparently in police custody, with, on the right, a person which I understand is Jonathan Rosenhead, apparently being put into a police van.

166. The 6 photos are the ones referred to in the intelligence reports as having been discussed between the defendants, after the incident and before the conclusion of the criminal case [para 2 and 3, p1, Doc 8: MPS-0737109].
Letter from Privacy ('PT')

167. I have now found a letter in my paperwork from Privacy ('PT') to me dated 14th June 1972. Attached to it is what PT describes as 'my rather uninformative account of the events' at the hotel. He signs the letter off by wishing me 'Best of luck with the trial'. I produce this letter and 'account' [Doc 57 UCPI0000033628].

168. He describes the incident, his role in it and he also describes what 'Mike Scott' did. I assume this is 'Michael Scott' another defendant and the UCO. PT also names me.

169. I do not now recall PT. I see reference to him in the intelligence reports (eg paras 5 and 8, p1 and p2 of Doc 8: MPS-0737109).

170. In his account he refers to someone called Privacy. I think that this may be Privacy, another activist I was aware of from that time. Having said that, I see that Privacy was one of the defendants in my case.

171. As to his account, a lot of this tallies with my own independent recollection of events. I recall that the mouth of the car park was blocked by cars – by Jonathan Rosenhead's (a mini) and mine (a Renault). I seem to recall the team being on the coach – I recall a coach being stopped with people in it. I was responsible for ordering a skip, delivered on a special truck with a winch, to the hotel to add to the congestion and blockage at the
car park. It was likely that demonstrators were sitting in front of the coach, at several points during the demonstration. I do remember sitting on the verge of the road in police custody when the demonstration was over.

172. I don't recall the use of a smoke flare. I don't recall 'Mike Scott' and or... stopping the police from removing the mini. This is not to say that these things did not happen. Indeed, 'Mike Scott's' efforts to stop the police from moving the mini may have been the basis upon which he, and possibly others, were accused of obstructing the police. I note he was, it appears, found guilty of obstructing the police.

After the demonstration

173. I was arrested and prosecuted, certainly for obstruction of the highway. My case did not conclude at court for several weeks.

174. It is almost certain – confirmed by the intelligence reports - that there was discussion, between the activists who were defendants, about our case, preparation for a possible trial, including possible defences to the criminal charges.

175. It would not have been common for defendants, to have shared with other activists, who were not defendants, information about, say, their discussions between themselves, about their case. Nor would it be common

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9 Para 6, p4, Doc 6: MPS-0527782
to share with those others, the views of their lawyer or discussions held with
the lawyers by the defendants. There would only be some sharing of
information with non-defendants if there was a particular reason for doing so –
eg to try to find witnesses or get wider support for the case.

176. One possible defence to the charges we faced was that relevant
events took place in the car park, and this was not part of the highway, the
relevant road being Nightingale Lane.

177. I note from the intelligence reports that we were concerned, as was our
then lawyer (Ben Birnberg),

Intelligence reports supporting the defence

178. It seems from the intelligence reports I have been referred to, that
‘Michael Scott’, or those who recorded information he provided, could have
given relevant evidence, some helpful to our defence, in the criminal
proceedings.

179. I note in particular these references in the intelligence reports, which
appear to show that ‘Michael Scott’ and those receiving the reports knew that
most of those arrested were not guilty.
180. ‘Michael Scott’ could have given evidence about the location of the demonstration – whether it took place in the car park, or in the road or highway, beyond the car park. The police UCO records contain a report dated 16.05.72 at pages 9-11 of Doc 6: MPS-[0526782] written by HN298

The report writer does not suggest that this is in any way a false defence (at least for the majority of the defendants). The defence is consistent with the account of events at the hotel provided by HN298 earlier in his report.

181. The police UCO records [para 5, p1, Doc 9: MPS-0737108] also refer to a concern by our lawyer at the time, Ben Birnberg, shared by defendants, 

There is nothing in the report, written by HN298, which contradicts this assumption.

182. There is no attempt by SB to inform anyone involved in our prosecution that any of us may have been innocent, though I note that the Metropolitan police report at Doc 7: MPS-0737087 was sent to the ‘Solicitors Dept., and Special Branch’ (para vii, p2).

183. Evidence from ‘Michael Scott’, supportive of the defendants’ account (and contradicting uniformed police officers’ evidence) would, coming from a serving police officer, have been more credible than had it come just from protesters.
The conclusion of the criminal proceedings

184. I cannot now recall whether I pleaded guilty or not guilty, in this particular case.

185. I normally pleaded 'not guilty' in protest-related prosecutions. I did this sometimes only to try to put forward the political reasons for taking action. In this case for example I may have sought to say that by stopping the UK touring party from arriving in apartheid South Africa, I was contributing to South Africa's isolation in international sport and so contributing towards the regime's eventual downfall.

186. If I had pleaded not guilty, it is likely I would have given evidence at my trial.

187. I cannot now remember what defence(s) I put forward, or was thinking of putting forward, if I had pleaded 'not guilty' or was thinking of pleading 'not guilty'.

188. My position may have been different to the other defendants' position. I recognize that in the intelligence reports there is a suggestion that the evidence in my case was different to theirs and this may have led me to take a different approach to the case, as compared with their approach to it.

189. But the approach I took to my defence would have been different had I known that 'Michael Scott' was an undercover officer. It would have been
different had I been aware of the contents of the intelligence reports, now
provided to me by the Inquiry. The ‘account’ of `PT` would have
been much more significant had I known that the ‘Mike Scott’ he referred to
was an undercover police officer.

190. I understand that the offence of Obstruction of the Highway contrary to
section 121 of the Highways Act 1959 required the prosecution to prove that
there was an obstruction of the highway and that it was not reasonable. The
actions and evidence of the UCO Michael Scott would have been relevant to
both of these issues and whether I had defences based on them.

15.1 ‘Michael Scott’

191. I am asked if I recall ‘Michael Scott’, the undercover police officer
apparently involved in the protest and court proceedings.

192. I do not recall a ‘Michael Scott’ being involved in the protest and court
case. I do not remember him at all, on the information provided to me by the
Inquiry. I would be assisted if I were to be shown contemporaneous photos of
him, and some other description of him and his appearance and other
interactions I may have had with him.

193. I note however that his name and details appear in my box file of
contacts from that time (see above 10). I note that the first address for him on
those box files is the one he gave to the court, 16 Wetherby Gardens, SW5.

10 Doc 5, UCPI0000033631 and para 90, above.
15.2 Surprise?

194. I am asked if I am surprised to learn that one of the 14 people arrested that day was an undercover police officer.

195. I am surprised that the police used its resources to place an undercover officer in a peaceful demonstration, part of a wider campaign to contribute to the isolation and collapse of the apartheid South African regime.

15.3 Reaction

196. I am asked about my reaction to learning that 'Michael Scott' was an undercover police officer.

197. I was very concerned to learn, many decades later, that an undercover police officer was involved in the demonstration, was arrested with me and stood in court with me and others. I am concerned that he did this in his false identity – that he may have given the court a false name and that he may have given evidence in that false name. Furthermore, that undercover officer was convicted and sentenced under that false name. I would like to know whether that individual accepted that he was a criminal when living later under his true identity – eg whether he declared this conviction when asked about his previous criminal convictions.

198. I am concerned that it appears that neither I, my co-accused, our lawyers, the prosecution or the court were not made aware of 'Michael Scott's' true identity.
199. He may have been able to give significant evidence relevant to a planned legal defence to the court (the car park / highway point) and that evidence would have been more credible had it been known that he was a serving police officer.

200. I am concerned that this officer appears to have been involved in discussions within the group of activists / defendants about how to deal with the prosecution. 'Michael Scott' may also have been privy, either indirectly (from what people told him) or directly (by attending meetings) to private legal discussions between activists / defendants and their lawyer. He may even have influenced or had the opportunity to influence those discussions. These discussions may have been about fundamental questions - the evidence (the prosecution's and ours), what defence(s) we might have, whether to plead guilty or not guilty.

201. He may have reported - directly or indirectly - to the prosecution what was discussed, supposedly confidentially, between the activists and / or their lawyer.

202. I note that there is a reference (p8 of Doc 6: MPS-0626782) to the police being conscious of the 'potential of embarrassment to police' if 'Michael Scott' were to have been involved in the protest and in the criminal prosecution, in his cover name and then for it, later to come out that he was an UCO. This seems to highlight a failure to have procedures and criteria for
the oversight of UCOs in this situation. There is no mention in the note of more important concerns - that the other defendants in the criminal proceedings should have a fair trial, that innocent demonstrators should not be convicted of offences they have not committed etc. The only concerns expressed seem to be for institutional damage to the police. The failure to view activists as individuals with their own legitimate rights and interests and the decision to place those second to the unfettered gathering of information on them may be a precursor to some of the more gross abuses of activists that, I note, happened in later periods of undercover policing of campaigners.

Impact

203. ‘Phil Cooper’ / HN155. I have been asked about this undercover officer, in the light of reports dated 30.5.80 [Doc 42: UCPI0000013986] and 25.9.80 [Doc 43: UCPI0000014564] he is said to have authored in respect of events in 1980, at which, we are both, with 10s of others, said to have been present.

204. I do not recall him. Again, a contemporaneous photograph of him, or other description of him or his interaction with me, might or might not help.
205. I have been asked about this undercover officer, in the light of a report dated 3.11.97 [Doc 52: MPS-0742877] he is said to have authored about events, in 1997, at which, we are both, with 10s of others, said to have attended.

206. I have no recollection of him. The name has a slight reverberation in my memory. I have been shown by my solicitors a picture of him from a 2011 Guardian report about him. I don’t recognize him. I might be assisted were I to see more information about the circumstances in which I may have come across him.

207. I have been asked about this undercover officer, who 'authored some of these reports' which the Inquiry has provided to me.

208. The name has a faint resonance, but otherwise I have no recollection of him. I have been shown, in 2020, by my solicitors pictures, from the internet of him - apparently from his activist days and more recently. I do not recognize him. I might be assisted were I to see more information about the circumstances in which I may have come across him.
209. I am asked if there is anything else of assistance to the work of the Inquiry I want to add.

210. We were aware that there must have been some plant, an authority-placed figure, within STST. I was pretty sure at the time that I, personally, was of interest to the authorities.

211. This is because, before the incidents and campaigns I am now asked about, I had been involved in more direct action as part of other campaigns. I was one of the Committee of 100 – which campaigned against nuclear weapons and took action at military bases and elsewhere. This was in the 1960s.

212. Indeed, before that, I was very involved in CND too. I took part in and was very involved in publicizing the first Aldermaston marches – popular marches, from 1958 onwards, against nuclear weapons, particularly those stored at AWE Aldermaston military base.

213. It seems to me that my political activities before 1968, and the intelligence held on me by the police during this period, are relevant to this Inquiry. For example, I refer to these comments in p1 of the report.

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11 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_of_100_%28United_Kingdom%29
12 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/18/newsid_2909000/2909881.stm
surrounding my involvement, with other protesters, in the hotel protest in May 1972 [Doc 6: MPS-00526782]. The group of protesters is referred to as a ‘group of anarchist-orientated extremists under the control of Ernest RODKER’. It then describes me as follows: ‘This man has been a thorn in the flesh for several years now, having had no fewer than 14 court appearances prior to 1963 for offences involving public disorder. He was considered to be a menace at the time of the protest demonstrations taking place in this country concerning the Springboks rugby tour in 1969 and the Stop the 70s Tour in 1970’. I do not accept this characterization of me, the other protesters or our actions. For example, from memory, my arrests were for acts of NVDA and civil disobedience and were against nuclear weapons and the apartheid South African regime. The intemperate language in this report suggests a lack of judgement on the part of the police and a lack of respect for the right of peaceful protest. But the point I make here is that SB and the undercover police they worked with, had access to much more material and intelligence, (albeit incorrect and dating back before 1968) than has been disclosed to me, and this appears to have informed their decisions on how I and the campaigns I was involved in should be monitored and policed, from 1968. I wish to see all this material and intelligence. I refer to my comments, below, about further relevant documents.

214. I challenge the legitimacy of the police spying on me at all, and to such an extent and then retaining these records for such a long period of time.
215. I would be very interested to learn what else the UK authorities may have recorded about me and my activities.

20. Documents.

216. I am asked if I have any documents potentially relevant to the work of the Inquiry.

217. I would like to see all the Special Branch files on me and all the intelligence gathered on me by undercover officers. I am aware that UCO intelligence was often included in SB files without its source being made clear.

218. I am aware, from what I have seen in the public domain that SB collated more information on me and the campaigns I was active in, beyond what has been disclosed to me by the Inquiry.

219. I would wish to learn what was compiled on me and may not, now, be available and why it is not available, if that exercise is possible.

220. I would like more information on all the UCOs who spied on me – the details of all of them, their cover names, contemporaneous photographs and other ways to prompt me to identify them and what they may have done.
221. I am aware that activists are particularly concerned, also, about not seeing the full statements of all officers who spied on them at an early stage, or at all, in the Inquiry. I share this concern.

222. I would like this information not only to understand the extent of State surveillance on me, but also, more practically, in order for me to be in a position to provide further, fuller comments of assistance to the Inquiry.

223. For example, I have been made aware of the following police records, not provided to me by the Inquiry, but obtained by my solicitors from materials in the public domain.

224. First, there is a Metropolitan Police SB report dated 7.4.70. It is supposedly the 'first of a series of fortnightly reports and comment regarding the proposed actions of persons and organizations opposed to the cricket tour which is due to take place from 2 June to 28 August 1970'.

225. Its reference to me appears at para 12 as follows:

'Some of the leading personalities in the STST and allied organization are ....

ERNEST RODKER, STST ex Committee of 100...'

226. This – the reference to 'Committee of 100' - suggests that Special Branch, in 1970, were aware of and had a record of my time in the Committee
of 100. This tallies with what I knew when I was active in the Committee.

When I and others were taken to Bow Street magistrates' court, found guilty and sentenced, I recall that the prosecution produced evidence that the police had observers / infiltrators at the Committee of 100 meetings recording what was said. They were therefore able to prove that we were at those meetings and the part played by the defendants in those discussions. That was part of the prosecution evidence at trial. From memory, I think part of the allegations they made was that I, with others, was 'part of the group organizing mass civil disobedience in Central London' one reference being to this taking place at the 'Trafalgar Square end of Whitehall'. The demonstration there, at the north end of Whitehall, was where the prosecution said we committed an offence.

227. There is also reference to me in this report at para 26 as chairing a meeting of the STST on 5.4.70. That same meeting is referred to in the one page SB report which the Inquiry has provided to me [Doc 3: UCPI0000014398].

228. Second there is a 10.4.70 Metropolitan Police Special Branch report which includes, at para 4, this reference to me, in the context of the second conference of the STST on 5.4.70 and a discussion about the use of mirrors to shine into players' faces during matches:

'Ernest Rodker, the chairman of that meeting, was overheard to remark to those present that the mirrors had sharp edges and in order to obviate the
posibility of these found in possession of them at cricket matches being charged with possession offensive weapons the edges should be bound with adhesive tape'.

229. This is the sort of responsible thing I would have done to reduce the risk that, by using mirrors at STST demonstrations, we might, inadvertently cause damage and run the risk of arrest for a more serious offence. I do not understand why this report, which names me and casts me in a good light, has not been disclosed to me by the Inquiry.

230. This is a further reference to me and the STST conference on 5.4.70 in SB materials. So it seems to me that only one of the SB reports about me and that meeting has been disclosed to me by the Inquiry and that two have not been disclosed.

231. This makes me question whether the police have provided all information to the Inquiry and I or whether the Inquiry has disclosed to me all relevant materials. I feel I should be entitled to see all SB and UCO material and intelligence on me. I would like this for its own sake; so I can contribute fully to the Inquiry; to have some reassurance that the Inquiry is canvassing fully the views of activists such as me who have been victims of undercover policing; and to have some level of reassurance that the Inquiry's examination of the evidence and its conclusions can attract the confidence of the victims of undercover policing.
232. There may be some more materials, like this, which I or others have but which I have not yet been able to find. I have been limited in what I have been able to do to identify evidence because I have been given relatively little time by the Inquiry to locate this evidence, have not been able fully to discuss sources of evidence with others as a result of the Inquiry's 'restriction order' imposed on me and also because of my own health and age.

Diversity information, questions

21

232. My racial origin is white, Jewish.

22.

233. I am male.

234. I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Ernest Roseker 24/2/2020